OFFICIAL  DIPLOMATIC  DOCUMENTS 

RELATING   TO   THE   OUTBREAK   OF 

THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 


■Th^^^ 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NBW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •    CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


OFFICIAL  DIPLOMATIC  DOCUMENTS 

RELATING  TO  THE  OUTBREAK  OF 

THE  EUROPEAN  WAR- 


WITH    PHOTOGRAPHIC    REPRODUCTIONS    OF   OFFICIAL 
EDITIONS    OF    THE    DOCUMENTS    (BLUE,    WHITE, 
YELLOW,     ETC.,     BOOKS)      PUBLISHED      BY 
THE    GOVERNMENTS    OF    AUSTRIA- 
HUNGARY,    BELGIUM,    FRANCE, 
GERMANY,   GREAT   BRITAIN, 
RUSSIA  AND   SERBIA 


INTRODUCTION,  DAILY  SUMMARIES,   CROSS-REFERENCES, 
AND  FOOTNOTES 


EDMUND  VON  MACH,  A.B.,  A.M.,  Ph.D.  (harvard) 


THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 
1916 

All  rights  reserved 


>^- 


Copyright,  1916, 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  electro  typed.     Published  September,  1916. 


J.  S.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  «fe  Smith  Ca 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


INTRODUCTION 

In  constitutionally  governed  countries  it  is  customary  for  the 
Executive  at  important  times  to  lay  before  the  Representatives  of 
the  people  "collected  documents"  containing  the  information  on 
which  the  Government  has  shaped  its  foreign  policy. 

In  Great  Britain  these  documents  are  often  printed  on  large  sheets 
of  white  paper,  loosely  bound,  called  "White  Papers/'  If  the  docu- 
ments are  very  important,  they  are  later  reprinted  in  pamphlet  form, 
and  are  then  called  by  the  color  of  their  cover,  "  Blue  Books." 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War  in  1914  several  Governments 
besides  that  of  Great  Britain  issued  pamphlets  of  collected  -docu- 
ments, and  these  have  become  known,  by  the  color  of  their  respective 
bindings,  as  the  German  "White  Book,"  the  French  "Yellow  Book," 
the  Russian  "Orange  Book,"  and  so  on. 

Following  the  previous  customs  of  their  respective  countries  the 
several  Governments  issued  more  or  less  exhaustive  collections,  and 
in  each  case  were  primarily  guided  by  the  desire  to  justify  themselves 
before  their  own  people. 

In  America  the  British  Blue  Book  won  the  greatest  favor,  not 
only  because  it  became  known  first  but  also  because  of  its  inherent 
worth.  Its  despatches  are  well  written,  and  sufficiently  numerous 
to  tell  a  consecutive  story.  The  book  is  well  printed,  provided  with 
indexes  and  cross  references,  and  represents  the  most  scholarly  work 
done  by  any  of  the  European  Governments. 

The  German  White  Book,  on  the  other  hand,  contains  few  de- 
spatches, and  these  only  as  illustrations  of  points  made  in  an  exhaust- 
ive argument.  Such  a  presentation  can  be  convincing  only  if  one  has 
confidence  in  the  honesty  of  the  author.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
as  a  source  book  for  study  the  British  Parliamentary  Papers  are 
superior  to  the  German  Papers,  but  even  the  British  Papers  are  not, 
as  many  people  have  wished  to  believe,  complete  and  do  not,  there- 
fore, offer  the  final  authority  on  which  scholars  can  rely.  This  has 
been  conceded  and  actually  emphasized  by  so  staunch  a  friend  of 
the  Allies  as  the  late  Charles  Francis  Adams.  Writing  in  the  Pro- 
ceedings of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  January,  1915, 
Mr.  Adams  said :  — 

"We  hear  a  great  deal  from  those  interested  in  original  research  of  public 
archives  and  access  thereto,  and  of  dates  arbitrarily  fixed  by  the  various  Foreign 
Offices  at  which  those  archives  have  been,  or  are  to  be,  laid  open  to  the  investi- 
gator.    It  is,  however,  a  bit  confounding  in  this  connection  to  learn,  as  we  now 


343133 


VI 


Introduction 


are  learning,  that,  so  far  at  least  as  the  Foreign  Office  of  Great  Britain  is  concerned, 
the  papers  there  to  be  found  are  at  times  of  somewhat  secondary  importance. 
A  knowledge  of  the  true  inwardness  of  any  given  situation  of  a  certain  sort  must 
be  looked  for  elsew^here.  More  even  than  that,  the  papers  on  file  in  the  Foreign 
Office  are  not  unseldom  even  illusory.  The  statement  is  unquestionably  star- 
tling ;  and  how,  it  will  be  asked,  did  such  a  condition  of  affairs  come  about  ?  The 
explanation  is  curious  —  English  I  For  at  least  two  centuries  now  —  indeed 
ever  since  the  British  Foreign  Office  took  its  present  form  —  a  usage  as  to  cor- 
respondence has  prevailed  in  connection  with  it  which  has  now  to  be  reckoned 
with,  a  usage  in  no  wise  generally  understood.  As  Parliament,  far  back  in  the 
eighteenth  century  —  during  in  fact  the  Walpole  epoch  —  gradually  assumed 
the  large  state  functions  it  has  since  developed,  it  became  more  and  more  a  prac- 
tice to  call  on  those  constituting  the  Ministry  for  papers  relating  to  events 
connected  with  foreign  affairs,  especially  correspondence.  The  modern  Blue 
Book  was  thus  gradually  evolved.  As  the  practice  grew,  its.  inconveniences 
made  themselves  felt.  Both  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  those  with 
whom  he  was  in  correspondence  wrote  under  an  ever  increasing  sense  of  restraint. 
As  the  British  diplomatic  service  was  constituted  this,  not  unnaturally,  resulted 
in  two  forms  of  correspondence  and  sets  of  records  —  first  the  usual  official 
exchanges,  including  instructions  and  despatches  subject  to  parliamentary  call 
through  the  Blue  Book.  Meanwhile,  on  the  other  hand,  a  private  interchange 
of  letters,  frequently  familiar  in  tone  as  between  old  friends,  or  perhaps  relatives, 
would  be  going  on  between  the  representatives  at  certain  of  the  foreign  courts 
and  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  ...  It  was,  moreover,  in  times  of  exigency 
that  recourse  was  naturally  had  to  this  form  of  communication.  .  .  .  The  formal 
despatches,  constituting  the  great  mass  of  the  Foreign  Office  correspondence  — 
95  per  cent  of  it,  perhaps  —  were  regularly  filed  in  the  official  archives ;  and  there 
they  now  are.  The  private  communications,  however,  coming  from  the  important 
embassies  and  relating  generally  to  more  or  less  critical  situations,  were  consid- 
ered as  belonging  to  the  First  Secretary  for  the  time  being.  .  .  .  Such  were  the 
British  usage  and  understanding.     Such  are  they  now." 

This  quotation  establishes  the  presumption  that  also  in  the  present 
British  Blue  Book  only  a  part  of  the  Correspondence  that  was  ex- 
changed between  the  British  Foreign  Office  and  the  British  Ambas- 
sadors and  Ministers  abroad  has  been  published.  For  none  of  the 
other  books  has  completeness  been  claimed. 

The  question,  therefore,  arises  whether  the  study  of  any  one  of 
these  books  or  of  all  of  them  together  can  enable  the  student  to  arrive 
at  the  truth.  The  editor  believes  that  this  question  should  be 
answered  in  the  affirmative. 

If  six  or  more  interested  spectators  describe  one  event,  no  two 
descriptions  may  agree.  By  a  judicious  comparison  of  all,  however, 
an  impartial  observer  may  come  very  near  to  understanding  the 
truth.  By  noting,  moreover,  not  only  what  each  man  says  but 
also  what  he  refrains  from  saying,  it  is  easy  to  understand  the  atti- 
tude of  each  toward  the  event  described,  and  thus  to  check  his 
credibility. 

A  successful  study  from  this  point  of  view  necessitates  an  intimate 
familiarity  with  the  documents  published  by  all  the  European  Gov- 
ernments, and  to  attain  it  the  documents  must  be  studied  in  their 
relation  to  one  another.  This  is,  however,  very  difficult  unless  the 
system  of  cross  references  contained  in  the  British  Blue  Book  is 
extended  to  cover  all  the  books.      The  Macmillan  edition  is  the 


Introduction  vii 

first  to  do  this,  and  to  enable  the  student  to  turn  at  once  from  one 
book  to  another  and  to  cheek  the  probable  accuracy  of  a  Russian 
presentation,  for  instance,  by  comparing  it  with  the  British  or  Ger- 
man version  of  the  same  incident. 

The  several  versions  are  often  so  different  that  it  becomes  neces- 
sary to  adduce  proof  for  the  statement  that  they  have  reference  to 
the  same  event.     Such  proofs  are  given  in  the  footnotes. 

A  great  amount  of  additional  information  which  the  editor  had 
gathered  in  the  course  of  his  studies  and  which  he  thought  might  be 
helpful  to  other  students  is  also  given  in  the  footnotes.  It  is,  of 
course,  not  intended  to  be  exhaustive. 

There  is  one  other  point  in  which  the  Macmillan  edition  differs 
from  the  official  British  publication  of  The  Collected  Diplomatic 
Documents.  The  latter  prints  one  book  after  another,  complete, 
beginning  with  the  British  Blue  Book.  This  edition,  on  the  other 
hand,  prints  the  despatches  according  to  dates,  and  within  the  dates 
according  to  the  alphabetical  order  of  the  countries  which  sent  or 
received  them.  This  enables  the  student  to  see  at  a  glance  the  state 
of  the  diplomatic  activities  in  the  various  European  capitals  on  any 
one  day.  There  are  several  reasons  why  this  is  desirable,  but  the 
bare  mention  of  one  suffices. 

The  Serbian  reply  to  Austria-Hungary  was  given  on  the  evening 
of  July  25th.  It  did  not  become  known  in  the  European  Chancel- 
leries until  the  afternoon  of  July  26th,  as  is  stated  both  in  the  French 
Yellow  Book  and  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book.  Whether  the  delay 
was  due  to  Serbian  negligence  or  to  Austro-Hungarian  interference 
is  not  known.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  practically  all  the 
messages  of  July  26th,  in  which  the  reply  is  discussed,  were  based 
on  hearsay  and  not  on  a  knowledge  of  the  wording  of  the  reply.  In 
the  British  arrangement  of  the  despatches  this  and  similar  facts 
disappear.  In  the  present  arrangement  they  become  immediately 
apparent. 

The  English  translations  of  the  foreign  books  in  the  official  British 
version  are  excellent,  and  have  been  followed  in  this  edition  through- 
out. Good  translations  cannot  always  be  literal  translations,  and 
while  the  editor  believes  that  occasional  errors  have  crept  into  the 
Official  English  version  there  is  no  need  of  a  general  revision. 
Serious  students,  moreover,  will  prefer  to  check  the  accuracy  of 
any  given  passage  of  importance  themselves  by  consulting  the 
original.  Nor  will  they  be  satisfied  with  reprints  in  which  the 
possibility  of  errors  cannot  be  avoided.  For  this  reason  photo- 
graphic reproductions  of  official  copies  of  the  books  have  been  added 
as  an  appendix  to  this  edition.^ 

This  appendix  has  relieved  the  editor  of  a  double  responsibility, 
first  of  vouching  for  the  accuracy  of  the  translation,  and  secondly  of 
discussing  every  inaccuracy  he  discovered  however  slight  it  might 
have  been.     He  has,  therefore,  drawn  attention  to  mistranslations 

1  The  Editor  was  unable  to  obtain  an  ojBficial  Serbian  Blue  Book,  and  has  substituted 
an  excellent  French  edition. 


viii  Introdiiction 

only  when  they  appeared  to  him  to  have  a  possible  bearing  on  dis- 
puted points.  One  instance  will  illustrate  his  meaning.  In  No.  39 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  Count  Berchtold  instructs  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London  to  explain  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey  in  detail  the  dossier  "which  has  been  sent  to  you  by  mail'' 
{^'  das  Ihnen  auf  dem  Postwege  vhermittelte  Dossier '').  This  is  ren- 
dered in  the  official  English  version  "which  is  being  sent  to  you  by 
mail."  Since  the  question  has  arisen  whether  Sir  Edward  Grey 
received  the  dossier  before  Great  Britain  declared  war  on  Germany, 
the  change  of  the  past  tense  in  this  despatch  to  the  present  tense  may 
be  important. 

There  are  many  more  points  in  which  this  edition  differs  from 
others.  To  students  they  will  be  self-explanatory,  because  they  are 
the  result,  in  every  case,  of  the  editor's  wish  to  prepare  a  serviceable 
source  book,  not  for  partisans  but  for  scholars  and  intelligent  readers. 
The  editor  has  been  content  with  doing  the  hard  and  slow  work  of 
collating  the  despatches  and  bringing  order  out  of  chaos.  He  has 
tried  to  dispel  the  confusion  due  to  redundance  and  at  times  perhaps 
to  wilful  misrepresentation.  He  has  cracked  the  nut,  as  it  were, 
that  the  kernel  of  truth  might  lie  revealed. 

What  this  truth  is,  or  what  it  seems  to  him  to  be,  he  may  discuss 
at  some  future  time.  All  he  wished  to  do  in  this  book  was  to  make 
the  initial  studies  for  others  less  arduous  and  thus  to  stimulate  them 
to  search  for  the  truth  themselves.  His  greatest  reward,  therefore, 
will  be,  if  scholars  agree  that  he  has  succeeded  in  keeping  prejudice 
out  of  the  book,  being  fair  to  all,  and  preparing  that  most  necessary 
of  all  helps  to  a  scholar,  a  reliable  source  book. 

In  many  doubtful  cases  the  Editor  has  fortunately  had  the  in- 
valuable advice  of  Professor  C.  A.  Beard  of  Columbia  University, 
whose  impartial  fairness  and  keen  scent  for  the  truth  are  well 
known  among  scholars  and  to  whom  he  wishes  to  express  his  sincere 
thanks. 

EDMUND  VON  MACH. 

Cambridge,  Mass. 
June,  1916. 


LIST  OF  PRINCIPAL  PERSONS  MENTIONED  IN  THE 
CORRESPONDENCE,  SHOWING  THEIR  OFFICIAL 
POSITIONS 


1.  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

Lord  High  Chancellor  . 
Secretary   of  State  for 

Affairs     

Permanent     Under-Secretary 

State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
French  Ambassador       .     . 


of 


Russian  Ambassador    .     .     .     , 

German  Ambassador     .     .     . 
Austro- Hungarian  Ambassador 
Belgian  Minister      .... 
Serbian  Minister      .     .     .     .     , 


Viscount  Haldane. 

Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Sir  A.  Nicolson. 

M.  Paul  Cambon. 

M.  de  Fleuriau  (Charge  d'Aff aires). 

Count  Benckendorff. 

M.  de  Etter  (Counsellor  of  Embassy). 

Prince  Lichnowsky. 

Count  Mensdorff. 

Count  de  Lalaing. 

M.  Boschkovitch. 


2.  FRANCE. 


President  of  the  Republic  .  . 
President  of  the  Council  .  . 
Ministers  for  Foreign  Affairs 


Political  Director 
British  Ambassador . 
Russian  Ambassador 


German  Ambassador     .     .     . 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 
Belgian  Minister      .... 
Serbian  Minister      .... 


M.  Poincare. 
M.  Rene  Viviani. 

1.  M.  Jonnart. 

2.  M.  Stephen  Pichon. 

3.  M.  Rene  Viviani. 

4.  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  (Acting). 

5.  M.  Doumergue. 

6.  M.  Delcasse. 
M.  Berthelot. 

Sir  Francis  Bertie. 

M.  Isvolsky. 

M.  Sevastopoulo  (Charge  d'Aff  aires). 

Baron  von  Schoen. 

Count  Szecsen. 

Baron  Guillaume. 

M.  Vesnitch. 


3.  RUSSIA. 


Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
Minister  for  War  .  .  . 
British  Ambassador  .  . 
French  Ambassador  .  . 
German  Ambassador  .  . 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 

Serbian  Minister      .... 


M.  Sazonof. 

M.  Suchomlinof. 

Sir  George  Buchanan. 

M.  Paleologue. 

Count  Pourtales. 

Count  Szapary. 

Count  Czernin  (Charge  d'Aff  aires). 

Dr.  M.  Spalaikovitch. 


List  of  Principal  Persons 


4.  GERMANY. 

Imperial  Chancellor      .  . 

Secretary  of  State      .     .  . 

Under-Secretary  of  State  . 

British  Ambassador      .  . 


French  Ambassador       .... 

Russian  Ambassador    .... 

American  Ambassador       .     .     . 
Austro  -  Hungarian  Ambassador 

Belgian  Minister 

Serbian  Charge  d' Affaires      .     . 
French  Minister  at  Munich    .     . 
French  Consul-General  at  Frank- 
fort       


Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg. 

Hen*  von  Jagow. 

Herr  von  Zimmermann. 

Sir  Edward  Goschen. 

Sir    Horace    Rumbold    (Counsellor    of 

Embassy). 
M.  Jules  Cambon. 

M.  de  Manneville  (Charge  d' Affaires). 
M.  Swerbeiev. 

M.  Broniewsky  (Charge  d' Affaires). 
Mr.  Gerard. 
Count  Szogyeny. 
Baron  Beyens. 
Dr.  M.  Yovanovitch. 
M.  AUize. 


M.  Ronssin. 


5.  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs     

Under-Secretaries  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs      .... 

President    of    the    Ministry    of 

Hungary       .     .     . 
British  Ambassador 
French  Ambassador 
Russian  Ambassador    . 

American  Ambassador 
German  Ambassador 
Italian  Ambassador 
Belgian  Minister      .     . 
Serbian  Minister      .     . 
French  Consul-General  at  Buda- 
pest     

Russian  Consul-General  at  Fiume 
Acting  Russian  Consul  at  Prague 


Count  Berchtold. 

Baron  Macchio. 
Count  Forgach. 

Count  Tisza. 

Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen. 

M.  Dumaine. 

M.  Schebeko. 

Prince  Koudacheff  (Charge  d' Affaires). 

Mr.  Penfield. 

Herr  von  Tschirscky. 

Duke  d'Avarna. 

Count  Errembault  de  Dudzeele. 

M.  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch. 


M.  d'Apchier-le-Maugin. 
M.  Salviati. 
M.  Kazansky. 


6.  TURKEY. 


British  Charge  d' Affaires  . 
French  Ambassador       .     . 
Serbian  Charge  d' Affaires 
Austrian  Consul-General   . 


Mr.  Beaumont. 
M.  Bompard. 
M.  M.  Georgevitch. 
Herr  Jehlitschka. 


7.  BELGIUM. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs .     .  M.  Davignon. 

Baron  van  der  Elst  (Secretary-General). 

Colonial  Minister H.  Renkin. 

British  Minister Sir  Francis  Villiers. 

French  Minister M.  Klobukowski. 

American  Minister Mr.  Brand  Whitlock. 

German  Minister Herr  von  Below  Saleske. 

Austro  -  Hungarian  Minister  .     .  Count  Clary. 

Dutch  Minister M.  de  Weede. 


List  of  Principal  Persons     .  xi 


8.  SERBIA. 

Prime  Minister M.  Pashitch. 

Acting  Prime  Minister  and  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs       .  Dr.  Laza  Patchou. 

British  Minister Mr.  des  Graz. 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe  (First  Secretary). 

French  Minister M.  Boppe. 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires     .     .  M.  Strandtman. 

German  Secretary  of  Legation      .  Herr  von  Storck. 

Austro -Hungarian  Minister .     .  Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen. 

Belgian  Minister M.  de  -Welle. 

Austro  -  Hungarian         Consular 

Agent  at  Nish Herr  Hoflehner. 


9.  ITALY. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
British  Ambassador      .     . 
French  Ambassador       .     . 
German  Ambassador     .     . 
Serbian  Minister      .     .     . 


Marquis  di  San  Giuliano. 

Sir  Rennell  Rodd. 

M.  Barrere. 

Herr  von  Flotow. 

M.  Ljub  Michailovitch. 


10.  SPAIN. 

Belgian  Minister Baron  Grenier. 

11.  DENMARK. 

French  Minister M.  Bapst. 


12.  HOLLAND. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  .     .  M.  Loudon. 

French  Minister M.  Pellet. 

Belgian  Minister Baron  Fallon. 


13.  LUXEMBURG. 

Minister  of  State  and  President 

of  the  Government  ....  Dr.  Eyschen. 

French  Minister  ......  M.  Mollard. 

German  Minister Herr  von  Buch. 


14.  NORWAY. 

French  Minister M.  Chevalley. 

15.  SWEDEN. 

French  Minister M.  Thiebaut. 

16.  SWITZERLAND. 

French  Consul-General  at  Basle    M.  Farges. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Introduction v 

List    of    principal    persons   mentioned   in   the   correspondence, 

SHOWING    their    OFFICIAL   POSITIONS ix 

Calendar  of  despatches  sent  and  received xv 

Part  One.  Despatches  sent  and  received  at  the  various 
Foreign  Offices  ;  arranged  by  names  and  places  ;  with 
diaries,  summaries  of  despatches,  and  footnotes    ...        1 

Part  Two.     The  parts  of  the  several  official  publications  of 

diplomatic  documents  not  printed  under  Part  One        .        .     525 
I.   The  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  :   Introduction      .     525 
11.   The    French   Yellow    Book  :      Chapter    I,    Warnings 

(1913) 531 

III.  The  German  White  Book 551 

IV.  The  British  Blue  Book  :    Introductory  Narrative 

OF  Events       .        .        . 561 

Part  Three.  Documents  frequently  quoted  but  not  contained 
in  the  official  publications  of  collected  diplomatic  docu- 
MENTS       571 

I.   The  Chancellor's  speech,  August  4:Th,  1914        .        .    573 
II.   The  "Brussels"  documents     ......    577 

III.   The  Allied  Answer  to  the  "  Brussels  "  Documents    581 
TV.  Negotiations     of     Prince     Lichnowsky     with     Sir 

Edward  Grey 586 

V.   Documents  found  in   the   possession   of   Mr.  Grant- 
Watson,  Secretary  of  the  British  Legation      .     588 
VI.   The  telegrams  and  letters  exchanged  between  the 
Royal  and  Imperial  courts   of   London,   Berlin, 

AND   PeTROGRAD,    AND   BETWEEN    KiNG    GeORGE    AND 

President  Poincare 590 

Index 599 

Appendix.     The    several    official    publications    of    collected 

diplomatic  documents  in  photographic  reproduction      .        .     609 

xiii 


Calendar 


XV 


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CALENDAR 

Despatches  dated  later  than  August  6,  1914 


Foreign 
Office  of 

Vienna 

Paris  62     , 
Paris  61 
Paris  63 
London  64 
London  65 

August  9 
August  8 
August  10 
August  11 
August  12 

Brussels  67 
To  Jap.  Amb.     66 
Tokio  69 
Berlin  68 

August  22 
August  20 
August  23 
August  23 

Brussels 

The  Hague  56 
Paris  and  London 
57,58 
Paris  59 
The  Hague  60 
Paris  61 

The  Hague  63,  64 
To  Entente  65,  66 
The  Hague  62 
Whitlock  67 
Brit.  Min.  68 

August  7 
August  7 

August  8 
August  9 
August  9 
August  10 
August  10 
August  10 
August  11* 
August  11 

French  Min.  69 
The  Hague  71 
The  Hague  70 
From  Sazonof  72 
The  Hague  73 
Paris  74 
London  75 
From  colonies  76 
From  A.-H.  Min.  77 
The  Hague  78 
To  all  79 

August  11 
August  12 
August  12 
August  12 
August  13 
August  16 
August  17 
August  26 
August  28 
August  29 
August  29 

Paris 

Declaration  160 

Sept.  4 

Berlin 

London 

Sir  E.  Goschen  160 

August  8 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen 
161 

Sept.  1 

Petrograd 

Belgrade 

Report  from  Serbian 
Min.  to  Austria  52 

August  16 

PART  ONE 

DESPATCHES  SENT  AND  RECEIVED  AT  THE  VARIOUS 
FOREIGN  OFFICES;  ARRANGED  BY  NAMES  AND 
PLACES;  WITH  DIARIES,  SUMMARIES  OF  DE- 
SPATCHES,  AND  FOOTNOTES 


DIPLOMATIC  DOCUMENTS  CONCERNING 

THE  WAR 


Sunday,  June  28,  1914 

On  this  day  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  and  his  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohen- 
berg,  were  murdered  in  Serajevo. 

SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  op 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Vienna 

Germany 
Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

France : 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  7^ 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  June  28,  1914. 

News  has  just  arrived  at  Vienna  that  the  Hereditary  Archduke 
of  Austria  and  his  wife  have  been  to-day  assasinated  at  Serajevo 
by  a  student  belonging  to  Grahovo.  Some  moments  before  the 
attack  to  which  they  fell  a  victim,  they  had  escaped  the  explosion 
of  a  bomb  which  wounded  several  officers  of  their  suite. 

The  Emperor,  who  is  now  at  Ischl,  was  immediately  informed 
by  telegraph.  .  Dumaine. 

Monday,  June  29,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Belgrade 

Germany 
Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

Vienna 

1  For  earlier  numbers  of  French  Yellow  Book,  see  p.  531. 
B  1 


2  O^xial  Diplomatic  Documents 

Austria-Himgary : 

From  Belgrade 

Austro-Htjngarian  Red  Book  No.  1 
Ritter  von  Storck,  Secretary  of  Legation,  to  Count  Berchtold. 

Belgrade,  June  29,  1914- 

Under  the  terrible  shock  of  yesterday^s  catastrophe  it  is  diflB- 
cult  for  me  to  give  any  satisfactory  judgment  on  the  bloody  drama 
of  Serajevo  with  the  necessary  composure  and  judicial  calm.  I 
must  ask  you,  therefore,  to  allow  me  for  the  moment  to  limit  myself 
to  putting  on  record  certain  facts. 

Yesterday,  the  15/28,  the  anniversary  of  the  battle  of  the  Amsel- 
feld,  was  celebrated  with  greater  ceremony  than  usual,  and  there  were 
celebrations  in  honour  of  the  Servian  patriot,  Milos  Obilic,  who, 
in  1389  with  two  companions  treacherously  stabbed  the  victorious 
Murad. 

Among  all  Servians,  Obilic  is  regarded  as  the  national  hero.  In 
place  of  the  Turks,  however,  we  are  now  looked  on  as  the  hereditary 
enemy,  thanks  to  the  propaganda  which  has  been  nourished  under 
the  aegis  of  the  Royal  Government  and  the  agitation  which  has  for 
many  years  been  carried  on  in  the  press. 

A  repetition  of  the  drama  on  the  field  of  Kossovo  seems,  therefore, 
to  have  hovered  before  the  minds  of  the  three  young  criminals  of 
Serajevo,  Princip,  Cabrinovic  and  the  third  person  still  unknown,  who 
also  threw  a  bomb.  They  also  shot  down  an  innocent  woman,  and 
may  therefore  think  that  they  have  surpassed  their  model. 

For  many  years  hatred  against  the  Monarchy  has  been  sown  in 
Servia.     The  crop  has  sprung  up  and  the  harvest  is  murder. 

The  news  arrived  at  about  5  o'clock;  the  Servian  Government 
at  about  10  o'clock  caused  the  Obilic  festivities  to  be  officially  stopped. 
They  continued,  however,  unofficially  for  a  considerable  time  after  it 
was  dark.  The  accounts  of  eye-witnesses  say  that  people  fell  into 
one  another's  arms  in  delight,  and  remarks  were  heard,  such  as: 
"  It  serves  them  right,  we  have  been  expecting  this  for  a  long  time," 
or  "This  is  revenge  for  the  annexation." 

Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  1 

M.  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  June  16/29,  1914. 

The  Vienna  Press  asserts  that  the  magisterial  enquiry  has  already 
shown  that  the  Serajevo  outrage  was  prepared  at  Belgrade ;  further^ 
that  the  whole  conspiracy  in  its  wider  issues  was  organised    at  Bel- 


Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

^              Belgrade 

\ 

- 

Vienna,    Berlin, 
Constantinople 

June  30 y  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  2  3 

grade  among  youths  inspired  with  the  Great  Serbian  idea,  and  that 
the  Belgrade  Press  is  exciting  pubHc  opinion  by  pubHshing  articles 
about  the  intolerable  conditions  prevaiKng  in  Bosnia.  Press  articles 
of  this  kind,  according  to  the  Vienna  Press,  are  exercising  a  strong 
influence,  as  Serbian  newspapers  are  being  smuggled  in  large  quan- 
tities into  Bosnia. 

Tuesday,  June  30,  1814 
SUMMARY  OF   PUBLISHED   DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary  enquires  what  measures  the  Serbian  Government  had  taken 
"to  follow  up  the  clues  to  the  crime  which  notoriously  are  partly  to  be  found  in 
Serbia." 

Serbia  remarks  on  the  attempt  of  Austria-Hungary  to  ''represent  in  the  eyes 
of  Europe"  the  Serajevo  murder  as  "the  act  of  a  conspiracy  engineered  in  Serbia." 
The  murder   "  has  not  yet  engaged  the  attention  of  the  Serbian  poHee." 

Austria- Hungary : 

From  Belgrade 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    2 

Ritter  Von  Storck,  Secretary  of  Legation,  to  Count  Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  June  30,  1914. 

To-day  I  sent  an  enquiry  to  Herre  Gruic,  General  Secretary  of 
the  Foreign  Office,  to  ask  the  obvious  question  what  measures  the 
Royal  police  had  taken,  or  proposed  to  take,  in  order  to  follow  up 
the  clues  to  the  crime  which  notoriously  are  partly  to  be  found  in 
Servia. 

The  answer  was  that  the  matter  has  not  yet  engaged  the  attention 
of  the  Servian  police. 

Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  2 

M.  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  June  17/30,  1914. 

The  tendency  at  Vienna  to  represent,  in  the  eyes  of  Europe,  the 
outrage  committed  upon  the  Austro-Hungarian  Crown  Prince  as 


4  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  act  of  a  conspiracy  engineered  in  Serbia  is  becoming  more  and 
more  apparent.  The  idea  is  to  use  this  as  a  poUtical  weapon  against 
us.  The  greatest  attention  ought,  therefore,  to  be  paid  to  the  tone 
adopted  by  our  press  in  its  articles  on  the  Serajevo  outrage. 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  5 

M.  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Vienna,  June  17/30,  1914. 

As  Count  Berchtold  was  not  able  to  receive  me  when  I  called, 
I  spoke  to  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs  concerning  the  Serajevo  outrage.  In  the  course  of  our 
conversation  I  adopted  the  following  line  of  argument :  — 

"The  Royal  Serbian  Government  condemn  most  energetically 
the  Serajevo  outrage  and  on  their  part  will  certainly  most  loyally 
do  everything  to  prove  that  they  will  not  tolerate  within  their  terri- 
tory the  fostering  of  any  agitation  or  illegal  proceedings  calculated 
to  disturb  our  already  delicate  relations  with  Austria-Hungary. 
I  am  of  opinion  that  the  Government  are  prepared  also  to  submit 
to  trial  any  persons  implicated  in  the  plot,  in  the  event  of  its  being 
proved  that  there  are  any  in  Serbia.  The  Royal  Serbian  Govern- 
ment, notwithstanding  all  the  obstacles  hitherto  placed  in  their 
way  by  Austro-Hungarian  diplomacy  (creation  of  an  independent 
Albania,  opposition  to  Serbian  access  to  the  Adriatic,  demand  for 
revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest,  the  September  ultimatum, 
etc.)  remained  loyal  in  their  desire  to  establish  a  sound  basis  for 
our  good  neighbourly  relations.  You  know  that  in  this  direction 
something  has  been  done  and  achieved.  Serbia  intends  to  con- 
tinue to  work  for  this  object,  convinced  that  it  is  practicable  and 
ought  to  be  continued.  The  Serajevo  outrage  ought  not  to  and 
cannot  stultify  this  work." 

Baron  Macchio  has  taken  note  of  the  above  and  promised  to  com- 
municate to  Count  Berchtold  all  that  I  said  to  him. 

On  the  same  day  I  communicated  to  the  French  and  Russian  Am- 
bassadors the  substance  of  this  conversation. 

I  have,  etc. 

From  Berlin 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  3 

Dr,  M.  Yovanovitch,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  June  17/30,  191 4. 

The  Berlin  Press,  in  publishing  articles  based  on  information  from 
Vienna  and  Budapest,  in  which  the  Serajevo  outrage  is  connected 
with  Serbia,  is  misleading  German  public  opinion. 


June  30,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  6  5 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  4 

Dr.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  June  17/30,  1914. 

The  hostility  of  public  opinion  in  Germany  towards  us  is  growing, 
and  is  being  fostered  by  false  reports  coming  from  Vienna  and  Buda- 
pest. Such  reports  are  being  diligently  spread  in  spite  of  the  contra- 
dictions issued  by  some  newspapers  and  news  agencies. 

From  Constantinople 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  6 

M.  M.  Georgevitch,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Constantinople,  to  M.  N. 
Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Constantinople,  June  17/30,  1914- 

I  HAD  to-day  a  long  conversation  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  here  concerning  the  Serajevo  outrage.  I  expressed  the 
hope  that  this  regrettable  event  —  whatever  is  said  about  it  in  certain 
diplomatic  circles  —  would  not  unfavourably  influence  the  relations 
between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  which  lately  had  shown  con- 
siderable improvement. 

He  replied  that  such  an  eventuality  was  impossible,  and  ought  not 
to  be  contemplated.  He  was  also  of  opinion  that  Serbo-Austro- 
Hungarian  relations  had  much  improved  lately.  He  added  that 
the  work  in  that  direction  ought  to  be  persevered  in.  He  informed 
me  that  from  his  latest  conversations  with  Count  Berchtold  he 
understood  that  the  latter  was  satisfied  with  the  attitude  adopted 
by  the  Serbian  Government,  and  that  he,  on  his  part,  sincerely 
desired  friendly  relations  with  Serbia. 

I  have,  etc. 

Wednesday,  July  i,  19 14 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  Uskub,  Serbia 

Belgium  

France  

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia                                          All  Legations  abroad  London,  Vienna 

Austria-Hungary  is  informed  by  her  consul  in  Uskub,  Serbia,  of  "the  inhuman 
joy  with  which  the  murder  of  Serajevo  was  received  in  Serbia." 

EngUsh  newspapers  discuss  the  crime  as  emanating  from  Serbian  revolu- 
tionists. 


6  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  TJskuhy  Serbia 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  JIeD   BoOK   No.   3 

M.  Jehlitschka,  Consul-General,  to  Count  Berchtold. 

Uskuh,  July  1,  1914- 

On  the  15/28  June  the  Feast  of  St.  Vitus  (Corpus  Christi'Day), 
which  on  this  occasion  coincided  with  the  525th  anniversary  of  the 
battle  of  the  Amselfeld  (1389),  was  for  the  first  time  officially  cele- 
brated as  the  "  Festival  of  the  Liberation  "  of  the  Servian  nation. 

For  four  months  a  special  committee  had  worked  at  making  this 
celebration  an  especially  solemn  and  magnificent  demonstration  of 
Servian  nationality. 

The  propaganda  connected  with  this  at  the  same  time  extended 
to  Croatia,  Dalmatia  and  Bosnia,  but  especially  to  Hungary ;  those 
who  took  part  in  it  received  free  passes  on  the  Servian  State  railways ; 
food  and  lodging  at  low  prices,  maintenance  by  public  bodies,  etc., 
were  promised. 

The  agitation  was  carried  on  with  energy,  and  was  with  a  definite 
end  in  view. 

The  visitors  to  the  celebration  at  Prestina  were  brought  in  special 
trains. 

The  various  speeches  ran  riot  in  historical  reminiscences,  which 
were  connected  with  the  scene  of  the  celebration,  and  dealt  under 
different  aspects  with  the  well-known  theme  of  the  union  of  all  Servia 
and  the  "liberation  of  our  brethren  in  bondage"  beyond  the  Danube 
and  the  Save,  even  as  far  as  Bosnia  and  Dalmatia. 

When,  during  the  course  of  the  evening,  the  news  of  the  horrible 
crime  of  which  Serajevo  had  been  the  scene  was  circulated,  the  feeling 
which  animated  the  fanatical  crowd  was,  to  judge  by  the  numerous 
expressions  of  applause  reported  to  me  by  authorities  in  w^hom  I  have 
absolute  confidence,  one  that  I  can  only  characterise  as  inhuman. 

In  view  of  this  attitude  of  the  population,  which  was  also  displayed 
at  Uskub,  all  attempts  of  the  Servian  press  to  divest  Servia  of  the 
moral  responsibility  for  a  deed  which  was  received  by  a  representa- 
tive gathering  with  such  unvarnished  satisfaction,  collapse  miserably. 

Serbia : 

To  All  Serbian  Legations  Abroad 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  8 

M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prim.e  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign   Affairs 
to  all  the  Royal  Serbian  Legations  abroad. 

Belgrade,  June  18/ July  1,  1914- 

The  Austrian  and  Hungarian  press  are  blaming  Serbia  more  and 
more  for  the  Serajevo  outrage.     Their  aim  is  transparent,  viz.,  to 


July  1,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  7  7 

destroy  that  high  moral  reputation  ^  which  Serbia  now  enjoys  in 
Europe,  and  to  take  the  fullest  advantage  politically  against  Serbia 
of  the  act  of  a  young  and  ill-balanced  fanatic.  But,  in  Serbia  itself, 
the  Serajevo  outrage  has  been  most  severely  condemned  in  all  circles 
of  society,  inasmuch  as  all,  official  as  well  as  unofficial,  immediately 
recognised  that  this  outrage  would  be  most  prejudicial  not  only  to 
our  good  neighbourly  relations  with  Austria-Hungary  but  also  to  our 
co-nationalists  in  that  country,  as  recent  occurrences  have  proved. 
At  a  moment  when  Serbia  is  doing  everything  in  her  power  to  im- 
prove her  relations  with  the  neighbouring  Monarchy,  it  is  absurd 
to  think  that  Serbia  could  have  directly  or  indirectly  inspired  acts 
of  this  kind.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  of  the  greatest  interest  to 
Serbia  to  prevent  the  perpetration  of  this  outrage.  Unfortunately 
this  did  not  lie  within  Serbians  power,  as  both  assassins  are  Austrian 
subjects.  Hitherto  Serbia  has  been  careful  to  suppress  anarchic 
elements,  and  after  recent  events  she  will  redouble  her  vigilance,  and 
in  the  event  of  such  elements  existing  within  her  borders  will  take 
the  severest  measures  against  them.  Moreover,  Serbia  will  do  every- 
thing in  her  power  and  use  all  the  means  at  her  disposal  in  order 
to  restrain  the  feelings  of  ill-balanced  people  within  her  frontiers. 
But  Serbia  can  on  no  account  permit  the  Vienna  and  Hungarian 
press  to  mislead  European  public  opinion,  and  lay  the  heavy  respon- 
sibility for  a  crime  committed  by  an  Austrian  subject  at  the  door 
of  the  whole  Serbian  nation  and  on  Serbia,  who  can  only  suffer  harm 
from  such  acts  and  can  derive  no  benefit  whatever. 

Please  act  in  the  sense  of  the  above  views,  and  use  all  available 
channels  in  order  to  put  an  end  as  soon  as  possible  to  the  anti-Serbian 
campaign  in  the  European  press. 


From  London 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  7 

M.  M.  S.  Boschkovitch,  Minister  in  London,  to  M,  N,  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  London,  June  18/ July  1,  1914. 

Basing  their  information  upon  reports  coming  from  Austrian 
sources,  nearly  all  the  English  newspapers  attribute  the  Serajevo 
outrage  to  the  work  of  Serbian  revolutionaries. 

1  For  the  reputation  of  Serbia  see  the  Report  on  the  Balkan  Wars  by  an  Inter- 
national Commission  appointed  by  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace, 
and  published  by  the  Endowment,  Washington,  D.  C,  in  the  spring  of  1914.  The 
murderers  of  the  late  king  and  queen  have  not  yet  been  brought  to  justice. 


8  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  9 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M,  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  June  18/ July  1,  1914. 

There  were  demonstrations  last  night  in  front  of  the  Legation. 
I  may  say  that  the  police  showed  considerable  energy.  Order  and 
peace  were  maintained.  As  soon  as  I  obtain  positive  information 
that  the  Serbian  flag  has  been  burned/  I  will  lodge  a  complaint  in  the 
proper  quarters.  I  will  report  to  you  the  result.  Hatred  against 
Serbians  and  Serbia  is  being  spread  among  the  people,  especially 
by  the  lower  Catholic  circles,  the  Vienna  press,  and  military  circles. 
Please  do  what  is  possible  to  prevent  demonstrations  taking  place 
in  Serbia,  and  to  induce  the  Belgrade  press  to  be  as  moderate  as 
possible  in  tone.  The  tendency  towards  us  here  is  still  the  same. 
It  is  expected  that  the  decision  as  to  the  attitude  to  be  adopted 
towards  Serbia  and  the  Serbians  will  be  taken  after  the  funeral. 

Thursday,  July  2,  19 14 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

FoBEiON  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  

France  Vienna 

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia  Paris 

France  is  informed  of  great  excitement  in  Vienna,  and  is  quoted  as  counselling 
composure  in  Serbia. 

France : 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  8 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  2,  1914- 

The  crime  of  Serajevo  arouses  the  most  acute  resentment  in 
Austrian  military  circles,  and  among  all  those  who  are  not  content 
to  allow  Servia  to  maintain  in  the  Balkans  the  position  which  she 
has  acquired. 

1  See  July  3,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  11. 


July  3,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  11  9 

The  investigation  into  the  origin  of  the  crime  which  it  is  desired 
to  exact  from  the  Government  at  Belgrade  under  conditions  intoler- 
able to  their  dignity  would,  in  case  of  a  refusal,  furnish  grounds  of 
complaint  which  would  admit  of  resort  to  military  measures. 

DUMAINE. 

Serbia : 

From  Paris 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  10 

Dr.  M.  R.  Vesnitch,  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  A  fairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  June  19/ July  2,  1914- 

The  French  Government  advise  ^  us  to  maintain  an  attitude  of 
the  greatest  possible  calm  and  composure  in  official  circles  as  well  as 
in  pubUc  opinion. 


Friday,  July  3,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  

France  

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  — —  

Serbia  Vienna 


Austria-Hungary  complains  officially  of  the  tenor  of  the  Serbian  press,  while 
Serbia  complains  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  and  of  a/'flag"  incident  in 
Vienna  which  is  not  clearly  described  in  the  despatch. 


Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  U 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanomtch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Vienna,  June  20/ July  3,  1914. 

Yesterday  being  the  day  on  which  the  remains  of  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  and  his  wife  were  brought  from  Serajevoto 
Vienna,  I  gave  instructions  that  the  national  flag  at  my  residence 
should  be  hoisted  at  half-mast  as  a  sign  of  mourning. 

1  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  13,  July  24. 


10  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Yesterday  evening,  on  this  account,  protests  were  made  by  the 
concierge,  the  other  tenants,  the  landlord's  agent,  and  the  landlord 
himself,  who  demanded  the  removal  of  the  flag.  Explanations  proved 
of  no  avail,  and  the  assistance  of  the  police  authorities  was  requested. 
The  latter  privately  asked  that  the  flag  should  be  removed  in  order 
to  avoid  further  disorders.  The  flag  was  not  removed,  and  accord- 
ingly noisy  demonstrations  took  place  last  night  in  front  of  the 
Legation.  The  conduct  of  the  police  was  energetic,  and  nothing 
happened  to  the  flag  or  to  the  building  which  might  constitute  an 
insult.  At  2  A.M.  the  crowd  dispersed.  To-day's  papers,  more 
particularly  the  popular  clerical  papers,  publish  articles  under  the 
heading  "Provocation  by  the  Serbian  Minister,"  in  which  the 
whole  incident  is  falsely  described. 

The  flag  on  the  Legation  building  remained  flying  the  whole  time 
up  to  the  conclusion  of  the  service  at  the  Court  Chapel.  As  soon 
as  this  ceremony  was  concluded,  the  flag  was  removed.  People 
from  all  over  the  quarter  in  which  I  live  went  to  the  Prefecture,  the 
Municipality,  and  the  State  Council  to  demand  the  removal  of  our 
flag. 

The  crowd  was  harangued  by  Dr.  Funder,  director  in  chief  of  the 
Catholic  Reichspost,  Hermengild  Wagner,  and  Leopold  Mandl,  all 
of  whom  are  known  as  the  chief  instigators  of  the  attacks  in  the 
Austrian  and  German  press  against  Serbia  and  the  Serbians. 

I  have,  etc. 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  12 

M.   Yov.  M.    Yovanomtch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N,  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Vienna,  June  20/ July  3,  1914. 

In  the  course  of  a  conversation  which  I  had  with  the  Under- 
Secretary  at  the  Foreign  Office  on  the  subject  of  the  Serajevo  outrage. 
Baron  Macchio  severely  criticised  the  Belgrade  press  and  the  tone 
of  its  articles.^  He  argued  that  the  Belgrade  press  was  under  no 
control  and  created  die  Hetzereien  gegen  die  Monarchic.  I  told  him 
that  the  press  in  Serbia  was  absolutely  free,  and  that  as  a  result 
private  people  as  well  as  the  Government  very  often  suffered  ;  there 
were,  however,  no  means  of  proceeding  against  the  press  except  by 
going  to  law.  I  told  him  that  in  the  present  instance  the  fault  lay 
with  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  press  which  was  controlled  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government.  Was  it  not  true  that  during  the  past 
two  years  the  Austrian  and  Hungarian  press  had  been  attacking 
Serbia,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  offend  her  most  sensitive  feelings  ?  The 
anniversary  of  the  unfortunate  war  with  Bulgaria  had  taken  place  a 
few  days  ago.     I  had  myself  witnessed  the  great  lack  of  respect  with 

1  For  quotations  from  the  Serbian  Press  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19, 
under  date  of  July  25,  1914.  See  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  14,  under  date  of 
July  20,  1914. 


July  3y  Serbian  Blue  Book  No,  12  11 

which  the  Vienna  press  had  written  about  Serbia  and  the  Serbian 
army  during  and  after  the  war,  as  well  as  in  many  other  matters.  The 
press  in  Belgrade  was  much  more  moderate.  For  instance,  in  the 
present  case,  a  terrible  crime  had  been  committed  and  telegrams 
were  being  sent  from  Vienna  to  the  whole  world  accusing  the  entire 
Serbian  nation  and  Serbia  of  being  accomplices  of  the  detestable 
Serajevo  outrage.  All  the  Austrian  newspapers  were  writing  in  that 
strain.  Was  it  possible  to  remain  indifferent?  Even  if  the  crimi- 
nal was  a  Serbian,  the  whole  Serbian  nation  and  the  Kingdom  of 
Serbia  could  not  be  held  guilty,  nor  could  they  be  accused  in  such  a 
manner. 

Baron  Macchio  replied,  "Nobody  accuses  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia 
nor  its  Government,  nor  the  whole  Serbian  nation.  We  accuse  those 
who  encourage  the  Great  Serbian  scheme  and  work  for  the  realisation 
of  its  object.'* 

I  told  him  that  it  appeared  to  me  that  from  the  first  the  nationality 
of  the  criminal  had  been  deliberately  put  forward  in  order  to  involve 
Belgrade  and  to  create  the  impression  that  the  outrage  had  been 
organised  by  Serbia.  This  had  struck  me  immediately,  as  I  knew 
that  up  till  now  the  Serbians  of  Bosnia  had  been  spoken  of  as  die 
Bosniaken,  hosnische  Sprache,  die  Orthodoxen  au^  Bosnien,  while  now 
it  was  being  said  that  the  assassin  was  ein  Serbe,  but  not  that  he  was 
a  Bosnian  nor  that  he  was  an  Austrian  subject.  .  .  . 

"I  repeat,"  said  Baron  Macchio,  "that  we  do  not  accuse  the 
Serbian  Government  and  the  Serbian  nation  but  the  various  agi- 
tators. ..." 

I  begged  him  to  use  his  influence  in  order  to  induce  the  Vienna 
press  not  to  make  matters  more  difficult  by  its  accusations  in  this 
critical  moment,  when  Serbo-Austrian  relations  were  being  put  to 
a  severe  test. 

I  have,  etc. 


Saturday,  July  4»  iQiS 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  Paris 

Belgium  

France  Berlin 

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia  Paris,  Petrograd 

M.  Poincare,"  President  of  France,  expresses  his  sympathy  with  Austria-Hungary 
and  his  belief  that  Serbia  would  show  great  willingness  in  the  "judicial  investiga- 
tion and  the  prosecution  of  the  accomplices"  of  the  Serajevo  criminals.  In  this 
view  he  is  seconded  by  Germany,  who  for  this  reason  is  quoted  as  expecting  no  fur- 
ther complications. 


12  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Austria-Hxingary : 

From  Paris 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.   4 

Count  Szecsen  to  Count  Berchtold 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  4,  1914. 

To-day  I  communicated  to  M.  Poincare  the  thanks  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  for  their  sympathy. 

In  referring  to  the  hostile  demonstrations  against  Servia  among 
us,  he  mentioned  that  after  the  murder  of  President  Carnot,  all  Ital- 
ians throughout  France  were  exposed  to  the  worst  persecutions  on  the 
part  of  the  people. 

I  drew  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  that  crime  had  no  connection 
with  any  anti-French  agitation  in  Italy,  while  in  the  present  case  it 
must  be  admitted  that  for  years  past  there  has  been  an  agitation  in 
Servia  against  the  Monarchy  fomented  by  every  means,  legitimate 
and  illegitimate. 

In  conclusion,  M.  Poincare  expressed  his  conviction  that  the  Ser- 
vian Government  would  meet  us  with  the  greatest  willingness  in  the 
judicial  investigation  and  the  prosecution  of  the  accomplices.  No 
State  could  divest  itself  of  this  duty. 


France : 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  9 

M.  de  Mannemlle,  French  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  4,  1914- 

The  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  told  me  yes- 
terday, and  has  to-day  repeated  to  the  Russian  Ambassador,  that 
he  hoped  Servia  would  satisfy  the  demands  which  Austria  might 
have  to  make  to  her  with  regard  to  the  investigation  and  the  prose- 
cution of  the  accomplices  in  the  crime  of  Serajevo.  He  added  that 
he  was  confident  that  this  would  be  the  case  because  Servia,  if  she 
acted  in  any  other  way,  would  have  the  opinion  of  the  whole  civilised 
world  against  her. 

The  German  Government  do  not  then  appear  to  share  the  anxiety 
which  is  shown  by  a  part  of  the  German  press  as  to  possible  tension 
in  the  relations  between  the  Governments  of  Vienna  and  Belgrade, 
or  at  least  they  do  not  wish  to  seem  to  do  so. 

De  Manneville. 


Jvly  4y  Serbian  Blue  Book  No,  I4  13 

Serbia : 

From  Paris 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  13 

Dr.  M.  R.  Vesnitch,  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Parisj  June  21/ July  4,  1914- 

I  HAD  a  long  conversation  on  Wednesday  last  on  the  subject  of 
the  Serajevo  outrage  with  M.  Viviani,  the  new  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  who  was  somewhat  concerned  ^  at  what  had  occurred.  I 
made  use  of  this  opportunity  to  describe  to  him  briefly  the  causes 
which  had  led  to  the  outrage,  and  which  were  to  be  found,  in  the 
first  place,  in  the  irksome  system  of  Government  in  force  in  the 
annexed  provinces,  and  especially  in  the  attitude  of  the  officials,  as 
well  as  in  the  whole  policy  of  the  Monarchy  towards  anything  ortho- 
dox. He  understood  the  situation,  but  at  the  same  time  expressed  the 
hope  that  we  should  preserve  an  attitude  of  calm  and  dignity  in  order 
to  avoid  giving  cause  for  fresh  accusations  in  Vienna. 

After  the  first  moment  of  excitement  public  opinion  here  has 
quieted  down  to  such  an  extent  that  the  Minister-President  himself 
considered  it  advisable  in  the  Palais  de  Bourbon  to  soften  the  ex- 
pressions used  in  the  statement  which  he  had  made  earlier  on  the 
subject  in  the  Senate. 

I  have,  etc. 

From  Petrograd 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  14 

Dr.  M.  Spalaikovitch,  Minister  at  Petrograd,  to  M,  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Petrograd,  June  21 /July  4,  1914- 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  tells  me  that  the  outrages  com- 
mitted upon  Serbs  in  Bosnia  will  increase  the  sympathy  of  Europe 
for  us.  He  is  of  opinion  that  the  accusations  made  against  us  in 
Vienna  will  not  obtain  credence.  The  chief  thing  is  for  pubHc  opin- 
ion in  Serbia  to  remain  calm. 


Sunday,  July  5,  1914 

There  are  no  published  despatches.   . 

1  The  British  Premier,  Mr.  Asquith,  in  speaking  of  the  murder  of  Serajevo  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  had  said  that  it  made  him  "shudder  for  the  fate  of  humanity." 
[London  Times,  July  1,  1914.] 


14  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Monday,  July  6,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of    ,  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  Nish 

Belgium  

France  Petrograd 

Germany  - 

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia  Vienna 

Austria-Hungary  is  once  more  informed  of  the  "joy"  which  the  news  of  the 
Serajevo  murder  had  created  in  Serbia. 

Serbian  officials  acknowledge  the  unfortunate  tone  of  the  Serbian  press,  while 
the  Russian  foreign  minister,  M.  Sazonof,  is  troubled  by  the  ** attacks  of  theAus- 
trian  press  against  Serbia." 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Nish,  Serbia 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   5 

Herr  Hqflehner,  Consular  Agent,  to  Count  Berchtold. 

Nish,  July  6,  1914. 

The  news  of  the  terrible  crime  at  Serajevo,  which  had  been  only 
too  successful,  created  here  a  sensation  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word. 
There  was  practically  no  sign  of  consternation  or  indignation;  the 
predominant  mood  was  one  of  satisfaction  and  even  joy,  and  this 
was  often  quite  open  without  any  reserve,  and  even  found  expression 
in  a  brutal  way.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the  so-called  leading 
circles  —  the  intellectuals,  such  as  professional  politicians,  those  occu- 
pied in  education,  officials,  officers  and  the  students.  Commercial 
circles  adopted  a  rather  more  reserved  attitude. 

All  explanations  made  by  official  Servian  circles  or  individual  higher 
personalities  purporting  to  give  expression  to  indignation  at  the  crime 
and  condemnation  of  it,  must  have  the  effect  of  the  bitterest  irony 
on  anyone  who  has  had  an  opportunity,  during  the  last  few  days, 
of  gaining  an  insight  at  first  hand  into  the  feelings  of  the  educated 
Servian  people. 

On  the  day  of  the  crime  the  undersigned  had  gone  to  a  coffee 
garden  at  about  9  o'clock  in  the  evening  without  any  suspicion  of 
what  had  happened,  and  here  received  from  an  acquaintance  his 
first  information  as  to  the  very  definite  rumour  which  was  being 
circulated.  It  was  painful  in  the  highest  degree  to  see  and  hear 
what  a  feeling  of  real  delight  seizeci  the  numerous  visitors  who  were 
present,  with  what  obvious  satisfaction  the  deed  was  discussed, 
and  what  cries  of  joy,  scorn  and  contempt  burst  out  —  even  one  wha 


July  6,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  16  15 

has  long  been  accustomed  to  the  expression  of  poHtical  fanaticism 
which  obtains  here,  must  feel  the  greatest  depression  at  what  he  ob- 
served. 

France : 

From  Petrograd 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  10 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  6,  1914- 

In  the  course  of  an  interview  which  he  had  asked  for  with  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Charge  d'Affaires,  M.  Sazonof  pointed  out  in 
a  friendly  way  the  disquieting  irritation  which  the  attacks  of  the 
Austrian  press  against  Servia  are  in  danger  of  producing  in  his 
country. 

Count  Czernin  having  given  him  to  understand  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  would  perhaps  be  compelled  to  search  for 
the  instigators  of  the  crime  of  Serajevo  on  Servian  territory,  M. 
Sazonof  interrupted  him  :  "No  country,"  he  said,  "has  had  to  suffer 
more  than  Russia  from  crimes  prepared  on  foreign  territory.  Have 
we  ever  claimed  to  employ  in  any  country  whatsoever  the  procedure 
with  which  your  papers  threaten  Servia?  Do  not  embark  on  such 
a  course." 

May  this  warning  not  be  in  vain. 

Paleologue. 

Serbia: 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  15 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  June  23/ July  6,  1914. 

The  excitement  in  military  and  Government  circles  against  Serbia 
is  steadily  growing  owing  to  the  tone  of  our  press,  which  is  diligently 
exploited  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation  at  Belgrade. 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  16 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Vienna,  June  23 /July  6,  1914. 

The  principal  lines  and  tendencies  to  be  found  in  the  articles  of 
the  Vienna  press  on  the  subject  of  the  Serajevo  outrage  are  as  fol- 
lows :  — 


16  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

As  long  ago  as  Sunday  afternoon,  June  25/28  last,  when  the 
Vienna  newspapers  issued  extra  editions  regarding  the  outrage 
upon  the  Crown  Prince,  the  headlines  announced  that  both  the 
perpetrators  were  Serbians;  moreover,  this  was  done  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  leave  the  impression  that  they  were  Serbs  from  Serbia 
proper.  In  the  later  reports,  which  described  the  outrage,  there 
was  a  marked  tendency  to  connect  it  with  Serbia.  Two  circumstances 
were  especially  emphasised  and  were  intended  to  indicate  Belgrade 
as  the  place  of  origin  of  the  outrage,  viz. :  (1)  the  visit  to  Belgrade  of 
both  of  the  perpetrators ;  and  (2)  the  origin  of  the  bombs.  As  the 
third  and  last  link  in  this  chain  of  evidence,  the  Vienna  papers 
began  to  publish  the  evidence  given  by  the  assassins  at  the  trial. 
It  was  characteristic  to  find  that  the  Hungarian  Korrespondenz- 
bureau,  and  the  Hungarian  newspapers,  especially  the  Az  Eszt 
were  alone  in  a  position  to  know  all  about  this  "evidence."  This 
evidence  mainly  tends  to  show :  (1)  that  it  has  been  estabUshed  that 
the  perpetrators,  while  in  Belgrade,  associated  with  the  comitadji 
Mihaylo  Ciganovitch;  and  (2)  that  the  organiser  and  instigator  of 
the  outrage  was  Major  Pribitchevitch. 

Another  tendency  became  apparent  at  the  same  time,  viz. :  to 
hold  the  "Narodna  Odbrana"^  responsible  for  this  outrage.  Fur- 
ther, on  Friday  last,  the  latest  announcement  which  the  Hungarian 
Korrespondenzbureau  made  to  the  newspapers  stated :  — 

"The  enquiries  made  up  to  the  present  prove  conclusively  that 
this  outrage  is  the  work  of  a  conspiracy.  Besides  the  two  perpetra- 
tors, a  large  number  of  persons  have  been  arrested,  mostly  young 
men,  who  are  also,  like  the  perpetrators,  proved  to  have  been  em- 
ployed by  the  Belgrade  Narodna  Odbrana  in  order  to  commit  the 
outrage,  and  who  were  supplied  in  Belgrade  with  bombs  and  re- 
volvers." 

On  the  same  day,  late  at  night,  the  Hungarian  Korrespondenz- 
bureau sent  the  following  request  to  the  newspapers  :  — 

"We  beg  the  Editor  not  to  publish  the  report  relating  to  the 
Serajevo  outrage,  which  appeared  in  our  evening's  bulletin." 

At  the  same  time  the  Vienna  Korrespondenzbureau  published  the 
following  official  statement :  — 

"We  learn  from  authoritative  quarters  that  the  enquiries  relating 
to  the  outrage  are  being  kept  absolutely  secret.^  All  the  details, 
therefore,  which  have  appeared  in  the  public  press  should  be  accepted 
with  reserve." 

Nevertheless,    the    Budapest   newspapers    continued    to    publish 

1  The  "Narodna  Odbrana"  is  a  political  society  of  Serbia.  For  its  aims  and  con- 
stitution see  below,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  under  date  of  July  25,  1914. 

*  The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  did  not  know  where  the  threads  uncovered 
by  the  investigation  would  lead.  Its  wish  to  have  them  kept  secret  until  it  had  de- 
cided on  its  course  corresponds  to  its  action  a  few  months  earlier,  which  is  thus  de- 
scribed in  the  American  Review  of  Reviews,  May,  1914,  p.  545:  "Then  one  day  in 
March  a  bomb  was  exploded  in  the  office  of  the  Greek  Catholic  Magyar  bishop  that 
killed  the  vicar  and  two  others.  Evidence  discovered  later  proved  that  the  plot  was 
of  Russian  origin,  the  purpose  being  —  as  those  implicated  admitted  —  to  create 
trouble  between  Roumania  and  Austria-Hungary  which  in  its  turn  would  embarrass 
the  Triple  Alliance.  To  prevent  more  serious  complications,  the  Hungarian  Govern- 
ment decided  not  to  probe  too  deeply  in  the  affair." 


July  7,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No,  17  17 

alleged  reports  on  the  enquiry.  In  the  last  "  report "  of  the  Budapest 
newspaper  A  Nap,  which  was  reprinted  in  yesterday's  Vienna  papers, 
the  tendency  to  lay  the  responsibility  for  the  outrage  on  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  is  still  further  emphasised.  According  to  this  report  the 
accused  Gabrinovitch  had  stated  that  General  Yankovitch  is  the 
chief  instigator  of  the  outrage. 

I  have,  etc. 

Tuesday,  July  7,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

Vienna 

Austria-Hungary  is  reported  by  the  Serbian  Minister  in  Vienna  to  be  much 
excited. 

Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  17 

M.  Yov.  M.     Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Vienna,  June  24/ July  7,  W14- 

In  influential  circles  the  excitement  continues  undiminished. 
Though  the  Emperor  has  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Prime  Ministers 
of  Austria  and  Hungary  respectively,  and  to  the  Minister  of  Finance, 
Herr  Bilinski,  in  which  an  appeal  is  made  for  calmness,  it  is  impossible 
to  determine  what  attitude  the  Government  will  adopt  towards  us. 
For  them  one  thing  is  obvious ;  whether  it  is  proved  or  not  that  the 
outrage  has  been  inspired  and  prepared  at  Belgrade,  they  must  sooner 
or  later  solve  the  question  of  the  so-called  Great  Serbian  agitation 
within  the  Habsburg  Monarchy.  In  what  manner  they  will  do  this 
and  what  means  they  will  employ  to  that  end  has  not  as  yet  been 
decided ;  this  is  being  discussed  especially  in  high  Catholic  and  mili- 
tary circles.  The  ultimate  decision  will  be  taken  oiily  after  it  has 
been  definitely  ascertained  what  the  enquiry  at  Serajevo  has  brought 
to  light.  The  decision  will  be  in  accordance  with  the  findings  of  the 
enquiry. 

In  this  respect,  Austria-Hungary  has  to  choose  one  of  the  following 
courses :  either  to  regard  the  Serajevo  outrage  as  a  national  mis- 
fortune and  a  crime  which  ought  to  be  dealt  with  in  accordance  with 
the  evidence  obtained,  in  which  case  Serbia's  cooperation  in  the  work 


18        ,  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

will  be  requested  in  order  to  prevent  the  perpetrators  escaping 
the  extreme  penalty;  or,  to  treat  the  Serajevo  outrage  as  a  Pan- 
Serbian,  South-Slav  and  Pan-Slav  conspiracy  with  every  manifes- 
tation of  the  hatred,  hitherto  repressed,  against  Slavdom.  There 
are  many  indications  that  influential  circles  are  being  urged  to 
adopt  the  latter  course :  it  is  therefore  advisable  to  be  ready  for 
defence.  Should  the  former  and  wiser  course  be  adopted,  we  should 
do  all  we  can  to  meet  Austrian  wishes  in  this  respect. 

I  have,  etc. 


Wednesday,  July  8,  1914 
There  are  no  published  despatches. 

Thursday,  July  9,  19 14 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of                                   Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary                                       

Belgium                                                    

France                                                        

Germany                                                    

Great  Britain                                           

Russia                                                       

Serbia                                         All  Serbian  Legations  

Serbia : 


To  All  Serbian  Legations  A  broad 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  18 

M,  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs , 
to  all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  June  26/ July  9,  1914. 

The  Crown  Prince  Alexander  is  receiving  threatening  letters  from 
Austria-Hungary  nearly  every  day.  Make  use  of  this  in  course  of 
conversation  with  your  colleagues  and  journalists. 


Friday,  July  10,  19 14 
There  are  no  published  despatches. 


July  11,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  11  19 

Saturday,  July  ii,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  fbom 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  

France  Budapest 

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia  

France  is  informed  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  and  the  press  are 
for  peace,  but  that  "the  general  public  here  (Budapest)  believes  in  war  and  fears 
it." 

France : 

From  Budapest 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  11 

M.  d^Apchier  le  Maugin,  French  Consul-General  at  Budapest,  to 
M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Budapest,  July  11,  1914. 

Questioned  in  the  Chamber  on  the  state  of  the  Austro-Serbian 
question  M.  Tisza  explained  that  before  everything  else  it  was 
necessary  to  wait  for  the  result  of  the  judicial  inquiry,  as  to  w^hich 
he  refused  at  the  moment  to  make  any  disclosure  whatsoever.  And 
the  Chamber  has  given  its  full  approval  to  this.  He  also  showed 
himself  equally  discreet  as  to  the  decisions  taken  at  the  meeting  of 
Ministers  at  Vienna,  and  did  not  give  any  indication  whether  the 
project  of  a  demarche  at  Belgrade,  with  which  all  the  papers  of  both 
hemispheres  are  full,  would  be  followed  up.  The  Chamber  assented 
without  hesitation. 

With  regard  to  this  demarche  it  seems  that  the  word  has  been 
given  to  minimise  its  significance ;  the  anger  of  the  Hungarians  has, 
as  it  were,  evaporated  through  the  virulent  articles  of  the  press, 
which  is  now  unanimous  in  advising  against  this  step,  which  might 
be  dangerous.  The  semi-official  press  especially  would  desire  that 
for  the  word  "demarche,''  with  its  appearance  of  a  threat,  there  should 
be  substituted  the  expression  "pourparlers,''  which  appears  to  them 
more  friendly  and  more  courteous.  Thus,  officially,  for  the  moment 
all  is  for  peace. 

All  is  for  peace,  in  the  press.  But  the  general  public  here  believes 
in  war  and  fears  it.  Moreover,  persons  in  whom  I  have  every  rea- 
son to  have  confidence  have  assured  me  that  they  knew  that  every 
day  cannon  and  ammunition  were  being  sent  in  large  quantities 


2Q-  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

towards  the  frontier.  Whether  true  or  not  this  rumour  has  been 
brought  to  me  from  various  quarters  with  details  which  agree  with 
one  another ;  at  least  it  indicates  what  are  the  thoughts  with  which 
people  are  generally  occupied.  The  Government,  whether  it  is 
sincerely  desirous  of  peace,  or  whether  it  is  preparing  a  coup,  is  now 
doing  all  that  it  can  to  allay  these  anxieties.  This  is  why  the  tone 
of  the  Government  newspapers  has  been  lowered,  first  by  one  note, 
then  by  two,  so  that  it  is  at  the  present  moment  almost  optimistic. 
But  they  had  themselves  spread  the  alarm  as  it  suited  them  (a  plaisir). 
Their  optimism  to  order  is  in  fact  without  an  echo ;  the  nervousness 
of  the  Bourse,  a  barometer  which  cannot  be  neglected,  is  a  sure  proof 
of  this;  without  exception  stocks  have  fallen  to  an  unaccountably 
low  level ;  the  Hungarian  4  per  cents  were  quoted  yesterday  at 
79.95,  a  rate  which  has  never  been  quoted  since  they  were  first  issued. 

D'Apchier  Le  Maugin. 


Sunday,  July  12,  1914 

There  are  no  published  despatches. 

Monday,  July  13,  1914 
There  are  no  published  despatches. 

Tuesday,  July  14,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


FoBEiGN  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

•Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 
Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

All  Serbian  Legations 

Berlin,  Vienna 

The  tone  of  the  Serbian  press  and  in  turn  that  of  the  Aiistro-Hungarian  press 
continue  threatening. 

Serbia : 

From  Berlin 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  19 

Dr.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  I/I4,  1914. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  told  me  that  he  could  not  understand 
the  provocative  attitude  of  the  Serbian  press  and  the  attacks  made 


July  14,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No,  20  21 

by  it  against  Austria-Hungary,  who,  as  a  Great  Power,  could  not 
tolerate  such  proceedings. 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  22 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanomtch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Vienna,  July  I/I4,  1914. 

Once  more  public  opinion  has  been  excited  against  us  by  the 
Literary  Bureau  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
With  the  exception  of  the  Zeit  and  the  Arheiter  Zeitung,  all  the 
Austro-Hungarian  newspapers  have  obtained  from  that  Bureau  the 
material  and  tone  of  their  articles  on  the  subject  of  the  Serajevo 
outrage.  You  have  yourself  seen  what  kind  of  material  and  tone 
this  is. 

I  am  reliably  informed  that  official  German  circles  here  are  espe- 
cially ill-disposed  towards  us.  These  circles  have  had  some  influence 
upon  the  writings  of  the  Vienna  press,  especially  upon  those  of  the 
Neue  Freie  Presse. 

This  latter  paper  is  still  anti-Serbian  a  Voutrance.  The  Neue 
Freie  Presse,  which  is  widely  read  and  has  many  friends  in  high 
financial  circles,  and  which  —  if  so  desired  —  writes  in  accordance 
with  instructions  from  the  Vienna  Press  Bureau,  briefly  summarises 
the  matter  as  follows :  "  We  have  to  settle  matters  with  Serbia  by 
war ;  it  is  evident  that  peaceable  means  are  of  no  avail.  And  if  it 
must  come  to  war  sooner  or  later,  then  it  is  better  to  see  the  matter 
through  now." 

The  Bourse  is  very  depressed.  There  has  not  been  such  a  fall  in 
prices  in  Vi*enna  for  a  long  time.  Some  securities  have  fallen  45 
kronen. 

To  All  Serbian  Legations 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  20 

M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  I/I4,  1914. 

(1)  The  Austrian  Korrespondenzbureau  is  showing  a  marked 
tendency  to  excite  public  opinion  in  Europe.  This  Bureau  interprets 
neither  correctly  nor  sincerely  the  tone  adopted  by  the  Belgrade  press. 
It  selects  the  strongest  expressions  from  such  articles  as  contain  replies 
to  insults,  threats  and  false  news  designed  to  mislead  public  opinion, 
and  submits  them  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  public. 

(2)  The  Korrespondenzbureau  quotes  especially  extracts  from 
articles  from  those  Serbian  newspapers  which  are  not  the  organs  of 
any  party  or  corporation. 


22  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

(3)  As  far  back  as  the  annexation  crisis,  Austria-Hungary  pro- 
hibited the  entry  into  the  country  of  all  Serbian  political  and  other 
newspapers,  and  thus  our  Press  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  excite 
public  opinion  in  Austria-Hungary  and  Europe  if  the  Korrespondenz- 
bureau  did  not  lay  stress  on  and  spread  broadcast  the  items  of  news 
w^hich  it  gathers  from  various  Serbian  papers,  in  every  instance 
-exaggerating  them.  Six  days  ago  the  entry  into  Austria-Hungary 
of  the  Odyek,  the  organ  of  the  Independent  Radical  Party,  w^as  pro- 
hibited ;  thus  all  our  papers  are  now  prevented  from  entering  Austria- 
Hungary. 

(4)  With  us  the  press  is  absolutely  free.  Newspapers  can  be 
confiscated  only  for  lese-majeste  or  for  revolutionary  propaganda; 
in  all  other  cases  confiscation  is  illegal.  There  is  no  censorship  of 
newspapers. 

In  these  circumstances,  you  should  point  out  for  their  informa- 
tion, where  necessary,  that  we  have  no  other  constitutional  or  legal 
means  at  our  disposal  for  the  control  of  our  press.  Nevertheless, 
w^hen  the  articles  in  our  papers  are  compared  with  those  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  it  is  evident  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  papers  originate 
the  controversy,  while  ours  merely  reply. 

Please  also  emphasize  the  fact  that  public  opinion  in  Serbia  is 
relatively  calm,  and  that  there  is  no  desire  on  our  part  to  provoke 
and  insult  Austria-Hungary.  No  one  in  Europe  would  know  what 
our  newspapers  were  writing  if  the  Korrespondenzbureau  did  not 
publish  these  items  of  news  with  the  intention  of  doing  as  much  harm 
as  possible  to  Serbia. 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  21 

M.  N.  Pashitchy  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade ,  July  1/H,  1914- 

During  the  past  few  days  the  Austro-Hungarian  newspapers  have 
been  spreading  reports  to  the  effect  that  there  have  been  demon- 
strations at  Belgrade  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation,  that 
some  Hungarian  journalists  were  killed ;  that  Austro-Hungarian 
subjects  in  Belgrade  were  maltreated  and  are  now  panic-stricken; 
that  at  the  funeral  of  the  late  M.  Hartwig  Serbian  students  made 
a  demonstration  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister,  etc.  All 
these  reports  are  absolutely  untrue  and  imaginary.  Complete  calm 
prevails  in  Belgrade  and  there  were  no  demonstrations  of  any  kind 
this  year,  nor  has  there  been  any  question  of  disorder.  Not  only 
do  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  and  his  staff  w^alk  about  the 
town  without  being  molested  in  any  way,  but  no  Austro-Hungarian 
subject  has  been  in  any  way  insulted,  either  by  word  or  deed,  as 
is  reported  by  the  Viennese  papers ;  still  less  was  any  attack  made 
upon  the  house  of  any  Austro-Hungarian  subject  or  were  any  of  their 
windows  broken.     Not  a  single  Austro-Hungarian  subject  has  had 


July  15,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  12  23 

the  slightest  cause  for  any  complaint.  All  these  false  reports  are 
being  purposely  spread  in  order  to  arouse  and  excite  Austro-Hungarian 
public  opinion  against  Serbia. 

The  whole  of  Belgrade  and  the  entire  diplomatic  body  were  pres- 
ent to-day  at  the  funeral  of  the  late  M.  Hartwig ;  there  was  not  the 
slightest  sign  of  resentment  shown  by  anybody.  During  the  whole 
ceremony  exemplary  order  was  maintained;  so  much  so  that  for- 
eigners were  impressed  with  the  good  behaviour  of  the  crowd,  which 
was  such  as  does  not  always  prevail  on  similar  occasions  even  in  their 
own  countries. 

Be  good  enough  to  communicate  the  above  to  the  Government 
to  which  you  are  accredited  and  to  the  press. 


Wednesday,  July  15,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  

France  Vienna 

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia  Vienna 


France  is  informed  of  some  bellicose  articles  in  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
papers. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  intentions  toward  Serbia  are  quoted  by  the  Serbian 
Minister  as  shrouded  in  mystery. 


France : 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  12 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  15,  1914- 

Certain  organs  of  the  Vienna  Press,  discussing  the  military  organi- 
sation of  France  and  of  Russia,  represent  these  two  countries  as 
incapable  of  holding  their  own  in  European  affairs ;  this  would  ensure 
to  the  Dual  monarchy,  supported  by  Germany,  appreciable  facilities 
for  subjecting  Servia  to  any  treatment  which  it  might  be  pleased 
to  impose.  The  Militdrische  Rundschau  frankly  admits  it.  "The 
moment  is  still  favourable  to  us.  If  we  do  not  decide  for  war,  that 
war  in  which  we  shall  have  to  engage  at  the  latest  in  two  or  three 
years  will  be  begun  in  far  less  propitious  circumstances.  At  this 
moment  the  initiative  rests  with  us :  Russia  is  not  ready,  moral  fac- 


24  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

tors  and  right  are  on  our  side,  as  well  as  might.  Since  we  shall  have 
to  accept  the  contest  some  day/  let  us  provoke  it  at  once.  Our 
prestige,  our  position  as  a  Great  Power,  our  honour,  are  in  question ; 
and  yet  more,  for  it  would  seem  that  our  very  existence  is  concerned 
—  to  be  or  not  to  be  —  which  is  in  truth  the  great  matter  to-day." 

Surpassing  itself,  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  of  to-day  reproaches  Count 
Tisza  for  the  moderation  of  his  second  speech,  in  which  he  said, 
"Our  relations  with  Servia  require,  however,  to  be  made  clear." 
These  words  rouse  its  indignation.  For  it,  tranquillity  and  security 
can  result  only  from  a  war  to  the  knife  against  Pan-Servism,  and  it  is 
in  the  name  of  humanity  that  it  demands  the  extermination  of  the 
cursed  Servian  race.  Dumaine. 

Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  23 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  .    Vienna,  July  2/15,  1914. 

The  most  important  question  for  us  is,  what,  if  any,  are  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  as  regards  the  Serajevo 
outrage.  Until  now  I  have  been  unable  to  find  this  out,  and  my 
other  colleagues  are  in  a  similar  position.  The  word  has  now  been 
passed  round  here  not  to  tell  anybody  anything. 

The  evening  before  last  the  Ministers  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  held 
a  meeting.  It  has  not  been  possible  to  learn  anything  about  the 
object  and  the  result  of  this  meeting.  The  communique  issued  on 
the  subject  was  brief  and  obscure.  It  appears  that  the  consequences 
of  the  Serajevo  outrage  were  discussed  at  length,  but  that  nothing 
was  decided.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  Chief  of  Staff  and  the  Naval 
Commander-in-Chief  were  present,  as  was  rumoured.  After  this 
meeting  Count  Berchtold  travelled  to  Ischl  to  report  to  the  Em- 
peror, who,  after  the  funeral  of  Franz  Ferdinand,  had  returned  there 
to  recover  his  health.  In  the  Hungarian  Parliament  Count  Tisza 
has  replied  to  the  interpellations  of  the  opposition  concerning  the 
Serajevo  incident;  you  are  acquainted  with  his  statements.  His 
speech  was  not  clear,  and  I  believe  it  was  intentionally  obscure. 
Some  people  saw  in  it  signs  of  an  intention  quietly  to  await  the  de- 
velopment of  events  and  of  calmness  in  the  attitude  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government,  while  others  saw  in  it  hidden  intentions  for 

^  The  reasons  underlying  this  statement  are  thus  set  forth  in  the  American  Review 
of  Reviews,  July,  1914,  p.  30:  "It  is  believed  that  Russia  is  intending  to  provoke  a 
Near  Eastern  Crisis.  Reports  are  also  rife  that  a  secret  Naval  Convention  has  been 
concluded  between  England  and  Russia  with  the  object  of  enforcing  the  demands  of 
the  Triple  Entente  against  Germany."  And  these  demands  of  the  Triple  Entente,  so 
far  as  Russia  is  concerned,  are  set  forth  in  the  same  copy  of  American  Review  of 
Reviews  in  an  interview  with  the  Russian  statesman,  Professor  Mitronov,  as  follows : 
"As  far  as  Russia  is  concerned  extension  into  the  Balkans  is  a  political  necessity  and 
nothing  short  of  the  possession  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles  will  end  the  in- 
tolerable faituation." 


July  15,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  25  25 

(I  should  say)  an  action  as  yet  undecided.  It  was  noted  that  there 
was  no  occasion  for  haste  until  the  results  of  the  magisterial  enquiry 
were  announced.  Some  time  has  now  elapsed  ;  the  matter  has  been 
spoken  of,  discussed,  written  about  and  distorted ;  then  came  the 
death  of  Hartwig  and  the  alarm  of  Baron  Giesl.  In  connection  with 
this  again  came  the  interpellations  addressed  to  Count  Tisza  in  the 
Hungarian  Parliament;  you  have  read  his  reply.  Many  hold  the 
opinion  here  that  this  second  speech  is  much  more  restrained  than 
the  first,  and  that  this  is  to  be  attributed  to  an  order  from  the  Em- 
peror. (The  Bourse  has  now  recovered ;  both  the  War  Minister  and 
the  Chief  of  Staff  have  gone  on  leave.)  I  am  loath  to  express  an 
opinion.  In  the  above-mentioned  speech  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
possibility  of  war  is  not  excluded,  in  the  event  of  the  demands  of 
Austria-Hungary  in  regard  to  the  Serajevo  outrage  not  being  com- 
plied with. 

One  thing  is  certain :  Austria-Hungary  will  take  diplomatic  steps 
at  Belgrade  as  soon  as  the  magisterial  enquiry  at  Serajevo  is  com- 
pleted and  the  matter  submitted  to  the  Court. 

I  have,  etc. 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  24 

M.   Ym.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Sir,  Vienna,  July  2/15,  1914- 

It  is  thought  here  that  the  magisterial  enquiries  and  investigations 
have  not  produced  sufficient  evidence  to  justify  bringing  an  official 
accusation  against  Serbia,  but  it  is  believed  that  the  latter  will  be 
accused  of  tolerating  within  her  borders  certain  revolutionary  ele- 
ments. Diplomatic  circles  here  criticise  and  condemn  the  mode  of 
procedure  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  especially  the  atti- 
tude throughout  of  the  Korrespondenzbureau  and  the  Vienna  press. 
There  are  many  who  consider  our  attitude  to  be  correct  and  in 
accordance  with  the  dignity  of  a  nation.  They  find  fault  only  with 
the  views  expressed  in  some  of  our  newspapers,  though  they  all 
admit  that  it  is  provoked  by  the  Vienna  press. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  appears  that  the  German  Foreign  Office 
does  not  approve  of  the  anti-Serbian  policy  of  Vienna,  the  German 
Embassy  here  is  at  this  very  moment  encouraging  such  a  policy. 

I  have,  etc. 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  25 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,        .  Vienna,  July  2/15,  1914. 

What  steps  will  be  taken  ?  In  what  form  ?  What  demands  will 
Austria-Hungary  make  of  Serbia  ?     I  do  not  believe  that  to-day  even 


26  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  Ballplatz  ^  itself  could  answer  these  questions  clearly  and  pre- 
cisely. I  am  of  opinion  that  its  plans  are  now  being  laid,  and  that 
again  Count  Forgach  is  the  moving  spirit. 

In  an  earlier  report  I  mentioned  that  Austria-Hungary  has  to 
choose  between  two  courses :  either  to  make  the  Serajevo  outrage 
a  domestic  question,  inviting  us  to  assist  her  to  discover  and  punish 
the  culprits ;  or  to  make  it  a  case  against  the  Serbians  and  Serbia, 
and  even  against  the  Jugo-Slavs.  After  taking  into  consideration 
all  that  is  being  prepared  and  done,  it  appears  to  me  that  Austria- 
Hungary  will  choose  the  latter  course.  Austria-Hungary  will  do  this 
in  the  belief  that  she  will  have  the  approval  of  Europe.  Why  should 
she  not  profit  by  humiliating  us,  and,  to  a  certain  extent,  justify  the 
Friedjung  and  Agram  trials?  Besides,  Austria-Hungary  desires  in 
this  manner  to  justify  in  the  eyes  of  her  own  people  and  of  Europe 
the  sharp  and  reactionary  measures  which  she  contemplates  under- 
taking internally  in  order  to  suppress  the  Great  Serbian  propaganda 
and  the  Jugo-Slav  idea.  Finally,  for  the  sake  of  her  prestige,^  Austria- 
Hungary  must  take  some  action  in  the  belief  that  she  will  thus  raise 
her  prestige  internally  as  well  as  externally.  .  .  .^ 

Austria-Hungary  will,  I  think,  draw  up  in  the  form  of  a  memoran- 
dum an  accusation  against  Serbia.  In  that  accusation  will  be  set 
forth  all  the  evidence  that  has  been  collected  against  us  since  April, 
1909,  until  to-day ;  and  I  believe  that  this  accusation  will  be  fairly 
lengthy.  Austria-Hungary  will  communicate  this  accusation  to  the 
Cabinets  of  the  European  Powers  with  the  remark  that  the  facts  con- 
tained therein  give  her  the  right  to  take  diplomatic  steps  at  Belgrade, 
and  to  demand  that  Serbia  should  in  the  future  fulfill  all  the  obliga- 
tions of  a  loyal  neighbour.  At  the  same  time  Austria-Hungary  will 
also  hand  us  a  note  containing  her  demands,  which  we  shall  be  re- 
quested to  accept  unconditionally.'^ 

I  have,  etc. 


Thursday,  July  i6,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sknt  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  

France  

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia  Berlin 


1  The  Austrian  Foreign  OflBce  is  situated  on  the  Ballplatz. 

'  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  38,  despatch  from  Rome,  under  date  of  July  23, 
1914. 

'  The  omissions  indicated  by  the  dots  are  those  of  the  official  British  translation. 
*  This  was  the  exact  course  taken  by  Austria  a  few  days  later. 


July  17,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  27  27 

Serbia : 

From  Berlin 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  26 

Dr.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  3/16,  1914. 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  informed  me  that  the  reports  of  the 
German  Minister  at  Belgrade  point  to  the  existence  of  a  Great  Ser- 
bian propaganda,  which  should  be  energetically  suppressed  by  the 
Government  in  the  interest  of  good  relations  with  Austria-Hungary. 

Friday,  July  17,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  •  •  

France  

Germany  

Great  Britain 

Russia  ■ •  

Serbia London,  Rome 

Italy  is  said  to  have  warned  Austria-Hungary,  and  the  EngHsh  Press  is  reported 
in  Serbia  as  being  unfavorably  influenced  by  cuttings  from  the  Serbian  Press  sup- 
plied to  it  by  Austria-Hungary. 

Serbia : 

From  London 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  27 

M.  M.  S.  Boschkovitch,  Minister  at  London,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  London,  July  4/17,  1914. 

The  Austrian  Embassy  is  making  very  great  efforts  to  win  over 
the  English  press  against  us,  and  to  induce  it  to  favour  the  idea  that 
Austria  must  give  a  good  lesson  to  Serbia.  The  Embassy  is  sub- 
mitting to  the  news  editors  cuttings  from  our  newspapers  as  a  proof 
of  the  views  expressed  in  our  press.  The  situation  may  become 
more  acute  during  the  next  few  weeks.  No  reliance  should  be  placed 
in  the  ostensibly  peaceable  statements  of  Austro-Hungarian  official 
circles,  as  the  way  is  being  prepared  for  diplomatic  pressure  upon 
Serbia,  which  may  develop  into  an  armed  attack.  It  is  probable  that 
as  soon  as  Austria-Hungary  has  taken  action  at  Belgrade  she  will 
change  her  attitude  and  will  seek  to  humiliate  Serbia. 


28  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Rome 
Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  28 

M,  Ljub  Michailovitchy  Minister  at  Rome,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  4/17,  191 4. 

I ILWE  obtained  reliable  information  to  the  effect  that  the  Marquis 
di  San  Giuliano  has  stated  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  that 
any  step  undertaken  by  Austria  against  Serbia  which  failed  to  take 
into  account  international  considerations  would  meet  with  the  dis- 
approval of  public  opinion  in  Italy,  and  that  the  Italian  Government 
desire  to  see  the  complete  independence  of  Serbia  maintained. 

Saturday,  July  18,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 
Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

Petrograd 

Serbia : 

From  Petrograd 
Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  29 

Dr.  M.  Spalaikovitch,  Minister  at  Petrograd,  to  M.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

(Telegraphic.)  Petrograd,  July  5/18,  1914. 

I  HAVE  spoken  to  the  Assistant  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  the 
subject  of  the  provocative  attitude  of  the  Korrespondenzbureau  and 
the  Vienna  press. 

M.  Sazonof  told  me  a  few  days  ago  that  he  wondered  why  the 
Austrian  Government  were  doing  nothing  to  put  a  stop  to  the  futile 
agitation  on  the  part  of  the  press  in  Vienna  which,  after  all,  frightened 
nobody,  and  was  only  doing  harm  to  Austria  herself. 


July  19,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  I4  29 

Sunday,  July  19,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  fbom 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  

France  Vienna 

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  

Serbia  All  representatives  

France  is  placed  in  possession,  through  secret  sources,  of  the  terms  of  the  forth- 
coming Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia,  and  learns  the  reason  why  it  will  con- 
tain a  time  limit. 

Serbia  endeavors  to  justify  herself  at  the  various  foreign  offices  of  Europe. 

France : 

From  Vienna 

French  Yeulow  Book  No.  13 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

Vienna,  July  19,  191 4. 

The  Chancellor  of  the  Consulate,  who  has  sent  me  his  half-yearly 
report,  in  which  he  sums  up  the  various  economic  facts  which  have 
been  the  subject  of  his  study  since  the  beginning  of  the  year,  has 
added  a  section  containing  political  information  emanating  from  a 
trustworthy  source. 

I  asked  him  briefly  to  sima  up  the  information  which  he  has  ob- 
tained regarding  the  impending  presentation  of  the  Austrian  note 
to  Servia,  which  the  papers  have  for  some  days  been  persistently 
announcing. 

You  will  find  the  text  of  this  memorandum  interesting  on  account 
of  the  accurate  information  which  it  contains. 

Dumaine. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  14 

Memorandum 

{Extract  from  a  Consular  Report  on  the  Economic  and  Political  Situa- 
tion in  Austria) 

Vienna,  July  20,  1914} 

From  information  furnished  by  a  person  specially  well  informed 
as  to  official  news,  it  appears  that  the  French  Government  would  be 

1  This  memorandum  is  dated  July  20,  1^14.  Since  it  is  enclosed  in  a  letter  of 
July  19,  1914,  it  cannot  possibly  be  later  than  the  letter.     From  the  letter  itself  it  would 


30  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

wrong  to  have  confidence  in  disseminators  of  optimism;  much  will 
be  demanded  of  Servia ;  she  will  be  required  to  dissolve  several 
propagandist  societies,  she  will  be  summoned  to  repress  nationalism, 
to  guard  the  frontier  in  cooperation  with  Austrian  officials,  to  keep 
strict  control  over  anti- Austrian  tendencies  in  the  schools ;  and  it  is 
a  very  difficult  matter  for  a  Government  to  consent  to  become  in 
this  way  a  policeman  for  a  foreign  Government.  They  foresee  the 
subterfuges  by  which  Servia  will  doubtless  wish  to  avoid  giving  a 
clear  and  direct  reply ;  that  is  why  a  short  interval  will  perhaps  ^  be 
fixed  for  her  to  declare  whether  she  accepts  or  not.  The  tenor  of 
the  note  and  its  imperious  tone  almost  certainly  ensure  that  Bel- 
grade will  refuse.     Then  military  operations  will  begin. 

There  is  here,  and  equally  at  Berlin,  a  party  which  accepts  the 
idea  of  a  conflict  of  widespread  dimensions,  in  other  words,  a  con- 
flagration. The  leading  idea  is  probably  that  it  would  be  necessary 
to  start  before  Russia  has  completed  the  great  improvements  of  her 
army  and  railways,  and  before  France  has  brought  her  military 
organisation  to  perfection.  But  on  this  point  there  is  no  unanimity 
in  high  circles ;  Count  Berchtold  and  the  diplomatists  desire  at  the 
most  localised  operations  against  Servia.  But  everything  must  be 
regarded  as  possible.  A  singular  fact  is  pointed  out :  generally  the 
official  telegraph  agency,  in  its  summaries  and  reviews  of  the  foreign 
press,  pays  attention  only  to  semi-official  newspapers  and  to  the 
most  important  organs ;  it  omits  all  quotation  from  and  all  mention 
of  the  others.  This  is  a  rule  and  a  tradition.  Now,  for  the  last  ten 
days,  the  official  agency  has  furnished  daily  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
press  a  complete  review  of  the  whole  Servian  press,  giving  a  promi- 
nent place  to  the  least  known,  the  smallest,  and  most  insignificant 
papers,  which,  just  on  account  of  their  obscurity,  employ  language 
freer,  bolder,  more  aggressive,  and  often  insulting.  This  work  of 
the  official  agency  has  obviously  for  its  aim  the  excitement  of  public 
feeling  and  the  creation  of  opinion  favourable  to  war.  The  fact  is 
significant. 

seem  that  the  report  would  have  to  be  dated  not  later  than  on  the  date  previous  to  its 
submission  to  the  ambassador,  and  that  is  July  18,  1914, 

Whether  the  student  accepts  this  date,  or  July  19,  1914,  the  noteworthy  fact  is 
established  that  France  had  accurate  information  —  and  the  ambassador  knew  it 
to  be  so  (cf .  last  line  of  his  letter)  —  of  the  intended  action  of  Austria-Hungary,  and 
knew  that  there  would  be  a  time  limit  attached  to  Austria's  demands. 

1  The  word  "perhaps"  does  not  occur  in  the  Times  edition  of  the  French  Yellow 
Book,  but  has  been  added  to  the  text  in  the  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents  Relating 
to  the  Outbreak  of  the  European  War  printed  under  the  authority  of  His  Majesty's 
Stationery  Office.  There  is  no  explanation  in  the  Official  British  Version  why  the 
word  "perhaps"  has  been  added.  The  text  of  the  French  Yellow  Book  supplied 
to  the  editor  by  the  French  Embassy  in  Washington  in  October,  1915,  contains  the 
word  "peut-^tre." 


July  19,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  30  31 

Serbia : 

To  All  Serbian  Missions  Abroad 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  30 

M.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  all 
Serbian  Missions  abroad 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  6/19,  1914. 

Immediately  after  the  Serajevo  outrage  the  Austro-Hungarian 
press  began  to  accuse  Serbia  of  that  detestable  crime,  which,  in  the 
opinion  of  that  press,  was  the  direct  result  of  the  Great  Serbian  idea. 
The  Austrian  press  further  contended  that  that  idea  was  spread  and 
propagated  by  various  associations,  such  as  the  "Narodna  Odbrana," 
''Kolo  Srpskich  Sestara,"  etc.,  which  were  tolerated  by  the  Serbian 
Government. 

On  learning  of  the  murder,  the  Serbian  Royal  Family,  as  well  as 
the  Serbian  Government,  sent  messages  of  condolence,^  and  at  the 
same  time  expressed  severe  condemnation  of  and  horror  at  the  crime 
that  had  been  committed.  All  festivities  which  had  been  fixed  to 
take  place  on  that  day  in  Belgrade  were  immediately  cancelled. 

Nevertheless,  the  press  of  the  neighbouring  Monarchy  continued 
to  hold  Serbia  responsible  for  the  Serajevo  outrage.  Moreover,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  press  began  to  spread  in  connection  with  it  various 
false  reports,  designed  to  mislead  public  opinion,  which  provoked  the 
Belgrade  press  to  reply  in  self-defence,  and  sometimes  to  active  hos- 
tility in  a  spirit  of  embitterment  aroused  by  the  misrepresentation 
of  what  had  occurred.  Seeing  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  was 
intentionally  luring  the  Belgrade  press  into  an  awkward  and  delicate 
controversy,  the  Serbian  Government  hastened  to  warn  the  press  in 
Belgrade,  and  to  recommend  it  to  remain  calm  and  to  confine  itself 
to  simple  denials  and  to  the  suppression  of  false  and  misleading  re- 
ports. The  action  of  the  Serbian  Government  was  ineffectual  in  the 
case  of  some  of  the  less  important  papers,  more  especially  in  view 
of  the  fact  that  newly  invented  stories  were  daily  spread  abroad 
with  the  object  of  serving  political  ends  not  only  against  Serbia  but 
also  against  the  Serbs  in  Austria-Hungary.  The  Serbian  Govern- 
ment were  unable  to  avert  these  polemics  between  the  Serbian  and 
the  Austrian  press,  seeing  that  Serbian  law,  and  the  provisions  of  the 
constitution  itself,  guarantee  the  complete  independence  of  the  press 
and  prohibit  all  measures  of  control  and  the  seizure  of  newspapers. 
These  polemics  were  further  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  the  Vienna 
and  Budapesth  journals  selected  passages  from  such  of  the  Serbian 
newspapers  as  have  practically  no  influence  upon  public  opinion, 
strengthened  still  further  their  tone,  and,  having  thus  manipulated 
them,  passed  them  on  to  the  foreign  press  with  the  obvious  intention 
of  exciting  public  opinion  in  other  European  countries  and  of  repre- 
senting Serbia  as  being  guilty. 

Those  who  have  followed  the  course  of  these  polemics  will  know 

^  These  messages  are  not  given  in  the  published  documents.  Cf .  also  British  Blue 
Book  No.  121,  July  24  and  note  1. 


32  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

that  the  Belgrade  newspapers  merely  acted  in  self-defence,  confining 
their  activities  to  denials  and  to  the  refutation  of  falsehoods  designed 
to  mislead  public  opinion,  at  the  same  time  attempting  to  convince 
foreign  Governments  (which,  being  occupied  with  other  and  more 
serious  affairs,  had  no  time  to  go  into  the  matter  themselves)  of  the 
intention  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  to  excite  public  opinion  in 
its  own  country  and  abroad. 

The  Serbian  Government  at  once  expressed  their  readiness  to  hand 
over  to  justice  any  of  their  subjects  who  might  be  proved  to  have 
played  a  part  in  the  Serajevo  outrage.  The  Serbian  Government 
further  stated  that  they  had  prepared  a  more  drastic  law  against  the 
misuse  of  explosives.  The  draft  of  a  new  law  in  that  sense  had  already 
been  laid  before  the  State  Council,  but  could  not  be  submitted  to  the 
Skupshtina,  as  the  latter  was  not  sitting  at  the  time.  Finally,  the 
Serbian  Government  stated  that  they  were  ready,  as  heretofore,  to 
observe  all  those  good  neighbourly  obligations  to  which  Serbia  was 
bound  by  her  position  as  a  European  State. 

During  the  whole  of  this  period,  from  the  date  of  the  perpetration 
of  the  outrage  until  to-day,  not  once  did  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment apply  to  the  Serbian  Government  for  their  assistance  in  the 
matter.^  They  did  not  demand  that  any  of  the  accomplices  should 
be  subjected  to  an  enquiry,  or  that  they  should  be  handed  over  to 
trial.  In  one  instance  only  did  the  Austrian  Government  ask  for 
information  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  certain  students  who  had  been 
expelled  from  the  Pakratz  Teachers'  Seminary,  and  had  crossed  over 
to  Serbia  to  continue  their  studies.  All  available  information  on  this 
point  was  supplied. 

The  campaign  against  Serbia,  however,  was  unremittingly  pursued 
in  the  Austrian  press,  and  public  opinion  was  excited  against  her  in 
Austria  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  Europe.  Matters  went  so  far  that 
the  more  prominent  leaders  of  political  parties  in  Austria-Hungary 
began  to  ask  questions  in  Parliament  on  the  subject  of  the  outrage, 
to  which  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister  replied.  It  is  evident  from 
the  discussions  in  this  connection  that  Austria  is  contemplating  some 
action,  but  it  is  not  clear  in  what  sense.  It  is  not  stated  whether  the 
measures  which  are  to  be  taken  —  more  especially  military  measures 
—  will  depend  upon  the  reply  and  the  conciliatory  attitude  of  the 
Serbian  Government.  But  an  armed  conflict  is  being  hinted  at  in 
the  event  of  the  Serbian  Government  being  unable  to  give  a  cate- 
gorically satisfactory  reply. 

On  the  sudden  death  of  the  Russian  Minister,  M.  de  Hartwig,  at 
the  residence  of  the  Austrian  Minister,  the  polemics  in  the  news- 
papers became  still  more  acute ;  nevertheless  this  sad  event  did  not 
lead  to  any  disorders  even  during  the  funeral  of  M.  Hartwig.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation  was  so  perturbed  by 
certain  false  reports  that  Austrian  subjects  began  to  conceal  them- 
selves, some  of  them  taking  refuge  in  the  Semlin  and  Belgrade  hotels, 

1  This  statement  seems  to  be  at  variance  with  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  2, 
under  date  of  June  30,  1914. 


July  19,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No,  30  33 

and  others  in  the  Legation  itself.  At  5  p.m.  on  the  day  of  the  King's 
birthday,  which  passed  in  the  most  orderly  manner,  I  was  informed 
by  the  Austrian  Minister,  through  the  Viee-Consul,  M.  Pomgraz, 
that  preparations  were  being  made  for  an  attack  that  night  on  the 
Austrian  Legation  and  on  Austro-Hungarian*  subjects  in  Belgrade. 
He  begged  me  to  take  the  necessary  steps  for  the  protection  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  subjects  and  of  the  Legation,  stating  at  the  same  time 
that  he  held  Serbia  responsible  for  all  that  might  occur.  I  replied 
that  the  responsible  Serbian  Government  were  not  aware  of  any 
preparations  of  this  kind  being  made,  but  that  I  would  in  any  case 
at  once  inform  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and  beg  him  at  the  same 
time  to  take  such  measures  as  might  be  necessary.  The  next  day 
showed  that  the  Austrian  Legation  had  been  misled  by  false  rumours, 
for  neither  any  attack  nor  any  preparations  for  attack  were  made. 
Notwithstanding  this,  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  took  advantage 
of  this  incident  to  prove  how  excited  public  opinion  was  in  Serbia 
and  to  what  lengths  she  was  ready  to  go.  It  went  even  further  and 
tried  to  allege  that  something  really  had  been  intended  to  happen, 
since  M.  Pashitch  himself  had  stated  that  he  had  heard  of  such 
rumours.  All  this  indicates  clearly  the  intention  to  excite  public 
opinion  against  Serbia  w^henever  occasion  arises. 

When  all  that  has  been  said  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament  is  taken 
into  consideration,  there  is  reason  for  apprehension  that  some  step 
is  being  prepared  against  us  which  may  produce  a  disagreeable  effect 
upon  the  relations  between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary.  There  is 
still  further  ground  for  such  apprehension,  as  it  is  abundantly  evi- 
dent that  the  enquiry  which  is  being  made  is  not  to  be  limited  to  the 
perpetrators  and  their  possible  accomplices  in  the  crime,  but  is  most 
probably  to  be  extended  to  Serbia  and  the  Great  Serbian  idea. 

By  their  attitude  and  the  measures  they  have  taken,  the  Serbian 
Government  have  irrefutably  proved  that  they  are  working  to  restrain 
excitable  elements,  and  in  the  interests  of  peace  and  the  maintenance 
of  good  relations  with  all  their  neighbours.  The  Government  have 
given  their  particular  attention  to  the  improvement  and  strengthen- 
ing of  their  relations  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  which 
had  lately  become  strained  as  a  result  of  the  Balkan  wars  and  of  the 
questions  which  arose  therefrom.  With  that  object  in  view,  the  Ser- 
bian Government  proceeded  to  settle  the  question  of  the  Oriental 
Railway,  the  new  railway  connections,  and  the  transit  through  Serbia 
of  Austro-Hungarian  goods  for  Constantinople,  Sofia,  Salonica,  and 
Athens. 

The  Serbian  Government  consider  that  their  vital  interests  require 
that  peace  and  tranquillity  in  the  Balkans  should  be  firmly  and  last- 
ingly established.  And  for  this  very  reason  they  fear  lest  the  excited 
state  of  public  opinion  in  Austria-Hungary  may  induce  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  to  make  a  demarche  which  may  humiliate 
the  dignity  of  Serbia  as  a  State,  and  to  put  forward  demands  which 
€ould  not  be  accepted. 

I  have  the  honour  therefore  to  request  you  to  impress  upon  the 


34  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Government  to  which  you  are  accredited  our  desire  to  maintain 
friendly  relations  with  Austria-Hungary,  and  to  suppress  every  at- 
tempt directed  against  the  peace  and  public  safety  of  the  neighbour- 
ing Monarchy.  We  will  likewise  meet  the  wishes  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Empire  in  the  event  of  our  being  requested  to  subject  to 
trial  in  our  independent  Courts  any  accomplices  in  the  outrage  who 
are  in  Serbia  —  should  such,  of  course,  exist. 

But  we  can  never  comply  with  demands  which  may  be  directed 
against  the  dignity  of  Serbia,  and  which  would  be  inacceptable  to  any 
country  which  respects  and  maintains  its  independence. 

Actuated  by  the  desire  that  good  neighbourly  relations  may  be 
firmly  established  and  maintained,  we  beg  the  friendly  Governments 
to  take  note  of  these  declarations  and  to  act  in  a  conciliatory  sense 
should  occasion  or  necessity  arise. 

Monday,  July  20,  1 914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DOCUMENTS 

FoBEiQN  Office  op  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  

Belgium  

France  

Germany  

Great  Britain  Berlin  

Russia  

Serbia  Vienna 

Great  Britain  enters  the  diplomatic  exchange  of  views  on  this  day,  according  to 
the  British  Blue  Book.  From  the  Introductory  Narrative  to  the  British  Blue 
Book,  Edition  of  September  28,  it  appears  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  kept  in 
touch  from  the  first  with  the  events  arising  out  of  the  Serajevo  murder.  (For 
the  Introductory  Narrative  see  pp.  561  to  570.) 

Great  Britain : 

Sent  to  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  1 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  H.  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at 
Berlin 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  20,  1914. 

I  ASKED  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  if  he  had  any  news  of 
what  was  going  on  in  Vienna  with  regard  to  Servia. 

He  said  that  he  had  not,  but  Austria  was  certainly  going  to  take 
some  step,  and  he  regarded  the  situation  as  very  uncomfortable. 

I  said  that  I  had  not  heard  anything  recently,^  except  that  Count 

1  This  seems  to  be  at  variance  with  Chapter  Two  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  Introductory 
Narrative  to  the  British  Blue  Book  Edition,  of  Sept.  28, 1914.  See  p.  562.  Consider- 
ing, moreover,  the  close  relations  existing  between  the  French  and  the  British  Foreign 
Offices  it  seems  likely  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  may  have  had  cognisance  of  the  information 
contained  in  the  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  13  and  14,  under  date  of  July  19,  and  of  the  infor- 
mation contained  in  the  despatches  published  by  other  Foreign  Offices  under  dates  of 


July  20y  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  31  35 

Berchtold/  in  speaking  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  had 
deprecated  the  suggestion  that  the  situation  was  grave,  but  had  said 
that  it  should  be  cleared  up. 

The  German  Ambassador  said  that  it  would  be  a  very  desirable 
thing  if  Russia  could  act  as  a  mediator  with  regard  to  Servia. 

I  said  that  I  assumed  that  the  Austrian  Government  would  not 
do  anything  until  they  had  first  disclosed  to  the  public  their  case 
against  Servia,  founded  presumably  upon  what  they  had  discovered 
at  the  trial. 

The  Ambassador  said  that  he  certainly  assumed  that  they  would 
act  upon  some  case  that  would  be  known. 

I  said  that  this  would  make  it  easier  for  others,  such  as  Russia, 
to  counsel  moderation  in  Belgrade.  In  fact,  the  more  Austria  could 
keep  her  demand  within  reasonable  limits,  and  the  stronger  the  justi- 
fication she  could  produce  for  making  any  demand,  the  more  chance 
there  would  be  of  smoothing  things  over.  I  hated  the  idea  of  a  war 
between  any  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  that  any  of  them  should  be 
dragged  into  a  war  by  Servia  would  be  detestable. 

The  Ambassador  agreed  wholeheartedly  in  this  sentiment. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 

Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  31 

M.   Yov.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitchy 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

Sir,  Vienna,  July  7/20,  1914. 

It  is  very  difficult,  indeed  almost  impossible,  to  ascertain  here  any- 
thing positive  as  to  the  real  intentions  of  Austria-Hungary.  The 
word  has  been  passed  round  to  maintain  absolute  secrecy  about 
everything  that  is  being  done.  Judging  by  the  articles  in  our  news- 
papers, Belgrade  is  taking  an  optimistic  view  of  the  questions  pend- 
ing with  Austria-Hungary.  There  is,  however,  no  room  for  optimism. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Austria-Hungary  is  making  preparations  of  a 
serious  character.  What  is  chiefly  to  be  feared,  and  is  highly  prob- 
able, is,  that  Austria  is  preparing  for  war  against  Serbia.  The  general 
conviction  that  prevails  here  is  that  it  would  be  nothing  short  of 
suicide  for  Austria-Hungary  once  more  to  fail  to  take  advantage  of 
the  opportunity  to  act  against  Serbia.  It  is  believed  that  the  two 
opportunities  previously  missed  —  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  ^  and 
the  Balkan  war  ^  —  have  been  extremely  injurious  to  Austria-Hun- 
gary. In  addition,  the  conviction  is  steadily  growing  that  Serbia, 
after  her  two  wars,  is  completely  exhausted,  and  that  a  war  against 

June  28,  to  July  19, 1914.  Whether  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  30,  July  19,  had  been  deliv- 
ered to  Sir  E.  Grey  when  he  wrote  the  above  despatch  is  not  sure. 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

2 1908.  3 1913. 


36  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Serbia  would  in  fact  merely  mean  a  military  expedition  to  be  con- 
cluded by  a  speedy  occupation.  It  is  also  believed  that  such  a  war 
could  be  brought  to  an  end  before  Europe  could  intervene. 

The  seriousness  of  Austrian  intentions  is  further  emphasised  by 
the  military  preparations  which  are  being  made,  especially  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  Serbian  frontier. 

I  have,  etc. 


Tuesday,  July  21,  1814 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received 

Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  Belgrade 

Belgium  

France  London,  etc :  Berlin 

Germany  

Great  Britain  

Russia  ,  

Serbia  

Serbia  declares  her  readiness  in  Berlin  to  accept  the  forthcoming  Austro- 
Hungarian  demands,  provided  that  Austria-Hungary  asks  ''only  for  judicial 
cooperation." 

G'erman?/ declares  that  she  is  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  ** contents'*  of  the 
forthcoming  note. 

Austria-Hungary  receives  another  report  of  the  hostile  attitude  of  the  Serbian 
people,  who  are  represented  as  rejoicing  over  the  Serajevo  murder. 

Austria : 

From  Belgrade 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   6 

Freiherr  von  Giesl  to  Count  Berchtold 

Belgrade,  July  21,  1914. 

After  the  lamentable  crime  of  June  28th,  I  have  now  been  back 
at  my  post  for  some  time,  and  I  am  able  to  give  some  judgment  as 
to  the  tone  which  prevails  here. 

After  the  annexation  crisis  ^  the  relations  between  the  Monarchy 
and  Servia  were  poisoned  on  the  Servian  side  by  national  chauvinism, 
animosity  and  an  effective  propaganda  of  Great-Servian  aspirations 
carried  on  in  that  part  of  our  territory  where  there  is  a  Servian  popu- 
lation; since  the  last  two  Balkan  Wars,  the  success  of  Servia  has 
increased  this  chauvinism  to  a  paroxysm,  the  expression  of  which  in 
some  cases  bears  the  mark  of  insanity. 

I  may  be  excused  from  bringing  proof  and  evidence  of  this ;  they 
can  be  had  easily  everywhere  among  all  parties,  in  political  circles 
as  well  as  among  the  lower  classes.  I  put  it  forward  as  a  well-known 
axiom  that  the  policy  of  Servia  is  built  up  on  the  separation  of  the 
territories  inhabited  by  Southern  Slavs,  and  as  a  corollary  to  this  on 

1  The  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria-Hungary  in  1908. 


July  21  y  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  6  37 

the  abolition  of  the  Monarchy  as  a  Great  Power;    this  is  its  only' 
object. 

No  one  who  has  taken  the  trouble  to  move  and  take  part  in  political 
circles  here  for  a  week  can  be  blind  to  this  truth. 

The  hatred  against  the  Monarchy  has  been  further  intensified  as 
a  result  of  the  latest  events  which  influence  political  opinion  here; 
among  them  I  count  the  crime  of  Serajevo,  the  death  of  Hartwig 
and  the  electoral  campaign. 

The  crime  at  Serajevo  has  aroused  among  the  Servians  an  expec- 
tation that  in  the  immediate  future  the'Hapsburg  States  will  fall  to 
pieces ;  it  was  this  on  which  they  had  set  their  hopes  even  before ; 
there  has  been  dangled  before  their  eyes  the  cession  of  those  terri- 
tories in  the  Monarchy  which  are  inhabited  by  the  Southern  Slavs,  a 
revolution  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  the  unreliability  of  the 
Slav  regiments  —  this  is  regarded  as  ascertained  fact  and  had  brought 
system  and  apparent  justification  into  their  nationalist  madness. 

Austria-Hungary,  hated  as  she  is,  now  appears  to  the  Servians  as 
powerless,  and  as  scarcely  worthy  of  waging  war  with;  contempt 
is  mingled  with  hatred ;  she  is  ripe  for  destruction,  and  she  is  to  fall 
without  trouble  into  the  lap  of  the  Great-Servian  Empire,  which  is 
to  be  realized  in  the  immediate  future. 

Newspapers,  not  among  the  most  extreme,  discuss  the  powerless- 
ness  and  decrepitude  of  the  neighbouring  Monarchy  in  daily  articles, 
and  insult  its  officials  without  reserve  and  without  fear  of  reprimand. 
They  do  not  even  stop  short  of  the  exalted  person  of  our  ruler.  Even 
the  official  organ  refers  to  the  internal  condition  of  Austria-Hungary 
as  the  true  cause  of  this  wicked  crime.  There  is  no  longer  any  fear 
of  being  called  to  account.  For  decades  the  people  of  Servia  has  been 
educated  by  the  press,  and  the  policy  at  any  given  time  is  dependent 
on  the  party  press ;  the  Great-Servian  propaganda  and  its  monstrous 
offspring,  the  crime  of  June  28th,  are  a  fruit  of  this  education. 

1  pass  over  the  suspicions  and  accusations  with  regard  to  the  death 
of  Hartwig,  which  are  on  the  verge  of  insanity,  and  were  characterised 
by  "The  Times"  as  "ravings";  ^  I  do  not  mention  the  lying  cam- 
paign in  the  press  which,  however,  might  strengthen  Servians  in  the 
conviction  that  the  Government  and  the  representatives  of  Austria- 
Hungary  are  outlaws,  and  that  appellations  such  as  murderer,  rogue, 
cursed  Austrian,  etc.,  are  suitable  stock  epithets  for  us. 

The  death  of  Hartwig  and  the  recognition  of  the  gravity  of  this 
loss  ^  to  the  Servian  political  world,  have  let  loose  a  fanatical  cult  of 
the  deceased  ;  in  this  people  were  influenced  not  only  by  gratitude  for 
the  past,  but  also  by  anxiety  for  the  future,  and  outbid  one  another 
in  servile  submissiveness  to  Russia  in  order  to  secure  her  goodwill 
in  time  to  come. 

^  "The  latest  suggestion  made  in  one  of  them  (the  Servian  newspapers)  is  that  M. 
de  Hartwig's  sudden  death  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation  at  Belgrade  the  other 
day  was  due  to  poison.  Ravings  of  that  kind  move  the  contempt  as  well  as  the  dis- 
gust of  cultivated  people,  whatever  their  political  sympathies  may  be."  —  The  Times, 
July  16,  1913. 

2  Hartwig  was  the  Russian  Minister  in  Belgrade,  and  was  known  as  an  ardent 
Pan-Slavist,  and  reckless  hater  of  Austria-Hungary. 


38  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

As  a  third  factor  the  electoral  campaign  has  united  all  parties  on  a 
platform  of  hostility  against  Austria-Hungary.  None  of  the  parties 
which  aspire  to  office  will  incur  the  suspicion  of  being  held  capable  of 
weak  compliance  towards  the  Monarchy.  The  campaign,  therefore,  is 
conducted  under  the  catchword  of  hostility  towards  Austria-Hungary. 

For  both  internal  and  external  reasons  the  Monarchy  is  held  to  be 
powerless  and  incapable  of  any  energetic  action,  and  it  is  believed 
that  the  serious  words  which  were  spoken  by  leading  men  among 
us  are  only  "bluff." 

The  leave  of  absence  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Minister  of  War 
and  Chief  of  the  Staff  have  strengthened  the  conviction  that  the 
weakness  of  Austria-Hungary  is  now  obvious. 

I  have  allowed  myself  to  trespass  too  long  on  the  patience  of  Your 
Excellency,  not  because  I  thought  that  in  what  I  have  said  I  could 
tell  you  anything  new,  but  because  I  considered  this  picture  led  up 
to  the  conclusion  which  forces  itself  upon  me  that  a  reckoning  with 
Servia,  a  war  for  the  position  of  the  Monarchy  as  a  Great  Power,  even 
for  its  existence  as  such,  cannot  be  permanently  avoided. 

If  we  delay  in  clearing  up  our  relations  with  Servia,  we  shall  share 
the  responsibility  for  the  difficulties  and  the  unfavourable  situation 
in  any  future  war  which  must,  however,  sooner  or  later  be  carried 
through. 

For  any  observer  on  the  spot,  and  for  the  representative  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  interests  in  Servia,  the  question  takes  the  form  that  we 
cannot  any  longer  put  up  with  any  further  injury  to  our  prestige. 

Should  we  therefore  be  determined  to  put  forward  far-reaching 
requirements  joined  to  effective  control  —  for  this  alone  could  clear 
the  Augean  stable  of  Great-Servian  intrigues  —  then  all  possible  con- 
sequences must  be  considered,  and  from  the  beginning  there  must  be  a 
strong  and  firm  determination  to  carry  through  the  matter  to  the  end. 

Half  measures,  the  presentation  of  demands,  followed  by  long  dis- 
cussions and  ending  only  in  an  unsound  compromise,  would  be  the 
hardest  blow  which  could  be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary's 
reputation  in  Servia  and  her  position  in  Europe. 

France : 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  15 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  21,  1914. 

It  has  come  to  my  knowledge  that  the  Servian  representative  at 
Berlin  declared,  at  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  yesterday,  that  his  Govern- 
ment was  ready  to  entertain  Austria's  requirements  arising  out  of 
the  outrage  at  Serajevo,  provided  that  she  asked  only  ^  for  judicial 
cooperation  in  the  punishment  and  prevention  of  political  crimes, 

^  N.  Y,  Times  translation  reads  "did  not  demand." 


July  2U  French  Yellow  Book  No.  16  39 

but  that  he  was  charged  to  warn  the  German  Government  that  it 
would  be  dangerous  to  attempt,  through  that  investigation,  to  lower 
the  prestige  of  Servia. 

In  confidence  I  may  also  inform  your  Excellency  that  the  Russian 
Charge  d'Affaires  at  the  diplomatic  audience  to-day  mentioned  this 
subject  to  Herr  von  Jagow.  He  said  that  he  supposed  the  German 
Government  now  had  full  knowledge  of  the  note  prepared  by  Austria, 
and  were  therefore  willing  to  give  the  assurance  that  the  Austro- 
Servian  difficulties  would  be  localised.  The  Secretary  of  State  pro- 
tested that  he  was  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  contents  of  that  note, 
and  expressed  himself  in  the  same  way  to  me.^  I  could  not  help 
showing  my  astonishment  at  a  statement  which  agreed  so  little  with 
what  circumstances  lead  one  to  expect. 

I  have  also  been  assured  that,  from  now  on,  the  preliminary 
notices  for  mobilisation,^  the  object  of  which  is  to  place  Germany  in 
a  kind  of  "attention"  attitude  in  times  of  tension,  have  been  sent 
out  here  to  those  classes  which  would  receive  them  in  similar  circum- 
stances. That  is  a  measure  to  which  the  Germans,  constituted  as 
they  are,  can  have  recourse  without  indiscretion  and  without  exciting 
the  people.  It  is  not  a  sensational  measure,  and  is  not  necessarily 
followed  by  full  mobilisation,  as  we  have  already  seen,  but  it  is  none 

the  less  significant.  t  ^ 

Jules  Cambon. 

To  London,  Petrograd,  Vienna,  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  16 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  London, 
St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  21,  1914. 

I  SPECIALLY  draw  your  attention  to  information  of  which  I  am  in 
receipt  from  Berlin  ^ ;  the  French  Ambassador  notifies  the  extreme 
weakness  of  the  Berlin  Bourse  yesterday,  and  attributes  it  to  the 
anxiety  which  has  begun  to  be  aroused  by  the  Servian  question. 

M.  Jules  Cambon  has  very  grave  reason  for  believing  that  when 
Austria  makes  the  demarche  at  Belgrade  which  she  judges  necessary 
in  consequence  of  the  crime  of  Serajevo,  Germany  will  support  her 
with  her  authority,  without  seeking  to  play  the  part  of  mediator. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

1  The  reader  must  decide  for  himself  whether  or  not  to  give  credence  to  this  state- 
ment by  Mr.  von  Jagow,  the  German  Secretary  of  State.  If  true,  it  proves  that 
Austria-Hungary  was  preparing  her  case  against  Servia  without  consultation  with 
Germany.  In  that  case  it  is  natural  that  the  Entente  Powers  should  have  had  more 
accurate  preliminary  information  of  the  Austrian  note,  through  their  Secret  Service, 
which,  for  instance,  must  have  supplied  the  information,  French  Yellow  Book  Nos. 
13  and  14,  July  19,  1914.  A  friendly  power  is  less  apt  to  maintain  a  spy  service  at 
the  capital  of  an  allied  Government.  See  however,  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  19, 
July  22  and  footnote. 

2  This  information  is  proved  to  be  wholly  false  by  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101, 
July  30,  1914,  where  Viviani  implies  that  Germany  had  not  even  then  proceeded  to 
partial  mobilization. 

3  The  only  two  despatches  published  as  previously  received  from  Berlin  are  Nos.  9, 
July  4,  and  15,  July  15,  1914.     Neither  of  them  contains  the  information  here  given. 


40 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Wednesday,  July  22,  1915 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgrade,  London,  etc. 

Belgium 

France 

London,  etc. 

Vienna,  London 

Germany 

Great  Britain 

Berlin 

Russia 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary  sends  the  text  of  her  Serbian  note  to  her  minister  in  Belgrade 
for  presentation  on  the  next  day,  and  instructs  her  Representatives  at  the  other 
capitals  in  Europe  to  inform  the  several  foreign  offices  of  her  step. 

France  counsels  moderation  in  Vienna. 

Germany  and  Great  Britain  are  quoted  as  having  done  the  same. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  Belgrade. 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   7 

Count  Berchtold  to  Freiherr  von  Giesl  in  Belgrade. 

Vienna,  July  22,  1914. 

Your  Honor  will  please  transmit  the  following  note  on  Thursday, 
July  23,  in  the  afternoon,  to  the  Royal  Government. 


Le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  s'est  vu  oblige  d'a- 
dresser  jeudi  le  23  de  ce  mois, 
par  Tentremise  du  Ministre 
Imperial  et  Royal  a  Belgrade, 
la  note  suivante  au  Gouverne- 
ment Royal  de  Serbie : 

"Le  31  mars,  1909,  le 
Ministre  de  Serbie  a  Vienne 
a  fait,  d'ordre  de  son  Gouverne- 
ment, au  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  la  declaration  sui- 
vante :  — 

"  *  La  Serbie  reconnait 
qu'elle  n*a  pas  ete  atteinte  dans 
ses  droits  par  le  fait  accompli 
cree  en  Bosnie-Herzegovine  et 
qu'elle  se  conformera  par  conse- 
quent  a   telle   decision   que   les 


(Translation) 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment felt  compelled  to  ad- 
dress the  following  note  to  the 
Servian  Government  on  the  23rd 
July,  through  the  medium  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at 
Belgrade :  — 

"On  the  31st  March,  1909, 
the  Servian  Minister  in  Vienna, 
on  the  instructions  of  the  Ser- 
vian Government,  made  the 
following  declaration  to  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment :  — 

"^Servia  recognises  that  the 
fait  accompli  regarding  Bosnia 
has  not  affected  her  rights,  and 
consequently  she  will  conform 
to  the  decisions  that  the  Powers 
may    take    in    conformity    with 


July  22y  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7 


41 


Puissances  prendront  par  rap- 
port a  I'article  25  du  Traite  de 
Berlin.  Se  rendant  aux  conseils 
des  Grandes  Puissances,  la  Ser- 
bie  s'engage  des  a  present  a 
abandonner  I'attitude  de  protes- 
tation et  d'opposition  qu'elle  a 
observee  a  I'egard  de  I'annexion 
depuis  I'automne  dernier,  et  elle 
s'engage,  en  outre,  a  changer  le 
cours  de  sa  politique  actuelle 
envers  I'Autriche-Hongrie  pour 
vivre  desormais  avec  cette  der- 
niere  sur  le  pied  d'un  bon  voi- 
sinage.' 

"Or,  rhistoire  des  dernieres 
annees,  et  notamment  les  evene- 
ments  douloureux  du  28  juin,  ont 
demontre  I'existence  en  Serbie 
d'un  mouvement  subversif  dont 
le  but  est  de  detacher  de  la 
Monarchic  austro-hongroise  cer- 
taines  parties  de  ses  territoires. 
Ce  mouvement,  qui  a  pris  jour 
sous  les  yeux  du  Gouvernement 
serbe,  est  arrive  a  se  manifester 
au  dela  du  territoire  du  royaume 
par  des  actes  de  terrorisme,  par 
une  serie  d'attentats  et  par  des 
meurtres.   ' 

"Le  Gouvernement  Royal 
serbe,  loin  de  satisfaire  aux  en- 
gagements formels  contenus  dans 
la  declaration  du  31  mars,  1909, 
n'a  rien  fait  pour  supprimer  ce 
mouvement :  il  a  tolere  I'acti- 
vite  criminelle  des  differentes 
societes  et  affiliations  dirigees 
contre  la  Monarchic,  le  langage 
effrene  de  la  presse,  la  glorifica- 
tion des  auteurs  d'attentats,  la 
participation  d'officiers  et  de  fonc- 
tionnaires  dans  les  agissements 
subversifs,  une  propagande  mal- 
saine  dans  I'instruction  publique, 
tolere  enfin  toutes  les  manifes- 
tations qui  pouvaient  induire  la 
population  serbe  a  la  haine  de  la 


article  25  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 
In  deference  to  the  advice  of  the 
Great  Powers,  Servia  undertakes 
to  renounce  from  now  onwards 
the  attitude  of  protest  and  oppo- 
sition which  she  has  adopted  with 
regard  to  the  annexation  since 
last  autumn.  She  undertakes, 
moreover,  to  modify  the  direc- 
tion of  her  policy  with  regard  to 
Austria-Hungary  and  to  live  in 
future  on  good  neighbourly  terms 
with  the  latter.' 


"The  history  of  recent  years, 
and  in  particular  the  painful 
events  of  the  28th  June  last, 
have  shown  the  existence  of  a 
subversive  movement  with  the 
object  of  detaching  a  part  of  the 
territories  of  Austria-Hungary 
from  the  Monarchy.  The  move- 
ment, which  had  its  birth  under 
the  eye  of  the  Servian  Gov- 
ernment, has  gone  so  far  as  to 
make  itself  manifest  on  both 
sides  of  the  Servian  frontier  in 
the  shape  of  acts  of  terrorism 
and  a  series  of  outrages  and 
murders. 

"Far  from  carrying  out  the 
formal  undertakings  contained 
in  the  declaration  of  the  31st 
March,  1909,  the  Royal  Servian 
Government  has  done  nothing  to 
repress  these  movements.  It  has 
permitted  the  criminal  mach- 
inations of  various  societies  and 
associations  directed  against 
the  Monarchy,  and  has  tolerated 
unrestrained  language  on  the 
part  of  the  press,  the  glorifica- 
tion of  the  perpetrators  of  out- 
rages, and  the  participation  of 
officers  and  functionaries  in  sub- 
versive agitation.  It  has  per- 
mitted an  unwholesome  propa- 
ganda in  public  instruction;  in 


42 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Monarchic  ct  au  mepris  dc  ses 
institutions. 


"Cctte  tolerance  coupable  du 
Gouvernement  Royal  de  Serbie 
n'avait  pas  cesse  au  moment  oil 
les  evenements  du  28  juin  der- 
nier en  ont  demontre  au  monde 
entier  les  consequences  funestes. 

"II  resulte  des  depositions  et 
aveux  des  auteurs  criminels  de 
I'attentat  du  28  juin  que  le 
meurtre  de  Sarajevo  a  ete  trame 
a  Belgrade,  que  les  armes  et  ex- 
plosifs  dont  les  meurtriers  se 
trouvaient  etre  munis  leur  ont 
ete  donnes  par  des  officiers  et 
fonctionnaires  serbes  faisant  par- 
tie  de  la  'Narodna  Odbrana/  et 
enfin  que  le  passage  en  Bosnie 
des  criminels  et  de  leurs  armes  a 
ete  organise  et  effectue  par  des 
chefs  du  service-frontiere  serbe. 


"Les  resultats  mentionnes  de 
I'instruction  ne  permettent  pas 
au  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  de  poursuivre  plus  long- 
temps  Tattitude  de  longanimite 
expectative  qu'il  avait  observee 
pendant  des  annees  vis-a-vis  des 
agissements  concentres  a  Bel- 
grade et  propages  de  la  sur  les 
territoires  de  la  Monarchic;  ces 
resultats  lui  imposent  au  con- 
traire  le  devoir  de  mettre  fin  a 
des  menees  qui  forment  une 
menace  perpetuelle  pour  la  tran- 
quillite  de  la  Monarchic. 

"C'est  pour  atteindre  ce  but 
que  le  Gbuvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  se  voit  oblige  de  de- 
mander  au  Gouvernement  serbe 
I'enonciation  officielle  qu'il  con- 
damne    la    propagande    dirigee 


short,  it  has  permitted  all  mani- 
festations of  a  nature  to  incite  the 
Servian  population  to  hatred  of 
the  Monarchy  and  contempt  of 
its  institutions. 

"  This  culpable  tolerance  of  the 
Royal  Servian  Government  had 
not  ceased  at  the  moment  when 
the  events  of  the  28th  June  last 
proved  its  fatal  consequences  to 
the    whole  world. 

"  It  results  from  the  depositions 
and  confessions  of  the  criminal 
perpetrators  of  the  outrage  of  the 
28th  June  that  the  Serajevo  as- 
sassinations were  planned  in  Bel- 
grade ;  that  the  arms  and  explo- 
sives with  which  the  murderers 
were  provided  had  been  given 
to  them  by  Servian  officers  and 
functionaries  belonging  to  the 
'  Narodna  Odbrana ' ;  and  finally, 
that  the  passage  into  Bosnia  of 
the  criminals  and  their  arms  was 
organised  and  effected  by  the 
chiefs  of  the  Servian  frontier 
service. 

"The  above-mentioned  results 
of  the  magisterial  investigation 
do  not  permit  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government  to  pursue 
any  longer  the  attitude  of  ex- 
pectant forbearance  which  they 
have  maintained  for  years  in  face 
of  the  machinations  hatched  in 
Belgrade,  and  thence  propagated 
in  the  territories  of  the  Mon- 
archy. The  results,  on  the  con- 
trary, impose  on  them  the  duty 
of  putting  an  end  to  the  intrigues 
which  form  a  perpetual  menace 
to  the  tranquillity  of  the  Mon- 
archy. 

"To  achieve  this  end  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government  see 
themselves  compelled  to  demand 
from  the  Royal  Servian  Govern- 
ment a  formal  assurance  that  they 
condemn  this  dangerous  propa- 


July  22y  Amtro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No,  7 


43 


centre  la  Monarchie  austro-hon- 
groise,  c  'est-a-dire  rensemble  des 
tendances  qui  aspirent  en  dernier 
lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchie 
des  territoires  qui  en  font  partie, 
et  qu'il  s'engage  a  supprimer,  par 
tous  les  moyens,  cette  propa- 
gande  criminelle  et  terroriste. 

"Afin  de  donner  un  caractere 
solennel  a  cet  engagement,  le 
Gouvernement  Royal  de  Serbie 
fera  publier  a  la  premiere  page 
du  ^Journal  officiel'  en  date  du 
13/26  juillet  I'enonciation  sui- 
vante :  — 

"'Le  Gouvernement  Royal  de 
Serbie  condamne  la  propagande 
dirigee  contre  I'Autriche-Hon- 
grie,  c'est-a-dire  I'ensemble  des 
tendances  qui  aspirent  en  dernier 
lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchie 
austro-hongroise  des  territoires 
qui  en  font  partie,  et  il  deplore 
sincerement  les  consequences  fu- 
nestes  de  ces  agissements  cri- 
minels. 

" '  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  re- 
grette  que  des  officiers  et  fonc- 
tionnaires  serbes  aient  participe 
a  la  propagande  susmentionnee 
et  compromis  par  la  les  relations 
de  bon  voisinage  auquel  le  Gou- 
vernement Royal  s'etait  solen- 
nellement  engage  par  sa  declara- 
tion du  31  mars,  1909. 

" '  Le  Gouvernement  Royal, 
qui  desapprouve  et  repudie  toute 
idee  ou  tentative  d'immixtion 
dans  les  destinees  des  habitants 
de  quelque  partie  de  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  considere  de 
son  devoir  d'avertir  formellement 
les  officiers,  les  fonctionnaires  et 
toute  la  population  du  royaume 
que  dorenavant  il  procedera  avec 
la  derniere  rigueur  contre  les  per- 
sonnes  qui  se  rendraient  cou- 
pables  de  pareils  agissements  qu'il 


ganda  against  the  Monarchy ;  in 
other  words,  the  whole  series  of 
tendencies,  the  ultimate  aim  of 
which  is  to  detach  from  the 
Monarchy  territories  belonging 
to  it,  and  that  they  undertake  to 
suppress  by  every  means  this 
criminal  and  terrorist  propa- 
ganda. 

"In  order  to  give  a  formal 
character  to  this  undertaking  the 
Royal  Servian  Government  shall 
publish  on  the  front  page  of  their 
'Official  Journal'  of  the  13/26 
July  the  following  declaration :  — 

"'The  Royal  Government  of 
Servia  condemn  the  propaganda 
directed  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary —  i.e.,  the  general  tendency 
of  which  the  final  aim  is  to 
detach  from  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  territories  be- 
longing to  it,  and  they  sincerely 
deplore  the  fatal  consequences 
of  these  criminal  proceedings. 

"'The  Royal  Government  re- 
gret that  Servian  officers  and 
functionaries  participated  in  the 
above-mentioned  propaganda 
and  thus  compromised  the  good 
neighbourly  relations  to  which 
the  Royal  Government  were 
solemnly  pledged  by  their  decla- 
ration of  the  31st  March,  1909. 

" '  The  Royal  Government, 
who  disapprove  and  repudiate  all 
idea  of  interfering  or  attempting 
to  interfere  with  the  destinies 
of  the  inhabitants  of  any  part 
whatsoever  of  Austria-Hungary, 
consider  it  their  duty  formally  to 
warn  officers  and  functionaries, 
and  the  whole  population  of  the 
kingdom,  that  henceforward  they 
will  proceed  with  the  utmost 
rigour  against  persons  who  may 
be  guilty  of  such  machinations, 


44 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


mettra  tous  ses  efforts  a  prevenir 
et  a  reprimer/ 

"  Cette  enonciation  sera  portee 
simultanement  a  la  connaissance 
de  rArmee  Royale  par  un  ordre 
du  jour  de  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  et 
sera  publiee  dans  le  'Bulletin 
officiel '  de  I'armee. 

"  Le  Gouvernement  Royal 
serbe  s'engage  en  outre : 

"  1°  a  supprimer  toute  publica- 
tion qui  excite  a  la  haine  et  au 
mepris  de  la  Monarchic  et  dont 
la  tendance  generale  est  dirigee 
contre  son  integrite  territoriale ; 

"2°  a  dissoudre  immediate- 
ment  la  societe  dite  'Narodna 
Odbrana/  a  confisquer  tous  ses 
moyens  de  propagande,  et  a  pro- 
ceder  de  la  meme  maniere  contre 
les  autres  societes  et  affiliations 
en  Serbie  qui  s'adonnent  a  la 
propagande  contre  la  Monarchic 
austro-hongroise ;  le  Gouverne- 
ment Royal  prendra  les  mesures 
necessaires  pour  que  les  societes 
dissoutes  ne  puissent  pas  con- 
tinuer  leur  activite  sous  un  autre 
nom  et  sous  une  autre  forme ; 

"3°  a  eliminer  sans  delai  de 
rinstruction  publique  en  Serbie, 
tant  en  ce  qui  concerne  le  corps 
enseignant  que  les  moyens  d 'in- 
struction, tout  ce  qui  sert  ou 
pourrait  servir  a  fomenter  la 
propagande  contre  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie ; 

"4°  a  eloigner  du  service  mili- 
taire  et  de  I'administration  en 
general  tous  les  officiers  et  fonc- 
tionnaires  coupables  de  la  pro- 
pagande contre  la  Monarchic 
austro-hongroise  et  dont  le  Gou- 
vernement Imperial  et  Royal  se 
reserve  de  communiquer  les  noms 
et  les  faits  au  Gouvernement 
Royal ; 


which  they  will  use  all  their 
efforts  to  anticipate  and  sup- 
press.' 

"This  declaration  shall  simul- 
taneously be  communicated  to 
the  Royal  army  as  an  order  of  the 
day  by  His  Majesty  the  King  and 
shall  be  published  in  the  '  Official 
Bulletin '  of  the  Army. 

"The  Royal  Servian  Govern- 
ment further  undertake : 

"1.  To  suppress  any  publica- 
tion which  incites  to  hatred  and 
contempt  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  and  the  general 
tendency  of  which  is  directed 
against  its  territorial  integrity ; 

"2.  To  dissolve  immediately 
the  society  styled  'Narodna  Od- 
brana,' to  confiscate  all  its  means 
of  propaganda,  and  to  proceed 
in  the  same  manner  against  other  . 
societies  and  their  branches  in 
Servia  which  engage  in  propa- 
ganda against  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy.  The  Royal 
Government  shall  take  the  neces- 
sary measures  to  prevent  the 
societies  dissolved  from  continu- 
ing their  activity  under  another 
name  and  form ; 

"3.  To  eliminate  without  delay 
from  public  instruction  in  Servia, 
both  as  regards  the  teaching  body 
and  also  as  regards  the  methods 
of  instruction,  everything  that 
serves,  or  might  serve,  to  foment 
the  propaganda  against  Austria- 
Hungary  ; 

"4.  To  remove  from  the  mili- 
tary service,  and  from  the  ad- 
ministration in  general,  all  officers 
and  functionaries  guilty  of  propa- 
ganda against  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy  whose  names 
and  deeds  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  reserve  to  them- 
selves the  right  of  communicat- 
ing to  the  Royal  Government ; 


July  22,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7 


45 


"  5°  a  accepter  la  collaboration 
en  Serbie  des  organes  du  Gou- 
vernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
dans  la  suppression  du  mouve- 
ment  subversif  dirige  contre  I'in- 
tegrite  territorial  de  la  Mo- 
narchic ; 

"  6°  a  ouvrir  une  enquete  judi- 
ciaire  contre  les  partisans  du 
complot  du  28  juin  se  trouvant 
sur  territoire  serbe ; 

"des  organes,  delegues  par  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal, 
prendront  part  aux  recherches  y 
relatives ; 

"7°  a  proceder  d'urgence  a 
Tarrestation  du  Commandant 
Voija  Tankosic  et  du  nomme 
Milan  Ciganovic,  employe  de 
I'Etat  serbe,  compromis  par  les 
resultats  de  I'instruction  de 
Sarajevo ; 

"8°  a  empecher,  par  des  me- 
sures  efficaces,  le  concours  des 
autorites  serbes  dans  le  trafic  illi- 
cite  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  a  tra- 
.vers  la  f rontiere ; 

"a  licencier  et  punir  severe- 
ment  les  fonctionnaires  du  ser- 
vice-frontiere  de  Schabatz  et  de 
Loznica  coupables  d'avoir  aide 
les  auteurs  du  crime  de  Sarajevo 
en  leur  facilitant  le  passage  de  la 
frontiere ; 

"9°  a  donner  au  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  des  expli- 
cations sur  les  propos  injusti- 
fiables  de  hauts  fonctionnaires 
serbes  tant  en  Serbie  qu'a  Te- 
tranger,  qui,  malgre  leur  position 


"5.  To  accept  the  collabora- 
tion ^  in  Servia  of  representatives 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment for  the  suppression  of  the 
subversive  movement  directed 
against  the  territorial  integrity 
of  the  Monarchy ; 

"6.  To  take  judicial  proceed- 
ings against  accessories  to  the 
plot  of  the  8th  June  who  are  on 
Servian  territory;  delegates  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment will  take  part  in  the  inves- 
tigation ^  relating  thereto ; 

"7.  To  proceed  without  delay 
to  the  arrest  of  Major  Voija  Tan- 
kositch  and  of  the  individual 
named  Milan  Ciganovitch,  a  Ser- 
vian State  employe,  who  have 
been  compromised  by  the  results 
of  the  magisterial  enquiry  at 
Serajevo ; 

"8.  To  prevent  by  effective 
measures  the  cooperation  of  the 
Servian  authorities  in  the  illicit 
traffic  in  arms  and  explosives 
across  the  frontier,  to  dismiss  and 
punish  severely  the  officials  of 
the  frontier  service  at  Schabatz 
and  Loznica  guilty  of  having 
assisted  the  perpetrators  of  the 
Serajevo  crime  by  facilitating 
their  passage  across  the  frontier ; 

"9.  To  furnish  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  with  ex- 
planations regarding  the  unjus- 
tifiable utterances  of  high  Ser- 
vian officials,  both  in  Servia  and 
abroad,     who,     notwithstanding 


1  The  meaning  of  Clauses  5  and  6  was,  according  to  Austria-Hungary,  "wilfully 
misinterpreted"  by  Serbia  and  her  champions.  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  64,  July  28, 
1914,  where  Austria-Hungary  is  quoted  as  stating  "that  cooperation  of  Austrian 
agents  in  Servia  was  to  be  only  in  investigation,  not  in  judicial  or  administrative 
measures."  Similar  cooperation  in  investigation  had,  upon  request,  been  granted 
to  Serbia  twice  at  least  in  the  past  (see  Austro-Hungary  and  the  War  by  Ernest  Ludwig), 
and  had  also  been  asked  by,  and  granted  to,  the  United  States  of  America  in  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  sinking  of  the  Maine.  See  also  the  Austrian  Explanation,  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  27,  July  25,  where  Austria-Hungary  explains  that  what  she 
has  in  mind  is  an  arrangement  in  Serbia  similar  to  the  "Bureau  de  Siirete"  maintained 
in  Paris  by  Russia.     See  also  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914. 


46 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


officielle,  n'ont  pas  hesite  apres 
Tattentat  du  28  juin  de  s'expri- 
mer  dans  des  interviews  d'une 
maniere  hostile  envers  la  Mo- 
narchie  austro-hongroise ;  enfin 

"10°  d'avertir,  sans  retard,  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
de  I'execution  des  mesures  com- 
prises dans  les  points  precedents. 

"  Le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  attend  la  reponse  du 
Gouvernement  Royal  au  plus 
tard  jusqu'au  samedi,  25  de  ce 
mois,  a  6  heures  du  soir. 

"Un  memoire  concernant  les 
resultats  de  I'instruction  de  Sara- 
jevo a  regard  des  fonctionnaires 
mentionnes  aux  points  7  et  8.  est 
annexe  a  cette  note." 

J'ai  I'honneur  d'inviter  votre 
Excellence  de  vouloir  porter  le 
contenu  de  cette  note  a  la  con- 
naissance  du  Gouvernement  au- 
pres  duquel  vous  etes  accredite, 
en  accompagnant  cette  communi- 
cation du  commentaire  que  voici : 

Le  31  mars,  1909,  le  Gouverne- 
ment Royal  serbe  a  adresse  a 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  la  declaration 
dont  le  texte  est  reproduit  ci- 
dessus. 

Le  lendemain  meme  de  cette 
declaration  la  Serbie  s'est  engagee 
dans  une  politique  tendant  a 
inspirer  des  idees  subversives 
aux  ressortissants  serbes  de  la 
Monarchic  austro-hongroise  et  a 
preparer  ainsi  la  separation  des 
territoires  austro-hongrois,  limi- 
trophes  a  la  Serbie. 

La^Serbie  devint  le  foyer  d'une 
agitation  criminelle. 

Des  societes  et  affiliations  ne 
tarderent  pax  a  se  former  qui, 
soit  ouvertement,  soit  clandes- 
tinement,     etaient    destinees     a 


their  official  position,  have  not 
hesitated  since  the  crime  of  the 
28th  June  to  express  themselves 
in  interviews  in  terms  of  hostility 
to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment ;   and,  finally, 

"10.  To  notify  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  without 
delay  of  the  execution  of  the 
measures  comprised  under  the 
preceding  heads. 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment expect  the  reply  of  the 
Royal  Government  at  the  latest 
by  6  o'clock  on  Saturday  even- 
ing, the  25th  July. 

"  A  memorandum  dealing  with 
the  results  of  the  magisterial 
enquiry  at  Serajevo  with  regard 
to  the  officials  mentioned  under 
heads  (7)  and  (8)  is  attached  to 
this  note." 

I  have  the  honour  to  request 
your  Excellency  to  bring  the  con- 
tents of  this  note  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  Government  to  which 
you  are  accredited,  accompany- 
ing your  communication  with 
the  following  observations  :  — 

On  the  31st  March,  1909,  the 
Royal  Servian  Government  ad- 
dressed to  Austria-Hungary  the 
declaration  of  which  the  text  is 
reproduced  above. 

On  the  very  day  after  this 
declaration  Servia  embarked  on  a 
policy  of  instilling  revolutionary 
ideas  into  the  Serb  subjects  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
and  so  preparing  for  the  sep- 
aration of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
territory  on  the  Servian  frontier. 

Servia  became  the  centre  of  a 
criminal  agitation. 

No  tirne  was  lost  in  the  forma- 
tion of  societies  and  groups, 
whose  object,  either  avowed  or 
secret,  was  the  creation  of  dis- 


July  22,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7 


47 


creer  des  desordres  sur  le  terri- 
toire  austro-hongrois.-  Ces  socie- 
tes  et  affiliations  comptent  parmi 
leurs  membres  des  generaux  et 
des  diplomates,  des  fonction- 
naires  d'Etat  et  des  juges,  bref 
les  sommites  du  monde  officiel  et 
inofficiel  du  royaume. 

Le  journalisme  serbe  est  pres- 
que  entierement  au  service  de 
cette  propagande,  dirigee  centre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie,  et  pas  un  jour 
ne  passe  sans  que  les  organes  de 
la  presse  serbe  n'excitent  leurs 
lecteurs  a  la  haine  et  au  mepris 
de  la  Monarchic  voisine  ou  a  des 
attentats  diriges  plus  ou  moins 
ouvertement  contre  sa  surete  et 
son  integrite. 

Un  grand  nombre  d 'agents  est 
appele  a  soutenir  par  tons  les 
moyens  I'agitation  contre  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie et  a  corrompre 
dans  les  provinces  limitrophes  la 
jeunesse  de  ces  pays. 

L'esprit  conspirateur  des  poli- 
ticiens  serbes,  esprit  dont  les 
annales  du  royaume  portent  les 
sanglantes  empreintes,  a  subi  une 
recrudescence  depuis  la  derniere 
crise  balkanique;  des  individus 
ayant  fait  partie  des  bandes  jus- 
que-la  occupees  en  Macedoine 
sont  venus  se  mettre  a  la  disposi- 
tion de  la  propagande  terroriste 
contre  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En  presence  de  ces  agissements, 
auxquels  I'Autriche-Hongrie  est 
exposee  depuis  des  annees,  le 
Gouvernement  de  la  Serbie  n'a 
pas  cru  devoir  prendre  la  moindre 
mesure.  C'est  ainsi  que  le  Gou- 
vernement serbe  a  manque  au 
devoir  que  lui  imposait  la  decla- 
ration solennelle  du  31  mars, 
1909,  et  c'est  ainsi  qu'il  s'est  mis 
en  contradiction  avec  la  volonte 
de  I'Europe  et  avec  I'engagement 


orders  on  Austro-Hungarian  ter- 
ritory. These  societies  and 
groups  count  among  their  mem- 
bers generals  and  diplomatists, 
Government  officials  and  judges 
—  in  short,  men  at  the  top  of 
official  and  unofficial  society  in 
the  kingdom. 

Servian  journalism  is  almost 
entirely  at  the  service  of  this 
propaganda,  which  is  directed 
against  Austria-Hungary,  and 
not  a  day  passes  without  the 
organs  of  the  Servian  press  stir- 
ring up  their  readers  to  hatred  or 
contempt  for  the  neighbouring 
Monarchy,  or  .to  outrages 
directed  more  or  less  openly 
against  its  security  and  integrity. 

A  large  number  of  agents  are 
employed  in  carrying  on  by  every 
means  the  agitation  against  Aus- 
tria-Hungary and  corrupting  the 
youth  in  the  frontier  provinces. 

Since  the  recent  Balkan  crisis 
there  has  been  a  recrudescence 
of  the  spirit  of  conspiracy  in- 
herent in  Servian  politicia^ns, 
which  has  left  such  sanguinary 
imprints  on  the  history  of  the 
kingdom;  individuals  belonging 
formerly  to  bands  employed  in 
Macedonia  have  come  to  place 
themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the 
terrorist  propaganda  against 
Austria-Hungary. 

In  the  presence  of  these  doings, 
to  which  Austria-Hungary  has 
been  exposed  for  years,  the  Ser- 
vian Government  have  not 
thought  it  incumbent  on  them 
to  take  the  slightest  step.  The 
Servian  Government  have  thus 
failed  in  the  duty  imposed  on 
them  by  the  solemn  declara- 
tion of  the  31st  March,  1909, 
and  acted  in  opposition  to  the 
will  of   Europe  and   the  under- 


48 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


qu'il  avait  pris  vis-a-vis  de  TAu- 
triche-Hongrie. 

La  longanimite  du  Gouverne- 
ment  Imperial  et  Royal  a  I'egard 
de  Tattitude  proyocatrice  de  la 
Serbie  etait  inspiree  du  desin- 
teressement  territorial  de  la 
Monarchic  austro-hongroise  et  de 
Tespoir  que  le  Gouvernement 
serbe  finirait  tout  de  meme  par 
apprecier  a  sa  juste  valeur  Taiiii- 
tie  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie.  En 
observant  une  attitude  bien- 
veillante  pour  les  interets  poli- 
tiques  de  la  Serbie,  le  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  esperait 
que  le  royaume  se  deciderait 
finalement  a  suivre  de  son  cote 
une  ligne  de  conduite  analogue. 
L'Autriche-Hongrie  s'attendait 
surtout  a  une  pareille  evolution 
dans  les  idees  politiques  en  Ser- 
bie, lorsque,  apres  les  evenements 
de  Tannee  1912,  le  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  rendit 
possible,  par  une  attitude  desin- 
teressee  et  sans  rancune,  Tagran- 
dissement  si  considerable  de  la 
Serbie. 

Cette  bienveillance  manifestee 
par  I'Autriche-Hongrie  a  I'egard 
de  I'Etat  voisin  n'a  cependant 
aucunement  modifie  les  procedes 
du  royaume,  qui  a  continue  a 
tolerer  sur  son  territoire  une 
propagande,  dont  les  funestes 
consequences  se  sont  manifestees 
au  monde  entier  le  28  juin  der- 
nier, jour  oil  I'heritier  presomptif 
de  la  Monarchic  et  son  illustre 
epouse  devinrent  les  victimes 
d'un  complot  trame  a  Belgrade. 

En  presence  de  cet  etat  de 
choses  le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  a  du  se  decider  a  entre- 
prendre  de  nouvelles  et  pressantes 
demarches  a  Belgrade  afin 
d'amener  le  Gouvernement  serbe 
a  arreter  le  mouvement  incen- 


taking    given    to    Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The  patience  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  in  the 
face  of  the  provocative  attitude 
of  Servia  was  inspired  by  the 
territorial  disinterestedness  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
and  the  hope  that  the  Servian 
Government  would  end  in  spite 
of  everything  by  appreciating 
Austria-Hungary's  friendship  at 
its  true  value.  By  observing  a 
benevolent  attitude  towards  the 
political  interests  of  Servia,  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
hoped  that  the  kingdom  would 
finally  decide  to  follow  an  analo- 
gous line  of  conduct  on  its  own 
side.  In  particular,  Austria- 
Hungary  expected  a  development 
of  this  kind  in  the  political  ideas 
of  Servia,  when,  after  the  events 
of  1912,  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government,  by  its  disinterested 
and  ungrudging  attitude,  made 
such  a  considerable  aggrandise- 
ment of  Servia  possible. 

The  benevolence  which  Aus- 
tria-Hungary showed  towards  the 
neighbouring  State  had  no  re- 
straining effect  on  the  proceed- 
ings of  the  kingdom,  which  con- 
tinued to  tolerate  on  its  territory 
a  propaganda  of  which  the  fatal 
consequences  were  demonstrated 
to  the  whole  world  on  the  28th 
June  last,  when  the  Heir  Pre- 
sumptive to  the  Monarchy  and 
his  illustrious  consort  fell  victims 
to  a  plot  hatched  at  Belgrade. 

In  the  presence  of  this  state  of 
things  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  have  felt  compelled 
to  take  new  and  urgent  steps  at 
Belgrade  with  a  view  to  inducing 
the  Servian  Government  to  stop 
the  incendiary  movement  that  is 


July  22,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7 


49 


diaire  mena^ant  la  surete  et  Tin- 
tegrite  de  la  Monarchic  austro- 
hongroise. 

Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  est  persuade  qu'en  entre- 
prenant  cette  demarche  il  se 
trouve  en  plein  accord  avec  les 
sentiments  de  toutes  les  nations 
civilisees,  qui  ne  sauraient  ad- 
mettre  que  le  regicide  devint  une 
arme  dont  on  puisse  se  servir 
impunement  dans  la  lutte  poli- 
tique, et  que  la  paix  europeenne 
fut  continuellement  troublee  par 
les  agissements  partant  de  Bel- 
grade. 

C'est  a  I'appui  de  ce  qui  pre- 
cede que  le  Gouvernement  Im- 
perial et  Royal  tient  a  la  dis- 
position du  Gouvernement  Royal 
de  Grande-Bretagne  un  dossier 
elucidant  les  menees  serbes  et  les 
rapports  existant  entre  ces  menees 
et  le  meurtre  du  28  juin. 

Une  communication  identique 
est  adressee  aux  representants 
Imperiaux  et  Royaux  aupres  des 
autres  Puissances  signatiares. 

Vous  etes  autorise  de  laisser 
une  copie  de  cette  depeche  entre 
les  mains  de  M.  le  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  24juillet,  1914. 


threatening  the  security  and 
integrity  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Gov- 
ernment are  convinced  that  in 
taking  this  step  they  will  find 
themselves  in  full  agreement  with 
the  sentiments  of  all  civilised 
nations,  who  cannot  permit  regi- 
cide to  become  a  weapon'  that 
can  be  employed  with  impunity 
in  political  strife,  and  the  peace 
of  Europe  to  be  continually  dis- 
turbed by  movements  emanating 
from  Belgrade. 

In  support  of  the  above  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
hold  at  the  disposal  of  the 
British  Government  a  dossier 
elucidating  the  Servian  intrigues 
and  the  connection  between  these 
intrigues  and  the  murder  of  the 
28th  June. 

An  identical  communication 
has  been  addressed  to  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  representatives 
accredited  to  the  other  signatory 
Powers. 

You  are  authorised  to  leave  a 
copy  of  this  despatch  in  the  hands 
of  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  24,  1914' 


Annexe 

L'instruction  criminelle  ou- 
verte  par  le  Tribunal  de  Sarajevo 
contre  Gavrilo  Princip  et  con- 
sorts du  chef  d^assassinat  et  de 
complicite  y  relative  —  crime 
commis  par  eux  le  28  juin  der- 
nier —  a  jusqu'ici  abouti  aux 
constations  suivantes : 

1°.  Le  complot  ayant  pour  but 
d'assassiner,  lors  de  sor\  sejour  a 

E 


Annex 

The  criniinal  enquiry  opened 
by  the  Court  of  Serajevo  against 
Gavrilo  Princip  and  his  acces- 
sories in  and  before  the  act  of 
assassination  committed  by  them 
on  the  28th  June  last  has  up  to 
the  present  led  to  the  following 
conclusions :  — 

1.  The  plot,  having  as  its  ob- 
ject the  assassination  of  the  Arch- 


50 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Sarajevo,  de  TArchiduc  Fran- 
cois-Ferdinand fut  forme  a  Bel- 
grade par  Gavrilo  Princip, 
Nedelkjo  ^Cabrinovic,  le  nomme 
Milan  Ciganovic  et  Trifko 
Grabez,  avec  le  concours  du 
commandant  Voija  Tankosic. 

2°.  Les  six  bombes  et  les  qua- 
tre  pistolets  Browning  avec  muni- 
tion, moyennant  lesquels  les  mal- 
faiteurs  ont  commis  Fattentat, 
furent  livres  a  Belgrade  a  Prin- 
cip, Cabrinovic  et  Grabez  par  le 
nomme  Milan  Ciganovic  et  le 
commandant  Voija  Tankosic. 

3°.  Les  bombes  sont  des  gre- 
nades a  la  main  provenant  du 
depot  d'armes  de  I'armee  serbe  a 
Kragujevac. 

4°.  Pour  assurer  la  reussite 
de  I'attentat,  Ciganovic  enseigna 
a  Princip,  Cabrinovic  et  Grabez  la 
maniere  de  se  servir  des  grenades 
et  donna,  dans  un  foret  pres  du 
champ  de  tir  a  Topschider,  des 
le9ons  de  tir  avec  pistolets  Brown- 
ing a  Princip  et  Grabez. 

5°.  Pour  rendre  possible  a 
Princip,  Cabrinovic  et  Grabez  de 
passer  la  frontiere  de  Bosnie- 
Herzegovine  et  d'y  introduire 
clandestinement  leur  contrebande 
d'armes,  un  systeme  deJ:ransport 
secret  fut  organise  par  Ciganovic. 

D'apres  cette  organisation  I'in- 
troduction  en  Bosnie-Herzego- 
vine  des  malfaiteurs  et  de  leurs 
armes  fut  op6ree  par  les  capi- 
taines-frontieres  de  Chabac 
(Rade  Popovic)  et  de  Loznica 
ainsi  que  par  le  douanier  Rudivoj 
Grbic  de  Loznica  avec  le  con- 
cours de  divers  particuliers. 


duke  Francis  Ferdinand  at  the 
time  of  his  visit  to  Serajevo,  was 
formed  at  Belgrade  by  Gavrilo 
Princip,  Nedeljko  Cabrinovic,  one 
Milan  Ciganovic,  and  Trifko 
Grabez,  with  the  assistance  of 
Commander  Voija  Tankosic. 

2.  The  six  bombs  and  the  four 
Browning  pistols  and  ammuni- 
tion with  which  the  guilty  par- 
ties committed  the  ^  act  were 
delivered  to  Princip,  Cabrinovic, 
and  Grabez  by  the  man  Milan 
Ciganovic  and  Commander  Voija 
Tankosic  at  Belgrade. 

3.  The  bombs  are  hand-gre- 
nades coming  from  the  arms 
depot  of  the  Servian  army  at  Kra- 
gujevac. 

4.  In  order  to^  ensure  the  suc- 
cess of  the  act,  Ciganovic  taught 
Princip,  Cabrinovic,  and  Grabez 
how  to  use  the  bombs,  and  gave 
lessons  in  firing  Browning  pistols 
to  Princip  and  Grabez  in  a  forest 
near  the  shooting  ground  at  Top- 
schider. 

■v 

5.  To  enable  Princip,  Cabrino- 
vic, and  Grabez  to  cross  the  fron- 
tier of  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and 
smuggle  in  their  contraband  of 
arms  secretly,  a  secret  system j3f 
transport  was  organised  by  Ci- 
ganovic. 

By  this  arrangement  the  intro- 
duction into  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
of  criminals  and  their  arms  was 
effected  by  the  officials  controlling 
the  frontiers  at  Chabec  (Rade 
Popovic)  and  Loznica,  as  well  as 
by  the  customs  officer  Rudivoj 
Grbic,  of  Loznica,  with  the  as- 
sistance of  various  individuals. 


On  the  occasion  of  transmitting  the  above  note,  your  Honor  will 
verbally  add  that  you  are  instructed  —  in  case  an  unconditional 
affirmative  answer  of  the  Royal  Government  shall  not  in  the  meantime 
have  been  delivered  to  you  —  to  leave  Belgrade  together  with  the 
personnel  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Embassy  at  the  expiration  of  the 


July  22,  Amtro-Hunganan  Red  Book  No.  8  51 

period  of  grace  of  forty-eight  hours  after  your  communication  con- 
templated in  the  note  has  been  made. 


To  Berlin,  Rome,  Paris,  London,  Petrograd,  and  Constantinople 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   8 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  in  Berlin, 
Rome,  Paris,  London,  St.  Petershurgh  and  Constantinople 

Vienna,  July  22}  1914. 
(Translated  from  the  French.) 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  felt  compelled  to  address 
the  following  note  to  the  Royal  Servian  Government  on  Thursday, 
the  23rd  instant,  through  the  medium  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Minister  at  Belgrade  (see  instructions  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Envoy  in  Belgrade  of  July  22nd,  1914). 

On  the  31st  March,  1909,  the  Royal  Servian  Government  addressed 
to  Austria-Hungary  the  declaration  of  which  the  text  is  reproduced 
above. 

On  the  very  day  after  this  declaration  Servia  embarked  on  a  policy 
of  instilling  revolutionary  ideas  into  the  Serb  subjects  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  so  preparing  for  the  separation  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  territory  on  the  Servian  frontier. 

Servia  became  the  centre  of  a  criminal  agitation. 

No  time  was  lost  in  the  formation  of  societies  and  groups,  whose 
object,  either  avowed  or  secret,  was  the  creation  of  disorders  on 
Austro-Hungarian  territory.  These  societies  and  groups  count  among 
their  members  generals  and  diplomatists,  Government  officials  and 
judges  —  in  short,  men  at  the  top  of  official  and  unofficial  society  in 
the  kingdom. 

Servian  journalism  is  almost  entirely  at  the  service  of  this  prop- 
aganda, which  is  directed  against  Austria-Hungary,  and  not  a  day 
passes  without  the  organs  'of  the  Servian  press  stirring  up  their 
readers  to  hatred  or  contempt  for  the  neighbouring  Monarchy,  or  to 
outrages  directed  more  or  less  openly  against  its  security  and  integrity. 

A  large  number  of  agents  are  employed  in  carrying  on  by  every 
means  the  agitation  against  Austria-Hungary  and  corrupting  the 
youth  in  the  frontier  provinces. 

Since  the  recent  Balkan  crisis  there  has  been  a  recrudescence  of 
the  spirit  of  conspiracy  inherent  in  Servian  politicians,  which  has 
left  such  sanguinary  imprints  on  the  history  of  the  kingdom ;  indi- 
viduals belonging  formerly  to  bands  employed  in  Macedonia  have 
come  to  place  themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the  terrorist  propaganda 
against  Austria-Hungary. 

In  the  presence  of  these  doings,  to  which  Austria-Hungary  has 
been  exposed  for  years,  the  Servian  Government  have  not  thought 

1  This  note  was  to  be  presented  on  July  24.  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  9, 
July  23,  1914. 


52  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

it  incumbent  on  them  to  take  the  shghtest  step.  The  Servian  Gov- 
ernment have  thus  failed  in  the  duty  imposed  on  them  by  the  solemn 
declaration  of  the  31st  March,  1909,  and  acted  in  opposition  to  the 
will  of  Europe  and  the  undertaking  given  to  Austria-Hungary. 

The  patience  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  in  the  face 
of  the  provocative  attitude  of  Servia  was  inspired  by  the  territorial 
disinterestedness  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  hope 
that  the  Servian  Government  would  end  in  spite  of  everything  by 
appreciating  Austria-Hungary's  friendship  at  its  true  value.  By 
observing  a  benevolent  attitude  towards  the  political  interests  of 
Servia,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  hoped  that  the  kingdom 
would  finally  decide  to  follow  an  analogous  line  of  conduct  on  its 
own  side.  In  particular,  Austria-Hungary  expected  a  development 
of  this  kind  in  the  political  ideas  of  Servia,  when,  after  the  events 
of  1912,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  by  its  disinterested 
and  ungrudging  attitude,  made  such  a  considerable  aggrandisement 
of  Servia  possible. 

The  benevolence  which  Austria-Hungary  showed  towards  the 
neighbouring  State  had  no  restraining  effect  on  the  proceedings  of 
the  kingdom,  which  continued  to  tolerate  on  its  territory  a  propaganda 
of  which  the  fatal  consequences  were  demonstrated  to  the  whole 
world  on  the  28th  June  last,  when  the  Heir  Presumptive  to  the  Mon- 
archy and  his  illustrious  consort  fell  victims  to  a  plot  hatched  at 
Belgrade. 

In  the  presence  of  this  state  of  things  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  have  felt  compelled  to  take  new  and  urgent  steps  at 
Belgrade  with  a  view  to  inducing  the  Servian  Government  to  stop 
the  incendiary  movement  that  is  threatening  the  security  and  in- 
tegrity of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  convinced  that  in  tak- 
ing this  step  they  will  find  themselves  in  full  agreement  with  the 
sentiments  of  all  civilised  nations,  who  cannot  permit  regicide  to 
become  a  weapon  that  can  be  employed  with  impunity  in  political 
strife,  and  the  peace  of  Europe  to  be  continually  disturbed  by  move- 
ments emanating  from  Belgrade. 

In  support  of  the  above  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
hold  at  the  disposal  of  the  British  Government  a  dossier  elucidating 
the  Servian  intrigues  and  the  connection  between  these  intrigues  and 
the  murder  of  the  28th  June. 

An  identical  communication  has  been  addressed  to  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  representatives  accredited  to  the  other  signatory  Powers. 

You  are  authorised  to  leave  a  copy  of  this  despatch  in  the  hands 
of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


July  22;  French  Yellow  Book  No.  18  53 

France : 

To  London,  Petrograd,  Vienna,  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  17 

M,  Bienvenu-Martin,   Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,   to  the 
French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  22,  1914. 

M.  Jules  Cambon  having  questioned  Herr  von  Jagow  on  the 
tenor  of  the  Austrian  note  at  Belgrade,  the  latter  replied  that  he 
knew  nothing  of  the  text;  our  Ambassador  expressed  his  great  as- 
tonishment at  this.^  He  emphasizes  that  the  weakness  of  the  Berlin 
Bourse  continues,  and  that  pessimistic  rumours  are  current. 

M.  Barrere  also  discussed  the  same  question  with  the  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano,  who  appears  disturbed  by  it,  and  gives  the  assurance 
that  he  is  working  ^  at  Vienna  in  order  that  Servia  may  not  be  asked 
for  anything  beyond  what  is  practicable,  for  instance,  the  dissolution 
of  the  Bosnian  Club,  and  not  a  judicial  inquiry  into  the  causes  of  the 
crime  of  Serajevo. 

In  present  circumstances,  the  most  favourable  presumption  one 
can  make  is  that  the  Cabinet  at  Vienna,  finding  itself  carried  away 
by  the  press  and  the  military  party,  is  trying  to  obtain  the  maxi- 
mum from  Servia  by  starting  to  intimidate  her,  directly  and  in- 
directly, and  looks  to  Germany  for  support  in  this. 

I  have  asked  the  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  use  all  his  in- 
fluence with  Count  Berchtold  and  to  represent  to  him,  in  a  friendly 
conversation,  how  much  Europe  would  appreciate  moderation  on 
the  part  of  the  Austrian  Government,  and  what  consequences  would 
be  likely  to  be  entailed  by  violent  pressure  on  Servia. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  18 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  22?  19U. 

Nothing  is  known  as  to  the  decision  which  Count  Berchtold, 
who  is  prolonging  his  stay  at  Ischl,  is  trying  to  obtain  from  the  Em- 
peror. The  intention  of  proceeding  against  Servia  with  the  greatest 
severity,  of  having  done  with  her,  of  "treating  her  like  another  Po- 
land," is  attributed  to  the  Government.  Eight  army  corps  are  said 
to  be  ready  to  start  on  the  campaign,  but  M.  Tisza,  who  is  very  dis- 

1  French  Yellow  Book  No.  15,  July  21,  1914.  ,,.,,. 

2  The  despatch  from  Rome  containing  this  information  has  not  been  pubhshed  m 
the  French  Yellow  Book  or  elsewhere.  -r>      i      ,,  t.   j 

3  The  date  of  this  despatch  seems  strange,  since  Count  Berchtold  had  returned  to 
Vienna  and  despatched  the  "Serbian  Note  "  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  in  Bel- 
grade on  that  date. 


54  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

turbed  about  the  excitement  in  Croatia,  is  said  to  have  intervened 
actively  in  order  to  exercise  a  moderating  influence. 

In  any  case  it  is  believed  that  the  demarche  will  be  made  at  Bel- 
grade this  week.  The  requirements  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment with  regard  to  the  punishment  of  the  outrage,  and  to  guaran- 
tees of  control  and  police  supervision,  seem  to  be  acceptable  to  the 
dignity  of  the  Servians;  M.  Yovanovich  believes  they  will  be  ac- 
cepted. M.  Pashitch  wishes  for  a  peaceful  solution,  but  says  that 
he  is  ready  for  a  full  resistance.  He  has  confidence  in  the  strength 
of  the  Servian  army ;  besides,  he  counts  on  the  union  of  all  the  Slavs 
in  the  Monarchy  to  paralyse  the  effort  directed  against  his  country. 

Unless  people  are  absolutely  blinded,  it  must  be  recognised  here 
that  a  violent  blow  has  every  chance  of  being  fatal  both  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  army  and  to  the  cohesion  of  the  nationalities  governed 
by  the  Emperor,  which  has  already  been  so  much  compromised. 

Herr  von  Tschirscky,  the  German  Ambassador,  is  showing  him- 
self a  supporter  of  violent  measures,  while  at  the  same  time  he  is 
willing  to  let  it  be  understood  that  the  Imperial  Chancery  would 
not  be  in  entire  agreement  with  him  on  this  point.  The  Russian 
Ambassador,  who  left  yesterday  for  the  country  in  consequence  of 
reassuring  explanations  made  to  him  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  has  confided  to  me  that  his  Government  will  not  raise  any 
objection  to  steps  directed  towards  the  punishment  of  the  guilty  and 
the  dissolution  of  the  societies  which  are  notoriously  revolutionary, 
but  could  not  accept  requirements  which  would  humiliate  Servian 
national  feeling.  Dumaine. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  19 

M.  Paul  Cambonj  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  22,  1914. 

Your  Excellency  has  been  good  enough  to  communicate  to  me  the 
impressions  which  have  been  collected  by  our  Ambassador  at  Berlin 
with  regard  to  the  demarche  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister 
is  proposing  to  make  at  Belgrade. 

These  impressions  have  been  confirmed  by  a  conversation  which 
I  had  yesterday  with  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  told  me  that  he  had  seen  the  German  Ambassador, 
who  stated  to  him  ^  that  at  Berlin  a  demarche  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  2,  July  22,  1914.  The  interview  here  spoken  of  is  not 
given  in  this  British  Blue  Book  unless  it  is  the  interview  of  July  20,  British  Blue  Book 
No.  1,  July  20.  Sir  E.  Grey's  remarks  quoted  here  are  so  much  like  those  made  by  him 
on  July  20  that  it  seems  unlikely  that  the  interviews  given  in  French  Yellow  Book  No. 
19  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  1  are  not  the  same.  In  that  case,  however,  the  remarks 
of  the  German  Ambassador  are  wrongly  given  either  here  or  in  the  Blue  Book.  In 
British  Blue  Book  No.  2,  July  22,  the  German  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  is  quoted  as 
considering  it  "inadvisable  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  should  be  ap- 
proached by  the  German  Government."  It  seems  incredible  that  the  accuracy  of  this 
statement  should  not  have  been  challenged  in  the  British  Blue  Book  if  the  German 


July  22,  French  Yellow  Booh  No.  19  55 

Government  to  the  Servian  Government  was  expected.  Prince 
Lichnowsky  assured  him  that  the  German  Government  were  en- 
deavouring to  hold  back  and  moderate  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna/  but 
that  up  to  the  present  time  they  had  not  been  successful  in  this,  and 
that  he  w^as  not  without  anxiety  as  to  the  results  of  a  demarche  of  this 
kind.  Sir  Edward  Grey  answered  Prince  Lichnowsky  that  he  would 
like  to  believe  that,  before  intervening  at  Belgrade,  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  had  fully  informed  themselves  as  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  conspiracy  to  which  the  Hereditary  Archduke  and 
the  Duchess  of  Hohenburg  had  fallen  victims,  and  had  assured 
themselves  that  the  Servian  Government  had  been  cognisant  of  it 
and  had  not  done  all  that  lay  in  their  power  to  prevent  the  conse- 
quences. For  if  it  could  not  be  proved  that  the  Servian  Government 
were  responsible  and  implicated  to  a  certain  degree,  the  intervention 
of  Austria-Hungary  would  not  be  justified  and  would  arouse  against 
them  the  opinion  of  Europe. 

The  communication  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  had  left  Sir  Edward 
Grey  with  an  impression  of  anxiety  which  he  did  not  conceal  from  me. 
The  same  impression  was  given  me  by  the  Italian  Ambassador,  who 
also  fears  the  possibility  of  fresh  tension  in  Austro-Servian  relations. 

This  morning  the  Servian  Minister  came  to  see  me,  and  he  shares 
the  apprehensions  of  Sir  Edward  Grey.  He  fears  that  Austria  may 
make  of  the  Servian  Government  demands  which  their  dignity,  and 
above  all  the  susceptibility  of  public  opinion,  will  not  allow  them  to 
accept  without  a  protest.  When  I  pointed  out  to  him  the  quiet 
which  appears  to  reign  at  Vienna,  and  to  which  all  the  Ambassadors 
accredited  to  that  Court  bear  testimony,  he  answered  that  this 
official  quiet  was  only  apparent  and  concealed  feelings  which  were 
most  fundamentally  hostile  to  Servia.  But,  he  added,  if  these  feel- 
ings take  a  public  form  {demarche)  which  lacks  the  moderation  that 
is  desirable,  it  will  be  necessary  to  take  account  of  Servian  public 
opinion,  which  has  been  inflamed  by  the  harsh  treatment  to  which 
the  Austrian  Government  have  constantly  subjected  that  country, 
and  which  has  been  made  less  patient  by  the  memory  of  two  vic- 
torious wars  which  is  still  quite  fresh.  Notwithstanding  the  sacrifices 
w^hich  Servia  has  made  for  her  recent  victories  she  can  still  put 
400,000  men  in  the  field,  and  public  opinion,  which  knows  this,  is 
not  inclined  to  put  up  with  any  humiliation. 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  an  interview  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador,^  asked  him  to  recommend  his  Government  not  to  de- 
part from  the  prudence  and  moderation  necessary  for  avoiding  new 
complications,  not  to  demand  from  Servia  any  measures  to  which 
she  could  not  reasonably  submit,  and  not  to  allow  themselves  to  be 
carried  away  too  far. 

Paul  Cambon. 

Ambassador  had  told  Sir  E.  Grey  on  July  20  (or  21)  that  the  "  German  Government 
were  endeavouring  to  hold  back  and  moderate  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  etc." 

1  This  important  statement  is  not  given  in  the  British  Blue  Book.    See  previous  note. 

2  Such  an  interview  is  pubHshed  in  the  British  Blue  Book  No.  3,  July  23,  while  this 
despatch  is  dated  July  22,  1914. 


56  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Great  Britain : 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  2 

Sir  H.  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  {Received  July  22) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  22,  1914. 

Last  night  I  met  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the 
forthcoming  Austrian  demarche  at  Belgrade  was  alluded  to  by  his 
Excellency  in  the  conversation  that  ensued.  His  Excellency  was 
evidently  of  opinion  that  this  step  on  Austria's  part  would  have  been 
made  ere  this.  He  insisted  that  question  at  issue  was  one  for  settle- 
ment between  Servia  and  Austria  alone,  and  that  there  should  be  no 
interference  from  outside  in  the  discussions  between  those  two  coun- 
tries. He  had  therefore  considered  it  inadvisable  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  should  be  approached  by  the  German  Gov- 
ernment on  the  matter.  He  had,  however,  on  several  occasions,  in 
conversation  with  the  Servian  Minister,  emphasised  the  extreme 
importance  that  Austro-Servian  relations  should  be  put  on  a  proper 
footing. 

Finally,  his  Excellency  observed  to  me  that  for  a  long  time  past 
the  attitude  adopted  towards  Servia  by  Austria  had,  in  his  opinion, 
been  one  of  great  forbearance.^ 

1  Cf.  the  previous  despatch,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  19. 


July  23,  AustrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  9  57 

Thursday,  July  23,  1914 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ultimatum  is  Presented  to  Serbia 

SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of  Sent  Despatches  to  Received  Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary  London  ' 

Belgium 


France  London,  etc.  Munich 

Germany     ^  London,  etc.  

Great  Britain  Vienna  Rome,      Austr.-Hung. 
.  Ambassador 

Russia  Belgrade 

Servia  London,  etc.  Aust.-Hung.  Minister 

Austria-Hungary  presents  her  note  to  Serbia  at  6  p.m.  ;  and  believing  that 
''Great  Britain  might  be  most  easily  led  to  form  an  impartial  judgment,"  sends 
special  instructions  to  her  Ambassador  in  London. 

Germany  sends  instructions  to  her  Ambassadors  in  London,  Paris,  and  Petro- 
grad,  dating  these  instructions  July  23  for  presentation  on  July  24.  In  the  in- 
structions she  defines  her  position. 

Great  Britain  is  informally  informed  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia, 
and  discusses  the  possibility  of  a  European  war. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  London 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  9 
Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Mensdorff  at  London. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  23,  1914. 

As  among  the  Entente  Powers,  Great  Britain  might  be  most  easily 
led  to  form  an  impartial  judgment  on  the  step  which  we  are  to-day 
taking  at  Belgrade,  I  request  Your  Excellency  in  the  conversation  which 
you  will  have  on  the  24th  instant  on  the  occasion  when  you  hand  in 
our  circular  note^  at  the  Foreign  Office,  to  point  out  among  other 
matters  that  it  would  have  been  within  the  power  of  Servia  to  render 
less  acute  the  serious  steps  which  she  must  expect  from  us,  by  spon- 
taneously doing  what  is  necessary  in  order  to  start  an  inquiry  on 
Servian  soil  against  the  Servian  accomplices  in  the  crime  of  28th 
June,  and  by  bringing  to  light  the  threads,  which,  as  has  been  proved, 
lead  from  Belgrade  to  Servia. 

Up  to  the  present  time,  although  a  number  of  notorious  indications 
point  to  Belgrade,  the  Servian  Government  have  not  taken  any 
steps  in  this  direction;  on  the  contrary,  they  have  attempted  to 
wipe  out  the  existing  traces. 

Thus,  from  a  telegraphic  despatch  from  our  Legation  at  Belgrade,^ 
it  is  to  be  gathered  that  the  Servian  civil  servant  Ciganovic,  who  is 
compromised  by  the  independent  testimony  of  the  affidavits  of  both 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  8,  July  22. 

2  This  Despatch  has  not  been  published  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book. 


58  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

criminals,  on  the  day  of  the  outrage  was  still  in  Belgrade,  and  three 
days  afterwards,  when  his  name  was  mentioned  in  the  papers,  had 
already  left  the  town.  As  is^well  known  also,  the  director  of  the 
Servian  press  declared  that  Ciganovic  is  completely  unknown  in 
Belgrade. 

With  regard  to  the  short  time-limit  attached  to  our  demand, 
this  must  be  attributed  to  our  long  experience  of  the  dilatory  arts  of 
Servia.^ 

The  requirements  which  we  demand  that  Servia  should  fulfil,  and 
which  indeed  contains  nothing  which  is  not  a  matter  of  course  in  the 
intercourse  between  States  which  are  to  live  in  peace  and  friendship, 
cannot  be  made  the  subject  of  negotiations  and  compromise;  and, 
having  regard  to  our  economic  interests,  we  cannot  take  the  risk  of  a 
method  of  political  action  by  which  it  would  be  open  to  Servia  at 
pleasure  to  prolong  the  crisis  which  has  arisen. 

France : 

To  London,  Berlin,  Petrograd  and  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  20 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  London, 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburgh,  and  Rome. 

Paris,  July  23,  1914. 

According  to  information  collected  by  the  French  Ambassador 
at  Vienna,^  the  first  intention  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
had  been  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  severity  against  Servia,  while 
keeping  eight  army  corps  ready  to  start  operations. 

The  disposition  at  this  moment  was  more  conciliatory ;  in  answer 
to  a  question  put  to  him  by  M.  Dumaine,  whom  I  instructed  to  call 
the  attention  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  the  anxiety 
aroused  in  Europe,  Baron  Macchio  stated^  to  our  Ambassador  that  the 
tone  of  the  Austrian  note,  and  the  demands  which  would  be  formu- 
lated in  it,  allow  us  to  count  on  a  peaceful  result.  In  view  of  the 
customary  procedure  of  the  Imperial  Chancery  I  do  not  know  what 
confidence  ought  to  be  placed  in  these  assurances. 

In  any  case  the  Austrian  note  will  be  presented  in  a  very  short 
space  of  time.  The  Servian  Minister  holds  that  as  M.  Pashitch  wishes 
to  come  to  an  understanding,  he  will  accept  those  demands  which 
relate  to  the  punishment  of  the  outrage  and  to  the  guarantees  for 
control  and  police  supervision,  but  that  he  will  resist  everything 
which  might  affect  the  sovereignty  and  dignity  of  his  country. 

In  diplomatic  circles  at  Vienna  the  German  Ambassador  is  in 
favour  of  violent  measures,  while  at  the  same  time  he  confesses  that 

1  Exactly  the  same  explanation  for  the  forthcoming  time  limit  was  advanced  in 
French  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  13  and  14,  as  early  as  July  19,  1914.  Austria  could,  of 
course,  not  know  that  the  substance  of  her  note  and  her  reasons  for  it  had  been  familiar 
to  the  Entente  Powers  since  the  previous  Sunday. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  18,  July  22,  1915. 

3  The  interview  here  referred  to  is  not  mentioned  in  the  only  published  Despatch, 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  18,  July  22,  1915,  on  which  the  present  message  can  be  based. 


July  23,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  1  59 

the  Imperial  Chancery  is  perhaps  not  entirely  in  agreement  with 
him  on  this  point ;  the  Russian  Ambassador,  trusting  to  assurances 
which  have  been  given  him,  has  left  Vienna,  and  before  his  departure 
confided  to  M.  Dumaine  that  his  Government  will  not  raise  any  ob- 
jection to  the  punishment  of  the  guilty  and  the  dissolution  of  the  rev- 
olutionary associations,  but  that  they  could  not  accept  requirements 
which  were  humiliating  to  the  national  sentiment  of  Servia. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From  Munich 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  21 

M.  Allize,  French  Minister  at  Munich,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Paris. 

Munich,  July  23,  1914. 

The  Bavarian  press  seems  to  believe  that  a  peaceful  solution  of 
the  Austro-Servian  incident  is  not  only  possible  but  even  probable ; 
on  the  other  hand  official  circles  have  for  some  time  been  assuming 
with  more  or  less  sincerity  an  air  of  real  pessimism. 

In  particular  the  President  of  the  Council  said  to  me  to-day  that 
the  Austrian  note  the  contents  of  which  were  known  to  him  {dont  il 
avait  cqnnaissance  ^)  was  in  his  opinion  drawn  up  in  terms  which  could 
be  accepted  by  Servia,  but  that  none  the  less  the  existing  situation 
appeared  to  him  to  be  very  serious. 

Germany : 

To  Paris,  London,  and  Petrograd 

German  WmTE  Book  ExmsiT  1^ 

The  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassadors  at  Paris,  London,  and 
St.  Petersburg,  on  July  23rd,  1914- 

The  publications  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  con- 
cerning the  circumstances  under  which  the  assassination  of  the 
Austrian  successor  to  the  throne  and  his  consort  took  place,  disclose 
clearly  the  aims  which  the  pan-Serb  propaganda  has  set  itself  and  the 

1  The  French  phrase  does  not  imply  accurate  knowledge.  It  may  mean  that  he 
had  a  general  idea  of  the  contents,  possibly  similar  to  that  shared  by  the  Entente 
Powers  since  July  19',  1914  ;  cf.  French  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  13  and  14. 

Bavaria  is  one  of  the  federated  States  comprising  the  German  Empire.  Owing  to 
its  size  and  importance  it  enjoys  special  prerogatives,  one  of  which  is  its  independent 
representation  in  some  foreign  capitals  and  at  the  Vatican.  Diplomatic  negotiations 
of  importance  and  those  concerning  the  Empire  are  conducted  by  the  German  Foreign 
Office  and  the  German  Ambassadors  and  Ministers.  If  the  President  of  the  Bavarian 
Council  had  more  accurate  information  of  the  Austrian  note  than  the  phrase  definitely 
says  he  had,  he  may  have  received  it  through  the  Bavarian  Minister  who  being  a 
CathoUc  may  be  assumed  to  have  been  in  intimate  personal  relations  with  the  leading 
Catholics  of  Austria-Hungary. 

2  The  German  Foreign  Office  is  not  in  the  habit  of  issuing  collected  diplomatic 
papers  on  given  subjects  as  the  British  Foreign  Office  is.  As  regards  the  outbreak  of 
the  European  War  the  German  Foreign  Office  contented  itself  with  issuing  a  narra- 
tive to  which  a  number  of  despatches  were  added  as  exhibits.  There  are  therefore 
comparatively  few  German  despatches  published.  For  the  narrative  see  pp.  551  to. 
560. 


60  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

means  which  it  utiHses  for  their  realization.  Through  the  pub- 
lished facts  the  last  doubt  must  disappear  that  the  centre  of  action 
of  the  efforts  for  the  separation  of  the  South  Slavic  provinces  from 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  their  union  with  the  Servian 
Kingdom  must  be  sought  in  Belgrade  where  it  displays  its  activity 
with  the  connivance  of  members  of  the  Government  and  of  the 
Army. 

The  Serb  intrigues  may  be  traced  back  through  a  series  of  years. 
In  a  specially  marked  manner  the  pan-Serb  chauvinism  showed 
itself  during  the  Bosnian  crisis.^  Only  to  the  far-reaching  self-re- 
straint and  moderation  of  the  iVustro-Hungarian  Government  and  the 
energetic  intercession  of  the  Powers  is  it  to  be  ascribed  that  the  provo- 
cations to  which  at  that  time  Austria-Hungary  was  exposed  on  the 
part  of  Servia,  did  not  lead  to  a  conflict.  The  assurance  of  future 
well-behaviour  which  the  Servian  Government  gave  at  that  time,  it 
has  not  kept.  Under  the  very  eyes,  at  least  with  the  tacit  sufferance 
of  official  Servia,  the  pan-Serb  propaganda  has  meanwhile  increased 
in  scope  and  intensity ;  at  its  door  is  to  be  laid  the  latest  crime  the 
threads  of  which  lead  to  Belgrade.  It  has  become  evident  that  it  is 
compatible  neither  with  the  dignity  nor  with  the  self-preservation 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  to  view  any  longer  idly  the  doings 
across  the  border  through  which  the  safety  and  the  integrity  of  the 
Monarchy  are  permanently  threatened.  With  this  state  of  affairs, 
the  action  as  well  as  the  demands  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment can  be  viewed  only  as  justifiable.  Nevertheless,  the  attitude 
assumed  by  public  opinion  as  well  as  by  the  Government  in  Servia 
does  not  preclude  the  fear  that  the  Servian  Government  will  decline 
to  meet  these  demands  and  that  it  w^ill  allow  itself  to  be  carried  away 
into  a  provocative  attitude  toward  Austria-Hungary.  Nothing  would 
remain  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  unless  it  renounced 
definitely  its  position  as  a  great  Power,  but  to  press  its  demands  with 
the  Servian  Government,  and,  if  need  be,  enforce  the  same  by  appeal 
to  military  measures,  in  regard  to  which  the  choice  of  means  must  be 
left  with  it. 

I  have  the  honour  to  request  you  to  express  yourself  ^  in  the  sense 
indicated  above  to  (the  present  representative  of  M.  Viviani)  (Sir 
Edward  Grey)  (M.  Sasonof)  and  therewith  give  special  emphasis 
to  the  view  that  in  this  question  there  is  concerned  an  affair  which 
should  be  settled  solely  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  the 
limitation  to  which  it  must  be  the  earnest  endeavour  of  the  powers 
to  insure.     We  anxiously  desire  the  localisation  of  the  conflict  because 

1  Of  1908-1909. 

2  Austria  had  sent  her  note  to  her  representative  in  Belgrade  on  July  22,  and  notified 
her  other  representatives  on  the  same  day,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  Nos.  7  and  8. 
The  formal  presentation  of  the  note  in  Serbia  was  to  take  place  in  the  afternoon  of 
July  23,  while  the  Powers  were  to  be  informed  of  it  officially,  receiving  a  copy  of  the 
note  on  July  24,  1914  ;  cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  9.  Informally  the  Powers 
were  informed  on  July  23  ;  cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  3,  July  23,  1914. 

On  July  21,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  15,  the  German  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  had 
said  he  did  not  know  the  contents  of  the  forthcoming  note.  Between  then  and  July  23, 
Germany  had  been  informed  of  the  note,  and  as  the  above  despatch  proves,  given  her 
approval. 


July  23,  British  Blue  Book  No.  3  61 

every  intercession  of  another  power  on  account  of  the  various  treaty- 
aUiances  would  precipitate  inconceivable  consequences. 

I  shall  look  forward  with  interest  to  a  telegraphic  report  about 
the  course  of  your  interview. 

Great  Britain : 

From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  38 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  —  (Re- 
ceived July  27.)^ 

Sir,  Rome,  July  23,  1914. 

I  GATHER  that  the  Italian  Government  have  been  made  cognisant 
of  the  terms  of  the  communication  which  will  be  addressed  to  Servia. 
Secretary-General,  whom  I  saw  this  morning  at  the  Italian  Foreign 
Office,  took  the  view  that  the  gravity  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  con- 
viction of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  that  it  was  absolutely 
necessary  for  their  prestige,  after  the  many  disillusions  which  the  turn 
of  events  in  the  Balkans  has  occasioned,  to  score  a  definite  success. 

I  have,  etc. 

Rennell  Rodd. 

To  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  3 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  23,  1914. 

Count  Mensdorff  ^  told  me  to-day  that  he  would  be  able  to- 
morrow morning  to  let  me  have  officially  the  communication  that  he 
understood  was  being  made  to  Servia  to-day  by  Austria.  He  then 
explained  privately  what  the  nature  of  the  demand  would  be.  As  he 
told  me  that  the  facts  would  all  be  set  out  in  the  paper  that  he  would 
give  me  to-morrow,  it  is  unnecessary  to  record  them  now.  I  gathered 
that  they  would  include  proof  of  the  complicity  of  some  Servian 
officials  in  the  plot  to  murder  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  and  a 
long  list  of  demands  consequently  made  by  Austria  on  Servia. 

As  regards  all  this,  I  said  that  it  was  not  a  matter  on  which  I  would 
make  any  comment  until  I  received  an  official  communication,  and 
it  seemed  to  me  probably  a  matter  on  which  I  should  not  be  able  to 
make  any  comment  at  first  sight. 

But,  when  Count  Mensdorff  told  me  that  he  supposed  there  would 

1  This  is  a  letter,  delayed  in  transmission  to  July  27,  and  therefore  printed  by  Sir 
E.  Grey  among  the  July  27  despatches.  Important  diplomatic  messages  are  sent  in 
duplicate  by  telegram  and  by  letter.  This  is  one  of  the  few  instances  where  Sir  E. 
Grey  did  not  print  the  telegram,  which  undoubtedly  was  properly  received.  The 
British  Blue  Book  contains  no  explanation. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 


62  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

be  something  in  the  nature  of  a  time-Hmit,  which  was  in  effect  akin 
to  an  ultimatum,  I  said  that  I  regretted  ^  this  very  much.  To  begin 
with  a  time-Hmit  might  inflame  opinion  in  Russia,  and  it  would  make 
it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  give  more  time,  even  if  after  a  few 
days  it  appeared  that  by  giving  more  time  there  would  be  a  prospect 
of  securing  a  peaceful  settlement  and  getting  a  satisfactory  reply  from 
Servia.  I  admitted  that,  if  there  was  no  time-limit,  the  proceedings 
might  be  unduly  protracted,  but  I  urged  that  a  time-limit  could  al- 
ways be  introduced  afterwards ;  that,  if  the  demands  were  made  with- 
out a  time-limit  in  the  first  instance,  Russian  public  opinion  might 
be  less  excited,  after  a  week  it  might  have  cooled  down,  and  if  the 
Austrian  case  was  very  strong  it  might  be  apparent  that  the  Russian 
Government  would  be  in  a  position  to  use  their  influence  in  favour 
of  a  satisfactory  reply  from  Servia.  A  time-limit  was  generally  a 
thing  to  be  used  only  in  the  last  resort,  after  other  means  had  been 
tried  and  failed. 

Count  Mensdorff  said  that  if  Servia,  in  the  interval  that  had  elapsed 
since  the  murder  of  the  Archduke,  had  voluntarily  instituted  an  en- 
quiry on  her  own  territory,  all  this  might  have  been  avoided.  In 
1909,  Servia  had  said  in  a  note  that  she  intended  to  live  on  terms 
of  good  neighbourhood  with  Austria;  but  she  had  never  kept  her 
promise,  she  had  stirred  up  agitation  the  object  of  which  was  to  dis- 
integrate Austria,  and  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  Austria  to  pro- 
tect herself. 

I  said  that  I  would  not  comment  upon  or  criticise  what  Count 
Mensdorff  had  told  me  this  afternoon,  but  I  could  not  help  dwelling 
upon  the  awful  consequences  involved  in  the  situation.  Great 
apprehension  had  been  expressed  to  me,  not  specially  by  M.  Cambon 
and  Count  Benckendorff,^  but  also  by  others,  as  to  what  might 
happen,  and  it  had  been  represented  to  me  that  it  would  be  very  de- 
sirable that  those  who  had  influence  in  St.  Petersburgh  should  use  it 
on  behalf  of  patience  and  moderation.  I  had  replied  that  the  amount 
of  influence  that  could  be  used  in  this  sense  would  depend  upon  how 
reasonable  were  the  Austrian  demands  and  how  strong  the  justifica- 
tion that  Austria  might  have  discovered  for  making  her  demands. 
The  possible  consequences  of  the  present  situation  were  terrible.  If  as 
many  as  four  Great  Powers  of  Europe  —  let  us  say,  Austria,  France, 
Russia,  and  Germany  —  were  engaged  in  war,  it  seemed  to  me  that  it 
must  involve  the  expenditure  of  so  vast  a  sum  of  money,  and  such  an 
interference  with  trade,  that  a  war  would  be  accompanied  or  followed 
by  a  complete  collapse  of  European^  credit  and  industry.  In  these 
days,  in  great  industrial  States,  this  would  mean  a  state  of  things 
worse  than  that  of  1848,  and,  irrespective  of  who  were  victors  in  the 
war,  many  things  might  be  completely  swept  away. 

1  France,  and  therefore  probably  the  Entente  Powers  had  known  of  the  time  limit 
since  July  19,  1914  ;  cf.  French  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  13  and  14. 

2  Accounts  of  previous  interviews  to  this  effect  with  the  Russian  and  French  Am- 
bassadors are  not  printed  in  the  British  Blue  Book. 

'  This  suggests  what  Sir  E.  Grey  said  in  his  speech  of  August  3,  that  England 
would  suffer  almost  as  much  if  she  stayed  out  as  if  she  entered  the  war.  Such  a  view 
contemplates  only  England's  trade,  and  disregards  the  loss  of  lives. 


July  23,  Russian  Orange  Booh  No.  2  63 

Count  Mensdorff  did  not  demur  to  this  statement  of  the  possible 
consequences  of  the  present  situation,  but  he  said  that  all  would  de- 
pend upon  Russia. 

I  made  the  remark  that,  in  a  time  of  difficulties  such  as  this,  it  was 
just  as  true  to  say  that  it  required  two  to  keep  the  peace  as  it  was  to 
say,  ordinarily,  that  it  took  two  to  make  a  quarrel.  I  hoped  very 
much  that,  if  there  were  difficulties,  Austria  and  Russia  would 
be  able  in  the  first  instance  to  discuss  them  directly  with  each 
other. 

Count  Mensdorff  said  that  he  hoped  this  would  be  possible,  but 
he  was  under  the  impression  that  the  attitude  in  St.  Petersburgh 
had  not  been  very  favourable  recently. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 

Russia : 

From  Belgrade. 

Russian  Okange  Book  No.  1 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Belgrade,  July  10  {23),  1914. 

The  Austrian  Minister,  at  6  o'clock  this  evening,  presented  an 
ultimatum  from  his  Government  to  the  Minister  of  Finance,  Patcho/U, 
in  the  absence  of  Pashitch,  requiring  the  acceptance  of  the  demands 
contained  therein  within  forty-eight  hours.  Giesl  added  verbally 
that,  in  the  event  of  failure  to  accept  the  note  integrally  within  forty- 
eight  hours,  he  was  under  instructions  to  leave  Belgrade  with  the 
staff  at  the  legation.  Pashitch  and  the  other  Ministers,  who  are 
away  electioneering,  have  been  recalled  and  are  expected  at  Bel- 
grade to-morrow,  Friday,  at  10  a.m.  Patchou,  who  communicated 
to  me  the  contents  of  the  note,  solicits  the  help  of  Russia  and  de- 
clares that  no  Servian  Government  could  accept  the  demands  of 
Austria. 


Russian  Orange  Book  No.  2 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Belgrade,  July  10  (23),  1914. 

Text  of  the  note  presented  to  the  Servian  Government  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  to-day. 

[Here  follows  the  text  of  the  note,  for  which  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 
No.  7,  July  22,  1914.] 


64  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Serbia : 

From  Austro-Hungarian  Minister 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  32 

Baron  Giesl  mn  Gieslingen,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade, 
to  Dr.  Laza  Patchou,  Acting  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Belgrade,  July  10/£3,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  transmit  to  Your  Excellency  herewith  the 
enclosed  Note  which  I  have  received  from  my  Government,  addressed 
to  the  Royal  Serbian  Government. 

I  have,  etc. 

Handed  personally  at  6  p.m. 

[For  the  text  of  the  note  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  No.  7,  July  22,  1914.] 

To  All  the  Serbian  Legations  Abroad 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  33 

Dr.  Laza  Patchou,  Acting  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  10/23,  1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  handed  me  this  afternoon  at 
6  P.M.  a  note  in  regard  to  the  Serajevo  outrage  embodying  the  demands 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  and  insisting  on  a  reply  from 
the  Serbian  Government  within  two  days,  i.e.,  by  Saturday,  at  6  p.m. 
He  informed  me  orally  that  he  and  his  staff  would  leave  Belgrade 
unless  a  favourable  answer  were  forthcoming  within  the  stipulated 
time. 

Some  of  the  Ministers  being  absent  from  Belgrade  the  Serbian 
Government  have  not  as  yet  come  to  any  decision,  but  I  am  in  a 
position  to  state  now  that  the  demands  are  such  that  no  Serbian 
Government  could  accept  them  in  their  entirety. 


July  24,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  17 


65 


Friday,  July  24,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 
Great  Britain 

Russia 


Serbia 


Sent  Despatches  to 


Received  Despatches  from 


London,  Petrograd 
London,  etc. 
Viviani,  London,  etc. 


Vienna,    Paris, 

Belgrade 
Vienna,  London  etc. 


Petrograd,  London 
Crown  Prince  to  Czar 


London,  Paris,  Petrograd 

Vienna 

Viviani,  Berlin,  London,  Petrograd, 
Aust.-Hung.  Ambassador 
Vienna,  Petrograd 
Berlin,     Petrograd,  Vienna,  Belgrade,  Ger- 
man Ambassador 

Berlin,  Paris,  Belgrade  Aust.-Hung. 
Ambassador,  Crown  Prince  of 
Servia 

Petrograd 


The  Governments  of  the  several  European  Powers  are  officially  notified  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Servia. 

Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  insist  that  the  dispute  remain  localized  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia. 

Great  Britain  proposes  a  Conference  of  four  Powers,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Germany  and  Italy  to  mediate  between  Austria  and  Russia.  At  the  request  of 
the  French  Ambassador  she  apparently  alters  her  plan  to  mean  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Serbia.  From  the  published  despatches  of  this  day,  which  are  con- 
tradictory, it  does  not  appear  which  plan  Great  Britain  is  urging.  She  refuses 
however,  to  exert  pressure  on  Russia  while  asking  Germany  to  exert  pressure  in 
Vienna. 

Great  Britain  refuses  Russia's  request  to  promise  her  unconditional  support  of 
Russia  and  France,  but  instructs  her  representative  in  Belgrade  to  express  no 
views  except  in  agreement  with  the  representatives  of  the  other  two  Entente 
Powers,  whose  alliance  with  each  other  she  recognizes  to  be  as  binding  as  that  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany. 

Serbia  is  sure  that  war  on  her  means  a  European  War. 

Russia  is  hostile  in  her  dealings  with  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  and 
discusses  her  determination  to  support  Serbia  even  to  the  extent  of  going  to  war, 
but  does  so  only  with  the  Entente  Powers. 

France  promises  to  support  Russia  in  war,  if  need  be,  but  gives  active  diplo- 
matic support  to  Great  Britain's  proposal  of  a  Conference  of  Four  Powers.  Italy 
does  the  same. 

Great  Britain  mobilizes  her  fleet,  according  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  66, 
July  27,  1914,  but  does  not  mention  this  fact  in  any  of  her  published  despatches. 

Belgium  foresees  a  European  war. 


Austria-Hungary : 


To  London 


AUSTRO-HUNGAKIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    17 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Mensdorff  at  London, 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  24,  1914, 

In  answer  to  Your  Excellency's  telegram  of  yesterday : 
I  beg  you  to  explain  at  once  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  our  demarche 
of  yesterday  at  Belgrade  is  not  to  be  considered  as  a  formal  ultimatum, 


66  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

but  that  it  is  merely  a  demarche  with  a  time-Hmit,  which,  as  Your 
Excellency  will  be  good  enough  to  explain  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  in 
strict  confidence  will  —  if  the  time-limit  expires  without  result  —  for 
the  time  be  followed  only  by  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations, 
and  by  the  beginning  of  the  necessary  military  preparations,  as  we 
are  absolutely  resolved  to  carry  through  our  just  demands. 

Your  Excellency  is  empowered  to  add  that  if  Servia,  after  the  ex- 
piration of  the  time-limit,  were  only  to  give  way  under  the  pressure  of 
our  military  preparations,  we  should  indeed  have  to  demand  that  she 
should  make  good  the  expenses  which  we  had  incurred ;  as  is  well 
known,  we  have  already  had  twice  (1908  and  1912)  to  mobilise  because 
of  Servia. 

Austria-Hungary: 

From  London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    10 

Count  Mensdorff  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  London,  July  24,  1914- 

Have  just  handed  the  circular  note  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who 
read  it  carefully.  At  the  fifth  heading,  he  asked  what  it  meant; 
to  introduce  officials  of  our  Government  in  Servia  would  be  equivalent 
to  the  end  of  Servian  political  independence.  I  answered  that  co- 
operation of,  e.g.,  police  officials,  in  no  way  affected  the  sovereignty 
of  the  State. 

He  regretted  the  time-limit,  as  in  this  way  we  should  be  deprived 
of  the  possibility  of  quieting  the  first  outbreak  of  excitement  and  bring- 
ing pressure  to  bear  upon  Belgrade  to  give  us  a  satisfactory  answer. 
It  was  always  possible  to  send  an  ultimatum  if  answer  not  satis- 
factory. 

I  developed  our  point  of  view  at  length.  (Necessity  of  defence 
against  continued  revolutionary  undertakings  which  threaten  the 
territory  of  the  Monarchy,  protection  of  our  most  vital  interests, 
complete  failure  of  the  conciliatory  attitude  which  we  had  hitherto 
often  shown  to  Servia,  who  had  had  more  than  three  weeks  to  set 
on  foot  of  her  own  accord  investigations  as  to  accomplices  in  outrage, 
etc.) 

The  Secretary  of  State  repeated  his  objections  to  the  short  time- 
limit,  but  recognized  that  what  was  said  as  to  complicity  in  the  crime 
of  Serajevo,  as  well  as  many  of  our  other  requirements,  was  justified. 

He  would  be  quite  ready  to  look  on  the  affair  as  one  which  only 
concerned  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia.  He  is,  however,  very 
"apprehensive"  that  several  Great  Powers  might  be  involved  in  a 
war.  Speaking  of  Russia,  Germany  and  France,  he  observed  that 
the  terms  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  might  be  more  or  less  to  the 
same  effect  as  those  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

I  fully  explained  to  him  our  point  of  view,  and  repeated  with 
emphasis  that  in  this  case  we  must  stand  firm  so  as  to  gain  for  our- 


July  24,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  11  67 

selves  some  sort  of  guarantees,  as  hitherto  Servian  promises  have  never 
been  kept.  I  understand  that  in  the  first  place  he  considered  the 
question  only  as  it  influences  the  position  of  Europe.  He  must,  how- 
ever, in  order  to  be  fair  to  our  point  of  view,  put  himself  in  our  situa- 
tion. 

He  would  not  go  into  any  more  detailed  discussion  on  this  subject, 
said  he  must  have  time  to  study  the  note  more  carefully.  He  was 
to  see  the  German  and  the  French  Ambassadors,  as  he  must  first  of  all 
exchange  ideas  with  the  Powers  who  are  allies  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  Russia  respectively,  but  have  themselves  no  direct  interest  in 
Servia. 

From  Paris 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  11 
Count  Szecsen  to  Count  Berchtold, 
(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  2^,  1914. 

I  HAVE  just  read  instructions  of  the  22nd  instant  to  the  Minister 
of  Justice,^  who  is  entrusted  with  the  representation  of  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  in  his  absence,  and  left  copy. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  who  had  received  information  as  to  the  con- 
tents of  our  demarche  at  Belgrade  through  this  morning's  papers, 
seemed  to  be  considerably  impressed  by  my  communication.  With- 
out entering  on  any  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  text,  he  readily 
agreed  that  recent  events  and  the  attitude  of  the  Servian  Government 
made  energetic  action  on  our  side  quite  comprehensible. 

Point  5  in  the  note  handed  in  at  Belgrade  seemed  to  make  a  special 
impression  on  the  Minister  as  he  asked  me  to  read  it  to  him  twice. 

The  Minister  thanked  me  for  my  communication  which,  he  said, 
would  be  carefully  examined.  I  took  the  opportunity  to  impress  on 
him  that  the  question  was  one  which  must  be  brought  to  an  issue 
directly  between  Servia  and  us,  but  that  it  was  in  the  general  interests 
of  Europe  that  the  trouble  which  for  years  past  had  been  kept  up  by 
Servian  intrigues  against  us  should  at  last  make  way  for  a  clear  situa- 
tion. 

All  friends  of  peace  and  order,  and  I  placed  France  in  the  first 
rank  of  these,  should  therefore  give  serious  advice  to  Servia  com- 
pletely to  change  her  attitude,  and  to  satisfy  our  just  demands. 

The  Minister  said  that  it  was  the  duty  of  Servia  to  proceed  ener- 
getically against  any  accomplices  of  the  murderers  of  Serajevo,  a 
duty  which  she  could  not  escape.  While  laying  special  stress  on  the 
sympathy  of  France  for  Austria-Hungary,  and  on  the  good  relations 
which  existed  between  our  two  countries,  he  expressed  the  hope  that 
the  controversy  would  be  brought  to  an  end  peacefully  in  a  manner 
corresponding  to  our  wishes. 

The  Minister  avoided  every  attempt  to  palliate  or  to  defend  in 
any  way  the  attitude  of  Servia. 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  25,  July  24,  1914. 


68  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD  BoOK  No.    12 

Count  Szecsen  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  2Jj.,  19H. 

Baron  Schoen  will,  in  accordance  with  instructions/  make  a  com- 
munication here  to-day  that  according  to  the  view  of  the  Berlin 
Cabinet,  our  controversy  with  Servia  is  a  matter  which  concerns  only 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia. 

In  this  connection,  he  would  give  them  to  understand  that  in  case 
third  States  should  wish  to  intervene,  Germany,  true  to  the  obligations 
of  her  alliance,  would-be  on  our  side. 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    13 

Count  Szecsen  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  24, 1914- 

Baron  Schoen  has  just  made  the  demarche  as  he  was  instructed. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  said  to  him  he  could  not  yet  express  himself 
definitely.  He  could,  however,  already  say  this,  that  the  French 
Government  are  also  of  opinion  that  our  controversy  with  Servia 
concerns  Belgrade  and  Vienna  alone,  and  that  it  was  hoped  here  that 
the  question  would  find  a  direct  and  peaceful  solution. 

The  Servian  Minister  here  had  already  been  advised  ^  that  his 
Government  should  give  way  in  every  point  so  far  as  it  was  possible, 
with  the  limitation,  however,  "  so  far  as  their  sovereign  rights  were  not 
affected." 

Baron  Schoen  laid  stress  on  the  European  necessity  that  the  focus 
of  constant  disturbance  at  Belgrade  must  at  last  be  done  away  with. 

To  Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    18 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petershurgh. 

Vienna,  July  24,  1914- 

I  RECEIVED  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  on  the  morning  of  the 
24th,  and  assured  him  that  I  attached  special  importance  to  bringing 
to  his  knowedge  as  soon  as  possible  the  steps  we  were  taking  in  Bel- 
grade, and  explaining  to  him  our  point  of  view  as  regards  them. 

Prince  Koudacheff,  while  thanking  me  for  this  courtesy,  did  not 
hide  his  anxiety  as  to  our  categorical  procedure  against  Servia,  and 
he  observed  that  there  had  always  been  apprehension  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh  that  our  demarche  might  take  the  form  of  a  humiliation  of 
Servia,  which  must  have  an  echo  in  Russia. 

1  took  the  opportunity  of  reassuring  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires 

»  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  1,  July  23,  1914. 

2  Cf.  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  10,  July  2.  For  different  advice  given  Serbia  by 
France,  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  26,  July  24,  1914. 


July  24,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  I4.  69 

as  to  this.  Our  aim  was  to  clear  up  the  untenable  position  of  Servia 
as  regards  the  Monarchy,  and  with  this  object  to  cause  the  Govern- 
nient  of  that  State  on  the  one  hand  publicly  to  disavow  the  tendencies 
directed  against  the  present  position  of  the  Monarchy,  and  to  suppress 
them  by  administrative  measures,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  make  it 
possible  for  us  to  satisfy  ourselves  that  these  measures  were  honestly 
carried  out.  I  explained  at  greater  length  the  danger,  not  only  to 
the  integrity  of  the  Monarchy,  but  also  to  the  balance  of  power  and 
the  peace  of  Europe,  which  would  be  involved  in  giving  further  scope 
to  the  Great-Servian  propaganda,  and  how  all  the  dynasties,  and,  not 
least,  the  Russian,  would  apparently  be  threatened,  if  the  idea  took 
root  that  a  movement  which  made  use  of  murder  as  a  national  weapon 
could  be  continued  with  impunity. 

In  conclusion,  I  pointed  out  that  we  did  not  aim  at  any  increase 
of  territory,  but  only  at  the  maintenance  of  what  we  possess,  a  point 
of  view  which  could  not  fail  to  be  understood  by  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment. 

Prince  Koudacheff  remarked  on  this  that  he  did  not  know  the  view 
of  his  own  Government,  and  also  did  not  know  what  position  Servia 
would  take  towards  individual  demands. 

At  the  conclusion  of  our  interview  the  Charge  d 'Affaires  expressly 
said  that  he  would  not  fail  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  his  Government 
the  explanation  which  I  had  given  him  of  the  step  we  had  taken, 
especially  to  the  effect  that  no  humiliation  of  Servia  was  intended 
by  us. 

From  Petrograd 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  14 
Count  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  24,  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  receiving  me,  said  that  he  knew 
what  brought  me  to  him,  and  he  would  at  once  explain  to  me  that  he 
could  not  take  up  any  definite  attitude  towards  my  demarche.  ,  I  be- 
gan by  reading  out  my  instructions.^  The  Minister  interrupted  me 
for  the  first  time  on  the  mention  of  the  series  of  outrages,  and,  on  my 
explanation,  asked  if  then  it  had  been  proved  that  they  all  had  orig- 
inated at  Belgrade.  I  laid  stress  on  the  fact  that  they  all  sprang 
from  Servian  instigation.  In  the  further  course  of  the  reading  he  said 
that  he  knew  what  it  was  all  about :  we  wanted  to  make  war  on  Servia, 
and  this  was  to  serve  as  a  pretext.  I  replied  that  our  attitude  during 
recent  years  was  a  sufficient  proof  that  we  neither  sought  nor  required 
pretexts  against  Servia.  The  formal  declaration  which  is  required 
did  not  elicit  any  objection  from  the  Minister ;  he  only  continued  to 
maintain  that  Pasic  had  already  expressed  himself  to  this  effect.  This 
I  corrected.  "II  dira  cela  25  fois  si  vous  midez,''  said  he.  I  said  to 
him  that  no  one  among  us  was  attacking  the  integrity  of  Servia  or  the 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  Nos.  7  and  8,  July  22,  1914. 


70  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

dynasty.  M.  Sazonof  expressed  himself  most  vigorously  against  the 
dissolution  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  which  Servia  would  never  under- 
take. The  participation  of  Imperial  and  Royal  officials  in  the  sup- 
pression of  the  revolutionary  movements  elicited  further  protest  on 
the  part  of  the  Minister.  Servia  then  will  no  longer  be  master  in 
her  own  house.  "  You  will  always  be  wanting  to  intervene  again,  and 
what  a  life  you  will  lead  Europe."  I  answered  that  if  Servia  shows 
goodwill  it  will  be  a  quieter  life  than  hitherto. 

The  commentary  added  to  the  communication  of  the  note  was 
listened  to  by  the  Minister  with  fair  composure ;  at  the  passage  that 
our  feelings  were  shared  by  those  of  all  civilised  nations,  he  observed 
that  this  was  a  mistake.  With  all  the  emphasis  I  could  command,  I 
pointed  out  how  regrettable  it  would  be  if  we  could  not  come  to  an 
understanding  with  Russia  on  this  question,  in  which  everything 
which  is  most  sacred  to  us  was  at  stake  and,  whatever  the  Minister 
might  say,  everything  which  is  sacred  in  Russia.  The  Minister 
attempted  to  minimise  the  Monarchial  side  of  the  question. 

With  regard  to  the  dossier  which  was  put  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Governments,  M.  Sazonof  wanted  to  know  why  we  had  given  our- 
selves this  trouble,  as  we  had  already  delivered  the  ultimatum.  This 
was  the  best  proof  that  we  did  not  really  desire  an  impartial  examina- 
tion of  the  matter.  I  said  to  him  that  the  results  which  had  been 
attained  by  our  own  investigations  were  quite  sufficient  for  our  pro- 
cedure in  this  matter,  which  had  to  do  with  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia,  and  that  we  were  only  ready  to  give  the  Powers  further  infor- 
mation if  it  interested  them,  as  we  had  nothing  to  keep  secret. 

M.  Sazonof  said  that  now  that  the  ultimatum  had  been  issued  he 
was  not  in  the  least  curious.  He  represented  the  matter  as  if  we  only 
wanted  to  make  war  with  Servia  whatever  happened.  I  answered 
that  we  were  the  most  peace-loving  Power  in  the  world,  but  what 
we  wanted  was  security  for  our  territory  from  foreign  revolutionary 
intrigues,  and  the  protection  of  our  dynasty  from  bombs. 

In  the  course  of  the  further  discussion,  M.  Sazonof  again  made  the 
observation  that  we  certainly  had  created  a  serious  situation. 

In  spite  of  his  relative  calm,  the  attitude  of  the  Minister  was  through- 
out unaccommodating  and  hostile. 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    15 

Communique  of  the  Russian  official  Gazette, 

St.  Petershurgh,  July  24,  1914., 

The  St.  Petersburgh  telegraphic  agency  announces :  — 

The  official  journal  publishes  the  following  communique  — 
Recent  events  and  the  despatch  of  an  ultimatum  to  Servia 
by  Austria-Hungary  are  causing  the  Russian  Government 
the  greatest  anxiety.  The  Government  are  closely  following 
the  course  of  the  dispute  between  the  two  countries,  to  which 
Russia  cannot  remain  indifferent. 


July  24,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  16  71 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    16 

Count  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  24,  1914. 

After  a  Council  of  Ministers^  which  lasted  for  five  hours,  M. 
Sazonof  this  evening  received  the  German  Ambassador,  and  had  a 
long  conversation  with  him. 

The  Minister  took  the  point  of  view,  which  is  probably  to  be  con- 
sidered as  the  outcome  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian-Servian  conflict  was  not  a  matter  confined  to  these  States, 
but  a  European  affair,  as  the  settlement  arrived  at  in  the  year  1909 
by  the  Servian  declaration  had  been  made  under  the  auspices  of  the 
whole  of  Europe. 

The  Minister  pointed  out  particularly  that  he  had  been  disagree- 
ably affected  by  the  circumstance  that  Austria-Hungary  had  offered 
a  dossier  for  investigation  when  an  ultimatum  had  already  been 
presented.  Russia  would  require  an  international  investigation  of 
the  dossier,  which  had  been  put  at  her  disposal.  My  German  col- 
league at  once  brought  to  M.  Sazonof 's  notice  that  Austria-Hungary 
would  not  accept  interference  in  her  difference  with  Servia,  and  that 
Germany  also  on  her  side  could  not  accept  a  suggestion  which  would 
be  contrary  to  the  dignity  of  her  ally  as  a  Great  Power. 

In  the  further  course  of  the  conversation,  the  Minister  explained 
that  that  which  Russia  could  not  accept  with  indifference  was  the 
eventual  intention  of  Austria-Hungary  ''  de  devorer  la  Serbie."  Count 
Pourtales  answered  that  he  did  not  accept  any  such  intention  on 
the  part  of  Austria-Hungary,  as  this  would  be  contrary  to  the  most 
special  interest  of  the  Monarchy.  The  only  object  of  Austria- 
Hungary  was  "  d'infliger  a  la  Serbie  le  chdtiment  justement  merite. ' '  M. 
Sazonof  on  this  expressed  his  doubts  whether  Austria-Hungary  would 
allow,  herself  to  be  contented  with  this,  even  if  explanations  on  this 
point  had  been  made. 

The  interview  concluded  with  an  appeal  by  M.  Sazonof  that  Ger- 
many should  work  with  Russia  at  the  maintenance  of  peace.^  The 
German  Ambassador  assured  the  Russian  Minister  that  Germany 
certainly  had  no  wish  to  bring  about  a  war,  but  that  she  naturally 
fully  represented  the  interests  of  her  ally. 

1  This  is  undoubtedly  the  Council  of  Ministers  at  which  Mr.  Sazonof  said,  British 
Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  1914,  he  would  have  to  consult  his  colleagues  concerning  the 
reply  which  Serbia  would  make  to  Austria. 

2  The  condition  on  which  Russia  would  insist  is  stated  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  17, 
July  25,  1914,  where  Sazonof,  as  a  result  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  held  in  the  after- 
noon of  July  24,  states :  "Russia  could  not  allow  Austria  to  crush  Serbia  and  become 
the  predominant  Power  in  the  Balkans,  and  if  she  feels  secure  of  the  support  of  France, 
she  will  face  all  the  risks  of  war." 

Students  will  note  that  while  the  determination  of  the  Entente  Powers  to  go  to 
war  unless  Austria-Hungary  recedes  from  her  position  is  occasionally  expressed  even  in 
the  published  despatches  (e.g.  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  38,  July  25,  and  No.  37,  which  should  be  compared  with  British  Blue  Book  No.  25, 
same  day.  See  also  the  Editor's  "  Germany's  Point  of  View,"  page  230),  this  is  nev^r 
mentioned  to  any  of  the  Triple  Alliance  Powers. 


72  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Belgium : 

From  Vienna 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  1 

Count  Erremhault  de  Dudzeele,  Belgian  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Vienna,  July  24,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  enclose  herewith  the  text  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  ultimatum  to  Servia. 

[Here  follows  the  text  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia,  Red  Book  No.  7, 
July  22,  1914.] 

To  Paris,  London,  Berlin,  Vienna  and  Petrograd 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  2 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburg. 

Sir,  Brussels,   July  24,    1914- 

The  Belgian  Government  have  had  under  their  consideration 
whether,  in  present  circumstances,  it  would  not  be  advisable  to 
address  to  the  Powers  who  guarantee  Belgian  independence  and  neu- 
trality a  communication  assuring  them  of  Belgium's  determination  to 
fulfil  the  international  obligations  imposed  upon  her  by  treaty  in 
the  event  of  a  war  breaking  out  on  her  frontiers. 

The  Government  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  such  a  communi- 
tion  would  be  premature  at  present,  but  that  events  might  move 
rapidly  and  not  leave  sufficient  time  to  forward  suitable  instructions 
at  the  desired  moment  to  the  Belgian  representatives  abroad. 

In  these  circumstances  I  have  proposed  to  the  King  and  to  my  col- 
leagues in  the  Cabinet,  who  have  concurred,  to  give  you  now  exact 
instructions  as  to  the  steps  to  be  taken  by  you  if  the  prospect  of  a 
Franco-German  war  became  more  threatening. 

I  enclose  herewith  a  note,  signed,  but  not  dated,  which  you  should 
read  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  of  which  you  should  give 
him  a  copy,  if  circumstances  render  such  a  communication  necessary. 

I  will  inform  you  by  telegram  when  you  are  to  act  on  these  instruc- 
tions. 

This  telegram  will  be  despatched  when  the  order  is  given  for  the 
mobilisation  of  the  Belgian  army  if,  contrary  to  our  earnest  hope  and 
to  the  apparent  prospect  of  a  peaceful  settlement,  our  information 
leads  us  to  take  this  extreme  measure  of  precaution. 


Enclosure  in  No.  2. 
Sir, 

The  international  situation  is  serious,  and  the  possibility  of  a  war 
between  several  Powers  naturally  preoccupies  the  Belgian  Government. 


July  24i  Belgian  Gray  Book  No,  2  73 

Belgium  has  most  scrupulously  observed  ^  the  duties  of  a  neutral 
State  imposed  upon  her  by  the  treaties  of  April  19,  1839 ;  and  those 
duties  she  will  strive  unflinchingly  to  fulfil,  whatever  the  circum- 
stances may  be. 

The  friendly  feelings  of  the  Powers  towards  her  have  been  so  often 
reaffirmed  that  Belgium  confidently  expects  that  her  territory  will 
remain  free  from  any  attack,  should  hostilities  break  out  upon  her 
frontiers. 

All  necessary  steps  to  ensure  respect  of  Belgian  neutrality  have 
nevertheless  been  taken  by  the  Government.  The  Belgian  army 
has  been  mobilised  and  is  taking  up  such  strategic  positions  as  have 
been  chosen  to  secure  the  defence  of  the  country  and  the  respect  of 
its  neutrality.  The  forts  of  Antwerp  and  on  the  Meuse  have  been  put 
in  a  state  of  defence. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  nature  of  these  measures. 
They  are  intended  solely  to  enable  Belgium  to  fulfil  her  international 
obligations ;  and  it  is  obvious  that  they  neither  have  been  nor  can 
have  been  undertaken  with  any  intention  of  taking  part  in  an  armed 
struggle  between  the  Powers  or  from  any  feeling  of  distrust  of  any 
of  those  Powers. 

In  accordance  with  my  instructions,  I  have  the  honour  to  communi- 
cate to  your  Excellency  a  copy  of  the  declaration  by  the  Belgian 
Government,  and  to  request  that  you  will  be  good  enough  to  take 
note  of  it. 

A  similar  communication  has  been  made  to  the  other  Powers 
guaranteeing  Belgian  neutrality.^ 

1  The  truth  of  this  statement  has  been  challenged  by  Germany.  For  the  Official 
Publications  on  this  subject  see  European  Politics  During  the  Decade  before  the  War 
as  Described  by  Belgian  Diplomatists,  German  Foreign  Office,  1915.  See  also  Fuehr, 
Alexander,  The  Neutrality  of  Belgium,  Funk  &  Wagnalls  Co.,  1915. 

2  These  notes  were  presented  to  the  several  Powers  on  August  1,  1914,  in  accordance 
with  a  telegram  (see  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  16)  of  that  day ;  i.e.  a  week  and  a  day 
after  the  note  had  been  drawn. 

One  of  the  reasons  why  Belgium  drew  this  note  thus  early,  on  July  24,  may  be 
found  in  the  events  touched  upon  in  an  account  of  the  experiences  of  a  member  of  the 
British  Military  Intelligence  Department,  given  by  himself  before  the  Boston  Press 
Club  on  Sunday,  January  14,  1915.  This  British  officer  is  Mr.  Forbes  Sutherland, 
who  said  according  to  an  affidavit  by  two  witnesses  in  the  editor's  possession  : 

That  for  several  years  he  had  been  a  member  of  the  British  Military  -Intelligence 
Department. 

That  he  landed  in  New  York  toward  the  end  of  June,  1914,  and  he  there  found  a 
cablegram  from  the  home  office  in  London,  already  three  days  old,  telling  him  to  re- 
port immediately. 

That  he  telephoned  to  his  local  chief  in  Montreal,  Canada,  to  mquire  what  it  was 
all  about,  and  that  he  was  told  that  it  was  for  the  European  service. 

That  he  had  returned  to  London  and  that  about  one  week  before  the  first  declara- 
tion of  war  he  had  gone  to  Antwerp  with  one  of  the  heads  of  the  intelligence  depart- 
ment to  concert  measures  with  the  head  of  the  Belgian  secret  service. 


74  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  M.  Viviani,  the  French  Premier,  who  had  been  absent  together 
with  the  President  on  a  msit  to  Russia. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  22 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  to  M.  Rienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

I  SHOULD  be  obliged  if  you  would  urgently  send  on  to  M.  Dumaine 
the  following  information  and  instructions. 

Reml,  July  24,  1914,  1  A-M. 

In  the  course  of  my  conversation  with  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  we  had  to  take  into  consideration  the  dangers  which 
might  result  from  any  step  taken  by  Austria-Hungary  in  relation  to 
Servia  in  connection  with  the  crime  of  which  the  Hereditary  Archduke 
has  been  a  victim.  We  found  ourselves  in  agreement  in  thinking  that 
we  should  not  leave  anything  undone  to  prevent  a  request  for  an  ex- 
planation or  some  mise  en  demeure  which  would  be  equivalent  to  in- 
tervention in  the  internal  affairs  of  Servia,  of  such  a  kind  that  Servia 
might  consider  it  as  an  attack  on  her  sovereignty  and  independence. 

We  have  in  consequence  come  to  the  opinion  that  we  might  by 
means  of  a  friendly  conversation  with  Count  Berchtold,  give  him 
counsels  of  moderation,  of  such  a  kind  as  to  make  him  understand 
how  undesirable  would  be  any  intervention  at  Belgrade  which  would 
appear  to  be  a  threat  on  the  part  of  the  Cabinet  at  Vienna. 

The  British  Ambassador,  who  was  kept  informed  by  M.  Sazonof, 
expressed  the  idea  that  his  Government  would  doubtless  associate 
itself  with  a  demarche  for  removing  any  danger  which  might  threaten 
general  peace,  and  he  has  telegraphed  to  his  Government  to  this  effect. 

M.  Sazonof  has  addressed  instructions  to  this  effect  to  M.  Schebeko. 
While  there  is  no  question  in  this  of  collective  or  concerted  action  at 
Vienna  on  the  part  of  the  representatives  of  the  Triple  Entente,  I  ask 
you  to  discuss  the  matter  with  the  Russian  and  British  Ambassadors, 
and  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  them  as  to  the  best  means  by  which 
each  of  you  can  make  Count  Berchtold  understand  without  delay 
the  moderation  that  the  present  situation  appears  to  us  to  require. 

Further,  it  would  be  desirable  to  ask  M.  Paul  Cambon  to  bring  the 
advantages  of  this  procedure  to  the  notice  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and 
to  support  the  suggestion  that  the  British  Ambassador  in  Russia 
will  have  made  to  this  effect  to  the  Foreign  Office.  Count  Bencken- 
dorff  is  instructed  to  make  a  similar  recommendation. 

Rene  Viviani. 


July  24,  Frerwh  Yellow  Book  No.  25  75 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  23 

M.  Biemenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Vouncil,  on  hoard  the  "France.'' 

Paris,  July  2J,.,  1914. 

I  HAVE  sent  on  your  instructions  to  Vienna  as  urgent,  but  ^  from  in- 
formation contained  in  this  morning's  papers  it  appears  that  the 
Austrian  note  was  presented  at  Belgrade  at  6  o'clock  yesterday 
evening. 

This  note,  the  official  text  of  which  has  not  yet  been  handed  to 
us  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  x\mbassador,  appears  to  be  very  sharp  ; 
it  appears  to  aim  not  only  at  obtaining  the  prosecution  of  the  Serbs 
who  were  directly  implicated  in  the  outrage  of  Serajevo  but  to  require 
the  immediate  suppression  of  the  whole  of  the  anti-Austrian  propa- 
ganda in  the  Servian  press  and  army.  It  is  said  to  give  Servia  till 
6  o'clock  on  Saturday  evening  to  make  her  submission. 

In  sending  your  instructions  to  M.  Dumaine  I  requested  him  to 
come  to  an  agreement  with  his  British  and  Russian  colleagues^  as  to 
his  action. 

Bienvenu-Martin.  - 


France 


From  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  24 


[Here  follows  the  text  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia,  Austrian  Red 
Book  No.  7,  July  22,  1914.1 

To  Viviani,  and  London,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Petrograd,  Rome  and  Belgrade. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  25 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  on  board  the  "France,''  and  to 
London,  Berlin,  Vienna,  St.  Petersburgh,  Rome,  Belgrade. 

Paris,  July  24,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  this  morning  left  me  a  copy  of  the  Austrian  note  which 
was  handed  in  at  Belgrade  on  Thursday  evening.    Count  Szecsen  in- 

1  M.  Martin's  reply,  No.  23,  indicates  that  he  understood  M.  Viviani's  message, 
No.  22,  to  suggest  means  by  which  Austria-Hungary  might  be  prevented  from  pre- 
senting her  note  to  Servia.  If  this  was  the  meaning  of  the  message,  it  can  only  have 
been  written  with  a  view  to  future  publication  and  not  in  the  hope  of  accomplishing 
anything.  The  note  is  dated  July  24,  1  a.m.  By  that  time  both  Russia  and  Great 
Britain  had  been  informed  of  the  contents  of  the  note  (British  Blue  Book  No.  3)  and  the 
fact  that  the  note  had  been  presented  (Russian  Orange  Book  No,  2).  In  view  of  the 
decision  of  the  Entente  Powers  to  have  their  representatives  act  in  unison  —  cf.  last 
sentence  of  Yellow  Book  No.  23  with  British  Blue  Book  No.  12,  July  24,  1914  —  it  is 
certain  that  neither  Great  Britain  nor  Russia  would  have  kept  so  important  an  event 
as  the  presentation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  from  the  French  Premier. 

2  The  Entente  Powers  acted  in  the  Serbian  difficulty  as  a  unit  from  the  first.  Cf. 
British  Blue  Book  No.  12,  same  day,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  23,  same  day,  also 
Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  5,  June  30,  1914. 


76  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

forms  me  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  gives  the  Servian 
Government  up  to  5  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  Saturday  the  25th 
for  their  answer.^ 

The  note  is  based  on  the  undertaking  made  by  Servia  on  the 
31st  March  1909,  to  recognise  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, and  reproaches  the  Servian  Government  with  having  tolerated 
an  anti-Austrian  propaganda  in  which  officials,  the  army,  and  the 
press  have  taken  part,  a  propaganda  which  threatens  the  security 
and  integrity  of  Austria,  and  the  danger  of  which  has  been  shown 
by  the  crime  of  the  28th  June  which,  according  to  the  facts  established 
during  the  investigation,  was  planned  at  Belgrade. 
.  The  Austrian  Government  explain  that  they  are  compelled  to  put 
an  end  to  a  propaganda  which  forms  a  permanent  danger  to  their 
tranquillity,  and  to  require  from  the  Servian  Government  an  official 
pronouncement  of  their  determination  to  condemn  and  suppress  it, 
by  publishing  in  the  Official  Gazette  of  the  26th  a  declaration,  the 
terms  of  which  are  given,  condemning  it,  stating  their  regret,  and 
threatening  to  crush  it.  A  general  order  of  the  King  to  the  Servian 
army  is  at  the  same  time  to  make  these  declarations  known  to  the 
army.  In  addition  to  this,  the  Servian  Government  are  to  undertake 
to  suppress  publications,  to  dissolve  the  societies,  to  dismiss  those 
officers  and  civil  servants  whose  names  would  be  communicated  to 
them  by  the  Austrian  Government,  to  accept  the  cooperation  of 
Austrian  officials  in  suppressing  the  subversive  acts  to  which  their 
attention  has  been  directed,  as  well  as  for  the  investigation  into  the 
crime  of  Serajevo,  and  finally  to  proceed  to  the  immediate  arrest  of  a 
Servian  officer  and  an  official  who  were  concerned  in  it. 

Annexed  to  the  Austrian  memorandum  is  a  note  which  sums  up 
the  facts  established  by  the  investigation  into  the  crime  of  Serajevo, 
and  declares  that  it  was  planned  at  Belgrade ;  that  the  bombs  were 
provided  for  the  murderers,  and  came  from  a  depot  of  the  Servian 
army ;  finally  that  the  murderers  were  drilled  and  helped  by  Servian 
officers  and  officials. 

On  visiting  the  Acting  Political  Director  immediately  after  making 
this  communication,  Count  Szecsen  without  any  observations  in- 
formed him  that  the  note  had  been  presented.  M.  Berthelot,  on 
my  instructions,  confined  himself  to  pointing  out  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador  the  feeling  of  anxiety  which  had  been  aroused 
by  the  information  available  this  morning  as  to  the  contents  of  the 
Austrian  note,  and  the  painful  feeling  which  could  not  fail  to  be 
aroused  in  French  public  opinion  by  the  time  chosen  for  so  categorical 

1  The  French  Yellow  Book  prints  here  the  following  note  :  "  The  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  in  a  private  letter  on  the  24th  July  sent  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Afifairs 
the  following  correction : 

"  'In  the  copy  of  the  dispatch  which  I  had  the  honour  to  send  to  your  Excellency 
this  morning,  it  was  said  that  my  Government  expected  an  answer  from  the  Cabinet 
at  Belgrade  at  latest  by  5  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  Saturday  the  25th  of  this  month. 
As  our  Minister  at  Belgrade  did  not  deliver  his  note  yesterday  until  6  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  the  time  allowed  for  the  answer  has  in  consequence  been  prolonged  to  6 
o'clock  to-morrow,  Saturday  evening. 

"'I  consider  it  my  duty  to  inform  your  Excellency  of  this  slight  alteration  in  the 
termination  of  the  period  fixed  for  the  answer  to  the  Servian  Government.'  " 


July  24,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  26  11 

a  demarche  with  so  short  a  time  Hmit ;  that  is  to  say,  a  time  when  the 
President  of  the  Republic  and  the  President  of  the  Council  and 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Republic  had  left  St.  Petersburgh 
and  were  at  sea/  and  consequently  were  not  able  to  exert,  in  agree- 
ment with  those  Powers  which  were  not  directly  interested,  that 
soothing  influence  on  Servia  and  Austria  which  was  so  desirable  in 
the  interest  of  general  peace. ^ 

The  Servian  Minister  has  not  yet  received  any  information  as  to 
the  intentions  of  his  Government. 

The  German  Ambassador  has  asked  me  to  receive  him  at  5  o'clock 

this  afternoon.  ^ 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

To  Stockholm  — for  M.  Vimani  —  Belgrade,  Vienna,  London,  Berlin, 

Rome,  Petrograd 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  26 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M. 
Thiehaut,  French  Minister  at  Stockholm  (for  the  President  of  the 
Council),  and  to  Belgrade,  Vienna,  London,  Berlin,  Rome,  St. 
Petersburgh. 

Paris,  July  24,  1914- 

M.  Vesnitch  was  this  morning  still  without  any  telegram  from 
his  Government  informing  him  as  to  their  intentions,  and  did  not 
know  the  contents  of  the  Austrian  note.^ 

To  a  request  for  advice  which  he  made  to  the  Political  Director, 
M.  Berthelot  said  to  him,  speaking  personally  and  for  himself  alone, 
that  Servia  must  try  to  gain  time,^  as  the  limit  of  forty-eight  hours 
perhaps  formed  rather  a  "mise  en  demeure^'  than  an  ultimatum  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  term ;  that  there  might,  for  instance,  be  an 
opportunity  of  offering  satisfaction  on  all  those  points  which  were 
not  inconsistent  with  the  dignity  and  sovereignty  of  Servia ;  he  was 
advised  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  statements  based  on  the 
Austrian  investigations  at  Serajevo  were  one  sided,  and  that  Servia, 
while  she  was  quite  ready  to  take  measures  against  all  the  accomplices 
of  a  crime  which  she  most  strongly  condemned,  required  full  in- 
formation as  to  the  evidence  in  order  to  be  able  to  verify  it  with  all 
speed  ;  above  all  to  attempt  to  escape  from  the  direct  grip  of  Austria 
by  declaring  herself  ready  to  submit  to  the  arbitration  of  Europe. 

I  have  asked  at  London  and  St.  Petersburgh  for  the  views  and  in- 
tentions of  the  British  and  Russian  Governments.     It  appears  on 

1  This  thought  is  stated  as  coining  from  the  Russian  Charg6  d 'Affaires  in  Berlin, 
in  Yellow  Book  No.  29,  July  24,  1914.     Cf.  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  6. 

2  The  Austrian  Ambassador  reporting  to  his  home  office  (Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  11,  July  24),  does  not  mention  this  interview  with  the  Acting  Political  Director. 

On  the  other  hand  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  does  not  state  here  what  the  Ambassador 
quotes  him  there  as  having  said. 

3  The  contents  of  the  Austrian  note  had  been  published  in  the  French  morning 
papers  of  July  24,  1914,  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  11,  July  24;  and  had 
been  disclosed  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Blue  Book  No.  3,  July  23,  1914. 

*  The  advice  given  Serbia  by  France  is  differently  stated  in  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  13,  July  24,  1914. 


78y  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  other  hand  from  our  information  that  the  Austrian  note  was  not 
communicated  to  Italy  until  to-day,  and  that  Italy  had  neither  been 
consulted  nor  even  informed  ^  of  it. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  27 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Stock- 
holm {for  the  President  of  the  Council),  and  to  Belgrade,  London, 
St.  Petershurgh,  Berlin,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  2Ii.,  1914- 

The  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna  informs  me  ^  that  opinion  has 
been  startled  by  the  sudden  and  exaggerated  nature  of  the  Austrian 
demands,  but  that  the  chief  fear  of  the  military  party  appears  to  be 
that  Servia  may  give  way. 

The  Servian  Minister  in  Austria  thinks  that  his.  Government  will 
show  themselves  very  conciliatory  in  all  that  concerns  the  punish- 
ment of  the  accomplices  of  the  crime,  and  the  guarantees  to  be  given 
as  to  the  suppression  of  the  anti-Austrian  propaganda,  but  that  they 
could  not  accept  a  general  order  to  the  army  dictated  to  the  King, 
nor  the  dismissal  of  officers  who  were  suspected  by  Austria,  nor  the 
interference  of  foreign  officials  in  Servia.  M.  Yovanovitch  considers 
that,  if  it  were  possible  to  start  a  discussion,  a  settlement  of  the  dis- 
pute might  still  be  arranged,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Powers. 

Our  Ambassador  at  Berlin  ^  gives  an  account  of  the  excitement 
aroused  by  the  Austrian  note,  and  of  the  state  of  feeling  of  the  Russian 
Charge  d'Affaires,  who  thinks  that  a  large  part  of  opinion  in  Ger- 
many would  desire  war.  The  tone  of  the  press  is  threatening  and 
appears  to  have  as  its  object  the  intimidation  of  Russia.  Our 
Ambassador  is  to  see  Herr  von  Jagow  this  evening. 

M.  Barrere  informs  us  that  Italy  "^  is  exercising  moderating  influence 
at  Vienna  and  is  trying  to  avoid  complications. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  28 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Stock- 
holm {for  the  President  of  the  Council),  and  to  Belgrade,  London, 
St.  Petershurgh,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  24,  1914. 

Herr  von  Schoen  came  to  inform  me  of  a  note  from  his  Govern- 
ment, of  which  he  would  not  leave  me  a  copy,^  but  at  my  request  he 
read  it  twice  over  to  me. 

1  This  seems  to  be  at  variance  with  British  Blue  Book  No.  38,  July  23,  1914. 

2  The  despatch  from  the  French  Ambassador  in  Vienna  here  referred  to  has  not 
been  published. 

» Cf.  below  French  Yellow  Book  No.  29.  July  24,  1914. 

*  The  despatch  from  the  French  Ambassador  in  Rome  here  referred  to  has  not  been 
published. 

'  There  is  no  reason  why  he  should  not  leave  a  copy  with  M.  Martin.  The  Ger- 
man Ambassador  in  London  apparently  left  a  copy  with  Sir  E.  Grey  ;  British  Blue  Book 


July  2Jf,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  28  79 

The  Note  was  almost  word  for  word  as  follows  :  — 

"The  statements  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  newspapers  concerning 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian  heir 
presumptive  and  his  consort  has  taken  place  disclose  unmistakably 
the  aims  which  the  Pan-Servian  propaganda  has  set  itself,  and  the 
means  it  employs  to  realise  them.  The  facts  made  known  must  also 
do  away  with  all  doubt  that  the  centre  of  activity  of  all  those  tend- 
encies which  are  directed  towards  the  detachment  of  the  Southern 
Slav  provinces  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  their  in- 
corporation into  the  Servian  Kingdom  is  to  be  found  in  Belgrade,  and 
is,  at  any  rate,  at  work  there,  with  the  connivance  of  members  of  the 
Government  and  the  army. 

"The  Servian  intrigues  have  been  going  on  for  many  years.  In 
an  especially  marked  form  the  Pan-Servian  chauvinism  manifested 
itself  during  the  Bosnian  crisis.  It  was  only  owing  to  the  moderation 
and  far-reaching  self-restraint  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
and  to  the  energetic  intervention  of  the  Great  Powers  that  the  Servian 
provocations  to  which  Austria-Hungary  was  then  exposed  did  not 
lead  to  a  conflict.  The  assurance  of  good  conduct  in  future  which 
was  given  by  the  Servian  Government  at  that  time  has  not  been  kept. 
Under  the  eyes,  at  least  with  the  tacit  permission,  of  official  Servia, 
the  Pan-Servian  propaganda  has,  since  that  time,  continuously  in- 
creased in  extension  and  intensity.  To  its  account  must  be  set  the 
recent  crime,  the  threads  of  which  lead  to  Belgrade.  It  has  become 
clearly  evident  that  it  would  not  be  consistent  either  with  the  dignity 
or  with  the  self-preservation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  to 
remain  longer  inactive  in  face  of  this  movement  on  the  other  side  of  the 
frontier,  by  which  the  security  and  the  integrity  of  her  territories  are 
constantly  menaced.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  course  of  pro- 
cedure and  demands  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  can  only 
be  regarded  as  justified.  In  spite  of  that,  the  attitude  which  public 
opinion  as  well  as  the  Government  in  Servia  have  recently  adopted 
does  not  exclude  the  apprehension  that  the  Servian  Government 
might  refuse  to  comply  with  those  demands,  and  might  even  allow 
themselves  to  be  carried  away  into  a  provocative  attitude  towards 
Austria-Hungary.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  if  they  do 
not  wish  definitely  to  abandon  Austria's  position  as  a  Great  Power, 
would  then  have  no  choice  but  to  obtain  the  fulfilment  of  their  de- 
mands from  the  Servian  Government  by  strong  pressure  and,  if 
necessary,  by  using  military  measures,  the  choice  of  the  means  having 
to  be  left  to  them." 

The  German  Ambassador  particularly  called  my  attention  to  the 
last  two  paragraphs  of  his  note  before  reading  it,  pressing  the  point 
that  this  was  the  important  matter.  I  noted  down  the  text  literally ; 
it  is  as  follows :  —  "  The  German  Government  consider  that  in  the 
present  case  there  is  only  question  of  a  matter  to  be  settled  exclusively 

No.  9,  July  24,  1914.  M.  Martin  must  have  had  a  copy  of  it  when  he  wrote  this  mes- 
sage. However  excellent  his  memory  is,  he  could  not  have  quoted  a  lengthy  note  as 
accurately  as  he  did,  from  memory. 


80  Official  Diplomatic  Docummts 

betweei?  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  that  the  Great  Powers 
ought  seriously  to  endeavour  to  restrict  it  to  those  two  immediately 
concerned. 

"The  German  Government  desire  urgently  the  localisation  of  the 
dispute,  because  every  interference  of  another  Power  would,  owing 
to  the  natural  play  of  alliances,  be  followed  by  incalculable  conse- 
quences." 

I  called  the  German  Ambassador's  attention  to  the  fact  that  while 
it  might  appear  legitimate  to  demand  the  punishment  of  all  those 
who  were  implicated  in  the  crime  of  Serajevo,  on  the  other  hand 
it  seemed  difficult  to  require  measures  which  could  not  be  accepted, 
having  regard  to  the  dignity  and  sovereignty  of  Servia ;  the  Servian 
Government,  even  if  it  was  willing  to  submit  to  them,  would  risk  being 
carried  away  by  a  revolution. 

I  also  pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Schoen  that  his  note  only  took  into 
account  two  hypotheses  :  that  of  a  pure  and  simple  refusal  or  that  of 
a  provocative  attitude  on  the  part  of  Servia.  The  third  hypothesis 
(which  would  leave  the  door  open  for  an  arrangement)  should  also 
be  taken  into  consideration ;  that  of  Servia's  acceptance  and  of  her 
agreeing  at  once  to  give  full  satisfaction  for  the  punishment  of  the  ac- 
complices and  full  guarantees  for  the  suppression  of  the  anti-Austrian 
propaganda  so  far  as  they  were  compatible  with  her  sovereignty  and 
dignity. 

I  added  that  if  within  these  limits  the  satisfaction  desired  by 
Austria  could  be  admitted,  the  means  of  obtaining  it  could  be 
examined ;  if  Servia  gave  obvious  proof  of  goodwill  it  could  not  be 
thought  that  Austria  would  refuse  to  take  part  in  the  conversation. 

Perhaps  they  should  not  make  it  too  difficult  for  third  Powers,  who 
could  not  either  morally  or  sentimentally  cease  to  take  interest  in 
Servia,  to  take  an  attitude  which  was  in  accord  with  the  wishes  of 
Germany  to  localise  the  dispute. 

Herr  von  Schoen  recognised  the  justice  of  these  considerations  and 
vaguely  stated  that  hope  was  always  possible.  When  I  asked  him  if 
we  should  give  to  the  x\ustrian  note  the  character  of  a  simple  mise  en 
demeure,  which  permitted  a  discussion,  or  an  ultimatum,  he  answ^ered 
that  personally  he  had  no  views.  Bienvenu-Martin. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  29 

M,  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  24,  1914. 

The  delivery  of  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia  has  made  a  deep  im- 
pression. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  declares  that  his  Government  could 
not  abate  any  of  their  demands.  At  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  as  well  as 
in  the  press,  the  same  view  is  expressed. 


July  24,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  30  81 

Most  of  the  Charges  d'Affaires  present  in  Berlin  came  to  see  me 
this  morning.  They  show  Httle  hope  of  a  peaceful  issue.  The 
Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  bitterly  remarked  that  Austria  has  pre- 
sented her  note  at  the  very  moment  that  the  President  of  the  Republic 
and  the  President  of  the  Council  had  left  St.  Petersburgh.^  He  is  in- 
clined to  think  that  a  considerable  section  of  opinion  in  Germany 
desires  war  and  would  like  to  seize  this  opportunity,  in  which  Austria 
will  not  doubt  be  found  more  united  than  in  the  past,  and  in  which 
the  German  Emperor,  influenced  by  a  desire  to  give  support  to  the 
monarchic  principle  (par  un  sentiment  de  solidarite  monarchique)  and 
by  horror  at  the  crime,  is  less  inclined  to  show  a  conciliatory  attitude. 

Herr  von  Jagow  is  going  to  receive  me  late  in  the  afternoon. 

Jules  Cambon. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  30 

M.  Jules  Camhon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin^  to  M.  Bienvenu-. 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  24,  1914. 

I  ASKED  the  Secretary  of  State  to-day,  in  the  interview  which  I 
had  w^ith  him,  if  it  was  correct,  as  announced  in  the  newspapers, 
that  Austria  had  presented  a  note  to  the  Powers  on  her  dispute 
with  Servia ;  if  he  had  received  it ;  and  what  view  he  took  of  it. 

Herr  von  Jagow^  answered  me  in  the  affirmative,  adding  that  the 
note  was  forcible,  and  that  he  approved  it,  the  Servian  Government 
having  for  a  long  time  past  wearied  the  patience  of  Austria.  More- 
over, he  considers  this  question  to  be  a  domestic  one  for  Austria,  and 
he  hopes  that  it  will  be  localised. 

I  then  said  to  him  that  not  having  as  yet  received  any  instructions, 
the  views  which  I  wished  to  exchange  with  him  were  strictly  personal. 
Thereupon  I  asked  him  if  the  Berlin  Cabinet  had  really  been  entirely 
ignorant  of  Austria's  requirements  before  they  were  communicated  to 
Belgrade,  and  as  he  told  me  that  that  was  so,  I  showed  him  my  sur- 
prise at  seeing  him  thus  undertake  to  support  claims,  of  whose  limit 
and  scope  he  w^as  ignorant. 

Herr  von  Jagow  interrupted  me,  and  said,  "  It  is  only  because  we 
are  having  a  personal  conversation  that  I  allow  you  to  say  that  to  me." 

"Certainly,"  I  replied,  "but  if  Peter  I.  humiliates  himself , domestic 
trouble  will  probably  break  out  in  Servia ;  that  will  open  the  door  to 
fresh  possibilities,  and  do  you  know  where  you  will  be  led  by  Vienna  ?  " 
I  added  that  the  language  of  the  German  newspapers  was  not  the 
language  of  persons  who  were  indifferent  to,  and  unacquainted  with, 
the  question,  but  betoken  an  active  support.  Finally,  I  remarked 
that  the  shortness  of  the  time  limit  given  to  Servia  for  submission 
w^ould  make  an  unpleasant  impression  in  Europe. 

Here  von  Jagow  answered  that  he  quite  expected  a  little  excitement 

1  The  identical  thought  was  expressed  on  the  same  day  in  Paris  by  the  Acting 
Political  Director,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  25.  See  also  same  day,  British  Blue  Book 
No.  6. 


82  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

(un  peu  d' emotion)  on  the  part  of  Servia's  friends,  but  that  he  was 
counting  on  their  giving  her  wise  advice. 

"I  have  no  doubt,"  I  then  said  to  him,  "that  Russia  would  en- 
deavour to  persuade  the  Cabinet  of  Belgrade  to  make  acceptable 
concessions ;  but  why  not  ask  from  one  what  is  being  asked  from  the 
other,  and  if  reliance  is  being  placed  on  advice  being  given  at  Bel- 
grade, is  it  not  also  legitimate  to  rely  on  advice  being  given  at  Vienna 
from  another  quarter?" 

The  Secretary  of  State  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  that  depended  on 
circumstances  ;  but  immediately  checked  himself ;  he  repeated  that 
the  difficulty  must  be  localised.  He  asked  me  if  I  really  thought  the 
situation  serious.  "Certainly,"  I  answered,  "because  if  what  is 
happening  is  the  result  of  due  reflection,  I  do  not  understand  why  all 
means  of  retreat  have  been  cut  off." 

k\\  the  evidence  shows  that  Germany  is  ready  to  support  Austria's 
attitude  with  unusual  energy.  The  weakness  which  her  Austro- 
Hungarian  ally  has  shown  for  some  years  past,  has  w^eakened  the  con- 
fidence that  was  placed  in  her  here.  She  was  found  heavy  to  drag 
along.  Mischievous  legal  proceedings,  such  as  the  Agram  and  the 
Friedjung  affairs,  brought  odium  on  her  police  and  covered  them  with 
ridicule.  All  that  was  asked  of  the  police  was  that  they  should  be 
strong ;  the  conviction  is  that  they  were  violent. 

An  article  which  appeared  in  the  Lokal  Anzeiger  this  evening  shows 
also  that  at  the  German  Chancery  there  exists  a  state  of  mind  to  which 
we  in  Paris  are  naturally  not  inclined  to  pay  sufficient  attention,  I 
mean  the  feeling  that  the  monarchies  must  stand  together  {sentiment 
de  la  solidarite  monarchique) .  I  am  convinced  that  great  weight  must 
be  attached  to  this  point  of  view  in  order  to  appreciate  the  attitude 
of  the  Emperor  William,  whose  impressionable  nature  must  have 
been  affected  by  the  assassination  of  a  prince  whose  guest  he  had  been 
a  few  days  previously. 

It  is  not  less  striking  to  notice  the  pains  with  which  Herr  von 
Jagow,  and  all  the  officials  placed  under  his  orders,  pretend  to  every 
one  that  they  were  ^  ignorant  of  the  scope  of  the  note  sent  by  Austria 
to  Servia.  Jules  Cambon. 

From  Petrograd 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  31 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  S.  Peter shurgh,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin^  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petershurgh,  July  24,  1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  has  communicated  to  M. 
Sazonof  a  threatening  note  to  Servia. 

1  This  sentence  reads  "know  nothing  of  the  note"  in  The  New  York  Times  Trans- 
lation. It  contradicts,  therefore,  the  first  part  of  the  despatch  where  the  contents  of 
the  note  are  discussed.  The  official  English  version  gives  no  explanation  of  the  altered 
wording.  The  edition  of  the  French  Yellow  Book  supplied  to  the  editor  by  the  French 
Ambassador  in  Washington,  October,  1915,  contains  the  past  tense. 


July  24,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  32  83 

The  intentions  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  his  Ministers  could 
not  be  more  pacific/  a  fact  of  which  the  President  of  the  RepubHc 
and  the  President  of  the  Council  have  been  able  to  satisfy  them- 
selves directly;  but  the  ultimatum  which  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  has  just  delivered  to  the  Cabinet  at  Belgrade  introduces 
a  new  and  disquieting  element  into  the  situation. 

Public  opinion  in  Russia  would  not  allow  Austria  to  offer  violence 
to  Servia.  The  shortness  of  the  time  limit  fixed  by  the  ultimatum 
renders  still  more  difficult  the  moderating  influence  that  the  Powers 
of  the  Triple  Entente, might  exercise  at  Vienna. 

On  the  other  hand,  M.  Sazonof  assumes  that  Germany  will  desire 

to  support  her  ally  and  I  am  afraid  that  this  impression  is  correct. 

Nothing  but  the  assurance  of  the  solidarity  of  the  Triple  Entente 

can  prevent  the  German  Powers  from  emphasising  their  provocative 

attitude.  ^ 

Paleologue. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  32 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.   Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  24,  1914- 
Sir  Edward  Grey  having  discussed  with  me  his  desire  to  leave  no 
stone  unturned  to  avert  the  crisis,  we  agreed  in  thinking  that  the 
British  Cabinet  might  ask  the  German  Government  to  take  the  ini- 
tiative in  approaching  Vienna  with  the  object  of  offering  the  media- 
tion, between  Austria  and  Servia,^  of  the  four  Powers  which  are  not 
directly  interested.  If  Germany  agrees,  time  will  be  gained,  and  this 
is  the  essential  point. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  told  me  that  he  would  discuss  with  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  the  proposal  I  have  just  explained.  I  mentioned  the  matter 
to  my  Russian  colleague,  who  is  afraid  of  a  surprise  from  Germany, 
and  who  imagines  that  Austria  w^ould  not  have  despatched  her  ulti- 
matum without  previous  agreement  with  Berlin. 

Count  Benckendorff  told  me  that  Prince  Lichnowsky,  when  he 
returned  from  leave  about  a  month  ago,  had  intimated  that  he  held 
pessimistic  views  regarding  the  relations  between  St.  Petersburgh 
and  Berlin.  He  had  observed  the  uneasiness  caused  in  this  latter 
capital  by  the  rumours  of  a  naval  entente  between  Russia  and  Great 
Britain,  by  the  Tsar's  visit  to  Bucharest,  and  by  the  strengthening 
of  the  Russian  army.     Count  Benckendorff  had  concluded  from  this 

1  This  differs  from  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24 ;  and  No.  17,  July  25,  1914. 
There  was  a  conference  between  Sazonof  and  the  French  and  British  Ambassadors  in 
Petrograd  on  July  24,  in  the  morning,  as  described  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  6.  So  far 
as  the  French  published  despatches  go,  the  above  is  the  only  report.  Cf.  also  below, 
German  White  Book,  Exhibit  4,  July  24,  1914. 

2  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  in  quoting  this  suggestion  in  Yellow  Book  No.  34,  same  day, 
alters  it  to  include  mediation  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.  That  this  was  not  the 
Cambon-Grey  intention  appears  from  British  Blue  Book  No.  10,  July  24,  where  Sir 
E.  Grey  begins  with  his  idea  of  action  "  simultaneously  in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh," 
while  M.  Paul  Cambon  prefers  "mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia." 


84  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

that  a  war  with  Russia  would  be  looked  upon  without  disfavour  in 
Germany. 

The  Under-Secretary  of  State  has  been  struck,  as  all  of  us  have  been, 
by  the  anxious  looks  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  since  his  return  from 
Berlin,  and  he  considers  that  if  Germany  had  wished  to  do  so  she 
could  have  stopped  the  despatch  of  the  ultimatum. 

The  situation,  therefore,  is  as  grave  as  it  can  be,  and  we  see  no  way 
of  arresting  the  course  of  events. 

However,  Count  Benckendorff  thinks  it  right  to  attempt  the 
demarche  upon  which  I  have  agreed  with  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Paul  Cambon. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  33  ^ 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M,  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  2Jj.,  19H. 

The  Servian  Minister  received  to-night  from  M.  Pashitch  a  tele- 
gram saying  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  sent  him 
their  ultimatum,  the  time  limit  of  which  expires  at  6  o'clock  to- 
morrow, Saturday  evening.  j\I.  Pashitch  does  not  give  the  terms  of 
the  Austrian  communication,  but  if  it  is  of  the  nature  reported  in 
to-day's  "  Times,"  it  seems  impossible  for  the  Servian  Government  to 
accept  it. 

In  consultation  with  my  Russian  colleague,  who  thinks  it  extremely 
difficult  for  his  Government  not  to  support  Servia,  we  have  been  ask- 
ing ourselves  what  intervention  could  avert  the  conflict. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  having  summoned  me  for  this  afternoon,  I  pro- 
pose to  suggest  that  he  should  ask  for  the  semi-official  intervention 
of  the  German  Government  at  Vienna  to  prevent  a  sudden  attack. 

Paul  Cambon. 

To  Stockholm  for  M.  Viviani,  Belgrade,  Petrograd,  Berlin,  Vienna, 

Rome 

French  Yellow  Sook  No.  34 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Stock- 
holm (for  the  President  of  the  Council),  Belgrade,  St.  Petersburg h, 
Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  24,  1914. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  having  communicated  his  Govern- 
ment's note  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  latter  observed  that  no  such 

1  This  despatch  has  been  doctored  for  insertion  here.  It  is  an  impossible  message 
in  its  present  form.  It  is  dated  July  24,  and  states  that  the  "  Servian  Minister  received 
to-night,"  etc.,  notification  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note.  This  notification,  however, 
was  sent  to  the  Servian  Minister  on  the  previous  day,  July  23.  Cf .  Serbian  Blue  Book 
No.  33.  The  casual  reader  would  receive  the  impression  from  this  despatch  that  the 
time  limit  granted  to  Serbia  was  24  hours,  from  "to-night,"  July  24,  to  "to-morrow, 
Saturday  evening." 

The  last  paragraph  of  this  despatch.  No.  33,  refers  to  a  summons  to  a  conference, 
which  has  been  described  in  No.  32. 


July  24,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  3  85 

formidable  declaration  had  ever  been  addressed  by  one  Government 
to  another ;  he  drew  Count  Mensdorff's  attention  to  the  responsibility 
assumed  by  Austria. 

With  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  between  Austria  and  Russia  before 
him,  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposes  to  ask  for  the  cooperation  of  the 
German  Government  with  a  view  to  the  mediation  of  the  four  powers 
who  are  not  directly  interested  in  the  Servian  question,  namely, 
England,  France,  Italy  and  Germany ;  this  mediation  to  be  exercised 
simultaneously  at  Vienna  and  at  St.  Petersburgh.^ 

1  advised  the  Servian  Minister  to  act  cautiously,  and  I  am  willing 
to  cooperate  in  any  conciliatory  action  at  Vienna,  in  the  hope  that 
Austria  will  not  insist  on  the  acceptance  of  all  her  demands  as  against 
a  small  State,  if  the  latter  shows  herself  ready  to  give  every  satis- 
faction which  is  considered  compatible  with  her  independence  and 

^     ^    ^'  Bienvenu-Martin. 

Germany : 

From  Vienna 

German  WmTE  Book  ExmsiT  3^ 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  the  Chancellor  on 
July  24th,  1914. 

Count  Berchtold  has  asked  to-day  for  the  Russian  Charge 
d'affaires^  in  order  to  explain  to  him  thoroughly  and  cordially  Austria- 
Hungary's  point  of  view  toward  Servia.  After  recapitulation  of  the 
historical  development  of  the  past  few  years,  he  emphasised  that 
the  Monarchy  entertained  no  thought  of  conquest  toward  Servia. 
Austria-Hungary  would  not  claim  Servian  territory.  It  insisted 
merely  that  this  step  was  meant  as  a  definite  means  of  checking  the 
Serb  intrigues.  Impelled  by  force  of  circumstances,  Austria-Hungary 
must  have  a  guaranty  for  continued  amicable  relations  with  Servia. 
It  was  far  from  him  to  intend  to  bring  about  a  change  in  the  balance 
of  powers  in  the  Balkan.  The  Charge  d'affaires,  who  had  received  no 
instructions  from  St.  Petersburg,  took  the  discussion  of  the  Secretary 
"ad  referendum"  with  the  promise  to  submit  it  immediately  to 
Sasonof. 

1  Mediation  both  in  Vienna  and  Petrograd  was  Sir  E.  Grey's  first  idea,  see  British 
Blue  Book  No.  10,  July  24,  but  he  was  dissuaded  from  it  by  the  French  Ambassador 
in  London,  M.  Paul  Cambon.  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  10,  July  24,  1914.  This 
statement  here  is,  moreover,  at  variance  with  M.  Cambon's  report.  Yellow  Book  No. 
32,  same  day.  M.  Cambon's  desire  not  to  bring  any  pressure  to  bear  on  Russia  was 
eventually  shared  by  Sir  E.  Grey.  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  62,  July  27,  and  No. 
80,  July  28,  and  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  11  and  16. 

2  For  Exhibit  No.  2  see  July  28,  1914.  The  Exhibits  of  the  German  White  Book  are 
not  numbered  chronologically. 

3  See  above,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  18,  July  24,  1914. 


86  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  4 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  the  Chan- 
cellor on  July  2Jfth,  1914-- 

I  HAVE  just  utilized  the  contents  of  Order  592  in  a  prolonged  inter- 
view with  Sasonof .  The  Secretary  (Sasonof)  indulged  in  unmeasured 
accusations^  toward  Austria-Hungary  and  he  was  very  much  agitated. 
He  declared  most  positively  that  Russia  could  not  permit  ^  under  any 
circumstances  that  the  Servo-Austrian  difficulty  be  settled  alone 
between  the  parties  concerned. 

Great  Britain : 

From  the  Austrian  Ambassador. 

British  Blue  Book  No.  4 

Count  Berchtold,  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count 
Mensdorff,  Austrian  Ambassador  in  London.  —  {Communicated 
by  Count  Mensdorff,  July  24,  1914.) 

[Here  follows  the  Austro-Hungarian  Note  to  Serbia;  cf.  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book  No.  7,  July  22,  1914.] 

British  Blue  Book  No.  5 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

Note  addressed  to  Servia,  together  with  an  explanation  of  the 
reasons  leading  up  to  it,  has  been  communicated  to  me  by  Count 
Mensdorff.3 

In  the  ensuing  conversation  with  his  Excellency,  I  remarked  that 
it  seemed  to  me  a  matter  for  great  regret  that  a  time  limit,^  and  such 
a  short  one  at  that,  had  been  insisted  upon  at  this  stage  of  the  pro- 
ceedings. The  murder  of  the  Archduke  and  some  of  the  circum- 
stances respecting  Servia  quoted  in  the  note  aroused  sympathy  with 
Austria,  as  was  but  natural,  but  at  the  same  time  I  had  never  before 
seen  one  State  address  to  another  independent  State  a  document  of  so 
formidable  a  character.  Demand  No.  5  would  be  hardly  consistent 
with  the  maintenance  of  Servia 's  independent  sovereignty  if  it  were 
to  mean,^  as  it  seemed  that  it  might,  that  Austria-Hungary  was  to  be 
invested  with  a  right  to  appoint  officials  who  would  have  authority 
within  the  frontiers  of  Servia. 

1  Cf.  above  French  Yellow  Book  No.  31,  same  day,  "The  intentions  of  the  Emperor 
and  his  ministers  could  not  be  more  pacific." 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  1915. 

3  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

*  That  there  would  be  a  time  limit  had  been  known  to  France  and,  therefore, 
probably  to  the  Entente  Powers,  since  July  19,  1914 ;  cf.  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  13 
and  14. 

6  The  meaning  of  this  clause  is  best  explained  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  64,  July  28, 
1914,  where  it  is  said  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  stated  "that  co- 
operation of  Austrian  agents  in  Servia  was  to  be  only  in  investigation,  not  in  judicial 
or  administrative  measures.  Servia  was  said  to  have  wilfully  misinterpreted  this." 
Cf.  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  15,  July  21,  1914. 


July  23,  British  Blue  Book  No,  6  87 

I  added  that  I  felt  great  apprehension,  and  that  I  should  concern 
myself  with  the  matter  simply  and  solely  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  peace  of  Europe.  The  merits  of  the  dispute  between  Austria  and 
Servia  were  not  the  concern  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  and  such 
comments  as  I  had  made  above  were  not  made  in  order  to  discuss 
those  merits. 

I  ended  by  saying  that  doubtless  we  should  enter  into  an  exchange 
of  views  with  other  Powers,  and  that  I  must  await  their  views  as  to 
what  could  be  done  to  mitigate  the  diflSculties  of  the  situation. 

Count  Mensdorff  ^  replied  that  the  present  situation  might  never 
have  arisen  if  Servia  had  held  out  a  hand  after  the  murder  of  the 
Archduke ;  Servia  had,  however,  shown  no  sign  of  sympathy  or  help, 
though  some  weeks  had  already  elapsed  since  the  murder;  a  time 
limit,  said  his  Excellency,  was  essential,  owing  to  the  procrastination 
on  Servia's  part. 

I  said  that  if  Servia  had  procrastinated  in  replying,  a  time  limit 
could  have  been  introduced  later ;  but,  as  things  now  stood,  the  terms 
of  the  Servian  reply  had  been  dictated  by  Austria,  who  had  not  been 
content  to  limit  herself  to  a  demand  for  a  reply  within  a  limit  of 
forty-eight  hours  from  its  presentation. 

From  Petrograd 

British  Blue  Book  No.  6 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  24.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  24,  1914. 

I  HAD  a  telephone  message  this  morning  from  M.  Sazonof  ^  to  the 
effect  that  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  had  just  reached  him. 

His  Excellency  added  that  a  reply  within  forty-eight  hours  was 
demanded,  and  he  begged  me  to  meet  him  at  the  French  ^  Embassy  to 
discuss  matters,  as  Austrian  step  clearly  meant  that  war  was  imminent. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Austria's  conduct  was  both 
provocative  and  immoral ;  she  would  never  have  taken  such  action 
unless  Germany  had  first  been  consulted ;  some  of  her  demands  were 
quite  impossible  of  acceptance.  He  hoped  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  would  not  fail  to  proclaim  their  solidarity  with  Russia 
and  France. 

The  French  Ambassador  gave  me  to  understand  that  France  would 
fulfil  all  the  obligations  ^  entailed  by  her  alliance  with  Russia,  if 
necessity  arose,  besides  supporting  Russia  strongly  in  any  diplomatic 
negotiations. 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

2  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

3  The  Entente  Powers  acted  in  the  Serbian  difficulty  together  from  the  first.  Cf . 
British  Blue  Book  No.  12,  same  day,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  23,  same  day.  See 
also  British  Blue  Book  No.  10,  note  2. 

4  This  must  mean  "going  to  war,"  diplomatic  support  being  spoken  of  in  the  next 
line. 


88  Official  Diplomatic  Documents  • 

I  said  that  I  would  telegraph  a  full  report  to  you  of  what  their 
Excellencies  had  just  said  to  me.  I  could  not,  of  course,  speak  in  the 
name  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  but  personally  I  saw  no  reason 
to  expect  any  declaration  of  solidarity  from  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment that  would  entail  an  unconditional  engagement  on  their  part  to 
support  Russia  and  France  by  force  of  arms.  Direct  British  interests 
in  Servia  were  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf  of  that  country  would  never 
be  sanctioned  by  British  public  opinion.^  To  this  M.  Sazonof  replied 
that  we  must  not  forget  that  the  general  European  question  ^  was 
involved,  the  Servian  question  being  but  a  part  of  the  former,  and 
that  Great  Britain  could  not  afford  to  efface  herself  from  the  problems 
now  at  issue. 

In  reply  to  these  remarks,  I  observed  that  I  gathered  from  what 
he  said  that  his  Excellency  was  suggesting  that  Great  Britain  should 
join  in  making  a  communication  to  Austria  to  the  effect  that  active 
intervention  by  her  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Servia  could  not  .be 
tolerated.  But  supposing  Austria  nevertheless  proceeded  to  embark 
on  military  measures  against  Servia  in  spite  of  our  representations, 
was  it  the  intention  of  the  Russian  Government  forthwith  to  declare 
war  on  Austria  ? 

M.  Sazonof  ^  said  that  he  himself  thought  that  Russian  mobilisa- 
tion would  at  any  rate  have  to  be  carried  out ;  ^  but  a  council  of  Min- 
isters was  being  held  this  afternoon  to  consider  the  whole  question. 
A  further  council  would  be  held,  probably  to-morrow,  at  which  the 
Emperor  would  preside,  when  a  decision^  would  be  come  to. 

I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  important  point  was  to  induce 
Austria  to  extend  the  time  limit,  and  that  the  first  thing  to  do  was  to 
bring  an  influence  to  bear  on  Austria  with  that  end  in  view ;  French 
Ambassador,  however,  thought  that  either  Austria  had  made  up  her 
mind  to  act  at  once  or  that  she  was  bluffing.  Whichever  it  might  be, 
our  only  chance  of  averting  war  was  for  us  to  adopt  a  firm  and  united 
attitude.  He  did  not  think  there  was  time  to  carry  out  my  sugges- 
tion. Thereupon  I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  desirable  that  we  should 
know  just  how  far  Servia  was  prepared  to  go  to  meet  the  demands 
formulated  by  Austria  in  her  note.  M.  Sazonof  replied  that  he  must 
first  consult  his  colleagues  ^  on  this  point,  but  that  doubtless  some  of 
the  Austrian  demands  could  be  accepted  by  Servia. 

French  Ambassador  and  M.  Sazonof  both  continued  to  press  me 

1  This  sentence  is  contrary  to  the  claim  that  Great  Britain  is  fighting  for  the  rights 
of  the  little  nations,  including  Serbia.     Cf.  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  10  and  11,  same  day. 

'  This  refers  to  the  fetich  of  all  the  Powers  for  the  past  century,  often  called  "the 
balance  of  power."  See  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  17,  July  25:  "We  count  upon  it 
that  England  will  at  once  side  definitely  with  France  and  Russia  in  order  to  maintain 
the  European  balance  of  power  for  which  she  has  constantly  intervened  in  the  past." 
Cf.  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  26,  July  24,  1914. 

'  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

*  This  raises  the  question,  when  it  was  begun. 

'  For  a  French  account  of  the  decision  arrived  at  in  this  meeting,  see  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  50,  July  26,  1914. 

*  This  almost  makes  it  appear  as  if  Russia  wrote  Serbia's  reply  for  her.  Cf.  Re- 
port of  the  Balkan  Commission,  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  1914, 
p.  41 :  "The  Balkan  alliance  in  its  later  phase  was  but  a  tool  employed  by  local  policy 
encouraged  by  Russia,  and  directed,  under  the  inspiration  of  Russian  diplomacy, 
against  Germanic  pretensions." 


July  24,  British  Blue  Book  No.  7  89 

for  a  declaration  of  complete  solidarity  of  His  Majesty's  Government 
with  French  and  Russian  Governments,  and  I  therefore  said  that  it 
seemed  to  me  possible  that  you  might  perhaps  be  willing  to  make 
strong  representations  to  both  German  and  Austrian  Governments, 
urging  upon  them  that  an  attack  by  Austria  upon  Servia  would 
endanger  the  whole  peace  of  Europe.  Perhaps  you  might  see  your 
way  to  saying  to  them  that  such  action  on  the  part  of  Austria  would 
probably  mean  Russian  intervention,  which  would  involve  France  and 
Germany,  and  that  it  would  be  difficult  for  Great  Britain  to  keep  out 
if  the  war  were  to  become  general.  M.  Sazonof  answered  that  we 
would  sooner  or  later  be  dragged  into  war  if  it  did  break  out;  we 
should  have  rendered  war  more  likely  if  we  did  not  from  the  outset 
make  common  cause  with  his  country  and  with  France ;  at  any  rate, 
he  hoped  His  Majesty's  Government  would  express  strong  reprobation 
of  action  taken  by  Austria. 

President  of  French  Republic  and  President  of  the  Council  cannot 
reach  France,  on  their  return  from  Russia,  for  four  or  five  days,  and 
it  looks  as  though  Austria  purposely  chose  this  moment  to  present 
their  ultimatum.^ 

It  seems  to  me,  from  the  language  held  by  French  Ambassador, 
that,  even  if  we  decline  to  join  them,  France  and  Russia  are  deter- 
mined to  make  a  strong  stand. ^ 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  7 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  {Received  July  24-) 

(Telegraphic.)  '  Vienna,  July  24,  1914. 

Before  departing  on  leave  of  absence,  I  was  assured  by  Russian 
Ambassador  that  any  action  taken  by  Austria  to  humiliate  Servia 
could  not  leave  Russia  indifferent.^ 

Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  was  received  this  morning  by  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  said  ^  to  him,  as  his  own  personal  view,  that 
Austrian  note  was  drawn  up  in  a  form  rendering  it  impossible  of 
acceptance  as  it  stood,  and  that  it  was  both  unusual  and  peremptory 
in  its  terms.  J  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  Austrian 
Minister  was  under  instructions  to  leave  Belgrade  unless  Austrian 
demands  were  accepted  integrally  by  4  p.m.  ^  to-morrow.  His 
Excellency  added. that  Dual  Monarchy  feh  that  its  very  existence 

1  This  same  idea  is  expressed  by  the  other  two  Entente  Powers.  Cf.  French  Yellow 
Book  Nos.  25  and  29,  same  day. 

2  Cf.  next  day,  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  "If  she  [Russia]  feels  secure  of  the  support 
of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks  of  war." 

3  For  a  stronger  phrasing  see  July  25,  British  Blue  Book  No.  17. 

*  This  interview  is  spoken  of  in  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  18,  July  24,  and 
German  White  Book,  Exhibit  3,  same  day.  According  to  both  despatches  the  Russian 
Charge  d 'Affaires  was  without  instructions,  and  consequently  refrained  from  expressing 
an  opinion. 

6  The  hour  was  at  first  placed  at  5  p.m.,  later  at  6  p.m.  See  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  25,  July  24. 


90  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

was  at  stake ;  and  that  the  step  taken  had  caused  great  satisfaction 
throughout  the  country.  He  did  not  think  that  objections  to  what 
had  been  done  could  be  raised  by  any  Power. 

From  Belgrade 

British  Blue  Book  No.  8 

Mr.    Crackanthorpe,   British   Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade,   to   Sir 
Edward  Grey.  —  (Received  July  24.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  24,  1914- 

AusTRL\N  demands  are  considered  absolutely  unacceptable  by 
Servian  Government,  who  earnestly  trust  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment may  see  their  way  to  induce  Austrian  Government  to  moderate 
them. 

This  request  was  conveyed  to  me  by  Servian  Prime  Minister,  who 
returned  early  this  morning  to  Belgrade.  His  Excellency  is  dejected, 
and  is  clearly  very  anxious  as  to  developments  that  may  arise. 

From  the  German  Ambassador 
British  Blue  Book  No.  9 

Note  ^  communicated  by  German  Ambassador,  July  24,  1914- 

The  publications  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  con- 
cerning the  circumstances  under  which  the  assassination  of  the 
Austrian  heir  presumptive  and  his  consort  has  taken  place  disclose 
unmistakably  the  aims  which  the  Great  Servian  propaganda  has  set 
itself,  and  the  means  it  employs  to  realise  them.  The  facts  now 
made  known  must  also  do  away  with  the  last  doubts  that  the  centre 
of  activity  of  all  those  tendencies  which  are  directed  towards  the 
detachment  of  the  Southern  Slav  provinces  from  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy  and  their  incorporation  into  the  Servian  Kingdom 
is  to  be  found  in  Belgrade,  and  is  at  work  there  with  at  least  the 
connivance  of  members  of  Government  and  army. 

The  Servian  intrigues  have  been  going  on  for  many  years.  In  an 
especially  marked  form  the  Great  Servian  chauvinism  manifested 
itself  during  the  Bosnian  crisis.  It  was  only  owing  to  the  far-reaching 
self-restraint  and  moderation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
and  to  the  energetic  interference  of  the  Great  Powers  that  the 
Servian  provocations  to  which  Austria-Hungary  was  then  exposed 
did  not  lead  to  a  conflict.  The  assurance  of  good  conduct  in  future 
which  was  given  by  the  Servian  Government  at  that  time  has  not 
been  kept.  Under  the  eyes,  at  least  with  the  tacit  permission  of 
official  Servia,  the  Great  Servian  propaganda  has  continuously 
increased  in  extension  and  intensity:  to  its  account  must  be  set  the 
recent  crime,  the  threads  of  which  lead  to  Belgrade.     It  has  become 

1  German  White  Book  Exhibit  No.  1,  July  23,  1914,  cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  28, 
same  day. 


July  24,  British  Blue  Book  No.  10  91 

clearly  evident  that  it  would  not  be  consistent  either  with  the  dignity 
or  with  the  self-preservation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  still 
longer  to  remain  inactive  in  face  of  this  movement  on  the  other  side 
of  the  frontier,  by  which  the  security  and  the  integrity  of  her  terri- 
tories are  constantly  menaced.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
course  of  procedure  and  demands  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment can  only  be  regarded  as  equitable  and  moderate.  In  spite  of 
that,  the  attitude  which  public  opinion  as  well  as  the  Government  in 
Seryia  have  recently  adopted  does  not  exclude  the  apprehension 
that  the  Servian  Government  might  refuse  to  comply  with  those 
demands,  and  might  allow  themselves  to  be  carried  away  into  a 
provocative  attitude  against  Austria-Hungary.  The  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government,  if  it  does  not  wish  definitely  to  abandon  Austria's 
position  as  a  Great  Powder,  would  then  have  no  choice  but  to  obtain 
the  fulfilment  of  their  demands  from  the  Servian  Government  by 
strong  pressure  and,  if  necessary,  by  using  military  measures,  the 
choice  of  the  means  having  to  be  left  to  them. 

The  Imperial  Government  want  to  emphasise  their  opinion  that 
in  the  present  case  there  is  only  question  of  a  matter,  to  be  settled 
exclusively  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  that  the  Great 
Powers  ought  seriously  to  endeavour  to  reserve  it  to  those  two 
immediately  concerned.  The  Imperial  Government  desire  urgently 
the  localisation  of  the  conflict,  because  every  interference  of  another 
Power  would,  owing  to  the  different  treaty  obligations,  be  followed 
by  incalculable  consequences. 


To  Paris 
British  Blue  Book  No.  10 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

After  telling  M.  Cambon  ^  to-day  of  the  Austrian  communication 
to  Servia,  which  I  had  received  this  morning,  and  of  the  comment  I 
had  made  to  Count  Mensdorff  ^  upon  it  yesterday,  I  told  M.  Cambon 
that  this  afternoon  I  was  to  see  the  German  Ambassador,  who  some 
days  ago  ^  had  asked  me  privately  to  exercise  moderating  influence  in 
St.  Petersburgh.  I  would  say  ^  to  the  Ambassador  that,  of  course,  if 
the  presentation  of  this  ultimatum  to  Servia  did  not  lead  to  trouble 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  we  need  not  concern  ourselves  about  it,^ 
but,  if  Russia  took  the  view  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  which  it 
seemed  to  me  that  any  Power  interested  in  Servia  would  take,  I 
should  be  quite  powerless,  in  face  of  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum,  to 

1  French  Ambassador  in  London. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

3  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  1,  July  20,  1914. 

*  Sir  Edward's  remarks  to  the  German  Ambassador  are  the  result  of  his  mterview 
with  the  French  Ambassador.  For  the  determination  of  the  Entente  Powers  to  act 
together  in  this  matter  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  and  note  1. 

6  Cf.  Nos.  6  and  11,  same  day. 


92  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

exercise  any  moderating  influence.  I  would  say  that  I  thought  the 
only  chance  of  any  mediating  or  moderating  influence  being  exercised 
was  that  Germany,  France,  Italy,  and  ourselves,  who  had  not  direct 
interests  in  Servia,  should  act  together  for  the  sake  of  peace,  simul- 
taneously in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.^ 

M.  Cambon  said  that,  if  there  was  a  chance  of  mediation  by  the 
four  Powers,  he  had  no  doubt  that  his  Government  would  be  glad  to 
join  in  it ;  but  he  pointed  out  that  we  could  not  say  anything  in 
St.  Petersburgh  till  Russia  had  expressed  some  opinion  or  taken  some 
action.  But,  when  two  days  were  over,  Austria  would  march  into 
Servia,  for  the  Servians  could  not  possibly  accept  the  Austrian 
demand.  Russia  would  be  compelled  by  her  public  opinion  to  take 
action  as  soon  as  Austria  attacked  Servia,  and  therefore,  once  the 
Austrians  had  attacked  Servia,  it  would  be  too  late  for  any  mediation. 

I  said  that  I  had  not  contemplated  anything  being  said  in  St. 
Petersburgh  ^  until  after  it  was  clear  that  there  must  be  trouble 
between  Austria  and  Russia.  I  had  thought  that  if  Austria  did  move 
into  Servia,  and  Russia  then  mobilised,  it  would  be  possible  for  the 
four  Powers  to  urge  Austria  to  stop  her  advance,  and  Russia  also 
to  stop  hers,  pending  mediation.  But  it  would  be  essential  for  any 
chance  of  success  for  such  a  step  that  Germany  should  participate 
in  it. 

M.  Cambon  said  that  it  would  be  too  late  after  Austria  had  once 
moved  against  Servia.  The  important  thing  was  to  gain  time  by 
mediation  in  Vienna.  The  best  chance  of  this  being  accepted  would 
be  that  Germany  should  propose  it  to  the  other  Powers. 

I  said  that  by  this  he  meant  a  mediation  between  Austria  and 
Servia. 

He  replied  that  it  was  so. 

I  said  that  I  would  talk  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon 
on  the  subject. 

I  am,  etc. 
E.  Grey. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  U 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  H,  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914- 

German  Ambassador  has  communicated  to  me  the  view  of  the 
German  Government  about  the  Austrian  demand  in  Servia.  I  under- 
stand the  German  Government  is  making  the  same  communication 
to  the  Powers. 

I  said  that  if  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  did  not  lead  to 
trouble  between  Austria  and  Russia  I  had  no  concern  with  it ;  ^  I  had 
heard  nothing  yet  from  St.  Petersburgh,  but  I  was  very  apprehensive 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  34,  July  24,  and  note  1. 
»  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  and  note  3. 


July  24,  British  Blue  Book  No.  12  93 

of  the  view  Russia  would  take  of  the  situation.  I  reminded  the 
German  Ambassador  that  some  days  ago  he  had  expressed  a  personal 
hope  that  if  need  arose  I  would  endeavour  to  exercise  moderating 
influence  at  St.  Petersburgh,  but  now  I  said  that,  in  view  of  the 
extraordinarily  stiff  character  of  the  Austrian  note,  the  shortness  of 
the  time  allowed,  and  the  wide  scope  of  the  demands  upon  Servia, 
I  felt  quite  helpless  as  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  and  I  did  not 
believe  any  Power  could  exercise  influence  alone. 

The  only  chance  I  could  see  of  mediating  or  moderating  influence 
being  effective,  was  that  the  four  Powers,  Germany,  Italy,  France, 
and  ourselves,  should  work  together  simultaneously  at  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburgh  ^  in  favour  of  moderation  in  the  event  of  the  relations 
between  Austria  and  Russia  becoming  threatening. 

The  immediate  danger  was  that  in  a  few  hours  Austria  might 
march  into  Servia  and  Russian  Slav  opinion  demand  that  Russia 
should  march  to  help  Servia ;  it  would  be  very  desirable  to  get 
Austria  not  to  precipitate  military  action  and  so  to  gain  more  time. 
But  none  of  us  could  influence  Austria  in  this  direction  unless  Ger-' 
many  would  propose  and  participate  in  such  action  at  Vienna.  You 
should  inform  Secretary  of  State. 

Prince  Lichnowsky  ^  said  that  Austria  might  be  expected  to  move 
when  the  time  limit  expired  unless  Servia  could  give  unconditional 
acceptance  of  Austrian  demands  in  toto.  Speaking  privately,  his 
Excellency  suggested  that  a  negative  reply  must  in  no  case  be  re- 
turned by  Servia ;  a  reply  favourable  on  some  points  must  be  sent 
at  once,  so  that  an  excuse  against  immediate  action  might  be  afforded 
to  Austria. 

To  Belgrade 

British  Blue  Book  No.  12 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at 
Belgrade. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

Servia  ought  to  promise  that,  if  it  is  proved  that  Servian  officials, 
however  subordinate  they  may  be,  were  accomplices  in  the  murder  of 
the  Archduke  at  Serajevo,  she  will  give  Austria  the  fullest  satisfaction. 
She  certainly  ought  to  express  concern  and  regret.^  For  the  rest, 
Servian  Government  must  reply  to  Austrian  demands  as  they  consider 
best  in  Servian  interests. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  military  action  by  Austria  when 
time  limit  expires  can  be  averted  by  anything  but  unconditional 
acceptance  of  her  demands,  but  only  chance  appears  to  lie  in  avoiding 

1  Cf.  previous  note,  where  Sir  E.  Grey  apparently  dropped  his  idea  of  bringing 
simultaneous  pressure  to  bear  on  Vienna  and  Petrograd  in  favor  of  Paul  Cambon's 
idea  of  mediation  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade. 

2  German  Ambassador  in  London.  c,    ,. 

3  This  would  imply  that  Austria-Hungary's  claim  was  correct  that  Serbia  had 
neglected  to  do  this,  although  four  weeks  had  elapsed  since  the  murder.  Cf.  also  note 
1  to  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  30,  July  19. 


94  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

an  absolute  refusal  and  replying  favourably  to  as  many  points  as  the 
time  limit  allows. 

Servian  Minister  here  has  begged  that  His  Majesty's  Government 
will  express  their  views,  but  I  cannot  undertake  responsibility  of 
saying  more  than  I  have  said  above,  and  I  do  not  like  to  say  even 
that  without  knowing  what  is  being  said  at  Belgrade  by  French  and 
Russian  Governments.^  You  should  therefore  consult  your  French 
and  Russian  colleagues  as  to  repeating  what  my  views  are,  as  ex- 
pressed above,  to  Servian  Government.^ 

1  have  urged  upon  German  Ambassador  that  Austria  should  not 
precipitate  military  action. 

Russia : 

From  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  3 

Note  verbale  personally  presented  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambas- 
sador at  St.  Petersburg  to  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
at  10  A.M.  on  July  11  {2^),  1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  felt  compelled  to  address 
the  following  note  to  the  Servian  Government  on  Thursday,  the 
10th  (23rd)  instant,  through  the  medium  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister  at  Belgrade. 

[Here  follows  the  text  of  the  note ;  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7,  July 
22,  1914.] 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  4 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires 
at  Vienna.  Communicated  also  to  London,  Rome,  Paris,  and 
Belgrade.^ 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  11  {24),  1914.^ 

Please  convey  the  following  message  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs :  — 

"  La  communication  du  Gou-  "  The  communication  made  by 

vernement    austro-hongrois    aux  Austria-Hungary  to  the  Powers 

Puissances   le   lendemain   de   la  the  day  after  the  presentation  of 

presentation    de    I'ultimatum    a  the  ultimatum  at  Belgrade  leaves 

Belgrade  ne  laisse  aux  Puissances  a  period  to  the  Powers  which  is 

qu'un  delai  tout  a  fait  insuffisant  quite  insufficient  to  enable  them 

pour  entreprendre  quoi  qu'il  soit  to  take  any  steps  which  might 

»  Cf .  French  Yellow  Book  No.  23,  July  24,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  same  day, 
and  note  1. 

2  This  advice  was  never  given  to  Servia  ;  cf.  British  Blue  Book  no.  22,  July  25,  1914. 
'  According  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  39  this  note  was  communicated  to  Bucharest 

instead  of  to  Belgrade  and  also  to  Berlin. 

*  This  note,  although  dated  July  24,  was  presented  in  London  (British  Blue  Book 
No.  13)  and  Paris  (Yellow  Book  No.  39)  on  July  25,  the  very  day  on  which  the  time 
limit  was  to  expire.  Russia  was  informed  of  the  presentation  of  the  note  on  July  23. 
(Russian  Orange  Book  No.  2.) 


July  24,  Russian  Orange  Booh  No.  4. 


95 


d'utile  pour  raplanissement  des 
complications  siirgies. 

"Pour  prevenir  les  conse- 
quences incalculables  et  egale- 
ment  nefastes  pour  toutes  les 
Puissances  qui  peuvent  suivre  le 
mode  d'action  du  Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois,  il  nous  parait  in- 
dispensable qu'avant  tout  le  delai 
donne  a  la  Serbie  pour  repondre 
soit  prolonge.  L'Autriche-Hon- 
grie,  se  declarant  disposee  a  in- 
former les  Puissances  des  donnees 
de  Fenquete  sur  lesquelles  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
base  ses  accusations,  devrait  leur 
donner  6galement  le  temps  de  s'en 
rendre  compte. 

"  En  ce  cas,  si  les  Puissances  se 
convainquaient  du  bien-fonde  de 
certaines  des  exigences  autri- 
chiennes,  elles  se  trouveraient  en 
mesure  de  faire  parvenir  au 
Gouvernement  serbe  des  conseils 
en  consequence. 

"Un  refus  de  prolottger  le 
terme  de  I'ultimatum  priverait 
de  toute  ported  la  demarche  du 
Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 
aupres  des  Puissances  et  se  trou- 
verait  en  contradiction  avec  les 
bases  meme  des  relations  inter- 
nationales. 

"Le  Prince  Koudachef  est 
charge  de  communiquer  ce  qui 
precede  au  Cabinet  de  Vienne.'* 

M.  Sazonof  espere  que  le 
Gouvernement    de    Sa    Majeste 

1  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  8,  July  22,  paragraph  before  last,  where  Aus- 
tria-Hungary offers  to  the  Powers  a  'dossier  elucidating  the  Servian  intrigues  and  the 
connection  between  these  intrigues  and  the  murder  of  the  28th  June."  So  far  as 
Austria  was  concerned,  this  was  an  act  of  courtesy.  The  Powers  had  been  unwilling 
or  unable  to  protect  her  from  these  intrigues  culminating  in  the  murder  of  the  Arch- 
duke. It  was,  therefore,  she  claimed,  her  right  and  her  duty  to  punish  them  in  her 
own  way. 

Sazonof  interprets  the  offer  of  Austria-Hungary  not  as  an  act  of  courtesy  but  as 
an  accusation  lodged  before  the  tribunal  of  the  Powers,  who,  therefore,  should  be  the 
judges  of  how  far  Austria-Hungary  might  be  permitted  to  go.  According  to  European 
traditions,  followed  for  over  a  century  by  all  the  nations,  such  a  course  would  have 
affected  the  dignity  of  Austria-Hungary  as  one  of  the  Great  Powers.  Cf.  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  21,  July  25,  1914. 

2  This  line  varied,  of  course,  according  to  the  Government  to  which  the  note  was  pre- 
sented. 


help  to  smooth  away  the  diffi- 
culties that  have  arisen. 

"In  order  to  prevent  the  con- 
sequences, equally  incalculable 
and  fatal  to  all  the  Powers,  which 
may  result  from  the  course  of 
action  followed  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government,  it  seems 
to  us  to  be  above  all  essential 
that  the  period  allowed  for  the 
Servian  reply  should  be  extended. 
Austria-Hungary,  having  de- 
clared her  readiness  ^  to  inform 
the  Powers  of  the  results  of  the 
enquiry  upon  which  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  base  their 
accusations,  should  equally  allow 
them  sufficient  time  to  study 
them. 

"In  this  case,  if  the  Powers 
were  convinced  that  certain  of 
the  Austrian  demands  were  well 
founded,  they  would  be  in  a 
position  to  offer  advice  to  the 
Servian  Government. 

"  A  refusal  to  prolong  the  term 
of  the  ultimatum  would  render 
nugatory  the  proposals  made  by 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment to  the  Powers,  and  would 
be  in  contradiction  to  the  very 
bases  of  international  relations. 

"  Prince  Kudachef  is  instructed 
to  communicate  the  above  to  the 
Cabinet  at  Vienna.*' 

M.  Sazonof  hopes  that  His  Bri- 
tannic  Majesty's    Government  ^ 


96  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

britannique  adherera  au  point  de  will  adhere  to  the  point  of  view 

vue  expose,  et  il  exprime  Tespoir  set  forth  above,  and  he  trusts 

que  Sir  Edward  Grey  voudra  bien  that  Sir  E.  Gray  will  see  his  way 

munir    I'Ambassadeur    d'Angle-  to  furnish  similar  instructions  to 

terre  a  Vienne  d 'instructions  con-  the     British     Ambassador      at 

formes.  Vienna. 

To  London,  Berlin,  Rome  and  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  5 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Representatives  at 
London,  Berlin,  Rome,  and  Paris. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburg,  July  11  {2^),  1914. 

With  reference  to  my  telegram  of  to-day  to  Kudachef  ^  we  trust 
that  the  Government  to  which  you  are  accredited  will  share  the 
Russian  point  of  view  and  will  at  once  instruct  their  Representative 
at  Vienna  to  hold  similar  language. 

Communicated  to  Belgrade. 

From  the  Serbian  Crown  Prince  and  Prince  Regent  of  Serbia 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  6 

Telegram  from  His  Royal  Highness  the  Croivn  Prince  and  Prince  Regent 
of  Serbia  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 

Belgrade,  July  11  (24),  1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  yesterday  evening  presented 
to  the  Servian  Government  a  note  respecting  the  outrage  at  Sera- 
jevo.  Servia,  aware  of  her  international  obligations,  has  declared, 
ever  since  the  horrible  crime  was  committed,  that  she  condemned  it, 
and  that  she  was  ready  to  open  an  enquiry  in  Servia  if  the  complicity 
of  certain  of  her  subjects  were  proved  at  the  trial  instituted  by 
the  Austro-Hungarian  authorities.  The  demands  contained  in  the 
Austro-Hungarian  note  are,  however,  unnecessarily  humiliating 
for  Servia,  and  incompatible  with  her  dignity  as  an  independent 
State.  For  instance,  we  are  peremptorily  called  upon  to  insert  a 
declaration  by  the  Government  in  the  "Official  Journal,"  and  for 
an  order  from  the  Sovereign  to  the  army,  in  which  we  are  to  check 
the  spirit  of  hostility  towards  Austria  and  to  blame  ourselves  for 
criminal  weakness  as  regards  our  treacherous  intrigues.  We  are 
further  required  to  admit  Austro-Hungarian  officials  into  Servia  to 
take  part  with  our  officials  at  the  trial  and  to  superintend  the  carry- 
ing out  of  the  other  conditions  laid  down  in  the  note.  We  are  re- 
quired to  accept  these  demands  in  their  entirety  within  forty-eight 
hours,  failing  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation  will  leave 
Belgrade.     We  are  prepared  to  accept  those  of  the  Austro-Hun- 

^  Russian  Charg^  d' Affaires  in  Vienna. 


July  24,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  8  97 

garian  conditions  which  are  compatible  with  the  position  of  an 
independent  State,  as  well  as  those  to  which  your  Majesty  may 
advise  us  to  agree,  and  all  those  persons  whose  complicity  in  the 
crime  may  be  proved  will  be  severely  punished  by  us.  Certain  of 
the  demands  could  not  be  carried  out  without  changes  in  our  legis- 
lation, which  would  need  time.  We  have  been  allowed  too  short  a 
time  limit.  We  may  be  attacked  at  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit 
by  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  which  is  concentrating  upon  our 
frontier.  We  are  unable  to  defend  ourselves  and  we  beg  your  Majesty 
to  come  to  our  aid  as  soon  as  possible.  The  much  appreciated  good- 
will which  your  Majesty  has  so  often  shown  towards  us  inspires  us 
with  the  firm  belief  that  once  again  our  appeal  to  your  noble  Slav 
heart  will  not  pass  unheeded. 

At  this  critical  moment  I  echo  the  feelings  of  the  Servian  people 
in  praying  your  Majesty  to  be  pleased  to  interest  yourself  in  the  fate 
of  the  Kingdom  of  Servia. 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  7 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  11  {24),  1914. 

All  the  morning  papers,  even  those  few  which  recognise  the 
impossibility  of  Servians  accepting  the  prescribed  conditions,  warmly 
welcome  the  strong  line  adopted  by  Austria.  The  semi-ofiicial 
"Lokal-Anzeiger''  is  particularly  violent;  it  describes  as  fruitless 
any  possible  appeals  that  Servia  may  make  to  St.  Petersburgh,  Paris, 
Athens,  or  Bucharest,  and  concludes  by  saying  that  the  German 
people  will  breathe  freely  when  they  learn  that  the  situation  in  the 
Balkan  ^  peninsula  is  to  be  cleared  up  at  last. 

From  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  8 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  11  {24),  1914^ 

A  COPY  of  the  note  officially  presented  at  Belgrade  has  been  com- 
municated to  the  French  Government  by  the  Austrian  Ambassador .^ 
The  German  Ambassador  later  visited  ^  the  Minister  and  read  to 

1  The  Balkans  had  been  spoken  of  for  years  as  the  Powder  Magazine  of  Europe, 
where  at  any  moment  a  spark  might  start  a  European  conflagration.  Nobody  in 
Berlin  or  Vienna  believed  any  nation  would  came  to  the  support  of  Serbia  in  view  of 
the  intrigues  which  had  led  to  the  murder  of  Serajevo,  and  which  Berlin  and  Vienna  be- 
lieved were  rightly  charged  against  Serbia. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  25,  July  24,  1914. 

3  French  Yellow  Book  No.  28,  July  24,  1914. 


98  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

him  a  communication  containing  the  Austrian  arguments,  and 
indicating  that  in  the  event  of  a  refusal  on  the  part  of  Servia,  Austria 
would  be  obliged  to  resort  to  pressure,  and,  in  case  of  need,  to  mili- 
tary measures.  The  communication  ended  with  the  observation 
that,  in  the  opinion  of  Germany,  this  question  ought  to  be  settled 
between  Austria  and  Servia  direct,  and  that  it  was  to  the  interest  of 
the  Powers  to  localise  the  affair  by  leaving  it  to  the  interested  parties. 
The  Acting  Head  of  the  Political  Department,  who  was  present  at 
the  interview,  asked  ^  the  Ambassador  whether  the  Austrian  action 
should  be  considered  as  an  ultimatum  —  in  other  words,  whether, 
in  the  event  of  Servia  not  submitting  entirely  to  the  Austrian  de- 
mands, hostilities  were  inevitable.  The  Ambassador  avoided  a 
direct  reply,  alleging  that  he  had  no  instructions. 


From  Belgrade 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  9 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Belgrade,  July  11  (2J(),  1914. 

Pashitch  has  returned  to  Belgrade.  He  intends'  to  give  an  answer 
to  Austria  within  the  prescribed  time  limit  —  that  is  to  say,  to- 
morrow, Saturday,  at  6  p.m.  —  showing  the  points  which  are  accept- 
able or  unacceptable.  To-day  an  appeal  will  be  addressed  to  the 
Powers  2  to  defend  the  independence  of  Servia.  Then,  added  Pashitch, 
if  war  is  inevitable,  we  will  make  war. 

Serbia : 

To  Petrograd 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  34 

M,  N,  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to 
Dr,  M.  Spalaikovitch,  Minister  at  Petrograd. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  11/24,  1914. 

I  INFORMED  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  that  I  would  hand  in 
the  reply  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum  on  Saturday  at  6  p.m. 
I  told  him  that  the  Serbian  Government  would  appeal  ^  to  the  Govern- 
ments of  the  friendly  Powers  to  protect  the  independence  of  Serbia. 
If  war  was  inevitable,  I  added,  Serbia  would  carry  it  on. 

1  In  the  French  account  of  this  interview,  Yellow  Book  No.  28,  July  24,  M.  Martin 
and  not  the  Acting  Head  of  the  Political  Department  is  said  to  have  asked  this  ques- 
tion. 

2  The  only  published  appeal  is  that  of  the  Serbian  Crown  Prince  to  the  Czar,  Russian 
Orange  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  1914. 

'  No  such  appeal  had  been  published,  except  one  from  the  Serbian  Crown  Prince 
to  the  Czar,  July  24,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  6. 


July  24,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  37  99 

To  London 
Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  35 

M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to 
M.  M.  Boschkovitch,  Minister  in  London. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  11/24,  1914. 

I  INFORMED  the  British  Charge  d'Affaires  to-day  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  demands  were  such  that  no  Government  of  an  independent 
country  could  accept  them  in  their  entirety.  I  expressed  the  hope 
that  the  British  Government  might  possibly  see  their  way  to  induce 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  moderate  them.  I  did  not 
conceal  my  anxiety  as  to  future  developments. 

From  Petrograd 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  36 

Dr.  M.  Spalaikovitch,  Minister  at  Petrograd,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime 
Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

{Telegraphic.)  Petrograd,  July  11/24,  1914- 

As  I  was  leaving  M.  Sazonof,  to  whom  I  communicated  the  con- 
tents of  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,  I  met  the  German  Am- 
bassador. He  seemed  to  be  in  very  good  spirits.^  During  the  con- 
versation which  followed  in  regard  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  demarche 
I  asked  Count  Pourtales  to  indicate  to  me  some  way  out  of  the 
situation  created  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum.  The  Am- 
bassador replied  that  this  depended  on  Serbia  alone,  since  the  matter 
in  question  must  be  settled  between  Austria  and  Serbia  only,  and 
did  not  concern  anyone  else.  In  reply  I  told  Count  Pourtales  that 
he  was  under  a  misapprehension,  and  that  he  would  see  before  long 
that  this  was  not  a  question  merely  between  Serbia  and  Austria, 
but  a  European  question. 

To  the  Czar  from  the  Serbian  Crown  Prince 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  37 

His  Royal  Highness  the  Crown  Prince  Alexander  to  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  11/24,  1914. 

[See  No.  6  of  Russian  Orange  Book,  July  24,  1914.] 

1  This  sentence  may  have  been  retained  to  give  the  reader  an  insight  into  the 
character  of  Count  Pourtales.  It  should,  therefore,  be  compared  with  similar  pic- 
tures, e.g.  British  Blue  Book  No.  78,  July  29,  and  contrasted  with  British  Blue  Book 
No.  72,  July  29,  and  No.  97,  July  30. 


100 


Offijcial  Diplomatic  Documents 


Saturday,  July  25,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 


Austria-Hungary 


Sent  Despatches  to 


Received 
Despatches  from 


London,  Petrograd 
Under  Secretary  of  State, 

Rome  etc. 
London  etc.,  Vienna 


Belgrade 


Germany 
Great  Britain 


Russia 


London 

Paris,  Petrograd,  Berlin, 
Vienna,    Rome,    Bel- 
grade 

London 

All  Representatives 


Belgium       ^  Rome  etc.  Belgrade 

France  London  etc.,  Vienna  Berlin,  London,  Petro- 

grad, Rome,  Vienna, 
Belgrade 
Petrograd 

Paris,  Petrograd,  Ber- 
lin,  Rome,    Vienna, 
Belgrade,      Russian 
Ambassador 
Vienna,  Belgrade,  Ber- 
lin,   Paris,    London, 
German      Ambassa- 
dor 
Russia  and  Great  Britain  endeavor  to  secure  from  Austria-Hungary  an  exten- 
sion of  the  time  limit  set  in  the  Serbian  note  to  expire  on  this  day  at  6  p.m.     The 
French  support  of  this  request,  while  promised,  does  not  materialize.     Germany 
gives  her  support,  but  doubts  Austria's  willingness  to  grant  the  request. 

Austria-Hungary  denies  the  request,  but  announces  that  she  will  not  immedi- 
ately proceed  to  war,  and  that  a  period  of  military  preparation  will  intervene. 
This  appears  to  satisfy  Great  Britain  as  a  concession  of  practical  value. 

Serbia  delivers  her  reply  which  does  not  satisfy  Austria-Hungary,  whose  lega- 
tion leaves  Belgrade  at  6.30  p.m. 

Great  Britain  continues  her  efforts  to  bring  about  a  Conference  of  four  powers, 
but  apparently  has  yielded  to  the  view  of  the  French  Ambassador  that  no  pres- 
sure should  be  exerted  on  Russia,  for  in  one  note  Sir  E.  Grey  even  substitutes 
Russia  for  Italy  in  the  proposed  group  of  the  mediating  powers. 

Germany  repeats  that  she  had  not  been  consulted  by  Austria-Hungary  in  the 
preparation  of  her  note  to  Servia,  but  finding  her  demands  just  would  support  her. 
She  declines  to  mediate  between  Austria  and  Serbia,  but  announces  her  willingness 
to  take  part  in  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia. 

Russia  and  France  are  endeavoring  to  secure  the  unconditional  support  of  Great 
Britain,  not  in  the  interest  of  Serbia,  but  to  maintain  the  European  balance  of 
power. 

Austria-Hungary  disclaims  any  intention  of  disturbing  this  balance  of  power, 
and  explains  anew  her  reasons  for  proceeding  against  Serbia.  She  also  explains 
the  meaning  of  those  clauses  of  her  note  which  she  says  had  been  misunderstood ; 
and  states  that  Russia  was  acting  under  a  misapprehension.  She  also  issues  a 
dossier  containing  the  proofs  of  her  indictment  of  Serbia. 

France  refuses  to  issue  an  official  correction  of  erroneous  accounts  in  the  French 
press  concerning  the  attitude  of  Germany. 

Belgium  continues  to  contemplate  the  probability  of  a  European  War. 


Juhj  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Boole  Nn.  19  IGl 

Austria-Hungary : 

AUSTROHUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    19 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  at  Berlin,  Rome, 
Paris,  London,  St.  Petershurgh  and  Constantinople. 

Vienna,  July  25,  lOlJf.. 

Your  Excellency  will  find  herewith  the  dossier  mentioned  in 
the  circular  note  ^  to  the  Powers  with  reference  to  the  Great-Servian 
propaganda,  and  its  connection  with  the  Serajevo  murder. 

Your  Excellency  is  instructed  to  bring  this  dossier  to  the  notice 
of  the  Government  to  which  you  are  accredited. 

(See  Note  2  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  48,  July  27.) 

Enclosure 
"The  Dossier"  2 

The  Servian  agitation,  which  has  as  its  object  the  separation  from 
the  Austrian  Monarchy  of  the  Southern  Slav  districts  in  order  to  unite 
them  with  the  Servian  States,  dates  from  far  back. 

This  propaganda  on  Servian  soil,  always  the  same  in  its  ultimate 
object,  although  varying  in  its  means  and  intensity,  reached  one  of  its 
culminating  points  at  the  time  of  the  annexation  crisis.  Throwing 
off  the  protecting  cloak  of  secrecy,  it  then  revealed  its  purpose  openly 
and  undisguisedly,  and  attempted,  under  the  patronage  of  the  Servian 
Government,  to  attain  its  ends  by  every  means  in  its  power. 

While  the  whole  of  the  Servian  press  was  calling  for  war  against 
the  Monarchy  by  malicious  invectives  in  which  facts  were  perverted, 
apart  from  other  means  of  propaganda,  associations  were  being  formed 
to  prepare  for  this  war. 

The  Narodna  Odbrana  stood  out  as  the  most  important  of  these 
associations.  Having  its  origin  in  an  already  existing  revolutionary 
committee,  it  was  constituted  as  a  private  society,  although  in  fact 
it  took  the  form  of  an  organisation  of  Servian  military  and  civil  officials 
wholly  dependent  on  the  Foreign  Office  at  Belgrade.  Amongst  its 
founders  one  may  mention :  General  Bozo  Jankovic,  ex-ministers 
Ljuba  Jovanovic,  Ljuba  Davidovic,  and  Velislav  Vulovic,  Zivojin 

.  1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  8,  July  22,  1914. 
2  This  "dossier, "  being  too  long  to  be  telegraphed,  was  sent  by  mail  (see  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  39,  July  28).  It  was  presented  (the  Powers  were  advised  of 
it  on  July  25,  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  38  and  note  1)  in  Paris  on  July  27,  and  was 
published,  in  part,  under  No.  75  of  the  French  Yellow  Book  of  that  date.  It  was  prob- 
ably presented  in  London  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  the  same  day.  Sir  E.  Grey,  however, 
published  only  a  scant  summary  of  it  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  48,  omitting  the  rest 
and  not  stating  that  he  had  received  it.  In  the  introductory  narrative  to  the  edition 
of  the  Blue  Book  of  Sept.  28,  1914,  Sir  E.  Grey  says  :  "That  his  Majesty's  Government 
did  not  receive  any  statement  of  the  evidence  on  which  Austria  had  founded  her  ulti- 
matum till  the  7th  August."  Neither  the  British  Blue  Book  nor  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book  contains  a  despatch  of  this  day,  which  renders  it  impossible  to  ascertain 
to  which  "evidence"  Sir  E.  Grey  referred  in  this  sentence.  It  may  have  been  a 
complete  transcript  of  the  evidence  presented  at  the  trial  of  the  Serajevo  murderers. 
The  "dossier,"  however,  contained  the  "evidence  on  which  Austria  had  founded 
her  ultimatum,"  and  this  Sir  E.  Grey  kept  from  Parliament,  from  the  country  and 
possibly  from  his  colleagues.  The  first  partial  knowledge  of  the  "dossier"  that  the 
world  had  came  from  the  French  Yellow  Book  which  was  published  several  months 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 


10^  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Dacic  (Director  of  the  Government  printing  establishment),  and 
Majors  (then  Captains)  Voja  Tankosic^  and  Milan  Pribicevic.  This 
association  aimed  at  the  creation  and  equipment  of  free  companies 
for  use  in  the  impending  war  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy.    (See  Appendix  2.) 

A  convinction  description  of  the  activity  at  that  time  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  will  be  found  amongst  others  in  the  deposition  of 
Trifko  Krstanovic,  a  Bosnia-Herzegovinian  subject,  in  the  course  of 
his  evidence  before  the  district  court  at  Serajevo ;  he  was  then  at 
Belgrade,  and  had  been  accepted  by  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  with 
other  subjects  of  the  Monarchy  as  a  komitadji.  At  the  beginning  of 
1909,  Krstanovic  had  arrived  with  about  140  fellow-^nembers  at  a 
school  established  for  the  formation  of  new  bands  at  Cuprija  (in  the 
district  of  Jagodina),  managed  by  Captains  Voja  Tankosic  and  Dusan 
Putnik.  The  only  instructors  at  this  school  were  Servian  officers. 
General  Bozo  Jankovic  and  Captain  Milan  Pribicevic  inspected  the 
three-monthly  courses  of  these  bands  at  regular  intervals. 

The  new  komitadjis  received  their  training  in  musketry,  bomb 
throwing,  mine  laying,  blowing  up  of  railways,  tunnels  and  bridges, 
and  the  destruction  of  telegraph  wires.  According  to  the  instructions 
of  their  leaders,  it  was  their  duty  to  put  into  practice  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  the  knowledge  they  had  recently  acquired.^ 

By  this  action,  carried  on  in  the  most  open  manner  and  encouraged 
by  the  Servian  Government,  the  Narodna  Odbrana  was  thus  prepared 
for  guerilla  warfare  against  Austria-Hungary.  In  this  way  sub- 
jects of  the  ]\Ionarchy  were  led  into  treason  against  their  country, 
and  induced,  as  Servian  emissaries,  systematically  to  practice  under- 
hand attacks  against  the  means  of  defence  of  their  country. 

This  period  of  aggressive  aspirations  ended  with  the  declaration 
made  by  the  Servian  Government  on  the  31st  March,  1909,  in  which 
the  Government  of  Belgrade  announced  that  they  were  prepared  to 
accept  the  new  situation  created  in  municipal  and  international  law 
by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  solemnly  promised 
to  maintain  in  future  friendly  relations  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy. 

With  this  declaration,  the  agitation,  which  constituted  a  source 
of  constant  trouble  to  Austria-Hungary,  seemed  to  have  come  to  an 
end,  and  the  road  to  an  amicable  rapprochement  between  Servia  and  the 
Monarchy  to  have  been  entered  on.  Deprived  of  the  encouragement 
of  the  Servian  Government,  and  combated  by  that  Government  in 
accordance  with  their  engagements,  the  propaganda  hostile  to  the 
Monarchy  could  only  have  continued  a  shadowy  existence  and  would 
have  been  condemned  to  early  destruction.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
ties  of  language,  race  and  culture  existing  between  the  Southern  Slav 
districts  of  the  Monarchy  and  Servia  ought  to  have  resulted  in  the 
realisation  of  a  task  of  common  development  inspired  by  mutual 
friendship  and  parallel  interests. 

These  hopes,  however,  have  not  been  realised. 

Aspirations  hostile  to  the  Monarchy  have  continued,  and  under 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  103 

the  eyes  of  the  Servian  Government,  who  have  done  nothing  to  sup- 
press this  movement,  the  anti-Austro-Hungarian  propaganda  has 
only  increased  in  extent  and  volume.  Hatred  against  the  Monarchy 
has  been  fanned  and  kindled  into  an  irreconcilable  feeling.  The 
Servian  people  alike  by  adapting  their  former  course  of  action  to  the 
new  situation  and  by  supplementing  it  by  fresh  methods  were  sum- 
moned to  the  "inevitable  death  struggle"  against  Austria-Hungary. 
Secret  ramifications  have  been  systematically  spread  towards  the 
Slav  districts  in  the  south  of  the  Monarchy  whose  subjects  have 
been  incited  to  treason  against  their  country. 

Above  all,  the  Servian  press  has  since  then  worked  incessantly 
in  this  spirit. 

Up  to  the  present  time  no  fewer  than  eighty-one  newspapers 
appearing  in  Servia  have  had  to  forfeit  their  right  to  delivery  through 
the  post  on  account  of  their  contents  falling  within  the  scope  of  the 
penal  law. 

There  is  hardly  a  clause  in  the  penal  code  protecting  the  sacred 
person  of  the  Monarch  and  the  members  of  the  Imperial  Family, 
or  the  integrity  of  the  State,  that  has  not  been  violated  by  Servian 
papers. 

A  few  examples  of  these  press  views,  selected  from  the  great  mass 
of  material  published  by  the  press  at  various  dates,  are  contained  in 
Appendix  I. 

Without  entering  into  a  detailed  account  of  these  expressions  of 
Servian  public  opinion,  it  is  necessary  to  note  that  in  spite  of  the 
formal  recognition  accorded  by  Servia,  it  has  never  ceased  to  consider 
the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  both  before  and  after 
the  event;  as  a  robbery  committed  against  Servia  for  which  repara- 
tion is  due.  This  idea  not  only  constantly  recurs  with  every  modu- 
lation of  its  coarse  language  in  the  papers  professing  most  advanced 
views,  but  also  finds  expression  in  hardly  veiled  terms  in  the  Samou- 
prava,  which  is  in  such  close  touch  with  the  Foreign  OflSce  of 
Belgrade.     (See  Appendix  I  (6).) 

Nor  can  one  omit  to  draw  attention  to  the  manner  in  which  the 
attempt  made  on  the  15th  June,  1910,  at  Serajevo,  by  Bogdan  Zerajic 
against  the  Feldzeugmeister  von  Varesanin,  Governor  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  was  turned  to  account  by  the  press. 

As  is  known,  Zerajic  had  killed  himself  immediately  after  his  deed, 
and  before  committing  it  had  burnt  all  his  papers.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  was  impossible  to  throw  full  light  upon  the  motives 
of  his  crime.  It  could,  however,  be  inferred  from  a  document  found 
on  his  person  that  he  was  a  follower  of  the  views  of  Krapotkin. 
Evidence  collected  leads  likewise  to  the  conclusion  that  the  crime 
was  of  an  anarchist  type. 

This,  however,  did  not  prevent  the  Servian  press  from  celebrating 
the  criminal  as  a  national  Servian  hero  and  from  glorifying  his  deed. 
Indeed,  the  "Politika"  protested  strongly  against  the  idea  that 
Zerajic  was  an  anarchist,  and  declared  him  to  be  "a  Servian  hero 
whose  name  all  Servians  will  repeat  with  respect  and  grief." 


104  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  Politika  considers  the  18th  August  ^  of  the  same  year  as  a 
suitable  opportunity  on  which  to  return  to  the  crime  of  Zerajic, 
"whose  name  will  be  sacred  to  the  people,"  and  to  celebrate  the 
outrage  in  verse.     (See  Appendix  I  (a).) 

In  this  way  this  crime,  which  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  territorial 
aspirations  against  the  Monarchy,  was  exploited  for  the  furtherance 
of  these  ideas  and  by  the  glorifying  of  Zerajic,  murder  was  hailed 
in  the  most  explicit  way  as  a  glorious  means  towards  the  realisation 
of  this  aim  and  one  worthy  to  be  imitated  in  the  struggle.  This 
approbation  of  murder  as  a  weapon  fully  admissible  in  the  struggle 
against  the  Monarchy  re-appears  later  in  the  press  in  discussing  the 
attempt  made  by  Jukic  against  the  Royal  Commissioner  von  Cuvaj. 
(See  Appendix  I  (c).) 

These  newspapers,  which  were  circulated  not  only  in  Servia  but 
also,  as  we  shall  show  later,  illicitly  smuggled  into  the  Monarchy  by 
well-organised  secret  methods,  have  awakened  and  kept  alive  this 
mood  in  the  masses,  a  mood  which  has  provided  a  fruitful  field  for 
the  activities  of  the  associations  hostile  to  the  Monarchy. 

The  Narodna  Odbrana  became  the  centre  of  the  agitation  car- 
ried on  by  the  associations.  The  same  persons  who  were  at  its  head 
at  the  time  of  the  annexation  still  control  it.  Now  as  then,  they 
still  control  it  in  the  capacity  of  the  most  active  and  energetic  organ- 
isers, the  most  violent  opponents  of  the  jMonarchy;  General  Bozo 
Jankovic,  Zivojin  Dacic  (Director  of  the  Government  printing  estab- 
lishment), and  Majors  Milan  Pribicevic  and  Voja  Tankosic.  Organ- 
ised on  a  broad  and  far-reaching  scale  and  constituted  on  a  strict 
hierarchical  basis  (see  Appendix  2,  "Organisation"),  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  counted  soon  some  400  committees  which  developed  a  very 
active  agitation. 

Moreover,  the  Narodna  Odbrana  became  closely  allied  with 
the  "shooting  federation"  (Schutzenbimd) ,  (762  societies),  the 
great  SokoP  Association  "Dusan"  (2,500  members),  the  Olympian 
Club,  the  association  of  horsemen  (Reiterverein) ,  "Prince  Michael," 
the  society  of  sportsmen  (Jdgerbund),  and  the  league  of  development 
(Kulturliga),  as  well  as  numerous  other  associations  all  of  which, 
subordinate  to  it,  were  under  the  guidance  and  protection  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana,  and  worked  on  the  same  lines.  Becoming  more 
and  more  closely  intermingled,  these  associations  arrived  at  a  com- 
plete amalgamation  in  such  a  way  that  to-day  they  are  nothing  but 
members  of  the  single  body  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana. 

Thus  the  Narodna  Odbrana  has  set  up  all  over  Servia  a  close 
network  of  agitation,  and  has  attracted  to  its  principles  all  those 
who  were  receptive  of  its  ideas. 

The  official  publications  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  demonstrate 
sufficiently  clearly  the  spirit  which  animates  it. 

While  in  its  statutes,  it  represents  itself  as  an  "educational  society" 

1  Birthday  of  His  Imperial  and  Apostolic  Majesty. 

2  [Sokol  =  falcon.  The  name  given  to  gymnastic  associations  throughout  Slav 
countries  which  have  adopted  the  falcon  as  their  emblem.] 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  105 

(Kulturverein)  concerning  itself  only  with  the  spiritual  and  physical 
improvement  of  the  Servian  population  and  its  material  progress,  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  discloses  in  its  official  publication  (see  Appendix  2) 
the  true  and  single  motive  of  its  existence  in  that  which  it  calls  its 
"re-organised  programme":  to  preach  to  the  Servian  people  the 
sacred  truth  by  "fanatical  and  indefatigable  work"  under  the  pre- 
tence that  the  Monarchy  wishes  to  "take  away  Servian  liberty  and 
language  and  even  to  destroy  her" ;  that  it  is  an  essential  necessity 
to  wage  against  Austria-Hungary,  her  "first  and  greatest  enemy," 
"a  war  of  extermination  with  rifle  and  cannon,"  and  "by  every 
means"  to  prepare  the  people  for  this  war,  which  is  ''to  liberate 
the  conquered  territories,"  in  which  "seven  million  brothers  are 
suffering  in  bondage." 

All  the  efforts  "  at  an  educational  programme"  {Kulturhestrehungen) 
of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  are  exclusively  concerned  with  this  idea 
simply  as  a  means  for  the  organisation  and  education  of  the  people 
for  the  longed-for  death  struggle  against  the  Monarchy. 

All  the  associations  affiliated  to  the  Narodna  Odbrana  work 
in  the  same  spirit ;  the  Sokol  Association  at  Kragujevac  w^ill  serve  as 
an  example  (see  Appendix  3). 

As  in  the  case  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  officers,  professors  and 
civil  servants  are  at  its  head. 

The  speech  in  which  its  President,  Major  Kovacevic,  opened  the 
annual  meeting  of  1914,  made  absolutely  no  mention  of  physical 
training,  which  is  supposed  to  be  the  real  object  of  a  Sokol  association, 
and  confined  itself  solely  to  "the  preparations  for  war"  against  the 
"dangerous,  heartless,  grasping,  odious  and  greedy  enemy  in  the 
north"  who  "robs  millions  of  Servian  brothers  of  their  liberty  and 
rights,  and  holds  them  in  bondage  and  chains." 

In  the  administrative  reports  of  this  association  the  technical 
work  is  placed  entirely  in  the  background,  and  only  serves  as  headlines 
for  the  avowal  of  the  real  "objects  of  the  activities  of  the  adminis-. 
tration,!'  namely,  the  preparation  of  national  development  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  "oppressed  nation"  with  the  object  of  enabling 
it  to  carry  out  its  "incomplete  programme  and  its  unfinished  task," 
and  to  accomplish  that  "great  action"  "which  is  to  be  carried  out 
in  the  near  future,"  "the  liberation  of  those  brothers  who  live  across 
the  Drina,  who  are  suffering  the  martyrdom  of  the  crucified." 

Even  the  treasurer  makes  use  of  his  financial  reports  to  send 
forth  the  appeal  that  "falcons  must  be  reared"  capable  "of  bringing 
freedom  to  the  brothers  still  iri  bondage." 

As  in  the  case  of  the  "educational  programme"  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana,  the  gymnastic  activity  of  the  Sokols  is  not  the  real  object 
but  merely  a  means  at  the  service  of  the  same  propaganda  carried 
on  in  the  same  spirit,  and  even  with  the  very  same  words. 

When  the  Narodna  Odbrana  appeals  to  the  "people"  for  a  death 
struggle  against  the  Monarchy,  it  does  not  address  itself  only  to 
the  Servian  people,  but  to  all  Southern  Slav  nationalities.  In  the 
eyes  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  the  Slav  regions  in  the  south  of  the 


106  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Monarchy  are  regarded  as  "our  subjected  Servian  territories/'  (See 
Appendix  4.)  The  Southern  Slav  subjects  of  the  Monarchy  are 
further  also  expected  to  take  part  in  this  ''national  work."  This 
"healthy  and  necessary  work"  is,  therefore,  to  be  carried  on  beyond 
the  Servian  frontier.  The  Narodna  Odbrana  recruits  its  "heroes  for 
this  holy  war"  even  on  the  soil  of  the  Monarchy,  and  among  them 
Obilic,  the  murderer  of  Murad,  is  to  light  them  on  their  way  as  an 
example  of  sacrifice  for  one's  country  worthy  of  imitation. 

But  in  order  to  incite  "brothers  outside  Servia"  to  share  in  "the 
work  of  private  effort,"  the  Narodna  Odbrana  keeps  in  close  touch 
with  the  "brothers  beyond  the  frontier."  It  is  not  said  in  the  publi- 
cations of  the  society,  how  this  intimate  association  is  carried  out, 
no  doubt  because  it  appertains  to  that  part  of  the  "common  work" 
which  "for  many  reasons  cannot,  or  ought  not  to  be  divulged." 

How  comprehensive  this  branch  of  its  activity  is,  can  be  seen  by 
the  fact  that  not  only  the  central  committee  of  the  Narodna  Od- 
brana, but  also  certain  of  its  local  committees  contain  special  sections 
for  "foreign  affairs." 

This  "foreign"  activity  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  its  affiliated 
branches  is  extremely  varied. 

What  is  relatively  less  dangerous  inasmuch  as  it  can  be  officially 
controlled,  consists  of  lecture  tours  undertaken  by  distinguished 
members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  in  the  southeastern  parts  of 
the  Monarchy  where  they  speak  before  various  societies  on  national 
or  educational  subjects.  These  tours  give  the  speakers  the  desired 
opportunity,  which  is  indeed  the  chief  object  of  these  journeys,  of 
explaining  the  true  aims  of  the  associations  in  language  more  or  less 
veiled,  which  is  intelligible  to  those  who  are  already  initiated. 

Amongst  these,  emissaries,  one  of  the  best  known  is  Zivojin  Dacic 
(Director  of  the  Government  printing  establishment),  already  several 
times  alluded  to ;  it  was  he  who,  on  the  8th  August,  1909,  issued  an 
"appeal"  to  the  Servian  people  in  which  he  called  Austria-Hungary 
the  enemy  of  Servia,  and  exhorted  them  to  prepare  for  the  war 
against  the  Monarchy.  On  numerous  occasions,  Dacic  under- 
took tours  of  this  nature  in  the  southeastern  districts  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy.  During  one  of  these  lectures  at  Karlovci  in 
1912,  he  flung  his  accustomed  prudence  to  the  winds  and  spoke  openly 
of  the  "union  of  all  Serbs  against  the  common  foe,"  by  which  he 
designated  Austria-Hungary  in  unmistakable  language. 

More  dangerous  are  the  relations  with  associations  in  the  Monarchy 
formed  by  Servian  associations  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  under  the  cloak  of  community  of  interests  and  of  culture ; 
for  the  mutual  visits  of  these  associations,  whether  by  delegates  or 
in  bodies,  which  escape  all  official  control,  are  utilised  by  the  Ser- 
vians for  all  sorts  of  plots  against  the  Monarchy. 

Thus,  for  instance,  at  the  well-known  feast  of  the  Prosvjeta  Asso- 
ciation at  Serajevo,  in  September,  1912,  an  envoy  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  had  the  effrontery  secretly  to  recruit  Bosnian  adherents  to 
his  society.     (See  Appendix  6.)     The  message  which  the  representa- 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  107 

tive  of  the  Sokol  Association  at  Kragujevac  brought  to  the  "  brothers 
in  Bosnia  "  at  this  feast  was  :  "  We  have  not  forgotten  you ;  the  wings 
of  the  falcon  of  Sumadija  are  still  powerful"  —  a  thought  which  in 
confidential  intercourse  would  no  doubt  have  found  quite  a  different 
expression  and  one  better  corresponding  to  the  tendencies  of  this 
society  which  we  have  already  explained.  (See  Appendix  3.)  As  to 
the  events  that  take  place  at  meetings  of  the  same  kind  in  Servia, 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  authorities  cannot  have  any  information 
founded  on  unimpeachable  authority,  as  they  only  possess  on  this 
matter  confidential  information  which  it  is  difficult  to  check.  In  this 
connection,  one  may  mention  the  visit  of  Agram  students  to  Servia 
in  April,  1912,  who  received  from  the  Servians  an  official  military 
reception  accompanied  even  by  a  review  of  troops  in  their  honour, 
and  that  in  a  manner  so  suggestive  that  the  administrative  report  of 
the  Sokol  Association  at  Kragujevac  could  say :  "This  event  marks 
the  beginning  and  germ  of  a  great  deed  which  will  be  accomplished 
in  the  near  future,  it  is  a  germ  which  will  ripen  when  the  soul  of  the 
people  bursts  its  bonds  and  until  there  is  no  barrier  that  has  not 
been  destroyed.'' 

It  is  only  recently  that  it  has  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  authorities  that  the  Servian  Sokol  associations  have 
succeeded  in  inducing  similar  societies  into  the  Monarchy  to  estab- 
lish a  connection  with  them  which  is  up  to  the  present  secret,  and  the 
character  of  which  is  not  yet  quite  clear,  for  the  inquiries  on  this 
point  are  still  in  progress.  Up  to  the  present,  however,  the  informa- 
tion obtained  permits  the  conclusion  that  traces  have  been  dis- 
covered of  one  of  the  ways  by  which  the  subversive  aims  of  the  Servian 
Sdkols  and  their  friends  have  poisoned  the  minds  of  certain  groups 
of  mistaken  and  misled  persons  in  the  Monarchy. 

This  propaganda  which  is  aimed  at  wider  circles,  and  is  rather  of 
a  preparatory  nature,  assumes  minor  importance  compared  with  that 
of  the  "foreign  work"  which  is  conducted  by  the  Narodna  Odbrana 
and  its  friends  in  the  form  of  personal  agitation  among  individuals. 
It  is  in  this  field  that  the  most  melancholy  results  are  shown. 

By  means  of  confidential  and  secret  emissaries,  it  carries  the 
poison  of  rebellion  to  the  circles  of  men  of  mature  age  as  well  as  those 
of  irresponsible  youth. 

It  is  thus,  for  example,  that  the  late  officers  of  the  Honved  B.B., 
D.K.,  V.M.,  and  the  lieutenant  of  Croatian-Slavonian  Gendarmerie 
V.K.,  led  astray  by  Milan  Pribicevic,  left  the  service  of  the  army  of 
the  Monarchy  under  most  suspicious  circumstances  and  turned  to 
Servia ;  they  have  seen  in  the  meanwhile  most  of  their  dreams 
unrealised  and  some  of  them,  at  any  rate,  are  thinking  of  returning 
to  the  Fatherland  they  have  betrayed. 

The  agitation  introduced  from  Servia  into  the  middle  schools  of 
Croatia  and  Bosnia  is  unhappily  too  well  known  to  need  illustration ; 
what  is  less  known  is  that  people  who  have  been  expelled  from 
Croatian  and  Bosnian  schools  owing  to  grave  breaches  of  discipline, 
are  received  in  Servia  with  open  arms,  and  often  even  protected  by  the 


108  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

State  and  educated  as  enemies  of  the  Monarchy.  The  Servian  schools 
with  their  anti-Austrian  staffs,  and  their  large  number  of  professors 
and  teachers  who  are  members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  are  clearly 
establishments  thoroughly  adapted  for  training  experts  of  this  kind. 
A  very  notable  case  of  this  sort  may  be  quoted  here.  In  March,  1914, 
several  pupils  of  the  Training  College  of  Pakrac  (Croatia)  were  dis- 
missed on  account  of  a  strike.  They  went  to  Servia,  where  some  of 
them  immediately  obtained  situations  as  schoolmasters,  while  others 
were  admitted  to  a  college  for  teachers.  One  of  those  who  had  been 
thus  dismissed,  and  who  was  connected  with  ant i- Austrian  circles, 
declared  publicly  that  he  and  his  people  would  give  a  proof,  during 
the  sojourn  of  the  hereditary  Archduke  in  Bosnia,  that  this  province 
was  Servian  territory.  It  is,  as  we  may  add,  highly  significant  that 
during  the  stay  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  in  Bosnia,  the  Royal 
Servian  Prefect  of  the  district  of  Krajna  gave  to  the  three  training 
college  students,  who  were  thus  gravely  implicated,  Servian  passports 
in  which  he  falsely  described  them  as  Servian  subjects,  although  he 
must  have  known  that  they  were  Croatians.  With  these  passports, 
the  three  agitators  were  able  to  enter  the  Monarchy  without  being 
noticed,  where,  however,  they  were  eventually  recognised  and 
arrested. 

All  this  is  not,  by  a  long  way,  enough  to  give  a  complete  repre- 
sentation of  the  "foreign"  activity  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  had  been  informed  for  a 
long  time  past  by  confidential  reports  that  the  Narodna  Odbrana 
had  made  military  preparations  for  the  war  which  it  desired  to  make 
against  the  Monarchy,  inasmuch  as  it  kept  emissaries  in  Austria- 
Hungary,  who,  as  soon  as  hostilities  broke  out,  would  attempt  in  the 
usual  guerilla  manner  to  destroy  means  of  transport  and  equip- 
ment and  stir  up  revolt  or  panic.     (See  Appendix  7.) 

The  criminal  proceedings  taken  in  1913  by  the  District  Court  at 
Serajevo  against  Jovo  Jaglicic  and  his  associates  for  espionage 
(Appendix  6),  confirm  this  confidential  information.  As  at  the  time 
of  its  foundation,  the  preparation  for  guerilla  warfare  still  figures  in 
the  programme  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  to  which  must  now  be 
further  added  a  complete  system  of  espionage. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  programme  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana, 
described  as  "re-organised,"  is  in  reality  an  extended  programme 
which  includes  the  preparation  for  a  "war  of  extermination"  against 
the  Monarchy,  and  even  its  realisation,  and  finally  the  unfurling  of 
the  "ancient  red  flag  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana." 

Acts  of  terrorism  must  finally  result  from  this  atmosphere  of  hatred 
against  the  Monarchy,  which  is  publicly  and  secretly  provoked,  and 
from  an  agitation  which  considers  itself  free  from  all  responsibility ; 
in  order  to  bring  them  about,  all  means  are  regarded  as  permissible 
in  the  struggle  against  Austria-Hungary,  including  even  without  any 
sense  of  shame  common  acts  of  murder. 

On  the  8th  June,  1912,  a  man  named  Lukas  Jukic  shot  von  Cuvaj, 
the  Royal  Commissioner  at  Agram,  with  the  result  that  the  Councillor 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  109 

(Banalrat)  von  Hervoic,  who  was  seated  in  the  same  carriage,  was 
mortally  wounded.  Jukic,  in  his  flight,  shot  a  policeman  who  was 
pursuing  him,  and  wounded  two  others. 

From  the  subsequent  public  investigation  it  appeared  that  Jukic 
was  saturated  with  the  ideas  and  plans  propagated  by  the  Narodna 
Odbrana,  and  that  although  Jukic  had  for  some  time  past  been 
devoting  himself  to  criminal  schemes,  these  schemes  were  only 
matured  after  he  had  made  an  excursion  to  Belgrade  together  with 
the  Agram  students  on  the  18th  of  April,  1912.  At  the  noisy  cele- 
brations in  honour  of  the  visitors,  Jukic  had  entered  into  relations 
with  several  people  belonging  to  the  circle  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana, 
with  whom  he  had  had  political  discussions.  A  few  days  after- 
wards he  returned  to  Belgrade,  and  there  received  from  a  Servian 
major  a  bomb,  and  from  a  comrade  the  Browning  pistol  with  which 
he  carried  out  his  crime. 

In  the  opinion  of  experts,  the  bomb  found  at  Agram  was  made 
in  an  arsenal  for  military  purposes. 

Jukic's  attempt  had  not  been  forgotten,  when  on  the  18th  of 
August,  1913,  Stephen  Dojcic,  who  had  returned  from  America, 
made  an  attempt  on  the  life  of  the  Royal  Commissioner,  Baron 
Skerlecz,  at  Agram  —  an  attempt  which  was  the  outcome  of  action 
organised  by  the  Servians  among  the  Southern  Slavs  living  in  America, 
and  which  was  also  the  work  of  the  "foreign"  propaganda  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  and  its  confederates. 

A  pamphlet  by  the  Servian,  T.  Dimitrijevic,  printed  in  Chicago, 
and  entitled  "Natrag  u  staro  ognjiste  vase,"  with  its  unbridled 
attacks  against  His  Imperial  and  Royal  Apostolic  Majesty,  and  its 
appeal  to  the  Servians  of  the  Monarchy  with  reference  to  their  im- 
pending "deliverance,"  and  urging  them  to  migrate  home  to  Servia, 
demonstrates  the  fact  that  the  propaganda  carried  out  unchecked 
in  America  from  Servia,  and  that  carried  on  from  Servia  in  the  terri- 
tory of  the  Monarchy,  worked  on  parallel  lines. 

And  again,  scarcely  a  year  later,  Agram  was  the  scene  of  a  new 
outrage,  this  time  unsuccessful. 

On  the  20th  of  May,  1914,  Jakob  Schafer  made  an  attempt  at  the 
Agram  Theatre  on  the  life  of  the  Ban,  Freiherr  von  Skerlecz,  an 
attempt  which  was  frustrated  at  the  last  moment  by  a  police  official. 
The  subsequent  investigation  revealed  the  existence  of  a  plot  inspired 
by  Rudolf  Hercigonja.  From  the  depositions  of  Hercigonja  and  his 
five  accomplices,  it  is  manifest  that  this  crime  also  originated  in  Servia. 

Having  taken  part  in  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  liberate  Jukic, 
Hercigonja  fled  to  Servia  (October,  1912),  where,  together  with  his 
accomplice  Marojan  Jaksic,  he  consorted  with  the  komitadjis  and 
.members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana.  As  frequently  happens  when 
immature  minds  are  excited  by  occupying  themselves  too  early  with 
political  questions,  the  result  of  this  corrupting  company  was  here 
also  disastrous.  Hercigonja  returned  home  impressed  by  the  dogma 
learnt  in  Belgrade  that  the  Southern  Slav  territories  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary must  be  separated  from  it  and  re-united  to  the  Servian  kingdom. 


110  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

He  had  further  been  persuaded  by  the  teachings  of  the  friends  with 
whom  he  associated  there,  that  this  object  should  be  pursued  by 
means  of  attempts  on  the  Hves  of  persons  holding  high  office  and 
leading  politicians  of  the  Monarchy  as  the  only  means  of  obtaining 
this  end. 

This  is  the  spirit  in  which  Hercigonja  influenced  his  friends  at 
Agram  and  converted  some  of  them  to  his  ideas.  Foremost  among  his 
plans  was  the  carrying  out  of  an  attempt  on  the  life  of  the  heir  to  the 
throne,  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand. 

A  few  months  before  proceedings  had  been  taken  against  Luka 
Aljinovic  for  treasonable  agitation.  In  the  course  of  these  proceed- 
ings three  witnesses  declared  that  Aljinovic  had  told  them  that  in 
the  year  1913  he  had  received  at  Belgrade  100  dinar  from  the  Narodna 
Odbrana,  and  a  similar  sum  from  a  secret  association  of  students, 
for  purposes  of  agitation,  but  especially  to  carry  out  an  attempt  on 
the  life  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand. 

It  is  clear  how  far  the  criminal  agitation  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana 
and  those  who  shared  in  its  views,  has  of  late  been  primarily  directed 
against  the  person  of  the  hereditary  Archduke.  From  these  facts 
the  conclusion  may  be  drawn  that  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  as  well 
as  the  associations  hostile  to  the  Monarchy  in  Servia,  which  were 
grouped  round  it,  recently  decided  that  the  hour  had  struck  to  trans- 
late theory  into  practice. 

It  is  noteworthy,  however,  that  the  Narodna  limits  itself  in  this 
way  to  inciting,  and  where  the  incitement  has  fallen  on  fertile  soil 
to  providing  means  of  material  assistance  for  the  realisation  of  its 
plans,  but  that  it  has  confided  the  only  dangerous  part  of  this  prop- 
aganda of  action  to  the  youth  of  the  Monarchy,  which  it  has  ex- 
cited and  corrupted,  and  which  alone  has  to  bear  the  burden  of  this 
miserable  "heroism." 

All  the  characteristics  of  this  procedure  are  found  in  the  history 
and  origin  of  the  profoundly  regrettable  outrage  of  the  28th  of  June 
(see  Appendix  8) . 

Princip  and  Grabez  are  characteristic  examples  of  young  men 
who  have  been  poisoned  from  their  school  days  by  the  doctrines  of 
the  Narodna  Odbrana. 

At  Belgrade,  where  he  frequented  the  society  of  students  imbued 
with  these  ideas,  Princip  busied  himself  with  criminal  plans  against 
the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  against  whom  the  hatred  of  the 
Servian  element  hostile  to  the  Monarchy  was  particularly  acute  on 
the  occasion  of  his  tour  in  the  annexed  territories. 

He  was  joined  by  Cabrinovic,  who  moved  in  the  same  circles,  and 
whose  shifting  and  radically  revolutionary  views,  as  he  himself  admits, 
as  well  as  the  influence  of  his  surroundings  in  Belgrade  and  the  reading 
of  the  Servian  papers,  inspired  him  with  the  same  sense  of  hostility 
to  the  Monarchy,  and  brought  him  into  the  propaganda  of  action. 

Thanks  to  the  state  of  mind  in  which  he  already  was,  Grabez 
succumbed  very  quickly  to  this  milieu,  which  he  now  entered. 

But  however  far  this  plot  may  have  prospered,  and  however 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  111 

determined  the  conspirators  may  have  been  to  carry  out  the  attempt, 
it  would  never  have  been  effected,  if  people  had  not  been  found,  as 
in  the  case  of  Jukic,  to  provide  the  accomplices  with  means  of  com- 
mitting their  crime.  For,  as  Princip  and  Cabrinovic  have  expressly 
admitted,  they  lacked  the  necessary  arms,  as  well  as  the  money  to 
purchase  them. 

It  is  interesting  to  see  where  the  accomplices  tried  to  procure 
their  arms.  Milan  Pribicevic  and  Zivojin  Dacic,  the  two  principal 
men  in  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  were  the  first  accomplices  thought  of 
as  a  sure  source  of  help  in  their  need,  doubtless  because  it  had  already 
become  a  tradition  amongst  those  ready  to  commit  crimes,  that  they 
could  obtain  instruments  for  murder  from  these  representatives  of 
the  Narodna  Odbrana.  The  accidental  circumstance  that  these 
two  men  were  not  at  Belgrade  at  the  crkical  moment  doubtless 
balked  this  plan.  However,  Princip  and  Cabrinovic  were  not  at  a 
loss  in  finding  other  help,  that  of  Milan  Ciganovic,  an  ex-komitadji, 
and  now  a  railway  official  at  Belgrade,  and  at  the  same  time  an  active 
member  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  who,  in  1909,  first  appeared  as 
a  pupil  at  the  school  {Bandenschule)  at  Cuprija  (see  Appendix  5). 
Princip  and  Cabrinovic  were  not  deceived  in  their  expectations,  as 
they  at  once  received  the  necessary  help  from  Ciganovic. 

The  latter,  and  at  his  instigation,  his  friend  Major  Voja  Tankosic, 
of  the  Royal  Servian  Army,  also  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana,  who  has  already  been  mentioned  several  times,  and  who, 
in  1908,  was  at  the  head  of  the  school  of  armed  bands  at  Cuprija 
(see  Appendix  5),  now  appear  as  moving  spirits  and  active  furtherers 
in  the  plot ;  the  repulsive  manner  in  which  they  approved  as  a  matter 
of  course,  is  significant  of  the  moral  qualities  of  the  whole  anti- 
Austrian  movement.  They  had  at  first  only  one  doubt,  and  that  but 
a  fleeting  one,  as  to  whether  the  three  conspirators  were  really  resolved 
to  commit  this  act.  This  doubt,  however,  soon  disappeared,  thanks 
to  their  insidious  counsels.  Thenceforth  they  were  prepared  to  give 
every  assistance.  Tankosic  produced  four  Browning  pistols,  ammuni- 
tion and  money  for  the  journey ;  six  hand-grenades  from  the  Servian 
army  supplies  completed  the  equipment,  of  which  the  composition 
and  origin  recalls  the  case  of  Jukic.  Anxious  about  the  success  of 
the  attempt,  Tankosic  had  the  conspirators  instructed  in  shooting, 
a  task  which  Ciganovic  carried  out  with  a  success  which  has  since 
been  fully  proved.  Tankosic  and  Ciganovic  were  further  anxious  to 
ensure  secrecy  for  the  plot  by  special  means  which  had  not  been  bar- 
gained for  by  the  assassins.  They  therefore  supplied  cyanide  of 
potassium,  telling  the  two  culprits  to  commit  suicide  after  the  crime, 
a  precaution  which  was  to  be  specially  advantageous  to  themselves, 
as  secrecy  would  thus  relieve  them  of  the  slight  danger  which  they 
were  incurring  in  the  enterprise.  Sure  death  for  the  victims  of  their 
corruption,  perfect  security  for  themselves,  this  is  the  motto  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana,  as  was  already  known. 

In  order  to  render  the  execution  of  the  crime  possible,  it  was 
necessary  that  the  bombs  and  arms  should  be  secretly  smuggled  into 


112  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Bosnia.  There  again  Ciganovic  gave  all  the  assistance  in  his  power ; 
he  wrote  out  for  the  conspirators  the  exact  route  to  be  followed,  and 
assured  them  of  the  collusion  of  the  Servian  Customs  officials  for 
getting  them  into  Bosnia.  The  way  in  which  this  journey,  described 
by  Princip  as  "mysterious,"  was  organised  and  carried  out  can  leave 
no  doubt  but  that  this  route  was  a  secret  one,  prepared  in  advance, 
and  already  often  used  for  the  mysterious  designs  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana.  With  an  assurance  and  a  certainty  which  could  only 
result  from  long  habit,  the  frontier  guards  at  Sabac  and  Loznica  lent 
their  administrative  organisation  for  the  purpose.  The  secret  trans- 
port with  its  complicated  system  of  ever-changing  guides,  who  were 
summoned  as  if  by  magic,  and  who  were  always  on  the  spot  w^hen 
wanted,  was  effected  without  a  hitch.  Without  inquiring  into  the 
object  of  this  strange  journey  of  some  immature  students,  the  Ser- 
vian authorities  set  this  smooth  machinery  into  motion  at  a  word 
from  the  ex-komitadji  and  minor  railway  official,  Ciganovic.  How- 
ever, they  had  no  need  to  ask  any  questions,  as  from  the  instructions 
they  had  received,  it  was  perfectly  clear  that  a  new  "mission'*'  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  was  being  carried  out.  The  sight  of  the  arsenal 
of  bombs  and  revolvers  caused  the  exciseman  Grbic  merely  to  smile 
good-naturedly  and  approvingly  —  sufficient  proof  of  how  accus- 
tomed they  were  on  this  "route"  to  find  contraband  of  this  nature. 

The  Royal  Servian  Government  have  taken  a  grave  responsibility 
on  their  shoulders,  in  allowing  all  this  to  take  place. 

Though  bound  to  cultivate  neighbourly  relations  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  they  have  allowed  their  press  to  disseminate  hatred  against 
the  Monarchy;  they  have  allowed  associations  established  on  their 
own  territory  under  the  leadership  of  high  officers,  of  public  officials, 
of  professors  and  of  judges,  to  carry  on  openly  a  campaign  against 
the  Monarchy,  with  the  ultimate  object  of  inciting  its  citizens  to  revo- 
lution; they  have  not  prevented  men  devoid  of  all  moral  scruples, 
who  share  in  the  direction  of  its  military  and  civil  administration, 
from  poisoning  the  public  conscience,  so  that  in  this  struggle  low 
murder  appears  as  the  best  weapon. 


APPENDIX  1 

Opinions  of  the  Servian  Press 

(a)  The  PolitikUy  on  the  18th  August,  1910,  on  the  occasion  of 
the  eightieth  birthday  of  His  Imperial  and  Royal  Apostolic  Majesty, 
published  a  large  portrait  of  Bogdan  Zerajic,  who,  two  months 
earlier,  had  made  a  murderous  attack  on  the  Governor  of  Bosnia, 
Freiherr  von  Varesanin.  In  the  article  dealing  with  this,  the  fol- 
lowing observations  were  made :  —  "  Two  months  ago,  on  the  2nd 
of  June  (old  style),  on  the  opening  day  of  the  Diet  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  a  young  Servian,  the  student  Bogdan  Zerajic,  made 
an  attempt  in  Serajevo  to  kill  the  Governor  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina,   General   Marian    Varesanin.     Zerajic   fired   five   shots   at 


July  25 y  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  113 

this  renegade,  who  had  assured  his  career  by  pouring  out  the  blood 
of  his  brothers  in  the  famous  insurrection  in  Rakovica,  but,  owing 
to  a  remarkable  accident,  did  not  succeed  in  killing  him.  Whereon 
the  brave  and  composed  Zerajic  fired  the  sixth  and  last  bullet  through 
his  own  head,  and  immediately  fell  dead.  In  Vienna,  they  knew  very 
well  that  it  was  not  the  reading  of  Russian  and  revolutionary  writings 
which  had  induced  Zerajic  to  make  his  attempt,  but  that  he  acted 
thus  as  the  noble  scion  of  a  race  which  wished  to  protest  against 
foreign  rule  in  this  bloody  way.  Therefore,  they  sought  to  hush  up 
the  whole  matter  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  —  contrary  to  their  cus- 
tom —  to  avoid  an  affair  which  would  have  still  more  compromised 
the  Austrian  Government  in  Bosnia  g^nd  Herzegovina.  In  Vienna, 
it  was  desired  that  every  memory  of  Zerajic  should  be  extinguished, 
that  no  importance  should  be  attached  to  his  attempt ;  but  just  this 
fear  of  the  dead  Zerajic,  and  the  prohibition  against  mentioning  his 
name  throughout  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  brought  it  about  that  his 
name  is  spoken  among  the  people  as  something  sacred  to-day,  on 
the  18th  of  August,  perhaps  more  than  ever. 

"  To-day,  we  too  light  a  candle  at  his  grave  and  cry  *  Honour  to 
Zerajic.'" 

To  this  is  added  a  poem,  the  translation  of  which  is  as  follows :  — 

"Bosnia  lives  and  is  not  dead  yet, 
In  vain  have  you  buried  her  corpse ; 
Still  the  chained  victim  spits  fire, 

Nor  is  it  yet  time  to  sing  the  dirge.  ^ 

With  devil's  hand  you  have  scratched  a  grave  for  her 
But  the  living  dead  will  not  descend  into  the  vault ; 
Emperor,  dost  thou  hear  ? 

In  the  flash  of  the  revolver  the  leaden  bullets  hiss  about  thy  throne. 
These  are  not  slaves ;  this  is  glorious  freedom 
Which  flashes  from  the  bold  hand  of  the  oppressed. 
Why  does  this  horrible  Golgotha  shudder  ? 
Peter  drew  the  sword  in  Christ's  defence, 
His  hand  fell,  but  out  of  the  blood 
A  thousand  brave  hands  will  rise ; 
That  shot  was  only  the  first  herald 
Of  the  glorious  Easter  after  Golgotha's  torments." 

(6)  On  the  8th  October,  1910,  on  the  occasion  of  the  anniversary 
of  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  Politika  and 
the  Mali  Journal,  the  last  of  which  appeared  with  a  black  border, 
published  articles  in  which  they  indulged  in  violent  attacks 
against  Austria-Hungary.  Europe  must  convince  herself  that  the 
Servian  people  still  think  always  of  the  "remrwhe."^  The  day  of  the 
"remnche''  must  come;  for  this  the  feverish  exertions  of  Servia  to 
organise  her  military  power  as  well  as  the  feeling  of  the  Servian  people 
and  their  hatred  of  the  neighbouring  kingdom  were  a  guarantee. 

On  the  same  occasion  the  Samouprava  wrote  on  the  9th  October, 
1910,  "  Abuse  and  excesses  are  no  fit  means  to  express  true  patriotism ; 
quiet,  steady  and  honest  work  alone  leads  to  the  goal." 

(c)  On  the  18th  April,  1911,  the  Politika  said:  "Except  for  a 
few  cynics,  no  one  in  Servia  would  be  glad  to  see  King  Peter  pro- 


114  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

ceeding  to  Vienna  or  Budapest.  By  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  the  possibiUty  of  friendship  between  Servia  and  Austria- 
Hungary  was  once  for  all  destroyed.     Every  Servian  feels  that.'' 

(d)  The  Beogradske  N ovine  wrote  on  the  18th  April,  1911: — ■ 
"  Even  in  Government  circles  the  projected  journey  of  King  Peter 
to  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  is  disapproved.  The  storm  of  indig- 
nation which  has  seized  the  whole  of  the  Servian  race  on  account  of 
the  King's  proposed  journey  is  entirely  comprehensible." 

{e)  The  Mali  Journal  of  the  19th  April,  1911,  says:  "A  visit 
of  King  Peter  to  the  ruler  of  Austria-Hungary  would  be  an  insult 
to  all  Serbs.  By  this  visit,  Servia  would  forfeit  the  right  to  play  the 
part  of  Piedmont.  The  interests  of  Servia  can  never  coincide  with 
the  interests  of  Austria." 

(/)  On  the  23rd  April,  1911,  the  Politika,  the  Mali  Journal,  the 
Tribuna,  the  Beogradske  Novine,  and  the  Vezernje  Novosti,  com- 
mented on  the  projected  visit  of  King  Peter  to  the  Court  of  Vienna : 
"Between  Servia  and  Austria,  friendship  can  never  exist.  The 
projected  visit  of  King  Peter  would,  therefore,  be  for  Servia  a  '  shame- 
ful capitulation,'  'a  humiliation  of  Servia,'  'a  solemn  sanctioning 
of  all  the  crimes  and  misdeeds  that  Austria-Hungary  has  committed 
against  Servia  and  the  Servian  people.' " 

(g)  On  the  18th  April,  1912,  the  Trgovinski  Glasnik  wrote  in  an 
article  headed,  "The  decay  of  Austria":  — 

"In  Austria-Hungary  decay  prevails  on  all  sides.  What  is  now 
happening  beyond  the  Danube  and  the  Save  is  no  longer  a  German, 
Magyar,  Bohemian  or  Croatian  crisis,  it  is  a  universal  Austrian  crisis, 
a  crisis  of  the  dynasty  itself.  We  Servians  can  observe  such  a  devel- 
opment of  affairs  in  Austria  with  satisfaction." 

(h)  The  Balkan,  in  an  article  entitled  "The  Borders  of  Albania," 
in  attacking  Austria-Hungary,  expressed  itself  to  this  effect :  "  If 
Europe  is  too  weak  to  call  a  halt  to  Austria-Hungary,  Montenegro 
and  Servia  will  do  it,  saying  to  Austria, '  Halt !  no  further  ! '  A  war 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia  is  inevitable.  We  have  dis- 
membered the  Turkish  Empire,  we  will  dismember  Austria  too.  We 
have  finished  one  war,  we  are  now  facing  a  second." 

(i)  The  Vecernje  Novosti,  of  the  22nd  April,  1913,  appeals  to  the 
Servian  travelling  public  and  to  Servian  traders  to  boycott  the 
Donau  Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft  (The  Danube  Steam  Navigation 
Company).  "No  one  should  travel  or  consign  goods  by  ships  of 
this  Austrian  Company.  All  who  do  this  should  be  punished  with 
fines  by  a  committee.  The  moneys  would  flow  to  the  funds  of  the 
Komitadjis  which  are  to  be  applied  for  the  purpose  of  the  coming 
war  with  Austria." 

(k)  The  Tribuna  of  the  26th  May,  1913,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
seizure  of  Ada  Kaleh  by  Austria,  writes :  "  The  criminal  black  and 
yellow  Austria  has  again  carried  out  a  piratical  trick.  It  is  a  thief 
who,  when  he  cannot  steal  a  whole  sack  of  gold,  contents  himself  with 
one  dinar." 

(I)  On  the  10th  June,  1913,  on  the  occasion  of  the  recurrence  of 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  115 

the  anniversary  of  the  murderous  attack  on  the  Royal  Commissary 
in  Agram  by  the  student  Luka  Jukic,  the  Servian  newspapers  pub- 
lished memorial  articles.  An  article  in  the  Pragda  stated  that :  "  It 
must  grieve  us  to  the  bottom  of  our  hearts  that  everyone  has  not 
acted  like  our  Jukic.  We  have  no  longer  a  Jukic,  but  we  have  the 
hatred,  we  have  the  anger,  we  have  to-day  ten  million  Jukics.  We 
are  convinced  that  soon  Jukic,  through  his  prison  window,  will  hear 
the  last  cannon  shot  of  freedom." 

(m)  The  Mali  Journal  of  the  7th  October,  1913,  gives  a  leading 
place  to  an  article  in  which  Austria-Hungary  is  denied  the  right  of 
existence,  and  the  Slavonic  peoples  are  invited  to  support  the  offensive 
campaign  contemplated  by  Servia. 

(n)  The  Piemont  writes  on  the  commemoration  day  of  the  annex- 
ation :  "  Five  years  ago  to-day  an  imperial  decree  extended  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  Hapsburg  sceptre  over  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
The  Servian  people  will  feel  for  decades  yet  the  grief  which  was  that 
day  inflicted  on  them.  Shamed  and  shattered,  the  Servian  people 
groaned  in  despair.  The  people  vow  to  take  vengeance  in  attaining 
freedom  by  an  heroic  step.  This  day  has  aroused  the  energy  which 
had  already  sunk  to  sleep,  and  soon  the  refreshed  hero  will  strive  for 
freedom.  To-day  when  Servian  graves  adorn  the  ancient  Servian 
territories,  when  the  Servian  cavalry  has  trod  the  battlefields  of 
Macedonia  and  old  Servia,  the  Servian  people  having  ended  their 
task  in  the  South  turn  to  the  other  side,  whence  the  groans  and  tears 
of  the  Servian  brother  are  heard,  and  where  the  gallows  has  its  home. 
The  Servian  soldiers  who  to-day  in  Dusan's  kingdom  fight  those 
Albanians  who  were  provoked  against  us  by  the  state  which  took 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  from  us,  vowed  to  march  against  the  'sec- 
ond Turkey'  even  as  with  God's  help  they  had  marched  against  the 
Balkan  Turkey.  They  make  this  vow  and  hope  that  the  day  of 
revenge  is  drawing  near.  One  Turkey  vanished.  The  good  Servian 
God  will  grant  that  the  'second  Turkey'  will  vanish  too." 

(o)  The  Mali  Jmtrnal  of  the  4th  November,  1913,  writes  :  "Every 
effort  tow^ards  a  rapprochement  with  Austria-Hungary  is  equivalent 
to  a  betrayal  of  the  Servian  people.  Servia  must  understand  the 
facts  and  always  hold  before  her  eyes  that  she  has  in  Austria-Hungary 
her  most  dangerous  enemy,  and  that  it  must  be  the  sacred  obliga- 
tion of  every  Servian  Government  to  fight  this  enemy." 

(p)  On  the  14th  January,  1914,  the  Pragda  said:  "Our  new 
year's  wishes  are  first  of  all  for  our  still  unfreed  brothers  sighing  under 
a  foreign  yoke.  Let  the  Servians  endure;  after  Kossovo  came 
Kumanovo,  and  our  victorious  career  is  not  yet  ended." 

(q)  The  Novosti  of  the  18th  January,  1914,  published  a  picture 
of  "The  Blessing  of  the  Water  in  Bosnia"  with  the  following  text: 
"  Even  in  places  which  lie  under  the  foreign  yoke,  the  Servians  pre- 
serve their  customs  against  the  day  when  in  glorious  joy  the  day  of 
freedom  dawns." 

(r)  The  Zastava  confesses  in  January,  1914:  "Servia  incites  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Servians  to  revolution." 


116  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

(s)  The  Mali  Journal  of  the  9th  March,  1914,  writes  :  "Servia  can 
never  forget  Franz  Ferdinand's  sabre-rattHng  in  the  Skutari  affair." 

(t)  On  the  4th  April,  1914,  the  Zastava  writes:  "The  Austrian 
statesmen  who  only  conduct  a  policy  of  hatred,  a  bureaucratic  policy, 
not  a  policy  inspired  by  broad  vision,  are  themselves  preparing  the 
ruin  of  their  State." 

(u)  The  Pragda  of  the  8th  April,  1914,  says:  "Austria  has  now 
lost  her  right  to  exist." 

{v)  In  their  Easter  numbers  (April,  1914)  all  the  Servian  newspapers 
expressed  the  hope  that  soon  their  unfreed,  oppressed  brothers  under 
the  yoke  would  celebrate  a  joyous  resurrection. 

{w)  In  the  Tribuna  of  the  23rd  April,  1914,  it  is  stated  that : 
"The  pacifists  have  invented  a  new  catchword,  that  of  the  'patriotism 
of  Europe.'  This  programme  can  only  be  realised,  however,  when 
Austria  is  partitioned." 

(.t)  The  Mali  Journal  of  the  12th  May,  1914,  writes:  "What 
are  called  crimes  in  private  life  are  called,  in  Austria,  politics.  History 
knows  a  monster,  and  that  monster  is  called  Austria." 


APPENDIX  2 

Extract  from  the  "Narodna  Odbrana,"  an  organ  published  by 
THE  Central  Committee  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  Society. 
(Narodna   odbrana  izdanje  stredisnog  odbora  narodne- 

ODBRANE.      BeOGRAD,    1911.      "NoVA  STAMPARIJA"   DaVIDOVIC, 

Decanska  ulica  BR.  14,  Ljub.  Davidovica.) 

In  a  short  introduction  it  is  first  of  all  remarked  that  this  pamphlet 
"does  not  completely  or  exhaustively  reproduce  the  whole  work  of 
the  Narodna  Odbrana  because,  for  many  reasons,  it  is  neither  per- 
missible nor  possible  to  do  this." 

The  document  is  divided  into  three  parts  of  which  the  first  consists 
of  fourteen  chapters  and  is  in  the  nature  of  a  programme,  while  the 
second  contains  a  report  of  the  activities  of  the  Society,  and  in  the 
third  examples  are  given  for  the  organisation  of  similar  societies 
abroad. 

In  the  first  chapter,  "Origin  and  activity  of  the  first  Narodna 
Odbrana,"  it  is  remarked  that  the  Society  was  founded  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  popular  movement  arising  in  Servia  on  the  annexation 
of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  that  it  had  the  following  objects  :  — 

(1)  Raising,  inspiring  and  strengthening  the  sentiment  of  nation- 
ality. 

(2)  Registration  and  enlistment  of  volunteers. 

(3)  Formation  of  volunteer  units  and  their  preparation  for  armed 
action. 

(4)  Collection  of  voluntary  contributions,  including  money  and 
other  things  necessary  for  the  realisation  of  its  task. 

(5)  Organisation,  equipment  and  training  of  a  special  revolutionary 
band  (Komitee),  destined  for  special  and  independent  military  action. 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  117 

(6)  Development  of  activity  for  the  defence  of  the  Servian  people 
in  all  other  directions.  In  this  connection,  it  is  remarked  that  owing 
to  the  recognition  of  the  annexation  by  the  Great  Powers  an  end  had 
been  made  to  all  this  work  of  the  Society  on  which,  while  retaining 
its  existing  constitution,  the  Society  had  taken  measures  to  reorganise 
its  programme  and  to  undertake  new  work,  so  that,  on  the  recurrence 
of  a  similar  occasion,  "  the  old  red  War  Flag  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana 
would  again  be  unfurled." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  second  chapter,  "The  new  Narodna 
Odbrana  of  to-day,"  it  is  stated  that  "at  the  time  of  the  annexation, 
experience  had  shown  that  Servia  was  not  ready  for  the  struggle 
which  circumstances  imposed  upon  her,  and  that  this  struggle,  which 
Servia  must  take  up,  is  much  more  serious  and  more  difficult  than  it 
was  thought  to  be ;  the  annexation  was  only  one  of  the  blows  which 
the  enemies  of  Servia  have  aimed  at  this  land,  many  blows  have 
preceded  it,  and  many  will  follow  it.  Work  and  preparation  are 
necessary  so  that  a  new  attack  may  not  find  Servia  equally  unpre- 
pared." The  object  assigned  to  the  work  to  be  done  by  people  of 
every  class  is  stated  to  be  "the  preparation  of  the  people  for  war  in 
all  forms  of  national  work,  corresponding  to  the  requirements  of  the 
present  day,"  and  the  means  suggested  to  effect  this  object  are 
"  strengthening  of  the  national  consciousness,  bodily  exercises,  increase 
of  material  and  bodily  well-being,  cultural  improvement,  etc.  ...  so 
far  as  individuals  and  societies  can  and  should  assist  the  State  in 
these  spheres." 

The  third  chapter,  "The  three  principal  tasks,"  begins  with  a 
hint  that  the  annexation  has  taught  that  national  consciousness  in 
Servia  is  not  so  strong  as  it  should  be  in  a  country  which,  as  a  small 
fraction  of  three  millions,  forms  a  hope  of  support  for  seven  millions  of 
the  oppressed  Servian  people.  The  first  task  of  the  Society,  therefore, 
consists  in  strengthening  the  national  consciousness.  The  second 
task  is  the  cultivation  of  bodily  exercises,  the  third  the  proper  util- 
isation of  these  activities  learned  in  the  field  of  sport. 

In  the  fourth  chapter  (Musketry)  prominence  is  given  to  the  value 
of  good  training  in  musketry,  especially  having  regard  to  the  circum- 
stances of  Servia,  w^here  the  military  training  only  lasts  six  months. 
These  observations  conclude  with  the  sentence : 

"A  new  blow,  like  that  of  the  annexation,  must  be  met  by  a  new 
Servia,  in  which  every  Servian,  from  child  to  greybeard,  is  a  rifle- 
man." 

The  fifth  chapter,  which  treats  of  "The  relations  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  to  the  Sokol  societies,"  begins  with  a  social  and  political 
excursus  as  to  the  conditions  on  which  the  powers  of  States  de- 
pend. In  this  connection  the  fall  of  Turkey  is  referred  to,  and  it  is 
said : 

"The  old  Turks  of  the  South  gradually  disappear  and  only  a  part 
of  our  people  suffer  under  their  rule.  But  new  Turks  come  from  the 
North,  more  fearful  and  dangerous  than  the  old  ;  stronger  in  civilisa- 
tion and  more  advanced  economically,  our  northern  enemies  come 


118  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

against  us.'  They  want  to  take  our  freedom  and  our  language  from 
us  and  to  crush  us.  We  can  already  feel  the  presages  of  the  struggle 
which  approaches  in  that  quarter.  The  Servian  people  are  faced  by 
the  question  '  to  be  or  not  to  be  ? ' " 

"What  is  the  object  of  the  Lectures?"  is  the  title  of  the  seventh 
chapter,  the  principal  contents  of  which  are  covered  by  the  following 
sentences : 

"The  Narodna  Odbrana  instituted  lectures  which  were  largely 
propaganda  lectures.  The  programme  of  our  new  work  was  devel- 
oped. Every  lecture  referred  to  the  annexation,  the  work  of  the 
old  Narodna  Odbrana  and  the  task  of  the  new.  The  lectures  will 
never  cease  to  be  propaganda  lectures,  but  they  wdll  develop  special 
branches  more  and  more  and  concern  themselves  with  all  questions 
of  our  social  and  national  life." 

In  the  eighth  chapter,  "Women's  Activities  in  the  Narodna 
Odbrana,"  the  ninth  "Detail  and  Lesser  Work,"  and  the  tenth, 
"Renaissance  of  the  Society,"  the  preparation  and  deepening  of  the 
Society's  work  and  the  necessity  of  a  regeneration  of  the  individual, 
the  nation  and  the  State  are  treated  in  reference  to  the  tasks  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana. 

The  Introduction  to  the  eleventh  chapter  ("  New  Obilice  and 
Singjelice"  ^)  runs  as  follows :  — 

"  It  is  an  error  to  assert  that  Kossovo  is  past  and  gone.  We  find 
ourselves  in  the  midst  of  Kossovo.  Our  Kossovo  of  to-day  is  the 
gloom  and  ignorance  in  which  our  people  live.  The  other  causes  of 
the  new  Kossovo  live  on  the  frontiers  to  the  North  and  West :  the 
Germans,  Austrians  and  ^Schwabas,'  with  their  onward  pressure 
against  our  Servian  and  Slavonic  South."  In  conjunction  with  the 
reference  to  the  heroic  deeds  of  Obilice  and  Singjelice,  the  necessity  of 
sacrifice  in  the  service  of  the  nation  is  alluded  to,  and  it  is  declared 
that  "national  work  is  interwoven  with  sacrifice,  particularly  in 
Turkey  and  in  Austria,  where  such  workers  are  persecuted  by  the 
authorities  and  dragged  to  prison  and  the  gallows.  For  this  struggle, 
also,  against  gloom  and  ignorance  there  is  no  need  of  such  heroes. 
The  Narodna  Odbrana  does  not  doubt  that  in  the  fight  with  gun  and 
cannon  against  the  '  Schwabas '  and  the  other  enemies  with  whom  we 
stand  face  to  face,  our  people  will  provide  a  succession  of  heroes. 
However,  the  Narodna  Odbrana  is  not  content  with  this,  for  it 
regards  the  so-called  peaceful  present  day  conditions  as  war,  and 
demands  heroes  too  for  this  struggle  of  to-day  which  we  are  carrying 
on  in  Servia  and  beyond  the  frontier." 

The  twelfth  chapter  treats  of  "Union  with  our  brothers  and 
friends,"  and  its  principal  contents  are  concentrated  in  the  following 
sentences :  — 

^  Milos  Obilice  (or  Kobili6)  crept  —  according  to  Serbian  tradition  —  into  the 
Turkish  Camp,  after  the  battle  on  the  Amselveld,  and  there  murdered  the  Sultan 
Murad  (von  Kdllay,  Geschichte  der  Serben,  Vol.  I).  Stephan  Singjelic,  Prince  of 
Resara,  played  a  part  during  the  Serbian  Revolution,  1807-1810.  In  1809,  Sing- 
jeUc  defended  the  redoubt  of  Tschagar  against  the  Turks,  and  is  said  to  have  blown 
himself  into  the  air,  with  some  of  his  followers  and  many  Turks,  when  outnumbered. 
(Von  Kdllay,  Die  Geschichte  des  serbischen  Aufstandes.) 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  119 

"The  maintenance  of  union  with  our  brothers  near  and  far  across 
the  frontier,  and  our  other  friends  in  the  world,  is  one  of  the  chief 
tasks  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana.  In  using  the  word  'people'  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  means  our  whole  people,  not  only  those  in  Servia. 
It  hopes  that  the  work  done  by  it  in  Servia  will  spur  the  brothers  out- 
side Servia  to  take  a  more  energetic  share  in  the  work  of  private 
initiative,  so  that  the  new  present  day  movement  for  the  creation  of  a 
powerful  Servian  Narodna  Odbrana  will  go  forward  in  unison  in  all 
Servian  territories." 

The  thirteenth  chapter,  which  is  headed  "Two  Important  Tasks," 
proceeds  as  follows  :  — 

"As  we  take  up  the  standpoint  that  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  has  completely  brought  into  the  light  of  day  the 
pressure  against  our  countries  from  the  North,  the  Narodna  Odbrana 
proclaims  to  the  people  that  Austria  is  our  first  and  greatest  enemy." 
This  work  (that  is  to  say,  to  depict  Austria  to  the  Servian  people  as 
their  greatest  enemy)  is  regarded  by  the  Society,  according  to  the  fol- 
lowing expressions  of  opinion,  as  a  healthy  and  necessary  task,  in  fact, 
as  its  principal  obligation.     For  the  pamphlet  goes  on  as  follows  :  — 

"Just  as  once  the  Turks  attacked  us  from  the  south,  so  Austria 
attacks  us  to-day  from  the  north.  If  the  Narodna  Odbrana  preaches 
the  necessity  of  fighting  Austria,  she  preaches  a  sacred  truth  of  our 
national  position." 

The  hatred  against  Austria  brought  about  by  this  propaganda 
is,  of  course,  not  the  aim  but  the  natural  consequence  of  this  work, 
the  object  of  which  is  independence  and  freedom.  If  on  this  account 
hatred  of  Austria  germinates,  it  is  Austria  who  sows  it  by  her  advance, 
w^hich  conduct  "makes  obligatory  a  war  of  extermination  against 
Austria." 

After  some  praise  of  the  modern  conception  of  nationalism  the 
remark  is  made  that  in  speaking  of  "freedom  and  unity,"  too  much  is 
mere  talk.     The  people  must  be  told  that :  — 

"  For  the  sake  of  bread  and  room,  for  the  sake  of  the  fundamental 
essentials  of  culture  and  trade,  the  freeing  of  the  conquered  Servian 
territories  and  their  union  with  Servia  is  necessary  to  gentlemen, 
tradesmen,  and  peasants  alike."  Perceiving  this  the  people  will 
tackle  the  national  work  with  greater  self-sacrifice.  Our  people  must 
be  told  that  the  freedom  of  Bosnia  is  necessary  for  her,  not  only  out 
of  pity  for  the  brothers  suffering  there,  but  also  for  the  sake  of  trade 
and  the  connection  with  the  sea. 

The  "two  tasks"  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  are  then  again  brought 
together  in  the  following  concluding  sentence  :  — 

"  In  addition  to  the  task  of  explaining  to  the  people  the  danger 
threatening  it  from  Austria,  the  Narodna  Odbrana  has  the  important 
duty,  while  preserving  intact  the  sacred  national  memories,  of  giving 
to  the  people  this  new,  wholesome  and,  in  its  consequences,  mighty 
conception  of  nationalism  and  of  work  in  the  cause  of  freedom  and 
union." 

The  fourteenth  and  final  chapter  begins  with  an  appeal  to  the 


120  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Government  and  people  of  Servia  to  prepare  themselves  in  all  ways 
for  the  struggle  "which  the  annexation  has  foreshadowed." 

Hereon  the  activities  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  are  again  recapitu- 
lated in  the  following  sentences  :  — 

"  While  the  Narodna  Odbrana  works  in  conformity  with  the  times 
according  to  the  altered  conditions,  it  also  maintains  all  the  connec- 
tions made  at  the  time  of  the  annexation ;  to-day  therefore  it  is  the 
same  as  it  was  at  the  time  of  the  annexation.  To-day,  too,  it  is 
Odbrana  (defence) ;  to-day,  too,  Narodna  (of  the  people) ;  to-day, 
too,  it  gathers  under  its  standard  the  citizens  of  Servia  as  it  gathered 
them  at  the  time  of  the  annexation.  Then  the  crs^  was  for  war, 
now  the  cr>^  is  for  work.  Then  meetings,  demonstrations,  voluntary 
clubs,  {Komitees),  weapons  and  bombs  were  asked  for ;  to-day  steady, 
fanatical,  tireless  work  and  again  work  is  required  to  fulfil  the  tasks 
and  duties  to  which  we  have  drawn  attention  by  way  of  present 
preparation  for  the  fight  with  gun  and  cannon  which  will  come.'' 


The  pamphlet  and  the  atinual  report  contain  the  following  infor- 
mation as  to  the  organisation  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  :  — 

A  Central  Committee  at  Belgrade  directs  all  proceedings  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana.  All  other  committees  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana 
are  subject  to  this.  The  Central  Committee  is  divided  into  four 
sections  :  —  for  cultural  work,  for  bodily  training,  for  financial  policy, 
and  for  foreign  affairs. 

District  Committees,  with  their  centre  at  the  seat  of  the  offices 
of  the  District  Government,  conduct  the  affairs  of  the  Society  in  the 
corresponding  districts.  Every  District  Committee  divides  itself 
into  sections  for  culture  (the  President  being  the  Chairman  of  the  local 
branch  of  the  "Culture  League"),  for  bodily  training  (the  President 
being  a  local  member  of  the  Riflemen's,  Sokol,  Sportsmen's  and 
Horsemen's  clubs)  and  for  financial  affairs;  some  District  Com- 
mittees have  also  a  section  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Divisional  Committees  located  at  the  seat  of  the  local  authorities 
conduct  the  affairs  of  the  Society  in  the  various  divisions. 

Local  Committees  conduct  the  Society's  affairs  in  the  various  towns 
and  villages. 

Confidential  men  are  located  in  those  places  in  the  interior  of  the 
country  where  the  constitution  of  a  Committee  is  not  necessary. 

Societies  "which  work  in  close  connection  with  the  organisation 
of  the  Narodna  Odbrana"  and  are  supported  by  the  latter  in  every 
respect  are  the  following :  — 

The  Riflemen's  Association  with  762  societies,  the  Sokol  Association 
"Dusan  the  Strong"  with  2500  members,  the  Olympic  Club,  the 
Horsemen's  Society,  "  Prince  Michael,"  the  Sportsmen's  Association 
and  the  Culture  League. 

All  these  societies  are  organised  on  similar  lines  to  those  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  and  use  their  premises,  including  club  houses, 
libraries,  etc.  Distinguished  members  of  these  societies  are  chairmen 
of  sections  in  the  Committees  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana. 


July  25,  AmtrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  121 


APPENDIX  3 

Extract  from  the  "Report  on  the  Activities  of  the  Sokol 
Society  Dusan  the  Strong  in  Kragujevac  in  the  years 
1912-13."  (Kragujevac  Printing  Office  "  Buducnost "  Tm. 
Lekic  1914.) 

At  the  head  of  this  report  is  printed  the  speech  with  which  the 
President,  Major  Kovacevic  of  the  Servian  Army,  greeted  the  annual 
meeting  in  January,  1914. 

"It  is  known  to  you,"  the  President  began,  "that  SokoUsm,  which 
arose  in  the  struggle  against  Germanism,  is  a  purely  Slavonic  insti- 
tution, which  has  for  its  aim  to  unite  and  to  inspire  all  the  Slavonic 
brothers,  and  to  give  physical  and  intellectual  training  for  the  struggle 
against  the  enemy  of  Slavism. 

"We  Servians,  as  a  part  of  the  great  Slavonic  community,  have 
taken  up  the  Sokol  idea  and  have  agreed  to  the  common  work  for  our 
own  and  our  brothers'  welfare  and  happiness. 

"We  Serbians,  too,  will  live  and  work  in  the  spirit  of  the  Sokols, 
for  we  wish  to  revive  the  weary  and  the  feeble,  to  strengthen  the 
weak  and  the  troubled,  to  free  the  imprisoned  and  the  enchained. 
We  have  done  this  now  and  in  earlier  wars.  We  have  rescued  part 
of  our  brothers  from  the  insolence  of  the  enemy  in  the  South.  We 
have  struck  off  their  fetters,  we  have  rid  them  of  their  sufferings  and 
given  them  freedom,  so  that  they  enjoy  happiness,  equality  and 
brotherhood." 

After  giving  a  few  words  of  praise  to  this  "noble  work"  which 
"  realised  a  part  of  the  great  Sokol  idea,"  Major  Kovacevic  proceeded  : 

"Oh,  my  brothers  and  sisters,  our  enemy  in  the  North  is  more 
dangerous  and  pitiless,  because  he  is  stronger  in  respect  of  his  civilisa- 
tion and  his  economic  position. 

"  This  enemy  is  insatiable  in  his  lusts ;  he  holds  millions  of  our 
brothers  in  slavery  and  chains.  He  took  law  and  freedom  from  them 
and  subjected  them  all  to  his  service.  The  brothers  murmur,  call 
and  beg  for  still  quicker  help. 

"  We  must  not  leave  them  to  the  mercy  of  this  fearful  and  greedy 
enemy.  We  must  hurry  to  their  help  the  sooner  because  it  is  our 
duty  to  do  so.  Could  we  in  any  event  be  happy  when  so  many 
brothers  live  in  slavery,  suffer  and  murmur? 

"  Brothers  and  sisters  ! 

"The  enemy  is  dangerous,  greedy  and  troublesome.  Let  us  ever 
be  on  our  guard. 

"  Let  us  go  to  work  with  still  greater  willingness  and  self-sacrifice. 
Let  us  be  scrupulous  according  to  the  sacred  Sokol  obligation,  true 
and  enduring. 

"Let  us  prepare  ourselves  for  the  struggle  and  for  the  just  Sokol 
idea. 

"Let  us  unite  and  ally  ourselves  with  innumerable  Sokol  hosts, 
and  let  us  always  remember  that  truth  which  the  Servian  Sokols 


122  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

wrote  upon  their  flag  :  That  only  a  healthy,  powerful,  well-organised 
people,  conscious  of  its  nationality,  is  fit  to  defend  itself,  to  struggle, 
and  to  conquer." 

The  report  of  the  Committee  of  Management  follows  the  speech 
of  the  President.  After  a  description  of  the  successes  in  the  last 
wars,  which  interfered  with  the  activities  of  the  Society  for  two  years, 
it  is  stated  that  "the  day  arrived  when  we  returned  to  our  work, 
because  our  programme  w^as  not  yet  fulfilled,  because  our  task  was 
not  yet  ended.  A  great  part  of  our  people  still  endure  the  pains  of 
the  crucified  Christ ;  we  have  still  to  visit  our  brothers  beyond  the 
Drina ;  we  have  still  to  seek  out  the  town  of  Serajevo  and  the  inherit- 
ance of  St.  Sava ;  ^  we  must  behold  the  home  of  Marina  Novak,  of 
Deli  Radivoj  and  of  the  old  Vujadin ;  we  must  cross  the  mountains 
of  Romanaija  and  see  why  Travnik  is  veiled  in  mist.  That  song  must 
end  at  last :  ^  Ah  !  Bosnia,  thou  orphan  child  before  God,  hast  thou 
nowhere  people  of  thy  race.  .  .  .'" 

After  a  discussion  of  various  undertakings  of  the  Society,  emphasis 
is  laid  on  the  fact  that  the  Society  maintains  relations  with  the  brother 
societies  beyond  the  Save  and  the  Drina,  and  special  emphasis  is  laid 
on  the  dispatch  of  delegates  to  the  Jubilee  of  the  Prosvjeta  held  in 
Serajevo.  On  this  the  report  remarks  :  "  By  sending  representatives 
to  the  brothers  in  Bosnia  the  Committee  intended  to  say  to  them  — 
we  have  not  forgotten  you,  the  wings  of  the  falcon  of  Sumadija  are 
still  mighty."  After  a  detailed  description  of  a  visit  of  the  Agram 
students  to  Servia  ^  and  of  the  dedication  of  the  flag  of  "  the  Young 
People's  Temperance  Association,"  the  report  of  the  executive  con- 
cludes with  the  following  sentences  :  — 

"  These  manifestations  —  the  coming  of  the  brother  Croats  to 
Sumadija  and  the  meeting  of  the  '  temperate  youth '  from  all  Servian 
regions  are  correctly  appreciated  by  our  leaders,  and  one  would  not 
exaggerate  if  one  said  that  these  events  indicate  the  beginning  and 
the  germ  of  a  great  deed  to  be  done  in  the  near  future. 

"They  are  the  expression  of  a  great  and,  till  now,  silent  awakening 
of  the  national  consciousness  and  of  the  strength  of  an  oppressed 
nation  which  is  not  allowed  to  arise  and  unite.  In  a  little  time  this 
germ  will  ripen,  and  when  the  soul  of  the  people  arises  still  more, 
there  will  be  no  barrier  which  it  cannot  break,  and  no  obstacle  which 
it  cannot  tear  down  upon  its  way.  The  work  of  strengthening  this 
power,  the  assistance  and  acceleration  of  the  progress  of  this  national 
development,  the  preparation  and  the  support  of  this  idea,  was 
always  the  aim  of  the  actions  of  our  leaders." 

The  treasurer's  report  enumerates  first  of  all  those  who. have 
supported  the  society.     In  addition  to  a  number  of  members  of  the 

1  St.  Sava  (ob.  1236)  is  the  patron  saint  of  the  Serbians.  Herzegovina  is  the  name 
of  Ducatus  Santi  Save.  The  "inheritance  of  St.  Sava"  is,  therefore,  equivalent  in 
meaning  to  "Herzegovina." 

2  This  visit  of  the  Agram  students  (April,  1912)  to  Belgrade,  Nish,  Semendria,  etc., 
was  used  in  Serbia  as  the  pretext  for  a  great  demonstration  of  hostility  to  the  Mon- 
archy. The  excursionists  were  accorded  military  honours,  and  lunches  and  balls 
took  place  in  the  Military  Academy  and  the  Ofl&cers'  Club.  In  Nish,  indeed,  a  military 
parade  was  held  in  honour  of  the  visitors. 


July  25,  Aitstro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  123 

ivragujevac  District  Committee,  the  following  are  mentioned  and 
thanked : — 

The  District  Committee  of  the  "  Narodna  Odbrana  "  at  Kragujevac, 
particularly  its  "Ritter'*  section,  which  often  assisted  the  Sokol 
Society  with  substantial  support ;  the  Headmaster  of  the  Gymnasium 
at  Kragujevac,  who  "always  showed  his  fatherly  care"  to  the  Sokols ; 
the  Divisional  Commandant  of  Sumadija,  who  had  substantially 
supported  the  society ;  the  President  of  the  District  Court  at  Kragu- 
jevac; the  District  Chairman  and  the  Parish  Chairman  at  Kragu- 
jevac. 

After  referring  to  the  members  of  the  society  who  have  fallen 
in  war,  the  treasurer  closes  his  report  with  the  following  words  :  — 

"After  so  brilliant  a  victory  over  a  portion  of  our  enemies,  those 
who  control  our  society  hope  that  you  all,  from  now  onwards,  >  will 
devote  yourselves  still  more,  more  unitedly  and  more  entirely,  to 
the  activities  of  Sokolism  so  that  you  may  rear  falcons  in  our  falcon's 
eyrie,  who  at  the  given  moment,  will  one  day  be  ready  to  fly  aloft, 
and  in  their  mighty  flight  bring  freedom,  love  and  brotherhood  to  all 
our  brothers  who  are  not  yet  free." 

The  annual  report  is  signed  by  Major  M.  J.  Kovacevic,  President, 
by  the  secretary  of  the  Law  Courts,  D.  V.  Brzakovic,  as  secretary,  and 
by  ten  members  of  the  executive,  among  whom  are  included  two 
professors  (Emil  Lukic  and  Milan  Jankovic),  as  well  as  a  further 
officer  (Major  of  Infantry,  Michael  Vasic). 

It  is  clear  from  this  annual  report,  and  from  a  schedule  also  signed 
by  Major  M.  J.  Kovacevic  and  Brzakovic,  Secretary  of  the  Law 
Courts,  and  sent  to  the  Kragujevac  Sokol  Society  by  the  "Srpski 
Soko"  in  Tuzla  for  completion,  that  the  Sokol  Societies  in  Servia 
stand  in  close  relation  with  various  similar  societies  in  the  Monarchy 
to  an  extent  not  hitherto  known. 


APPENDIX  4 

The  Servian  Official  Gazette  in  the  service  of  the  Narodna 

Odbrana 

An  appeal  by  the  Narodna  Odbrana  appears  as  a  supplement 
to  the  Servian  Official  Gazette,  Srpski  Novine,  of  28th  June,  1914 
(new  style),  and  w^as  supplied  to  all  subscribers  to  the  paper. 

The  following  passages  occur  in  this  appeal :  — 

"Brothers  and  sisters  !  Kossovo  was  only  partly  avenged,  the  day 
of  St.  Vitus  (Vidovdan)  was  only  partly  expiated.  Just  as  far  as  the 
territories  reach  where  our  people's  speech  is  heard  —  the  Servian, 
Croatian,  and  Slovenian  —  from  Kikinda  to  Monastir,  from  Trieste  to 
Carevo-Solo,  just  as  far  and  wide  does  the  meaning  of  St.  Vitus'  Day 
and  of  Kossovo  extend.  So  many  souls  of  our  race  weep  on  this  terri- 
tory ;  so  many  fetters  of  our  brothers  clank ;  so  much  work  is  yet 
to  be  done ;  so  much  have  we  still  to  sacrifice.     St.  Vitus'  Day  could 


124  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

formerly  mean  a  day  of  mourning  for  us,  but  to-day,  when  we  have 
already  gone  so  far  in  the  new  history  of  the  people ;  when  behind 
us  stand  great  and  glorious  national  events,  and  before  us  still  greater 
and  more  glorious  events  await  us;  to-day  when  we  stand  in  the 
midst  of  the  creation  of  a  great  national  State;  to-day  St.  Vitus' 
Day  must  be  for  us  a  day  of  great  joy  and  pride,  because  of  that 
which  has  happened,  and  sprung  from  it,  and  still  more  because  of 
that  which  will  come.  Men  and  women  of  Servia  !  Millions  of  our 
brothers,  Slovenes,  Croats,  and  Servians  beyond  our  frontiers,  look 
to-day  to  us,  the  Children  of  the  Kingdom,  and  joy  and  hope  fill  their 
breast  as  they  now  behold  to-day's  majestic  manifestations  for  the 
national  cause.  God  helps  the  brave  !  Forward  all !  That  part  of 
our  sacred  task  which  is  as  yet  unrealised  calls  us.  Belgrade,  St. 
Vitus'  Day,  1914." 


APPENDIX  5 

Deposition  of  Trifko  Krstanovic,  concerning  the  Narodna 

Odbrana 

The  baker's  assistant,  Trifko  Krstanovic,  of  Zavadonici,  was 
arrested  by  a  gendarmerie  patrol  on  the  night  of  the  6th-7th  July, 
1914,  because  he  had  been  heard  to  remark  shortly  after  the  mur- 
derous attack  on  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  that  this  attack 
was  to  be  expected  and  because  this  remark  brought  him  under  sus- 
picion of  having  had  knowledge  of  the  plot. 

He  was,  on  this  account,  brought  up  before  the  District  Court  at 
Serajevo.  The  examination  of  the  prisoner  revealed  that  his  remark 
did  not  justify  the  suspicion  which  had  arisen  against  him,  since  it, 
founded  entirely  on  his  earlier  knowledge  of  the  activities  of  the 
Narodna,  was  merely  the  expression  of  his  conviction  that,  on 
account  of  the  agitation  developing  in  Servia  against  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  especially  against  the  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand,  a  deed  of  that  kind  was  to  be  expected.  In  the  absence 
of  any  material  facts  in  support  of  the  charge,  the  proceedings  against 
Krstanovic  were  accordingly  withdrawn,  and,  having  regard  to  his 
knowledge  of  the  activities  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  which  had  an 
important  bearing  on  the  inquiry,  he  was  subpoenaed  as  a  witness. 

An  extract  from  his  depositions  taken  on  the  19th  July,  1914, 
which  is  relevant  to  the  matters  here  in  question,  is  as  follows :  — 

"  In  the  autumn  of  the  year  1 908,  I  crossed  the  frontier  to  Servia 
on  the  Mokra  Gora,  near  Visegrad,  to  seek  work.  I  first  came  to 
Bagina  Basta  in  the  district  of  Uzice,  and  as  I  found  no  work  there, 
I  went  to  Belgrade,  where  I  arrived  just  at  the  time  when  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  announced.  As  I  saw  that  the 
annexation  had  caused  great  popular  commotion  and  excitement, 
and  that  I  should  not  be  able  to  find  any  work,  I  went  to  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Consulate  and  tried  to  get  myself  sent  home.    There  I  was 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  125 

told  to  come  back  in  the  afternoon,  and  that  I  should  then  be  sent 
home.  However,  as  I  came  out  of  the  Consulate,  a  gendarme 
seized  me  on  the  street,  and  asked  me  where  I  came  from ;  under  the 
impression  that  I  was  a  spy,  he  conducted  me  to  a  tower  (Karaula). 
Here  I  was  questioned,  and  when  I  said  to  them  that  I  wanted  to  go 
home,  a  non-commissioned  officer  began  to  abuse  me :  Why  should 
I  now  want  to  go  out  of  Servia  which  now  needed  more  people  because 
a  war  with  Austria  would  come  ?  When  I  said  to  him  that  I  had 
nothing  to  live  on,  he  answered  me  that  I  would  find  full  maintenance 
if  I  would  register  myself  in  the  Komitee.  In  my  need  I  agreed,  and 
a  gendarme  took  me  to  the  inn  'Zelenom  Vijencu'  ('The  Green 
Wreath'),  and  introduced  me  there  to  Voja  Tankosic,  the  leader 
of  the  Komitee  and  a  captain  in  the  regular  army.  Here,  at  the 
'Green  W>eath'  I  was  provided  with  food  and  lodging,  and,  as  I  saw, 
other  members  of  the  Komitee  lived  here.  Voja  Tankosic  told  me 
that  the  business  of  the  Komitee  was  to  learn  bomb-throwing, 
the  destruction  of  bridges,  tunnels,  telegraphs  and  railways,  because  a 
war  between  Servia  and  iVustria  could  easily  arise.  On  this  a  man 
took  me  to  a  small  building  belonging  to  the  Royal  Demesne  next  to 
the  Treasury,  where  the  offices  of  the  Komitee  were  situated,  and  in 
the  office  I  met  Milan  Pribicevic,  who  enrolled  me  in  the  Komitee. 
At  this  enrolment,  Milan  Pribicevic  asked  me  whether  Voja  Tankosic 
had  told  me  the  obligations  which  I  had  as  a  member  of  the  Komitee. 
To  this  I  answered  'Yes.'  He  said  that  those  enrolled  must  be 
efficient,  strong,  and  self-sacrificing.  "  There  were  then  about  70  of 
us  enrolled.  In  Belgrade  we  did  nothing.  After  about  six  weeks 
our  leader  Tankosic  informed  us  that  the  Great  Powers  had  pro- 
hibited our  Komitee,  and  that  we  must  leave  Belgrade  and  hide 
ourselves  somewhere  in  an  out-of-the-way  place  not  visited  by  for- 
eigners. In  this  way  they  sent  us  to  the  town  of  Cuprija.  Here 
we  were  drilled  by  the  officers,  Voja  Tankosic,  Dusan  Putnik,  Zivko 
Gvosdic  and  Mitar  Djinovic,  who  was  involved  in  the  Montenegrin 
bomb  outrage,  and  was  shot  in  Montenegro.  In  order  that  no 
one  should  become  aware  of  our  objects,  or  know  anything  of  our 
numbers,  we  were  forbidden  to  have  intercourse  with  outsiders. 
We  practised  the  throwing  of  bombs,  the  construction  of  mines,  and 
the  destruction  of  telegraphs,  railways,  tunnels  and  bridges.  Every 
fortnight  we  were  visited  by  Milan  Pribicevic,  General  Bozo  Jankovic, 
the  pharmacist  Skaric,  the  deputy  Zivko  Rafajlovic,  and  a  certain 
Glisic  Milutin,  a  Treasury  official,  who  watched  our  drill  and  paid 
for  our  board  on  each  occasion.  Our  instructors  told  us  that,  when 
war  was  declared,  we  Komitees  would  go  in  advance,  then  the  volun- 
teers, and  then  the  regular  army.  There  were  about  140  men  at 
Cuprija.  Besides  board,  we  had  lodging  and  clothes  and  25  para  a 
day  for  tobacco.  The  school  lasted  about  three  months,  that  is  until 
March,  1909.  Then  the  members  of  the  committee  told  us  that 
we  were  dismissed,  that  we  could  all  go  wherever  we  wished,  for 
the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  had  been  recognised  by  the 
Great  Powers,  and  that  our  Komitee  had  become  useless.     On  the 


126  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

dissolution  of  the  Komitee  General  Bozo  Jankovic  told  me  to  enter 
the  service  of  Bozo  Milanovic  at  Sabac,  where  I  should  receive  wages 
of  50  dinar  a  month.  He  did  not  tell  me  what  the  nature  of  the  service 
would  be.  I  accepted  because,  as  a  member  of  the  Komitee,  I  re- 
garded myself  as  bound  to  obey  General  Jankovic,  and  also  because 
I  had  nothing  to  live  on,  and  had  to  earn  my  livelihood.  In  this 
way  I  came  to  Sabac  in  March,  1909,  and  reported  myself  to  Bozo 
Milanovic,  a  tradesman  of  Sabac.  General  Jankovic  had  told  me  that 
Bozo  jNIilanovic  was  chairman  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  in  Sabac,  and 
that  I  should  assist  him  in  connection  with  this  Narodna  Odbrana. 
When  I  had  given  Bozo  Milanovic  the  General's  letter  and  he  had  read 
it,  he  told  me>  that  I  must  serve  him  faithfully  and  carry  out  his 
orders.  My  chief  duty  would  be  to  carry  his  letters  wheresoever 
they  were  addressed.  It  would  cost  me  my  life  if  I  failed  to  carry  a 
letter  to  its  destination,  and  if  any  one  else  got  hold  of  it.  On  the  next 
day.  Bozo  Milanovic  gave  me  a  closed  letter  which  I  was  to  take  to 
Cedo  Lukic,  Superintendent  of  Excise  at  Serbisch-Rac^a.  On  the  road 
to  RaCa,  at  the  village  of  Bogatic,  the  District  Captain  stopped  me, 
took  the  letter  from  me  opened  it  and  read  it.  In  the  letter  it  said 
that  Lukic  should  immediately  buy  three  boats  so  that  they  should 
be  ready  if  they  were  required.  100  dinar  were  enclosed  in  the  letter. 
On  this  occasion  the  Captain  told  me  that  the  Ministry  had  given 
strict  orders  that  the  Komitadji  were  to  do  nothing  without  orders, 
so  that  international  diplomatic  intervention  should  not  be  provoked. 
I  returned  to  Sabac  and  told  Bozo  INIilanovic  what  had  happened  to 
me.  Bozo  Milanovic  applied  to  the  District  Prefect,  who  gave 
orders  that  the  revolver,  which  the  Captain  at  Bogatic  had  taken 
from  me,  should  be  returned.  He  also  gave  orders  that  the  Captain 
should  send  the  letter  to  Cedo  Lukic  to  whom  it  was  addressed.  I 
carried  letters  of  this  sort  from  March,  1909,  until  October,  1910, 
and  in  that  time  I  took  43  letters  to  Serbisch-RaCa,  55  to  Loznica, 
5  to  Zvornik,  2  to  Ljubivija,  and  I  don't  know  how  many  to  Kovil- 
jaca.  I  noticed  how  often  I  was  in  each  place  because  these  places 
are  a  very  long  way  from  Sabac.  I  took  the  letters  to  the  chiefs  of 
the  Customs  houses  in  the  various  places,  and  from  them  I  received 
letters  in  reply  and  took  them  to  Bozo  Milanovic.  I  recollect  that 
on  a  few  occasions  I  took  letters  to  Sepacka  Ada.  My  assistant  in 
letter  carrying  was  one  Vaso  Eric,  a  native  of  Srebrenica.  Every 
week  I  took  letters  from  Bozo  Milanovic  to  Belgrade,  and  delivered 
them  to  Milan  Pribicevic  and  Bozo  Jankovic.  I  knew  nothing  of 
the  contents  of  these  letters,  and  no  one  told  me  anything  about  them. 
So  far  as  I  could  see,  the  letters  despatched  by  Bozo  Milanovic  were 
not  in  cipher,  but  the  letters  sent  by  the  chiefs  of  the  Customs  houses 
were  written  in  special  characters,  a  fact  which  I  observed  when 
Bozo  Milanovic  opened  them.  Once  I  brought  one  of  these  cipher 
letters  to  Bozo  Milanovic,  I  think  it  was  from  Zvornik,  and  he  sent 
me  with  the  letter  to  Mika  Atanasijevic,  Professor  at  Sabac,  to  de- 
cipher. He  did  this,  as  he  usually  did ;  but  perhaps  he  forgot  to 
close  the  letter,  so  that  I  could  read  it.     The  letter  stated,  that  it 


July  25 y  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  127 

was  reported  from  a  reliable  source,  that  money  was  to  be  stamped 
with  the  likeness  of  the  heir  to  the  throne,  and  this  was  an  indication 
that  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  was  about  to  abdicate.  After  about 
eight  months  of  my  service  with  Bozo  Milanovic,  Bozo  gave  me  his 
visiting  card  with  a  death's  head  drawn  upon  it ;  on  it  was  written 
that  I  was  designated  an  initiate  (povjerenik)  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana. 
On  this  occasion  he  told  me,  that  the  business  was  spying.  .  .  . 

"On  one  occasion,  I  learnt  from  the  officer  Dusan  Opterkic, 
member  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  that  the  Narodna  Odbrana  had 
23  branches  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Beyond  this,  I  do  not  know 
what  organisation,  if  any,  the  Narodna  Odbrana  has  in  Bosnia. 
From  time  to  time,  Milan  Pribicevic  gave  me  a  revolver,  or  money 
for  the  purchase  of  a  revolver,  for  me  to  give  to  the  Customs  officers 
on  the  frontier  who  served  as  Komitadjis  who  had  no  revolver  nor 
any  money  to  buy  a  revolver  themselves.  It  appeared  to  me  that 
Milan  Pribicevic  gave  them  these  things  as  an  honour,  just  because 
they  were  Komitadjis.     I  had  nothing  else  to  do  with  arms. 

"On  one  occasion,  during  my  service  with  Bozo  Milanovic,  I  was 
ordered  to  accompany  a  man  to  a  peasant  in  Lijasnica  on  the  Drina, 
who  would  give  us  all  necessary  information  and  show  us  everything, 
so  that  we  two  could  kill  Ljubo  Stanaricic,  a  Servian  officer  of  Reserve, 
who  had  fled  to  Bijeljina.  For  the  Committee  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana  had  learnt  that  Ljubo  Stanaricic  was  dangerous  to  the 
Servian  State,  and  had  resolved  that  he  should  be  put  to  death. 

"That  man  and  I  received  instructions  from  Bozo  Milanovic  to 
go  to  a  certain  place  across  the  Drina,  and  to  kill  Ljubo  Stanaricic, 
who  lives  just  on  the  bank  of  the  Drina  on  the  Bosnian  side  in  the 
district  of  Bijeljin.  I  and  that  man  had  descended  into  the  Drina, 
but  because  the  water  was  deep,  and  we  saw  that  Ljubo  was  walking 
round  his  house  with  a  gun  on  his  shoulder,  we  returned  to  that 
peasant's  house.  As  I  saw  that  Ave  could  not  kill  him  with  the  knife, 
I  sent  that  man  to  Sabac  to  tell  Bozo  Milanovic  that  it  was  not  pos- 
sible to  kill  Stanaricic  in  the  manner  he  desired,  namely,  with  the 
knife.  On  this,  I  received  orders  from  Bozo  Milanovic  that  we  should 
kill  him  in  any  case.  We  then  determined  to  shoot  him  with  a  gun. 
According  to  Bozo's  instructions,  the  man  who  was  with  me  was 
to  shoot  and  kill  him,  and  I  was  to  confirm  whether  these  instructions 
were  carried  out.  In  the  meantime,  however,  a  mounted  gendarme 
brought  us  instructions  from  the  District  Prefect  of  Sabac  that  we 
were  to  return,  and  to  abandon  the  original  project.  And  so  we 
returned  to  Sabac. 

"In  October,  1910,  I  demanded  an  increase  of  pay  from  Bozo 
Milanovic,  and,  on  his  refusal,  I  left  his  service.  From  Sabac  I  went 
to  Belgrade,  where  I  met  General  Jankovic,  and  he  had  me  arrested 
for  refusing  obedience.  They  took  me  through  various  prisons  for 
about  two  months,  and  all  because  I  had  refused  to  obey  them,  and 
they  feared  I  would  betray  their  secrets.  Finally,  the  authorities 
decided  to  send  me  to  Bosnia.  In  Sabac  a  prisoner  told  me  that  my 
life  was  at  stake.     The  gendarmes  accompanied  me  to  Zvornik,  where 


128  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

they  handed  me  over  to  the  Bosnian  gendarmes.  In  this  way  I  came 
to  Bosnia  in  December^  1910. 

"I  know  nothing  of  any  'Black  Hand/  with  the  exception  of 
w^hat  I  have  read  of  it  in  Servian  newspapers.  I  can't  remember  now 
w^hat  was  written  in  the  newspapers  about  the  'Black  Hand.'  Nor 
do  I  know  anything  of  the  'Black  List.'  After  the  annexation  there 
prevailed  in  Servia  universal  anger  and  hatred  against  the  person 
of  the  Heir  to  the  Austrian  Throne,  who  was  regarded  as  the  sworn 
enemy  of  the  Servians." 

Beyond  this,  Krstanovic  referred  to  his  earlier  statements,  of  which 
only  the  following  are  of  interest  as  supplementing  the  foregoing 
testimony. 

The  Komitee  into  which  Milan  Pribicevic  introduced  Krstanovic 
was  set  up  by  the  Narodna  Odbrana.  In  the  school  at  Cuprija  there 
were  20  to  22  Austrian  subjects.  Milan  Ciganovic  was  also  one  of 
the  pupils. 

In  the  school  at  Cuprija  it  was  inculcated  that  the  Komitee  must 
be  ready  to  proceed  to  Bosnia,  on  the  command  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana,  and  there  act  according  to  the  orders  of  their  commanders. 


APPENDIX  6 

Extract  from  the  Proceedings  of  the  District  Court  of 
Serajevo  in  the  Prosecution  of  Jovo  Jaglicic  and  others 
FOR  Espionage. 

In  the  year  1913,  it  was  discovered  that  Jovo  Jaglicic  and  several 
accomplices  were  carrying  on  espionage  in  Bosnia  in  the  interests  of 
Servia.  The  criminal  proceedings  instituted  in  the  matter  afforded 
inter  alia  opportunities  for  obtaining  an  insight  into  the  methods  of 
the  Great-Servian  propaganda,  and  more  especially  of  the  Narodna 
Odbrana. 

Jovo  Jaglicic  made  a  statement  that  in  the  month  of  August  or 
September,  1912,  he  for  the  first  time  met  Petar  Klaric,  known  as 
Pesut,  formerly  a  cattle  inspector  in  Foca,  who  had  fled  to  Monte- 
negro in  1912  and  then  became  a  Komitadji. 

At  their  first  meeting  Klaric  asked  Jaglicic  whether  he  knew  Rade 
Milosevic  of  Kalinovik,  and,  on  his  answering,  said  that  Milosevic  was 
lying  very  ill  in  hospital :  "  It  would  be  a  pity  if  he  were  to  die ;  we 
have  spoken  of  great  matters ;  has  he  never  said  anything  to  you  about 
them?"  On  receiving  a  negative  answer  Klaric  went  on:  "I  had 
something  important  to  tell  you ;  we  are  Servians,  and  must  do  some- 
thing important  for  Servia.  Come  to  my  office."  There  the  follow- 
ing conversation  ensued  between  them  :  — 

"Jovan,  I  will  tell  you  something;  I  don't  know  you  yet  and 
whether  you  will  betray  me.  I  tell  you,  nevertheless,  and  if  you  have 
the  heart,  betray  me  I" 


July  25,  AustrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  129 

On  Jaglicic  asking  him  what  it  was  all  about,  Klaric  answered, 
"Brother,  in  Servia  there  is  a  society  called  the  'Narodna  Odbrana/ 
Many  people  must  join  this  society ;  many  have  been  enrolled  already 
in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as  well  as  in  the  whole  Monarchy ;  among 
them  are  people  of  intelligence  and  means,  long-headed  people,  and  if 
they  can  do  it  why  should  we  not  do  it  too,  so  that  we  too  may  help 
a  bit." 

To  the  question,  what  was  the  object  of  this  society,  Klaric  an- 
swered :  — 

"The  Society  has  this  object :  for  instance,  you  are  in  Kalinovik; 
you  let  me  know  what  the  news  is  there,  how  many  soldiers,  how  many 
guns,  how  much  ammunition,  different  arms,  who  comes,  who  leaves, 
and  so  on.  We  have  a  secret  writing,  'cipher,'  and  use  it  for  corre- 
spondence.    If  you  are  loyal,  you  will  get  it  too." 

Jaglicic  was  frightened  that  Klaric  was  merely  sounding  him  for 
the  purpose  of  denouncing  him,  and  therefore  asked  him  to  tell  him 
the  names  of  some  of  the  members,  on  which  Klaric  reflected  for  some 
time  and  then  told  him  a  name,  which  gave  him  confidence. 

Hereon  Klaric  said  to  him:  "Shall  I  give  you  the  'cipher'?" 
Jaglicic  agreed.  Klaric,  who  knew  the  cipher  by  heart,  wrote  it  out 
on  a  slip  and  gave  it  to  Jaglicic. 

On  another  occasion  Klaric  gave  an  account  of  his  stay  at  Banja- 
Koviljaca  (near  Loznica)  where  he  was  instructed  by  the  Servian 
captain  Todorovic  ^  in  bomb-throwing,  and  when  asked  by  the  accused 
why  he  learnt  this  he  answered  :  "  If  anything  such  as  I  have  spoken  of 
to  you  comes  to  pass,  it  is  necessary  that  I  should  know  how  to  handle 
bombs,  and  that  I  should  teach  you  and  you  should  teach  others,  so 
that  powder  magazines  and  other  important  objects  should  be  blown 
up,  for  in  that  case  we  should  receive  bombs  from  Servia." 

Klaric  then  described  the  appearance  of  the  bombs,  and  said  that 
he  had  already  enrolled  people  w^ho,  in  case  of  war,  would  cut  telegraph 
and  telephone  wires. 

At  these  meetings  Jaglicic  learnt  from  Klaric  that  it  also  apper- 
tained to  the  duties  of  members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  to  induce 
Austro-Hungarian  soldiers  to  desert,  to  enlist  volunteers  (Komitadjis), 
to  organise  bands,  to  blow  up  objects  and  depots,  and  so  on.  Klaric 
also  informed  him  that  even  cipher  correspondence  between  Bos- 
nian and  Servian  members  would  not  be  entrusted  to  the  post,  but 
despatched  across  the  frontier  by  reliable  messengers. 

Klaric  further  told  Jaglicic  that  on  the  occasion  of  the  Prosvjeta 
celebration  (in  September,  1912)  a  Servian  major  had  stayed  in  the 
Hotel  "Europe"  with  the  Servian  deputation  which  was  sent  to  it,^ 
that  Klaric  had  taken  members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  to  him,  and 
that  he  had  sworn  them  in. 

From  a  spy  Jadlicic  learnt  that  bombs  would  arrive  in  Serajevo, 
or  had  already  arrived,  that  these  had  the  appearance  of  pieces  of 

1  Captain  Kosta  Todorovic  was  then  in  fact  Boundary  Commissioner  and  Director 
of  the  Serbian  Intelligence  Service  for  the  frontier  line  from  Raca  to  Ljuboija. 

2  The  Serbian  major,  Mika  Jankovic,  appeared  as  a  delegate  at  the  Prosvjeta  cele- 
bration. 


130  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

soap/  and  that  two  or  three  would  either  be  sent  to  this  spy  or  that 
he  would  fetch  them. 


APPENDIX  7 
From  Confidential  Reports  on  the  Narodna  Orbrana 

The  control  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  is  in  the  hands  of  representa- 
tives of  all  parties  so  as  to  win  over  both  the  progressives  and  those 
who  are  hostile  to  the  conspirators.  Its  actual  guiding  spirit  is 
Pribicevic,  now  Major.  The  position  of  secretary  is  always  filled  by 
an  officer  on  leave. 

The  object  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  is  to  develop  effective  prop- 
aganda in  military  and  civilian  circles  in  the  Southern-Slav  portions 
of  Austria-Hungary,  with  the  object  of  preparing  for  a  revolution, 
interference  with  any  mobilisation  that  may  take  place,  and  the  initia- 
tion of  panics,  revolts,  etc. 

The  organisation  has  many  trusted  representatives  and  emissaries 
in  the  Monarchy,  who  carry  on  an  unostentatious  personal  propa- 
ganda. Some  are  sent  specially  —  to  enlist  a  few  men  —  preferably 
railway  officials  —  in  the  neighbourhood  of  important  bridges,  junc- 
tions, etc.,  whose  duty  it  is  at  the  appropriate  moment  to  carry  out 
the  directions  they  have  received,  or  to  get  them  carried  out. 

Intercourse  between  the  members  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  is, 
So  far  as  possible,  effected  by  keeping  in  personal  touch  with  each 
other. 

Young  people,  workmen  and  railwaymen  chiefly  are  enrolled  as 
members. 


APPENDIX  8 

Extract  from  the  Records  of  the  District  Court  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  at  Serajevo,  touching  the  proceedings 

THERE  instituted  AGAINST  GaVRILO  PrINCIP  AND  CONFEDERATES 
ON  ACCOUNT  OF  THE  CRIME  OF  ASSASSINATION  PERPETRATED  ON 

THE  28th  June,  1914,  on  His  Imperial  and  Royal  Highness 
THE  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  of  Austria-Este  ^  and 
Her  Highness  the  Duchess  Sophie  of  Hohenberg. 

I.    The  deed  and  the  perpetrators 

Gavrilo  Princip,  Nedeljko  Cabrinovic,  Trifko  Grabez,  Vaso  Cubri- 
lovic  and  Cetres  Popovic  confess  that  in  common  with  the  fugitive 
Mehemed  Mehmedbasic  they  contrived  a  plot  for  the  murder  of  the 

1  The  bombs  used  in  the  Serajevo  attack  on  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  as 
well  as  those  found  in  the  Save,  near  Brcko,  in  the  year  1913,  which  came  from  the 
Royal  Serbian  Arsenal  at  Kragujevac,  can  in  fact  be  compared  with  pieces  of  soap. 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  131 

Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and,  armed  with  bombs  and  in  the  ease 
of  some  of  them  with  Browning  pistols,  laid  wait  for  him  on  the 
28th  June,  1914,  on  his  progress  through  Serajevo  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying  out  the  planned  attack. 

Nedeljko  Cabrinovic  confesses  that  he  was  the  first  of  the  con- 
spirators to  hurl  a  bomb  against  the  Archduke's  carriage,  which 
missed  its  mark  and  which  on  exploding  injured  only  the  occupants 
of  the  carriage  following  the  Archducal  motor  car. 

Gavrilo  Princip  confesses  that  he  fired  two  shots  from  a  Browning 
pistol  against  the  Archducal  motor  car,  by  which  the  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand  and  the  Duchess  Sophie  of  Hohenberg  received 
fatal  wounds. 

Both  perpetrators  confess  that  the  act  was  done  with  intent  to 
murder. 

These  confessions  have  been  fully  verified  by  means  of  the  inves- 
tigations which  have  taken  place,  and  it  is  established  that  the 
deceased  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  the  deceased  Duchess 
Sophie  of  Hohenberg  died  as  a  result  of  the  revolver  shots  fired  at 
them  by  Gavrilo  Princip. 

II.   Origin  of  the  plot 

The  accused  have  made  the  following  declarations,  which  are 
essentially  consistent,  before  the  examining  magistrate :  — 

In  April,  1914,  Princip,  during  his  stay  at  Belgrade,  where  he 
associated  with  a  number  of  Servian  students  in  the  cafes  of  the  town, 
conceived  the  plan  for  the  execution  of  an  attempt  on  the  life  of 
the  late  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand.  He  communicated  this  in- 
tention to  his  acquaintance  Cabrinovic,  who  also  was  in  Belgrade 
at  the  time.  The  latter  had  already  conceived  a  similar  idea  and  was 
ready  at  once  to  participate  in  the  attempt.  The  execution  of  an 
attempt  on  the  Archduke's  life  was  a^  frequent  topic  of  conversation 
in  the  circle  in  which  Princip  and  Cabrinovic  moved,  because  the 
Archduke  was  considered  to  be  a  dangerous  enemy  of  the  Servian 
people. 

Princip  and  Cabrinovic  desired  at  first  to  procure  the  bombs  and 
weapons  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the  deed  from  the  Servian 
Major  Milan  Pribicevic  or  from  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  as  they  them- 
selves did  not  possess  the  means  for  their  purchase.  As,  however. 
Major  Pribicevic  and  the  authoritative  member  of  the  said  association, 
Zivojin  Dacic,  were  absent  from  Belgrade  at  that  time,  they  decided 
to  try  to  obtain  the  weapons  from  their  acquaintance  Milan  Ciganovic, 
who  had  formerly  been  a  Komitadji  and  was  at  that  time  in  the 
employment  of  the  State  railways. 

^  Princip,  through  the  instrumentality  of  an  intimate  friend  of 
Ciganovic,  now  got  into  communication  with  the  latter.  Thereupon 
Ciganovic  called  on  Princip  and  discussed  the  planned  attempt  with 
him.  He  entirely  approved  it,  and  thereupon  declared  that  he  would 
like  to  consider  further  whether  he  should  provide  the  weapons  for 


132  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  attempt.     Cabrinovic  also  talked  with  Ciganovic  on  the  subject 
of  the  weapons. 

At  Easter  Princip  took  Trifko  Grabez,  who  also  was  in  Belgrade, 
into  his  confidence.     The  latter  is  also  shown  by  his  own  confession 
to  have  declared  himself  ready  to  take  part  in  the  attempt. 
^  In  the  following  weeks  Princip  had  repeated  conversations  with 
Ciganovic  about  the  execution  of  the  attempt. 

Meanwhile  Ciganovic  had  reached  an  understanding  on  the  subject 
of  the  planned  attack  with  the  Servian  Major  Voja  Tankosic,  who  was 
a  close  friend  of  his  and  who  then  placed  at  his  disposal  for  this  object 
the  Browning  pistols. 

Grabez  confesses  in  conformity  with  the  depositions  of  Princip 
and  Cabrinovic  that  on  the  24th  May  he,  accompanied  by  Ciganovic, 
visited  Major  Tankosic  at  the  latter's  request  at  his  rooms.  He  says 
that  after  he  had  been  introduced  Tankosic  said  to  him :  "  Are  you 
the  man?  Are  you  determined?"  Whereupon  Grabez  answered: 
"  I  am."  Tankosic  next  asked  :  "  Do  you  know  how  to  shoot  with  a 
revolver  J"  and  when  Grabez  answered  in  the  negative  Tankosic 
said  to  Ciganovic :  "  I  will  give  you  a  revolver ;  go  and  teach  them 
how  to  shoot  .J' 

Hereupon  Ciganovic  conducted  Princip  and  Grabez  to  the  military 
rifle  range  at  Toprider  and  instructed  them  in  a  wood  adjoining  the 
range  in  shooting  with  a  Browning  pistol  at  a  target.  Princip  proved 
himself  the  better  shot  of  the  two.  Ciganovic  also  familiarized 
Princip,  Grabez  and  Cabrinovic  with  the  use  of  the  bombs  which 
were  later  given  to  them. 

On  the  27th  May,  1914,  Ciganovic  handed  over  to  Princip,  Cabri- 
novic and  Grabez,  as  their  confessions  agree  in  stating,  six  bombs, 
four  Browning  revolvers  and  a  sufficient  quantity  of  ammunition,  as 
well  as  a  glass  tube  of  cyanide  of  potassium  with  which  to  poison 
themselves  after  the  accomplishment  of  the  deed  in  order  that  the 
secret  might  be  kept.     Moreover  Ciganovic  gave  them  some  money. 

Princip  had  previously  informed  Danilo  Ilic,  at  Easter,  of  his  plan 
of  assassination.  He  now  begged  the  latter  on  his  return  to  Serajevo 
to  enlist  certain  additional  persons,  in  order  to  ensure  the  success  of 
the  attempt.  Hereupon  Ilic  according  to  his  confession  enlisted  Jaso 
Cubrilovic,  Cetro  Popovic  and  Mehemed  Mehmedbasic  in  the  plot. 

III.   Origin  of  the  bombs 

Only  one  of  the  bombs  was  made  use  of  in  the  execution  of  the 
attempt.  The  remaining  five  bombs  came  later  into  the  possession 
of  the  police  at  Serajevo. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  judicial  experts  these  bombs  are  Servian 
hand-grenades  which  were  factory-made  and  intended  for  military 
purposes.  They  are  identical  with  the  21  bombs  which  were  found  in 
the  Save  at  Brcko  in  the  year  1913  and  which  were  partly  in  their 
original  packing,  which  proved  without  a  doubt  that  they  came  from 
the  Servian  arsenal  of  Kragujevac. 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  133 

It  is  thus  proved  that  the  grenades  which  were  used  in  the  attempt 
against  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  also  came  from  the  stores 
of  the  Army  Depot  at  Kragujevac. 

Grabez  quite  spontaneously  calls  the  grenades  which  were  handed 
over  to  him  and  his  accomplices  "  Kragujevac  bombs." 

IV.    Transport  of  the  three  assailants,  and  of  the  weapons  from  Serbia 

to  Bosnia 

With  regard  to  this  Princip  makes  the  following  statement :  — 

Ciganovic  told  Cabrinovic,  Grabez  and  Princip  that  they  were  to 
make  their  way  via  Sabac  and  Loznica  to  Tuzla  and  there  to  betake 
themselves  to  Misko  Jovanovic  who  would  take  over  the  weapons. 
Next  they  were  to  go  to  Sabac  and  report  themselves  to  the  frontier 
captain  Major  Rade  Popovic,  to  whom  he  gave  them  a  note,  of  which 
Princip  took  charge.  On  the  28th  May  the  three  accomplices  left 
Belgrade  with  the  weapons.  ^At  Sabac  Princip  handed  over  the  note 
which  he  had  received  from  Ciganovic  to  Major  Popovic,  who  there- 
upon conducted  all  three  to  the  orderly  room  and  drew  them  up  a  pass 
in  which  it  was  stated  that  one  of  them  was  an  exciseman  and  the 
other  two  his  colleagues.  The  pass  contained  also  the  name  of  this 
alleged  exciseman,  but  he  had  forgotten  the  name.  At  the  same  time 
Major  Popovic  handed  over  a  closed  letter  for  the  frontier  captain  at 
Loznica,  whose  name  was  Pravanovic,  Prdanovic  or  Predojevic, 

Princip,  Cabrinovic  and  Grabez  passed  the  night  at  Sabac  and  went 
by  train  the  next  morning  to  Loznica,  with  a  half-price  ticket,  it  may 
be  remarked,  on  the  strength  of  the  pass  which  Major  Popovic  had 
drawn  up  for  them.  They  reached  Loznica  at  noon  and  delivered  to 
the  frontier  captain  at  that  place  Major  Popovic's  letter,  in  which  were 
the  words :  "  See  that  you  receive  these  people  and  bring  them  on 
their  way,  you  know  where."  The  frontier  captain  said  he  would 
summon  his  excisemen  from  the  frontier  and  give  the  three  into  the 
charge  of  the  most  reliable  man.  Thereupon  he  telephoned,  and  made 
an  appointment  with  the  three  accomplices  for  7  o'clock  the  next 
morning  in  his  office. 

Next  morning  the  three  conspirators  agreed  that  Cabrinovic  should 
take  Grabez's  pass  and  make  his  way  openly  to  Zvornik,  but  that 
Princip  and  Grabez  should  cross  the  frontier  secretly.  This  plan  was 
discussed  with  the  frontier  captain  and  it  was  decided  that  arp  excise 
man  from  Ljesnica  called  Grbic  was  to  take  Princip  and  Grabez  with 
him  to  his  tower  (karaula)  and  bring  them  over  the  frontier.  Cabri- 
novic accordingly  walked  to  Banja  Koviljaca  in  the  direction  of 
Zvornik.  Princip  and  Grabez  drove  with  the  exciseman  Grbic  to 
Ljesnica,  where  they  deposited  the  bombs  and  the  revolver  in  a  room 
in  a  hotel.  While  they  were  doing  so  the  exciseman  Grbic  caught  sight 
of  these  objects.    Princip  himself  described  this  journey  as  mysterious. 

Grabez's  statement  conformed  in  essentials  with  Princip's  and  was 
supplemented  by  an  addition  to  the  effect  that  Grbic  laughed  when  he 
saw  the  bombs  and  the  revolver  and  merely  asked  to  what  part  of 


134  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Bosnia  they  were  going  with  those  bombs.  The  excisemen  certainly 
thought  that  Grabez  and  Princip  were  travelHng  on  a  mission. 

Grbic  and  a  second  exciseman  brought  Princip  and  Grabez  in  a  boat 
to  an  island  in  the  Drina.  There  Grbic  instructed  them  to  wait  for  a 
peasant  who  would  come  to  fetch  them.  They  passed  the  night  on 
the  island  in  a  peasant's  hut  to  which  Grbic  had  directed  them ;  next 
day  came  a  peasant  who  conducted  them  during  the  night  first  through 
a  bog  and  then  over  the  mountains  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Priboj, 
where  he  handed  them  over  to  the  local  teacher  Cubrilovic,  who 
seemed  to  have  been  already  waiting  for  them,  to  see  them  further 
on  their  way. 

He  took  them  on  to  Misko  Jovanovic  at  Tuzla. 

Cabrinovic's  statement  about  the  events  of  the  journey  up  to  the 
point  at  which  he  parted  with  Princip  and  Grabez  conformed  in 
essentials  w^ith  those  of  the  latter,  and  only  added  by  way  of  supple- 
ment that  Major  Popovic  told  them  that  he  did  not  reach  Sabac  from 
Belgrade  till  the  day  before  their  arrival. 

In  Loznica,  Cabrinovic,  Princip  and  Grabez  decided  to  separate, 
as  it  was  too  dangerous  to  go  about  all  three  together.  The  frontier 
captain  at  Loznica,  whom  they  informed  of  this,  applauded  their 
plan  and  gave  Cabrinovic  a  letter  for  M.  Jaklojevic,  the  teacher  at 
Mali-Zvornik.  Hereupon  Cabrinovic  handed  over  the  bombs,  Brown- 
ing pistol  and  ammunition  which  he  had  been  carrying,  to  Princip 
and  Grabez,  and  went  to  Mali-Zvornik  with  an  exciseman  who  had 
been  told  off  to  accompany  him. 

There  he  found  the  teacher  Jaklojevic,  to  whom  he  handed  the 
letter  from  the  frontier  captain  of  Loznica.  Hereupon  the  former 
notified  the  Servian  frontier  guard.  When  Cabrinovic,  with  the 
teacher,  reached  this  frontier  post,  a  man  was  already  waiting  there 
for  them,  who  brought  them  in  a  boat  over  the  Drina  to  Gross-Zvornik 
in  Bosnia. 

Cabrinovic  then  proceeded  to  Misko  Jovanovic  at  Tuzla. 

Supplement 

Just  before  this  memoir  was  closed,  minutes  of  evidence  were 
published  by  the  District  Court  at  Serajevo  from  which  it  appears 
that  a  subject  of  the  Monarchy  some  days  before  the  28th  June  last 
desired  to  make  a  report  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Consulate  at 
Belgrade  to  the  effect  that  he  suspected  that  a  plan  existed  for  the 
execution  of  an  attempt  on  the  life  of  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand 
during  his  presence  in  Bosnia.  It  seems  that  the  man  was  prevented 
from  making  this  report  by  members  of  the  Belgrade  police  force, 
who  arrested  him  on  trivial  grounds  just  as  he  was  about  to  enter 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Consulate.  The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from 
the  statements  contained  in  the  evidence  in  question  would  seem 
to  be  that  the  police  officials  concerned  had  knowledge  of  the  planned 
attempt,  and  only  arrested  this  man  in  order  to  prevent  him  from 
laying  the  information. 


July  25 y  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  135 

As  these  statements  have  not  yet  been  verified,  no  opinion  can 
be  expressed  at  the  present  stage  on  their  rehabiUty.  In  view  of  the 
investigations  into  the  matter  now  pending,  the  more  minute  details 
of  the  evidence  cannot  be  pubHshed  more  exactly  at  present. 


APPENDIX  9 
The  Serbian  Press  on  the  Assassination 

(a)  The  Belgrade  newspaper  Balkan  writes  on  the  29th  June, 
with  regard  to  the  two  perpetrators  :  — 

"Nedeljko  Cabrinovic,  a  compositor  by  profession,  was  full  of 
anarchical  ideas,  and  well  known  as  a  restless  spirit.  Until  twenty 
days  ago,  he  lived  in  Belgrade,  whither  he  came  after  the  war  and 
was  employed  in  the  State  printing  works.  Before  his  departure  he 
announced  that  he  was  going  to  Trieste,  where  he  would  get  work 
in  a  new  printing  works.  Gavrilo  Princip  also  was  living  at  Belgrade 
until  a  short  time  ago.  During  the  war  he  offered  his  services  as  a 
volunteer,  but  was  not  accepted,  and  therefore  he  left  Belgrade. 
He  returned,  however,  at  Christmas  last  year  to  Belgrade,  attended 
the^gymnasium  for  a  time,  and  left  Belgrade  almost  at  the  same  time 
as  Cabrinovic,  though  in  a  different  direction.  Princip  was  a  silent, 
nervous,  hard-working  student,  and  associated  with  some  fellow 
students  who  caine,  like  himself,  from  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  as  well 
as  latterly  with  Cabrinovic.  He  inclined  towards  socialistic  ideas, 
although  he  had  originally  belonged  to  the  Young  Men  Progressive 
Party.  Princip,  like  Cabrinovic,  was  brought  up  at  Serajevo;  the 
two  have  been  bound  by  ties  of  the  closest  friendship  since  their 
childhood." 

(6)  The  Piemont  of  the  1st  July,  points  out  that  Princip's  pro- 
test was  a  sequel  to  the  public  protest  of  the  assassin  Zerajic.  The 
explanation  of  the  former's,  as  of  the  latter's  activities,  is  to  be  found 
in  the  system  of  government  in  Bosnia.  The  circumstance  that 
Princip  executed  the  deed  of  vengeance  on  the  national  festival  of 
St.  Vitus,  the  day  which  had  been  chosen  for  the  manoeuvres,  made 
the  desperate  act  of  the  young  martyr  more  intelligible  and  more 
natural.  (The  newspaper  was  confiscated  by  the  police  on  account 
of  this  article ;  the  confiscation  was,  however,  annulled  the  day  after 
by  the  Court  of  First  Instance  at  Belgrade.) 

(c)  The  Young  Radical  Odjek,  of  the  3rd  July,  says:  — "The 
Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  was  sent  to  Serajevo  on  the  day  of 
enthusiasm  in  order  to  celebrate  a  brutal  manifestation  of  vio- 
lence and  domination.  This  brutal  act  was  bound  to  evoke  brutal 
feelings  of  resistance,  hatred  and  revenge." 

{d)  The  organ  of  the  Nationalist  Party,  Srpska  Zastam,  of  the 
3rd  July,  says  in  an  article  entitled  "Suspicions  and  Threats":  — 
''The  assassination  comes  to  be  regarded  more  and  more  as  the  out- 


136  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

come  of  the  unsound  state  of  affairs  in  the  Monarchy.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  savage  persecution  of  the  Servian  people  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  evokes  the  horror  of  the  whole  civilised  world." 

{e)  The  Progressive  newspaper,  Pravda,  of  the  3rd  July,  writes  :  — 
"The  policy  of  Vienna  is  a  cynical  one.  It  exploits  the  death  of 
the  unfortunate  couple  for  its  abominable  aims  against  the  Servian 
people." 

(/)  The  Agence  des  Balkans,  of  the  3rd  July,  says  :  —  "The  crimes 
which  have  been  perpetrated  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  against  the 
Servians  have  been  carried  out  under  the  auspices  and  at  the  direct 
instigation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  civil  and  military  authorities." 

ig)  The  Pragda,  of  the  4th  July,  says:  —  "All  the  murders  and 
assassinations  which  have  been  carried  out  up  to  the  present  time 
in  Austria  have  arisen  from  one  and  the  same  source.  The  oppressed 
peoples  of  the  JMonarchy  were  obliged  to  have  recourse  to  this  method 
of  protest,  because  no  other  way  was  open  to  them.  In  the  chaos  of 
a  reign  of  terror,  it  is  natural  and  quite  intelligible  that  the  era  of 
assassinations  should  have  firmly  established  itself." 

(h)  The  Balkan,  of  the  5th  July,  remarks  that  Austria-Hungary 
"must  be  placed  under  international  control,  because  of  its  persecu- 
tion of  the  innocent";  for  Austria-Hungary  has  less  cohesion  than 
Turkey. 

(i)  The  Mali  Journal,  of  the  7th  July,  wTites  :  —  "A  sprig  of  the 
Middle  Ages  has  been  murdered  at  Serajevo  within  the  last  few 
days.  He  has  been  murdered  by  a  lad  whose  grief  for  the  enslave- 
ment of  his  immediate  Fatherland  (engeres  Vaterland)  amounted  to  a 
paroxysm,  that  grief  w^hich  the  robbers  of  the  land  of  his  fathers  had 
brought  upon  him.  What  has  been  the  contribution  of  official 
Austria-Hungary  to  this?  It  has  answered  with  general  massacres, 
plunderings  and  destruction  of  Servian  life  and  property.  Only  the 
worthless  distinguish  themselves  by  such  heroism.  Cowards  are 
always  mighty  heroes  when  they  are  sure  that  nothing  will  happen 
to  them.  Only  compare  Princip  and  Cabrinovic  with  these  heroes, 
and  you  will  at  once  see  the  great  difference  between  them.  Civil- 
isation and  justice  are  a  huge  lie  in  Austria-Hungary." 

(j)  The  Tribuna,  of  the  7th  July,  says  :  —  "  We  are  of  the  opinion 
that  the  Serajevo  murder  was  arranged  to  facilitate  the  extermination 
of  the  Servians  at  one  blow." 

(k)  The  Piemont,  of  the  8th  July,  reports  from  Bajina  Baschka 
that  the  Austrian  officials  in  Bosnia  are  preparing  a  massacre  of  the 
Christians. 

(/)  The  Balkan,  of  the  8th,  publishes  a  report  from  Bosnia,  under 
the  title  "St.  Bartholomew's  Day  at  Serajevo,"  and  pleads  for  a 
general  boycott  against  all  the  Austrians  living  in  Servia. 

(m)  The  Mali  Journal,  of  the  8th,  appeals  to  its  readers  to  boycott 
the  Danube  Steamship  Company. 

(n)  Under  the  title  "Nothing  from  Austria-Hungary!"  the 
Tribuna,  of  the  8th,  writes  that  it  would  be  best  to  order  nothing 
from  Austria-Hungary,  to  abstain  from  visiting  the  Austrian  and 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  137 

Hungarian  Spas,  and  from  calling  in  doctors  from  Austria-Hungary. 
It  says  that  private  initiative  can  accomplish  a  great  deal  in  the 
direction  suggested.  The  State  and  the  Government  offices  must  not 
mix  themselves  up  in  this  movement.  It  is  enough  to  appeal  to  the 
citizens. 

(o)  The  Stampa,  of  the  8th,  asserts  that  the  Serajevo  police  are 
exposing  the  arrested  assassins  to  the  most  inhuman  and  brutal  torture 
in  order  to  extort  from  them  untrue  confessions  on  which  it  is  intended 
to  base  complaints  against  the  Servian  people. 

(p)  The  Agence  des  Balkans,  of  the  9th,  reports  from  Belgrade: 
—  "Absolutely  trustworthy  private  reports  announce  that  a  general 
massacre  of  Servians  is  on  the  point  of  breaking  out  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina." 

(q)  The  Balkan,  of  the  9th  July,  taking  as  its  text  Mr.  Asquith's 
statement  on  the  announcement  of  the  news  of  the  death  of  Arch- 
duke Franz  Ferdinand,  that  he  was  full  of  anxiety  for  the  fate  of 
humanity,^  publishes  a  historical  survey  of  the  events  of  the  last  40 
years,  from  which  it  deduces  that  the  Servian  people  during  this 
period  have  been  exposed  to  the  cruel  persecutions  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary's Jesuitical  policy.  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  like  all  the  sons 
of  Loyola,  who  only  work  in  human  blood,  and  who  do  homage  to  the 
principle,  "The  end  justifies  the  means,"  was  bound  to  be  overtaken 
by  fate  and  to  fall  a  victim  to  Jesuitism,  as  the  whole  of  Austria- 
Hungary  will  also  fall.  But  by  the  downfall  of  Austria-Hungary, 
peace  and  tranquillity  would  ensue  to  mankind.  The  sum  of  all  these 
truths  emerges  in  the  conclusion  that  Asquith  might  with  a  calm  mind 
have  accompanied  the  news  of  the  murder  with  the  word,  "I  am 
no  longer  anxious  for  the  fate  of  humanity." 

(r)  The  Politika,  of  the  9th  July,  expresses  itself  in  a  leading 
article  under  the  heading,  "Shameless  Lies,"  as  follows:  —  "The 
manner  in  which  the  inquiries  into  the  Serajevo  murder  are  being 
carried  on  shows  quite  clearly  what  objects  Austria  is  aiming  at  in 
those  inquiries.  When  the  assassins,  regardless  of  all  the  tortures  to 
which  they  were  exposed,  refused  to  say  what  was  demanded  of  them, 
other  individuals  were  unearthed  who  expressed  themselves  ready  on 
certain  conditions  to  confess  a  certain  degree  of  complicity  in  the 
murder,  but  at  the  same  time  to  implicate  all  those  persons  who  were 
objectionable  to  Austria.  This  method  has  succeeded  for  the  moment 
because  the  hired  individuals  state  whatever  they  are  asked  to  state, 
and  the  Austrian  police  take  care  that  these  lies  are  at  once  spread 
to  all  the  points  of  the  compass.  Austria  has  no  sense  of  shame,  and 
thinks  that  somebody  will  be  found  to  believe  lies  of  this  sort." 

(s)  The  Stampa,  of  the  9th,  says  that  not  everything  which  has 
happened  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  has  yet  been  revealed  and 
attained  publicity.  Strict  secrecy  is  being  maintained.  But  the 
truth  will  sooner  or  later  come  to  the  surface ;  blood-thirsty  Austria 

^  ["We  are  once  more  confronted  with  one  of  those  incredible  crimes  which  almost 
make  us  despair  of  the  progress  of  mankind." 

Mr.  Asquith's  Speech,  Times,  July  1,  1914.] 


138  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

will  drink,  nay,  is  drinking,  Servian  blood,  till  she  can  drink  no  more. 
It  is  reported  that  there  are  to-day  about  ten  thousand  wounded  and 
dead  in  Bosnia. 

(t)  The  Politika,  of  the  10th  July,  hurls  extravagant  abuse  against 
the  members  of  the  Imperial  House. 

(u)  The  Commercial  Journal,  Trgovinski  Glasnik,  of  the  10th 
July,  talks  about  the  corruption  and  unscrupulousness  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  policy,  which  it  calls  Jesuitical,  reckless  and  dishonour- 
able. It  is  a  warning  to  the  Servian  people  in  Austria-Hungary  that 
they  are  not  living  in  a  civilised  State  which  guarantees  life  and 
property,  but  that  they  must  hold  themselves  armed  and  ever  ready 
to  defend  themselves  against  the  robbery  of  the  officials  and  the 
Government.  After  the  latest  occurrences,  the  Servian  people  ought 
no  longer  to  wait  like  a  lamb,  which  any  day  might  be  led  to  the 
slaughter,  but  like  a  lion  ready  for  a  bloody  resistance. 

{v)  In  the  Stampa,  of  the  10th  July,  we  find:  —  "Nothing  lasts 
for  ever,  nor  will  Austria-Hungary  remain  for  ever  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  The  time  is  not  far  off  when  the  Servians  who  broke 
the  power  of  the  Turks  and  punished  the  Bulgarians,  will  circle 
round  the  Ivan  Planina  on  the  Trebevic." 

(w)  The  Pravda,  of  the  10th  July,  under  the  title  "Boycott  against 
Good-for-nothings,"  appeals  for  a  boycott  of  Austrian  firms  in 
Belgrade,  as  well  as  of  Austrian  wares,  and  says  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  to  see  that  the  boycott  is  strictly  carried  out. 

{x)  The  Zvono,  of  the  16th  July,  declares  Princip  to  be  the  son 
of  Countess  Lonyay,  to  whom  the  charge  was  given  that  he  should 
avenge  the  death  of  Crown  Prince  Rudolf  on  his  murderer.  Arch- 
duke Franz  Ferdinand. 

(y)  The  Mali  Journal^  of  the  19th  July,  publishes  a  report  which 
says  :  —  "  Princip  was  instigated  to  make  the  attempt  by  an  Austro- 
Hungarian  agent.  It  is  said  in  Vienna  that  it  is  only  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Legation  at  Belgrade  that  the  real  culprit  is  to  be  found." 

(z)  The  leading  Young  Radical  organ,  Odjek,  of  the  20th  July, 
writes :  —  "  Austria-Hungary  offers  a  hundred  proofs  that  it  will 
inherit  the  title  of  the  'sick  man'  of  Europe.  While  in  Servia  not 
a  single  Austrian  citizen  has  been  molested,  villages  and  towns  have 
been  plundered  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  This  fact  is  one  more 
proof  on  how  much  higher  a  cultural  and  moral  level  Servia  stands 
than  Austria-Hungary." 


APPENDIX  10 
The  Local  Committee  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  at  Nish,  on 

THE    subject    of   THE    CRIME    AGAINST    THE   ArCHDUKE    FrANZ 

Ferdinand. 

A  confidential  communication  has  come  to  the  ears  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Foreign  OflBce  from  a  reliable  correspondent,  whose  name 


July  25,  AustrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19  139 

will  be  published  at  the  proper  time,  according  to  which  the  Local 
Committee  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  at  Nish,  recently  held  a  meeting 
at  which  the  president  of  this  Committee,  Jasa  Nenadovic,  director 
of  the  Nish  prison,  touched  on  the  subject  of  the  assassination  of 
the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  using  the  following  words :  "Servia 
was  absolutely  bound  this  time  to  have  recourse  to  a  measure  like  the 
assassination  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  because  the  Arch- 
duke, on  account  of  his  aggressive  and  eccentric  character,  was  a 
prominent  and  deadly  danger  for  Servia,  and  possibly  for  wider 
Slavonic  circles  also.  Had  he  remained  alive,  he  would  have  soon 
challenged  Servia  to  war  or  attacked  it,  in  which  case  Servia,  which 
was  now  so  much  weakened  materially,  and  had  not  yet  completed 
her  army  re-organisation,  would  certainly  have  been  lost.  But  now 
Servia  had  been  rescued  by  the  Serajevo  murder,  and  one  of  the  dan- 
gers which  threatened  Servia  in  the  person  of  the  victim  had  been 
swept  out  of  the  way.  Servia  would  now  have  rest  for  several  years, 
as  the  new  heir  to  the  throne  would  consider  well  before  walking 
in  the  steps  of  his  predecessor." 

"  Though  he  was  aware,  continued  the  speaker,  that  the  murder  of 
the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  would  be  a  heavy  blow  and  a  great 
grief  to  Austria-Hungary,  and  that  it  would  be  followed  by  the  torture 
of  those  of  our  nation  who  were  living  in  that  country,  yet  he  would 
not  have  thought  that  his  suppositions  would  have  been  so  completely 
fulfilled,  and  that  the  Croatians  would  have  behaved  as  they  had. 
Yet  his  friends  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  had  assured  him  that 
the  Austro-Hungarian  officials  were  cowards  and  would  not  dare  to 
overstep  the  mark  in  the  measures  they  took ;  unfortunately,  how- 
ever, these  friends,  and  through  them  we  too,  had  been  disappointed. 
If  things  went  on  much  longer  as  they  were  going  at  present,  revolvers 
and  bombs  would  at  last  have  to  play  their  real  role.  Whatever  the 
God  of  Servia  has  in  store,  things  cannot  go  on  as  at  present." 

The  remarks  of  the  speaker  were  received  with  complete  approval 
by  his  hearers. 


APPENDIX  11 

Supplements  after  going  to  Press 

1.  —  To  Appendix  8 

The  teacher,  Cubrilovic,  who  undertook  the  guidance  of  Princip 
and  Grabez  at  Priboj,  has  made  a  complete  confession,  from  which 
the  following  important  facts  emerge  :  — 

In  the  year  1911,  Cubrilovic,  on  the  occasion  of  a  Sokol  expedition 
to  §abac,  was  initiated  by  Bozo  Foviz,  a  member  of  the  managing 
committee  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana,  into  the  objects  of  that  asso- 
ciation, and  was  then  appointed  representative  of^the  Narodna 
Odbrana  in  Zvornik  (Bosnia).     At  his  invitation,  Misko  Jovanovic 


140  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

was  later  nominated  representative  of  the  Narodna  Odbrana  for 
Tuzla. 

A  peasant  acted  as  go-between  in  the  communications  with  the 
Narodna  Odbrana,  in  fact,  the  same  peasant  who  brought  Princip 
and  Grabez  to  Cubrilovic,  with  the  information  that  he  was  bringing 
two  Servian  students  with  weapons  to  him.  When  he  learned  this, 
he  knew  that  it  was  a  "  mission  "  from  the  Narodna  Odbrana.  Princip 
and  Grabez  told  him  that  they  had  bombs  and  revolvers  with  them, 
with  a  view  to  making  an  attempt  on  the  life  of  the  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand. 


2.  —  Pictures  in  the  Belgrade  War  Office  of  a  nature  hostile  to  the 

Monarchy 

There  are  four  allegorical  pictures  on  the  wall  outside  the  reception 
hall  of  the  Royal  Servian  War  Office,  of  which  three  are  representa- 
tions of  Servian  victories,  while  the  fourth  symbolises  the  realisation 
of  the  anti-Monarchical  tendencies  of  Servia. 

Over  a  landscape,  partly  mountains  (Bosnia),  partly  plains  (South 
Hungary),  rises  the  "Zora,"  the  rosy  dawn  of  Servian  hopes.  In  the 
foreground  stands  a  woman  in  armour,  whose  shield  bears  the  names 
of  all  the  "provinces  still  awaiting  Uberation"  :  Bosnia,  Herzegovina, 
Vojvodina,  Syrmia,  Dalmatia,  etc. 


To  the  UndSr  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK   No.   20 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Under  Secretary ,  Freiherr  von  Macchio  at  Vienna, 
(Telegraphic.)  Lamhach,  July  25 y  1914. 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  telegraphs  to  me  that  he  has  received 
urgent  instructions  from  his  Government  to  press  for  a  prolongation 
of  time-limit  fixed  for  the  ultimatum  to  Servia.  I  request  Your  Excel- 
lency to  reply  to  him  in  my  name  that  we  cannot  consent  to  a  pro- 
longation of  time-limit.  Your  Excellency  will  add,  that  Servia,  even 
after  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations,  can  bring  about  friendly 
solution  by  unconditional  acceptance  of  our  demands,  although  we 
should  be  obliged  in  such  an  event  to  demand  reimbursement  by 
Servia  of  all  costs  and  damage  incurred  by  us  through  our  military 
measures. 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  22  141 

To  Petrograd 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  21 
Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Bad  Ischl,  July  25,  191^. 

For  Your  Excellency's  information  and  guidance :  — 

The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  called  this  morning  ^  on  the  Under 
Secretary,  in  order  to  express  in  the  name  of  his  Government  the 
wish  that  the  time-limit  fixed  in  our  note  to  Servia  might  be  pro- 
longed. 

This  request  was  based  on  the  grounds  that  the  Powers  had  been 
taken  by  surprise  by  our  move,  and  that  the  Russian  Government 
would  regard  it  merely  as  natural  consideration  for  the  other  Cabi- 
nets, on  the  part  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet,  if  an  opportunity  were 
given  to  the  former  to  examine  the  data  on  which  our  communica- 
tion to  the  Powers  was  based  and  to  study  our  prospective  dossier. 

The  Under  Secretary  replied  to  the  Charge  d'Affaires  that  he 
would  immediately  bring  his  explanation  to  my  knowledge;  but 
that  he  could  tell  him  at  once  that  there  was  no  prospect  of  a  pro- 
longation of  the  time-limit  fixed  being  granted  by  us.  As  to  the 
grounds  which  the  Russian  Government  had  advanced  in  sup- 
port of  the  wish  they  had  expressed,  they  appeared  to  rest  upon  a 
mistaken  hypothesis.^  Our  note  to  the  Powers  was  in  no  way  in- 
tended to  invite  them  to  make  known  their  own  views  on  the  subject, 
but  merely  bore  the  character  of  a  statement  for  information,  the 
communication  of  which  we  regarded  as  a  duty  laid  on  us  by  inter- 
national courtesy.  For  the  rest,  we  regarded  our  action  as  a  matter 
concerning  us  and  Servia  alone,  which  action,  notwithstanding  the 
patience  and  longsuffering  we  had  exhibited  for  years  past,  we  had 
been  forced  by  the  development  of  circumstances  to  take,  much 
against  our  own  wish,  for  the  defence  of  our  most  vital  interests. 

From  Belgrade 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   22 

Freiherr  von  Giesl  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  25,  1914. 

Cabinet  Council  met  yesterday  evening  and  early  this  morning ; 
form  of  answer  to  our  note  was  settled  after  several  drafts,  and  is 
to  be  delivered  to  me  before  the  time-limit  expires.  I^  hear  that 
Royal  train  is  being  made  up ;  gold  belonging  to  the  National  Bank 

1  This  time  of  day  is  important,  because  the  French  Ambassador  says,  French 
Yellow  Book  No.  48,  that  it  "seems  useless  to  support"  the  Russian  request,  when 
there  is  no  longer  any  time  for  it,"  since  his  instructions  reached  him  exactly  at  the 
moment  when  the  time  limit  given  to  Servia  expires."  The  time  limit  expired  at  6 
P.M.  No  reason  is  advanced  in  the  French  Yellow  Book  why  the  instructions  should 
have  reached  the  French  Ambassador  so  late.  There  is  telegraphic  and  telephonic 
communication  between  Paris  and  Vienna.  See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  39,  No.  41 
<"  this  morning  "),  No.  44,  No.  45,  No.  47  and  No.  48;  British  Blue  Book  No.  26,  and 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  15,  all  of  the  same  day. 

2  Cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  4,  July  24,  1914,  and  note  3. 


142  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

and  to  the  railway,  as  well  as  the  Foreign  Office  records,  are  being 
taken  into  the  interior  of  the  country.  Some  of  my  colleagues  are 
of  the  opinion  that  they  must  follow  the  Government;  packing-up 
is  proceeding  at  the  Russian  Legation  in  particular. 

Garrison  has  left  town  in  field  order.  Ammunition  depots  in  the 
fortress  were  evacuated.  RaiWay  station  thronged  with  soldiers. 
The  ambulance  trains  have  left  Belgrade,  proceeding  towards  the 
south.  In  pursuance  of  the  instructions  which  have  reached  me  while 
I  write,  we  intend,  in  the  event  of  a  rupture,  to  leave  Belgrade  by 
the  6.30  train. 

From  Semlin,  Serbia 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD  BoOK  No.   23 

Freiherr  von  Giesl  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraph  c.)  Semlin,  July  25,  1914, 

Orders  for  general  mobilisation  were  issued  in  Servia  at  3  p.m. 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD  BoOK  No.   24 

Freiherr  Von  Giesl  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Semlin,  July  25,  1914- 

As  a  result  of  the  Royal  Servian  Government's  unsatisfactory 
answer  to  our  demands  of  the  23rd  inst.,  I  have  announced  that 
diplomatic  relations  are  broken  off  with  Servia,  and  have  left  Belgrade 
with  the  staff  of  the  Legation.  The  reply  was  delivered  to  me  at 
two  minutes  to  six  p.m. 

From  Serbia 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.   25 

Note  ^  of  the  Royal  Serbian  Government  of  12/25  July,  1914- 

(Translation). 

The  Royal  Servian  Government  have  received  the  communication 
of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  of  the  10th  instant,^  and  are 
convinced  that  their  reply  will  remove  any  misunderstanding  which 
may  threaten  to  impair  the  good  neighbourly  relations  between  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  Kingdom  of  Servia. 

Conscious  of  the  fact  that  the  protests  which  were  made  both  from 
the  tribune  of  the  national  Skuptchina  and  in  the  declarations  and 
actions  of  the  responsible  representatives  of  the  State  —  protests 

^  See  Austrian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914  where  the  Serbian  Note  is  printed  in 
full  together  with  the  reasons  why  Austria-Hungary  deemed  it  unsatisfactory. 
«  Old  style. 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  25  143 

which  were  cut  short  by  the  declarations  made  by  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment on  the  18th  ^  March,  1909  —  have  not  been  renewed  on  any 
occasion  as  regards  the  great  neighbouring  Monarchy,  and  that  no 
attempt  has  been  made  since  that  time,  either  by  the  successive  Royal 
Governments  or  by  their  agents,  to  change  the  poUtical  and  legal 
state  of  affairs  created  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  this  connection  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  have  made  no  representation  except  one  con- 
cerning a  school  book,  and  that  on  that  occasion  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  received  an  entirely  satisfactory  explanation. 
Servia  has  several  times  given  proofs  of  her  pacific  and  moderate 
policy  during  the  Balkan  crisis,  and  it  is  thanks  to  Servia  and  to  the 
sacrifice  that  she  has  made  in  the  exclusive  interest  of  European  peace 
that  that  peace  has  been  preserved.  The  Royal  Government  cannot 
be  held  responsible  for  manifestations  of  a  private  character,  such 
as  articles  in  the  press  and  the  peaceable  work  of  societies  —  manifes- 
tations which  take  place  in  nearly  all  countries  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  events,  and  which,  as  a  general  rule,  escape  official  control.  The 
Royal  Government  are  all  the  less  responsible,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
at  the  time  of  the  solution  of  a  series  of  questions  which  arose  between 
Servia  and  Austria-Hungary  they  gave  proof  of  a  great  readiness  to 
oblige,  and  thus  succeeded  in  settling  the  majority  of  these  questions 
to  the  advantage  of  the  two  neighbouring  countries. 

For  these  reasons  the  Royal  Government  have  been  pained  and 
surprised  at  the  statements,  according  to  which  members  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Servia  are  supposed  to  have  participated  in  the  prepara- 
tions for  the  crime  committed  at  Serajevo ;  the  Royal  Government 
expected  to  be  invited  to  collaborate  in  an  investigation  of  all  that 
concerns  this  crime,  and  they  were  ready,  in  order  to  prove  the  entire 
correctness  of  their  attitude,  to  take  measures  against  any  persons 
concerning  whom  representations  were  made  to  them.  Falling  in, 
therefore,  with  the  desire  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government, 
they  are  prepared  to  hand  over  for  trial  any  Servian  subject,  without 
regard  to  his  situation  or  rank,  of  whose  complicity  in  the  crime  of 
Serajevo  proofs  are  forthcoming,  and  more  especially  they  undertake 
to  cause  to  be  published  on  the  first  page  of  the  Journal  officiel, 
on  the  date  of  the  13th  (26th)  July,  the  following  declaration  :  — 

"The  Royal  Government  of  Servia  condemn  all  propaganda  which 
may  be  directed  against  Austria-Hungary  —  i.e.,  the  general  tend- 
ency of  which  the  final  aim  is  to  detach  from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  territories  belonging  to  it,  and  they  sincerely  deplore  the 
fatal  consequences  of  these  criminal  proceedings.  The  Royal  Govern- 
ment regret  that,  according  to  the  communication  from  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  certain  Servian  officers  and  functionaries 
participated  in  the  above-mentioned  propaganda,  and  thus  compro- 
mised the  good  neighbourly  relations  to  which  the  Royal  Servian 
Government  was  solemnly  pledged  by  the  declaration  of  the  31st 
March,  1909.^ 

1  New  style. 


144  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

"The  Government,  etc.  .  .  /'  (identical  with  the  text  as  de- 
manded). 

The  Royal  Government  further  undertake :  — 

1.  To  introduce  at  the  first  regular  convocation  of  the  Skuptchina 
a  provision  into  the  press  law  providing  for  the  most  severe  punish- 
ment of  incitement  to  hatred  and  contempt  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  and  for  taking  action  against  any  publication  the  general 
tendency  of  which  is  directed  against  the  territorial  integrity  of 
Austria-Hungary.  The  Government  engage  at  the  approaching  re- 
vision of  the  Constitution  to  cause  an  amendment  to  be  introduced 
into  article  22  of  the  Constitution  of  such  a  nature  that  such  publi- 
cation may  be  confiscated,  a  proceeding  at  present  impossible  under 
the  categorical  terms  of  article  22  of  the  Constitution. 

2.  The  Government  possess  no  proof,  nor  does  the  note  of  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government  furnish  them  w^ith  any,  that  the  Na- 
rodna  Obdrana  and  other  similar  societies  have  committed  up  to  the 
present  any  criminal  act  of  this  nature  through  the  proceedings  of 
any  of  their  members.  Nevertheless,  the  Royal  Government  will 
accept  the  demand  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  and  will 
dissolve  the  Narodna  Odbrana  Society  and  every  other  society  which 
may  be  directing  its  efforts  against  Austria-Hungary. 

3.  The  Royal  Servian  Government  undertake  to  eliminate  without 
delay  from  public  instruction  in  Servia  everything  that  serves  or  might 
serve  to  foment  the  propaganda  against  Austria-Hungary,  whenever 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  furnish  them  with  facts  and 
proofs  of  this  propaganda. 

4.  The  Royal  Government  also  agree  to  remove  from  the  military 
service  all  such  persons  as  the  judicial  enquiry  may  have  proved  to 
be  guilty  of  acts  directed  against  the  integrity  of  the  territory  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  they  expect  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  to  communicate  to  them  at  a  later  date  the  names 
and  the  acts  of  these  officers  and  functionaries  for  the  purposes  of  the 
proceedings  which  are  to  be  taken  against  them. 

5.  The  Royal  Government  must  confess  that  they  do  not  clearly 
grasp  the  meaning  or  the  scope  of  the  demand  made  by  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  that  Servia  shall  undertake  to  accept  the  col- 
laboration of  the  representatives  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment upon  their  territory,  but  they  declare  that  they  will  admit  such 
collaboration  as  agrees  with  the  principle  of  international  law,  with 
criminal  procedure,  and  with  good  neighbourly  relations. 

6.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  Royal  Government  consider 
it  their  duty  to  open  an  enquiry  against  all  such  persons  as  are,  or 
eventually  may  be,  implicated  in  the  plot  of  the  15th  ^  June,  and  who 
happen  to  be  within  the  territory  of  the  kingdom.  As  regards  the 
participation  in  this  enquiry  of  Austro-Hungarian  agents  or  authori- 
ties appointed  for  this  purpose  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment, the  Royal  Government  cannot  accept  such  an  arrangement,  as 
it  would  be  a  violation  of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  law  of  criminal 

1  Old  Style. 


July  25,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  26  145 

procedure ;  nevertheless,  in  concrete  cases  communications  as  to  the 
results  of  the  investigation  in  question  might  be  given  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  agents. 

7.  The  Royal  Government  proceeded,  on  the  very  evening  of  the 
delivery  of  the^  note,  to  arrest  Commandant  Voja  Tankosic.  As 
regards  Milan  Ciganovic,  who  is  a  subject  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  and  who  up  to  the  15th  ^  June  was  employed  (on  probation) 
by  the  directorate  of  railways,  it  has  not  yet  been  possible  to  arrest 
him. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  are  requested  to  be  so  good 
as  to  supply  as  soon  as  possible,  in  the  customary  form,  the  presump- 
tive evidence  of  guilt,  as  well  as  the  eventual  proofs  of  guilt  which 
have  been  collected  up  to  the  present,  at  the  enquiry  at  Serajevo  for 
the  purposes  of  the  later  enquiry. 

8.  The  Servian  Government  will  reinforce  and  extend  the  measures 
which  have  been  taken  for  preventing  the  illicit  traffic  in  arms  and 
explosives  across  the  frontier.  It  goes  without  saying  that  they  will 
immediately  order  an  enquiry  and  will  severely  punish  the  frontier 
officials  on  the  Schabatz-Locnitza  line  who  have  failed  in  their  duty 
and  allowed  the  authors  of  the  crime  of  Serajevo  to  pass. 

9.  The  Royal  Government  will  gladly  give  explanations  of  the  re- 
marks made  by  their  officials  whether  in  Servia  or  abroad,  in  inter- 
views after  the  crime  which,  according  to  the  statement  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  were  hostile  towards  the  Monarchy,  as  soon 
as  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  have  communicated  to  them 
the  passages  in  question  in  these  remarks,  and  as  soon  as  they  have 
shown  that  the  remarks  were  actually  made  by  the  said  officials,  al- 
though the  Royal  Government  will  themselves  take  steps  to  collect 
evidence  and  proofs. 

10.  The  Royal  Government  will  inform  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  of  the  execution  of  the  measures  comprised  under  the 
above  heads,  in  so  far  as  this  has  not  already  been  done  by  the  present 
note,  as  soon  as  each  measure  has  been  ordered  and^  carried  out. 

If  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  not  satisfied  with  this 
reply,  the  Servian  Government,  considering  that  it  is  not  to  the  com- 
mon interest  to  precipitate  the  solution  of  this  question,  are  ready, 
as  always,  to  accept  a  pacific  understanding,  either  by  referring  this 
question  to  the  decision  of  the  International  Tribunal  of  the  Hague, 
or  to  the  Great  Powers  which  took  part  in  the  drawing  up  of  the  decla- 
ration made  by  the  Servian  Government  on  the  18th  (31st)  March, 
1909. 

To  Petrograd 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  26 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

Vienna,  July  25,  1914. 

We  were,  of  course,  aware,  when  we  decided  to  take  serious 
measures  against  Servia,  of  the  possibility  that  the  Servian  dispute 


146  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

might  develop  into  a  collision  with  Russia.  We  could  not,  however, 
allow  ourselves  to  be  diverted  by  this  eventuality  from  the  position 
we  took  up  towards  Servia,  because  fundamental  considerations  of 
national  policy  brought  us  face  to  face  with  the  necessity  of  putting 
an  end  to  the  state  of  affairs  in  which  a  Russian  charter  made  it 
possible  for  Servia  to  threaten  the  Monarchy  continuously  without 
punishment  and  without  the  possibility  of  punishment. 

Should  events  prove  that  Russia  considered  the  moment  for  the 
great  settlement  with  the  central  European  Powers  to  have  already 
arrived/  and  was  therefore  determined  on  war  from  the  beginning, 
the  following  instructions  to  your  Excellency  appear  indeed  super- 
fluous. 

It  might,  however,  be  conceivable  that  Russia,  in  the  event  of  the 
refusal  of  our  demands  by  Servia,  and  in  face  of  the  resulting  necessity 
for  us  of  military  measures,  might  think  better  of  it,  and  might  even 
be  willing  not  to  allow  herself  to  be  swept  away  by  the  bellicose 
elements.  It  is  to  meet  this  situation  that  the  following  explanations 
have  been  drawn  up,  which  your  Excellency  will  use  with  M.  Sazonof 
and  the  President  of  the  Council,  at  the  right  moment,  in  the  manner 
which  you  think  best,  and  when  the  opportunity,  in  your  opinion, 
presents  itself. 

I  assume,  generally,  that  your  Excellency  in  the  existing  circum- 
stances, has  established  a  close  understanding  with  your  German 
colleague,^  who  will  certainly  have  been  enjoined  by  his  Government 
to  leave  the  Russian  Government  no  room  for  doubt  that  Austria- 
Hungary,  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  with  Russia,  would  not  stand 
alone. 

I  am  under  no  illusion  that  it  will  be  easy  to  make  M.  Sazonof 
understand  the  step  taken  by  us  at  Belgrade,  which  had  become 
inevitable. 

There  is,  however,  one  factor  which  cannot  fail  to  impress  the 
Russian  Foreign  Minister,  and  that  is  the  emphasising  of  the  circum- 
stance that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  in  conformity  with  the 
principle  to  which  it  has  adhered  for  decades  past,  is  actuated  in 
the  present  crisis  by  no  selfish  motives  in  appealing  to  arms  in  order 
to  reach  a  settlement  of  her  differences  with  Servia. 

The  Monarchy  possesses  territory  to  repletion  and  has  no  desire 
for  Servian  possessions.  If  a  conflict  with  Servia  is  forced  upon  us, 
it  will  be  for  us  not  a  conflict  for  territorial  gain,  but  merely  a  means 
of  self-defence  and  self-preservation. 

The  contents  of  the  circular  note,  which  in  itself  is  sufficiently 
eloquent,  are  placed  in  their  proper  light  by  the  dossier  relating  to 
the  Servian  propaganda  against  the  Monarchy,  and  the  various  points 
of  connection  between  this  propaganda  and  the  crime  of  June  28th. 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  N9. 17,  July  25,  1914. 

2  Germany  and  Austria,  it  seems,  were  determined  to  stand  together  diplomati- 
cally as  closely  as  France,  England  and  Russia  ;  cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24, 
note  1.  Italy  appears  to  have  been  as  close  to  the  Entente  Powers  as  to  her  own 
allies  if  one  may  judge  by  the  despatches  from  Rome  contained  in  the  British  Blue 
Book  and  the  French  Yellow  Book.  See  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  35,  July  25,  and 
No.  51,  July  26. 


July  25,  AustrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No,  26  147 

Your  Excellency  will  draw  the  Russian  Minister's  very  particular 
attention  to  this  dossier  ^  and  impress  upon  him  that  it  is  an  unique 
event  in  history  that  a  Great  Power  should  have  borne  with  the 
seditious  intrigues  of  an  adjoining  small  State  for  so  long  a  time  and 
with  such  unparalleled  patience  as  Austria-Hungary  has  borne  with 
those  of  Servia. 

We  had  no  wish  to  pursue  a  policy  adverse  to  the  ambitions  of 
the  Christian  Balkan  States,  and  we  have  therefore  —  notwithstand- 
ing that  we  well  knew  how  little  value  was  to  be  attached  to  Servian 
promises  —  suffered  Servia  to  increase  her  territory  after  the  annexa- 
tion crisis  of  1908  to  nearly  double  its  former  extent. 

Since  that  time  the  subversive  movement  which  has  been  fostered 
in  Servia  against  the  Monarchy  has  assumed  such  excessive  propor- 
tions that  the  vital  interests  of  Austria-Hungary,  and  even  of  our 
Dynasty  itself,  appear  to  be  threatened  by  the  revolutionary  activities 
of  Servia. 

We  must  assume  that  to  conservative  loyal  Russia  energetic 
measures  on  our  part  against  this  menace  to  all  public  order  will 
appear  intelligible  and  indeed  necessary. 

When  Your  Excellency  reaches  this  point  in  your  conversation 
with  M.  Sazonof,  the  moment  will  have  arrived  to  add  to  your  expla- 
nation of  our  motives  and  intentions  the  hint  that  we  —  as  your 
Excellency  will  have  already  been  in  a  position  to  explain  —  aim  at 
no  territorial  gains,  and  also  did  not  wish  to  infringe  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Kingdom,  but  that,  on  the  other  hand,  we  will  proceed  to  ex- 
treme measures  for  the  enforcement  of  our  demands. 

That  we  had  striven  up  till  now,  so  far  as  in  us  lay,  to  preserve  the 
peace  which  we  considered  to  be  the  most  precious  possession  of 
nations,  was  shown  by  the  course  of  events  during  the  last  40  years, 
and  by  the  historical  fact  that  our  gracious  Emperor  has  won  for  him- 
self the  glorious  title  of  "Protector  of  the  Peace." 

We  should,  therefore,  most  sincerely  deplore  the  disturbance  of 
the  European  peace,  because  we  also  were  of  the  opinion  that  the 
strengthening  of  the  Balkan  States  in  a  position  of  political  and 
national  independence  would  prove  to  the  advantage  of  our  relations 
with  Russia,  and  would  also  remove  all  possibility  of  antagonism 
between  us  and  Russia;  also  because  we  have  always  been  ready, 
in  the  shaping  of  our  own  policy,  to  take  into  consideration  the 
dominant  political  interests  of  Russia. 

Any  further  toleration  of  Servian  intrigues  would  undermine  our 
existence  as  a  State  and  our  position  as  a  Great  Power,  thus  also 
threatening  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe.  We  are,  however,  con- 
vinced that  it  is  to  Russia's  own  interests,  as  her  peaceful  leaders  will 
clearly  see,  that  the  existing  European  balance  of  power  which  is  of 
such  importance  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  should  be  maintained. 
Our  action  against  Servia,  whatever  form  it  takes,  is  conservative 

1  See  note  1  to  Enclosure  of  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25,  1914, 
where  it  is  stated  that  Sir  E.  Grey  did  not  publish  this  "dossier."  Russia  also  omitted 
it  in  her  published  documents  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book. 


148  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

from  first  to  last,  and  its  object  is  the  necessary  preservation  of  our 
position  in  Europe. 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    27 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  25,  1914, 

As  point  5  of  our  demands,  namely,  the  participation  of  representa- 
tives of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  in  the  suppression  of  the 
subversive  movement  in  Servia  has  given  rise  to  special  objection  on 
the  part  of  M.  Sazonof,  your  Excellency  will  explain  in  strict  confi- 
dence with  regard  to  this  point  that  this  clause  was  interpolated 
merely  out  of  practical  considerations,  and  was  in  no  way  intended 
to  infringe  on  the  sovereignty  of  Servia. 

By  "collaboration"  in  point  5,  we  are  thinking  of  the  establish- 
ment of  a  private  "Bureau  de  Surete"  at  Belgrade,  which  would 
operate  in  the  same  way  as  the  analogous  Russian  establishments  in 
Paris  and  in  co-operation  with  the  Servian  police  and  administration. 

Belgium : 

To  Rome,  The  Hague,  and  Luxemburg. 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  3 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Rome,  The  Hague,  and  Luxemburg. 

Sir,  Brussels,  July  25,  1914. 

I  HAVE  addressed  an  undated  circular  note,  a  copy  of  which  is 
enclosed,  to  the  Belgian  representatives  accredited  to  the  Powers 
guaranteeing  the  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

Should  the  danger  of  a  war  between  France  and  Germany  be- 
come imminent,  this  circular  note  will  be  communicated  to  the 
Governments  of  the  guaranteeing  Powers,  in  order  to  inform  them 
of  our  fixed  determination  to  fulfil  those  international  obligations 
that  are  imposed  upon  us  by  the  treaties  of  1839. 

The  communications  in  question  would  only  be  made  upon  tele- 
graphic instructions  from  me. 

If  circumstances  lead  me  to  issue  such  instructions,  I  shall  re- 
quest you  also,  by  telegram,  to  notify  the  Government  to  which  you 
are  accredited  of  the  step  we  have  taken,  and  to  communicate  to 
them  a  copy  of  the  enclosed  circular  note  for  their  information,  and 
without  any  request  that  they  should  take  note  thereof. 

My  telegram  will  ^  inform  you  of  the  date  to  be  given  to  the  cir- 
cular note,  which  you  should  be  careful  to  fill  in  on  the  copy  which 
you  hand  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  point  out  that  this  despatch  and  its  enclo- 
sure should  be  treated  as  strictly  confidential  until  the  receipt  of 
fresh  instructions  from  me. 

1  Notice  the  absence  of  any  uncertainty  whether  or  not  such  a  telegram  will  be  sent. 


July  25,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  35  149 

Enclosure  in  No.  3 
(See  Enclosure  in  No.  2.) 

From  Belgrade 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  4 

M.  Michotte  de  Welle,  Belgian  Minister  at  Belgrade,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Sir,  .  Belgrade,  July  25,  1914} 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  the  text  of  the  reply 
returned  by  the  Servian  Government  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
note  of  the  10  (23)  July. 


Enclosure  in  No.  4 

[Text  of  the  Serbian  reply,  for  which  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  No.  25, 
July  25  and  No.  34,  July  27,  1914.] 

France : 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  35 

M,  Jules  Camhon,  French  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Belgian  Minister  appears  very  anxious  about  the  course  of 
events. 

He  is  of  opinion  that  Austria  and  Germany  have  desired  to  take 
advantage  of  the  fact  that,  owing  to  a  combination  of  circumstances 
at  the  present  moment,  Russia  and  England  appear  to  them  to  be 
threatened  by  domestic  troubles,  while  in  France  the  state  of  the 
army  is  under  discussion.  Moreover,  he  does  not  believe  in  the 
pretended  ignorance  of  the  Government  of  Berlin  on  the  subject  of 
Austria's  demarche. 

He  thinks  that  if  the  form  of  it  has  not  been  submitted  to  the 
Cabinet  at  Berlin,  the  moment  of  its  despatch  has  been  cleverly 
chosen  in  consultation  with  that  Cabinet,  in  order  to  surprise  the 
Triple  Entente  at  a  moment  of  disorganisation. 

He  has  seen  the  Italian  Ambassador,  who  has  just  interrupted 
his  holiday  in  order  to  return.  It  looks  as  if  Italy  would  be  surprised, 
to  put  it  no  higher,  at  having  been  kept  out  of  the  whole  affair  by 
her  two  allies.^  j^^^^  ^ambon. 

1  This  despatch  could  not  have  reached  Brussels  on  July  25.  It  was  probably  sent 
by  mail.  In  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  6,  July  27,  the  actual  Serbian  reply  does  not  seem 
to  be  known.  Cf .  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  56,  July  26,  where  it  is  stated  that  the 
reply  became  known  after  a  delay  of  20  hours.  Cf.  also  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  36, 
July  27. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  36,  same  day,  where  according  to  the  German  Am- 
bassador Austria-Hungary  had  acted  without  consulting  either  Germany  or  Italy. 


150  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Viviani  and  London,  Berlin,  Petrograd,  and  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  36 

M,  Bienvenu- Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Stock- 
holm {for  the  President  of  the  Council),  and  to  London,  Berlin, 
St.  Petershurgh,  Vienna. 

Paris,  July  25,  191 J^. 

The  German  Ambassador  came  at  12  o'clock  to  protest  against 
an  article  ^  in  the  Ech)  de  Paris  which  applied  the  term  "  German 
threat"  (menace  allemande)  to  his  demarche  of  yesterday.  Herr 
von  Schoen  told  a  certain  number  of  journalists,  and  came  to  state 
at  the  Direction  Politique,  that  there  has  been  no  "concert"  between 
Austria  and  Germany  in  connection  with  the  Austrian  note,  and  that 
the  German  Government  had  no  knowledge  of  this  note  when  it  was 
communicated  to  them  at  the  same  time  as  to  the  other  Powers, 
though  they  had  approved  it  subsequently. 

Baron  von  Schoen  added,  moreover,  that  there  was  no  "threat"; 
the  German  Government  had  merely  indicated  that  they  thought 
it  desirable  to  localise  the  dispute,  and  that  the  intervention  of  other 
Powers  ran  the  risk  of  aggravating  it. 

The  Acting  Political  Director  took  note  of  Baron  von  Schoen's 
demarche.  Having  asked  ^  him  to  repeat  the  actual  terms  of  the 
last  two  paragraphs  of  his  note,  he  remarked  to  him  that  the  terms 
showed  the  willingness  of  Germany  to  act  as  intermediary  between 
the  Powers  and  Austria.  M.  Berthelot  added  that,  as  no  private 
information  had  been  given  to  any  journalist,  the  information  in  the 
Echo  de  Paris  involved  this  newspaper  alone,  and  merely  showed  that 
the  German  demarche  appeared  to  have  been  known  elsewhere  than 
at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  and  apart  from  any  action  on  his  part.  The 
German  Ambassador  did  not  take  up  the  allusion. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  London  also 
came  to  reassure  Sir  Edward  Grey,  telling  him  that  the  Austrian 
note  did  not  constitute  an  "ultimatum"  but  "a  demand  for  a  reply 
with  a  time  limit";  which  meant  that  if  the  Austrian  demands  are 
not  accepted  by  6  o'clock  this  evening,  the  Austrian  minister  will 
leave  Belgrade  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  will  begin 
military  "preparations"  but  not  military  "operations." 

The  Cabinet  of  London,  like  those  of  Paris  and  St.  Petersburgh, 
has  advised  Belgrade  to  express  regret  ^  for  any  complicity  which 
might  be  established  in  the  crime  of  Serajevo,  and  to  promise  the 
most  complete  satisfaction  in  this  respect.  The  Cabinet  added  that 
in  any  case  it  was  Servia's  business  to  reply  in  terms  which  the  inter- 
ests of  the  country  appeared  to  call  for.     The  British  Minister  at 

1  Cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  19,  of  same  day  commenting  on  the  inaccuracies 
and  additions  of  this  article. 

2  This  refers  to  the  interview  of  the  previous  day,  July  24,  French  Yellow  Book  No. 
28.      There,  however,  Mr,  Martin  himself  does  the  asking. 

3  Belgrade  had  obviously  not  done  so  before,  for  if  it  had  this  advice  would  have 
been  superfluous.  One  of  the  chief  grounds  of  complaint  that  Austria-Hungary  had 
against  Serbia  was  that  the  latter  had  neither  officially  expressed  her  regret,  nor  con- 
trolled the  exultation  permeating  the  Serbian  press. 


July  25,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  37  151 

Belgrade  is  to  consult  his  French  and  Russian  colleagues,  and,  if 
these  have  had  corresponding  instructions  in  the  matter,  advise  ^  the 
Servian  Government  to  give  satisfaction  on  all  the  points  on  which 
they  shall  decide  that  they  are  able  to  do  so. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  told  Prince  Lichnowsky  (who,  up  to  the  present,^ 
has  made  no  communication  to  him  similar  to  that  of  Herr  von  Schoen 
at  Paris)  that  if  the  Austrian  note  caused  no  difficulty  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  the  British  Government  would  not  have  to 
concern  themselves  with  it,  but  that  it  was  to  be  feared  that  the 
stiffness  of  the  note  and  the  shortness  of  the  time  limit  would  bring 
about  a  state  of  tension.  Under  these  conditions  the  only  chance 
that  could  be  seen  of  avoiding  a  conflict  would  consist  in  the  mediation 
of  France,  Germany,  Italy  ^  and  England,  Germany  alone  being  able 
to  influence  the  Government  at  Vienna  in  this  direction. 

The  German  Ambassador  replied  that  he  would  transmit  this 
suggestion  to  Berlin,  but  he  gave  the  Russian  Ambassador,  who  is 
a  relative  of  his,  to  understand  that  Germany  would  not  lend 
herself  to  any  demarche  at  Vienna. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  37 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu^ 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  25,  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  came  to  the  Foreign  Office  to  state  that 
his  Government  would  refuse^  to  interfere  in  the  dispute  between 
Austria  and  Servia. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  replied  that  without  the  co-operation  of  Germany 
at  Vienna,  England  would  not  be  able  to  take  action  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh.  If,  however,  both  Austria  and  Russia  mobilised,  that  would 
certainly  be  the  occasion  for  the  four  other  Powers  to  intervene. 
Would  the  German  Government  then  maintain  its  passive  attitude, 
and  would  it  refuse  to  join  with  England,  France  and  Italy  ? 

Prince  Lichnowsky  does  not  think  so,  since  the  question  would 

1  As  a  matter  of  fact,  while  such  instructions  were  sent  by  Sir  E.  Grey  the  British 
representative  failed  to  offer  this  advice  to  Serbia.  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  22,  July 
25,  1914.  He  gave  as  his  reason  that  his  French  and  Russian  colleagues  "have  not 
yet  received  instructions  from  their  Governments."  So  far  as  the  French  Minister  is 
concerned,  this  explanation  is  at  variance  with  the  above  despatch. 

2  This  is  wrong  ;   see  British  Blue  Book  No.  9,  July  24,  1914. 

3  This  was  the  British  formula  of  July  24,  1915.  On  the  day  of  this  despatch, 
however,  July  25,  Sir  E.  Grey  had  changed  this  formula  to  read  Germany,  France, 
Russia  and  Great  Britain ;   see  British  Blue  Book  No.  25. 

^  This  is  not  so  stated  in  any  despatch  of  this  date  in  the  British  Blue  Book.  Cf. 
British  Blue  Book  No.  25,  where  the  German  Ambassador  is  quoted  by  Sir  E.  Grey : 
"if  what  I  contemplated  was  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia,  Austria  might 
be  able  with  dignity  to  accept  it."  This  means  that  Sir  E.  Grey's  original  idea  of 
mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia  might  be  acceptable,  while  its  modification, 
under  the  pressure  of  the  French  Ambassador,  of  mediation  between  Austria  and 
Serbia  was  not  acceptable. 


152  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

no  longer  be  one  of  difficulties  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade,  but  of 
a  conflict  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  added  this  observation,  that  if  war  eventually 
broke  out,  no  Power  in  Europe  would  be  able  to  take  up  a  detached 
attitude^  (pourrait  s'en  desinteresser) . 

De  Fleuriau. 

From  Petrograd 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  38 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  25, 1914. 

The  Russian  Government  is  about  to  endeavour  to  obtain  from 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  an  extension  of  the  time  limit 
fixed  by  the  ultimatum,  in  order  that  the  Powers  may  be  able  to 
form  an  opinion  on  the  judicial  dossier,  the  communication  of  which 
is  offered  to  them.^ 

M.  Sazonof  has  asked  the  German  Ambassador  to  point  out  to  his 
Government  the  danger  of  the  situation,  but  he  refrained  from  mak- 
ing any  allusion  to  the  measures  ^  which  Russia  would  no  doubt  be  led 
to  take,  if  either  the  national  independence  or  the  territorial  integrity 
of  Servia  were  threatened.  The  evasive  replies  and  the  recrimina- 
tions of  Count  de  Pourtales  left  an  unfavourable  impression  on  M. 
Sazonof. 

The  Ministers  will  hold  a  Council  to-morrow  with  the  Emperor 
presiding.  M.  Sazonof  preserves  complete  moderation.^  "  We  must 
avoid,"  he  said  to  me,  "everything  which  might  precipitate  the  crisis. 
I  am  of  opinion  that,  even  if  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
come  to  blows  with  Servia,  we  ought  not  to  break  off  negotiations." 

Paleologue. 

To  Vienna 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  39 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,   Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M, 
Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 

Paris,  July  25, 1914. 

The  Russian  Government  has  instructed  its  representative  at 
Vienna  to  ask  the  Austrian  Government  for  an  extension  of  the  time 

1  The  New  York  Times  translation  reads  "would  be  able  to  remain  aloof  from  it." 
A  comparison  of  Fleuriau's  report  of  Sir  E.  Grey's  words  with  the  latter's  own  report 
of  what  he  told  the  German  Ambassador,  British  Blue  Book  No.  25,  reveals  that 
Fleuriau  gave  his  Government  the  impression  that  Sir  E.  Grey  had  far  more  definitely 
hinted  to  the  German  Ambassador  that  England  would  fight  by  the  side  of  France 
and  Russia  than  Sir  E.  Grey  himself  stated  he  had  done. 

2  This  suggests  that  Sir  E.  Grey  knew  of  the  preparation  of  the  dossier.  Of.  notes  to 
British  Blue  Book  No.  48,  July  27,  and  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25 
(enclosure). 

'  This  means  Russia's  intention  to  go  to  war ;  of.  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25, 
1914. 

<  For  his  determination,  however,  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  1914. 


July  25,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  4I  153 

limit  fixed  for  Servia,  so  as  to  enable  the  Powers  to  form  an  opinion 
on  the  dossier  which  Austria  has  offered  to  communicate  to  them,  and 
with  a  view  to  avoiding  regrettable  consequences  for  everyone. 

A  refusal  of  this  demand  by  Austria-Hungary  would  deprive  of  all 
meaning  the  demarche  which  she  made  to  the  Powers  by  communi- 
cating her  note  to  them,  and  would  place  her  in  a  position  of  con- 
flict with  international  ethics. 

The  Russian  Government  has  asked  that  you  should  make  a  corre- 
sponding and  urgent  demarche  to  Count  Berchtold.  I  beg  you  to 
support  the  request  of  your  colleague.^  The  Russian  Government 
have  sent  the  same  request  to  London,  Rome,  Berlin  and  Bucharest. 

Bienvenu-Maktin. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  40 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  Jidy  25,  1914. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  had  communicated  to  him  this  morning  the 
instructions  which  require  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  ask 
for  an  extension  of  the  time  limit  given  to  Servia  by  Austria's  note 
of  the  day  before  yesterday.  M.  Sazonof  asked  that  the  Russian 
demarche  should  be  supported  by  the  British  Embassy. 

Sir  Edw^ard  Grey  telegraphed  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  to  take  the  same 
action  ^  as  his  Russian  colleague,  and  to  refer  to  Austria's  communi- 
cation which  was  made  to  him  late  last  night  by  Count  Mensdorff, 
according  to  the  terms  of  which  the  failure  of  Servia  to  comply  with 
the  conditions  of  the  ultimatum  would  only  result,  as  from  to-day, 
in  a  diplomatic  rupture  and  not  in  immediate  military  operations. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  inferred  from  this  action  that  time  would  be  left 
for  the  Powers  to  intervene  and  find  means  for  averting  the  crisis. 

De  Fleuriau. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  41 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  25,  1914. 

This  morning  the  British  Charge  d'Affaires,  acting  under  instruc- 
tions from  his  Government,  asked  Herr  von  Jagow  if  Germany  were 
willing  to  join  with  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy  with  the  object  of 

1  The  French  Minister  did  not  do  so ;  cf .  French  Yellow  Book  No.  48,  same  day. 
For  a  discussion  of  his  reasons  see  above,  Austro-Hunganan  Red  Book  No.  21,  July  25, 
1914 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  26,  July  25,  1914  where  Sir  E.  Grey  writes :  "You  may 
support  in  general  terms,  etc." 


154  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

intervening  between  Austria  and  Russia,  to  prevent  a  conflict  and, 
in  the  first  instance,  to  ask  Vienna  to  grant  an  extension  of  the  time 
Hmit  imposed  on  Servia  by  the  ultimatum. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  directly 
after  the  receipt  of  Prince  Lichnowsky's  despatch  informing  him  of 
the  intentions  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  he  had  already  telegraphed  this 
very  morning  to  the  German  ^  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  the  effect 
that  he  should  ask  Count  Berchtold  for  this  extension.  Unfor- 
tunately Count  Berchtold  is  at  Ischl.^  In  any  case  Herr  von  Jagow 
does  not  think  that  this  request  would  be  granted. 

The  British  Charge  d'Affaires  also  enquired  of  Herr  von  Jagow,  as 
I  had  done  yesterday,  if  Germany  had  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
Austrian  note  before  it  was  despatched,  and  he  received  so  clear  a 
reply  in  the  negative  that  he  was  not  able  to  carry  the  matter  further ; 
but  he  could  not  refrain  from  expressing  his  surprise  at  the  blank 
cheque  given  by  Germany  to  Austria. 

Herr  von  Jagow  having  replied  to  him  that  the  matter  was  a 
domestic  one  for  Austria,  he  remarked  that  it  had  become  essentially 
an  international  one. 

Jules  Cambon. 


French  Yellow  Book  No.  42 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  has  been  instructed  to  ask  the 
German  Government  to  make  strong  representations  to  the  Cabinet 
at  Vienna,  with  a  view  to  obtaining  an  extension  of  the  time  limit 
of  the  ultimatum. 

Herr  von  Jagow  not  having  made  an  appointment  with  him  until 
late  in  the  afternoon,^  that  is  to  say,  till  the  very  moment  when  the 
ultimatum  will  expire,  M.  Broniewski  sent  an  urgent  note  addressed  to 
the  Secretary  of  State  in  which  he  points  out  that  the  lateness  of 
Austria's  communication  to  the  Powers  makes  the  effect  of  this  com- 
munication illusory,  inasmuch  as  it  does  not  give  the  Powers  time  to 
consider  the  facts  brought  to  their  notice  before  the  expiration  of 
the  time  limit.  He  insists  very  strongly  on  the  necessity  for  extending 
the  time  limit,  unless  the  intention  be  to  create  a  serious  crisis. 

Jules  Cambon. 

1  In  French  text  by  an  obvious  error  "de  la  Grande-Bretagne  "  is  printed. 

2  Count  Berchtold  left  for  Ischl  on  the  25th  in  the  morning ;  cf .  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book  No.  21,  same  day.  The  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Serbia  had  been  made 
known  to  Russia  in  the  evening  of  July  23  ;  and  had  been  known  to  France  and,  there- 
fore, probably  to  the  Entente  Powers,  in  general  terms,  inclusive  of  the  fact  that 
there  would  be  a  time  limit,  on  July  19,  1914  ;  cf.  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  13  and  14. 

'  Cf.  the  previous  despatch  No.  41,  where  Mr.  von  Jagow  is  spoken  of  as  having 
received  the  British  Charg6  d'Affaires  in  the  same  matter,  and  having  already  re- 
quested an  extension  of  the  time  limit. 


July  25,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  44  155 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  43 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Berlin,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  has,  in  accordance  with  his  in- 
structions, approached  the  Secretary  of  State  with  a  view  to  securing 
an  extension  of  the  time  Hmit  of  the  ultimatum.  Herr  von  Jagow 
repHed  that  he  had  already  transmitted  to  Vienna  a  suggestion 
of  this  nature,  but  that  in  his  opinion  all  these  demarches  were  too 
late. 

M.  Broniewski  insisted  that  if  the  time  limit  could  not  be  extended, 
action  ^  at  least  might  be  delayed  so  as  to  allow  the  Powers  to  exert 
themselves  to  avoid  a  conflict.  He  added  that  the  Austrian  note 
was  couched  in  terms  calculated  to  wound  Servia  and  to  force  her  into 
war. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  there  was  no  question  of  a  war,  but 
of  an  "execution''  ^  in  a  local  matter. 

The  Charge  d'Affaires  in  reply  expressed  regret  that  the  German 
Government  did  not  weigh  their  responsibilities  in  the  event  of  hos- 
tilities breaking  out,  which  might  extend  to  the  rest  of  Europe ;  to 
this  Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  he  refused  to  believe  in  such  con- 
sequences. 

The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires,  like  myself,  has  heard  the  rumour 
that  Austria,  while  declaring  that  she  did  not  desire  an  annexation 
of  territory,  would  occupy  parts  of  Servia  until  she  had  received 
complete  satisfaction.  "One  knows,"  he  said  to  me,  "what  this 
word  'satisfaction'  means."  M.  Broniewski's  impressions  of  Ger- 
many's ultimate  intentions  are  very  pessimistic. 

Jules  Cambon. 

From  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  44 

M.  Barrere,  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Rome,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  has  carried  out  at  the  Consulta  the 
demarche  which  M.  Sazonof  requested  the  representatives  of  Russia 
at  Paris,  Berlin,  Rome  and  Bucharest  ^  to  undertake,  the  object  of 
which  was  to  induce  these  various  Cabinets  to  take  action  similar 
to  that  of  Russia  at  Vienna,  with  a  view  of  obtaining  an  extension  of 
the  time  limit  imposed  on  Servia. 

1  Austria-Hungary  had  already  promised  that  actual  military  operations  would  be 
delayed  ;    cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  26,  July  25,  1914. 

2  There  is  no  reason  why  the  official  English  translation  should  have  retained  this 
French  word,  instead  of  translating  the  whole  phrase  which  means  "no  question  of 
war,  but  of  action  in  a  local  matter." 

3  The  occasional  appearance  of  Bucharest  in  these  despatches  is  noteworthy. 


156  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

In  the  absence  of  the  Marquis  di  San  GiuUano,  M.  Salandra  and 
M.  di  Martino  repKed  that  they  would  put  themselves  into  communi- 
cation with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  but  that  his  reply  could 
not  reach  them  until  towards  6  o'clock,  that  is  to  say,  too  late  to  take 
any  step  at  Vienna. 

Barrere. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  45 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  25, 1914. 

The  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  received  instructions  from  his 
Government  to  ask  for  an  extended  time  limit  for  the  ultimatum  to 
Servia  at  the  very  moment  ^  that  Count  Berchtold  was  leaving  for 
Ischl,  with  the  intention,  according  to  the  newspapers,  of  remaining 
there  near  the  Emperor  until  the  end  of  the  crisis. 

Prince  Koudacheff  informed  him  nevertheless  of  the  demarche  which 
he  had  to  carry  out,  by  means  of  two  telegrams  en  clair,  one  addressed 
to  him  on  his  journey  and  the  other  at  his  destination.  He  does  not 
expect  any  result. 

Baron  Macchio,  General  Secretary  of  the  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to  whom  the  Prince  communicated  the  tenour  of  his  instruc- 
tions and  of  his  telegrams,  behaved  with  icy  coldness  when  it  was 
represented  to  him  that  to  submit  for  consideration  grievances  with 
documentary  proofs  without  leaving  time  for  the  dossier  to  be  studied, 
was  not  consonant  with  international  courtesy.^  Baron  Macchio 
replied  that  one's  interests  sometimes  exempted  one  from  being 
courteous. 

The  Austrian  Government  is  determined  to  inflict  humiliation  on 
Servia  :  it  will  accept  no  intervention  from  any  Power  until  the  blow 
had  been  delivered  and  received  full  in  the  face  by  Servia. 

DUMAINE. 

From  Belgrade 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  46 

M.  Boppe,  French  Minister  at  Belgrade,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Belgrade,  July  25,  1914- 

M.  Pashitch  has  just  acquainted  me  with  the  reply  which  will  be 
sent  this  evening  to  the  Austrian  Minister. 

The  Servian  Government  agrees  to  publish  to-morrow  inihe  Journal 
Officiel  the  declaration  which  has  been  required  of  them ;   they  will 

1  This  was  in  the  morning ;  cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  21,  same  day. 

2  Austria-Hungary  was  of  a  different  opinion;  cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 
No.  21,  July  25,  and  note  2. 


July  25,  French  Yellow  Booh  No.  4.7  157 

communicate  it  also  to  the  army  by  means  of  an  Order  of  the  Day ; 
they  will  dissolve  the  societies  of  national  defence  and  all  other  asso- 
ciations which  might  agitate  against  Austria-Hungary ;  they  under- 
take to  modify  the  press  law,  to  dismiss  from  service  in  the  army, 
in  the  ministry  of  public  instruction  and  in  the  other  Government 
offices,  all  officials  who  shall  be  proved  to  have  taken  part  in  the 
propaganda ;  they  only  request  that  the  names  of  these  officials  may 
be  communicated  to  them. 

As  to  the  participation  of  Austrian  officials  in  the  enquiry,  the 
Government  ask  that  an  explanation  ^  of  the  manner  in  which  this 
will  be  exercised  may  be  given  to  them.  They  could  accept  no  parti- 
cipation which  conflicted  with  international  law  or  with  good  and 
neighbourly  relations. 

They  accept  all  the  other  demands  of  the  ultimatum  and  declare 
that  if  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  is  not  content  with  this, 
they  are  ready  to  refer  the  matter  to  the  Hague  Tribunal,  or  to  the 
decision  of  the  Great  Powers  who  took  part  in  the  preparation  of  the 
declaration  of  March  31,  1909. 

BOPPE. 


From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  47 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  25,  1914. 

Throughout  the  afternoon  there  has  been  a  persistent  rumour 
that  Servia  had  submitted  to  the  Austrian  demands.  This  even- 
ing the  newspapers  published  extra  editions  which  announce  a 
rupture  at  Belgrade  and  the  departure  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister. 

The  correspondent  of  the  Agence  Havas  at  the  Wilhelmstrasse  has 
just  received  confirmation  of  this  rumour.  Large  crowds  consisting 
of  several  hundred  persons  are  collecting  here  before  the  newspaper 
offices  and  a  demonstration  of  numbers  of  young  people  has  just  passed 
through  the  Pariser-platz  shouting  cries  of  "Hurrah"  for  Germany, 
and  singing  patriotic  songs.  The  demonstrators  are  visiting  the 
Siegessdule,  the  Austrian  and  then  the  Italian  ^  Embassy.  It  is  a 
significant  outburst  of  chauvinism. 

A  German  ^  whom  I  saw  this  evening  confessed  to  me  that  it  had 
been  feared  here  that  Servia  would  accept  the  whole  Austrian  note, 

1  For  an  explanation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  meaning  see  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book  No.  27,  of  the  same  day. 

2  As  early  as  in  1912  Paul  Rohrbach  had  pointed  out  in  Der  deutsche  Gedanke  in 
der  Welt  (translated,  German  World  Policies,  The  Macmillan  Co.)  that  in  a  European 
conflagration  Germany  could  not  count  on  the  support  of  Italy. 

3  For  a  clear  understanding  of  the  ante-war  days  it  is  unfortunate  that  the  French 
Ambassador  in  Berlin  not  infrequently  quotes  anonymous  Germans  whose  standing 
and  importance  remain  obscure. 


158  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

reserving  to  herself  the  right  to  discuss  the  manner  in  which  effect 
should  be  given  to  it,  in  order  to  gain  time  and  to  allow  the  efforts 
of  the  Powers  to  develop  effectively  before  the  rupture. 

In  financial  circles  measures  are  already  being  taken  to  meet  every 
eventuality,  for  no  means  of  averting  the  crisis  is  seen,  in  view  of 
the  determined  support  which  Germany  is  giving  to  Austria. 

I,  for  my  part,  see  in  Great  Britain  the  only  Power  which  might 
be  listened  to  at  Berlin. 

Whatever  happens,  Paris,  St.  Petersburgh  and  London  will  not  suc- 
ceed in  maintaining  peace  with  dignity  unless  they  show  a  firm  and 
absolutely  united  front. ^ 

Jules  Cambon. 


From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  48 

M.  DumainCy  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  A  fairs. 

Vienna,  July  25, 1914. 

Your  telegram^  reaches  me  exactly  at  the  moment  when  the  time 
limit  given  to  Servia  expires.  On  the  other  hand  I  have  just  informed 
you  under  what  conditions  the  Russian  Charge  d 'Affaires  has  had 
to  carry  out  his  demarche.  It  seems  useless  to  support  him  when 
there  is  no  longer  any  time  for  it.^ 

During  the  afternoon  a  rumour  spread  that  Servia  had  yielded 
to  the  ultimatum,  while  adding  that  she  was  appealing  to  the  Powers 
against  it.  But  the  latest  news  is  that  at  the  last  moment  we  are 
assured  that  the  Austrian  Minister  has  just  left  Belgrade  hurriedly; 
he  must  have  thought  the  Servian  Government's  acceptance  of  the 
conditions  imposed  by  his  Government  inadequate. 

DUMAINE. 


French  Yellow  Book  No.  49 
Reply  of  Serbian  Government  to  AuMro-Hungarian  Note. 

(Communicated  by  M.  Vesnitch,  Serbian  Minister,  July  27.)  ^ 
[For  the  text  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914, 
or  lb.  No.  25,  July  25,  1914.] 

1  This  was  Russia's  great  aim,  to  secure  England's  unconditional  support ;  cf. 
British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  June  24,  1914,  and  no.  17,  June  25. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  39,  same  day. 

'  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  21,  same  day:  "This  morning."  The  time 
limit  was  to  expire  at  6  p.m.  See  also  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  15,  same  day.  There 
would  not  seem  to  be  any  reason  why  the  French  Ambassador  should  have  received 
his  instructions  too  late  to  act.     See  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  13,  July  25,  1914. 

*  Notice  the  day,  July  27,  when  the  Serbian  reply  was  officially  presented.  A  sum- 
mary reached  France  on  July  26,  but  with  a  delay  of  .20  hours.  See  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  56,  July  26. 


July  25,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  6  159 

Germany: 

To  London 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  13 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  London  on 
July  25th,  1914. 

The  distinction^  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  between  an  Austro- 
Servian  and  an  Austro-Russian  conflict  is  perfectly  correct.  We  do 
not  wish  to  interpose  in  the  former  any  more  than  England,  and  as 
heretofore  we  take  the  position  that  this  question  must  be  localised 
by  virtue  of  all  powers  refraining  from  intervention.  It  is  therefore 
our  hope  that  Russia  will  refrain  from  any  action  in  view  of  her  re- 
sponsibility and  the  seriousness  of  the  situation.  We  are  prepared, 
in  the  event  of  an  Austro-Russian  controversy,  quite  apart  from  our 
known  duties  as  allies,  to  intercede  between  Russia  and  Austria 
jointly  with  the  other  powers. 

From  Petrograd 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  6 

Telegram   of  the    Imperial  Ambassador   at   St.   Petersburgh,    to  the 
Chancellor  on  July  25th,  1914- 

Message  to  H.M.  from  General  von  Chelius  (German  honorary 
aide  de  camp  to  the  Czar). 

The  manoeuvres  of  the  troops  in  the  Krasnoe  camp  were  suddenly 
interrupted  and  the  regiments  returned  to  their  garrisons  at  once. 
The  manoeuvres  have  been  cancelled.  The  military  pupils  were 
raised  to-day  to  the  rank  of  officers  instead  of  next  fall.  At  head- 
quarters there  obtains  great  excitement  over  the  procedure  of  Austria. 
I  have  the  impression  ^  that  complete  preparations  for  mobilisation 
against  Austria  are  being  made. 

1  Sir  Edward  Grey  knew  from  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  6  and  17  of  Russia's  determina- 
tion to  intervene  in  favor  of  Serbia.  Germany  believed  that  Russia  would  not  inter- 
vene because,  without  England,  she  might  be  forced  by  France  to  r^rain  from  aggressive 
action,  and  in  view  of  Asquith's  invectives  against  Serbia  in  Parliament  after  the  Serajevo 
murder  [The  Times,  July  1,  1914  quotes  him  as  saying,  "We  are  once  more  confronted 
with  one  of  those  incredible  crimes  which  almost  make  us  despair  of  the  progress  of 
mankind"]  did  not  believe  that  England  would  go  to  war  for  Serbia. 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  first  proposal  was  that  four  powers  should  intervene  simul- 
taneously in  Petrograd  and  in  Vienna.  This  plan  was  modified  under  French  pressure 
(see  despatches  of  July  24  and  25,  1914)  to  amount  to  a  request  that  Germany  induce 
Austria-Hungary  to  submit  her  case  against  Serbia  to  a  conference  of  four  powers, 
one  of  whom  should  be  Russia  herself  (British  Blue  Book  No.  25,  July  25,  1914). 

The  German  position  is  made  perfectly  clear  in  the  above  despatch. 

2  The  correctness  of  this  impression  is  proved  by  the  telegram  from  the  Czar  to 
the  German  Emperor  of  July  30  (German  White  Book,  Exhibit  23a),  in  which  the  Czar 
says:  "The  military  measures  now  taking  form  were  decided  upon  five  days  ago." 
Cf.  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  and  note  5.  And  for  the  general  subject  o^ 
Russian  mobilization  see  the  American  Review  of  Reviews,  May,  1914,  p.  544:  "The 
French  papers  are  now  admitting  that  Russia's  recent  mobilization  of  a  million  men 
on  her  German  and  Austrian  frontiers  was  chiefly  intended  as  a  demonstration  to 
France  that  her  ally  could  help  her  in  time  of  need."  See  also  Musical  Courier,  Sept. 
30,  1915,  p.  8,  where  an  American  traveller  relates  his  experiences  with  mobilized  Rus- 
sian troops  in  Batum  and  in  Sebastopol  on  May  24,  1914. 


160  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Great  Britain: 

From  the  Riossian  Ambassador 

British  Blue  BtooK  No.  13  ^ 

Note  communicated  by  Russian  Ambassador,  July  25. 

(Translation.) 
M.    Sazonof    telegraphic  au         M.  Sazonof  telegraphs  to  the 
Charge   d'iVff aires   de   Russie   a     Russian    Charge    d' Affaires    at 
Vienne  en  date  du  11  (24)  juillet,     Vienna  on  the  11th  (24th)  July, 
1914:  1914: 

[For  the  text  see  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  4,  July  24,  1914.] 

To  Paris  and  Petrograd 
British  Blue  Book  No.  14 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  and  to 
Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914. 

Austrian  Ambassador  has  been  authorised  to  explain  to  me  that 
the  step  taken  at  Belgrade  was  not  an  ultimatum,  but  a  demarche 
with  a  time  limit,  and  that  if  the  Austrian  demands  were  not  com- 
plied with  within  the  time  limit  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
would  break  off  diplomatic  relations  and  begin  military  preparations, 
not  operations.^ 

In  case  Austro-Hungarian  Government  have  not  given  the  same 
information  at  Paris  (St.  Petersburgh),  you  should  inform  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  as  soon  as  possible ;  it  makes  the  immediate  situa- 
tion rather  less  acute. 

From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  15 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  25,   1914. 

I  LEARN  from  the  Acting  Political  Director  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment have  not  yet  received  the  explanation  from  the  Austrian  Gov- 

1  This  is  the  first  despatch  listed  in  the  British  Blue  Book  under  date  of  July  25. 
It  was  sent  on  the  24th  from  Petrograd  and  delivered  in  London  early  the  next  day. 
It  was  undoubtedly  received  at  the  same  time  in  Paris,  if  not  late  on  July  24.  Since 
it  is  not  listed  in  the  French  Yellow  Book  the  exact  time  when  it  was  received  cannot 
be  given.  It  may,  however,  be  surmised  that  in  the  absence  of  published  information  to 
the  contrary,  it  reached  Paris  in  ample  time  to  instruct  the  French  Ambassador  to  sup- 
port his  Russian  colleague  in  Vienna.  The  French  Ambassador,  however,  claimed  that 
his  instructions  reached  him  too  late ;  cf .  French  Yellow  Book  No.  48,  same  day. 

2  This  concession  of  Austria-Hungary  was  a  half-way  acceptance  of  Russia's 
request  (British  Blue  Book  No.  13,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  4)  for  an  extension  of 
the  time  limit. 


July  25,  British  Blue  Booh  No.  17  161 

eminent  contained  in  your  telegram  of  to-day .^  They  have,  how- 
ever, through  the  Servian  Minister  here,  given  similar  advice  to 
Servia  as  was  contained  in  your  telegram  to  Belgrade  of  yesterday .^ 


British  Blue  Book  No.  16 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  25,  1914. 

Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  no  suggestions  to  make 
except  that  moderating  advice  might  be  given  at  Vienna  as  well  as 
Belgrade.^  He  hopes  that  the  Servian  Government's  answer  to  the 
Austrian  ultimatum  will  be  sufficiently  favourable  to  obviate  extreme 
measures  being  taken  by  the  Austrian  Government.  He  says,  how- 
ever, that  there  would  be  a  revolution  in  Servia  if  she  were  to  accept 
the  Austrian  demands  in  their  entirety. 

From  Petrograd 

British  Blue  Book  No.  17 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petershurgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  25,  191^. 

I  SAW  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this  morning,  and  communi- 
cated to  his  Excellency  the  substance  of  your  telegram  of  to-day  to 
Paris,^  and  this  afternoon  I  discussed  with  him  the  communication 
which  the  French  Ambassador  suggested  should  be  made  to  the 
Servian  Government,  as  recorded  in  your  telegram  of  yesterday  to 
Belgrade.^ 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said,  as  regards  the  former,  that  the 
explanations  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador  did  not  quite  correspond 
with  the  information  which  had  reached  him  from  German  quarters.* 
As  regards  the  latter,  both  his  Excellency  and  the  French  Ambassador 
agreed  that  it  is  too  late  to  make  such  a  communication,  as  the  time 
limit  expires  this  evening. 

1  See  No.  14. 

2  The  advice  spoken  of  is  contained  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  12,  July  24,  1914,  a 
despatch  to  the  British  Minister  in  Belgrade,  who  in  No.  22,  July  25,  informs  Sir  E. 
Grey  that  he  had  not  offered  the  advice  because  his  French  and  Russian  colleagues 
had  received  no  instructions.     Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  1914. 

3  Cf.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  13,  July  25th,  and  note  ;  also  British  Blue  Book 
No.  10,  July  24,  and  note,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  34,  July  24.  France  wishes 
mediation  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade. 

4  See  No.  14. 

6  See  No.  12.  There  is  no  hint  in  Sir  E.  Grey's  despatch  to  Belgrade  that  it  was 
suggested  by  the  French  Ambassador.     Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  15,  and  note. 

«  The  published  despatches  contain  no  hint  as  to  this  information,  and  as  a  matter 
of  fact  Austria  did  as  she  had  told  England  she  would  do.  Sazonof,  moreover,  had 
received  the  correct  Austro-Hungarian  offer  through  the  Russian  Ambassador  in 
London,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  16,  same  day. 


162  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Servia  was  quite  ready 
to  do  as  you  had  suggested  and  to  punish  those  proved  to  be  guilty, 
but  that  no  independent  State  could  be  expected  to  accept  the  political 
demands  which  had  been  put  forward.  The  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  thought,  from  a  conversation  which  he  had  with  the  Servian 
Minister  yesterday,  that,  in  the  event  of  the  Austrians  attacking 
Servia,  the  Servian  Government  would  abandon  Belgrade,  and  with- 
draw their  forces  into  the  interior,  while  they  would  at  .the  same 
time  appeal  to  the  Powers  to  help  them.  His  Excellency  was  in 
favour  of  their  making  this  appeal.  He  would  like  to  see  the  question 
placed  on  an  international  footing,  as  the  obligations  taken  by  Servia 
in  1908,  to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  were 
given  not  to  Austria,  but  to  the  Powers. 

If  Servia  should  appeal  to  the  Powers,  Russia  would  be  quite  ready 
to  stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the  hands  of  England,  France, 
Germany,  and  Italy.  It  was  possible,  in  his  opinion,  that  Servia 
might  propose  to  submit  the  question  to  arbitration. 

On  my  expressing  the  earnest  hope  that  Russia  would  not  precipi- 
tate war  by  mobilising  until  you  had  had  time  to  use  your  influence 
in  favour  of  peace,  his  Excellency  assured  me  that  Russia  had  no  ag- 
gressive intentions,^  and  she  would  take  no  action  until  it  was  forced 
upon  her.  Austria's  action  was  in  reality  directed  against  Russia. 
She  aimed  at  overthrowing  the  present  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  and 
establishing  her  own  hegemony  there.  He  did  not  believe  that  Ger- 
many really  wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  was  decided  by  ours.  If 
we  took  our  stand  firmly  with  France  and  Russia  there  would  be  no 
war.  If  we  failed  them  now,  rivers  of  blood  would  flow,  and  we  would 
in  the  end  be  dragged  into  war. 

I  said  that  England  could  play  the  role  of  mediator  at  Berlin  and 
Vienna  to  better  purpose  as  friend  who,  if  her  counsels  of  moderation 
were  disregarded,  might  one  day  be  converted  into  an  ally,  than  if 
she  were  to  declare  herself  Russia's  ally  at  once.  His  Excellency  said 
that  unfortunately  Germany  was  convinced  that  she  could  count 
upon  our  neutrality. 

I  said  all  I  could  to  impress  prudence  on  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  warned  him  that  if  Russia  mobilised,  Germany  would 
not  be  content  with  mere  mobilisation,  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry 
out  hers,  but  would  probably  declare  war  at  once.  His  Excellency 
replied  that  Russia  could  not  allow  Austria  to  crush  Servia  and  be- 
come the  predominant  Power  in  the  Balkans,  and,  if  she  feels  secure 
of  the  support  of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks  of  war.  He  as- 
sured me  once  more  that  he  did  not  wish  to  precipitate  a  conflict, 
but  that  unless  Germany  could  restrain  Austria  I  could  regard  the 
situation  as  desperate. 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  1914,  and  last  paragraph  of  this  note. 


July  25y  British  Blue  Book  No.  18  163 

From  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  18 

Sir  H.  Rumhold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  25,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  the  24th  July  ^  acted  on. 

Secretary  of  State  says  that  on  receipt  of  a  telegram  at  10  this 
morning  from  German  Ambassador  at  London,  he  immediately  in- 
structed German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  pass  on  to  Austrian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  your  suggestion  for  an  extension  of  time 
limit,  and  to  speak  to  his  Excellency  about  it.  Unfortunately  it 
appeared  from  press  that  Count  Berchtold  ^  is  at  Ischl,  and  Secretary 
of  State  thought  that  in  these ,  circumstances  there  would  be  delay 
and  difficulty  in  getting  time  limit  extended.  Secretary  of  State 
said  that  he  did  not  know  what  Austria-Hungary  had  ready  on  the 
spot,  but  he  admitted  quite  freely  that  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment wished  to  give  the  Servians  a  lesson,  and  that  they  meant  to 
take  military  action.  He  also  admitted  that  Servian  Government 
could  not  swallow  certain  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  demands. 

Secretary  of  State  said  that  a  reassuring  feature  of  situation  was  that 
Count  Berchtold  had  sent  for  Russian  representative  at  Vienna  and 
had  told  him  that  Austria-Hungary  had  no  intention  of  seizing  Servian 
territory.  This  step  should,  in  his  opinion,  exercise  a  calming  in- 
fluence at  St.  Petersburgh.  I  asked  whether  it  was  not  to  be  feared 
that,  in  taking  military  action  against  Servia,  Austria  would  dan- 
gerously excite  public  opinion  in  Russia.  He  said  he  thought  not. 
He  remained  of  opinion  that  crisis  could  be  localised.  I  said  that 
telegrams  from  Russia  in  this  morning's  papers  did  not  look  very 
reassuring,  but  he  maintained  his  optimistic  view  with  regard  to 
Russia.  He  said  that  he  had  given  the  Russian  Government  to  under- 
stand that  last  thing  Germany  wanted  was  a  general  war,  and  he 
would  do  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  such  a  calamity.  If  the  relations 
between  Austria  and  Russia  became  threatening,  he  was  quite  ready 
to  fall  in  with  your  suggestion  as  to  the  four  Powers  working  in  favour 
of  moderation  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Secretary  of  State  confessed  privately  that  he  thought  the  note 
left  much  to  be  desired  as  a  diplomatic  document.  He  repeated  very 
earnestly  that,  though  he  had  been  accused  of  knowing  all  about  the 
contents  of  that  note,  he  had  in  fact  had  no  such  knowledge. 

1  See  No.  11,  July  24,  1914. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


164  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  19 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  25,) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  25,  1914. 

I  SAW  the  Secretary-General  this  morning  and  found  that  he 
knew  of  the  suggestion  that  France,  Italy,  Germany  and  ourselves 
should  work  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  in  favour  of  moderation, 
if  the  relations  between  Austria  and  Servia  become  menacing. 

In  his  opinion  Austria  will  only  be  restrained  by  the  unconditional 
acceptance  by  the  Servian  Government  of  her  note.  There  is  reliable 
information  that  Austria  intends  to  seize  the  Salonica  Railway. 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  20 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
—  {Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  25,  1914. 

Language  of  press  this  morning  leaves  the  impression  that  the 
surrender  of  Servia  is  neither  expected  nor  really  desired.  It  is 
officially  announced  that  the  Austrian  Minister  is  instructed  to  leave 
Belgrade  with  staff  of  legation  failing  unconditional  acceptance  of 
note  at  6  p.m.  to-day. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  goes  to  Ischl  to-day  ^  to  communicate 
personally  to  the  Emperor  Servian  reply  when  it  comes. 

From  Belgrade 

British  Blue  Book  No.  21 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  {Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Council  of  Ministers  is  now  drawing  up  their  reply  to  the 
Austrian  note.  I  am  informed  by  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  that  it  will  be  most  conciliatory  and  will  meet  the 
Austrian  demands  in  as  large  a  measure  as  is  possible. 

The  following  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  projected  reply :  — 
The  Servian  Government  consent  to  the  publication  of  a  declara- 
tion in  the  Official  Gazette.     The  ten  points  are  accepted  with  reserva- 
tions.    Servian  Government  declare  themselves  ready  to  agree  to 
a  mixed  commission  of  enquiry  so  long  as  the  appointment  of  the 

^  Cf .  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  21,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  45  and  note, 
July  26,  1915. 


July  25,  British  Blue  Book  No.  24  165 

commission  can  be  shown  to  be  in  accordance  with  international 
usage.  They  consent  to  dismiss  and  prosecute  those  officers  who  can 
be  clearly  proved  to  be  guilty,  and  they  have  already  arrested  the 
officer  referred  to  in  the  Austrian  note.  They  are  prepared  to  sup- 
press the  Narodna  Odbrana. 

The  Servian  Government  consider  that,  unless  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment want  war  at  any  cost,  they  cannot  but  be  content^  with  the  full 
satisfaction  offered  in  the  Servian  reply. 

British  Blue  Book  No.  22 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British   Charge  d' Affaires,   at  Belgrade,   to  Sir 
Edward  Grey.  —  (Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  25,  1914- 

I  HAVE  seen  the  new  French  Minister,  who  has  just  arrived  from 
Constantinople,  and  my  Russian  colleague,  and  informed  them  of 
your  views. 

They  have  not  yet  received  instructions  from  their  Governments, 
and  in  view  of  this  and  of  the  proposed  conciliatory  terms  of  the 
Servian  reply,  I  have  up  to  now  abstained^  from  offering  advice  to 
the  Servian  Government. 

I  think  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  Russian  Government  have 
already  urged  the  utmost  moderation  on  the  Servian  Government. 

British  Blue  Book  No.  23 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  {Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Austrian  Minister  left  at  6.30. 

The  Government  have  left  for  Nish,  where  the  Skuptchina  ^  will 
meet  on  Monday.  I  am  leaving  with  my  other  colleagues,  but  the 
vice-consul  is  remaining  in  charge  of  the  archives. 

To  Petrograd 

British  Blue  Book  No.  24 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914. 

You  spoke  quite  rightly  in  very  difficult  circumstances  as  to  the 
attitude  of  His  Majesty's  Government.     I  entirely  approve  what  you 

1  For  reasons  why  Austria-Hungary  was  not  content,  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  12.  July  24. 

3  The  Serbian  Parliament. 


166  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

said  as  reported  in  your  telegram  of  yesterday/  and  I  cannot  promise 
more  on  behalf  of  the  Government. 

I  do  not  consider  that  public  opinion  here  would  or  ought  to  sanc- 
tion our  going  to  war  over  a  Servian  quarrel.^  If,  however,  war  does 
take  place,  the  development  of  other  issues  may  draw  us  into  it,  and 
I  am  therefore  anxious  to  prevent  it. 

The  sudden,  brusque,  and  peremptory  character  of  the  Austrian 
demarche  makes  it  almost  inevitable  that  in  a  very  short  time  both 
Russia  and  Austria  will  have  mobilised  against  each  other.  In  this 
event,  the  only  chance  of  peace,  in  my  opinion,  is  for  the  other  four 
Powers  to  join  in  asking  the  Austrian  and  Russian  Governments  not 
to  cross  the  frontier,  and  to  give  time  for  the  four  Powers  acting  at 
Vienna  and  St.  Peter sburgh  to  try  and  arrange  matters.  If  Germany 
will  adopt  this  view,  I  feel  strongly  that  France  and  ourselves  should 
act  upon  it.     Italy  would  no  doubt  gladly  co-operate. 

No  diplomatic  intervention  or  mediation  would  be  tolerated  by 
either  Russia  or  Austria  unless  it  was  clearly  impartial  and  included 
the  allies  or  friends  of  both.  The  co-operation  of  Germany  would 
therefore,  be  essential.' 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  25 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  H.  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d^  Affaires  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  25, 1914. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  has  been  authorised  to  inform  me  that 
the  Austrian  method  of  procedure  on  expiry  of  the  time  limit  would 
be  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations  and  commence  military  prepara- 
tions, but  not  military  operations.  In  informing  the  German  Am- 
bassador of  this,  I  said  that  it  interposed  a  stage  of  mobilisation 
before  the  frontier  was  actually  crossed,  which  I  had  urged  yesterday 
should  be  delayed. 

Apparently  we  should  now  soon  be  face  to  face  with  the  mobilisa- 
tion of  Austria  and  Russia.  The  only  chance  of  peace,  if  this  did 
happen,  would  be  for  Germany,  France,  Russia,^  and  ourselves  to  keep 

1  See  No.  6,  July  24.  1916. 

*  This  disposes  of  the  claim  popularly  made  that  one  of  the  reasons  why  Great 
Britain  went  to  war  was  in  part  to  protect  the  independence  of  a  little  state  —  Serbia. 

3  Germany  accepted  Sir  Edward  Grey's  view  and  promised  her  cooperation  in  media- 
tion between  Russia  and  Austria  on  this  same  day,  July  25,  cf.  German  White  Book, 
Exhibit  13.  Cf.,  however,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  37,  same  day,  where  Germany 
is  quoted  as  refusing  to  interfere  between  Austria  and  Serbia. 

The  Petrograd-Vienna  mediation  may  be  called  the  Sir  E.  Grey  plan,  and  this 
Germany  accepted  on  July  25.  The  Vienna-Belgrade  mediation  may  be  called  the 
Paul  Cambon  modification,  and  this  Germany  rejected. 

*  All  the  editions  of  the  British  Blue  Book  including  the  important  one  of  Sept.  28, 
1914,  print  here  "  Russia."  In  the  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents  Sir  Edward  Grey 
inserts  a  footnote  to  Russia  "Should  be  Italy."  A  similar  footnote  had  appeared 
in  the  New  York  Times  edition  of  August,  1914.  The  fact  that  "Russia"  continued 
to  be  printed  without  a  footnote,  even  in  the  official  edition  of  Sept.  28,  which  con- 
tained a  number  of  corrections,  raises  the  presumption  that  "Russia"  had  not  only 
been  written,  but  also  meant.  It  is  true  that  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  17  of  the  same 
date,  Russia  said  that  she  "would  be  quite  ready  to  stand  aside,"  but  this  may  also 
imply  that  mention  had  been  made  of  her  as  a  naember  of  the  "Conference."  Cer- 
tainty on  this  point  is,  however,  impossible. 


July  25 y  British  Blue  Booh  No-.  26  167 

together,  and  to  join  in  asking  Austria  and  Russia  not  to  cross  the 
frontier  till  we  had  had  time  to  try  and  arrange  matters  between  them. 

The  German  Ambassador  read  me  a  telegram  from  the  German 
Foreign  OflSce  saying  that  his  Government  had  not  known  before- 
hand, and  had  had  no  more  than  other  Powers  to  do  with  the  stiff 
terms  of  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia,  but  once  she  had  launched  that 
note,  Austria  could  not  draw  back.  Prince  Lichnowsky  ^  said,  how- 
ever, that  if  what  I  contemplated  was  mediation  between  Austria 
and  Russia,  Austria  might  be  able  with  dignity  to  accept  it.^  He  ex- 
pressed himself  as  personally  favourable  to  this  suggestion. 

I  concurred  in  his  observation,  and  said  that  I  felt  I  had  no  title 
to  intervene  between  Austria  and  Servia,  but  as  soon  as  the  question 
became  one  as  between  Austria  and  Russia,  the  peace  of  Europe  was 
affected,  in  which  we  must  all  take  a  hand.^ 

.  I  impressed  upon  the  Ambassador  that,  in  the  event  of  Russian  and 
Austrian  mobilisation,  the  participation  of  Germany  would  be  essen- 
tial to  any  diplomatic  action  for  peace.  Alone  we  could  do  nothing. 
The  French  Government  were  travelling  at  the  moment,  and  I  had 
had  no  time  to  consult  them,^  and  could  not  therefore  be  sure  of  their 
views,  but  I  was  prepared,  if  the  German  Government  agreed  with  my 
suggestion,  to  tell  the  French  Government  that  I  thought  it  the  right 
thing  to  act  upon  it. 

To  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  26 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office^  July  25,  191Jf. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  has  communicated  to  me  the  following 
telegram  which  his  Government  have  sent  to  the  Russian  Ambassador 
at  Vienna,  with  instructions  to  communicate  it  to  the  Austrian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  :  — 

"  The  delay  given  to  Servia  for  a  reply  is  so  limited  that  the  Powers 
are  prevented  from  taking  any  steps  to  avert  the  complications  which 
are  threatening.  The  Russian  Government  trust  that  the  Austrian 
Government  will  prolong  the  time  limit,  and  as  the  latter  have  de- 
clared their  willingness  to  inform  the  Powers  of  the  data  on  which  they 
have  based  their  demands  on  Servia,  the  Russian  Government  hope 
that  these  particulars  will  be  furnished  in  order  that  the  Powers  may 
examine  the  matter.  If  they  found  that  some  of  the  Austrian  re- 
quests were  well  founded,  they  would  be  in  a  position  to  advise  the 
Servian  Government  accordingly.  If  the  Austrian  Government 
were  indisposed  to  prolong  the  time  limit,  not  only  would  they  be 

^  German  Ambassador  in  London. 

2  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  13,  same  day. 

3  This  phrase  is  very  much  stronger  in  French  Yellow  Book  No.  37,  same  day, 
where  Paul  Cambon  reports  what  he  claims  Sir  E.  Grey  told  him  he  had  said  to  the 
German  Ambassador. 

*  See,  however,  the  British-French  and  French-British  despatches  of  July  24,  and 
July  25,  1914. 


168  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

acting  against  international  ethics,  but  they  would  deprive  their 
communication  to  the  Powers  of  any  practical  meaning." 

You  may  support  in  general  terms  ^  the  step  taken  by  your  Russian 
colleague. 

Since  the  telegram  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  was  sent, 
it  has  been  a  relief  to  hear  that  the  steps  which  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment were  taking  were  to  be  limited  for  the  moment  to  the  rupture  of 
relations  and  to  military  preparations,  and  not  operations.  I  trust, 
therefore,  that  if  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  consider  it  too 
late  to  prolong  the  time  limit,  they  will  at  any  rate  give  time  in 
the  sense  and  for  the  reasons  desired  by  Russia  before  taking  any 
irretrievable  steps. 

To  PariSy  Berlin,  and  Petrograd 

British  Blue  Book  No.  27 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Sir 
H.  Rumhold,  British  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Berlin,  and  Sir  G. 
Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914- 

I  HAVE  communicated  to  German  Ambassador  the  forecast  of  the 
Servian  reply  contained  in  Mr.  Crackanthorpe's  telegram  of  to-day.^ 
I  have  said  that,  if  Servian  reply,  when  received  at  Vienna,  corre- 
sponds to  this  forecast,  I  hope  the  German  Government  will  feel  able 
to  influence  the  Austrian  Government  to  take  a  favourable  view  of  it. 

To?  or  Fromf 

No.  28 

[Nil.] 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  never  explained  this  deleted  No.  28.  The  British  Blue 
Book  was  not  prepared  and  distributed,  as  was  the  German  White  Book,  in  a 
hurry  to  supply  the  necessary  background  to  the  speeches  delivered  in  Parliament 
on  the  strength  of  which  the  nation  went  to  war.  The  British  Blue  Book  was  dis- 
tributed in  Parliament  several  days  after  England  had  declared  war  on  Germany. 
A  careless  numbering  of  the  despatches  seems  out  of  the  question.  No.  28  very 
likely  was  a  despatch  which  Sir  E.  Grey  at  the  last  moment  decided  not  to 
publish. 

To  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  29 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  19H. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  came  to  see  me  to-day.  I  told  him  in  gen- 
eral terms  what  I  had  said  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning.^ 

1  On  this  day  Sir  E.  Grey  was  not  yet  willing  to  be  known  either  in  Vienna  or  in 
Berlin  as  making  common  cause  with  the  other  Entente  Powers. 

2  See  No.  21,  same  day. 

»  Cf .  British  Blue  Book  No.  27,  same  day. 


July  25,  Bxitish  Blue  Book  No.  30  169 

The  Italian  Ambassador  cordially  approved  of  this.  He  made 
no  secret  of  the  fact  that  Italy  was  most  desirous  to  see  war  avoided. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 

To  Belgrade 
British  Blue  Book  No.  30 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charg^  d' Affaires  at 
Belgrade. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914- 

The  Servian  Minister  called  on  the  23rd  ^  instant  and  spoke  to  Sir 
A.  Nicolson  ^  on  the  present  strained  relations  between  Servia  and 
Austria-Hungary. 

He  said  that  his  Government  were  most  anxious  and  disquieted. 
They  were  perfectly  ready  to  meet  any  reasonable  demands  of  Austria- 
Hungary  so  long  as  such  demands  were  kept  on  the  "terrain 
juridique."  If  the  results  of  the  enquiry  at  Serajevo  —  an  enquiry 
conducted  with  so  much  mystery  and  secrecy  —  disclosed  the  fact  that 
there  were  any  individuals  conspiring  or  organising  plots  on  Servian 
territory,  the  Servian  Government  w  ould  be  quite  ready  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  give  satisfaction;  but  if  Austria  transported  the 
question  on  to  the  political  ground,  and  said  that  Servian  policy, 
being  inconvenient  to  her,  must  undergo  a  radical  change,  and  that 
Servia  must  abandon  certain  political  ideals,^  no  independent  State 
would,  or  could,  submit  to  such  dictation. 

He  mentioned  that  both  the  assassins  of  the  Archduke  were 
Austrian  subjects  —  Bosniaks ;  ^  that  one  of  them  had  been  in  Servia, 
and  that  the  Servian  authorities,  considering  him  suspect  and  dan- 
gerous, had  desired  to  expel  him,  but  on  applying  to  the  Austrian 
authorities  found  that  the  latter  protected  him,  and  said  that  he 
was  an  innocent  and  harmless  individual. 

Sir  A.  Nicolson,  on  being  asked  by  M.  Boschkovitch  ^  his  opinion 
on  the  whole  question,  observed  that  there  were  no  data  on  which  to 
base  one,  though  it  was  to  be  hoped  that  the  Servian  Government 
would  endeavour  to  meet  the  Austrian  demands  in  a  conciliatory  and 
moderate  spirit.  I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 

1  It  seems  strange  that  this  interview  of  the  23d  should  not  have  been  mentioned 
to  the  British  representative  in  Belgrade  until  two  days  later,  the  twenty-fifth,  es- 
pecially since  the  instructions  given  to  the  representative  in  Belgrade  in  No.  12,  July  24, 
seem  to  be  based  on  the  information  given  in  the  interview  of  the  23d.  The  inter- 
view, moreover,  appears  to  have  taken  place  before  the  presentation  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  note.  While  in  a  continuous  story  of  events  this  note  does  not  belong 
here,  the  reader  will  have  no  difficulty  in  seeing  why  it  has  nevertheless  been  introduced 
in  this  place. 

2  British  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

3  These  certain  political  ideals  were  those  of  a  Greater  Serbia  which  could  not  be 
realized  except  at  the  cost  of  a  dismembered  Austria-Hungary. 

*  Bosniaks  is  the  term  by  which  Austria-Hungary  called  the  Serbians  in  Bosnia 
before  the  murder  of  Serajevo,  while  Serbia  called  them  Serbians.  After  the  murder, 
the  Serbians  used  the  term  Bosniaks  to  indicate  that  Serbia  was  innocent,  and  Austria- 
Hungary  used  the  term  Serbians  to  show  that  Serbia  was  guilty. 

^  Serbian  Minister  in  London. 


170  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Russia : 

Announcement  by  the  Russian  Government 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  10 

St.  Petersburg,  July  12  {25),  1914. 
Recent  events  and  the  despatch  of  an  ultimatum  to  Servia  by 
Austria-Hungary  are  causing  the  Russian  Government  the  greatest 
anxiety.  The  Government  are  closely  following  the  course  of  the 
dispute  between  the  two  countries,  to  which  Russia  cannot  remain 
indifferent. 

From  Vienna 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  11 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Vienna,  July  12  {25)  1914. 

Count  Berchtold  is  at  Ischl.^  In  view  of  the  impossibility  of 
arriving  there  in  time,  I  have  telegraphed  to  him  our  proposal  to  ex- 
tend the  time  limit  of  the  ultimatum,  and  I  have  repeated  this 
proposal  verbally  to  Baron  Macchio.  The  latter  promised  to  com- 
municate it  in  time  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  but  added 
that  he  had  no  hesitation  in  predicting  a  categorical  refusal. 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  12 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Vienna  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Vienna,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

In  continuation  of  my  telegram  of  to-day  I  have  just  heard  ^  from 
Macchio  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  refuse  our  proposal 
to  extend  the  time  limit  of  the  note. 

From  Belgrade 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  13 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade  to  Russia  Minister  for  Foreign 

^ff^^^^'  Belgrade,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

(Delayed  in  transmission,  received  July  14  (27),  1914). 
(Telegram.) 

Following  is  the  reply  which  the  President  of  the  Servian  Cabinet 
to-day  handed  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade  before 
the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  of  the  ultimatum. 

[Here  follows  the  text  of  the  Serbian  reply,  for  which  see  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book  No.  25,  July  25,  and  No.  34,  July  27,  1914.] 

1  He  went  there  during  the  forenoon  of  July  25.  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 
No.  21,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  20,  July  25,  1914,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  45, 
same  day. 

'  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  20,  and  for  reasons  for  the  refusal  No.  21, 
July  25,  1914. 


July  25,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  16  171 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  14 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegrams  of  .the  llth  (24th)  ^  July  and  have 
communicated  its  contents  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  He 
tells  me  that  the  British  Government  have  likewise  urged  him  to 
advise  ^  Vienna  to  extend  the  time  limit  of  the  ultimatum.  He  has 
informed  Vienna  telegraphically  of  this  step,  and  he  will  do  the  same 
as  regards  Russia's  action,  but  he  fears  that  in  the  absence  of  Berch- 
told,  who  has  left  for  Ischl,  and  in  view  of  the  lack  of  time,  his  tele- 
grams may  have  no  result.  Moreover,  he  has  doubts  as  to  the  wis- 
dom of  Austria  yielding  at  the  last  moment,  and  he  is  inclined  to 
think  that  such  a  step  on  her  part  might  increase  the  assurance  of 
Servia.  I  replied  that  a  great  Power  such  as  Austria  could  give  way 
without  impairing  her  prestige,  and  I  adduced  every  other  similar 
argument,  but  failed,  nevertheless,  to  obtain  any  more  definite 
promise.  Even  when  I  gave  him  to  understand  that  action  must  be 
taken  at  Vienna  if  the  possibility  of  terrible  consequences  was  to  be 
avoided,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  answered  each  time  in  the 
negative. 

From  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  15 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegram  of  the  llth  (24th)  ^  July  respecting 
the  extension  of  the  time  limit  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  and  I  have 
made  the  communication  in  accordance  with  your  instructions.  The 
French  Representative  ^  at  Vienna  has  been  furnished  with  similar 
instructions. 

From  London 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  16 
Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  London,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegram  of  the  llth  July.^  Grey  has  in- 
structed ^  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  support  our  action 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  Nos.  4  and  5,  July  24,  1914. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  26,  July  25,  1914 ;  cf.  also  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  41, 
42,  43,  July  25,  1914. 

3  Russian  Orange  Book  Nos.  4  and  5,  July  24,  1914. 

*  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  39  and  48,  July  25,  1914. 

6  Russian  Calendar,  which  is  July  24  of  our  calendar ;   Russian  Orange  Book  Nos, 

6  British  Blue  Book  No.  26,  July  25,  1914. 


172  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

for  the  extension  of  the  time  limit  of  the  ultimatum.  At  the  same 
time  he  explained  to  me  that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  had  come 
to  see  him/  and  had  explained  that  the  Austrian  note  should  not  be 
regarded  as  an  ultimatum.  It  should  be  regarded  as  a  step,  which, 
in  the  event  of  no  reply,  or  in  the  event  of  an  unsatisfactory  reply 
within  the  time  fixed,  would  be  followed  by  a  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations  and  the  immediate  departure  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Mmister  from  Belgrade ;  without,  however,  entailing  the  immediate 
opening  of  hostilities.  Grey  added  that  as  a  result  of  this  explana- 
tion he  had  told  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  that,  should  it  be 
too  late  to  raise  the  question  of  extending  the  time  limit  of  the  ulti- 
matum, the  question  of  preventing  hostilities  might  perhaps  serve 
as  a  basis  for  discussion.^ 


To  London 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  17 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign   Affairs  to  Russian   Ambassador  at 
London. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburg,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

In  the  event  of  any  change  for  the  worse  in  the  situation  which 
might  lead  to  joint  action  by  the  Great  Powers,  we  count  upon  it  that 
England  will  at  once  side  definitely  with  Russia  and  France,  in  order 
to  maintain  the  European  balance  of  power ,^  for  which  she  has  con- 
stantly intervened  in  the  past,  and  which  would  certainly  be  com- 
promised in  the  event  of  the  triumph  of  Austria. 

From  the  German  Ambassador 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  18'* 

Note  verbale  handed  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  by   the 
German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  July  12  {25),  1914- 

(Translation.) 

Il    nous    revient    de    source  We  learn  from  an  authorita- 

autoritative     que     la     nouvelle  tive  source  that  the  news  spread 

repandue  par  quelques  journaux  by   certain   newspapers,   to   the 

d'apres  laquelle  la  demarche  du  effect    that    the    action    of    the 

Gouvernement    d'Autriche-Hon-  Austro-Hungarian     Government 

grie  a  Belgrade  aurait  ete  faite  a  at   Belgrade   was   instigated   by 

rinstigation  de  TAllemagne  est  Germany,    is    absolutely    false. 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  14,  July  25,  1914. 

'  Contrast  the  information  here  directly  transmitted  to  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  with  the  latter's  reply  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Petrograd,  British 
Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  1914. 

»  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  1914,  and  note  4. 

*  This  is  only  a  supplementary  declaration  to  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  No.  1, 
which  is  the  important  German  declaration,  presented  in  Paris,  London  and  Petrograd. 
It  is  printed  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  9,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  28,  July  24,  but  is 
omitted  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book. 


July  25,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  19  173 

absolumentfausse.  LeGouverne-  The   German   Government   had 

ment  allemand  n'a  pas  eu  con-  no  knowledge  of  the  text  of  the 

naissance   du   texte  de   la   note  Austrian  note  before  it  was  pre- 

autrichienne    avant    qu'elle    ait  sented,  and  exercised  no  influence 

ete  remise,  et  n'a  exerce  aucune  upon  its  contents.     A  threaten- 

influence  sur  son  contenu.     C'est  ing  attitude  is  wrongly  attributed 

a  tort  qu'on  attribue  a  I'Alle-  to  Germany, 
magne    une    attitude    commina- 
toire. 

L'Allemagne  appuie  naturelle-  Germany,     as     the     ally     of 

ment  comme  allie  de  I'Autriche  Austria,  naturally  supports  the 

les    revendications    a    son    avis  claims    made    by    the    Vienna 

legitimes  du  Cabinet  de  Vienne  Cabinet    against    Servia,    which 

contre  la  Serbie.  she  considers  justified. 

Avant  tout  elle  desire,  comme  Above  all  Germany  wishes,  as 

elle  I'a  deja  declare  des  le  com-  she   has   already   declared   from 

mencement  du  differend  austro-  the  very  beginning  of  the  Austro- 

serbe,  que  ce  conflit  reste  loca-  Servian  dispute,  that  this  conflict 

lise.  should  be  localised. 


From  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  19 

Russian  Charge  d' A  f aires  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
A  fairs. 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

Please  refer  to  my  telegram  ^  of  the  Uth  (24th)  July. 

A  morning  paper  has  to-day  published,  in  a  not  altogether  correct 
form,^  the  declarations  made  yesterday  by  the  German  Ambassador, 
and  has  added  comments  in  which  it  characterises  these  utterances 
as  being  in  the  nature  of  threats.  The  German  Ambassador,  who  is 
much  upset  by  these  disclosures,  to-day  visited  the  Acting  Head  of 
the  Political  Department,  and  explained  to  him  that  his  words  in 
no  wise  bore  the  threatening  character  attributed  to  them.  He 
stated  that  Austria  had  presented  her  note  to  Servia  without  any 
deflnite  understanding  with  Berlin,  but  that  Germany  nevertheless 
approved  of  the  Austrian  point  of  view,  and  that  undoubtedly  "  the 
bolt  once  flred"  (these  were  his  own  words),  Germany  could  only 
be  guided  by  her  duties  as  an  ally. 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  8,  July  24,  1914. 
*  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  36,  July  25,  1914. 


174  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  20 

Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs, 

(Telegram.)  London,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

Grey  has  told  me  that  the  German  Ambassador  has  declared  to  him 
that  the  German  Government  were  not  informed  of  the  text  of  the 
Austrian  note,  but  that  they  entirely  supported  Austria's  action.^ 
The  Ambassador  at  the  same  time  asked  if  Great  Britain  could  see 
her  way  to  bring  conciliatory  pressure  to  bear  at  St.  Petersburg. 
Grey  replied  that  this  was  quite  impossible.  He  added  that,  as  long 
as  complications  existed  between  Austria  and  Servia  alone,  British 
interests  were  only  indirectly  affected ;  but  he  had  to  look  ahead  to 
the  fact  that  Austrian  mobilisation  would  lead  to  Russian  mobilisa- 
tion, and  that  from  that  moment  a  situation  would  exist  in  which  the 
interests  of  all  the  Powers  would  be  involved.  In  that  event  Great 
Britain  reserved  to  herself  full  liberty  of  action.^ 

From  Belgrade 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  21 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Belgrade,  Jidy  12  (25),  1914. 

In  spite  of  the  extremely  conciliatory  nature  of  the  Servian  reply 
to  the  ultimatum,  the  Austrian  Minister  has  just  informed  the 
Servian  Government,  in  a  note  handed  in  at  6.30  p.m.  this  evening, 
that,  not  having  received  a  satisfactory^  answer  within  the  time 
limit  fixed,  he  was  leaving  Belgrade  with  the  entire  staff  of  the  lega- 
tion. The  Skupshtina  is  convoked  for  the  14th  (27th)  July  at  Nish. 
The  Servian  Government  and  the  Diplomatic  Body  are  leaving  this 
evening  for  that  town. 

From  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  22 

Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  London,  July  12  {25),  1914. 

Grey  has  told  the  German  Ambassador  that  in  his  opinion  Austrian 
mobilisation  must  lead  to  Russian  mobilisation,  that  grave  danger  of  a 

1  See  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  No.  1,  July  23,  British  Blue  Book  No.  9, 
July  24,  omitted  in  the  Orange  Book.  See  note  to  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  18, 
July  25,  1914. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  25,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  37,  July  25,  1914.  • 
'  For  the  reasons  of  Austria-Hungary  why  the  Serbian  note  did  not  satisfy  her,  see 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914. 


July  25,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  39  175 

general  war  will  thereupon  arise,  and  that  he  sees  only  one  means  of 
reaching  a  peaceful  settlement,  namely,  that,  in  view  of  the  Austrian 
and  Russian  mobilisations,  Germany,  France,  Italy,  and  Great 
Britain  should  abstain  from  immediate  mobilisation,  and  should  at 
once  offer  their  good  offices.  Grey  told  me  that  the  first  essential 
of  this  plan  was  the  consent  of  Germany  and  her  promise  not  to 
mobihse.  'He  has  therefore,  as  a  first  step,  made  an  enquiry  on  this 
point  at  Berlin.^ 

Serbia : 

To  All  Serbian  Legations  Abroad 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  38 

M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to 
all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad. 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  12/25,  1914. 

A  BRIEF  summary  of  the  reply  of  the  Royal  Government  was  com- 
municated to  the  representatives  of  the  allied  Governments  ^  at  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day.^  They  were  informed  that  the 
reply  would  be  quite  conciliatory  on  all  points,  and  that  the  Serbian 
Government  would  accept  the  Austro-Hungarian  demands  as  far 
as  possible.  The  Serbian  Government  trust  that  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government,  unless  they  are  determined  to  make  war  at  all 
costs,  will  see  their  way  to  accept  the  full  satisfaction  offered  in 
the  Serbian  reply. 


The  Serbian  Reply  to  Austria-Hungary 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  39 

Reply  of  Serbian  Government  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Note. — Belgrade, 
Jidy  12/25,  1914. 

[For  the  text  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  No.  25,  July  25,  and  No.  34, 
July  27,  1914.] 

.  1  No  detailed  references  to  the  mobilization  of  Germany,  France,  Italy  and  Great 
Britain  are  contained  in  any  despatches  published  in  the  British  Blue  Book. 

2  This  expression  is  noteworthy,  referring  no  doubt  to  France,  Russia  and  Eng- 
land, who  are  here  spoken  of  either  as  allied  to  each  other  or  even  allied  to  Serbia. 
See  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  58,  August  4.  where  Count  Mensdorf  quotes 
Sir  E.  Grey  as  referring  to  Great  Britain  as  the  ally  of  France.  Cf .  also  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  158,  August  4.  Since  no  mention  is  made  of  a  summary  being  given  to  the 
representatives  of  the  other  Powers,  "the  representatives  of  the  allied  Governments" 
were  possibly  invited  as  representing  a  unit  to  the  Serbian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs". 
This  is,  however,  not  mentioned  in  French  Yellow  Book  No.  46,  July  25,  1914,  where  the 
French  Minister  simply  reports  "M.  Pashitch  has  just  acquainted  me,  etc." 

3  For  the  delay  with  which  even  this  summary  reached  the  Powers  see  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  56,  July  26,  and  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  36,  July  27. 


176  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister 
Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  40  ^ 

Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen,  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade, 
to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Sir,  Belgrade,  July  12/25,  1914. 

As  the  time  limit  stipulated  in  the  note,  which,  by  order  of  my 
Government,  I  handed  to  His  Excellency  M.  Patchou,  on  Thursday, 
the  day  before  yesterday,  at  6  p.m.,  has  now  expired,  and  as  I  have 
received  no  satisfactory  reply,  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  Your 
Excellency  that  I  am  leaving  Belgrade  to-night  together  with  the  staff 
of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Legation. 

The  protection  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Legation,  together  with 
all  its  appurtenances,  annexes,  and  archives,  as  well  as  the  care  of 
the  subjects  and  interests  of  Austria-Hungary  in  Serbia,  is  entrusted 
to  the  Imperial  German  Legation. 

Finally,  I  desire  to  state  formally  that  from  the  moment  this 
letter  reaches  Your  Excellency  the  rupture  in  the  diplomatic  relations 
between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  will  have  the  character  of  a 
fait  accompli. 

I  have,  etc. 


To  All  Serbian  Legations  Abroad 
Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  41  ^ 

M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to 
all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad. 

Belgrade,  July  12/25,  1914. 

I  COMMUNICATED  the  reply  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to-day 
at  5.45  P.M.  You  will  receive  the  full  text  of  the  reply  to-night. 
From  it  you  will  see  that  we  have  gone  as  far  as  was  possible.  When 
I  handed  the  note  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  he  stated  that  he 
would  have  to  compare  it  with  his  instructions,  and  that  he  would  then 
give  an  immediate  answer.  As  soon  as  I  returned  to  the  Ministry,  I 
was  informed  in  a  note  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  that  he 
was  not  satisfied  with  our  reply,  and  that  he  was  leaving  Belgrade  the 
same  evening,  with  the  entire  staff  of  the  Legation.  The  protection  of 
the  Legation  and  its  archives,  and  the  care  of  Austrian  and  Hungarian 
interests  had  been  entrusted  by  him  to  the  German  Legation.  He 
stated  finally  that  on  receipt  of  the  note  diplomatic  relations  between 
Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  must  be  considered  as  definitely  broken 
off. 

^  This  note  should  more  properly  follow  No.  41. 

'  Parts  of  this  note,  from  a  chronological  point  of  view,  should  have  been  printed 
before  No.  40. 


July  25,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  42  111 

The  Royal  Serbian  Government  have  summoned  the  Skupshtina 
to  meet  on  July  14/27  at  Nish,  whither  all  the  Ministries  with  their 
staffs  are  proceeding  this  evening.  The  Crown  Prince  has  issued,  in 
the  name  of  the  King,  an  order  for  the  mobilisation  of  the  army, 
while  to-morrow  or  the  day  after  a  proclamation  will  be  made  in  which 
it  will  be  announced  that  civilians  who  are  not' liable  to  military  service 
should  remain  peaceably  at  home,  while  soldiers  should  proceed  to 
their  appointed  posts  and  defend  the  country  to  the  best  of  their 
ability,  in  the  event  of  Serbia  being  attacked. 


From  the  Au^tro-Hungarian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  42 

Count   Leopold   Berchtold,   Austro-Hungarian   Minister  for   Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Yov.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna. 

Sir,  Vienna,  July  12/2S,  1914. 

As  no  satisfactory  reply^  has  been  given  to  the  note  which  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Minister  Extraordinary  and  Plenipotentiary  handed 
to  the  Royal  Government  on  the  10/23  instant,  I  have  been  compelled 
to  instruct  Baron  Giesl  to  leave  the  Serbian  capital  and  to  entrust 
the  protection  of  the  subjects  of  His  Imperial  and  Royal  Apostolic 
Majesty  to  the  German  Legation. 

I  regret  that  the  relations  which  I  have  had  the  honour  to  maintain 
with  you,  M.  le  Ministre,  are  thus  terminated,  and  I  avail  myself  of 
this  opportunity  to  place  at  your  disposal  the  enclosed  passports  for 
your  return  to  Serbia,  as  well  as  for  the  return  of  the  staff  of  the  Royal 
Legation. 

I  have,  etc. 

1  For  Austria-Hungary's  reasons  why  the  reply  was  not  satisfactory  see  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914. 


178 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Sunday,  July  26,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

London,  Berlin,  Rome, 
London,  Paris,  Petrograd 

Petrograd 

Belgium 

Austro-Hungarian 
Minister 

France 

London,  London,  etc. 

Rome,    Petrograd,    Vienna, 

Note  for  Minister 

Christiania,  Luxemburg 

Germany 

London,  Paris,  Petrograd 

Petrograd 

Great  Britain 

Paris,  Berlin,  Rome, 
Paris 

Vienna,  Berlin,  Rome 

Russia 
Serbia 

Rome,  Vienna,  Berlin 

Prague,  Paris,  Berlin 

The  full  Serbian  reply  and  the  reasons  why  it  had  not  satisfied  Austria-Hungary 
remained  unknown  to  the  Powers  throughout  the  whole  of  Sunday,  July  26.  A 
summary  of  the  Serbian  reply  reached  Paris  and  also  Petrograd  with  a  delay  of 
twenty  hours,  and  there  is  no  indication  in  the  published  despatches  that  it  reached 
the  other  Foreign  Offices  sooner. 

In  the  absence  of  accurate  information  two  versions  gained  currency.  First 
that  Serbia's  seeming  concessions  were  a  sham,  and  that  she  knew  them  to  be  so 
or  she  would  not  have  ordered  the  mobilization  of  her  troops  three  hours  before 
she  sent  her  reply  to  Austria-Hungary.  Secondly,  that  she  had  yielded  in  every- 
thing except  a  few  minor  points. 

Austria-Hungary  continues  her  endeavors  to  prove  to  the  Powers  that  she  had 
been  forced  to  act  harshly  with  Serbia,  but  that  she  did  not  contemplate  any 
territorial  aggrandisement  at  the  expense  of  Serbia.  She  orders  the  mobilization 
of  some  of  her  troops. 

Germany  is  greatly  concerned  about  the  military  preparations  going  on  espe- 
cially in  Russia  and  warns  the  Powers  of  the  danger  that  lies  in  mobilisation.  She 
endeavors  to  gain  the  confidence  of  France,  and  France's  willingness  to  intercede 
in  Russia. 

Great  Britain  continues  her  efforts  to  bring  about  a  Conference  of  four  Powers ; 
at  first,  as  on  the  previous  days,  with  a  view  to  mediation  between  Petrograd  and 
Vienna ;  afterwards  —  and  probably  owing  to  French  opposition  to  her  original 
plan — with  the  view  of  discovering  **an  issue  which  would  prevent  complica- 
tions." 

Russia  holds  a  "long  and  friendly  conversation,"  as  Sazonof  describes  it,  with 
Austria-Hungary,  and  suggests  the  settlement  of  the  Serbian  difficulty  by  means 
of  direct  conversations  between  Petrograd  and  Vienna.  Another  suggestion  that 
Serbia  should  appeal  for  British  intervention  is  not  pressed. 

Russian  mobilization  continues. 

France  reverts  to  her  plan  that  Germany  should  exert  pressure  on  Austria- 
Hungary  amounting  to  mediation  between  her  and  Serbia.  She  claims  to  be 
convinced  of  Russia's  moderation  and  pacific  intentions,  but  does  not  publish  the 
accounts  of  Russian  mobilisation  which  must  have  reached  her  as  well  as  Ger- 
many. Germany's  request  that  she  let  it  be  known  that  France  and  Germany  are 
jointly  working  for  peace,  she  rejects  as  emphatically  as  Germany's  other  request 
that  she  should  urge  moderation  in  Petrograd. 

Italy  is  urged  by  the  Entente  Powers  to  dissociate  her  interests  from  those  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  and  is  informed  by  Russia  of  the  latter's  definite 
determination  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  Serbia. 

Serbia  is  silent  on  this  day,  and  Belgium  practically  so. 


July  26,  AustrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  28  179 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.   28 

Count  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  26,  1914, 

As  the  result  of  reports  about  measures  taken  for  mobilisation  of 
Russian  troops,  Count  Pourtales  has  called  the  Russian  Minister's 
attention  in  the  most  serious  manner  to  the  fact  that  nowadays 
measures  of  mobilisation  ^  would  be  a  highly  dangerous  form  of  diplo- 
matic pressure.  For,  in  that  event,  the  purely  military  consideration 
of  the  question  by  the  general  staffs  would  find  expression,  and  if  that 
button  were  once  touched  in  Germany,  the  situation  would  get  out 
of  control. 

M.  Sazonof  assured  the  German  Ambassador  on  his  word  of  honour 
that  the  reports  on  the  subject  were  incorrect ;  that  up  to  that  time 
not  a  single  horse  and  not  a  single  reservist  had  been  called  up,  and 
that  all  the  measures  that  were  being  taken  were  merely  measures 
of  preparation  in  the  military  districts  of  Kieff,  Odessa,  and  perhaps 
Kasan  and  Moscow. 

Immediately  afterwards  the  Imperial  German  Military  Attache 
received  by  courier  late  in  the  evening  an  invitation  from  Suchomlinof , 
the  Minister  for  War,  who  explained  that  Count  Pourtales  had  spoken 
with  the  Foreign  Minister  about  the  Russian  military  preparations, 
and  as  the  Ambassador  might  have  misunderstood  certain  military 
details,  he  was  taking  the  opportunity  of  giving  him  more  detailed 
information.  In  the  following  telegram  ^  from  Count  Pourtales  to 
Berlin  which  has  been  placed  at  my  disposal,  the  pertinent  communi- 
cations from  Major  von  Eggeling  are  collected : 

"  The  Military  Attache  reports  with  regard  to  a  conversation  with 
the  Russian  Minister  of  War :  M.  Sazonof  had  asked  him  to  make 
the  military  position  clear  to  me.  The  Minister  for  War  gave  me  his 
word  of  honour  that  as  yet  no  orders  for  mobilisation  of  any  kind  had 
been  issued.  For  the  present  merely  preparatory  measures  would  be 
taken,  not  a  horse  would  be  taken,  not  a  reservist  called  up.  If 
Austria  crossed  the  Servian  frontier,  the  military  districts  of  Kieff, 
Odessa,  Moscow  and  Kasan,  which  face  Austria,  would  be  mobilised. 
In  no  circumstances  will  mobilisation  take  place  on  the  German 
front,  Warsaw,  Vilna  and  St.  Petersburgh.  Peace  with  Germany  is 
earnestly  desired.  My  question  what  was  the  object  of  the  mobilisa- 
tion against  Austria,  was  met  with  a  shrug  of  the  shoulders  and  a 

^  For  the  aggressive  meaning  of  mobilisation  according  to  International  Law  see 
Elihu  Root,  President  of  the  American  Society  of  International  Law,  in  the  American 
Journal  of  International  Law,  July,  1914  :  "It  is  well  understood  that  the  exercise  of 
the  right  of  self-protection  may  and  frequently  does  extend  in  its  effect  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  state  exercising  it.  The  strongest  example 
probably  would  be  the  mobilisation  of  an  army  by  another  Power  immediately  across 
the  frontier.  Every  act  done  by  the  other  Power  may  be  within  its  own  territory,  yet 
the  country  threatened  by  the  state  of  facts  is  justified  in  protecting  itself  by  immediate  war." 

2  Not  published  in  German  White  Book. 


180  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

reference  to  the  diplomatists.  I  gave  the  Minister  for  War  to  under- 
stand that  his  friendly  intentions  would  be  appreciated  by  us,  but 
that  we  should  also  consider  mobilisation  against  Austria  to  be  in 
itself  extremely  threatening.  The  Minister  emphasised  repeatedly 
and  with  great  stress  Russia's  urgent  need  of  and  earnest  wish  for 
peace." 

To  London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   29 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Mensdorff  at  London. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  26,  1914. 

Herr  von  Tschirschky  informed  me  to-day  in  pursuance  of  his 
instructions  that,  according  to  a  telegram  ^  from  Prince  Lichnowsky 
which  had  been  despatched  in  London  on  the  25th  of  July  at  3  p.m., 
Sir  E.  Grey  had  transmitted  to  the  latter  the  sketch  of  an  answer  from 
Servia,  and  had  remarked  in  the  private  letter  accompanying  it,  that 
he  hoped  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  in  view  of  the  conciliatory  tenor 
of  this  answer  would  support  its  acceptance  in  Vienna. 

I  consider  it  desirable  that  your  Excellency  should  again  approach 
the  matter  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  call  his  attention  to  the 
fact  that  almost  simultaneously  with  the  transmission  by  him  of  this 
letter  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  namely  at  3  p.m.  yesterday,  Servia  had 
already  ordered  the  general  mobilisation  ^  of  her  army,  which  proves 
that  no  inclination  for  a  peaceful  solution  existed  in  Belgrade.  It 
was  not  till  six  o'clock,  after  mobilisation  had  been  proclaimed,  that 
the  answer,  which  had  apparently  been  previously  telegraphed  to 
London  and  the  contents  of  which  were  not  reconcilable  with  our 
demands,  was  delivered  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Minister  at  Bel- 
grade. 

To  Berlin,  Rome,  London,  Paris,  and  Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   30 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  at  Berlin, 
Rome,  London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petershurgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  26,  1914. 

We  have  broken  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Servia  after  she  had 
refused  ^  the  demands  we  had  addressed  to  her.  I  beg  your  Excel- 
lency now  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  Foreign  Minister  or  his  deputy, 
and  to  express  yourself  to  him  approximately  to  the  following  effect : — 

The  Royal  Servian  Government  have  refused  to  accept  the  de- 
mands which  we  were  forced  to  address  to  them  in  order  to  secure 

1  Not  published  in  German  White  Book. 

*  See  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  5,  July  26,  1914,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  32,  same 
day. 

'  For  the  reasons  why  Austria-Hungary  deemed  the  Serbian  note  unsatisfactory 
886  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914. 


July  26,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  50  181 

permanently  our  most  vital  interests  which  were  menaced  by  them, 
and  have  thereby  made  it  clear  that  they  do  not  intend  to  abandon 
their  subversive  aims,  tending  towards  continuous  disorder  in  some  of 
our  frontier  provinces  and  their  final  disruption  from  the  Monarchy. 
Reluctantly,  therefore,  and  very  much  against  our  wish,  we  find 
ourselves  obliged  to  compel  Servia  by  the  sharpest  measures  to  make 
a  fundamental  change  in  the  attitude  of  enmity  she  has  up  to  now 
pursued. 

See  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  31,  July  27,  1914,  which  describes  an 
interview  between  Sazonof  and  the  Austrian  Ambassador  on  July  26,  1914. 

Belgium : 

From  Austro-Hungarian  Legation 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  5 

Communications  made  on  July  26,  1914,  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Legation  at  Brussels  to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

M.  Pashitch  gave  the  reply  of  the  Servian  Government  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  note  before  6  o'clock  yesterday.  This  reply  not 
having  been  considered  satisfactory,  diplomatic  relations  have  been 
broken  off  and  the  Minister  and  staff  of  the  Austrian  Legation  have 
left  Belgrade.  Servian  mobilisation  had  already  been  ordered  before 
3  o'clock.^ 

France : 

To  Viviani,  London,  etc. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  50 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council  (on  board  the  ''La  France,'')  and  to  the  French 
Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  26,  1914. 

The  events  of  Saturday  can  be  summed  up  as  follows :  —  refusal 
of  Austria  to  grant  the  extension  of  the  time  limit  asked  for  by 
Russia,  —  departure  of  the  Austrian  Minister  from  Belgrade  after 
receiving  a  reply  from  Servia  which  was  considered  insufficient 
although  it  reached  the  limit  of  any  possible  concession  ^  —  order  for 
mobilisation  given  in  Servia  whose  Government  retired  to  Kragou- 
jewatz,^  where  it  was  followed  by  the  French  and  Russian  Ministers. 

The  Italian  Government,  to  whom  the  Austrian  note  had  been 
communicated  on  Friday,  without  any  request  for  support  or  even 

^  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  29,  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  32,  same 
day. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  49,  printed  under  July  25,  1914,  stating  that  Serbia 
did  not  present  her  reply  to  France  till  the  next  day,  July  27.  Cf.  also  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  56,  July  26,  which  states  that  even  the  summary  was  20  hours  late  in 
reaching  the  Foreign  Office.  Cf.  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  29,  July  26, 
1914,  and  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  36,  July  27.  See  also,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  38, 
July  25,  Note  2. 

3  Nish,  according  to  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  21,  July  25,  1914. 


182  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

advice,  could  not,  in  the  absence  of  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano, 
who  does  not  return  till  Tuesday,  make  any  reply  to  the  suggestion 
of  the  Russian  Government  proposing  to  press  at  Vienna  for  an  ex- 
tension of  time.  It  appears  from  a  confidential  communication  by 
the  Italian  Ambassador  to  M.  Paleologue  that  at  Vienna  people  still 
soothe  themselves  with  the  illusion  that  Russia  "will  not  hold  firm." 
It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  Italy  is  only  bound  by  the  engage- 
ments of  the  Triple  Alliance  if  she  has  been  consulted  beforehand. 

From  St.  Petersburgh  we  learn  that  M.  Sazonof  has  advised  Servia 
to  ask  for  British  mediation.^  At  the  Council  of  Ministers  ^  on  the 
25th,  which  was  held  in  presence  of  the  Emperor,  the  mobilisation 
of  thirteen  army  corps  intended  eventually  to  operate  against  Austria 
was  considered ;  this  mobilisation,  however,  would  only  be  made 
effective  if  Austria  were  to  bring  armed  pressure  to  bear  upon  Servia, 
and  not  till  after  notice  had  been  given  by  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  upon  whom  falls  the  duty  of  fixing  the  day,  liberty  being 
left  to  him  to  go  on  with  negotiations  even  if  Belgrade  should  be 
occupied.  Russian  opinion  makes  clear  that  it  is  both  politically 
and  morally  impossible  for  Russia  to  allow  Servia  to  be  crushed. 

In  London  the  German  demarche^  was  made  on  the  25th  in  the 
same  terms  as  those  used  by  Baron  von  Schoen  at  Paris.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  has  replied  to  Prince  Lichnowsky  that  if  the  war  were  to  break 
out  no  Power  in  Europe  could  take  up  a  detached  attitude.  He  did 
not  express  himself  more  definitely  and  used  very  reserved  language 
to  the  Servian  Minister.  The  communication  made  on  the  evening  ^ 
of  the  25th  by  the  Austrian  Ambassador  makes  Sir  Edward  Grey 
more  optimistic;  since  the  diplomatic  rupture  does  not  necessarily 
involve  immediate  military  operations,  the  Secretary  of  State  is  still 
willing  to  hope  that  the  Powers  will  have  time  to  intervene. 

At  Berlin  ^  the  language  used  by  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the 
Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  is  unsatisfactory  and  dilatory ;  when  the 
latter  asked  him  to  associate  himself  with  a  demarche  at  Vienna  for 
an  extension  of  the  time  limit,  he  replied  that  he  had  already  taken 
action  in  this  sense  but  that  it  was  too  late;  to  the  request  for  an 
extension  of  the  time  limit  before  active  measures  were  taken,  he 
replied  that  this  had  to  do  with  a  domestic  matter,  and  not  with  a 
war  but  with  local  operations.  •  Herr  von  Jagow  pretends  not  to 
believe  that  the  Austrian  action  could  lead  to  general  consequences. 

A  real  explosion  of  chauvinism  ^  has  taken  place  at  Berlin.     The 

1  This  is  a  new  suggestion.  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  46,  July  25,  where  an 
appeal  to  the  European  Powers  is  contemplated.  It  reached  Paris,  moreover,  not  on 
the  25th,  as  this  despatch  implies,  but  on  the  26th ;  see  below  No.  53,  French  Yellow 
Book. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  1914. 

3  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  36,  July  25,  1914,  and  note. 

*  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  14,  July  25,  and  its  place  among  the  despatches  of 
that  date,  which  makes  it  more  likely  that  the  communication  was  made  eariy  in  the 
morning.  It  was,  moreover,  the  subject  of  much  diplomatic  correspondence  throughout 
the  day. 

'  For  the  events  described  in  this  paragraph  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  18,  and 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  37,  of  July  25,  1914.  ' 

«  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  47,  July  25,  1914.  The  rest  of  the  information  con- 
tained in  this  paragraph  is  not  written  in  M.  Jules  Cambon's  published  despatch. 


July  26,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  51  183 

German  Emperor  returns  direct  to  Kiel.  M.  Jules  Cambon  thinks 
that,  at  the  first  military  steps  taken  by  Russia,  Germany  would 
immediately  reply,  and  probably  would  not  wait  for  a  pretext  before 
attacking  us. 

At  Vienna,  the  French  Ambassador  has  not  had  time  ^  to  join  in 
the  demarche  of  his  Russian  colleague  for  obtaining  an  extension  of 
the  time  limit  fixed  for  Servia ;  he  does  not  regret  it,  this  demarche 
having  been  categorically  rejected,  and  England  not  having  had 
time  to  give  instructions  to  her  representative  about  it. 

A  note  from  the  British  Embassy  ^  has  been  delivered  to  me :  it 
gives  an  account  of  the  conversation  between  the  British  Ambassa- 
dor at  St.  Petersburgh  and  M.  Sazonof  and  M.  Paleologue.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  thinks  that  the  four  Powers  who  are  not  directly  in- 
terested ought  to  press  both  on  Russia  and  Austria  that  their  armies 
should  not  cross  the  frontier,  and  that  they  should  give  time  to  Eng- 
land, France,  Germany  and  Italy  to  bring  their  mediation  into  play. 
If  Germany  accepts,  the  British  Government  has  reason  to  think 
that  Italy  also  would  be  glad  to  be  associated  in  the  joint  action  of 
England  and  France;  the  adherence  of  Germany  is  essential,  for 
neither  Austria  nor  Russia  would  tolerate  any  intervention  except 
that  of  impartial  friends  or  allies. 

Bienyenu-Martin. 

From  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  51 

M.  Barrere,  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Rome,  July  26,.  1914. 

A  TELEGRAM  from  Vienna  which  has  just  been  received  at  the  Con- 
sulta  informs  them  that  the  diplomatic  rupture  between  Austria  and 
Servia  has  taken  place,  and  that  Austria  is  proceeding  to  military 
measures. 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  who  is  at  Fiuggi,  will  not  return  to 
Rome  till  the  day  after  to-morrow. 

To-day  I  had  an  interesting  conversation  with  the  President  of 
the  Council  on  the  situation,  the  full  gravity  of  which  he  recognises. 
From  the  general  drift  of  his  remarks,  I  have  carried  away  the  im- 
pression that  the  Italian  Government  would  be  willing,  in  case  of 
war,  to  keep  out  of  it  and  to  maintain  an  attitude  of  observation.^ 

M.  Salandra  said  to  me  on  this  subject:  "We  shall  make  the 
greatest  efforts  to  prevent  peace  being  broken ;  our  situation  is  some- 
what analogous  to  that  of  England.  Perhaps  we  could  do  some- 
thing in  a  pacific  sense  together  with  the  English.''     M.  Salandra 

1  For  the  error  of  this  statement  see  the  despatches  dealing  with  this  subject  on 
July  25,  1914,  and  the  notes. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  24,  July  25,  1914.  . 

3  It  was  obviously  in  the  interest  of  the  Entente  Powers,  m  case  of  a  European 
war,  to  secure  the  separation  of  Italy  from  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany. 


184  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

stated  definitely  to  me  that  the  Austrian  note  had  been  communi- 
cated to  Rome  at  the  last  moment.  t^ 

Barrere. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  52  ^ 

M.  Barrere y  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  M,  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Rome,  July  26,  1914. 

M.  Sazonof  yesterday  told  the  Italian  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh  that  Russia  would  employ  all  diplomatic  means  to  avoid  a 
conflict,  and  that  she  did  not  give  up  hope  that  mediation  might  lead 
Austria  to  a  less  uncompromising  attitude;  but  that  Russia  could 
not  be  asked  to  allow  Servia  to  be  crushed. 

I  observe  that  the  greater  part  of  Italian  public  opinion  is  hostile 

to  Austria  in  this  serious  business.  r, 

Barrere. 

To  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  53 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M.  de 
Fleuriau,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London. 

Paris,  July  26,  1914. 

M.  Paleologue  sends  me  the  following  telegram :  — 

"  M.  Sazonof  advises  the  Servian  Government  to  ask  for  the  media- 
tion of  the  British  Government."  ^ 

In  concurrence  with  M.  Paul  Cambon,^  I  think  that  the  French 
Government  can  only  say  that  they  hope  to  see  the  British  Govern- 
ment accept,  if  an  offer  of  this  kind  is  made  to  them. 

Be  good  enough  to  express  yourself  in  this  sense  at  the  Foreign 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From  Petrograd 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  54 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  26,  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  continues  with  praiseworthy  per- 
severance to  seek  means  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  solution.     "Up 

1  This  despatch  refers  to  the  interview,  described  in  British  Blue  Book  No,  17,  July  25, 
1914,  between  the  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  British  and  French 
Ambassadors.  The  direct  report  of  this  interview  by  the  French  Ambassador  has 
not  been  printed  in  the  French  Yellow  Book.  No  valid  reason  appears  why  such  a 
roundabout  mention  of  this  interview  in  Petrograd  should  receive  preference  in  the 
official  publication  of  the  despatches. 

*  See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  50,  July  26,  and  note  3 ;  contrast  British  Blue  Book 
No.  44,  July  27. 

» No  despatch  from  Paul  Cambon,  the  French  Ambassador  in  London,  to  this 
effect  has  been  published  in  the  French  Yellow  Book. 


July  26y  French  Yellow  Book  No,  55  185 

to  the  last  moment,"  he  declared  to  me,  "I  shall  show  myself  ready 
to  negotiate."  ^ 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  he  has  just  sent  for  Count  Szapary  to  come 
to  a  "frank  and  loyal  explanation."  M.  Sazonof  commented  in  his 
presence  on  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,  article  by  article, 
making  clear  the  insulting  character  ^  of  the  principal  clauses.  "The 
intention  which  inspired  this  document,"  he  said,  "is  legitimate  if 
you  pursued  no  aim  other  than  the  protection  of  your  territory 
against  the  intrigues  of  Servian  anarchists;  but  the  procedure  to 
which  you  have  had  recourse  is  not  defensible."  He  concluded: 
"Take  back  your  ultimatum,  modify  its  form,  and  I  will  guarantee 
you  the  result." 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  showed  himself  moved  by  this 
language;  however,  while  awaiting  instructions,  he  reserves  the 
opinion  of  his  Government.  Without  being  discouraged  M.  Sazonof 
has  decided  to  propose  ^  this  evening  to  Count  Berchtold  the  opening 
of  direct  conversations  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  on  the 
changes  to  be  introduced  into  the  ultimatum. 

This  friendly  and  semi-official  interposition  of  Russia  between 
Austria  and  Servia  has  the  advantage  of  being  expeditious.  I  there- 
fore believe  it  to  be  preferable  to  any  other  procedure  and  likely  to 

succeed.  ^     . 

Paleologue. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  55 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  26,  1914. 

M.  ScHEBEKO  has  returned  hastily  from  a  journey  to  Russia ;  he 
had  only  undertaken  it  after  he  had  received  an  assurance  from 
Count  Berchtold  that  the  demands  on  Servia  would  be  thoroughly 
acceptable.^ 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  spoke  in 
the  same  sense  to  M.  Sazonof  the  evening  before  the  delivery  of  the 
note.     This  procedure,  which  is  quite  usual  ^  in  the  diplomacy  of  the 

1  Cf .  French  Yellow  Book  No.  38,  July  25,  and  contrast  with  British  Blue  Book  No. 
17,  same  day. 

2  In  the  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  same  day  this  interview  is  called  "long  and 
friendly."  Cf.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  5,  same  day,  and  note;  also  British 
Blue  Book  No.  44,  July  27. 

3  There  is  no  published  despatch  showing  that  he  did  this.  On  the  contrary  in 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  53,  July  26,  Sazonof  makes  an  entirely  different  suggestion. 
He  did,  however,  revert  to  the  plan  proposed  here  later  (see  British  Blue  Book  No.  78, 
July  29)  and  thereby  blocked  the  plan  of  a  Conference  of  Ministers  in  Belgrade. 

*  The  reader  must  decide  for  himself  whether  Count  Berchtold  was  honest  in  his 
belief  or^not.  From  French  Yellow  Book  No.  15,  July  21,  New  York  Times  translation, 
it  seems  that  Serbia  was  willing  to  accept  the  demands  of  Austria-Hungary,  if  they 
did  not  include  judicial  participation.  This  demand  was  dropped  in  favor  of  participa- 
tion in  the  investigation.  See  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  57,  July  27,  printed  under 
date  of  July  28. 

^  A  subjective  judgment  of  this  kind  while  indicative  of  the  existing  suspicion  on 
the  part  of  the  French  Government  cannot,  of  course,  claim  to  be  in  the  nature  of 
proving  the  case. 


186  Offijcial  Diplomatic  Documents 

Monarchy,  and  which  Baron  Macchio  has  also  employed  towards 
me,  seems  to  have  greatly  added  to  the  irritation  of  the  Russian 
Government. 

M.  Schebeko  will  make  an  effort,  however,  to  profit  by  the  delay 
which  is  indispensable  for  mobilisation,  in  order  to  make  a  proposal 
for  an  arrangement,  which  will  at  least  have  the  advantage  of  allow- 
ing us  to  measure  the  value  of  the  pacific  declarations  of  Germany. 

While  we  were  talking  over  the  situation  this  evening,  in  company 
w^ith  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,^  the  latter  received  instructions  ^  from  the 
Foreign  Office  with  reference  to  the  demarche  to  be  attempted  by  the 
representatives  of  the  four  Powers  less  directly  interested.  I  am 
expecting,  therefore,  that  we  may  have  to  consult  to-morrow  with 
the  Duke  d'Avarna  and  with  M.  Tschirscky,  who,  in  order  to  refuse 
his  concurrence,  will  almost  certainly  entrench  himself  behind  the 
principle  of  localising  the  conflict.^ 

My  impression  is  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  although 
surprised  and  perhaps  regretting  the  vigour  with  which  they  have 
been  inspired,  will  believe  themselves  obliged  to  commence  military 
action.  t-v 

DUMAINE. 

To  Vimaniy  London,  Petrograd,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  56 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  MiniMer  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council  {on  board  the  "La  France,'')  and  to  the  French 
Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  26,  1914. 

The  summary  of  the  Servian  reply  to  the  Austrian  note  only 
reached  us  after  twenty  hours  delay ."^  Although  the  Servian  Gov- 
ernment had  given  way  on  all  points,  with  the  exception  of  two  small 
reservations,^  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  has  broken  off  rela- 
tions, thus  proving  the  determined  wish  of  his  Government  to  pro- 
ceed to  execution  on  Servia. 

According  to  a  telegram  from  M.  Jules  Cambon,  the  British  Am- 
bassador thinks  that  there  is  a  slight  yielding ;  when  he  observed  to 
Herr  von  Jagow  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  not  ask  him  to  intervene 
between  Austria  and  Servia,  but,  as  this  question  ceased  to  be  local- 
ised, to  intervene  with  England,  France  and  Italy  at  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburgh,  the  Secretary  of  State  declared  that  he  would  do  his 
best  to  maintain  peace.® 

1  The  close  union  of  the  three  Entente  Powers  is  apparent  throughout.  Cf .  British 
Blue  Book  No.  40,  July  26,  1914,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  note  1,  July  24. 

2  See  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  55  and  36,  July  26,  1914. 

'  Contrast  this  paragraph  with  British  Blue  Book  No.  40,  same  day,  where  the  same 
interview  is  described. 

*  I.e.  on  Sunday,  July  26,  at  2  p.m. 

*  For  the  entirely  different  view  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  see  their 
Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914. 

«  Germany  did  more  and  accepted  Sir  E.  Grey's  plan ;  German  White  Book, 
Exhibit  13,  July  25,  1914. 


July  26,  French  Yellow  Booh  No.  57  187 

In  the  course  of  an  interview  between  M.  Barrere  and  the  General 
Secretary  of  the  Itahan  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  the  latter  indi- 
cated that  probably  the  Italian  Government  would  not  have  ap- 
proved the  Austrian  note ;  but  as  it  was  not  communicated  to  them 
beforehand,  the  Government  consider  themselves  by  this  fact  re- 
lieved of  all  responsibility  in  the  grave  step  taken  by  Austria.^ 

The  German  Ambassador  came  this  afternoon  to  make  a  com- 
munication to  me  relating  to  an  intervention  by  France  with  Russia 
in  a  pacific  sense.  "Austria,"  he  said  to  me,  "has  declared  to  Russia 
that  she  was  not  pursuing  any  territorial  aggrandisement  nor  any 
attack  on  the  integrity  of  the  Kingdom  of  Servia ;  her  only  intention 
is  to  ensure  her  own  tranquillity  and  to  take  police  measures.  The 
prexention  of  war  depends  on  the  decision  of  Russia ;  Germany  feels 
herself  identified  with  France  in  the  ardent  desire  that  peace  may  be 
maintained,  and  has  the  firm  hope  that  France  will  use  her  influence 
in  this  sense  at  St.  Petersburgh." 

I  replied  to  this  suggestion  that  Russia  was  moderate,  that  she 
had  not  committed  any  act  which  allowed  any  doubt  as  to  her  modera- 
tion, and  that  we  were  in  agreement  with  her  in  seeking  a  peaceful 
solution  of  the  dispute.  It  therefore  appeared  to  us  that  Germany 
on  her  side  ought  to  act  at  Vienna,  where  her  action  would  certainly 
be  effective,  with  a  view  to  avoiding  military  operations  leading  to 
the  occupation  of  Servia.^ 

The  Ambassador  having  observed  to  me  that  this  could  not  be 
reconciled  with  the  position  taken  up  by  Germany  "that  the  ques- 
tion concerned  only  Austria  and  Servia,"  I  told  him  that  the  media- 
tion at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  could  be  the  act  of  the  four  other 
Powers  less  interested  in  the  question. 

Herr  von  Schoen  then  entrenched  himself  behind  his  lack  of  instruc- 
tions in  this  respect,  and  I  told  him  that  in  these  conditions  I  did  not 
feel  myself  in  a  position  to  take  any  action  at  St.  Petersburgh  alone. 

The  conversation  ended  by  the  renewed  assurances  of  the  Am-, 
bassador  of  the  peaceful  intention  of  Germany,  whom  he  declared 
to  be  on  this  point  identified  with  France.^       Bienvenu-Martin. 


French  Yellow  Book  No.  57 

Note  for  the  Minister 

Paris,  Sunday  evening,  July  26,  1914. 

After  the  visit  which  he  paid  to  the  Minister  at  5  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon.  Baron  von  Schoen  went  this  evening  at  7  o'clock  to  the 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  51  and  52,  same  day. 

2  The  attitude  of  France,  consistently  carried  out  through  the  next  days,  is  here 
foreshadowed.  Her  view  is  that  Austria-Hungary's  position  was  unreasonable,  while 
Russia's  was  reasonable  and  moderate.  Germany,  therefore-,  should  exert  pressure  on 
Austria,  while  she  herself  refused  to  exert  like  pressure  on  Russia. 

3  Germany  was  trying  to  work  together  with  France  for  the  maintenance  of  peace. 
France  refused  to  appear  to  act  in  accord  with  Germany  for  fear  of  offending  Russia, 
see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  62,  July  27. 


188  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Direction  Politique,  to  ask  that  in  order  to  avoid  the  appearance  in 
the  newspapers  of  comments  intended  to  influence  public  opinion, 
such  as  that  in  the  Echo  de  Paris  of  the  evening  before/  and  in  order 
to  define  exactly  the  sense  of  the  demarches  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment, a  brief  statement  should  be  communicated  to  the  press  on  the 
interview  between  the  German  Ambassador  and  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs. 

Herr  von  Schoen,  in  order  to  define  what  he  had  in  his  mind,  sug- 
gested the  following  terms,  which  the  Acting  Political  Director  took 
down  at  his  dictation :  "  During  the  afternoon  the  German  Ambas- 
sador and  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  a  fresh  interview,  in 
the  course  of  which,  in  the  most  amicable  spirit,  and  acting  in  an 
identical  spirit  of  peaceful  co-operation  (sentiment  de  solidarite  paci- 
fique),  they  examined  the  means  which  might  be  employed  to  main- 
tain general  peace."  ^ 

The  Acting  Political  Director  replied  at  once,  "Then,  in  your 
opinion,  every  thing  is  settled,  and  you  bring  us  the  assurance  that 
Austria  accepts  the  Servian  note  or  will  enter  into  conversations  with 
the  Powers  on  this  matter?"  The  Ambassador  having  appeared 
surprised,  and  having  vigorously  denied  the  suggestion,  it  was  ex- 
plained to  him  that  if  there  was  no  modification  in  Germany's  nega- 
tive attitude,  the  terms  of  the  suggested  "note  to  the  press"  were 
exaggerated,  and  of  a  nature  to  give  a  false  security  to  French  opinion 
by  creating  illusion  on  the  real  situation,  the  dangers  of  which  were 
only  too  evident. 

To  the  assurances  lavished  by  the  German  Ambassador  as  to  the 
optimistic  impressions  which  he  had  formed,  the  Acting  Political 
Director  replied  by  asking  if  he  might  speak  to  him  in  a  manner 
quite  personal  and  private,  as  man  to  man,  quite  freely  and  without 
regard  to  their  respective  functions.  Baron  von  Schoen  asked  him 
to  do  so. 

M.  Berthelot  then  said  that  to  any  simple  mind  Germany's  atti- 
tude was  inexplicable  if  it  did  not  aim  at  war ;  a  purely  objective 
analysis  of  the  facts  and  the  psychology  of  the  Austro-German  rela- 
tions led  logically  to  this  conclusion.  In  the  face  of  the  repeated 
statement  that  Germany  was  ignorant  of  the  contents  of  the  Aus- 
trian note,  it  was  no  longer  permissible  to  raise  any  doubt  on  that 
point ;  but  was  it  probable  that  Germany  would  have  arrayed  her- 
self on  the  side  of  Austria  in  such  an  adventure  with  her  eyes  closed  ? 
Did  the  psychology  of  all  the  past  relations  of  Vienna  and  Berlin 
allow  one  to  admit  that  Austria  could  have  taken  up  a  position  with- 
out any  possible  retreat,  before  having  weighed  with  her  ally  all  the 
consequences  of  her  uncompromising  attitude?  How  surprising 
appeared  the  refusal  by  Germany  to  exercise  mediating^  influence 
at  Vienna  now  that  she  knew  the  extraordinary  text  of  the  Austrian 
note !     What  responsibility  was  the  German  Government  assuming 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  36,  and  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  19,  July  25,  1914. 

'  Cf.  preceding  despatch  and  note  6. 

'  France  was  still  clinging  to  the  Paul  Cambon  modification  —  mediation  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia  —  of  the  Sir  E.  Grey  plan  —  mediation  between  Russia 
and  Austria-Hungary. 


July  26,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  57  189 

and  what  suspicions  would  rest  upon  them  if  they  persisted  in  inter- 
posing between  Austria  and  the  Powers,  after  what  might  be  called 
the  absolute  submission  of  Servia,  and  when  the  slightest  advice 
given  by  them  to  Vienna  would  put  an  end  to  the  nightmare  which 
weighed  on  Europe ! 

The  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  by  Austria,  her  threats 
of  war,  and  the  mobilisation  which  she  was  undertaking^  make 
peculiarly  urgent  pacific  action  on  the  part  of  Germany,  for  from  the 
day  when  Austrian  troops  crossed  the  Servian  frontier,  one  would 
be  faced  by  an  act  which  without  doubt  would  oblige  ^  the  St.  Peters- 
burgh  Cabinet  to  intervene,  and  would  risk  the  unloosing  of  a  war 
which  Germany  declares  that  she  wishes  to  avoid. 

Herr  von  Schoen,  who  listened  smiling,  once  more  affirmed  that 
Germany  had  been  ignorant  of  the  text  of  the  Austrian  note,^  and 
had  only  approved  it  after  its  delivery ;  she  thought,  however,  that 
Servia  had  need  of  a  lesson  severe  enough  for  her  not  to  be  able  to 
forget  it,  and  that  Austria  owed  it  to  herself  to  put  an  end  to  a  situa- 
tion which  was  dangerous  and  intolerable  for  a  great  Power.  He 
declared  besides  that  he  did  not  know  the  text  of  the  Servian  reply, 
and  showed  his  personal  surprise  that  it  had  not  satisfied  Austria, 
if  indeed  it  was  such  as  the  papers,  which  are  often  ill  informed, 
represented  it  to  be. 

He  insisted  again  on  Germany's  peaceful  intentions  and  gave  his 
impressions  as  to  the  effect  that  might  arise  from  good  advice  given, 
for  instance,  at  Vienna,  by  England  in  a  friendly  tone.  According 
to  him  Austria  was  not  uncompromising;  what  she  rejects  is  the 
idea  of  a  formal  mediation,  the  "  spectre  *'  of  a  conference :  a  peaceful 
word  coming  from  St.  Petersburgh,  good  words  said  in  a  conciliatory 
tone  by  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente,  would  have  a  chance  of 
being  well  received.  He  added,  finally,  that  he  did  not  say  that 
Germany  on  her  side  would  not  give  some  advice  at  Vienna. 

In  these  conditions  the  Political  Director  announced  that  he 
would  ask  the  Minister  if  it  appeared  to  him  opportune  to  communi- 
cate to  the  press  a  short  note  in  a  moderate  tone. 

1  There  is  here  no  reference  to  Serbia's  mobilisation  ordered  three  hours  before  she 
sent  her  reply  to  Austria-Hungary ;   cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  5,  July  26,  1914. 

2  France  throughout  deemed  Russia's  interest  in  protecting  Serbia  more  vital 
than  Austria-Hungary's  interests  in  protecting  herself  from  Serbian  intrigues. 

'Here  the  official  British  publication  "Collected  Diplomatic  Documents"  prints 
the  following  note,  not  contained  in  the  French  Yellow  Book,  and  does  so  without  any 
explanation : 

"  Cf.  No.  21.  Letter  from  the  French  Minister  in  Munich  stating  that  the  Bavarian 
President  of  the  Council  said,  on  July  23,  that  he  had  read  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia. 

"C/.  also  the  British  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  No.  95,  page  74,  in  which  Sir 
M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  states :  — 

"Although  I  am  not  able  to  verify  it,  I  have  private  information  that  the  German 
Ambassador  knew  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  before  it  was  despatched 
and  telegraphed  it  to  the  German  Emperor.  I  know  from  the  German  Ambassador 
himself  that  he  endorses  every  line  of  it." 

The  first  paragraph  in  its  English  translation,  is  a  perversion  of  the  truth.  The  French 
text  merely  says  that  he  "  had  cognisance,"  and  for  this  see  note  to  French  Yellow  Book 
No .  2 1 ,  July  23 .  As  to  the  rest  the  reader  must  decide  for  himself  whether  the  anonymous 
informant  of  the  British  Ambassador  deserves  more  credence  than  the  German  Chan- 
cellor and  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  who  repeatedly  said  that  they  had  not  known 
the  contents  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  until  it  was  oflficially  presented  to  the 
Powers.  Cf.  especially  French  Yellow  Book  No.  15,  July  21,  No.  17,  July  22,  and 
No.  30,  July  24. 


190  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Christiania 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  58 

M.  Chevalley,  French  Minister  at  Christiania,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Christiania,  July  26,  1914. 

The  whole  German  fleet  ^  in  Norway  has  received  orders  to  put 
to  sea.  The  German  authorities  at  Bergen  declare  that  it  is  to  make 
straight  for  Germany. 

German  ships  scattered  in  the  Fjords  to  the  north  of  Bergen  were 
to  join  those  which  are  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Stavanger. 

Chevalley. 


From  Luxemburg 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  59 

M.  d'Annoville,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Luxemburg,  to  M.  Bien- 
venu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Luxemburg,  July  26,  1914. 

According  to  information  which  I  have  just  received  from  Thion- 
ville,  the  four  last  classes  set  at  liberty  have  been  ordered  to  hold 
themselves  at  the  disposition  of  the  Commandatur  at  any  moment. 

Without  being  completely  mobilised  the  reservists  are  forbidden 
to  go  away  from  their  place  of  residence. 


Germany : 


From  Petrograd 
German  White  Book  Exhibit  5 


The    Imperial   Ambassador    at    St.    Petersburg    to    the    Chancellor. 
Telegram  of  July  26th,  1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  had  an  extended  interview  ^ 
with  Sazonof  this  afternoon.  Both  parties  had  a  satisfactory  im- 
pression as  they  told  me  afterwards.  The  assurance  of  the  Ambassa- 
dor that  Austria-Hungary  had  no  idea  of  conquest  but  wished  to 
obtain  peace  at  last  at  her  frontiers,  greatly  pacified  the  Secretary. 

1  Orders  to  stop  the  demobilization  of  the  British  fleet  had  been  issued,  two  days 
earlier,  on  July  24,  1914,  according  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  66,  July  27,  1914.  See 
also  note  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  47,  July  27. 

2  Cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  same  day,  "long  and  friendly"  interview;  but 
contrast  impression  of  this  interview  on  French  Ambassador.  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  54,  same  day,  where  Sazonof  is  reported  as  having  "made  clear  the  insulting  char- 
acter of  the  principal  clauses."  No  mention  of  this  interview  is  made  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book.  The  Russian  despatch,  No.  25,  is  sent  to  Vienna.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  Sazonof  gave  the  impression  to  both  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany 
that  a  rapprochement  between  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  was  possible. 


July  26,  German  White  ^Book  Exhibit  10a  191 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  7 

Telegram    of   the   Imperial   Ambassador   at   St.  Petersburgh,   to    the 
Chancellor  on  July  26th,  1914. 

The  military  attache  requests  the  following  message  to  be  sent  to 
the  general  staff : 

I  deem  it  certain  that  mobilisation  has  been  ordered  for  Kiev  and 
Odessa.  It  is  doubtful  at  Warsaw  and  Moscow  and  improbable 
elsewhere. 

To  London 
German  White  Book  Exhibit  10 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  London. 
Urgent.     July  26th,  1914. 

Austria-Hungary  has  declared  in  St.  Petersburg  officially  and 
solemnly  that  it  has  no  desire  for  territorial  gain  in  Servia ;  that  it 
will  not  touch  the  existence  of  the  Kingdom,  but  that  it  desires  to 
establish  peaceful  conditions.  According  to  news  received  here, 
Russia  is  about  to  summon  several  bodies  of  reservists  also  against  us.^ 
If  this  news  proves  correct,  we  shall  be  forced  to  countermeasures 
very  much  against  our  own  wishes.  Our  desire  to  localise  the  con- 
flict and  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe  remains  unchanged.  We 
ask  to  act  in  this  sense  at  St.  Petersburg  with  all  possible  emphasis.^ 

To  Paris 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  10a' 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at 
Paris.     July  26th,  1914. 

After  officially  declaring  to  Russia  that  Austria-Hungary  has  no 
intention  to  acquire  territorial  gain  and  to  touch  the  existence  of  the 
Kingdom,  the  decision  whether  there  is  to  be  a  European  war  rests 
solely  with  Russia  which  has  to  bear  the  entire  responsibility.  We 
depend  upon  France  with  which  we  are  at  one  in  the  desire  for  the 
preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe  that  it  will  exercise  its  influence 
at  St.  Petersburg  in  favour  of  peace. 

1  The  words  in  italics  are  substituted  here  from  the  New  York  Times  translation  for 
those  of  the  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents,  which  is  the  official  British  version 
and  follows  the  official  German  translation,  and  reads  "the  call  for  several  classes  of 
the  reserves  is  expected  immediately  which  is  equivalent  to  mobilisation."  It  will  be 
noticed  that  two  thoughts  are  inadvertently  omitted  here :  first  that  it  is  Russia  who 
is  mobilizing;  secondly  that  she  is  mobilising  "also  against  us."  The  editor  of  the 
Collected  Diplomatic  Documents  who  states,  on  p.  403,  that  "a  few  footnotes  have 
been  inserted  to  point  out  certain  discrepancies  between  the  translation  and  the  Ger- 
man original,"  disregards  the  omission  of  Russia  in  his  footnote  to  these  words,  stating 
merely  "The  German  text  adds  here  auch  gegen  uns  (also  against  us)." 

2  This  entire  message  delivered  to  Sir  E,  Grey  by  the  German  Ambassador  has  been 
omitted  in  the  British  Blue  Book. 

3  From  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  28,  July  26,  1914,  it  appears  that  this  message 
was  delivered  in  Paris.     It'is,  however,  not  printed  in  the  French  Yellow  Book. 

In  the  English  Translations  published  by  The  Imperial  German  Foreign  Office  these 
"Exhibits"  are  renumbered  and  printed  as  numbers:    10a  becomes  11  ;    106  12,  etc. 


192  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Petrograd 
German  White  Book  Exhibit  106  ^ 

Telegram    of  the    Chancellor    to    the   Imperial   Ambassador    at   St, 
Petersburg  on  July  26th,  1914. 

After  Austria's  solemn  declaration  of  its  territorial  disinterested- 
ness, the  responsibility  for  a  possible  disturbance  of  the  peace  of 
Europe  through  a  Russian  intervention  rests  solely  upon  Russia.  We 
trust  still  that  Russia  will  undertake  no  steps  which  will  threaten 
seriously  the  peace  of  Europe. 

For  an  additional  message  to  Russia  see  oelow  after  No.  29  of  the  Russian 
Orange  Book,  July  26,  1914. 

Great  Britain: 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  31  * 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  —  (Received  July  26.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  25,  1914. 

Servian  reply  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  demands  is  not  considered 
satisfactory,  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  has  left  Belgrade. 
War  is  thought  to  be  imminent. 

British  Blue  Book  No.  32 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  26.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  26,  1914. 

According  to  confident  belief  of  German  Ambassador,  Russia  will 
keep  quiet  during  chastisement  of  Servia,  which  Austria-Hungary  is 
resolved  to  inflict,  having  received  assurances  that  no  Servian  terri- 
tory will  be  annexed  by  Austria-Hungary.  In  reply  to  my  question 
whether  Russian  Government  might  not  be  compelled  by  public 
opinion  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  kindred  nationality,  he  said  that 
everything  depended  on  the  personality  of  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  who  could  resist  easily,  if  he  chose,  the  pressure  of  a 
few  newspapers.  He  pointed  out  that  the  days  of  Pan-Slav  agita- 
tion in  Russia  were  over  and  that  Moscow  was  perfectly  quiet.  The 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  would  not,  his  Excellency 
thought,  be  so  imprudent  as  to  take  a  step  which  would  probably 
result  in  many  frontier  questions  in  which  Russia  is  interested,  such 

^  Like  the  preceding  two  messages  which  have  been  omitted  from  the  British  Blue 
Book  and  the  French  Yellow  Book  respectively,  this  message  has  been  omitted  from 
the  Russian  Orange  Book. 

2  The  information  contained  in  this  despatch  had  reached  England  from  Belgrade 
on  the  previous  day ;   British  Blue  Book  No.  23. 


July  26,  British  Blue  Book  No.  33  193 

as  Swedish,  Polish,  Ruthene,  Roumanian,  and  Persian  questions  being 
brought  into  the  melting-pot.  France,  too,  was  not  at  all  in  a  con- 
dition for  facing  a  war. 

I  replied  that  matters  had,  I  thought,  been  made  a  little  difficult 
for  other  Powers  by  the  tone  of  Austro-Hungarian  Government's 
ultimatum  to  Servia.  One  naturally  sympathised  with  many  of  the 
requirements  of  the  ultimatum,  if  only  the  manner  of  expressing 
them  had  been  more  temperate.  It  was,  however,  impossible;  ac- 
cording to  the  German  Ambassador,  to  speak  effectively  in  any  other 
way  to  Servia.  Servia  was  about  to  receive  a  lesson  which  she  re- 
quired ;  the  quarrel,  however,  ought  not  to  be  extended  in  any  way 
to  foreign  countries.  He  doubted  Russia,  who  had  no  right  to  assume 
a  protectorate  over  Servia,  acting  as  if  she  made  any  such  claim. 
As  for  Germany  she  knew  very  well  what  she  was  about  in  backing 
up  Austria-Hungary  in  this  matter. 

The  German  Ambassador  had  heard  of  a  letter  ^  addressed  by  you 
yesterday  to  the  German  Ambassador  in  London  in  which  you  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  the  Servian  concessions  would  be  regarded  as 
satisfactory.  He  asked  whether  I  had  been  informed  that  a  pretence 
of  giving  way  at  the  last  moment  had  been  made  by  the  Servian 
Government.  I  had,  I  said,  heard  that  on  practically  every  point 
Servia  had  been  willing  to  give  in.  His  Excellency  replied  that  Ser- 
vian concessions  were  all  a  sham.^  Servia  proved  that  she  well  knew 
that  they  were  insufficient  to  satisfy  the  legitimate  demands  of 
Austria-Hungary  by  the  fact  that  before  making  her  offer  she  had 
ordered  mobilisation  ^  and  retirement  of  Government  from  Belgrade. 


Frmn  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  33 

Sir  H.  Rumhold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  26.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  26,  1911 

.  Emperor  returns  suddenly  to-night,  and  Under-Secretary  of  State 
says  that  Foreign  Office  regret  this  step,  which  was  taken  on  His 
Majesty's  own  initiative.  They  fear  that  His  Majesty's  sudden 
return  may  cause  speculation  and  excitement.  Under-Secretary  of 
State  likewise  told  me  that  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh 
had  reported  that,  in  conversation  with  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  latter  had  said  that  if  Austria  annexed  bits  of  Servian  ter- 
ritory Russia  would  not  remain  indifferent.  Under-Secretary  of 
State  drew  conclusion  that  Russia  would  not  act  if  Austria  did  not 
annex  territory. 

1  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  29,  same  day. 

2  For  the  reasons  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914. 

8  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  29,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  5,  same  day. 


194  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

British  Blue  Book  No.  34 

Sir  H.  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  26.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  26,  1914. 

Under-Secretary  of  State  has  just  telephoned  to  me  to  say  that 
German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  has  been  instructed  to  pass  on  to 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  your  hopes  that  they  may  take  a 
favourable  view  of  Servian  reply  if  it  corresponds  to  the  forecast  con- 
tained in  Belgrade  telegram  of  25th  July.^ 

Under-Secretary  of  State  considers  very  fact  of  their  making  this 
communication  to  Austro-Hungarian  Government  implies  that  they 
associate  themselves  to  a  certain  extent  with  your  hope.  German 
Government  do  not  see  their  way  to  going  beyond  this. 

From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  35  ^ 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  26.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  26,  1914. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  welcomes  your  proposal  for  a  con- 
ference, and  will  instruct  Italian  Ambassador  to-night  accordingly. 

Austrian  Ambassador  has  informed  Italian  Government  this  even- 
ing that  Minister  in  Belgrade  had  been  recalled,  but  that  this  did 
not  imply  declaration  of  war. 

.  To  Paris,  Berlin,  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  36 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Sir 
H.  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  and  Sir  R.  Rodd, 
British  Ambassador  at  Rome. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  26,  1914- 

Would  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  be  disposed  to  instruct  Am- 
bassador here  to  join  with  representatives  of  France,  Italy,  and  Ger- 
many, and  myself  to  meet  here  in  conference  immediately  for  the 
purpose  bf  discovering  an  issue  which  would  prevent  complications  ?  ^ 
You  should  ask  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  whether  he  would  do 
this.  If  so,  when  bringing  the  above  suggestion  to  the  notice  of  the 
Governments  to  which  they  are  accredited,  representatives  at  Bel- 
grade, Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh  should  be  authorised  to  request 

1  See  No.  21,  July  25,  1914. 

2  This  seems  to  be  a  reply  to  No.  36. 

3  This  is  no  longer  the  Conference  of  Sir  E.  Grey's  original  plan  —  mediation  be- 
tween Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  —  nor  of  the  Paul  Cambon  modification  of  this 
plan  —  mediation  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia.     See  note  to  No.  37. 


July  26,  British  Blue  Book  No.  39  195 

that  all  active  military  operations  should  be  suspended  pending 
results  of  conference. 

To  Paris 
British  Blue  Book  No.  37 
Sir  Edioard  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  26,  1911 

Berlin  telegram  of  25th  July.^ 

It  is  important  to  know  if  France  will  agree  to  suggested  action 
by  the  four  Powers  if  necessary. 

From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  38 

[Here  Sir  E.  Grey  prints  a  despatch  from  Rome  dated  July  23,  but  delayed  in 
transmission.    For  the  text  see  above  under  date  of  July  23,  and  explanatory  note.] 

British  Blue  Book  No.  39 

Reply  of  Serbian  Government  to  Austro-Hungarian  Note.  —  {Commu- 
nicated by  the  Serbian  Minister,  July  27.) 

[For  the  text  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  25,  July  25,  and  No.  34, 
July  27,  1914.  The  British  Blue  Book  fails  to  print  the  Austro-Hungarian 
comment.] 

According  to  the  published  despatches  none  of  the  Entente  Powers  had  received 
copies  of  the  Serbian  reply  on  July  26,  and  even  a  summary  of  the  reply  had 
reached  Paris  with  a  delay  of  twenty  hours,  i.e.  at  2  p.m.  Sunday,  July  26,  1914 
(French  Yellow  Book  No.  56,  same  day  also  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  36,  July  27). 
As  to  the  reply,  however,  two  versions  were  current  on  July  26  :  first,  that  dis- 
seminated by  Russia,  Serbia  and  France,  to  the  effect  that  Serbia  had  yielded 
completely  except  on  one  or  two  minor  points ;  secondly,  that  given  out  by  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany,  to  the  effect  that  Serbia's  concessions  were  a  sham  and 
that  the  entire  reply  was  unsatisfactory. 

The  only  foreign  offices  cognisant  of  the  reply  were,  of  course,  those  of  Serbia 
and  Austria-Hungary,  unless  one  wishes  to  understand  a  passage  of  British  Blue 
Book  No.  6,  July  24,  (see  note  7)  to  mean  that  the  Russian  Cabinet  wrote  the  note 
for  Serbia. 

Eventually  Austria-Hungary  sent  her  commentary  on  this  note  to  the  Powers 
by  mail  July  27  (see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  39,  July  28).  These  com- 
ments, however,  were  not  printed  either  in  the  British  Blue  Book  or  the  French 
Yellow  Book  in  any  of  the  editions  receiving  currency  in  America  or  in  tlie 
Collected  Diplomatic  Documents  officially  issued  by  England.  Neither  does  it 
appear  in  any  of  the  other  books  except  the  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book. 

1  The officialBritish  version  contains  here  a  footnote  "See  No.  18."  The  Conference 
there  spoken  of  has  in  view  "working  in  favour  of  mediation  in  Vienna  and  at  St. 
Petersburgh."  It  is  in  short  Sir  E.  Grey's  original  plan.  Despatches  Nos.  36  and  37, 
therefore,  contain  different  proposals.  France's  objections  to  working  in  favour  of 
moderation  in  Petrograd  were  discussed  above  in  note  5  to  French  Yellow  Book  No. 
56,  July  26.  Very  probably,  therefore,  British  Blue  Book  No.  37  should  precede  No.  36. 
When  Sir  E.  Grey  met  determined  opposition  in  Paris  to  his  plan  (No.  37)  he  may 
have  modified  it,  as  expressed  in  No.  36.  No.  36  reached  the  British  Ambassador  while 
he  was  at  a  conference  with  the  Russian  and  French  Ambassadors  in  Vienna  in  the 
evening  (French  Yellow  Book  No.  55)  and  his  reply,  British  Blue  Book  No.  40,  while 
dated  July  26,  was  received  in  London  the  next  day.  All  this  makes  it  unlikely  that 
after  sending  No.  36,  Sir  E.  Grey  should  have  reverted  to  his  original  plan  in  No.  37. 
From  No.  35  it  does  not  appear  which  plan  of  a  conference  was  accepted  by  Italy. 


196  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  40^ 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
—  {Received  July  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  26,  191^. 

Russian  Ambassador  just  returned  from  leave  thinks  that  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  are  determined  on  war,  and  that  it  is  im- 
possible for  Russia  to  remain  indifferent.  He  does  not  propose  to 
press  for  more  time  in  the  sense  of  your  telegram  of  the  25th  instant  ^ 
(last  paragraph). 

When  the  repetition  of  your  telegram  of  the  26th  instant  to  Paris  ^ 
arrived,  I  had  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors  both  with  me.^ 
They  expressed  great  satisfaction  with  its  contents,  which  I  commu- 
nicated to  them.  They  doubted,  however,  whether  the  principle  of 
Russia  being  an  interested  party  entitled  to  have  a  say  in  the  settle- 
ment of  a  purely  Austro-Servian  dispute  would  be  accepted  by  either 
the  Austro-Hungarian  or  the  German  Government. 

Instructions  were  also  given  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  to  support 
the  request  of  the  Russian  Government  that  the  time  limit  should  be 
postponed.  They  arrived,  however,  too  late  for  any  useful  action  to 
be  taken. 

Russia : 

To  Rome 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  23 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  Rome. 
(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  13  {26),  1914. 

Italy  might  play  a  part  of  the  first  importance  in  favour  of  pre- 
serving peace,  by  bringing  the  necessary  influence  to  bear  upon 
Austria,  and  by  adopting  a  definitely  unfavourable  attitude  towards 
the  dispute  on  the  ground  that  it  could  not  be  localised.  You  should 
express  your  conviction  that  Russia  cannot  possibly  avoid  coming 
to  the  help  of  Servia.^ 

1  No.  40  should  precede  No.  39,  for  while  both  despatches  are  said  to  have  been 
received  on  July  27,  No.  40  was  sent  on  July  26. 

2  See  No.  26,  July  25. 

»  See  No.  36,  July  26,  1914. 

*  Cf.  the  French  account  of  this  interview,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  55,  same  day. 

6  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  51  and  52,  July  26,  and  for  Russia's  determination 
to  force  a  war  unless  Austria-Hungary  yielded.  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  1914, 
"  if  she  (i.e.  Russia)  feels  secure  of  the  support  of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks 
of  war." 


July  26,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25  197 

From  Prague 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  24 

Acting  Russian  Consul  at  Prague  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Prague,  July  13  (26),  19H. 

Mobilisation  ^  has  been  ordered. 

To  Vienna;  also  Berlin,  Paris,  London,  and  Rome 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  13  {26),  1914. 

I  HAD  a  long  and  friendly  ^  conversation  to-day  with  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Ambassador.  After  discussing  the  ten  demands  addressed 
to  Servia,  I  drew  his  attention  to  the  fact  that,  quite  apart  from  the 
clumsy  form  in  which  they  were  presented,  some  of  them  were  quite 
impracticable,  even  if  the  Servian  Government  agreed  to  accept 
them.  Thus,  for  example,  points  1  and  2  could  not  be  carried  out 
without  recasting  the  Servian  press  law  and  associations  law,  and 
to  that  it  might  be  difficult  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Skupshtina. 
As  for  enforcing  paints  4  and  5,  this  might  lead  to  most  dangerous 
consequences,  and  even  to  the  risk  of  acts  of  terrorism  directed 
against  the  Royal  Family  and  against  Pashitch,  which  clearly  could 
not  be  the  intention  of  Austria.  With  regard  to  the  other  points  it 
seemed  to  me  that,  with  certain  changes  of  detail,  it  would  not  be 
difficult  to  find  a  basis  of  mutual  agreement,  if  the  accusations  con- 
tained in  them  were  confirmed  by.  sufficient  proof. 

In  the  interest  of  the  maintenance  of  peace,  which,  according  to 
the  statements  of  Szapary,  is  as  much  desired  by  Austria  as  by  all 
the  Powers,  it  was  necessary  to  end  the  tension  of  the  present  moment 
as  soon  as  possible.  With  this  object  in  view  it  seemed  to  me  most 
desirable  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  should  be  authorised 
to  enter  into  a  private  exchange  of  views  ^  in  order  to  redraft  certain 
articles  of  the  Austrian  note  of  the  10th  (23rd)  July  in  consultation 
with  me.  This  method  of  procedure  would  perhaps  enable  us  to 
find  a  formula  which  would  prove  acceptable  to  Servia,  while  giving 
satisfaction  to  Austria  in  respect  of  the  chief  of  her  demands.  Please 
convey  the  substance  of  this  telegram  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  in  a  judicious  and  friendly  manner. 

Communicated  to  Russian  Ambassadors  in  Germany,  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Italy. 

1  The  despatches  probably  received  in  Petrograd  announcing  the  Serbian  mobi- 
lisation on  July  25,  three  hours  before  Serbia  sent  her  reply  to  Austria-Hungary, 
are  not  published  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book.  See  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  5,  July  26, 
1914. 

2  Cf.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  5,  and  contrast  French  Yellow  Book  No.  54, 
both  of  July  26,  1914.     For  the  Austrian  Version  see  Red  Book  No.  31,  July  27,  1914. 

3  This  is  Sazonof 's  counter  proposition  to  Sir  E.  Grey's  plan  of  a  conference  of  four 
Powers. 


198  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Berlin 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  26 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
(Telegram.)  St,  Petersburg,  July  13  {26),  1914. 

Please  communicate  the  contents  of  my  telegram^  to  Vienna  of 
to-day  to  the  German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  express  to 
him  the  hope  that  he,  on  his  part,  will  be  able  to  advise  Vienna  to 
meet  Russia's  proposal  in  a  friendly  spirit. 

From  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  27 

Russian  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  13  {26),  191J,.. 

The  Director  of  the  Political  Department  informs  me  that,  upon 
his  informing  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  ^  of  the  contents  of 
the  Servian  reply  to  the  ultimatum,  the  Ambassador  did  not  conceal 
his  surprise  that  it  had  failed  to  satisfy  Giesl.  In  the  opinion  of  the 
Director  of  the  Political  Department,  Servia's  conciliatory  ^  attitude 
should  produce  the  best  impression  in  Europe. 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  28 

Russian  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs, 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  13  {26),  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  again  visited  the  Acting  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  to-day,  and  made  to  him  the  following  declarations  :^ — 

(Translation.) 

"L'Autriche    a    declare    a    la  "Austria     has     declared     to 

Russie  qu'elle  ne  recherche  pas  Russia  that  she  does  not  desire 

des   acquisitions   territoriales   et  territorial  acquisitions,  and  that 

qu'elle  ne  menace  pas  I'integrite  she  harbours  no  designs  against 

de   la   Serbie.     Son   but  unique  the  integrity  of  Servia.     Her  sole 

est  d'assurer  sa  propre  tranquil-  object  is  to  secure  her  own  peace 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  and  see  note  3  to  that  despatch. 

»  The  summary  of  the  Serbian  reply  reached  Paris  in  the  afternoon  of  July  26,  1914 ; 
see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  56,  July  26,  where  an  interview  with  the  German 
Ambassador  is  described.  The  interview  here  referred  to  with  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  is  not  mentioned  in  the  French  Yellow  Book. 

3  For  a  contrary  interpretation  of  the  Serbian  attitude  see  British  Blue  Book 
No.  32,  same  day,  and  note  2. 

*  This  is  the  official  message,  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  10a,  sent  by  the  Chan- 
cellor to  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris.  It  is  not  printed  in  the  French  Yellow 
Book  and  is  here  printed  as  if  it  were  a  personal  opinion  of  the  German  Ambassador. 


July  26 y  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  30  199 

lite.     Par  consequent  il  depend  and  quiet,  and  consequently  it 

de  la  Russie  d'eviter  la  guerre,  rests  with  Russia  to  prevent  war. 

L'Allemagne    se    sent    solidaire  Germany  is  at  one  with  France 

avec    la    France    dans    le    desir  in  her  ardent  desire  to  preserve 

ardent  de  conserver  la  paix  et  peace,  and   she   sincerely   hopes 

espere  fermement  que  la  France  that     France     will    exercise     a 

usera  de  son  influence  a  Peters-  moderating     influence     at     St. 

bourg  dans  un  sens  moderateur."  Petersburg." 

The  Minister  pointed  out  that  Germany  on  her  part  might  well 
act  on  similar  lines  at  Vienna,  especially  in  view  of  the  conciliatory 
spirit  displayed  by  Servia.  The  Ambassador  replied  that  such  a 
course  was  not  possible,  owing  to  the  decision  not  to  intervene  in 
the  Austro-Servian  dispute.  The  Minister  then  asked  whether  the 
four  Powers  —  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Italy,  and  France  —  could 
not  make  representations  at  St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna,  for  that  the 
matter  amounted,  in  effect,  to  a  dispute  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
The  Ambassador  alleged  that  he  had  no  instructions.  Finally,  the 
Minister  refused  to  agree  to  the  German  proposal. 


Russian  Orange  Book  No.  29 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  13  {26),  1914. 

The  Director  of  the  Political  Department  has  expressed  the  per- 
sonal opinion  that  the  series  of  representations  made  by  Germany  at 
Paris  aim  at  intimidating  ^  France  and  at  securing  her  intervention  at 
St.  Petersburgh. 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  30 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 

Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  13  {26),  1911 

On  the  news  reaching  Berlin  that  the  Austrian  army  had 
mobilised    against   Servia,    a    large    crowd,    in    which   the   papers 

1  Russia  also  received,  on  this  day,  July  26,  1914,  the  following  message  from 
Berlin,  which  is  not  printed  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book.  It  is  here  quoted  from 
the  German  White  Book  (authorized  translation),  p.  7  : 

"  Preparatory  military  measures  by  Russia  will  force  us  to  counter-measures  which 
must  consist  in  mobilising  the  army. 

"  But  mobilisation  means  war.  . 

"  As  we  know  the  obligations  of  France  towards  Russia,  this  mobilisation  would  be 
directed  against  both  Russia  and  France.  We  cannot  assume  that  Russia  desires 
to  unchain  such  a  European  war.  Since  Austria-Hungary  will  not  touch  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Servian  kingdom,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  Russia  can  afford  to  assume 
an  attitude  of  waiting.  We  can  all  the  more  support  the  desire  of  Russia  to  protect 
the  integrity  of  Servia,  as  Austria-Hungary  does  not  intend  to  question  the  latter. 
It  will  be  easy  in  the  further  development  of  the  affair  to  find  a  basis  for  an  under- 
standing." 


200  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

report  the  presence  of  an  Austrian  element,  gave  vent  to  a  series 
of  noisy  demonstrations  in  favour  of  Austria.  Late  in  the  even- 
ing the  crowd  several  times  collected  before  the  Imperial  Russian 
Embassy  and  some  anti-Russian  shouting  occurred.  Hardly  any 
police  were  present  and  no  precautions  were  taken. 

Serbia : 

Serbia  has  not  published  any  despatches  of  July  26,  1914. 


July  ^7,  19U 


201 


Monday,  July  27,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Petrograd,  Berlin,  Rome 
London,  Paris,  Petrograd 

Petrograd,  Berlin 

Belgium 

Berlin 

France 

London,  London  etc. 

Basle,  London,  Petro- 
grad,     Constantino- 
ple, Berlin,   Rome 

Serbian      reply      and 
Austro-Hungarian 
Memorandum. 

Germany 

London 

Kovno,   Berne,  Petro- 
grad 
Vienna,    Paris,  Berlin, 

Great  Britain 

Berlin,  Petrograd,  Vienna, 

Rome 

Petrograd,  Rome 
Serbian      reply       and 
Austro-H  ungarian 
Memorandum 

Russia 

Paris  and  London, 

London,  Paris,  Berlin, 

Berlin,  London  etc. 

Vienna 

Czar    to    Serbian    Crown 

Prince 

Serbia 

Czar  to  Serbian  Crown 
Prince. 

Austria-Hungary  sends  out  for  presentation  to  the  Powers  the  dossier  with  her 
proofs  of  Serbian  guilt  and  issues  her  comments  to  the  Serbian  reply,  explaining  in 
detail  why  she  could  not  accept  it  as  satisfactory,  and  repeats  her  declaration 
that  she  **does  not  aim  in  any  way  at  territorial  acquisitions  of  any  sort." 

France  continues  to  hold  Germany  responsible  for  Austria-Hungary's  firmness 
in  dealing  with  Serbia,  and  refuses  Germany's  request  to  intercede  in  Petrograd. 
She  is  troubled  by  the  confidence  expressed  by  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassadors  in  London  that  ^'England  would  preserve  neutrality"  and,  like 
Russia,  is  endeavoring  to  secure  the  promise  of  English  support  in  case  of  war. 
Sazonof  is  represented  by  the  French  officials  as  very  moderate  and  desirous  of 
peace.  Sir  E.  Grey's  proposal  of  a  conference  to  "examine  means  of  finding  a 
solution"  is  supported  but  altered  to  include  Belgrade  instead  of  only  Vienna 
and  Petrograd,  while  Jules  Cambon  in  Berlin  renews  his  request  that  Berlin  alone 
intervene  in  Vienna. 

Germany  accepts  in  principle  Sir  E.  Grey's  proposal  of  a  conference  and  "at 
once  starts  the  mediation  proposal  in  Vienna  in  the  sense  desired  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey."  She  expects,  however,  most  good  from  direct  conversations  between 
Vienna  and  Petrograd  as  suggested  by  Sazonof.  She  continues  to  point  out  the 
danger  of  Russian  mobilisation. 

Great  Britain  announces  the  action  of  keeping  her  fleet  mobilised  as  of  this  day 
while  it  actually  occurred  on  July  24.  It  was  meant  to  dissipate  the  impression 
that  in  any  event  England  "would  stand  aside,"  which  impression  Sazonof 
"deplored."  Serbia's  reply  continues  to  be  represented  as  satisfactory  by  Sir  E. 
Grey,  who  omits  from  the  Blue  Book  both  the  dossier  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
comments  on  the  Serbian  reply.  Great  Britain  repeats  her  conference  proposals 
to  mediate  between  Petrograd  and  Vienna  or,  according  to  the  French  Yellow 
Book,  also  Belgrade.  Sir  E.  Grey  is,  however,  not  unfavourable  to  Sazonof 's  plan 
of  direct  conversations. 

Russia,  while  not  refusing  categorically  Sir  E.  Grey's  plan,  urges  her  own  of 
direct  conversations.  She  continues  her  mobilisation,  although  some  of  her  hi^ 
officials  deny  this. 


202  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Serbia  officially  appeals  to  Russia  for  help. 

Belgium  discusses  the  Serbian  reply  on  information  supplied  by  the  British 
Charge  d'Affaires  at  Belgrade. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Petrograd 

AUSTROHUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    31 

Count  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  27,  1914. 

Just  had  a  long  conversation  with  M.  Sazonof.^  Told  the  Minis- 
ter I  was  under  the  impression  that  mistaken  ideas  were  prevalent  in 
Russia  with  regard  to  the  character  of  our  action.  We  were  credited 
with  wishing  to  push  forward  into  Balkan  territory,  and  to  begin  a 
march  to  Salonica  or  even  to  Constantinople.  Others,  again,  went 
so  far  as  to  describe  our  action  merely  as  the  starting  point  of  a  pre- 
ventive war  against  Russia.  I  said  that  all  this  was  erroneous,  and 
that  parts  of  it  were  absolutely  unreasonable.  The  goal  of  our  action 
was  self-preservation  and  self-defence  against  hostile  propaganda  by 
word,  in  writing,  and  in  action,  which  threatened  our  integrity.  It 
would  occur  to  no  one  in  Austria-Hungary  to  threaten  Russian  in- 
terests, or  indeed  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  Russia.  And  yet  we  were 
absolutely  determined  to  reach  the  goal  which  we  had  set  before  us, 
and  the  path  which  we  had  chosen  seemed  to  us  the  most  suitable. 
As,  however,  the  action  under  discussion  was  action  in  self-defence, 
I  could  not  conceal  from  him  that  we  could  not  allow  ourselves  to 
be  diverted  from  it  by  any  consequences,  of  whatever  kind  they 
might  be. 

M.  Sazonof  agreed  with  me.  Our  goal,  as  I  had  described  it  to 
him,  was  an  entirely  legitimate  one,  but  he  considered  that  the  path 
which  we  were  pursuing  with  a  view  to  attaining  it  was  not  the  surest. 
He  said  that  the  note  which  we  had  delivered  was  not  happy  ^  in  its 
form.  He  had  since  been  studying  it,  and  if  I  had  time,  he  would 
like  to  look  it  through  once  more  with  me.  I  remarked  that  I  was 
at  his  service,  but  was  not  authorised  either  to  discuss  the  text  of  the 
note  with  him  or  to  interpret  it.  Of  course,  however,  his  remarks 
were  of  interest.  The  Minister  then  took  all  the  points  of  the  note 
in  order,  and  on  this  occasion  found  seven  of  the  ten  points  admissible 
without  very  great  difficulty  ;  only  the  two  points  ^  dealing  with  the 
collaboration  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  officials  in  Servia  and  the 
point  dealing  with  the  removal  of  officers  and  civil  servants  to  be 
designated  by  us,'*  seemed  to  him  to  be  unacceptable  in  their  present 

1  While  dated  July  27,  this  interview  took  place  on  July  26 ;  cf .  Russian  Orange 
Book  No.  25,  July  26,  and  note  1.  The  last  paragraph  of  this  note,  moreover,  refers 
to  the  Serbian  mobilisation,  which  took  place  on  the  25th,  as  of  "the  previous  day." 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  54,  July  26,  quotes  Sazonof  as  having  said  "insulting." 
'  They  are  points  5  and  6^  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7,  July  22,  1914, 

and  the  explanation.  Red  Book  No.  27,  July  25,  1914. 

'   ♦  This  is  point  4  of  the  note  to  Serbia,  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7, 
July  22,  1914. 


July  27,  Austro-Hunganan  Red  Book  No.  34  203 

form.  With  regard  to  the  two  first  points,  I  was  in  a  position  to  give 
an  authentic  interpretation  in  the  sense  of  your  Excellency's  telegram 
of  the  25th  instant ;  ^  with  regard  to  the  third,  I  expressed  the  opinion 
that  it  was  a  necessary  demand.  Moreover,  matters  had  already  been 
set  in  motion.  The  Servians  had  mobilised  on  the  previous  day  ^  and 
I  did  not  know  what  had  happened  since  then. 

To  Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   32 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  27,  1914. 

I  EMPOWER  your  Excellency  to  declare  to  M.  Sazonof  that,  so 
long  as  the  war  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia  remains  local- 
ised, the  Monarchy  does  not  aim  in  any  way  at  territorial  acquisitions 
of  any  sort. 

From  Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   33 

Count  Szogyeny  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  June  27,  1914. 

M.  Sazonof  explained  to  the  German  Ambassador  that  he  could 
"guarantee"  to  him  "that  on  the  Russian  side  no  mobilisation  had 
been  begun ;  though  it  was  true  that  certain  necessary  military  pre- 
cautions were  being  taken." 

The  German  military  attache  at  St.  Petersburgh  reports  ^  that 
"  the  Russian  Minister  of  War  has  given  him  his  word  of  honour  that 
not  a  man  or  a  horse  has  been  mobiHsed ;  however,  naturally,  certain 
military  precautions  have  been  taken";  precautions  which,  as  the 
German  military  attache  adds,  apparently  spontaneously,  to  his 
report,  "are  to  be  sure  pretty  far-reaching." 

To  Berlin,  Rome,  London,  Paris,  and  Petrograd 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   34 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  in  Berlin, 
Rome,  London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Vienna,  July  27,  1914. 

Annexed  you  will  find  the  text,  annotated  with  our  remarks,  of 
the  note  which  the  Royal  Servian  Government  on  the  25th  of  June 
transmitted  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Minister  at  Belgrade. 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  Nos.  21,  26,  and  27,  July  25,  1914. 

2  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  5,  July  25,  1914. 

3  Cf.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  11,  also  8  and  9,  July  27,  1914. 


204 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Enclosure  ^ 

Reply  of  the  Royal  Servian  Government  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  of  the  12/25  July,  1914, 


(Translation.) 

The  Royal  Servian  Govern- 
ment have  received  the  commu- 
nication of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  of  the  10th 
instant,^  and  are  convinced  that 
their  reply  will  remove  any  mis- 
understanding which  may 
threaten  to  impair  the  good 
neighbourly  relations  between 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
and  the  Kingdom  of  Servia. 

Conscious  of  the  fact  that  the 
protests  which  were  made  both 
from  the  tribune  of  the  national 
Skupschtina  ^  and  in  the  declara- 
tions and  actions  of  the  respon- 
sible representatives  of  the  State 
—  protests  which  were  cut  short 
by  the  declarations  made  by  the 
Servian  Government  on  the  18th^ 
March,  1909  —  have  not  been 
renewed  on  any  occasion  as  re- 
gards the  great  neighbouring 
Monarchy,  and  that  no  attempt 
has  been  made  since  that  time, 
either  by  the  successive  Royal 
Governments  or  by  their  agents, 
to  change  the  political  and  legal 
state  of  affairs  created  in  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  the  Royal  Gov- 
ernment draw  attention  to  the 
fact  that  in  this  connection  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
have  made  no  representation 
except  one  concerning  a  school 
book,  and  that  on  that  occasion 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment received  an  entirely  satis- 
factory explanation.  Servia  has 
several  times  given  proofs  of  her 
pacific  and  moderate  policy  dur- 

1  For  a  brief  summary  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  75  (2),  July  28,  and  footnote. 

2  Old  style. 

» The  Serbian  Parliament. 


(Remarks.) 

The  Royal  Servian  Govern- 
ment confine  themselves  to  as- 
serting that,  since  the  declara- 
tions on  the  18th  March,  1909, 
no  attempt  has  been  made  by  the 
Servian  Government  and  their 
agents  to  change  the  position  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

Thereby  they  deliberately  and 
arbitrarily  shift  the  ground  on 
which  our  demarche  was  based, 
as  we  did  not  maintain  that  they 
and  their  agents  have  taken  any 
official  action  in  this  direction. 

Our  charge,  on  the  contrary, 
is  to  the  effect  that  the  Servian 
Government,  notwithstanding  the 
obligations  undertaken  in  the 
above-quoted  note,  have  neg- 
lected to  suppress  the  move- 
ment directed  against  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Monarchy. 

Their  obligation,  that  is  to  say, 
was  that  they  should  change  the 
whole  direction  of  their  policy 
and  adopt  a  friendly  and  neigh- 
bourly attitude  towards  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy, 
and  not  merely  that  they  should 
refrain  from  officially  attacking 
the  incorporation  of  Bosnia  in 
the  Monarchy. 


July  27,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34 


205 


ing  the  Balkan  crisis,  and  it  is 
thanks  to  Servia  and  to  the  sacri- 
fice that  she  has  made  in  the 
exclusive  interest  of  European 
peace  that  that  peace  has  been 
preserved.  The  Royal  Govern- 
ment cannot  be  held  responsible 
for  manifestations  of  a  private 
character,  such  as  articles  in  the 
press  and  the  peaceable  work  of 
societies  —  manifestations  which 
take  place  in  nearly  all  countries 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  events, 
and  which,  as  a  general  rule, 
escape  official  control.  The 
Royal  Government  are  all  the 
less  responsible,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  at  the  time  of  the  solu- 
tion of  a  series  of  questions  which 
arose  between  Servia  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary they  gave  proof  of 
a  great  readiness  to  oblige,  and 
thus  succeeded  in  settling  the 
majority  of  these  questions  to  the 
advantage  of  the  two  neighbour- 
ing countries. 


For  these  reasons  the  Royal 
Government  have  been  pained 
and  surprised  at  the  statements, 
according  to  which  members  of 
the  Kingdom  of  Servia  are  sup- 
posed to  have  participated  in  the 
preparations  for  the  crime  com- 
mitted at  Serajevo;  the  Royal 
Government  expected  to  be  in- 
vited to  collaborate  in  an  investi- 
gation of  all  that  concerns  this 
crime,  and  they  were  ready,  in 
order  to  prove  the  entire  correct- 
ness of  their  attitude,  to  take 
measures  against  any  persons 
concerning  whom  representations 
were  made  to  them.  Falling  in, 
therefore,  with  the  desire  of  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government, 
they  are  prepared  to  hand  over 
for    trial    any    Servian    subject, 


The  proposition  of  the  Royal 
Servian  Government  that  utter- 
ances in  the  press  and  the  activi- 
ties of  societies  are  of  a  private 
character  and  are  not  subject  to 
official  control  is  absolutely  an- 
tagonistic to  the  institutions  of 
modern  States,  even  those  which 
have  the  most  liberal  law  with 
regard  to  press  and  associations ; 
this  law  has  a  public  character 
and  subjects  the  press,  as  well 
as  associations,  to  State  control. 
Moreover,  Servian  institutions 
themselves  contemplate  some 
such  control.  The  complaint 
against  the  Servian  Government 
is  in  fact  that  they  have  entirely 
omitted  to  control  their  press 
and  their  associations,  of  whose 
activities  in  a  sense  hostile  to 
the  Monarchy  they  were  well 
aware. 

This  proposition  is  incorrect; 
the  Servian  Government  were 
accurately  informed  of  the  suspi- 
cions which  were  entertained 
against  quite  definite  persons  and 
were  not  only  in  a  position  but 
also  bound  by  their  internal  laws 
to  initiate  spontaneous  enquiries. 
They  have  done  nothing  in  this 
direction. 


206 


Ojfflcial  Diplomatic  Documents 


without  regard  to  his  situation  or 
rank,  of  whose  complicity  in  the 
crime  of  Sera jevo  proofs  are  forth- 
coming, and  more  especially  they 
undertake  to  cause  to  be  pub- 
lished on  the  first  page  of  the 
Journal  officiel,  on  the  date  of 
the  13th  (26th)  July,  the  follow- 
ing declaration :  — 

"The  Royal  Government  of 
Servia  condemn  all  propaganda 
which  may  be  directed  against 
Austria-Hungary  —  i.e.y  the 

general  tendency  of  which  the 
final  aim  is  to  detach  from  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  ter- 
ritories belonging  to  it,  and  they 
sincerely  deplore  the  fatal  con- 
sequences of  these  criminal 
proceedings. 


The  Royal  Government  regret 
that,  according  to  the  communi- 
cation from  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government,  certain  Ser- 
vian officers  and  functionaries 
participated  in  the  above-men- 
tioned propaganda,  and  thus 
compromised  the  good  neigh- 
bourly relations  to  which  the 
Royal  Servian  Government  was 
solemnly  pledged  by  the  declara- 
tion of  the  31st  March,  1909.^ 

"The  Government,  etc.  .  .  ." 
(identical  with  the  text  as  de- 
manded). 


The  Royal  Government  further 
undertake :  — 


Our  demand  ran :  — 

"The  Royal  Government  of 
Servia  condemn  the  propaganda 
directed  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary  '' 

The  alteration  made  by  the 
Royal  Servian  Government  in 
the  declaration  demanded  by  us 
implies  that  no  such  propaganda 
directed  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary exists,  or  that  they  are  cog- 
nisant of  no  such  propaganda. 
This  formula  is  insincere  and  dis- 
ingenuous, as  by  it  the  Servian 
Government  reserve  for  them- 
selves for  later  use  the  evasion 
that  they  had  not  by  this  decla- 
ration disavowed  the  then  exist- 
ing propaganda,  and  had  not 
admitted  that  it  was  hostile  to 
the  Monarchy,  from  which  they 
could  further  deduce  that  they 
had  not  bound  themselves  to 
suppress  propaganda  similar  to 
that  now  being  carried  on. 

The  wording  demanded  by  us 
ran :  — 

"The  Royal  Government  re- 
gret that  Servian  officers  and 
functionaries  .  .  .  partici- 
pated. .  .  ." 

By  the  adoption  of  this  word- 
ing with  the  addition  "according 
to  the  communication  from  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment" the  Servian  Government 
are  pursuing  the  object  that  has 
already  been  referred  to  above, 
namely,  that  of  preserving  a  free 
hand  for  the  future. 

We  had  demanded  of  them :  — 

1.  "To  suppress  any  publica- 
tion which  incites  to  hatred  and 
contempt    of    the    Austro-Hun- 


New  style. 


July  27,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34 


207 


1.  To  introduce  at  the  first 
regular  convocation  of  the  Skup- 
schtina  ^  a  provision  into  the  press 
law  providing  for  the  most  severe 
punishment  of  incitement  to 
hatred  and  contempt  of  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Monarchy,  and 
for  taking  action  against  any 
publication  the  general  tendency 
of  which  is  directed  against  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  Government 
engage  at  the  approaching  re- 
vision of  the  Constitution  to 
cause  an  amendment  to  be  intro- 
duced into  article  22  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  such  a  nature  that 
such  publication  may  be  confis- 
cated, a  proceeding  at  present 
impossible  under  the  categorical 
terms  of  article  22  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 


garian  Monarchy  and  the  general 
tendency  of  which  is  directed 
against  the  territorial  integrity 
of  the  Monarchy." 

We  wished  therefore  to  ensure 
that  Servia  should  be  obliged 
to  see  to  it  that  press  attacks  of 
that  nature  should  be  discon- 
tinued in  future;  we  wished 
therefore  to  know  that  a  definite 
result  in  this  connection  was 
assured. 

Instead  of  this  Servia  offers  us 
the  enactment  of  certain  laws 
which  would  be  calculated  to 
serve  as  means  towards  this 
result,  viz. :  — 

(a)  A  law  under  which  the 
press  publications  in  question 
which  are  hostile  to  the  Mon- 
archy are  to  be  punished  on  their 
merits  (suhjectiv)  a  matter  which 
is  of  complete  indifference  to  us, 
all  the  more  as  it  is  well  known 
that  the  prosecution  of  press 
offences  on  their  merits  (suhjec- 
tiv) is  only  very  rarely  possible, 
and,  if  any  law  of  the  sort  is  laxly 
administered,  even  in  the  few 
cases  of  this  nature  a  conviction 
would  not  be  obtained ;  this, 
therefore,  is  a  proposal  which  in 
no  way  meets  our  demand  as  it 
does  not  offer  us  the  slightest 
guarantee  for  the  result  which 
we  wish  to  obtain. 

(6)  A  law  supplementary  to 
Article  22  of  the  constitution 
which  would  permit  confiscation 
—  a  proposal  which  is  equally 
unsatisfactory  to  us,  as  the  exist- 
ence of  such  a  law  in  Servia  is  of 
no  Use  to  us,  but  only  the  obliga- 
tion of  the  Government  to  apply 
it ;  this,  however,  is  not  promised 
us. 

These  proposals  are  therefore 
entirely  unsatisfactory  —  all  the 


»  The  Serbian  Parliament. 


208 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


more  so  as  they  are  evasive  in 
that  we  are  not  told  within  what 
period  of  time  these  laws  would 
be  enacted,  and  that  in  the  event 
of  the  rejection  of  the  Bills  by  the 
Skupschtina  —  apart  from  the 
possible  resignation  of  the  Gov- 
ernment —  everything  would  be 
as  it  was  before. 


2.  The  Government  possess  no 
proof,  nor  does  the  note  of  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
furnish  them  with  any,  that  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  and  other 
similar  societies  have  committed 
up  to  the  present  any  criminal 
act  of  this  nature  through  the 
proceedings  of  any  of  their  mem- 
bers. Nevertheless,  the  Royal 
Government  will  accept  the  de- 
mand of  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government,  and  will  dissolve 
the  Narodna  Odbrana  Society 
and  every  other  society  which 
may  be  directing  its  efforts 
against  Austria-Hungary. 


3.  The  Royal  Servian  Govern- 
ment undertake  to  eliminate  with- 
out delay  from  public  instruction 
in  Servia  everything  that  serves 
or  might  serve  to  foment  the 
propaganda      against     Austria- 


The  whole  of  the  public  life  of 
Servia  teems  with  the  propa- 
ganda against  the  Monarchy,  of 
the  Narodna  Odbrana  and  of  so- 
cieties affiliated  to  it ;  it  is  there- 
fore quite  impossible  to  admit 
the  reservation  made  by  the 
Servian  Government  when  they 
say  that  they  know  nothing 
about  them. 

Quite  apart  from  this  the  de- 
mand we  have  made  is  not  en- 
tirely complied  with,  as  we 
further  required  :  — 

That  the  means  of  propaganda 
possessed  by  these  associations 
should  be  confiscated. 

That  the  re-establishment  of 
the  dissolved  associations  under 
another  name  and  in  another 
form  should  be  prevented. 

The  Belgrade  Cabinet  main- 
tains complete  silence  in  both 
these  directions,  so  that  the  half 
consent  which  has  been  given  us 
offers  no  guarantee  that  it  is 
contemplated  to  put  a  definite 
end  to  the  activities  of  the  asso- 
ciations hostile  to  the  Monarchy, 
especially  of  the  Narodna  Od- 
brana, by  their  dissolution. 

In  this  case  also  the  Servian 
Government  first  ask  for  proofs 
that  propaganda  against  the 
Monarchy  is  fomented  in  public 
educational  establishments  in 
Servia,   when  they  must  know 


July  27,  Austro -Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34 


209 


Hungary,  whenever  the  Imperial 
^nd  Royal  Government  furnish 
them  with  facts  and  proofs  of 
this  propaganda. 


4.  The  Royal  Government  also 
agree  to  remove  from  the  mili- 
tary service  all  such  persons  as 
the  judicial  enquiry  may  have 
proved  to  be  guilty  of  acts 
directed  against  the  integrity  of 
the  territory  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Monarchy,  and  they  ex- 
pect the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  to  communicate  to 
them  at  a  later  date  the  names 
and  the  acts  of  these  officers  and 
functionaries  for  the  purposes  of 
the  proceedings  which  are  to  be 
taken  against  them. 


5.  The  Royal  Government 
must  confess  that  they  do  not 
clearly  grasp  the  meaning  or  the 
scope  of  the  demand  made  by  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
that  Servia  shall  undertake  to 
xiccept  the  collaboration  of  the 


that  the  school  books  which  have 
been  introduced  into  the  Servian 
schools  contain  matter  of  an 
objectionable  nature  in  this  re- 
spect, and  that  a  large  propor- 
tion of  the  Servian  teachers  are 
enrolled  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  and  the  socie- 
ties affiliated  with  it. 

Moreover,  here  too  the  Ser- 
vian Government  have  not 
complied  with  a  portion  of  our  de- 
mand as  fully  as  we  required,  in- 
asmuch as  in  their  text  they  have 
omitted  the  addition  which  we 
desired  "both  as  regards  the 
teaching  body  and  also  as  re- 
gards the  methods  of  instruc- 
tion" —  an  addition  which  quite 
clearly  shows  in  what  directions 
the  propaganda  against  the  Mon- 
archy in  the  Servian  schools  is 
to  be  looked  for. 

Inasmuch  as  the  Royal  Servian 
Government  attach  to  their  con- 
sent to  the  removal  of  the  officers 
and  functionaries  in  question 
from  military  and  civil  service 
the  condition  that  these  persons 
should  have  been  convicted  by 
judicial  enquiry,  their  consent  is 
confined  to  those  cases  in  which 
these  persons  are  charged  with  a 
crime  punishable  by  law.  As  we, 
however,  demand  the  removal  of 
those  officers  and  functionaries 
who  foment  propaganda  against 
the  Monarchy,  a  proceeding 
which  is  not  generally  punish- 
able by  law  in  Servia,  it  appears 
that  our  demand  under  this 
head  also  is  not  complied  with. 

International  Law  has  just  as 
little  to  do  with  this  question  as 
has  criminal  procedure.  This  is 
purely  a  matter  of  State  police, 
which  must  be  settled  by  way  of 
a  separate  agreement.  Servians 
reservation  is  therefore  unintel- 


210 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


representatives  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  upon 
their  territory,  but  they  declare 
that  they  will  admit  such  collab- 
oration as  agrees  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  international  law,  with 
criminal  procedure,  and  with 
good  neighbourly  relations. 

6.  It  goes  without  saying  that 
the  Royal  Government  consider 
it  their  duty  to  open  an  enquiry 
against  all  such  persons  as  are, 
or  eventually  may  be,  implicated 
in  the  plot  of  the  15th  ^  June, 
and  who  happen  to  be  within 
the  territory  of  the  kingdom. 
As  regards  the  participation  in 
this  enquiry  of  Austro-Hungarian 
agents  or  authorities  appointed 
for  this  purpose  by  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  the 
Royal  Government  cannot  ac- 
cept such  an  arrangement,  as 
it  would  be  a  violation  of  the 
Constitution  and  of  the  law  of 
criminal  procedure ;  neverthe- 
less, in  concrete  cases  communi- 
cations as  to  the  results  of  the 
investigation  in  question  might 
be  given  to  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian agents. 


ligible,  and  would  be  calculated, 
owing  to  the  vague  general  form 
in  which  it  is  couched,  to  lead  to 
unsurmountable  difficulties  when 
the  time  comes  for  concluding 
the  prospective  agreement. 


Our  demand  was  quite  clear 
and  did  not  admit  of  misinter- 
pretation.    We  desired  :  — 

(1)  The  opening  of  a  judicial 
enquiry  (enquete  judiciaire) 
against  accessories  to  the. plot. 

(2)  The  collaboration  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  in  the  inves- 
tigations relating  thereto  ("  re- 
cherches^'  as  opposed  to  "enquete 
judiciaire"). 

It  hever  occurred  to  us  that 
representatives  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  should 
take  part  in  the  Servian  judicial 
proceedings ;  it  was  intended 
that  they  should  collaborate  only 
in  the  preliminary  police  inves- 
tigations, directed  to  the  collec- 
tion and  verification  of  the 
material  for  the  enquiry. 

If  the  Servian  Government 
misunderstand  us  on  this  point 
they  must  do  so  deliberately,  for 
the  distinction  between  "enquete 
judiciaire"  and  simple  "recher- 
ches"  must  be  familiar  to  them. 

In  desiring  to  be  exempted 
from  all  control  in  the  proceed- 
ings which  are  to  be  initiated, 
which  if  properly  carried  through 
would  have  results  of  a  very  un- 
desirable kind  for  themselves, 
and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  they 
have  no  handle  for  a  plausible 
refusal  of  the  collaboration  of 
our  representatives  in  the  pre- 
liminary police  investigations 
(numberless  precedents  exist  for 


»  Old  style. 


July  27 y  AustrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34 


211 


7.  The  Royal  Government  pro- 
ceeded, on  the  very  evening  of 
the  deHvery  of  the  note,  to  arrest 
Commandant  Voja  Tankosic. 
As  regards  Milan  Ziganovic, 
who  is  a  subject  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  and  who 
up  to  the  15th  ^  June  was  em- 
ployed (on  probation)  by  the 
directorate  of  railways,  it  has  not 
yet  been  possible  to  arrest  him. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment are  requested  to  be  so 
good  as  to  supply  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, in  the  customary  form,  the 
presumptive  evidence  of  guilt, 
is  well  as  the  eventual  proofs  of 
guilt  which  have  been  collected 
up  to  the  present,  at  the  enquiry 
at  Serajevo  for  the  purposes  of 
the  later  enquiry. 

8.  The  Servian  Government 
will  reinforce  and  extend  the 
measures  which  have  been  taken 
for  preventing  the  illicit  traffic 
in  arms  and  explosives  across  the 
frontier.  It  goes  without  saying 
that  they  will  immediately  order 
an  enquiry  and  will  severely 
punish  the  frontier  officials  on 
the  Schabatz-Loznitza  line  who 
have  failed  in  their  duty  and 
allowed  the  authors  of  the  crime 
of  Serajevo  to  pass. 

9.  The  Royal  Government  will 
gladly  give  explanations  of  the 
remarks  made  by  their  officials 
whether  in  Servia  or  abroad,  in 
interviews  after  the  crime  which, 
according  to  the  statement  of 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 

lOld 


such  police  intervention)  they 
have  adopted  a  standpoint  which 
is  intended  to  invest  their  refusal 
with  an  appearance  of  justifica- 
tion and  to  impress  on  our  de- 
mand the  stamp  of  impractica- 
bility. 

This  answer  is  disingenuous. 

The  enquiries  set  on  foot  by  us 
show  that  three  days  after  the 
crime,  when  it  became  known 
that  Ciganovic  was  implicated 
in  the  plot,  he  went  on  leave  and 
travelled  to  Ribari  on  a  commis- 
sion from  the  Prefecture  of 
Police  at  Belgrade.  It  is,  there- 
fdre,  in  the  first  place  incorrect 
to  say  that  Ciganovic  had  left 
the  Servian  State  Service  on  the 
25th/28th  June.  To  this  must 
be  added  the  fact  that  the  Pre- 
fect of  Police  at  Belgrade,  who 
had  himself  contrived  the  depar- 
ture of  Ciganovic  and  who  knew 
where  he  was  stopping,  declared 
in  an  interview  that  no  man  of 
the  name  of  Milan  Ciganovic 
existed  in  Belgrade. 


The  interviews  in  question 
must  be  quite  well  known  to  the 
Royal  Servian  Government.  By 
requesting  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  to  communi- 
cate tp  them  all  kinds  of  details 
about  these  interviews,  and  keep- 
style. 


212 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


ment,  were  hostile  towards  the 
Monarchy,  as  soon  as  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government 
have  communicated  to  them  the 
passages  in  question  in  these  re- 
marks, and  as  soon  as  they  have 
shown  that  the  remarks  were 
actually  made  by  the  said  offi- 
cials, although  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment will  themselves  take  steps 
to  collect  eridence  and  proofs. 

10.  The  Royal  Government 
will  inform  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  of  the  execu- 
tion of  the  measures  comprised 
under  the  above  heads,  in  so  far 
as  this  has  not  already  been  done 
by  the  present  note,  as  soon  as 
each  measure  has  been  ordered 
and  carried  out. 

If  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  are  not  satisfied 
with  this  reply,  the  Servian 
Government,  considering  that  it 
is  not  to  the  common  interest  to 
precipitate  the  solution  of  this 
question,  are  ready,  as  always, 
to  accept  a  pacific  understand- 
ing, either  by  referring  this  ques- 
tion to  the  decision  of  the  Inter- 
national Tribunal  of  The  Hague, 
or  to  the  Great  Powers  which  took 
part  in  the  drawing  up  of  the 
declaration  made  by  the  Servian 
Government  on  the  18th  (31st) 
March,  1909. 


ing  in  reserve  the  holding  of  a 
formal  enquiry  into  them,  they 
show  that  they  are  not  willing 
to  comply  seriously  with  this 
demand  either. 


Belgium : 

From  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  6 

Baron  BeyenSy  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M,  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  21,  191 J^. 

According  to  a  telegram  from  the  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at 
Belgrade,^  the  Servian  Government  have  given  way  on  all  the  points 

'  Belgium  had  her  own  representative  in  Belgrade.     No  valid  reason  appears  why 
the  information  here  published  should  have  come  in  the  roundabout  way  through  the: 


July  27,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  61  213 

of  the  Austrian  note.  They  even  allow  the  intervention  of  Austrian 
officials  if  such  a  proceeding  is  in  conformity  with  the  usages  of  inter- 
national law.  The  British  Charge  d'Affaires  considers  that  this  reply 
should  satisfy  Austria  if  she  is  not  desirous  of  war.  Nevertheless,  a 
more  hopeful  atmosphere  prevails  here  to-day,  more  particularly 
because  hostilities  against  Servia  have  not  begun.  The  British 
Government  suggest  mediation  by  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France, 
and  Italy  at  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna  in  order  to  find  some  basis 
for  compromise.  Germany  alone  has  not  yet  replied.  The  decision 
rests  with  the  Emperor. 

France : 

From  Basle 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  60 

M.  Farges,  French  Consul-General  at  Basle,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Basle,  July  21,  1914. 

Four  days  ago  the  German  officers  on  leave  in  this  district  re- 
ceived orders  to  break  off  their  leave  and  return  to  Germany. 

Moreover,  I  learn  from  two  reliable  sources  that  warning  has  been 
given  to  persons  owning  motor  cars  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden  to 
prepare  to  place  them  at  the  disposal  of  the  military  authorities,  two 
days  after  a  fresh  order.  Secrecy  on  the  subject  of  this  warning  has 
been  directed  under  penalty  of  a  fine.^ 

The  population  of  Basle  is  very  uneasy,  and  banking  facilities  are 
restricted. 

Faroes. 

To  Lcmdon,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  61 

M.  BienvenU'Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M.  Jules 
Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  on  board  the  "La  France'* 
(for  the  President  of  the  Council)  and  to  the  French  Ambassadors 
at  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  July  27,  1914. 

The  three  steps  taken  by  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris  seem 
characteristic :  —  On  Friday  he  reads  a  note  ^  in  which  the  German 

British  official  in  Belgrade  and  the  Belgian  Minister  in  Beriin.  Since  the  exhaustive 
Austro-Hungarian  comment  on  the  Serbian  reply,  Red  Book  No.  34,  same  day,  was 
presented  to  all  the  great  Powers  it  is  significant- that  no  reference  to  it  is  here  made," 
and  that  the  British  official  presents  exclusively  the  Serbian,  and  one  may  say,  Russian 
view  of  the  Serbian  reply. 

1  The  accuracy  of  this  statement  can  neither  be  proved  nor  disproved  at  this  writ- 
ing. German  writers  have  denied  it.  If  the  information  was  true,  one  should  expect 
to  have  it  reported  directly  by  the  French  consuls  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Baden.  On 
the  other  hand,  precautionary  measures  would,  of  course,  have  been  taken  near  the 
French  frontier  earlier  than  elsewhere. 

2  French  YeUow  Book  No.  28,  July  24. 


214  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Government  categorically  place  themselves  between  Austria  and  the 
Powers,  approving  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia,  and  adding 
that  "Germany  warmly  desires  that  the  dispute  should  remain 
localised,  since  any  intervention  of  another  party  must  through  the 
play  of  its  alliances  provoke  incalculable  consequences ; "  —  the  second 
day,  Saturday,  the  effect  having  been  produced,  and  the  Powers  hav- 
ing, on  account  of  the  surprise,  the  shortness  of  the  time-limit,  and 
the  risks  of  general  war,  advised  Servia  to  yield,^  Herr  von  Schoen 
returns  to  minimise  this  step,^  pretending  to  be  astonished  at  the 
impression  produced,  and  protests  that  intentions  are  attributed  to 
Germany  which  she  does  not  harbour,  "since,"  he  says,  "there  was 
neither  concert  before  nor  threat  afterwards;" — the  third  day, 
Sunday,  the  result  having  been  obtained,  since  Servia  has  yielded, 
as  one  might  almost  say,  to  all  the  Austrian  demands,  the  German 
Ambassador  appears  on  two  occasions  ^  to  insist  on  Germany's  peace- 
ful intentions,  and  on  her  warm  desire  to  co-operate  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace,  after  having  registered  the  Austrian  success  which 
closes  the  first  phase  of  the  crisis. 

The  situation  at  the  moment  of  writing  remains  disturbing,  on 
account  of  the  incomprehensible  ^  refusal  of  Austria  to  accept  Ser- 
via's  submission,  of  her  operations  of  mobilisation,  and  of  her  threats 
to  invade  Servia.  The  attitude  taken  up  from  the  beginning  by 
the  Austrian  Government,  with  German  support,  her  refusal  to 
accept  any  conversation  with  the  Powers,  practically  do  not  allow 
the  latter  to  intervene  effectively  with  Austria  without  the  media- 
tion of  Germany.  However,  time  presses,  for  if  the  Austrian  army 
crosses  the  frontier  it  will  be  very  difficult  to  circumscribe  the  crisis, 
Russia  not  appearing  to  be  able  to  tolerate  ^  the  occupation  of  Servia 
after  the  latter  has  in  reality  submitted  to  the  Austrian  note,  giving 
every  satisfaction  and  guarantee.  Germany,  from  the  very  fact  of 
the  position  taken  up  by  her,  is  qualified  to  intervene  effectively 
and  be  listened  to  at  Vienna ;  if  she  does  not  do  this  she  justifies  all 
suspicions  and  assumes  the  responsibility  for  the  war. 

The  Powers,  particularly  Russia,  France,  and  England,  have  by 
their  urgent  advice  induced  Belgrade  to  yield, ^  they  have  thus  ful- 
filled their  part ;  now  it  is  for  Germany,  who  is  alone  able  to  gain  a 
rapid  hearing  at  Vienna,  to  give  advice  to  Austria,  who  has  obtained 
satisfaction  and  cannot,  for  a  detail  easy  to  adjust,  bring  about  a 
general  war. 

It  is  in  these  circumstances  that  the  proposal  made  by  the  Cabinet 
of  London  is  put  forward;  M.  Sazonof  having  said  to  the  British 
Ambassador  that  as  a  consequence  of  the  appeal  of  Servia  to  the 
Powers,®  Russia  would  agree  to  stand  aside.  Sir  Edward  Grey  has 
formulated  the  following  suggestion  to  the  Cabinets  of  Paris,  Berlin 

1  See.note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  39,  July  26,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  22, 
where  it  appears  that  the  advice  was  never  given. 
«  French  Yellow  Book  No.  36,  July  25. 
»  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  56  and  57,  July  26. 

*  For  Austria's  reasons  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27. 

*  Cf.  Note  2,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  57,  July  26. 

*  This  appeal  was  never  made ;  cf.  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  68,  July  27,  1914. 


July  27,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  62  215 

and  Rome :  the  French,  German  and  Itahan  Ambassadors  at  Lon- 
don would  be  instructed  to  seek  with  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  means  of 
resolving  the  present  difficulties,  it  being  understood  that  during 
this  conversation  Russia,  Austria  and  Servia  would  abstain  from  all 
active  military  operations.^  Sir  A.  Nicolson  has  spoken  of  this  sug- 
gestion to  the  German  Ambassador,  who  showed  himself  favourable 
to  it ;  it  will  be  equally  well  received  in  Paris,  and  also  at  Rome, 
according  to  all  probability.  Here  again  it  is  Germany's  turn  to 
speak,  and  she  has  an  opportunity  to  show  her  goodwill  by  other 
means  than  words. 

I  w^ould  ask  you  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  your  British 
colleague,  and  to  support  his  proposal  with  the  German  Govern- 
ment in  whatever  form  appears  to  you  opportune. ^ 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

To  London,  St.  Petershurgh,  Berlin,  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  62 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Presi- 
deiit  of  the  Council  {on  board  the  "La  France'^)  and  to  the  French 
Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Peter sburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna. 

Paris,  July  27,  1914. 

After  his  demarche  of  yesterday  ^  tending  to  an  intervention  by 
France  at  St.  Petersburgh  in  favour  of  peace,  the  German  Ambas- 
sador returned,  as  I  have  informed  you,  to  the  Direction  Politique 
on  the  pretext  that  it  might  be  desirable  to  communicate  to  the  press 
a  short  note  indicating  the  peaceful  and  friendly  sense  of  the  con- 
versation ;  he  even  suggested  the  following  terms  :  —  "  During  the 
afternoon  the  German  Ambassador  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  had  a  fresh  interview,  in  the  course  of  which,  in  the  most 
amicable  spirit  and  acting  in  an  identical  spirit  of  peaceful  co-opera- 
tion, they  examined  the  means  which  might  be  employed  to  main- 
tain general  peace.''  He  was  told  in  answer,  that  the  terms  ap- 
peared exaggerated  and  of  a  nature  to  create  in  public  opinion  illusions 
on  the  real  situation ;  that,  however,  a  brief  note  in  the  sense  indi- 
cated, that  is  to  say,  giving  an  account  of  a  conversation  at  which 
the  means  employed  to  safeguard  peace  had  been  examined,  might 
be  issued  if  I  approved  it. 

The  note  communicated  was  as  follows:  —  "The  German  Am- 
bassador and  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  have  had  a  fresh  inter- 
view, in  the  course  of  which  they  sought  means  of  action  by  the  Powers 
for  the  maintenance  of  peace."  This  phrasing,  deliberately  colour- 
less, avoided  an  appearance  of  solidarity  with  Germany  which  might 
have  been  misinterpreted. 

1  Note  that  no  engagement  is  taken  to  refrain  from  mobilisation. 

2  This  last  paragraph  can  refer  only  to  the  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  although 
the  despatch  is  not*listed  as  having  been  sent  also  to  Berlin. 

3  French  Yellow*  Book  No.  56  and  57,  July  26. 


216  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

This  morning  ^  Herr  von  Schoen  addressed  a  private  letter  to  the 
PoHtical  Director  under  pretext  of  resuming  his  interview  with  the 
^Minister,  and  has  added :  "  Note  w^ell  the  phrase  in  an  identical 
spirit  of  peaceful  co-operation.  This  is  not  an  idle  phrase,  but  the 
sincere  expression  of  the  truth."  The  summary  annexed  to  the 
letter  was  drawn  up  as  follows :  —  "  The  Cabinet  of  Vienna  has, 
formally  and  officially,  caused  it  to  be  declared  to  that  of  St.  Peters- 
burgh,  that  it  does  not  seek  any  territorial  acquisition  in  Servia,  and 
that  it  has  no  intention  of  making  any  attempt  against  the  integrity 
of  the  kingdom ;  its  sole  intention  is  that  of  assuring  its  own  tran- 
quillity. At  this  moment  the  decision  whether  a  European  war 
must  break  out  depends  solely  on  Russia.  The  German  Govern- 
ment have  firm  confidence  that  the  French  Government,  with  which 
they  know  that  they  are  at  one  in  the  warm  desire  that  European 
peace  should  be  able  to  be  maintained,  will  use  their  whole  influence 
with  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburgh  in  a  pacific  spirit." 

I  have  let  you  know  the  reply  ^  which  has  been  given  (a  French 
demarche  at  St.  Petersburgh  would  be  misunderstood,^  and  must 
have  as  corollary  a  German  demarche  at  Vienna,  or,  failing  that, 
mediation  by  the  four  less  interested  Powers  in  both  capitals). 

Herr  von  Schoen's  letter  is  capable  of  different  interpretations; 
the  most  probable  is  that  it  has  for  its  object,  like  his  demarche  itself, 
an  attempt  to  compromise  France  with  Russia  and,  in  case  of  failure, 
to  throw  the  responsibility  for  an  eventual  war  on  Russia  and  on 
France  ^ ;  finally,  by  pacific  assurances  which  have  not  been  listened 
to,  to  mask  military  action  by  Austria  in  Servia  intended  to  com- 
plete the  success  of  Austria. 

I  communicate  this  news  to  you  by  way  of  information  and  for 
any  useful  purpose  you  can  put  it  to. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  63 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenii- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  21,  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 
allow  it  to  be  understood  that  they  are  sure  that  England  would 
preserve  neutrality  if  a  conflict  were  to  break  out.     Sir  Arthur  Nicol- 

^  From  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  28,  July  26,  it  appears  that  this  declaration  was 
made  on  July  26.  See  German  White  Book  10a,  July  26,  giving  an  official  German 
message  to  France,  which  is  not  printed  in  its  entirety  in  the  Yellow  Book. 

*  For  a  similar  refusal  of  Great  Britain  to  exert  her  conciliatory  influence  in  Petro- 
grad.  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  80,  July  28. 

'  The  Times  translation  says  "would  have  been  difficult  to  explain."  This  is  the 
more  accurate  translation. 

<  Cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  29,  July  26.  It  seems  that  the  entire  French  de- 
spatch refers  to  events  that  took  place  on  the  previous  day.  This  then  is  a  "rewritten " 
despatch  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  Yellow  Book  appear  to  be  more  complete 
than  it  is. 


July  27,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  65  217 

son  has  told  me/  however,  that  Prince  Lichnowsky  cannot,  after  the 
conversation  which  he  has  had  with  him  to-day,  entertain  any  doubt 
as  to  the  freedom  which  the  British  Government  intended  to  pre- 
serve of  intervening  in  case  they  should  judge  it  expedient. 

The  German  Ambassador  will  not  have  failed  to  be  struck  with 
this  declaration,  but  to  make  its  weight  felt  in  Germany  and  to  avoid 
a  conflict,  it  seems  indispensable  that  the  latter  should  be  brought 
to  know  for  certain  that  they  will  find  England  and  Russia  by  the 

side  of  France.^  _^     ^ 

De  Fleuriau. 


From  St  Petershurgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  64 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petershurgh,  to  M.  Bien- 
venu- Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petershurgh,  July  27,  1914. 

M.  Sazonof  has  used  conciliatory  language  to  all  my  colleagues. 

In  spite  of  the  public  excitement,  the  Russian  Government  is 
applying  itself  successfully  to  restraining  the  press;  in  particular 
great  moderation  towards  Germany  has  been  recommended.^ 

M.  Sazonof  has  not  received  any  information  from  Vienna  or  from 

Berlin  since  yesterday.  t^     ^ 

'^  Paleologue. 

From  Constantinople 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  65 

M.  Bompard,  French  Ambassador  at  Constantinople,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Therapia,  July  27,  1914. 

The  Austro-Servian  conflict  holds  the  attention  of  the  Ottoman 
Government,  and  the  Turks  are  delighted  at  the  misfortunes  of 
Servia,  but  people  here  generally  are  led  to  believe  that  the  conflict 
will  remain  localised.  It  is  generally  thought  that  once  again  Russia 
will  not  intervene  in  favour  of  Servia  in  circumstances  which  would 
extend  the  armed  conflict. 

The  unanimous  feeling  in  Ottoman  political  circles  is  that  Austria, 
with  the  support  of  Germany,  will  attain  her  objects  and  that  she 
will  make  Servia  follow  Bulgaria  and  enter  into  the  orbit  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.^  Bompard. 

1  This  is  not  given  in  the  British  Blue  Book. 

2  For  the  culmination  of  this  wish,  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  138,  August  2,  1914. 

3  But  even  M.  Paleologue  does  not  claim  that  it  was  observed.  See  the  Russian 
press  of  these  days. 

*  This  is  a  very  important  statement ;  especially  since  no  one  had  ever  claimed 
that  Bulgaria  had  been  forced  into  "the  orbit  of  the  Triple  Alliance"  by  unfair  or 
militaristic  means. 


218  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  66 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  27,  191  If.. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  ^  told  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning 
that  if  Austria  were  to  invade  Servia  after  the  Servian  reply,  she 
would  make  it  clear  that  she  was  not  merely  aiming  at  the  settlement 
of  the  questions  mentioned  in  her  note  of  July  23,  but  that  she  wished 
to  crush  a  small  state.  "Then,"  he  added,  "a  European  question 
would  arise,  and  war  would  follow  in  which  other  Powers  would  be 
led  to  take  a  part." 

The  attitude  of  Great  Britain  is  confirmed  by  the  postponement 
of  the  demobilisation  of  the  fleet.  The  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 
took  this  measure  quietly  on  Friday  ^  on  his  own  initiative  ;  to-night. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  and  his  colleagues  decided  to  make  it  public. 
This  result  is  due  to  the  conciliatory  attitude  of  Servia  and  Russia. 

De  Fleuriau. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  67 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  27,  19U. 

To-DAY  I  have  had  a  conversation  with  the  Secretary  of  State  on 
the  proposal  by  England  that  Germany  should  join  the  Cabinets  of 
London,  Paris  and  Rome  to  prevent  hostilities  between  St.  Peters- 
burgh  and  Vienna. 

I  remarked  to  him  that  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  opened  the 
way  to  a  peaceful  issue.  Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  he  was  dis- 
posed to  join  in,  but  he  remarked  to  me  that,  if  Russia  mobilised, 
Germany  would  be  obliged  to  mobilise  at  once,  that  we  should  be 
forced  to  the  same  course  also,  and  that  then  a  conflict  would  be 
almost  inevitable.  I  asked  him  if  Germany  would  regard  herself  as 
bound  to  mobilise  in  the  event  of  Russia  mobilising  only  on  the  Aus- 
trian frontier;  he  told  me  "No,"  and  authorised  me  formally  to 
communicate  this  limitation  to  you.  He  also  attached  the  greatest 
importance  to  an  intervention  with  Russia  by  the  Powers  which 
were  friendly  with  and  allied  to  her. 

Finally,  he  remarked  that  if  Russia  attacked  Austria,  Germany 
would  be  obliged  to  attack  at  once  on  her  side.     The  intervention 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27,  1914. 

*  Friday  was  July  24 ;  cf.  Sir  E.  Grey'^  "  to-day,"  British  Blue  Book  No.  48,  July  27, 
1914  ;  see  also  Blue  Book  No.  47,  July  27,  1914. 

For  the  effect  of  this  admiralty  order  on  Russia  and  on  bringing  on  the  war,  see 
Editorial,  Daily  News  (London),  August  1,  1914. 


July  27,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  69  219 

proposed  by  England  at  St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna  ^  could,  in  his 
opinion,  only  come  into  operation  if  events  were  not  precipitated. 
In  that  case,  he  does  not  despair  that  it  might  succeed.  I  expressed 
my  regret  that  Austria,  by  her  uncompromising  attitude  had  led 
Europe  to  the  difficult  pass  through  which  we  were  going,  but  I 
expressed  the  hope  that  intervention  would  have  its  effect. 

Jules  Cambon. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  68 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  London^  to  M.  Bienwnu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  27,  1914. 

Yesterday  in  the  course  of  a  conversation  between  M.  Sazonof, 
M.  Paleologue  and  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  the  Russian  Minister  said  that 
Servia  was  disposed  to  appeal  ^  to  the  Powers,  and  that  in  that  case 
his  Government  would  be  prepared  to  stand  aside. 

Sir  E.  Grey  has  taken  these  words  as  a  text  on  which  to  formulate 
to  the  Cabinets  of  Paris,  Berlin,  and  Rome  a  proposal  with  which 
Sir  Francis  Bertie  will  acquaint  your  Excellency.  The  four  Powers 
would  intervene  in  the  dispute,  and  the  French,  German,  and  Italian 
Ambassadors  at  London  would  be  instructed  to  seek,  with  Sir  E. 
Grey,  a  means  of  solving  the  present  difficulties. 

It  would  be  understood  that,  during  the  sittings  of  this  little  con- 
ference, Russia,  Austria  and  Servia  would  abstain  from  all  active 
military  operations.  Sir  A.  Nicolson  has  spoken  of  this  suggestion 
to  the  German  Ambassador,  who  has  shown  himself  favourable  to  it. 

De  Fleuriau. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  69 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  27,  191^. 

The  Servian  Minister  has  not  received  instructions  from  his  Gov- 
ernment to  ask  for  the  mediation  ^  of  England ;  it  is,  however,  pos- 
sible that  the  telegrams  from  his  Government  have  been  stopped  on 
the  way. 

iThis  is  Sir  E.  Grey's  first  plan.  The  French  wish  was  to  have  mediation  between 
Vienna  and  Belgrade. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  61,  July  27,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  22,  July  25, 
1914. 

3  The  proposal  of  English  mediation  was  one  of  the  many  made  but  never  pressed, 
probably  for  the  reason  suggested  in  French  Yellow  Book  No.  70,  same  day.  The 
nearest  account  of  something  in  the  nature  of  such  a  demand  is  given  in  Serbian  Blue 
Book  No.  35,  July  24  [note  the  date]. 


220  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

However,  the  British  proposal  for  intervention  by  the  four  Powers 
intimated  in  my  preceding  telegram  has  been  put  forward,  and  ought 
I  think  to  be  supported  in  the  first  place.  j^     ^ 

To  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  70 

M.  Bienvenu-Martiny  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M,  de 
Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London. 

Paris,  July  27,  1914. 

The  British  Ambassador  has  communicated  to  me  Sir  E.  Grey's 
proposal  ^  for  common  action  by  England,  Germany,  France  and 
Italy  at  Vienna,  Belgrade  ^  and  St.  Petersburgh,  to  stop  active  mili- 
tary operations  while  the  German,  Italian  and  French  Ambassadors 
at  London  examine,  with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  means  of  finding  a 
solution  for  the  present  complications. 

I  have  this  morning  directed  M.  Jules  Cambon  to  talk  this  over 
with  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  and  to  support  his  demarche 
in  whatever  form  he  should  judge  suitable. 

I  authorise  you  to  take  part  in  the  meeting  proposed  by  Sir  E. 
Grey.  I  am  also  ready  to  give  to  our  representatives  at  Vienna,  St. 
Petersburgh  and  Belgrade,  instructions  in  the  sense  asked  for  by  the 
British  Government. 

At  the  same  time  I  think  that  the  chances  of  success  of  Sir  E. 
Grey's  proposal  depend  essentially  on  the  action  that  Berlin  would 
be  disposed  to  take  at  Vienna ;  a  demarche  from  this  side,  promoted 
with  a  view  to  obtain  a  suspension  of  military  operations,  would 
appear  to  me  doomed  to  failure  if  Germany's  influence  were  not  first 
exercised. 

I  have  also  noted,  during  Baron  Von  Schoen's  observations,  that 

the    Austro-Hungarian    Government    was    particularly    susceptible 

when  the  words  "mediation,"   "intervention,"   "conference"  were 

used,  and  was  more  willing  to  admit  "friendly  advice"  and  "con- 
jt 

Bienvenu-Martin  . 


versations. 


From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  71 

M.  de  Fleuriau,  French  Charge  d' Affaires  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  27,  1914- 

I  HAVE  communicated  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  your  adherence  to  his 
proposal  for  mediation  by  the  four  Powers  and  for  a  conference  at 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  11,  July  24  and  No.  24,  July  25. 

"Belgrade  is  not  contained  in  the  British  proposal,  British  Blue  Book  No.  11, 
July  24.  It  was,  however,  France's  persistent  wish  to  have  mediation  between  Vienna 
and  Belgrade. 


July  27,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  72  221 

London.  The  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  has  received  the  neces- 
sary instructions  to  inform  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  as 
soon  as  his  French,  German,  and  Italian  colleagues  are  authorised 
to  make  the  same  demarche. 

The  Italian  Government  have  accepted  intervention  by  the  four 
Powers  with  a  view  to  prevent  military  operations ;  they  are  con- 
sulting the  German  Government  on  the  proposal  for  a  conference 
and  the  procedure  to  be  followed  with  regard  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government.     The  German  Government  have  not  yet  replied. 

De  Fleuriau. 

From  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  72 

M.  BarrerCy  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Rome,  July  27,  19U. 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  has  returned  to  Rome  this  evening, 
and  I  saw  him  immediately  after  his  arrival.  He  spoke  to  me  of  the 
contents  of  the  Austrian  note,  and  formally  assured  me  that  he  had 
not  had  any  previous  knowledge  of  it.^ 

He  knew,  indeed,  that  this  note  was  to  have  a  rigorous  and  for- 
cible character ;  but  he  had  not  suspected  that  it  could  take  such  a 
form.  I  asked  him  if  it  was  true  that  he  had  given  at  Vienna,  as 
certain  papers  allege,  an  approval  of  the  Austrian  action  and  an 
assurance  that  Italy  would  fulfil  her  duties  as  an  ally  towards  Aus- 
tria. "In  no  way  :"  the  Minister  replied  :  "we  were  not  consulted ; 
we  were  told  nothing ;  it  was  not  for  us  then  to  make  any  such  com- 
munication to  Vienna." 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  thinks  that  Servia  would  have  acted 
more  wisely  if  she  had  accepted  the  note  in  its  entirety ;  to-day  he 
still  thinks  that  this  would  be  the  only  thing  to  do,  being  convinced 
that  Austria  will  not  withdraw  any  of  her  claims,  and  will  maintain 
them,  even  at  the  risk  of  bringing  about  a  general  conflagration ;  he 
doubts  whether  Germany  is  disposed  to  lend  herself  to  any  pressure 
on  her  ally.  He  asserts,  however,  that  Germany  at  this  moment 
attaches  great  importance  to  her  relations  with  London,^  and  he 
believes  that  if  any  Power  can  determine  Berlin  in  favour  of  peaceful 
action,  it  is  England. 

As  for  Italy,  she  will  continue  to  make  every  effort  in  favour  of 
peace.  It  is  with  this  end  in  view,  that  he  has  adhered  without 
hesitation  to  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  for  a  meeting  in  London  of 
the  Ambassadors  of  those  Powers  which  are  not  directly  interested 
in  the  Austro-Servian  dispute.  Barrere 

1  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  Entente  diplomats  in  none  of  the  published  despatches 
doubted  the  honesty  of  Italy's  denial  of  having  had  previous  accurate  knowledge  of 
the  Austrian  note.    Cf.  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  51,  July  26. 

2  The  opponents  of  Germany  have  desired  to  minimize  Germany's  wish  to  be  on 
good  terms  with  England. 


222  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  73 

M.  Jules  Camhon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  21,  1911^. 

The  British  Ambassador,  who  returned  to-day,  saw  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  and  discussed  with  him  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal. 
In  his  reply  Herr  von  Jagow  continued  to  manifest  his  desire  for  peace, 
but  added  that  he  could  not  consent  to  anything  which  would  re- 
semble a  conference  of  the  Powers ;  that  would  be  to  set  up  a  kind 
of  court  of  arbitration,  the  idea  of  which  would  only  be  acceptable  if 
it  were  asked  for  by  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.^  Herr  von  Jagow's 
language  confirms  that  used  by  Baron  von  Schoen  to  your  Excellency. 

In  fact,  a  demarche  by  the  four  Powers  at  Vienna  and  St.  Peters- 
burgh  could  be  brought  about  by  diplomatic  means  without  assum- 
ing the  form  of  a  conference  and  it  is  susceptible  of  many  modifica- 
tions; the  important  thing  is  to  make  clear  at  Vienna  and  at  St. 
Petersburgh  the  common  desire  of  the  four  Powers  that  a  conflict 
should  be  avoided.  A  peaceful  issue  from  the  present  difficulties 
can  only  be  found  by  gaining  time.  j^^^^^  Cambon. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  74 

if.  Jules  Camhon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.   Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  27,  1914. 

I  HAD  a  conversation  to-day  with  the  Secretary  of  State  and  gave 
support  to  the  demarche  which  Sir  E.  Goschen  had  just  made. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  to  me,  as  he  had  to  the  British  Ambassa- 
dor, that  he  could  not  accept  ^  the  proposal  that  the  Italian,  French 
and  German  Ambassadors  should  be  instructed  to  endeavour  to  find 
with  Sir  Edward  Grey  a  method  of  resolving  the  present  difficulties, 
because  that  would  be  to  set  up  a  real  conference  to  deal  with  the 
affairs  of  Austria  and  Russia.^ 

I  replied  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  I  regretted  his  answer,  but  that 
the  great  object  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  in  view  went  beyond  any 
question  of  form ;  that  what  was  important  was  the  co-operation 
of  Great  Britain  and  France  with  Germany  and  Italy  in  a  work  of 
peace;  that  this  co-operation  could  take  effect  through  common 
demarches  at  St.  Petersburgh  and  at  Vienna,^  that  he  had  often  ex- 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  70,  same  day. 
«  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  70  and  73,  same  day. 

'  See,  however,  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  same  day,  where  Germany  accepts  "in 
principle." 

*  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  73,  same  day. 


July  27,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  74  223 

pressed  to  me  his  regret  at  seeing  the  two  aUied  groups  always  op- 
posed to  one  another  in  Europe ;  that  there  was  here  an  opportunity 
of  proving  that  there  was  a  European  spirit,  by  shewing  four  Powers 
belonging  to  the  two  groups  acting  in  common  agreement  to  prevent 
a  conflict. 

Herr  von  Jagow  evaded  the  point  by  saying  that  Germany  had 
engagements  with  Austria.  I  observed  to  him  that  the  relations  of 
Germany  with  Vienna  were  no  closer  than  those  of  France  with 
Russia/  and  that  it  was  he  himself  who  actually  was  putting  the  two 
groups  of  allies  in  opposition. 

The  Secretary  of  State  then  said  to  me  that  he  was  not  refusing 
to  act  so  as  to  keep  off  an  Austro-Russian  dispute,  but  that  he  could 
not  intervene  in  the  Austro-Servian  dispute.  "The  one  is  the  con- 
sequence of  the  other,"  I  said,  "and  it  is  a  question  of  preventing 
the  appearance  of  a  new  factor  of  such  a  nature  as  to  lead  to  inter- 
vention by  Russia." 

As  the  Secretary  of  State  persisted  in  saying  that  he  was  obliged 
to  keep  his  engagements  towards  Austria,  I  asked  him  if  he  was 
bound  to  follow  her  everywhere  with  his  eyes  blindfolded,  and  if  he 
had  taken  note  of  the  reply  of  Servia  to  Austria  which  the  Servian 
Charge  d'Affaires  had  delivered  to  him  this  morning.  "I  have  not 
yet  had  time,"  he  said.  "I  regret  it.  You  would  see  that  except 
on  some  points  of  detail  Servia  has  yielded  entirely.  It  appears  then 
that,  since  Austria  has  obtained  the  satisfaction  which  your  support 
has  procured  for  her,  you  might  to-day  advise  her  to  be  content  or 
to  examine  with  Servia  the  terms  of  her  reply." 

As  Herr  von  Jagow  gave  me  no  clear  reply,  I  asked  him  whether 
Germany  wished  for  war.  He  protested  energetically,  saying  that 
he  knew  what  was  in  my  mind,  but  that  it  was  wholly  incorrect. 
"You  must  then,"  I  replied,  "act  consistently.  When  you  read  the 
Servian  reply,  I  entreat  you  in  the  name  of  humanity  to  weigh  the 
terms  in  your  conscience,  and  do  not  personally  assume  a  part  of  the 
responsibility  for  the  catastrophe  which  you  are  allowing  to  be  pre- 
pared." Herr  von  Jagow  protested  anew,  adding  that  he  was  ready 
to  join  England  and  France  in  a  common  effort,  but  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  find  a  form  for  this  intervention  which  he  could  accept,  and 
that  the  Cabinets  must  come  to  an  understanding  on  this  point. 

"For  the  rest,"  he  added,  "direct  conversations  between  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburgh  have  been  entered  upon  and  are  in  progress.^ 
I  expect  very  good  results  from  them  and  I  am  hopeful." 

As  I  was  leaving  I  told  him  that  this  morning  I  had  had  the  im- 
pression that  the  hour  of  detente  had  struck,  but  I  now  saw  clearly 
that  there  was  nothing  in  it.     He  replied  that  I  was  mistaken ;  that 

1  This  has  been  denied  by  those  who  have  claimed  that  the  Teutonic  alliance  was 
practically  for  aggressive  purposes,  while  the  French-Russian  alliance  was  entirely 
defensive. 

2  Sazonof  had  proposed  this  conversation ;  cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  July  26, 
and  No.  38,  July  27,  alsQ  French  Yellow  Book  No.  54,  July  26  ;  also  British  Blue  Book 
Nos.  55  and  69,  July  28.  From  French  Yellow  Book  No.  54,  it  appears  that  Russia  had 
for  the  time  being  abandoned  the  Grey  Conference  idea,  and  that  the  French  Ambas- 
sador to  Russia  believed  Russia's  new  plan  "  to  be  preferable  to  any  other  procedure." 


224  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

he  hoped  that  matters  were  on  the  right  road  and  would  perhaps 
rapidly  reach  a  favourable  conclusion.  I  asked  him  to  take  such 
action  in  Vienna  as  would  hasten  the  progress  of  events,  because  it 
was  a  matter  of  importance  not  to  allow  time  for  the  development  in 
Russia  of  one  of  those  currents  of  opinion  which  carry  all  before 
them. 

In  my  opinion  it  would  be  well  to  ask  Sir  Edward  Grey,  who  must 
have  been  warned  by  Sir  Edward  Goschen  of  the  refusal  to  his  pro- 
posal in  the  form  in  which  it  was  made,  to  renew  it  under  another 
form,  so  that  Germany  would  have  no  pretext  for  refusing  to  asso- 
ciate herself  with  it,  and  would  have  to  assume  the  responsibilities 
that  belong  to  her  in  the  eyes  of  England. 

Jules  Cambon. 

To  Lcmdorif  St,  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  75 

M,  BienvenvrMartin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the 
French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna, 
Rome. 

Paris,  July  27,  1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  came  to  see  me  to  hand  me  a 
memorandum  ^  which  amounted  to  an  indictment  of  Servia ;  he  was 
instructed  by  his  Government  to  state  that  since  Servia  had  not 
given  a  satisfactory  reply  to  the  requirements  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, the  latter  found  themselves  obliged  to  take  strong  measures 
to  induce  Servia  to  give  the  satisfaction  and  guarantees  that  are  re- 
quired of  her.  To-morrow  the  Austrian  Government  will  take  steps 
to  that  effect. 

I  asked  the  Ambassador  to  acquaint  me  with  the  measures  con- 
templated by  Austria,  and  Count  Scezsen  replied  that  they  might 
be  either  an  ultimatum,  or  a  declaration  of  war,  or  the  crossing  of 
the  frontier,  but  he  had  no  precise  information  on  this  point. 

I  then  called  the  Ambassador's  attention  to  the  fact  that  Servia 
had  accepted  Austria's  requirements  on  practically  every  point,  and 
that  the  differences  that  remained  on  certain  points  might  vanish 
with  a  little  mutual  goodwill,  and  with  the  help  of  the  Powers  who 
wished  for  peace;  by  fixing  to-morrow  as  the  date  for  putting  her 
resolution  into  effect,  Austria  for  the  second  time  was  making  their 
co-operation  practically  impossible,  and  was  assuming  a  grave  respon- 
sibility in  running  the  risk  of  precipitating  a  war  the  limits  of  which 
it  was  impossible  to  foresee. 

I  enclose  for  your  information  the  memorandum  that  Count 
Scezsen  handed  to  me. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

1  The  so-called  dossier,  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25.  It  was 
published  only  in  part  in  the  New  York  Times  translation  of  the  French  Yellow  Book. 
Sir  E.  Grey  apparently  received  the  dossier  on  the  same  day  but  gave  only  a  very  brief 
nummary  of  it  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  48,  July  27.  The  dossier  itself  is  not  printed 
in  the  British  Blue  Book. 


July  27,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  11  225 

Enclosure 

Memorandum  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  G(yvernment,  handed  by  Count 
Scezsen  to  M.  Bienvenur- Martin  on  July  21,  1914. 

(See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25.) 

From  Serbia 

The  reply  of  the  Serbian  Government  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  was 
communicated  to  France  on  this  day,  July  27,  1914.  See  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  49,  July  25,  and  for  text  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27,  1914, 
except  that  France  did  not  publish  the  Austro-Hungarian  comment. 

Germany : 

From  KoTmo 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  8 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Consulate  at  Komw  to  the  Chancellor  on 
July  27th,  1914. 

Kovno  has  been  declared  to  be  in  a  state  of  war. 

From  Berne 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  9 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Minister  at  Berne  to  the  Chancellor  on 
July  27th,  1914. 

Have  learned  reliably  that  French  XlVth  corps  has  discontinued 
manoeuvres. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  11 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  the  Chan- 
cellor on  July  27th,  1914- 

Military  Attache  reports  a  conversation  with  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Sasonof  has  requested  the  latter  to  enlighten  me  on  the  situation. 
The  Secretary  of  War  has  given  me  his  word  of  honour  that  no  order 
to  mobilise  has  as  yet  been  issued.^  Though  general  preparations 
are  being  made,  no  reserves  were  called  and  no  horses  mustered.  If 
Austria  crossed  the  Servian  frontier,  such  military  districts  as. are 
directed  toward  Austria,  viz.,  Kiev,  Odessa,  Moscow,  Kazan,  are  to 
be  mobilised.  Under  no  circumstances  those  on  the  German  frontier, 
Warsaw,  Vilni,  St.  Petersburg.  Peace  with  Germany  was  desired  very 
much.     Upon  my  inquiry  into  the  object  of  mobilisation  against 

1  The  Czar  telegraphed  to  the  Emperor  on  July  30  that  mobilisation  had  been 
decided  upon  five  days  ago,  i.e.  July  25.  Cf.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  23a,  July  30. 
Cf .  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  note  5. 


226  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Austria  he  shrugged  his  shoulders  and  referred  to  the  diplomats.  I 
told  the  Secretary  that  we  appreciated  the  friendly  intentions,  but 
considered  mobilisation  even  against  Austria  as  very  menacing. 

To  London 
German  White  Book  Exhibit  12 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  London 
on  July  27th,  19U. 

We  know  as  yet  nothing  of  a  suggestion  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  to 
hold  a  quadruple  conference  in  London.-^  It  is  impossible  for  us  to 
place  our  ally  in  his  dispute  with  Servia  before  a  European  tribunal. 
Our  mediation  must  be  limited  to  the  danger  of  an  Austro-Russian 
conflict. 

To  London 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  15 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  London 
on  July  27th,  1914. 

We  have  at  once  started  the  mediation  proposal  in  Vienna  in  the 
sense  as  desired  by  Sir  Edward  Grey.  We  have  communicated  be- 
sides to  Count  Berchtold  the  desire  of  M.  Sasonof  for  a  direct  parley 
with  Vienna.^ 

Great  Britain : 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  41 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
—  {Received  July  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  27,  1914. 

I  HAVE  had  conversations  with  all  my  colleagues  representing  the 
Great  Powers.  The  impression  left  on  my  mind  is  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  note  was  so  drawn  up  as  to  make  war  inevitable ;  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  are  fully  resolved  to  have  war  with 
Servia ;  that  they  consider  their  position  as  a  Great  Power  to  be  at 
stake;  and  that  until  punishment  has  been  administered  to  Servia 
it  is  unlikely  that  they  will  listen  to  proposals  of  mediation.  This 
country  has  gone  wild  with  joy  at  the  prospect  of  war  with  Servia, 
and  its  postponement  or  prevention  would  undoubtedly  be  a  great 
disappointment. 

^  Apparently  antedates  British  Blue  Book  No.  43,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  67, 
July  27. 

2  Apparently  sent  in  reply  to  conversation  between  Mr.  von  Jagow  and  the  British 
Ambassador.  British  Blue  Book  No.  43,  same  day.  Cf.  also  British  Blue  Book 
No.  46,  same  day. 


July  27,  British  Blue  Booh  No,  43  227 

I  propose,  subject  to  any  special  directions  you  desire  to  send  me, 
to  express  to  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  the  hope  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  that  it  may  yet  be  possible  to  avoid  war,  and 
to  ask  his  Excellency  whether  he  can  not  suggest  a  way  out  even  now. 

From  Paris 
British  Blue  Book  No.  42 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  27,  1914. 

Your  proposal,^  as  stated  in  your  two  telegrams  of  yesterday, 
is  accepted  by  the  French  Government.  French  Ambassador  in 
London,  who  returns  there  this  evening,  has  been  instructed  ac- 
cordingly. Instructions  have  been  sent  to  the  French  Ambassador 
at  Berlin  to  concert  with  his  British  colleague  as  to  the  advisability 
of  their  speaking  jointly  to  the  German  Government.  Necessary 
instructions  have  also  been  sent  to  the  French  representatives  at 
Belgrade,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh,  but  until  it  is  known  that  the 
Germans  have  spoken  at  Vienna  with  some  success,  it  would,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  be  dangerous  for  the  French, 
Russian,  and  British  Ambassadors  to  do  so. 

From  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  43 

Sir  B.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 

{Received  July  27.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  27,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  26th  July.^ 

Secretary  of  State  says  that  conference  you  suggest  would  practi- 
cally amount  to  a  court  of  arbitration  and  could  not,  in  his  opinion, 
be  called  together  except  at  the  request  of  Austria  and  Russia.  He 
could  not  therefore  fall  in  with  your  suggestion,  desirous  though  he 
was  to  co-operate  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  I  said  I  was  sure  that 
your  idea  had  nothing  to  do  with  arbitration,  but  meant  that  repre- 
sentatives of  the  foui*  nations  not  directly  interested  should  discuss 
and  suggest  means  for  avoiding  a  dangerous  situation.  He  main- 
tained, however,  that  such  a  conference  as  you  proposed  was  not 
practicable.  He  added  that  news  he  had  just  received  from  St. 
Petersburgh  showed  that  there  was  an  intention  on  the  part  of  M.  de 
Sazoribf^  to  exchange  views  with  Count  Berchtold.^     He  thought 


1  The  official  version  prints  here  as  a  footnote  "Nos.  36  and  37."  These  two 
despatches  contained  different  proposals  as  explained  above  in  note  1  to  British  Blue 
Book  No.  37,  July  26.  .     ^^  .  ,  ^,       ^     , 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  36,  July  26  according  to  footnote  m  Official  Blue  Book. 
Cf.,  however,  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  where  Germany  accepts  the  offer  of  No.  37. 
See  notes  on  Nos.  36  and  37,  July  26,  1914. 

'  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  .        ^  -r^     ,    ^.r 

<  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  Cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No. 
25,  July  26,  1914. 


228  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

that  this  method  of  procedure  might  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result^ 
and  that  it  would  be  best,  before  doing  anything  else,  to  await  out- 
come of  the  exchange  of  views  between  the  Austrian  and  Russian 
Governments. 

In  the  course  of  a  short  conversation  Secretary  of  State  said  that 
as  yet  Austria  was  only  partially  mobilising,  but  that  if  Russia  mo- 
bilised against  Germany  latter  would  have  to  follow  suit.  I  asked 
him  what  he  meant  by  "mobilising  against  Germany."  He  said  that 
if  Russia  only  mobilised  in  south,  Germany  would  not  mobilise,  but 
if  she  mobilised  in  north,  Germany  would  have  to  do  so  too,  and 
Russian  system  of  mobilisation  was  so  complicated  that  it  might  be 
difficult  exactly  to  locate  her  mobilisation.  Germany  would  therefore 
have  to  be  very  careful  not  to  be  taken  by  surprise. 

Finally,  Secretary  of  State  said  that  news  from  St.  Petersburgh 
had  caused  him  to  take  more  hopeful  view  of  the  general  situation.^ 

From  St.  Petersburgh 
British  Blue  Book  No.  44 

Sir  G.  Bux^hanariy  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  {Received  July  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  27,  1914. 

Austrian  Ambassador  tried,  in  a  long  conversation  which  he  had 
yesterday^  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  explain  away 
objectionable  features  of  the  recent  action  taken  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  pointed  out 
that,  although  he  perfectly  understood  Austria's  motives,  the  ultima- 
tum had  been  so  drafted  that  it  could  not  possibly  be  accepted  as  a 
whole  by  the  Servian  Government.  Although  the  demands  were 
reasonable  enough  in  some  cases,  others  not  only  could  not  possibly 
be  put  into  immediate  execution  seeing  that  they  entailed  revision 
of  existing  Servian  laws,  but  were,  moreover,  incompatible  with 
Servia's  dignity  as  an  independent  State.  It  would  be  useless  for 
Russia  to  offer  her  good  offices  at  Belgrade,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  she 
was  the  object  of  such  suspicion  in  Austria.  In  order,  however,  to 
put  an  end  to  the  present  tension,  he  thought  that  England  and 
Italy  might  be  willing  to  collaborate  with  Austria.^     The  Austrian 

1  Cf.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  No.  5,  July  26. 

2  July  26,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  July  26.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  54, 
July  26. 

'  This  is  a  new  proposal  added  to  the  others  that  had  been  offered :  (o)  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  various  conference  plans,  (6)  Sazonof's  plan  to  substitute  for  the  Conference 
direct  conversation  with  Vienna.  This  last  proposal,  according  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan, 
was  made  by  Sazonof  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  This  was,  however,  not  the  case. 
See  Sazonof's  report  of  the  interview,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  July  26,  and  the 
French  Ambassador's  report,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  54,  same  day,  and  the  Austrian 
Ambassador's  report,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  31,  July  27.  From  French 
Yellow  Book  No.  52,  July  26,  it  appears  that  this  proposal  may  have  been  made  to 
the  Italian  Ambassador.  It  was  directly  made  to  Rome  by  Sazonof  in  Russian  Orange 
Book  No.  23,  July  26.  From  this  despatch,  where  Italy  is  urged  to  adopt  a  definitely 
unfavourable  attitude,  it  is  clear  that  the  proposal  was  not  bona  fide,  which  may  be 
the  reason  why  Sir  E.  Grey  did  not  accept  it.  The  prominent  fact  of  the  entire  in- 
vestigation is  that  Sir  G.  Buchanan's  despatch  is  inaccurate. 


July  27,  British  Blue  Book  No.  46  229 

Ambassador  undertook  to  communicate  his  Excellency's  remarks  to 
his  Government. 

On  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  questioning  me,  I  told  him  that 
I  had  correctly  defined  the  attitude  of  His  Majesty's  Government  in 
my  conversation  with  him,  which  I  reported  in  my  telegram  of  the 
24th  instant.^  I  added  that  you  could  not  promise  to  do  anything 
more,  and  that  his  Excellency  was  mistaken  if  he  believed  that  the 
cause  of  peace  could  be  promoted  by  our  telling  the  German  Govern- 
ment that  they  would  have  to  deal  with  us  as  well  as  with  Russia 
and  France  if  they  supported  Austria  by  force  of  arms.^  Their  atti- 
tude would  merely  be  stiffened  by  such  a  menace,  and  we  could  only 
induce  her  to  use  her  influence  at  Vienna  to  avert  war  by  approaching 
her  in  the  capacity  of  a  friend  who  was  anxious  to  preserve  peace.  His 
Excellency  must  not,  if  our  efforts^  were  to  be  successful,  do  anything 
to  precipitate  a  conflict.  In  these  circumstances  I  trusted  that 
the  Russian  Government  would  defer  mobilisation  ukase  for  as  long 
as  possible,  and  that  troops  would  not  be  allowed  to  cross  the  frontier 
even  when  it  was  issued. 

In  reply  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  told  me  that  until  the  issue 
of  the  Imperial  ukase  no  effective  steps  towards  mobilisation  could 
be  taken,  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  profit  by 
delay  in  order  to  complete  her  military  preparations  if  it  was  deferred 
too  long. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  45 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  {Received  July  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  27, 1914. 

Since  my  conversation  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  as 
reported  in  my  telegram  of  to-day,^  I  understand  that  his  Excellency 
has  proposed  that  the  modifications  to  be  introduced  into  Austrian 
demands  should  be  the  subject  of  direct  conversation  between  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburgh. 

To  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  46 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  B.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Ofwe,  July  27, 1914^ 

German  Ambassador  has  informed  me  that  German  Government 
accept  in  principle  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia  by  the 

1  See  No.  6,  July  24,  1914. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  1914. 

3  What  these  efforts  were,  to  preserve  peace  with  dignity  for  all,  or  to  force  Austria- 
Hungary  to  submit,  is  not  stated. 

*  See  No.  44. 


230  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

four  Powers/  reserving,  of  course,  their  right  as  an  ally  to  help  Austria 
if  attacked.  He  has  also  been  instructed  ^  to  request  me  to  use 
influence  in  St.  Petersburgh  to  localise  the  war  and  to  keep  up  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

I  have  replied  that  the  Servian  reply  went  farther  than  could  have 
been  expected  to  meet  the  Austrian  demands.  German  Secretary  of 
State  has  himself  said  that  there  were  some  things  in  the  Austrian 
note  that  Servia  could  hardly  be  expected  to  accept.^  I  assumed 
that  Servian  reply  could  not  have  gone  as  far  as  it  did  unless  Russia 
had  exercised  conciliatory  influence  at  Belgrade,  and  it  was  really  at 
Vienna  that  moderating  influence  was  now  required.  If  Austria 
put  the  Servian  reply  aside  as  being  worth  nothing  and  marched  into 
Servia,  it  meant  that  she  was  determined  to  crush  Servia  at  all  costs, 
being  reckless  of  the  consequences  that  might  be  involved.  Servian 
reply  should  at  least  be  treated  as  a  basis  for  discussion  and  pause. 
I  said  German  Government  should  urge  this  at  Vienna."^ 

I  recalled  what  German  Government  had  said  as  to  the  gravity 
of  the  situation  if  the  w^ar  could  not  be  localised,  and  observed  that  if 
Germany  assisted  Austria  against  Russia  it  would  be  because,  with- 
out any  reference  to  the  merits  of  the  dispute,  Germany  could  not 
afford  to  see  Austria  crushed.^  Just  so  other  issues  might  be  raised 
that  would  supersede  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia,  and 
would  bring  other  Powers  in,  and  the  war  would  be  the  biggest  ever 
known;  but  as  long  as  Germany  would  work  to  keep  the  peace  I 
would  keep  closely  in  touch.  I  repeated  that  after  the  Servian  reply 
it  was  at  Vienna  that  some  moderation  must  be  urged. 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  47 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Bv^hanariy  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  27,  1914. 

See  my  telegram  of  to-day  to  Sir  E.  Goschen.® 

I  have  been  told  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  in  German  and 
Austrian  circles  impression  prevails  that  in  any  event  we  would  stand 
aside.  His  Excellency  deplored  the  effect  that  such  an  impression 
must  produce.^ 

1  Cf .  German  White  Book  Exhibit  15,  July  27,  in  reply  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  43, 
July  27,  1914. 

»  This  further  instruction  is  not  printed  in  the  German  White  Book. 

•  Confirmation  of  such  a  remark  by  Mr.  von  Jagow  would  be  valuable. 

*  Germany  complied  with  this  request ;  cf .  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28. 

'  This  is  a  clear  reference  to  one  danger  threatening  Austria-Hungary.  The  otner 
danger  of  losing  her  prestige  as  a  big  Power  if  she  failed  to  punish  Serbian  intrigues  is 
often  mentioned  in  the  despatches. 

« The  ofl&cial  British  version  prints  this  footnote:  "See  No.  46."  In  first  edition 
the  reference  was  given  as  No.  37. 

'  Cf .  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  where  Sazonof  hopes  that  England  "would  not 
fail  to  proclaim  her  solidarity  with  Russia  and  France."  Germany  and  Austria  con- 
tinued to  believe  until  July  29  that  England  would  not  do  so  ;  cf .  British  Blue  Book  No. 
106,  July  30,  where  the  British  Ambassador  in  Rome  states  that  "Germany  was  now 


July  27,  British  Blue  Book  No.  48  231 

This  impression  ought,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  to  be  dispelled  by  the 
orders  we  have  given  to  the  First  Fleet,  which  is  concentrated,  as  it 
happens,  at  Portland,  not  to  disperse  for  manoeuvre  leave.  But 
I  explained  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  my  reference  to  it  must 
not  be  taken  to  mean  that  anything  more  than  diplomatic  action  was 
promised.^ 

We  hear  from  German  and  Austrian  sources  that  they  believe 
Russia  will  take  no  action  so  long  as  Austria  agrees  not  to  take 
Servian  territory.^  I  pointed  this  out,  and  added  that  it  would  be 
absurd  if  we  were  to  appear  more  Servian  than  the  Russians  ^  in  our 
dealings  with  the  German  and  Austrian  Governments. 

To  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  48 
Sir  E.  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  27, 1914. 

Count  Mensdorff  ^  told  me  by  instruction  ^  to-day  that  the 
Servian  Government  had  not  accepted  the  demands  which  the 
Austrian  Government  were  obliged  to  address  to  them  in  order  to 
secure  permanently  the  most  vital  Austrian  interests.  Servia  showed 
that  she  did  not  intend  to  abandon  her  subversive  aims,  tending  to- 
wards continuous  disorder  in  the  Austrian  frontier  territories  and  their 
final  disruption  from  the  Austrian  Monarchy.  Very  reluctantly,  and 
against  their  wish,  the  Austrian  Government  were  compelled  to  take 
more  severe  measures  to  enforce  a  fundamental  change  of  the  attitude 
of  enmity  pursued  up  to  now  by  Servia.  As  the  British  Government 
knew,  the  Austrian  Government  had  for  many  years  endeavoured  to 
find  a  way  to  get  on  with  their  turbulent  neighbour,  though  this  had 
been  made  very  difficult  for  them  by  the  continuous  provocations  of 
Servia.     The  Serajevo   murder   had   made  clear  to  everyone  what 

disposed  to  give  more  conciliatory  advice  to  Austria  as  she  seemed  convinced  that  we 
should  act  with  France  and  Russia,  and  was  most  anxious  to  avoid  issue  with  us." 
Cf.  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  80,  July  29,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  96,  July  29. 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  66,  July  27,  where  it  is  stated  that  the  fleet  was  kept 
mobilised  on  July  24.  See  also  letter  by  Admiral  Lord  Fisher,  New  York  Evening  Sun 
and  Milwaukee  Free  Press,  April  19,  1915,  "Mobilisation  of  the  fleet  before  the  war 
on  the  innocent  pretext  of  an  expected  visit  from  the  king." 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  33,  July  26. 

3  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  78,  July  29,  where  Sazonof  says  he  could  not  be  "more 
Servian  than  Ser\'ia." 

*  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

^  What  follows  is  a  very  brief  summary  in  general  terms  of  the  dossier,  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25.  This  was  received  in  Paris  on  July  27 ;  see 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  75,  of  that  date. 

In  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  39,  July  28,  it  is  stated  that  the  dossier  had 
been  sent  by  post,  "das  Ihnen  auf  dem  Postwege  iibermittelte  Dossier."  And  from 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  75,  July  27,  it  appears  that  it  had  been  sent  early  enough  to 
be  presented  in  Paris  on  July  27.  Such  documents  are  generally  sent  to  be  presented 
simultaneously  at  the  various  Foreign  ofl&ces.  It  is,  therefore,  practically  certain  that 
the  dossier  was  presented  also  in  London  on  July  27.  The  official  Enghsh  translation 
"which  is  being  sent  to  you  by  post"  conveys  the  wrong  impression  that  the  document 
could  not  have  been  in  London  on  July  27.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Sir  E.  Grey  did  not 
print  the  whole  dossier  anywhere  in  the  British  Blue  Book,  while  he  even  stated  in  the 
Preface  to  the  Blue  Book  edition  of  Sept.  28,  1914,  that  he  "did  not  receive  any  state- 
ment of  the  evidence  on  which  Austria  had  founded  her  ultimatum  till  the  7th  August." 
See  also  note  1  to  the  dossier,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25,  and  the 
Instructions  to  the  several  Ambassadors. 


232  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

appalling  consequences  the  Servian  propaganda  had  already  produced 
and  what  a  permanent  threat  to  Austria  it  involved.  We  would 
understand  that  the  Austrian  Government  must  consider  that  the 
moment  had  arrived  to  obtain,  by  means  of  the  strongest  pressure, 
guarantees  for  the  definite  suppression  of  the  Servian  aspirations  and 
for  the  security  of  peace  and  order  on  the  southeastern  frontier  of 
Austria.  As  the  peaceable  means  to  this  effect  were  exhausted,  the 
iVustrian  Government  must  at  last  appeal  to  force.  They  had  not 
taken  this  decision  without  reluctance.  Their  action,  which  had  no 
sort  of  aggressive  tendency,  could  not  be  represented  otherwise  than 
as  an  act  of  self-defence.  Also  they  thought  that  they  would  serve 
a  European  interest  if  they  prevented  Servia  from  being  henceforth  an 
element  of  general  unrest  such  as  she  had  been  for  the  last  ten  years. 
The  high  sense  of  justice  of  the  British  nation  and  of  British  states- 
men could  not  blame  the  Austrian  Government  if  the  latter  defended 
by  the  sword  what  was  theirs,  and  cleared  up  their  position  with  a 
country  whose  hostile  policy  had  forced  upon  them  for  years  measures 
so  costly  as  to  have  gravely  injured  Austrian  national  prosperity. 
Finally,  the  Austrian  Government,  confiding  in  their  amicable  re- 
lations with  us,  felt  that  they  could  count  on  our  sympathy  in  a 
fight  that  was  forced  on  them,  and  on  our  assistance  in  localising  the 
fight,  if  necessary. 

Count  Mensdorff  added  on  his  own  account  that,  as  long  as  Servia 
was  confronted  with  Turkey,  Austria  never  took  very  severe  measures 
because  of  her  adherence  to  the  policy  of  the  free  development  of  the 
Balkan  States.  Now  that  Servia  had  doubled  her  territory  and  popu- 
lation without  any  Austrian  interference,  the  repression  of  Servian 
subversive  aims  was  a  matter  of  self-defence  and  self-preservation  on 
Austria's  part.  He  reiterated  that  Austria  had  no  intention  of  taking 
Servian  territory  or  aggressive  designs  against  Servian  territory.^ 

I  said  that  I  could  not  understand  the  construction  ^  put  by  the 
Austrian  Government  upon  the  Servian  reply,  and  I  told  Count  Mens- 
dorff the  substance  of  the  conversation  that  I  had  had  with  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  this  morning  about  that  reply. 

Count  Mensdorff  admitted  that,  on  paper,  the  Servian  reply  might 
seem  to  be  satisfactory ;  but  the  Servians  had  refused  the  one  thing 
—  the  co-operation  of  Austrian  officials  and  police  —  which  would  be 
real  guarantee  that  in  practice  the  Servians  would  not  carry  on  their 
subversive  campaign  against  Austria. 

I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  as  if  the  Austrian  Government  believed 
that,  even  after  the  Servian  reply,  they  could  make  war  upon  Servia 
anyhow,  without  risk  of  bringing  Russia  into  the  dispute.  If  they 
could  make  war  on  Servia  and  at  the  same  time  satisfy  Russia,  well 
and  good  ^ ;  but,  if  not,  the  consequences  would  be  incalculable.  I 
pointed  out  to  him  that  I  quoted  this  phrase  from  an  expression  of 
the  views  of  the  German  Government.     I  feared  that  it  would  be 

*  Cf.  note  No.  3  to  the  previous  despatch. 

*  Cf.  note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  39  under  date  of  July  26. 

'  Sir  E.  Grey  here  expresses  an  idea  contrary  to  that  often  mentioned,  viz.  that 
England  was  the  protector  of  the  little  nations. 


July  27,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  31  233 

expected  in  St.  Petersburgh  that  the  Servian  reply  would  diminish 
the  tension,  and  now,  when  Russia  found  that  there  was  increased 
tension,  the  situation  would  become  increasingly  serious.  Already 
the  effect  on  Europe  was  one  of  anxiety.  I  pointed  out  that  our 
fleet  was  to  have  dispersed  to-day,^  but  we  had  felt  unable  to  let  it  dis- 
perse. We  should  not  think  of  calling  up  reserves  at  this  moment, 
and  there  was  no  menace  in  what  we  had  done  about  our  fleet ;  but, 
owing  to  the  possibility  of  a  European  conflagration,  it  was  im- 
possible for  us  to  disperse  our  forces  at  this  moment.  I  gave  this  as 
an  illustration  of  the  anxiety  that  was  felt.  It  seemed  to  me  that  the 
Servian  reply  already  involved  the  greatest  humiliation  to  Servia 
that  I  had  ever  seen  a  country  undergo,^  and  it  was  very  disappointing 
to  me  that  the  reply  was  treated  by  the  Austrian  Government  as  if 
it  were  as  unsatisfactory  as  a  blank  negative. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 
To  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  49 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  21, 1914.. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  informed  Sir  A.  Nicolson  ^  to-day  that  the 
Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  agreed  entirely  with  my  proposal 
for  a  conference  of  four  to  be  held  in  London. 

As  regards  the  question  of  asking  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Servia  to  suspend  military  operations  pending  the  result  of  the  con- 
ference, the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  ^  would  recommend  the  sugges- 
tion warmly  to  the  German  Government,  and  would  enquire  what 
procedure  they  would  propose  should  be  followed  at  Vienna. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 
British  Blue  Book  No.  39 

Reply  of  Serbian  Government  to  Austro-Hungarian  note  (communicated  by 
the  Serbian  Minister,  July  27) .     See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27. 

Russia : 

From  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  31 

Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 

Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  London,  July  14  (27),  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegram  of  the  13th  (26th)  July.^  Please 
inform  me  by  telegraph  whether  you  consider  that  your  direct  dis- 

1  Cf.  note  2  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  47,  July  27. 

2  With  this  "humiliation"  of  Serbia  compare  the  fate  in  recent  years  of  Persia, 
Morocco,  Corea,  and  other  small  nations. 

3  British  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
*  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

^  Not  printed  in  Russian  Orange  Book. 


234 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


cussions  ^  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet  harmonise  with  Grey's  scheme 
for  mediation  by  the  four  Governments.  Having  heard  from  the 
British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  that  you  would  be  prepared 
to  accept  such  a  combination,  Grey  decided  to  turn  it  into  an  official 
proposal,  which  he  communicated  yesterday  to  Berlin,  Paris,  and 
Rome.^ 


To  Paris  and  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  32 

Ruissian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassadors  at  Paris 
and  London. 

^Saint-Petershourg, 
(Telegraphique.) 

le  H  {27)  juillet,  1914. 
L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre 
est  venu  s'informer  si  nous 
jugeons  utile  que  TA^igleterre 
prenne  I'initiative  de  convoquer 
a  Londres  une  conference  des 
representants  de  I'Angleterre,  la 
France,  I'Allemagne  et  I'ltalie, 
pour  etudier  une  issue  a  la 
situation  actuelle. 

J'ai  repondu  a  TAmbassadeur 
que  j'ai  entame  des  pourparlers 
avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie,  en  conditions  que  j'es- 
pere  favorables.  Pourtant  je 
n'ai  pas  encore  re^u  de  reponse  a 
la  proposition  que  j'ai  faite  d'une 
revision  de  la  note  entre  les  deux 
Cabinets. 

Si  des  explications  directs  avec 
le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  se  trou- 
vaient  irrealisables,  je  suis  pret  a 
accepter  la  proposition  anglaise, 
ou  toute  autre  de  nature  a 
resoudre  favorablement  le  conflit. 

Je  voudrais  pourtant  ecarter 
des  aujourd'hui  un  malentendu 
qui  pourrait  surgir  de  la  reponse 


(Translation.) 

St.  Petershurgh, 
(Telegraphic.) 

July  27,  1914. 
The  British  Ambassador  came 
to  ascertain  whether  we  think  it 
desirable  that  Great  Britain 
should  take  the  initiative  in  con- 
voking a  conference  in  London 
of  the  representatives  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  Germany,  and 
Italy  to  examine  the  possibility 
of  a  way  out  of  the  present  situa- 
tion. 

I  replied  to  the  Ambassador 
that  I  have  begun  conversations 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Am- 
bassador under  conditions  which, 
I  hope,  may  be  favourable.  I 
have  not,  however,  received  as 
yet  any  reply  to  the  proposal 
made  by  me  for  revising  the  note 
between  the  two  Cabinets. 

If  direct  explanations  with  the 
Vienna  Cabinet  were  to  prove 
impossible,  I  am  ready  to  accept 
the  British  proposal,  or  any  other 
proposal  of  a  kind  that  would 
bring  about  a  favourable  solu- 
tion of  the  conflict. 

I  wish,  however,  to  put  an  end 
from  this  day  forth  to  a  mis- 
understanding which  might  arise 


1  See  Orange  Book  No.  25,  July  26  ;  No,  38,  July  27,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No. 
64,  July  27.  Sazonof  had  made  the  proposals  of  direct  discussions  of  the  Austrian 
note  to  Serbia  on  July  27,  and  on  July  28  had  not  yet  heard  from  Vienna.  For  a  re- 
view of  this  whole  subject  see  the  note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28. 

*  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  36,  37,  July  26,  also  Nos.  43  and  57,  July  27. 


July  27,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  35  235 

donnee    par    le    Ministre    de    la  from  the  answer  given  by  the 

Justice  fran9ais  a  I'Ambassadeur  French  Minister  of  Justice  to  the 

d'Allemagne,  concernant  des  con-  German  Ambassador,  regarding 

seils  de  moderation  a  donner  au  counsels    of    moderation    to   be 

Cabinet  Imperial.  given  to  the  Imperial  Cabinet. 

(To  Paris,  London,  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  33 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassadors  at  Paris, 
London,  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburg,  July  U  (27),  1914. 

I  HAVE  taken  note  of  the  reply  ^  returned  by  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment to  Baron  Giesl.  It  exceeds  all  our  expectations  in  its  modera- 
tion, and  in  its  desire  to  afford  the  fullest  satisfaction  to  Austria. 
We  do  not  see  what  further  demands  could  be  made  by  Austria,  unless 
the  Vienna  Cabinet  is  seeking  for  a  pretext  for  war  with  Serviac 

From  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  34 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  U  (27),  19U. 

The  German  Ambassador  discussed  the  situation  again  to-day 
at  great  length  with  the  Director  of  the  Political  Department.  The 
Ambassador  laid  great  stress  on  the  utter  impossibility  of  any  media- 
tion or  conference.^ 

From  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  35 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  U  (27),  1914. 

I  DISCUSSED  the  situation  with  the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  in  the  presence  of  Berthelot,  directly  after  my  return  to  Paris. 
They  both  confirmed  the  information  respecting  the  action  taken 
by  the  German  Ambassador,^  which  Sevastopoulo  has  already  tele- 
graphed to  you.  This  morning  Baron  von  Schoen  confirmed  his 
declaration  of  yesterday  in  writing,  i.e. : 

1.  That  Austria  has  declared  to  Russia  that  she  seeks  no  territorial 
acquisitions  and  that  she  harbours  no  designs  against  the  integrity 
of  Servia.     Her  sole  object  is  to  secure  her  own  peace  and  quiet. 

1  See  note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  39,  under  date  of  July  26. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  61,  July  27. 

3  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  61,  July  27. 


236  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

2.  That  consequently  it  rests  with  Russia  to  avoid  war. 

3.  That  Germany  and  France,  entirely  at  one  in  their  ardent  desire 
to  preserve  peace,  should  exercise  their  moderating  influence  upon 
Russia. 

Baron  von  Schoen  laid  special  emphasis  on  the  expression  of  soli- 
darity of  Germany  and  France.  The  Minister  of  Justice  is  convinced 
that  these  steps  on  the  part  of  Germany  are  taken  with  the  evident 
object  of  alienating  Russia  and  France,  t)f  inducing  the  French 
Government  to  make  representations  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  of  thus 
compromising  our  ally  in  our  eyes ;  and  finally,  in  the  event  of  war,  of 
throwing  the  responsibility  not  on  Germany,  who  is  ostensibly  mak- 
ing every  effort  to  maintain  peace,  but  on  Russia  and  France. 


From  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  36 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  14  {27),  1914. 

It  is  clear  from  your  telegrams  ^  of  the  13th  (26)  July  that  you  were 
not  then  aware  of  the  reply  of  the  Servian  Government.  The  tele- 
gram from  Belgrade  informing  me  of  it  also  took  twenty  hours  ^ 
to  reach  us.  The  telegram  from  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  sent  the  day  before  yesterday  at  11  o'clock  in  the  morning,  at 
the  special  urgent  rate,  which  contained  instructions  to  support  our 
representations,  only  reached  its  destination  at  6  o'clock.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  this  telegram  was  intentionally  delayed  by  the 
Austrian  telegraph  office. 

From  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  37 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  14  {27),  1914. 

On  the  instructions  of  his  Government,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  has 
informed  the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  Servians  answer 
has  not  been  considered  satisfactory  in  Vienna,  and  that  to-morrow, 
Tuesday,  Austria  will  proceed  to  take  "energetic  action"  with  the 
object  of  forcing  Servia  to  give  the  necessary  guarantees.  The 
Minister  having  asked  what  form  such  action  would  take,  the  Ambas- 
sador replied  that  he  had  no  exact  information  on  the  subject,  but  it 
might  mean  either  the  crossing  of  the  Servian  frontier,  or  an  ultima- 
tum, or  even  a  declaration  of  war. 

*  Not  printed  in  either  the  French  Yellow  Book  or  the  Russian  Orange  Book. 
'  It  also  reached  the  French  Government  with  a  delay  of  twenty  hours.     Cf .  French 
YeUow  Book  No.  56,  July  26. 


July  27 y  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  Jfi  237 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  38 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  U  (27),  1914. 

I  BEGGED  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  support  your  proposal 
in  Vienna  that  Szapary  should  be  authorised  to  draw  up,  by  means  of 
a  private  exchange  of  views  with  you,  a  wording  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  demands  which  would  be  acceptable  to  both  parties.  Jagow 
answered  that  he  was  aware  of  this  proposal  and  that  he  agreed  with 
Pourtales  that,  as  Szapary  had  begun  this  conversation,  he  might 
as  well  go  on  with  it.  He  will  telegraph  in  this  sense  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna.  I  begged  him  to  press  Vienna  with  greater 
insistence  to  adopt  this  conciliatory  line;  Jagow  answered  that  he 
could  not  advise  Austria  to  give  way. 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  39 

Russian  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  14  {27),  1914. 

Before  my  visit  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  his 
Excellency  had  received  the  French  Ambassador,  who  endeavoured 
to  induce  him  to  accept  the  British  proposal  for  action  in  favour  of 
peace,  such  action  to  be  taken  simultaneously  at  St.  Petersburgh  and 
at  Vienna  by  Great  Britain,  Germany,  Italy,  and  France.  Cambon 
suggested  that  these  Powers  should  give  their  advice  to  Vienna  in  the 
following  terms  :  "  To  abstain  from  all  action  which  might  aggravate 
the  existing  situation."  {S'abstenir  de  tout  acte  qui  pourrait  aggraver 
la  situation  de  Vheure  actuelle.)  By  adopting  this  vague  formula,  all 
mention  of  the  necessity  of  refraining  from  invading  Servia  might 
be  avoided.  Jagow  refused  point-blank  to  accept  this  suggestion  ^  in 
spite  of  the  entreaties  of  the  Ambassador,  who  emphasised,  as  a  good 
feature  of  the  suggestion,  the  mixed  grouping  of  the  Powers,  thanks 
to  which  the  opposition  between  the  Alliance  and  the  Entente  —  a 
matter  of  which  Jagow  himself  had  often  complained  —  was  avoided. 

To  Serbia 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  40 

Telegram  from  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia  to  His 
Royal  Highness  Prince  Alexander  of  Serbia,  July  14  (27),  1914- 

When  your  Royal  Highness  applied  to  me  at  a  time  of  especial 
stress,  you  were  not  mistaken  in  the  sentiments  which  I  entertain  for 
you,  or  in  my  cordial  sympathy  with  the  Servian  people. 

1  For  von  Jagow's  reasons  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  74,  July  27,  also  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  35,   July  28. 


238  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  existing  situation  is  engaging  my  most  serious  attention,  and 
my  Government  are  using  their  utmost,  endeavour  to  smooth  away 
the  present  difficulties.  I  have  no  doubt  that  your  Highness  and  the 
Royal  Servian  Government  wish  to  render  that  task  easy  by  neglecting 
no  step  which  might  lead  to  a  settlement,  and  thus  both  prevent  the 
horrors  of  a  new  war  and  safeguard  the  dignity  of  Servia. 

From  Vienna 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  41 

Russian  Ambassador  at   Vienna  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Vienna,  July  I4  (^7),  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  is  away.  During  a  long  conver- 
sation which  I  had  with  Macchio  to-day  I  drew  his  attention,  in  a 
perfectly  friendly  way,  to  the  unfavourable  impression  produced  in 
Russia  by  the  presentation  of  demands  by  Austria  to  Servia,  which  it 
was  quite  impossible  for  any  independent  State,  however  small,  to 
accept.  I  added  that  this  method  of  procedure  might  lead  to  the 
most  undesirable  complications,  and  that  it  had  aroused  profound 
surprise  and  general  condemnation  in  Russia.  We  can  only  suppose 
that  Austria,  influenced  by  the  assurances  given  by  the  German 
Representative  at  Vienna,  who  has  egged  her  on  throughout  this  crisis, 
has  counted  on  the  probable  localisation  of  the  dispute  with  Servia, 
and  on  the  possibility  of  inflicting  with  impunity  a  serious  blow  upon 
that  country.  The  declaration  by  the  Russian  Government  that 
Russia  could  not  possibly  remain  indifferent  in  the  face  of  such  con- 
duct has  caused  a  great  sensation  here. 

From  London 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  42 

Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
A  fairs. 

(Telegram.)  London,  July  I4  {27),  1914. 

Grey  has  just  informed  the  German  Ambassador,  who  came 
to  question  him  as  to  the  possibility  of  taking  action  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, that  such  action  ought  rather  to  be  taken  at  Vienna,  and  that 
the  Berlin  Cabinet  were  the  best  qualified  to  do  so.  Grey  also 
pointed  out  that  the  Servian  reply  to  the  Austrian  note  had  exceeded 
anything  that  could  have  been  expected  in  moderation  and  in  its 
spirit  of  conciliation.  Grey  added  that  he  had  therefore  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  Russia  must  have  advised  Belgrade  to  return  a 
moderate  reply,  and  that  he  thought  the  Servian  reply  could  form 
the  basis  of  a  peaceful  and  acceptable  solution  of  the  question. 


July  27,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  43  239 

In  these  circumstances,  continued  Grey,  if  Austria  were  to  begin 
hostilities  in  spite  of  that  reply,  she  would  prove  her  intention  of 
crushing  Servia.  Looked  at  in  this  light,  the  question  might  give 
rise  to  a  situation  which  might  lead  to  a  war  in  which  all  the  Powers 
would  be  involved 

Grey  finally  declared  that  the  British  Government  were  sincerely 
anxious  to  act  with  the  German  Government  as  long  as  the  preser- 
vation of  peace  was  in  question ;  but,  in  the  contrary  event.  Great 
Britain  reserved  to  herself  full  liberty  of  action. 

Serbia: 

From  St.  Petersburg 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  43 

His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia  to  His  Royal  Highness  the 
Crotvn  Prince  of  Serbia. 

(Telegraphic.)  Petrograd,  July  14/27,  1914. 

[See  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  40,  July  27.] 


240 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Tuesday,  July  28,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED   DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgrade,  Beriin,  London, 
St.  Petersburg!! 

Beriin,  Tokio 

Belgium 

Vienna 

France 

London,  Berlin,  St.  Peters- 

Vienna,   London,   Ber- 

burgh,   Vienna,    Rome, 

lin,  St.  Petersburgh, 

Viviani 

Viviani 

Germany 

German  Governments,  St. 

Peter  sburgh 
Emperor  to  Czar 

Vienna 

Great  Britain 

BerUn,  St.  Petersburgh 

Paris,  St.  Petersburgh, 
Vienna,  Rome,  Ber- 
lin, Nish,  French  and 
Russian  Embassies 

Russia 

London 

Fiume,  Vienna,  Berlin 

Serbia 

All  Serbian  legations 
St.  Petersburgh 

Vienna 

Austria-Hungary  declares  war  on  Serbia  and  endeavours  to  explain  her  point  of 
view  to  England  most  especially,  but  also  to  Russia.  Russia's  extensive  mobilisa- 
tion results  in  Austria-Hungary  calling  on  Germany  for  assistance  and  urging  her 
to  use  toward  Russia  "unambiguous  language."  Sir  E.  Grey's  proposal  trans- 
mitted by  Germany  is  declared  to  have  come  too  late. 

France  is  resolved  to  support  English  and  -Russian  proposals  but  persists  in 
claiming  that  mediation  should  not  be  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  alone, 
but  include  Belgrade.  She  views  with  suspicion  every  act  and  statement  of 
Germany,  and  refuses  to  announce  that  she  and  Germany  had  agreed  to  work  for 
peace.     She  also  refuses  to  use  a  moderating  influence  on  Russia. 

Germany :  The  Chancellor  informs  the  Federal  Governments  of  the  serious  state 
of  affairs,  expressing  the  hope  to  be  able  to  maintain  peace  but  announcing  it  as  the 
duty  of  Germany  to  support  Austria-Hungary,  if  **  through  the  interference  of 
Russia  the  fire  "  should  be  spread.  At  the  same  time  she  urges  Austria-Hungary 
to  come  to  an  uniderstanding  with  Russia. 

The  Emperor' personally  appeals  to  the  Czar  in  the  interest  of  peace. 

Great  Britain  declares  that  she  would  find  it  embarrassing  to  give  Russia 
"pacific  advice."  She  also  does  not  follow  up  the  advice  sent  by  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Rome  to  the  effect  that  "Serbia  may  be  induced  to  accept  note  in 
its  entirety  on  the  advice  of  the  four  Powers."  Her  own  conference  proposal 
she  "w^ould  suspend"  in  favor  of  Russia's  proposal  of  direct  conversations  with 
Vienna.  Sir  E.  Grey  even  made  an  alternate  proposal,  which  Germany  trans- 
mitted to  Vienna,  but  which  is  not  mentioned  either  in  the  British  Blue  Book 
or  the  French  Yellow  Book.     (See  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  16.) 

Russia  announces  the  failure  of  direct  conversations  with  Vienna  at  the  very 
moment  when  Sir  E.  Grey  suspends  his  proposal,  and  disregarding  Sir  E.  Grey's 
conference  plan  calls  for  English  mediation,  apparently  between  Vienna  and 
Belgrade,  which  was  France's  suggestion. 

Serbia,  according  to  the  uncontradicted  statement  of  Vienna  (British  Blue 
Book  No.  56,  under  date  of  July  28)  opens  hostihties,  and  asks  Russia  for  help, 
assuring  the  latter  of  her  loyalty. 


July  28,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  38  241 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Berlin 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  35 
Count  Szdgyeny  to  Count  Berchtold, 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  28,  1914. 

The  proposal  for  mediation  made  by  Great  Britain,  that  Germany, 
Italy,  Great  Britain  and  France  should  meet  at  a  conference  at 
London,  is  declined  ^  so  far  as  Germany  is  concerned  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  impossible  for  Germany  to  bring  her  Ally  before  a  European 
Court  in  her  settlement  with  Servia. 

From  Tokio 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  36 
Freiherr  Von  Milller  to  Count  Berchtold. 
(Telegraphic.)  Tokio,   July  28,   1914. 

To-day's  semi-officialJapan  Times  contains  a  leading  article  which 
concludes  by  saying  that  Japan  is  on  the  best  possible  terms  with 
the  three  Great  Powers  concerned  —  Austria-Hungary,  Germany 
and  Russia  —  while  it  is  in  no  way  interested  in  Servia.  In  the  case 
of  war,  the  Imperial  Government  would,  as  a  matter  of  course,  main- 
tain the  strictest  neutrality. 

To  Belgrade 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  37 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Royal  Servian  Foreign  Office  at  Belgrade.    ( Trans- 
lated from  the  French.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914- 

The  Royal  Servian  Government  not  having  answered  in  a  satis- 
factory manner  the  note  of  23rd  July  presented  by  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Minister  at  Belgrade,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
are  themselves  compelled  to  see  to  the  safeguarding  of  their  rights 
and  interests,  and,  with  this  object,  to  have  recourse  to  force  of  arms. 
Austria-Hungary  consequently  considers  herself  henceforward  in  a 
state  of  war  ^  with  Servia. 

To  Berlin 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  38 
Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdgyeny  in  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914^ 

For  Your  Excellency's  information  and  for  communication  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  :  — 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  43,  July  27.  For  a  later  agreement  see  British  Blue 
Book  No.  46,  July  27,  and  German  White  Book,  Exhibits  12  and  15,  July  27. 

2  For  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  announcing  to  the  Powers  that  war  had  been, 
declared,  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  50,  July  28. 

R 


242  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

I  have  received  the  following  telegram  from  Count  Mensdorff^ 
dated  the  27th  inst. :  — 

"  I  have  to-day  had  the  opportunity  of  explaining  at  length  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  that  our  action  is  not  one  of  aggression  but  of  self- 
defence  and  of  self-preservation,  and  that  we  have  no  intention  of 
making  any  territorial  acquisition,  or  of  destroying  Servian  independ- 
ence.^ What  we  desire  is  to  obtain  a  certain  measure  of  satisfaction 
for  what  has  passed,  and  guarantees  for  the  future. 

For  this  purpose  I  availed  myself  of  some  of  the  points  out  of  Your 
Excellency's  communications  to  Count  Szapary. 

Sir  E.  Grey  said  to  me  that  he  was  very  much  disappointed  that  we 
were  treating  the  Servian  answer  as  if  it  were  a  complete  refusal. 

He  had  believed  that  this  answer  would  furnish  a  basis  on  which 
the  four  other  Governments  could  arrive  at  a  peaceful  solution. 

This  was  his  idea  when  he  proposed  a  conference. 

The  conference  would  meet  on  the  assumption  that  Austria-Hun- 
gary as  well  as  Russia  would  refrain  from  every  military  operation 
during  the  attempt  of  the  other  Powers  to  find  a  peaceful  issue. 

(The  declaration  of  Sir  E.  Grey  in  the  House  of  Commons  to-day 
amplifies  the  project  of  a  conference.)  When  he  spoke  of  our  refrain- 
ing from  military  operations  against  Servia,  I  observed  that  I  feared 
that  it  was  perhaps  already  too  late.  The  Secretary  of  State  ex- 
pressed the  view  that  if  we  were  resolved  under  any  circumstances  to 
go  to  war  with  Servia,  and  if  we  assumed  that  Russia  would  remain 
quiet,  we  were  taking  a  great  risk.  If  we  could  induce  Russia  to 
remain  quiet,  he  had  nothing  more  to  say  on  the  question. ^  If  we 
could  not,  the  possibilities  and  the  dangers  were  incalculable. 

As  a  symptom  of  the  feeling  of  unrest  he  told  me  that  the  British 
Grand  Fleet,  which  was  concentrated  in  Portsmouth  after  the 
manoeuvres,  and  which  should  have  dispersed  to-day,^  would  for  the 
present  remain  there.  ''We  had  not  called  up  any  Reserves,  but  as 
they  are  assembled,  we  cannot  at  this  moment  send  them  home 
again." 

His  idea  of  a  conference  had  the  aim  of  preventing,  if  possible,  a 
collision  between  the  Great  Powers,  and  he  also  aimed  at  the  isolation 
of  the  conflict.  If,  therefore,  Russia  mobilises  and  Germany  takes 
action,  the  conference  necessarily  breaks  down. 

I  believe  that  I  need  not  specially  point  out  to  Your  Excellency 
that  Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference,  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  our 
conflict  with  Servia,  appears,  in  view  of  the  state  of  war  which  has 
arisen,  to  have  been  outstripped  by  events. 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  48,  July  27. 

2  This  is  a  refutation  of  the  popular  claim  that  Great  Britain  went  to  war  in  part  oq 
Serbia's  account,  to  vindicate  the  rights  of  the  little  nations. 

»  This  refers  to  the  interview  of  July  27.     See  British  Blue  Book  No.  48. 


July  28,  AustrO'Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  Jfi  243 

To  London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.   39 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Mensdorff  at  London. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

We  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  the  point  that  Sir  E.  Grey 
should  appreciate  in  an  impartial  manner  our  action  against  Servia 
in  general,  and  in  particular  our  refusal  to  accept  the  Servian  answer, 
and  I  therefore  ask  Your  Excellency  to  take  the  opportunity  of  ex- 
plaining to  the  Secretary  of  State  in  detail  the  dossier  which  is  being  ^ 
sent  to  you  by  post,  and  that  you  will  emphasise  the  specially  salient 
passages ;  in  the  same  sense  Your  Excellency  should  discuss  with  Sir 
E.  Grey  the  critical  observations  on  the  Servian  note  (the  text  of 
the  note  without  observations  has  been  sent  to  Your  Excellency  by 
post  yesterday),  ^  and  you  should  make  clear  to  him  that  the  offer  of 
Servia  to  meet  points  in  our  note  was  only  an  apparent  one,  intended 
to  deceive  Europe  without  giving  any  guarantee  for  the  future. 

As  the  Servian  Government  knew  that  only  an  unconditional  ac- 
ceptance of  our  demands  could  satisfy  us,  the  Servian  tactics  can 
easily  be  seen  through :  Servia  accepted  a  number  of  our  demands, 
with  all  sorts  of  reservations,  in  order  to  impress  public  opinion 
in  Europe,  trusting  that  she  would  not  be  required  to  fulfil  her 
promises.  In  conversing  with  Sir  E.  Grey  your  Excellency  should  lay 
special  emphasis  on  the  circumstance  that  the  general  mobilisa- 
tion of  the  Servian  army  was  ordered  for  the  afternoon  of  the  25th 
July  at  3  o'clock,  while  the  answer  to  our  note  was  delivered  just 
before  the  expiration  of  the  time  fixed,  that  is  to  say,  a  few  minutes 
before  6  o'clock.  Up  to  then  we  had  no  military  preparations,  but 
by  the  Servian  mobilisation  w^e  were  compelled  to  do  so. 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.   40 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

For  your  Excellency's  information  and  guidance : 
The  Imperial  Russian  Ambassador  spoke  to  me  to-day  in  order  to 
inform  me  of  his  return  from  short  leave  in  Russia,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  execute  a  telegraphic  instruction  of  M.  Sazonof .  The  latter 
had  informed  him  that  he  had  had  a  lengthy  and  friendly  discussion 
with  your  Excellency  (your  Excellency's  telegram  of  the  27th  in- 
stant),^ in  the  course  of  which  he  had  discussed  with  great  readiness 

1  This  is  a  wrong  translation  ;  it  should  read,  "which  has  been  despatched  to  you," 
and  is  so  translated  in  the  English  translation  issued  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment. 

2  Neither  the  dossier  nor  the  Austro-Hungarian  comments  on  the  Serbian  note  were 
printed  in  the  British  Blue  Book,  although  the  Serbian  reply  was  printed  in  No.  39 
before  No.  40  which  is  a  telegram  of  July  26.  For  the  reason  why  this  Serbian  reply 
is  printed  in  this  edition  among  the  July  27  despatches,  see  note  to  British  Blue  Book 
No.  39,  under  date  of  July  26. 

3  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  31,  July  27. 


244  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  various  points  of  the  Servian  answer.  M.  Sazonof  was  of  the 
opinion  that  Servia  had  gone  far  in  meeting  our  wishes,  but  that  some 
of  the  demands  appeared  to  him  entirely  unacceptable,  a  fact  which 
he  had  not  concealed  from  your  Excellency.  It  appeared  to  him 
under  these  circumstances  that  the  Servian  reply  might  properly  be 
regarded  as  furnishing  a  starting  point  for  an  understanding  to  attain 
which  the  Russian  Government  would  gladly  lend  a  hand.  M. 
Sazonof  therefore  desired  to  propose  to  me  that  the  exchange  of  ideas 
with  your  Excellency  should  be  continued,  and  that  your  Excellency 
should  receive  instructions  with  this  end  in  view. 

In  reply,  I  emphasised  my  inability  to  concur  in  such  a  proposal. 
No  one  in  our  country  could  understand,  nor  could  anyone  approve 
negotiations  with  reference  to  the  wording  used  in  the  answer  which 
we  had  designated  as  unsatisfactory.  This  was  all  the  more  im- 
possible because,  as  the  Ambassador  knew,  there  was  a  deep  feeling 
of  general  excitement  which  had  already  mastered  public  opinion. 
Moreover,  on  our  side  war  had  to-day  been  declared  against  Servia. 

In  reply  to  the  explanations  of  the  Ambassador,  which  culminated 
in  asserting  that  we  should  not  in  any  way  suppress  the  admitted 
hostile  opinion  in  Servia  by  a  warlike  action,  but  that,  on  the  contrary 
we  should  only  increase  it,  I  gave  him  some  insight  into  our  present 
relations  towards  Servia  which  made  it  necessary,  quite  against  our 
will,  and  without  any  selfish  secondary  object,  for  us  to  show  our  rest- 
less neighbour,  with  the  necessary  emphasis,  our  firm  intention  not 
to  permit  any  longer  a  movement  which  was  allowed  to  exist  by 
the  Government,  and  which  was  directed  against  the  existence  of  the 
Monarchy.  The  attitude  of  Servia  after  the  receipt  of  our  note  had 
further  not  been  calculated  to  make  a  peaceful  solution  possible, 
because  Servia,  even  before  she  transmitted  to  us  her  unsatisfactory 
reply,  had  ordered  a  general  mobilisation,  and  in  so  doing  had  already 
committed  a  hostile  act  against  us.  In  spite  of  this,  however,  we  had 
waited  for  three  days.  Yesterday  hostilities  were  opened  against  us 
on  the  Hungarian  frontier  on  the  part  of  Servia.  By  this  act  we 
were  deprived  of  the  possibility  of  maintaining  any  longer  the  patience 
which  we  had  shown  towards  Servia.  The  establishment  of  a  funda- 
mental but  peaceful  amelioration  of  our  relations  towards  Servia  had 
now  been  made  impossible,  and  we  were  compelled  to  meet  the  Servian 
provocation  in  the  only  form  which  in  the  given  circumstances  was 
consistent  with  the  dignity  of  the  Monarchy. 

To  London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.   41 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Mensdorff  at  London. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28, 1914, 

The  British  Ambassador,  who  discussed  matters  with  me  to-day 
has,  in  accordance  with  his  instructions,  explained  the  attitude  of 
Sir  E.  Grey  with  regard  to  our  conflict  with  Servia  as  follows  :  — 


July  28,  Amtro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  4I  245 

The  British  Government  have  followed  the  previous  course  of 
events  during  the  crisis  with  lively  interest,  and  they  attach  im- 
portance to  giving  us  an  assurance  that  they  entertain  sympathy  for 
us  in  the  point  of  view  we  have  adopted,  and  that  they  completely 
understand  the  grievances  which  we  have  against  Servia. 

If  England  has  no  ground  for  making  our  dispute  with  Servia  in 
itself  an  object  of  special  consideration,  nevertheless  this  question  can- 
not escape  the  attention  of  the  Cabinet  at  London,  because  this  con- 
flict may  affect  wider  circles  and  thereby  imperil  the  peace  of  Europe. 

To  this  extent  England  is  affected  by  the  question,  and  it  is  only 
on  this  ground  that  Sir  E.  Grey  has  been  led  to  send  an  invitation  to 
the  Governments  of  those  countries  which  are  not  directly  interested 
in  this  conflict  (Germany,  Italy  and  France),  in  order  to  test  in  com- 
mon with  them  by  means  of  a  continuous  exchange  of  ideas  the 
possibilities  of  the  situation,  and  to  discuss  how  the  differences  may  be 
most  quickly  settled.  Following  the  precedent  of  the  London  con- 
ference during  the  last  Balkan  crisis,  the  Ambassadors  of  the  various 
States  mentioned  resident  at  London  should,  according  to  the  view 
of  the  British  Secretary  of  State,  keep  themselves  in  continual  con- 
tact with  him  for  the  purpose  indicated.  Sir  E.  Grey  had  already 
received  answers  expressed  in  very  friendly  terms  from  the  Govern- 
ments concerned,  in  which  they  concurred  in  the  suggestion  put 
forward.  At  present  it  was  also  the  wish  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
if  possible,  to  prevent  even  at  the  eleventh  hour  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  if  this  were  not 
possible  at  least  to  prevent  the  conflict  from  causing  a  collision  in- 
volving bloodshed ;  if  necessary,  by  the  Servians  withdrawing  with- 
out accepting  battle.  The  reply  which  had  reached  us  from  Servia 
appeared  to  offer  the  possibility  that  it  might  provide  the  basis  of  an 
understanding.  England  would  willingly  be  prepared  in  this  matter 
to  make  her  influence  felt  according  to  our  ideas  and  wishes. 

I  thanked  the  Ambassador  for  the  communication  of  Sir  E.  Grey, 
and  I  answered  him  that  I  fully  appreciated  the  view  of  the  Secretary 
of  State.  His  point  of  view  was,  however,  naturally  different  from 
mine,  as  England  was  not  directly  interested  in  the  dispute  between 
us  and  Servia,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  could  not  be  fully  informed 
concerning  the  serious  significance  which  the  questions  at  issue  had 
for  the  Monarchy.  If  Sir  E.  Grey  spoke  of  the  possibility  of  prevent-  , 
ing  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  this  suggestion  came  too  late,  since 
our  soldiers  were  yesterday  fired  at  by  soldiers  from  over  the  Servian 
frontier,  and  to-day  war  has  been  declared  by  us  against  Servia.  I 
had  to  decline  to  entertain  the  idea  of  a  discussion  based  on  the  Servian 
answer.  What  we  asked  was  the  integral  acceptance  of  the  ulti- 
matum. Servia  had  endeavoured  to  get  out  of  her  difficulty  by  sub- 
terfuges.    We  knew  these  Servian  methods  only  too  well. 

Through  the  local  knowledge  which  he  has  gained  here.  Sir  Maurice 
de  Bunsen  was  in  a  position  to  appreciate  fully  our  point  of  view, 
and  he  would  be  in  a  position  to  give  Sir  E.  Grey  an  accurate  repre- 
sentation of  the  facts. 


246  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

In  so  far  as  Sir  E.  Grey  desired  to  be  of  service  to  the  cause  of 
European  peace,  he  would  certainly  not  find  any  opposition  from 
us.  He  must,  however,  reflect  that  the  peace  of  Europe  would  not 
be  saved  by  Great  Powers  placing  themselves  behind  Servia,  and 
directing  their  efforts  to  securing  that  she  should  escape  punishment. 

For,  even  if  we  consented  to  entertain  such  an  attempt  at  an  agree- 
ment, Servia  would  be  all  the  more  encouraged  to  continue  on  the 
path  she  has  formerly  followed,  and  this  would,  in  a  very  short  time, 
again  imperil  the  cause  of  peace. 

The  British  Ambassador  assured  me  in  conclusion  that  he  fully 
understood  our  point  of  view,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  regretted 
that,  under  these  circumstances,  the  desire  of  the  British  Government 
to  arrive  at  an  agreement  had,  for  the  time  being,  no  prospect  of  being 
realised.  He  hoped  to  remain  in  constant  communication  with  me 
as  that  appeared  to  him,  on  account  of  the  great  danger  of  a  European 
conflagration,  to  be  of  special  value. 

I  assured  the  Ambassador  that  I  was  at  all  times  at  his  disposal, 
and  thereupon  our  conversation  came  to  an  end. 

To  Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   42 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szogyeny  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  July  28,  1914. 

I  REQUEST  your  Excellency  to  go  at  once  to  the  Chancellor  or  the 
Secretary  of  State  and  communicate  to  him  the  following  in  my 
name :  — 

"According  to  mutually  consistent  reports,  received  from  St. 
Petersburgh,  Kieff,  Warsaw,  Moscow  and  Odessa,  Russia  is  making 
extensive  military  preparations.  M.  Sazonof  has  indeed  given  an 
assurance  on  his  word  of  honour,  as  has  also  the  Russian  Minister 
of  War,  that  mobilisation  has  not  up  to  now  been  ordered;  the 
latter  has,  however,  told  the  German  Military  Attache  that  the  mili- 
tary districts  which  border  on  Austria-Hungary  —  Kieff,  Odessa, 
Moscow  and  Kasan  —  will  be  mobilised,  should  our  troops  cross  the 
Servian  frontier.^ 

"  Under  these  circumstances,  I  would  urgently  ask  the  Cabinet  at 
Berlin  to  take  into  immediate  consideration  the  question  whether  the 
attention  of  Russia  should  not  be  drawn,  in  a  friendly  manner,  to 
the  fact  that  the  mobilisation  of  the  above  districts  amounts  to  a 
threat  against  Austria-Hungary,  and  that,  therefore,  should  these 
measures  be  carried  out,  they  would  be  answered  by  the  most  exten- 
sive military  counter  measures,  not  only  by  the  Monarchy  but  by 
our  Allyj  the  German  Empire." 

In  order  to  make  it  more  easy  for  Russia  to  withdraw,  it  appears 
to  us  appropriate  that  such  a  step  should,  in  the  first  place,  be  taken 

1  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  11,  July  27. 


July  28,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  75  {2)  247 

by  Germany  alone ;   nevertheless  we  are  ready  to  take  this  step  in 
conjunction  with  Germany. 

Unambiguous  language  appears  to  me  at  the  present  moment  to 
be  the  most  effective  method  of  making  Russia  fully  conscious  of  all 
that  is  involved  in  a  threatening  attitude.^ 

To  Berlin 

AUSTR0-HUNGARIA.N   ReD   BoOK  No.   43 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szogyeny  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  July  28, 1914. 

Information  has  been  received  from  the  Imperial  German  Ambas- 
sador that  Sir  E.  Grey  has  appealed  to  the  German  Government  to  use 
their  influence  with  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  in  order 
to  induce  them  either  to  regard  the  reply  received  from  Belgrade  as 
satisfactory,  or  to  accept  it  as  a  basis  for  discussion  between  the 
Cabinets.^ 

Herr  von  Tschirschky  was  commissioned  to  bring  the  British  pro- 
posal before  the  Vienna  Cabinet  for  their  consideration. 

Belgium : 

From  Vienna 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  7 

Count  Erremhault  de  Dudzeele,  Belgian  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M. 
Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

(Telegram.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  notified  me  of  the  declaration  ^ 
of  war  by  Austria-Hungary  against  Servia. 

France : 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  75  (2) 

Official  Communique  of  the  Press  Bureau."^ 

Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

The  Austrian  Minister  at  Belgrade  has  returned  to  Vienna  and 
presented  the  text  of  the  Servian  reply.  ^ 

1  This  despatch  would  seem  to  dispose  of  the  claim  sometimes  made  that  Germany's 
demand  on  Russia  to  demobilise  brought  on  the  war  much  against  the  wishes  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  who  had  been  dragged  in, 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27,  and  No.  67,  July  28. 

3  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  37,  July  28,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  50, 
same  day. 

*  This  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  comments  on  the  Serbian  reply, 
see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27. 

^  The  Austrian  Minister  left  Belgrade  on  the  evening  of  July  25  (see  Serbian  Blue 
Book  No.  41,  July  25),  after  receiving  the  Serbian  reply.    This  despatch  is  dated  July 


248  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

A  spirit  of  insincerity  pervades  the  whole  of  this  reply ;  it  makes 
it  clear  that  the  Servian  Government  have  no  serious  intention  of 
putting  an  end  to  the  culpable  toleration  which  has  given  rise  to  the 
anti-Austrian  intrigues.  The  Servian  reply  contains  such  restric- 
tions and  limitations,  not  only  with  regard  to  the  principle  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  demarche,  but  also  with  regard  to  the  claims  ad- 
vanced by  Austria,  that  the  concessions  which  are  made  are  without 
importance. 

In  particular,  under  an  empty  pretext,  there  is  a  refusal  to  accept 
the  participation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  officials  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  authors  of  the  crimes  who  are  resident  in  Servian  territory. 

In  the  same  way,  the  Servian  reply  to  the  Austrian  demand  that 
the  hostile  intrigues  of  the  press  should  be  suppressed,  amounts  to  a 
refusal. 

The  demand  with  regard  to  the  measures  to  be  taken  to  prevent 
associations  hostile  to  Austria-Hungary  from  continuing  their  activity 
under  another  name  and  form  after  their  dissolution,  has  not  even 
-been  considered. 

Inasmuch  as  these  claims  constitute  the  minimum  regarded  as 
necessary  for  the  re-establishment  of  a  permanent  peace  in  the  south- 
east of  the  Monarchy,  the  Servian  reply  is  considered  to  be  insufficient. 

That  the  Servian  Government  is  aware  of  this,  appears  from  the 
fact  that  they  contemplate  the  settlement  of  the  dispute  by  arbitra- 
tion, and  also  from  the  fact  that  on  the  day  on  which  their  reply  was 
due  and  before  it  was  in  fact  submitted,  they  gave  orders  for  mobili- 
sation. 

From  on  board  "La  France*' 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  76 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin^ 
A  cting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

On  hoard  the  "La  France,''  July  28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  from  Copenhagen  your  telegram  summarising 
the  events  of  Saturday ;  ^  the  telegram  describing  the  last  visit  of  the 
German  Ambassador,^  that  ^  relating  to  the  mediation  which  Russia 

28.  Its  number  is  75  (2),  which  is  unusual.  Beginning  with  the  second  paragraph  this 
communique  is  a  summary  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  comments  on  the  Serbian  reply. 
In  short  it  is  the  reply  to  the  Serbian  reply.  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34, 
July  27,  which  was  presented  also  in  Paris.  It  is  not  printed  in  its  entirety  in  the 
French  Yellow  Book.  The  editor  of  the  French  Yellow  Book,  however,  M.  Jules 
Cambon,  former  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  doubtless  felt  the  unfairness  of  making 
no  reference  to  it  at  all.  He,  therefore,  added  this  communique  as  an  afterthought, 
which  accounts  for  the  strange  number  75  (2). 

1  Saturday  was  July  25,  the  telegram  referred  to  was  sent  on  July  26.  Cf.  French 
Yellow  Book  No.  50,  also  No.  56. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  62,  July  27. 

3  This  is  a  mistranslation  substituted  in  the  official  British  Blue  Book  of  Sept.  28 
and  in  the  "Collected  Diplomatic  Documents"  for  the  correct  translation  in  the  A^.  Y. 
Times  version  which  reads,  "also  the  telegram  with  regard  to,"  etc.  This  third  tele- 
gram, however,  has  been  omitted  in  the  French  Yellow  Book.  It  would  be  interesting 
to  know  what  it  contained  and  what  the  "British  demarches  at  Berlin"  refer  to. 
Cf .  end  of  French  Yellow  Book  No.  80,  same  day ;  but  see  also  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  74,  July  27,  which  may  describe  the  demarche  mentioned  here. 


July  28,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  77  249 

advises  Servia  ^  to  ask  for  and  to  the  British  demarches  at  Berlin,  as 
well  2  as  your  telegram  received  this  morning  directly  through  the 
Eiffel  Tower. 

I  fully  approve  the  reply  which  you  made  to  Baron  von  Schoen; 
the  proposition  which  you  maintained  is  self-evident ;  in  the  search 
for  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  dispute,  we  are  fully  in  agreement  with 
Russia,  who  is  not  responsible  for  the  present  situation,  and  has  not 
taken  any  measure  whatever  which  could  arouse  the  least  suspicion ; 
but  it  is  plain  that  Germany  on  her  side  would  find  it  difficult  to  refuse 
to  give  advice  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  whose  action 
has  provoked  the  crisis. 

We  must  now  continue  to  use  the  same  language  to  the  German 
Ambassador.  Besides,  this  advice  is  in  harmony  with  the  two 
British  proposals  mentioned  in  your  telegram.^  I  entirely  approve 
the  combination  suggested  by  Sir  E.  Grey,  and  I  am  myself  requesting 
M.  Paul  Cambon  to  inform  him  of  this.  It  is  essential  that  it  should 
be  known  at  Berlin  and  at  Vienna  that  our  full  concurrence  is  given 
to  the  efforts  which  the  British  Government  is  making  with  a  view 
to  seeking  a  solution  of  the  Austro-Servian  dispute.  The  action  of 
the  four  less  interested  Powers  cannot,  for  the  reasons  given  above, 
be  exerted  only  at  Vienna  and  St.  Peter sburgh.  In  proposing  ^  to 
exert  it  also  at  Belgrade,  which  means  in  fact  between  Vienna  and 
Belgrade,  Sir  E.  Grey  grasps  the  logic  of  the  situation;  and,  in  not 
excluding  St.  Petersburgh,  he  offers  on  the  other  hand  to  Germany, 
a  method  of  withdrawing  with  perfect  dignity  from  the  demarche  by 
which  the  German  Government  have  caused  it  to  be  known  at  Paris 
and  at  London  that  the  affair  was  looked  upon  by  them  as  purely 
Austro-Servian  and  without  any  general  character. 

Please  communicate  the  present  telegram  to  our  representatives 
with  the  great  Powers  and  to  our  Minister  at  Belgrade. 

Rene  Viviani. 

To  Viviani 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  77 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council  on  board  the  "La  France.^' 

Paris,  July  28,  1914. 

In  spite  of  the  assurances  given,  both  in  Berlin  and  Paris,  by  the 
German  representatives,  of  the  desire  of  their  Government  to  assist  in 

1  For  another  proposal  by  Russia  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  44,  July  27. 

2  The  New  York  Times  translation  reads  :  "I  have  also  received  this  morning  your 
despatch  direct  from  the  Eiffel  Tower."  The  only  despatch  printed  under  July  28  as 
sent  to  Viviani  is  French  Yellow  Book  No.  77.  This  latter  despatch,  therefore,  should 
have  been  printed  before  No.  76.  It  is,  of  course,  possible  that  the  fourth  telegram 
mentioned  in  No.  76  has  not  been  pubUshed  as  was  the  case  with  the  third  telegram. 

3  There  were  two  proposals  mentioned  in  the  telegrams  to  which  Viviani  seems  to 
reply  here  ;  cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  50,  July  26,  and  No.  77,  July  28.  The  first  one 
contemplates  pressure  in  Petrograd  and  Vienna.  The  second  includes  Belgrade,  un- 
doubtedly as  the  result  of  the  urging  of  France,  who  had  always  contended  that  it 
was  a  case  of  mediation  between  Vienna  and  Belgrade  rather  than  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad. 


250  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

efforts  for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  no  sincere  action  has  been  taken 
by  them  to  hold  back  Austria ;  the  British  proposal,  which  consists 
in  action  by  the  four  less-interested  Powers  to  obtain  a  cessation  of 
military  operations  at  Vienna,  Belgrade,  and  St.  Petersburgh,  and  in  a 
meeting  at  London  of  the  German,  French,  and  Italian  Ambassadors 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Sir  E.  Grey,  with  a  view  of  seeking  a  solu- 
tion of  the  Austro-Servian  difficulty,  meets  with  objections  at  Berlin 
of  such  a  nature  as  must  lead  to  failure. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  has  proceeded  to  announce  that  his 
Government  will  to-morrow  take  energetic  measures  to  compel 
Servia  to  give  to  them  the  satisfaction  and  guarantees  which  they 
demand  from  that  Power ;  Count  Szecsen  has  given  no  explanation 
as  to  those  measures ;  according  to  our  Military  Attache  at  Vienna, 
mobilisation,  dating  from  July  28,  appears  to  be  certain. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

To  London,  Berlin,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Rome 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  78 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  London, 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Ernne. 

Paris,  July  28, 1914. 

I  HAVE  had  another  visit  from  the  German  Ambassador  this  morn- 
ing ;  he  told  me  that  he  had  no  communication  or  official  proposal  to 
make  to  me,  but  that  he  came,  as  on  the  evening  before,  to  talk 
over  the  situation  and  the  methods  to  be  employed  to  avoid  action 
which  would  be  irreparable.  When  I  asked  him  about  Austria's  in- 
tentions, he  declared  that  he  did  not  know  them,  and  was  ignorant  of 
the  nature  of  the  means  of  coercion  which  she  was  preparing. 

Germany,  according  to  Baron  von  Schoen,  only  asks  that  she  may 
act  with  France  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  Upon  my  observing 
to  him  that  a  proposal  for  mediation  by  the  four  Powers  to  which  we 
had  adhered,  and  which  had  obtained  assent  in  principle  from  Italy 
and  Germany,  had  been  put  forward  by  Great  Britain,  the  Ambassador 
said  that  the  German  Government  really  only  asked  to  associate 
themselves  with  the  action  of  the  Powers,  provided  that  that  action 
did  not*  take  the  form  of  arbitration  or  a  conference,  which  had  been 
rejected  by  Austria. 

I  replied  that,  if  it  was  the  expression  only  which  was  an  obstacle 
to  the  Austrian  Government,  the  object  might  be  attained  by  other 
means ;  the  German  Government  are  in  a  good  position  to  ask  Austria 
to  allow  the  Powers  time  to  intervene  and  find  a  means  of  conciliation. 

Baron  von  Schoen  then  observed  to  me  that  he  had  no  instructions, 
and  only  knew  that  Germany  refused  to  exercise  any  pressure  on 
Austria,  who  does  not  wish  for  a  conference.  He  accuses  the  French 
papers  of  attributing  to  Germany  an  attitude  which  she  has  not  taken 
up,  alleging  that  she  is  urging  Austria  on ;  doubtless  she  approves 
Austria's  attitude,  but  she  had  no  knowledge  of  the  Austrian  note ; 


July  28,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  80  251 

she  did  not  see  her  way  to  check  her  too  abruptly,  for  Austria  must 
have  guarantees  against  the  proceedings  of  the  Serbs. 

B  ienvenu-Martin. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  79 

M.   Bienvenu-Martin,   Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,   to  M. 
Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 

Paris,  July  28,  1914. 

Through  the  telegrams  from  our  Embassies  which  I  have  for- 
warded to  you,  you  are  aware  of  the  British  proposal  for  mediation  by 
the  four  Powers  and  for  a  conference  in  London,  as  well  as  of  our  ad- 
herence to  that  suggestion,  and  of  the  conditional  acceptance  by  Italy 
and  of  the  reservations  of  Berlin. 

Please  keep  yourself  in  touch  on  this  subject  with  your  British 
colleague,  who  had  received  the  necessary  instructions  to  acquaint 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  with  the  British  suggestion,  as 
soon  as  his  three  colleagues  have  been  authorised  to  make  the  same 
demarche;  you  will  adapt  your  attitude  to  his. 

From  London 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  80 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  28,  191Jf. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  yesterday  received  my  Austro-Hungarian  and 
German  colleagues.  The  first  continued  to  maintain  that  the  Servian 
reply  was  unacceptable.  The  second  used  language  similar  to  that  of 
Baron  von  Schoen  at  Paris.  He  emphasised  the  value  of  moderating 
action  by  Great  Britain  at  St.  Petersburgh.  Sir  Edward  Grey  re- 
plied that  Russia  had  shown  herself  very  moderate  from  the  beginning 
of  the  crisis,  especially  in  her  advice  ^  to  the  Servian  Government,  and 
that  he  would  find  it  very  embarrassing  to  give  her  pacific  ^  advice. 
He  added  that  it  was  at  Vienna  that  it  was  necessary  to  act  and  that 
Germany's  help  was  indispensable. 

On  the  other  hand  the  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  has 
telegraphed  that  M.  Sazonof  had  made  a  proposal  to  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  for  a  conversation  on  the  Servian  business.  This  in- 
formation has  been  confirmed  by  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 

^  The  published  despatches  nowhere  give  clear  evidence  that  Russia  gave  Serbia 
any  advice  that  had  a  moderating  influence,  although  the  British  Ambassador  said 
that  Sazonof  would  do  so,  British  Blue  Book  No.  55,  under  date  of  July  28. 

2  Germany  has  always  claimed  that  Russia  could  have  been  restrained  by  pacific 
advice  from  England.  The  same  view  was  expressed  in  the  London  Daily  News  of 
August  1,  1914.  France  had  also  refused  to  exert  her  conciliatory  influence  on  Russia. 
Cf .  French  Yellow  Book  No.  62,  July  27. 


252  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

who  has  sent  the  information  that  the  first  interview  between  the 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Count  Szapary  had  produced 
a  good  effect  at  the  Ballplatz. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  told  me  that,  if  an  agree- 
ment could  be  brought  about  by  direct  discussion  between  St.  Peters- 
burgh  and  Vienna,  it  would  be  a  matter  for  congratulation,  but  they 
raised  some  doubts  as  to  the  success  of  M.  Sazonof 's  attempt. 

When  Sir  George  Buchanan  asked  M.  Sazonof  about  the  eventual 
meeting  at  London  of  a  conference  of  representatives  of  Great  Britain, 
France,  Germany  and  Italy,  to  seek  a  solution  for  the  present  situa- 
tion, the  latter  replied  "  that  he  had  begun  pourparlers  with  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  under  conditions  which  he  hoped  were  favourable ;  that, 
however,  he  had  not  yet  received  any  reply  to  his  proposal  for  the 
revision  of  the  Servian  note  by  the  two  Cabinets."  If  direct  explana- 
tions with  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  are  impracticable,^  M.  Sazonof  de- 
clares himself  ready  to  accept  the  British  proposals  or  any  other  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  bring  about  a  favourable  issue  of  the  dispute. 

In  any  case,  at  a  moment  when  the  least  delay  might  have  serious 
consequences,  it  would  be  very  desirable  that  these  direct  negotiations 
should  be  carried  on  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  hamper  Sir  E.  Grey's 
action,  and  not  to  furnish  Austria  with  a  pretext  for  slipping  out  of 
the  friendly  intervention  of  the  four  Powers. 

The  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  having  made  a  determined 
effort  to  obtain  Herr  von  Jagow's  adherence  to  Sir  E.  Grey's  sugges- 
tion, the  German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  it  was  best 
to  await  the  result  of  the  conversation  which  had  been  begun  between 
St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna. ^  Sir  E.  Grey  has,  in  consequence, 
directed  Sir  E.  Goschen  to  suspend  his  demarche  for  the  moment.^ 
In  addition,  the  news  that  Austria  has  just  officially  declared  war 
against  Servia,  opens  a  new  phase  of  the  question. 

Paul  Cambon. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  81 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  28,  1914. 

M.  Sazonof's  conversation  with  Count  Szapary  ^  was  brought  to 
the  knowledge  of  Herr  von  Jagow  by  the  Russian  Charge  d'Affaires. 

1  This  implies  that  Sazonof  had  not  accepted  the  British  proposals  whole-heartedly 
on  the  previous  day,  but  had  rather  pushed  his  own  proposal  of  direct  conversations 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  43  and  46,  July  27,  andNos.  67,  68  and  69,  July  28,  and 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  July  27.  In  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  68,  69,  Sir  E.  Grey 
seems  to  prefer  Sazonof's  proposal  of  direct  conversations  to  his  own  of  a  conference. 

» It  is  nowhere  stated  what  this  demarche  was,  the  despatch  explaining  it  havmg 
been  omitted  from  the  Yellow  Book;  see  note  3  to  No.  76,  same  day.  A  possible 
explanation  is  found  in  the  text  of  the  German  White  Book,  which  is  illustrated  by 
Exhibit  16,  July  28.     See  the  note  there.  r  t  i     oc 

*  The  only  published  conversation  to  which  this  can  refer  is  the  one  of  July  2b, 
two  days  previous  to  this  despatch.     See  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  July  26. 


July  28,  French  Yellow  Booh  No.  81  253 

The  Secretary  of  State  told  him  that  in  agreement  with  the  remarks 
of  the  German  Ambassador  in  Russia,  since  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment did  not  refuse  to  continue  their  conversations  with  the  Russian 
Government  after  the  expiry  of  the  ultimatum,  there  was  ground  for 
hope  that  Count  Berchtold  on  his  side  might  be  able  to  converse  with 
M.  Schebeko,  and  that  it  might  be  possible  to  find  an  issue  from  the 
present  difficulties.  The  Russian  Charge  d 'Affaires  takes  a  favour- 
able view  of  this  state  of  mind,  which  corresponds  to  Herr  von  Jagow's 
desire  to  see  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  enter  into  direct  relations 
and  to  release  Germany.  There  is  ground,  however,  for  asking 
whether  Austria  is  not  seeking  to  gain  time  to  make  her  preparations. 

To-day  I  gave  my  support  to  the  demarche  made  by  my  British 
colleague  with  the  Secretary  of  State.  The  latter  replied  to  me,  as  he 
did  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  accept 
the  idea  of  a  kind  of  conference  at  London  between  the  Ambassadors 
of  the  four  Powers,  and  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  give  another 
form  to  the  British  suggestion  to  procure  its  realisation.  I  laid  stress 
upon  the  danger  of  delay,  which  might  bring  on  war,  and  asked  him 
if  he  wished  for  war.  He  protested,  and  added  that  direct  conversa- 
tions between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  were  in  progress,  and  that 
from  now  on  he  expected  a  favourable  result. 

The  British  and  Italian  Ambassadors  came  to  see  me  this  morning 
together,  to  talk  over  with  me  the  conversation  which  they  had  had 
with  Herr  von  Jagow  yesterday  on  the  subject  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
proposal.  To  sum  up,  the  Secretary  of  State  used  the  same  language 
to  them  as  to  me;  accepting  in  principle  the  idea  of  joining  in  a 
demarche  with  England,  Italy,  and  ourselves,  but  rejecting  any  idea 
of  a  conference. 

My  colleagues  and  I  thought  that  this  was  only  a  question  of  form, 
and  the  British  Ambassador  is  going  to  suggest  to  his  Government 
that  they  should  change  the  wording  of  their  proposal,  which  might 
take  the  character  of  a  diplomatic  demarche  at  Vienna  and  St.  Peters- 
burgh. 

In  consequence  of  the  repugnance  shown  by  Herr  von  Jagow  to  any 
demarche  at  Vienna,  Sir  Edward  Grey  could  put  him  in  a  dilemma  by 
asking  him  to  state  himself  precisely  how  diplomatic  action  by  the 
Powers  to  avoid  war  could  be  brought  about. 

We  ought  to  associate  ourselves  with  every  effort  in  favour  of  peace 
compatible  with  our  engagements  towards  our  ally ;  but  to  place  the 
reponsibility  in  the  proper  quarter,  we  must  take  care  to  ask  Germany 
to  state  precisely  what  she  wishes. 

Jules  Cambon. 


254  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  82 

M.  Paleologiie,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  28, 1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  has  not  yet  replied  to  the  pro- 
posal of  the  Russian  Government  suggesting  the  opening  of  direct 
conversations  between  St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna. 

M.  Sazonof  received  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  Am- 
bassadors this  afternoon.  The  impression  which  he  got  from  this 
double  interview  is  a  bad  one;  "Certainly,"  he  said  to  me,  "Austria 
is  unwilling  to  converse." 

As  the  result  of  a  conversation  which  I  have  just  had  with  my  two 
colleagues  I  have  the  same  impression  of  pessimism. 

Paleologue. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  83 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

Count  Berchtold  has  just  declared  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  that  any 
intervention,  aiming  at  the  resumption  of  the  discussion  between 
Austria  and  Servia  on  the  basis  of  the  Servian  reply,  would  be  useless, 
and  besides  that  it  would  be  too  late,  as  war  had  been  oflScially  de- 
clared at  mid-day. 

The  attitude  of  my  Russian  colleague  has  never  varied  up  to  the 
present ;  in  his  opinion  it  is  not  a  question  of  localising  the  conflict, 
but  rather  of  preventing  it.  The  declaration  of  war  will  make  very 
difficult  the  initiation  of  pourparlers  by  the  four  Powers,  as  well  as 
the  continuation  of  the  direct  discussions  between  M.  Sazonof  and 
Count  Szapary. 

It  is  held  here  that  the  formula  which  seemed  as  if  it  might  obtain 
the  adherence  of  Germany  — "  Mediation  between  Austria  and 
Russia  "  —  is  unsuitable,  inasmuch  as  it  alleges  a  dispute  between 
those  two  Empires  which  does  not  exist  up  to  the  present. 

Among  the  suspicions  aroused  by  the  sudden  and  violent  resolution 
of  Austria,  the  most  disquieting  is  that  Germany  should  have  pushed 
her  on  to  aggressive  action  against  Servia  in  order  to  be  able  herself 
to  enter  into  war  with  Russia  and  France,^  in  circumstances  which 
she  supposes  ought  to  be  most  favourable  to  herself  and  under 
conditions  which  have  been  thoroughly  considered. 

Dumaine. 

1  If  this  is  written  with  sincerity  it  reveals  the  serious  suspicion  of  Germany  enter- 
tained by  France.  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  42,  same  day,  where  it  ap- 
pears that  it  was  not  Germany  who  pushed  on  Austria-Hungary. 


July  28,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  2  255 

Germany : 

To  the  Gowrnments  of  Germany 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  2 

The  Chancellor  to  the  Federal  Governments  of  Germany.     Confidential. 
Berlin,  July  28,  1914. 

You  will  make  the  following  report  to  the  Government  to  which 
you  are  accredited : 

In  view  of  the  facts  which  the  Austrian  Government  has  published 
in  its  note  ^  to  the  Servian  Government,  the  last  doubt  must  disappear 
that  the  outrage  to  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  successor  to  the 
throne  has  fallen  a  victim,  was  prepared  in  Servia,  to  say  the  least 
with  the  connivance  of  members  of  the  Servian  Government  and 
army.  It  is  a  product  of  the  pan-Serb  intrigues  which  for  a  series  of 
years  have  become  a  source  of  permanent  disturbance  for  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  and  for  the  whole  of  Europe. 

The  pan-Serb  chauvinism  appeared  especially  marked  during  the 
Bosnian  crisis.  Only  to  the  far-reaching  self-restraint  and  modera- 
tion of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  and  the  energetic  inter- 
cession of  the  Powers  is  it  to  be  ascribed  that  the  provocations  to 
which  Austro-Hungary  was  exposed  at  that  time,  did  not  lead  to  a 
conflict.  The  assurance  of  future  well-behaviour,  which  the  Servian 
Government  gave  at  that  time,  it  has  not  kept.  Under  the  very  eyes, 
at  least  with  the  tacit  sufferance  of  official  Servia,  the  pan-Serb  prop- 
aganda has  meanwhile  continued  to  increase  in  scope  and  intensity. 
It  would  be  compatible  neither  with  its  dignity  nor  with  its  right 
to  self-preservation  if  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  persisted 
to  view  idly  any  longer  the  intrigues  beyond  the  frontier,  through 
which  the  safety  and  the  integrity  of  the  Monarchy  are  permanently 
threatened.  With  this  state  of  affairs,  the  action  as  well  as  the  de- 
mands of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  can  be  viewed  only  as 
justifiable. 

The  reply  of  the  Servian  Government  to  the  demands  which  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  put  on  the  23rd  inst.,  through  its 
representative  in  Belgrade,  shows  that  the  dominating  factors  in 
Servia  are  not  inclined  to  cease  their  former  policies  and  agitation. 
There  will  remain  nothing  else  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
than  to  press  its  demands,  if  need  be,  through  military  action,  unless 
it  renounces  for  good  its  position  as  a  great  Power. 

Some  Russian  personalities  deem  it  their  right  as  a  matter  of  course 
and  a  task  of  Russia's,  to  actively  become  a  party  to  Servia  in  the 
conflict  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia.  For  the  European 
conflagration  which  would  result  from  a  similar  step  by  Russia,  the 
"Nowoje  Wremja"  believes  itself  justified  in  making  Germany  re- 
sponsible in  so  far  as  it  does  not  induce  Austria-Hungary  to  yield. 

1  This  is  probably  an  inaccurate  reference,  for  the  Chancellor  undoubtedly  had  in 
mind  the  dossier  (Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25)  which  was  to  be 
presented,  and,  judging  by  this  despatch,  was  presented  to  the  foreign  offices  in  Berlin, 
Rome,  Paris,  London,  Petrograd,  and  Constantinople.  For  the  Austro-Hungarian  note 
to  Serbia  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  7,  July  22. 


256  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  Russian  press  thus  turns  conditions  upside  down.  It  is  not 
Austria-Hungary  which  has  called  forth  the  conflict  with  Servia, 
but  it  is  Servia  which,  through  unscrupulous  favour  toward  pan-Serb 
aspirations,  even  in  parts  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy, 
threatens  the  same  in  her  existence  and  creates  conditions,  which 
eventually  found  expression  in  the  wanton  outrage  at  Serajewo.  If 
Russia  believes  that  it  must  champion  the  cause  of  Servia  in  this 
matter,  it  certainly  has  the  right  to  do  so.  However,  it  must  realise 
that  it  makes  the  Serb  activities  its  own,  to  undermine  the  conditions 
of  existence  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  that  thus  it  bears 
the  sole  responsibility  if  out  of  the  Austro-Servian  affair,  which  all 
other  Great  Powers  desire  to  localise,  there  arises  a  European  war. 
This  reponsibility  of  Russia's  is  evident  and  it  weighs  the  more 
heavily  as  Count  Berchtold  has  officially  declared  to  Russia  that 
Austria-Hungary  has  no  intention  to  acquire  Servian  territory  or  to 
touch  the  existence  of  the  Servian  Kingdom,  but  only  desires  peace 
against  the  Servian  intrigues  threatening  its  existence. 

The  attitude  of  the  Imperial  Government  in  this  question  is  clearly 
indicated.  The  agitation  conducted  by  the  pan-Slavs  in  Austria- 
Hungary  has  for  its  goal,  with  the  destruction  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy,  the  scattering  or  weakening  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
with  a  complete  isolation  of  the  German  Empire  in  consequence. 
Our  own  interest  therefore  calls  us  to  the  side  of  Austria-Hungary. 
The  duty,  if  at  all  possible,  to  guard  Europe  against  a  universal  war, 
points  to  the  support  by  ourselves  of  those  endeavours  which  aim  at 
the  localisation  of  the  conflict,  faithful  to  the  course  of  those  policies 
which  we  have  carried  out  successfully  for  forty-four  years  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe. 

Should,  however,  against  our  hope,  through  the  interference  of 
Russia  the  fire  be  spread,  we  should  have  to  support,  faithful  to  our 
(Juty  as  allies,  the  neighbour-monarchy  with  all  the  power  at  our  com- 
mand. We  shall  take  the  sword  only  if  forced  to  it,  but  then  in  the 
clear  consciousness  that  we  are  not  guilty  of  the  calamity  which  war 
will  bring  upon  the  peoples  of  Europe. 

Germany  : 

To  St.  Petersburg 

German  WmTE  Book  Exhibit  14 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  A  mbassador  at  St.  Petersburg 
on  July  28th,  1914. 

We  continue  ^  in  our  endeavour  to  induce#Vienna  to  elucidate  in 
St.  Petersburg  the  object  and  scope  of  the  Austrian  action  in  Servia  in 
a  manner  both  convincing  and  satisfactory  to  Russia.  The  declara- 
tion of  war  which  has  meanwhile  ensued  alters  nothing  in  this  matter. 

1  See  note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28.  See  also  German  White  Book, 
Exhibit  15,  July  27. 


July  28,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  20        '         257 

From  Vienna 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  16  ^ 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  the  Chancellor  on 
July  28th,  1914. 

Count  Berchtold  requests  me  to  express  to  Your  Excellency  his 
thanks  for  the  communication  of  the  English  mediation  proposal.  He 
states,  however,  that  after  the  opening  of  hostilities  by  Servia  and  the 
subsequent  declaration  of  war,  the  step  appears  belated. 

To  St.  Petersburg 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  20 

I.  His  Majesty  to  the  Czar. 

July  28th,  10.4s  P.M. 

I  HAVE  heard  with  the  greatest  anxiety  of  the  impression  which  is 
caused  by  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  against  Servia.  The  unscru- 
pulous agitation  which  has  been  going  on  for  years  in  Servia,  has  led 
to  the  revolting  crime  of  which  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  has  become 
a  victim.  The  spirit  which  made  the  Servians  murder  their  own 
King  and  his  consort  still  dominates  that  country.  Doubtless  You 
will  agree  with  me  that  both  of  us.  You  as  well  as  I,  and  all  other 
sovereigns,  have  a  common  interest  to  insist  that  all  those  who  are 
responsible  for  this  horrible  murder  shall  suffer  their  deserved 
punishment. 

On  the  other  hand  I  by  no  means  overlook  the  difficulty  encoun- 
tered by  You  and  Your  Government  to  stem  the  tide  of  public  opinion. 
In  view  of  the  cordial  friendship  which  has  joined  us  both  for  a  long 
time  with  firm  ties,  I  shall  use  my  entire  influence  to  induce  Austria- 
Hungary  to  obtain  a  frank  and  satisfactory  understanding  with 
Russia.  I  hope  confidently  that  You  will  support  me  in  my  efforts 
to  overcome  all  difficulties  which  may  yet  arise.  • 

Your  most  sincere  and  devoted  friend  and  cousin, 

(Signed)    Wilhelm.  . 

Great  Britain: 

For  British  Blue  Book  No.  50  see  below  under  date  of  July  31,  1914. 

1  The  paragraph  in  the  Narrative  of  the  German  White  Book  which  these  Exhibits 
are  to  illustrate  reads:  "We  further  declared  ourselves  ready,  after  failure  of  the 
Conference  idea,  to  transmit  a  second  proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  to  Vienna  in 
which  he  suggested  Austria-Hungary  should  decide  that  either  the  Servian  reply  was 
sufficient,  or  that  it  be  used  as  a  basis  for  further  negotiations.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  remarked  with  full  appreciation  of  our  action  it  had  come  too  late,  the 
hostiUties  having  already  been  opened."  This  second  proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey  is  not 
mentioned  in  the  British  Blue  Book.  It  was  probably  discussed  in  the  third  tele- 
gram referred  to  but  not  printed  in  the  French  Yellow  Book  No.  76,  July  28,  see  also 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  80,  same  day. 


258 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  51 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  28,  1914.) 

Sir,  Paris,  July  27,  191^. 

I  ELWE  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  copy  of  a  memo- 
randum from  the  acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  as  to  the  steps 
to  be  taken  to  prevent  an  outbreak  of  hostiHties  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia.  I  have,  etc. 

Francis  Bertie. 


Enclosure  in  No.  51 
Note  communicated  to  Sir  F.  Bertie  by  M.  Bienvenu-Martin. 


Par  une  note  en  date  du  25 
de  ce  mois,  son  Excellence  TAm- 
bassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  fait 
connaitre  au  Gouvernement  de 
la  Republique  que,  d'apres  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  la  seule  maniere 
d'assurer,  si  c'etait  possible,  le 
maintien  de  la  paix  dans  le  cas 
ou  les  rapports  entre  la  Russie  et 
TAutriche  deviendraient  plus 
tendus  serait  une  demarche  com- 
mune a  Vienne  et  a  Saint- 
Petersbourg  des  representants  de 
TAngleterre,  de  la  France,  de 
I'Allemagne  et  de  Tltalie  en 
Autriche  et  en  Russie;  et  il  a 
exprime  le  desir  de  savoir  si  le 
Gouvernement  de  la  Republique 
etait  dispose  a  accueillir  favo- 
rablement  cette  suggestion^ 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres  par  interim  a  Thonneur  de 
faire  connaitre  a  son  Excellence 
Sir  Francis  Bertie  qu'il  a  invite 
M.  Jules  Cambon  ^  a  se  concerter 
avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre 
en  Allemagne  et  a  appuyer  la 


(Translation.) 
In  a  note  of  the  25th  of  this 
month,  his  Excellency  the  British 
Ambassador  ^  informed  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Republic  that,  in 
Sir  E.  Grey's  opinion,  the  only 
possible  way  of  assuring  the 
maintenance  of  peace  in  case  of 
the  relations  between  Russia  and 
Austria  becoming  more  strained 
would  be  if  the  representatives 
of  Great  Britain,  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Italy  in  Austria  and 
Russia  were  to  take  joint  action 
at  Vienna  and  at  St.  Petersburg ; 
and  he  expressed  the  wish  to 
know  if  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  were  disposed  to  wel- 
come such  a  suggestion. 


The  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  ad  interim  has  the  honour 
to  inform  his  Excellency  Sir  F. 
Bertie  that  he  has  requested 
M.  Jules  Cambon  ^  to  concert 
with  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Germany  and  to  support  any  rep- 


1  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin. 

»  Acting  on  instructions  contained  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  10,  July  24.  For  the 
entire  subject  see  the  summary  of  events  of  July  24  based  on  the  despatches  of  that 
day,  where  it  appears  that  Sir  E.  Grey  altered  his  original  proposal  at  the  suggestion 
of  France. 


July  28,  British  Blue  Book  No.  51 


259 


demarche  qu'ils  jugeront  oppor- 
tune de  faire  aupres  du  Cabinet 
de  Berlin. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Re- 
publique  a,  d 'autre  part,  con- 
formement  au  desir  exprime  par 
le  Gouvernement  britannique  et 
que  son  Excellence  Sir  Francis 
Bertie  lui  a  transmis  par  une  note 
en  date  du  26  de  ce  mois,  autorise 
M.  Paul  Cambon  ^  a  prendre  part 
a  la  reunion  proposee  par  Sir 
Edward  Grey  pour  rechercher 
avec  lui  et  les  Ambassadeurs 
d'Allemagne  et  d' Italic  a  Lon- 
dres,  les  moyens  de  resoudre  les 
difficultes  actuelles. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Re- 
publique  est  pret  egalement  a 
donner  aux  agents  fran^ais  a 
Petersbourg,  a  Vienne  et  a  Bel- 
grade des  instructions  pour  qu'ils 
obtiennent  des  Gouvernements 
russe,  autrichien  et  serbe  de 
s'abstenir  de  toute  operation 
militaire  active  en  attendant  les 
resultats  de  cette  conference.  II 
estime  toutefois  que  les  chances 
de  succes  de  la  proposition  de  Sir 
Edward  Grey  reposent  essen- 
tiellement  sur  Taction  que  Ber- 
lin serait  disposee  a  Vienna  [sic\. 
Une  demarche  aupres  du  Gou- 
vernement austro-hongrois  pour 
amener  la  suspension  des  opera- 
tions militaires  parait  vouee  a 
I'echec  si  I'influence  de  I'Alle- 
magne  ne  s'est  pas  exercee  au 
prealable  sur  le  Cabinet  de 
Vienne. 

Le  Garde  des  Seaux,  Presi- 
dent du  Conseil  et  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres  par  interim, 
saisit  cette  occasion  de  renou- 
veler,  etc. 

Paris,  le  27  juillet,  1914. 


resentation  which  they  may  con- 
sider it  advisable  to  make  to  the 
BerHn  Cabinet. 

In  accordance  with  the  desire 
expressed  by  the  British  Govern- 
ment and  conveyed  to  them  by 
Sir  F.  Bertie  in  his  note  of  the 
26th  of  this  month,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Republic  have  also 
authorised  M.  Paul  Cambon  ^  to 
take  part  in  the  conference  which 
Sir  E.  Grey  has  proposed  with  a 
view  to  discovering  in  consulta- 
tion with  himself  and  the  German 
and  Italian  Ambassadors  in  Lon- 
don a  means  of  settling  the  pres- 
ent difficulties. 

The  Government  of  the  Re- 
public is  likewise  ready  to  in- 
struct the  French  representa- 
tives at  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna, 
and  Belgrade  ^  to  induce  the 
Russian,  Austrian,  and  Servian 
Governments  to  abstain  from  all 
active  military  operations  pend- 
ing the  results  of  this  conference. 
He  considers,  however,  that  the 
chance  of  Sir  E.  Grey's  proposal 
being  successful  depends  essen- 
tially on  the  action  which  the 
Berlin  Government  would  be  will- 
ing to  take  at  Vienna.  Repre- 
sentations made  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  about  a  sus- 
pension of  military  operations 
would  seem  bound  to  fail  unless 
the  German  Government  do  not 
beforehand  exercise  their  in- 
fluence on  the  Vienna  Cabinet. 

The  President  of  the  Council 
ad  interim  takes  the  opportunity, 
etc. 


Paris,  July  27,  1914. 


^  French  Ambassador  in  London. 

2  The  frequency  with  which  France  introduces  Belgrade,  when  Sir  E.  Grey  s  pro- 
posal contemplates  only  Vienna  and  Petrograd,  is  noteworthy. 


260  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Paris 
British  Blue  Book  No.  52 
Note  communicated  by  French  Embassy,  July  28,  1914.. 


Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Re- 
publique  accepte  la  proposition 
de  Sir  Edward  Grey  relative  a 
une  intervention  de  la  Grande- 
Bretagne,  de  la  France,  de  I'Alle- 
magne  et  de  I'ltalie  en  vue 
d'eviter  les  operations  militaires 
actives  sur  les  frontieres  autri- 
chiennes,  russes  et  serbes;  il  a 
autorise  M.  P.  Cambon  ^  a  pren- 
dre part  aux  deliberations  de  la 
reunion  a  quatre,  qui  doit  se 
tenir  a  Londres. 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  a 
Berlin  a  re^u  pour  instructions, 
apres  s'etre  concerte  avec  I'Am- 
bassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  Ber- 
lin, d'appuyer  la  demarche  de  ce 
dernier  dans  la  forme  et  la  me- 
sure  qui  seraient  jugees  oppor- 
tunes. 

M.  Viviani  ^  est  pret  a  envoyer 
aux  representants  fran9ais  a 
Vienne,  Saint-Petersbourg  et  Bel- 
grade des  instructions  dans  le 
sens  suggere  par  le  Gouverne- 
ment britannique. 

Ambassade  de  France,  Londres, 
le  27  juillet,  1914, 


(Translation.) 

The  Government  of  the  Re- 
public accept  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
proposal  in  regard  to  interven- 
tion by  Great  Britain,  France, 
Germany,  and  Italy  with  a  view 
to  avoiding  active  military  opera- 
tions on  the  frontiers  of  Austria, 
Russia,  and  Servia ;  and  they 
have  authorised  M.  P.  Cambon  ^ 
to  take  part  in  the  deliberations 
of  the  four  representatives  at  the 
meeting  which  is  to  be  held  in 
London. 

The  French  Ambassador  in 
Berlin  has  received  instructions 
to  consult  first  the  British  Am- 
bassador in  Berlin,  and  then  to 
support  the  action  taken  by  the 
latter  in  such  manner  and  degree 
as  may  be  considered  appropriate. 

M.  Viviani  ^  is  ready  to  send 
to  the  representatives  of  France 
in  Vienna,  St.  Petersburgh,  and 
Belgrade  instructions  in  the  sense 
suggested  by  the  Biritsh  Gov- 
ernment. 

French  Embassy,  July  27,  1914- 


From  St.  Petersburg 

British  Blue  Book  No.  53 

M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count  Bencken- 
dorff,  Russian  Ambassador  in  London.  —  (Communicated  by 
Count  Benckendorff,  July  28.) 

(See  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  32,  July  27.) 


'  French  Ambassador  in  London. 
2  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


July  28 y  British  Blue  Book  No.  55 


261 


From  St.  Petersburg 
British  Blue  Book  No.  54 


M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for 
dorff,  Russian  A  mbassador 
Count  Benckendorff,  July  28, 

Saint-Petersbourg, 
le  15  (28)  juillet,  1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

Mes  entretiens  avec  TAmbas- 
sadeur  d^Allemagne  confirment 
mon  impression  que  rAllemagne 
est  plutot  favorable  a  Tintransi- 
geance  de  I'Autriche. 

Le  Cabinet  de  Berlin,  qui 
aurait  pu  arreter  tout  le  develop- 
pement  de  la  crise,  parait  n'exer- 
cer  aucune  action  sur  son  alliee. 

L'Ambassadeur  trouve  insuffi- 
sante  la  reponse  de  la  Serbie. 

Cette  attitude  allemande  est 
tout  partieulierement  alarmante. 

II  me  semble  que  mieux  que 
toute  autre  Puissance  I'Angle- 
terre  serait  en  mesure  de  tenter 
encore  d'agir  a  Berlin  pour  en- 
gager le  Gouvernement  alle- 
mand  a  Taction  necessaire. 
C'est  a  Berlin  qu'indubitable- 
ment  se  trouve  la  clef  de  la 
situation. 


Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count  Bencken- 
in    London.  —  (Communicated    by 
1914.) 

(Translation.) 

St.  Petersburgh, 
July  15  {28),  1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

My  interviews  ^  with  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  confirm  my 
impression  that  Germany  is,  if 
anything,  in  favour  of  the  un- 
compromising attitude  adopted 
by  Austria. 

The  Berlin  Cabinet,  who  could 
have  prevented  ^  the  whole  of  this 
crisis  developing,  appear  to  be  ex- 
erting no^  influence  on  their  ally. 

The  Ambassador  considers  that 
the  Servian  reply  is  insufficient. 

This  attitude  of  the  German 
Government  is  most  alarming.^ 

It  seems  to  me  that  Great 
Britain  is  in  a  better  position 
than  any  other  Power  to  make 
another  attempt  at  Berlin  to 
induce  the  German  Government 
to  take  the  necessary  action.^ 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  key 
of  the  situation  is  to  be  found  at 
Berlin. 


From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  55 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 

Grey.  —  {Received  July  28.) 
(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  27,  1914. 

With  reference  to  my  telegram  of  yesterday,^  I  saw  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  this  afternoon  and  found  him  very  conciliatory 
and  more  optimistic. 

^  No  accounts  of  interviews  between  Sazonof  and  the  German  Ambassador  are  men- 
tioned in  the  Russian  Orange  Book  in  telegrams  of  July  26,  27,  or  28.  For  Germany's 
attitude,  see  note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28,  and  German  White  Book,  p.  554. 

2  This  is  an  assertion  for  which  no  proof  has  been  advanced  in  the  published  despatches. 

3  See,  however,  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  15,  July  27,  and  Exhibit  14,  July  28.  • 

*  Contrast  with  this  footnote  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28. 

*  That  this  action  was  taken  appears  from  notes  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July 
28,  and  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  16,  same  date. 

6  British  Blue  Book  No.  44,  July  27. 


262  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

He  would,  he  said,  use  all  his  influence  ^  at  Belgrade  to  induce  the 
Servian  Government  to  go  as  far  as  possible  in  giving  satisfaction  to 
Austria,  but  her  territorial  integrity  must  be  guaranteed  and  her 
rights  as  a  sovereign  State  respected,  so  that  she  should  not  become 
Austria's  vassal.  He  did  not  know  whether  Austria  would  accept 
friendly  exchange  of  views  which  he  had  proposed,  but,  if  she  did, 
he  wished  to  keep  in  close  contact  with  the  other  Powers  through- 
out the  conversations  that  would  ensue. 

He  again  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  obligations  undertaken  by 
Servia  in  1908,  alluded  to  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  were  given  to 
the  Powers. 

I  asked  if  he  had  heard  of  your  proposal  with  regard  to  conference 
of  the  four  Powers,  and  on  his  replying  in  the  affirmative,  I  told  him 
confidentially  of  your  instructions  to  me,  and  enquired  whether 
instead  of  such  a  conference  he  would  prefer  a  direct  exchange  of 
views,  which  he  had  proposed.^  The  German  Ambassador,  to  whom 
I  had  just  spoken,  had  expressed  his  personal  opinion  that  a  direct 
exchange  of  views  would  be  more  agreeable  to  Austria-Hungary. 

His  Excellency  said  he  was  perfectly  ready  to  stand  aside  if  the 
Powers  accepted  the  proposal  for  a  conference,  but  he  trusted  that 
you  would  keep  in  touch  with  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  the  event 
of  its  taking  place. 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  56 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
—  {Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  27,  1914. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  had  to-day  a  long  and  earnest  conversa- 
tion with  Baron  Macchio,  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  He  told  him  that,  having  just  come  back  from  St.  Peters- 
burgh,  he  was  well  acquainted  with  the  views  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment and  the  state  of  Russian  public  opinion.  He  could  assure 
him  that  if  actual  war  broke  out  with  Servia  it  would  be  impossible 
to  localise  it,  for  Russia  was  not  prepared  to  give  way  again,  as  she 
had  done  on  previous  occasions,  and  especially  during  the  annexation 
crisis  of  1909.  He  earnestly  hoped  that  something  would  be  done 
before  Servia  was  actually  invaded.  Baron  Macchio  replied  that  this 
would  now  be  difficult,  as  a  skirmish  had  already  taken  place  on  the 
Danube,  in  which  the  Servians  had  been  the  aggressors.^  The  Rus- 
sian Ambassador  said  that  he  would  do  all  he  could  to  keep  the 
Servians  quiet  pending  any  discussions  that  might  yet  take  place, 
and  he  told  me  that  he  would  advise  his  Government  to  induce  the 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  40,  July  27. 

2  Cf,  British  Blue  Book  No.  53,  same  date. 

3  If  this  should  prove  to  have  been  the  case,  it  would  be  very  important,  because 
a  less  yielding  attitude  could  be  expected  of  Austria-Hungary  if  hostilities  had  actually 
been  begun,  not  by  Austria-Hungary,  but  by  Serbia.  The  diplomatic. documents  con- 
tain no  denial  of  this  assertion. 


July  28,  British  Blue  Book  No.  57  263 

Servian  Government  to  avoid  any  conflict  as  long  as  possible,  and  to 
fall  back  before  an  Austrian  advance.  Time  so  gained  should  suffice 
to  enable  a  settlement  to  be  reached.  He  had  just  heard  of  a  satis- 
factory conversation  which  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
had  yesterday  ^  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
The  former  had  agreed  that  much  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to 
Servia  had  been  perfectly  reasonable,  and  in  fact  they  had  practically 
reached  an  understanding  as  to  the  guarantees  which  Servia  might 
reasonably  be  asked  to  give  to  Austria-Hungary  for  her  future  good 
behaviour.  The  Russian  Ambassador  urged  that  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburgh  should  be  furnished  with  full  powers 
to  continue  discussion  with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  was  very  willing  to  advise  Servia  to  yield  all  that  could  be  fairly 
asked  of  her  as  an  independent  Power.  Baron  Macchio  promised 
to  submit  this  suggestion  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  57 

Sir  R.  Roddy  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — ■ 
{Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  27,  1914. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  greatly  doubts  whether  Germany 
will  be  willing  to  invite  Austria  to  suspend  military  action  pending 
the  conference,  but  he  had  hopes  that  military  action  may  be  practi- 
cally deferred  by  the  fact  of  the  conference  meeting  at  once.  As  at 
present  informed,  he  sees  no  possibility  of  Austria  receding  from  any 
point  laid  down  in  her  note  to  Servia,  but  he  believes  that  if  Servia 
will  even  now  accept  it  ^  Austria  will  be  satisfied,  and  if  she  had  rea- 
son to  think  that  such  will  be  the  advice  of  the  Powers,  Austria  may 
defer  action.  Servia  may  be  induced  to  accept  note  in  its  entirety 
on  the  advice  of  the  four  Powers  invited  to  the  conference,  and  this 
would  enable  her  to  say  that  she  had  yielded  to  Europe  and  not  to 
Austria-Hungary  alone.^ 

Telegrams  from  Vienna  to  the  press  here  stating  that  Austria  is 
favourably  impressed  with  the  declarations  of  the  Italian  Government 
have,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  assures  me,  no  foundation. 
He  said  he  has  expressed  no  opinion  to  Austria  with  regard  to  the 
note.     He  assured  me  both  before  and  after  communication  of  the 

1  Cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  25,  July  26 ;  and  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 
No.  31,  July  27. 

2  This  passage  taken  together  with  the  previous  telegram  would  seem  to  imply 
that  on  this  date  the  Powers  had  not  yet  decided  to  condemn  the  Austrian  demands 
as  altogether  unacceptable.  Serbia  took  the  same  view,  cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  64, 
same  day. 

3  If  this  suggestion  had  been  pressed  events  might  have  been  different.  When 
Sir  R.  Rodd  sent  this  telegram  on  July  27,  he  may  not  yet  have  known  of  Sir  E.  Grey's 
announcement  on  that  date  that  the  British  fleet  had  been  kept  mobilised.  It  was 
this  announcement  which  according  to  the  London  Daily  News  of  August  1,  1914, 
stiffened  the  backbone  of  the  Russian  war  party  and  made  war  inevitable. 


264  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

note,  and  again  to-day,  that  Austrian  Government  have  given  him 
assm'ances  that  they  demand  no' territorial  sacrifices  from  Servia.^ 


From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  58 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  28,  1914. 

I  COMMUNICATED  to  the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this 
afternoon  the  substance  of  your  conversation  with  the  German  Ambas- 
sador, recorded  in  your  telegram  ^  to  Berlin  of  the  27th  July. 

His  Excellency  is  grateful  for  the  communication.  He  said  that 
it  confirms  what  he  had  heard  of  your  attitude,  and  he  feels  confident 
that  your  observations  to  the  German  Ambassador  will  have  a  good 
effect  in  the  interest  of  peace. 


From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  59 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  28,  1914. 

I  INFORMED  the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  of 
your  conversation  with  the  Russian  Ambassador,  as  recorded  in  your 
telegram  of  yesterday  ^  to  St.  Petersburgh. 

He  is  grateful  for  the  communication,  and  quite  appreciates  the 
impossibility  for  His  Majesty's  Government  to  declare  themselves 
"solidaires"  with  Russia  on  a  question  between  Austria  and  Servia, 
which  in  its  present  condition  is  not  one  affecting  England.  He 
also  sees  that  you  cannot  take  up  an  attitude  at  Berlin  and  Vienna 
more  Servian  than  that  attributed  in  German  and  Austrian  sources 
to  the  Russian  Government. 

German  Ambassador  has  stated  that  Austria  would  respect  the 
integrity  of  Servia,  but  when  asked  whether  her  independence  also 
would  be  respected,  he  gave  no  assurance.^ 

"  1  By  this  assurance  it  was  hoped  to  satisfy  all  legitimate  demands  of  Russia,  as 
Austria-Hungary  saw  them.  From  British  Blue  Book  No.  78,  July  29,  it  appears 
that  even  Sazonof  did  not  categorically  reject  the  proposals  made  in  this  telegram. 

2  See  No.  46,  July  27. 

»  British  Blue  Book  No.  47,  July  27. 
•  ^  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris  could  have  given  assur- 
ances for  Austria-Hungary. 


July  28,  British  Blue  Booh  No.  62  265 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  60 

8ir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  28,  1914. 

Secretary  of  State  spoke  yesterday  in  the  same  sense  as  that 
reported  in  my  telegram  of  yesterday  ^  to  my  French  and  Italian 
colleagues  respecting  your  proposal.  I  discussed  with  my  two^  col- 
leagues this  morning  his  reply,  and  we  found  that,  while  refusing  the 
proposed  conference,  he  had  said  to  all  of  us  that  nevertheless  he 
desired  to  work  with  us  for  the  maintenance  of  general  peace.  We 
therefore  deduced  that  if  he  is  sincere  in  this  wish  he  can  only  be 
objecting  to  the  form  ^  of  your  proposal.  Perhaps  he  himself  could 
be  induced  to  suggest  lines  on  which  he  would  find  it  possible  to  work 
with  us. 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  61 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

—  (Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

I  SAW  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this  morning. 

His  Excellency  declared  that  Austria-Hungary  cannot  delay  war- 
like proceedings  against  Servia,  and  would  have  to  decline  any  sugges- 
tion of  negotiations  on  basis  of  Servian  reply.^ 

Prestige  ^  of  Dual  Monarchy  was  engaged,  and  nothing  could  now 
prevent  conflict. 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  62 

Sir  M.  de  Sunken,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

—  (Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914- 

I  SPOKE  to  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  in  the  sense  of 
your  telegram  of  27th  July  ^  to  Berlin.     I  avoided  the  word  "  media- 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  43,  July  27. 

2  The  text  would  appear  to  mean  the  French  and  Italian  Ambassadors,  but  when 
only  two  are  mentioned  by  one  of  the  Entente  Ambassadors  the  reference  is  generally 
to  the  ambassadors  of  the  other  two  Entente  Powers. 

3  That  this  was  the  case  appears  from  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27. 
*  See  note  to  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  16,  July  28. 

5  Austria-Hungary  believed  that  her  prestige,  i.e.  her  existence  as  a  great  power, 
was  at  stake,  and  that  her  action  against  Serbia,  therefore,  was  in  self-defence. 

6  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27. 


266  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

tion,"  but  said  that,  as  mentioned  in  your  speech/  which  he  had  just 
read  to  me,  you  had  hopes  that  conversations  in  London  between  the 
four  Powers  less  interested  might  yet  lead  to  an  arrangement  which 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  accept  as  satisfactory  and  as 
rendering  actual  hostilities  unnecessary.  I  added  that  you  had  re- 
garded Servian  reply  as  having  gone  far  to  meet  just  demands  of 
Austria-Hungary;  that  you  thought  it  constituted  a  fair  basis  of 
discussion  during  which  warlike  operations  might  remain  in  abey- 
ance, and  that  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Berlin  was  speaking  in  this 
sense.  Minister  for  Foreign  Aifairs  said  quietly,  but  firmly,  that  no 
discussion  could  be  accepted  on  basis  of  Servian  note;  that  war 
would  be  declared  to-day  and  that  well-known  pacific  character  of 
Emperor,  as  well  as,  he  might  add,  his  own,  might  be  accepted  as  a 
guarantee  that  war  was  both  just  and  inevitable.  This  was  a  matter 
that  must  be  settled  directly  between  the  two  parties  immediately 
concerned.  I  said  that  you  would  hear  with  regret  that  hostilities 
could  not  now  be  arrested,  as  you  feared  that  they  might  lead  to  com- 
plications threatening  the  peace  of  Europe. 

In  taking  leave  of  his  Excellency,  I  begged  him  to  believe  that, 
if  in  the  course  of  present  grave  crisis  our  point  of  view  should  some- 
times differ  from  his,  this  would  arise,  not  from  want  of  sympathy 
with  the  many  just  complaints  ^  which  Austria-Hungary  had  against 
Servia,  but  from  the  fact  that,  whereas  Austria-Hungary  put  first 
her  quarrel  with  Servia,  you  were  anxious  in  the  first  instance  for 
peace  of  Europe.  I  trusted  this  larger  aspect  of  the  question  would 
appeal  with  equal  force  to  his  Excellency.  He  said  he  had  it  also  in 
mind,  but  thought  that  Russia  ought  not  to  oppose  operations  like 
those  impending,  which  did  not  aim  at  territorial  aggrandisement 
and  which  could  no  longer  be  postponed.^ 


From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  63 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  28,) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  28,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  25th  July  to  Paris. ^ 

I  have  communicated  substance  to  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  immediately  telegraphed  in  precisely  similar  terms  to  Berlin  and 
Vienna. 

1  "Hansard,"  Vol.  65,  No.  107,  Columns  931,  932,  933. 

2  These  just  complaints  which  are  here  acknowledged  to  have  existed,  were  a  few 
days  later  entirely  lost  sight  of. 

3  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  61,  July  28. 

*  A  footnote  in  the  British  Blue  Book  gives  as  reference  No.  27.  This  can  hardly 
be  the  despatch  referred  to  here.  The  proper  despatch  is  either  not  printed,  or  con- 
tained in  No.  36  or  37.     Their  dates,  however,  are  July  26. 


July  28,  British  Blue  Book  No.  65  267 

From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  64 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  28,  1914. 

At  the  request  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  I  submit  the 
following  to  you :  — 

In  a  long  conversation  this  morning  Servian  Charge  d'Affaires 
had  said  he  thought  that  if  some  explanations  were  given  regarding 
mode  in  which  Austrian  agents  would  require  to  intervene  under 
article  5  and  article  6,  Servia  might  still  accept  the  whole  Austrian 
note.^ 

As  it  w^as  not  to  be  anticipated  that  Austria  would  give  such 
explanations  to  Servia,  they  might  be  given  ^  to  Powers  engaged  in 
discussions,  who  might  then  advise  Seryia  to  accept  without  con- 
ditions. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  in  the  meantime  published 
a  long  official  explanation  of  grounds  on  which  Servian  reply  was 
considered  inadequate.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  considered  many 
points  besides  explanation  —  such  as  slight  verbal  difference  in  sen- 
tence regarding  renunciation  of  propaganda  —  quite  childish,  but 
there  was  a  passage  which  might  prove  useful  in  facilitating  such  a 
course  as  was  considered  practicable  by  the  Servian  Charge  d'Affaires. 
It  was  stated  that  co-operation  of  Austrian  agents  in  Servia  was  to 
be  only  in  investigation,  not  in  judicial  or  administrative  measures. 
Servia  was  said  to  have  wilfully  ^  misinterpreted  this.  He  thought, 
therefore,  that  ground  might  be  cleared  here. 

I  only  reproduce  from  memory,  as  I  had  not  yet  received  text  of 
Austrian  declaration. 

Minister  impressed  upon  me,  above  all,  his  anxiety  for  the  imme- 
diate beginning  of  discussion.  A  wide  general  latitude  to  accept  at 
once  every  point  or  suggestion  on  which  he  could  be  in  agreement 
with  ourselves  and  Germany  had  been  given  to  Italian  Ambassador. 

From  Nish 

British  Blue  Book  No.  65 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  ChargS  d'Affaires  at  Belgrade,  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey.  —  {Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Nish,  July  28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  urged  on  the  Servian  Government  the  greatest  moderation  * 
pending  efforts  being  made  towards  a  peaceful  solution. 

1  As  late  as  July  28,  therefore,  Serbia  was  almost  ready  to  accept  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian note.  For  a  discussion  of  articles  5  and  6,  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 
Nos.  31  and  34,  July  27,  and  Nos.  21,  26  and  27,  July  25. 

2  They  were  so  given  to  Russia,  see  references  given  in  preceding  note. 

3  See  Austro-Hungarian  comment  to  Serbian  reply,  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27. 

*  Cf .  British  Blue  Book  No.  12,  July  24,  note  3  and  No.  22,  July  25.  The  advice 
for  moderation  was  not  given  until  after  the  reply  had  been  sent. 


268  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Two  Servian  steamers  fired  on  and  damaged,  and  two  Servian 
merchant-vessels  have  been  captured  by  a  Hungarian  monitor  at 
Orsova. 

From  Nish 

British  Blue  Book  No.  66 

Mr.  CracJcanthorpe,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade,  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey,  —  {Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Nish,  July  28,  1914. 

Telegram  received  here  that  war  declared  by  Austria. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  67 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  28,  1914- 

Explanation  given  in  your  telegram  of  the  27th  July  ^  of  what 
was  my  idea  in  proposing  a  conference  is  quite  right.  It  would  not 
be  an  arbitration,  but  a  private  and  informal  discussion  to  ascertain 
what  suggestion  could  be  made  for  a  settlement.  No  suggestion 
would  be  put  forward  that  had  not  previously  been  ascertained  to 
be  acceptable  to  Austria  and  Russia,  with  whom  the  mediating 
Powers  could  easily  keep  in  touch  through  their  respective  allies. 

But  as  long  as  there  is  a  prospect  of  a  direct  exchange  of  views 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  I  would  suspend  ^  every  other  sugges- 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  43,  July  27. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  77,  July  29.  (See  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No. 
47,  July  29.)  In  view  of  the  claim  that  Sir  E.  Grey  consistently  pressed  his  "con- 
ference" idea,  this  passage  is  of  importance.  The  entire  subject  has  been  discussed 
from  the  German  point  of  view  by  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-HoUweg  in  his  speech 
before  the  Reichstag,  Aug.  19,  1915,  as  follows: 

The  statement  that  the  whole  war  might  have  been  avoided  if  I  had  agreed  to  accept 
the  suggestion  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  take  part  in  a  conference  for  the  regulation 
of  the  Russian-Austrian  question  at  issue  has  again  of  late  been  repeatedly  made  in 
England.  Here  are  the  real  facts.  The  English  proposals  for  a  conference  were  de- 
livered here  by  the  English  Ambassador  on  the  27th  of  July.  The  English  Blue  Book 
also  shows  that  the  Secretary  of  State  at  the  Foreign  Office  in  the  conversation  in 
question  with  Sir  Edward  Goschen  —  a  conversation  in  which  the  Secretary  designated 
the  means  proposed  as  unsuitable  —  had  communicated  to  the  English  Ambassador 
that,  according  to  his  information  from  Russia,  M.  Sazonof  was  inclined  to  consider 
a  direct  exchange  of  opinion  with  Count  Berchtold.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  a 
direct  conversation  between  Petrograd  and  Vienna  might  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result. 
For  that  reason  it  was  best  to  await  the  results  of  this  conversation.  Sir  Edward 
Goschen  communicated  this  to  London  and  received  a  telegraphic  answer  in  which  Sir 
Edward  Grey  used  these  words : 

"  As  long  as  there  is  a  prospect  of  a  direct  exchange  of  views  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  I  would  suspend  every  other  suggestion,  as  I  entirely  agree  that  it  is  the  most 
preferable  method  of  all." 

Thus  Sir  Edward  Grey  accepted  the  German  point  of  view  at  that  time,  and  ex- 
pressly withdrew  his  proposal  of  a  conference  for  the  time  being. 

However,  unlike  Sir  Edward  Grey,  I  did  not  permit  matters  to  rest  with  the  platonic 
wish  that  a  direct  conversation  might  ensue  between  Vienna  and  Petrogi*ad,  but  did 
everything  within  my  power  to  persuade  the  Russian  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
governments  to  discuss  their  difTerences  by  an  exchange  of  opinions  between  their 
respective  cabinets.     I  have  once  before  declared  in  this  very  place  that  our  endeavors 


July  28,  British  Blue  Book  No.  67  269 

tion,  as  I  entirely  agree  that  it  is  the  most  preferable  method  of 
all. 

I  understand  that  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has 
proposed  a  friendly  exchange  of  views  to  the  Austrian  Government, 
and,  if  the  latter  accepts,  it  will  no  doubt  relieve  the  tension  and 
make  the  situation  less  critical. 

It  is  very  satisfactory  to  hear  from  the  German  Ambassador 
here  that  the  German  Government  have  taken  action  at  Vienna  in 
the  sense  of  the  conversation  recorded  in  my  telegram  of  yesterday 
to  you.^ 

at  medialion,  especially  in  Vienna,  had  been  carried  on  in  a  manner,  which,  as  I  stated 
at  the  time,  "  went  to  the  extreme  limits  of  all  that  was  compatible  with  our  relations 
as  an  ally."  Since  this  activity  of  mine  as  a  mediator  in  the  interests  of  preserving 
the  peace  has  been  repeatedly  called  in  question  in  England,  I  shall  prove  by  the 
evidence  of  facts  that  all  these  accusations  are  without  foundation. 

On  the  evening  of  July  29  the  following  communication  of  the  Imperial  Ambassador 
at  Petrograd  reached  Berlin : 

"  M.  Sazonof,  who  has  just  requested  me  to  see  him,  communicates  to  me  that 
the  Vienna  Cabinet  had  replied  with  a  categorical  refusal  to  consider  the  desire  he  had 
expressed  to  enter  into  direct  conversations.  There  was  therefore  nothing  left  to  do 
save  to  return  to  the  proposal  of  a  conversation  of  four,  as  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey." 

Since  the  Vienna  government  had  in  the  meantime  declared  itself  prepared  for  a 
direct  exchange  of  views  with  Petrograd,  it  was  clear  that  there  must  be  some  mis- 
understanding. 1  telegraphed  to  Vienna  and  made  use  of  the  opportunity  once  more 
to  make  a  clear  announcement  of  my  own  conception  of  the  situation  as  a  whole.  My 
instructions  to  Herr  von  Tschirschky  were  as  follows : 

"  The  communication  of  Count  Pourtales  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  represen- 
tations which  Your  Excellency  has  made  of  the  attitude  of  the  Austrian-Hungarian 
government.  Apparently  there  is  some  misunderstanding  which  I  beg  you  to  explain. 
We  cannot  expect  of  Austria-Hungary  a  willingness  to  negotiate  with  Serbia,  with 
whom  she  is  already  in  a  state  of  war.i  But  the  refusal  of  all  interchange  of  opinion 
with  Petrograd  would  be  a  grave  mistake.  We  are  indeed  prepared  to  fulfil  our  duty 
as  an  ally,  but  should  Austria-Hungary  ignore  our  advice,  we  must  nevertheless  decline 
to  be  drawn  into  a  world  conflagration,  through  Austria-Hungary  ignoring  our  advice. 
Your  Excellency  will  therefore  at  once  and  with  all  emphasis  and  earnestness  express 
yourself  in  this  sense  to  Count  Berchtold." 

Herr  von  Tschirschky  in  answer  to  this  communicated  on  July  30 : 

"  Count  von  Berchtold  states  that,  as  Your  Excellency  assumes,  there  has  indeed 
been  some  misunderstanding  in  question,  and  that  on  the  part  of  Russia.  Having 
already  received  word  of  this  misunderstanding  also  through  Count  Szapary,  the 
Austrian-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  Petrograd,  and  having  at  the  same  time  followed 
our  urgent  suggestion  that  he  enter  into  communication  with  Russia,  he  had  at  once 
given  the  necessary  instructions  to  Count  Szapary." 

Gentlemen,  I  made  all  this  known  to  the  British  press,  when  excitement  in  England 
increased  shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  serious  doubts  as  to  our  en- 
deavors to  preserve  peace  became  audible.  And  now  after  the  event,  that  press 
makes  the  insinuation  that  this  occurrence  had  never  taken  place  at  all  and  that  the 
instructions  to  Herr  von  Tschirschky  had  been  invented  in  order  to  mislead  public 
opinion  in  England.  You  will  agree  with  me  that  this  accusation  is  unworthy  of  an 
answer.  I  would  also  allude  at  the  same  time  to  the  Austrian  Red  Book  which  merely 
confirms  my  presentation  of  the  case  and  shows  how  after  the  aforesaid  misunder- 
standing had  been  cleared  up,  the  conversations  between  Petrograd  and  Vienna  had 
begun  to  take  their  course,  until  the  general  mobilization  of  the  Russian  army  brought 
them  to  an  untimely  end.  I  repeat,  gentlemen,  that  we  have  supported  the  direct 
discussion  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  with  the  utmost  emphasis  and  success. 

The  assertion  that  we,  by  refusing  to  accept  the  English  suggestion  of  a  conference, 
must  accept  the  blame  for  this  war,  belongs  to  the  category  of  those  calumnies  under 
cover  of  which  our  enemies  endeavor  to  hide  their  own  guilt.  The  war  became  un- 
avoidable only  through  the  Russian  mobilisation. 

1  Cf .  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27,  and  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  15,  same 
date.  The  effect  of  Germany's  continued  pressure  on  Austria-Hungary  appears  from 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  104,  July  30.  See  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  44, 
July  29. 


270  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  68 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  28,  1914. 

German  Government,  having  accepted  principle  of  mediation 
between  Austria  and  Russia  by  the  four  Powers,  if  necessary,  I  am 
ready  to  propose  that  the  German  Secretary  of  State  should  suggest 
the  lines  on  which  this  principle  should  be  applied.  I  will,  however, 
keep  the  idea  in  reserve  ^  until  we  see  how  the  conversations  between 
Austria  and  Russia  progress. 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  69 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Bux^hanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  28,  1914. 

It  is  most  satisfactory  that  there  is  a  prospect  of  direct  exchange 
of  views  between  the  Russian  and  Austrian  Governments,  as  reported 
in  your  telegram  of  the  27th  July.^ 

I  am  ready  to  put  forward  any  practical  proposal  that  would 
facilitate  this,  but  I  am  not  quite  clear  as  to  what  the  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  proposes  ^  the  Ministers  at  Belgrade  should  do. 
Could  he  not  first  mention  in  an  exchange  of  views  with  Austria  his 
willingness  to  co-operate  in  some  such  scheme  ?  It  might  then  take 
more  concrete  shape. 

Russia : 

To  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  43 

Russian   Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs   to  Russian  Ambassador  at 
London. 
[See  No.  54  of  British  Correspondence,  July  28,  1914.] 

From  Fiume 

RussLAJj  Orange  Book  No.  44 

Russian  Consul  General  at  Fiume  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Fiume,  July  15  (28),  1914. 

State  of  siege  has  been  proclaimed  in  Slavonia,  in  Croatia,  and 
at  Fiume,  and  the  reservists  of  all  classes  have  also  been  called  up. 

^  Again  Sir  E.  Grey  defers  to  Sazonof's  direct  conversation  idea. 
«  British  Blue  Book  No.  55,  July  27. 

» The  proposal  referring  to  the  Ministers  at  Belgrade  has  been  omitted  from  the 
despatch  No.  55,  to  which  the  Official  Blue  Book  refers  here. 


July  28,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  4^ 


271 


From  Vienna 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  45 


Russian  Ambassador  at   Vienna 
Affairs. 

Vienne, 
le  15  {28)  juillet,  1914. 

(Telegraphique.) 

J'ai  entretenu  aujourd'hui  le 
Comte  Berchtold  ^  dans  le  sens 
des  instructions  de  votre  Ex- 
cellence. Je  lui  fis  observer,  en 
termes  les  plus  amicaux,  combien 
il  etait  desirable  de  trouver  une 
solution  qui,  en  consolidant  les 
bons  rapports  entre  TAutriche- 
Hongrie  et  la  Russie,  donnerait 
a  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise 
des  garanties  serieuses  pour  ses 
rapports  futurs  avec  la  Serbie. 

J'attirais  I'attention  du  Comte 
Berchtold  ^  sur  tons  les  dangers 
pour  la  paix  de  I'Europe,  qu'en- 
trainerait  un  conflit  arme  entre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  la  Serbie. 

Le  Comte  Berchtold  ^  me  re- 
pondit  qu'il  se  rendait  parfaite- 
ment  compte  du  serieux  de  la 
situation  et  des  avantages  d'une 
franche  explication  avec  le  Cabi- 
net de  Saint-Petersbourg.  II  me 
dit  que  d'un  autre  cote  le  Gou- 
vernement  austro-hongrois,  qui 
ne  s'etait  decide  que  tres  mal 
volontiers  aux  mesures  ener- 
giques  qu'il  avait  prises  contre  la 
Serbie,  ne  pouvait  plus  ni  reculer, 
ni  entrer  en  discussion  aucune 
des  termes  de  la  note  austro- 
hongroise. 

Le  Comte  Berchtold  ^  ajouta 
que  la  crise  etait  devenue  si  aigue, 
et  que  I'excitation  de  Topinion 
publique  avait  atteint  tel  degre. 


to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
(Translation.) 

Vienna,  July  15  {28),  1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

I  SPOKE  to  Count  Berchtold^ 
to-day  in  the  sense  of  'your 
Excellency's  instructions.^  I 
brought  to  his  notice,  in  the 
most  friendly  manner,  how  desir- 
able it  was  to  find  a  solution 
which,  while  consolidating  good 
relations  between  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Russia,  would  give  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
genuine  guarantees  for  its  future 
relations  with  Servia. 

I  drew  Count  Berchtold's  ^ 
attention  to  all  the  dangers  to 
the  peace  of  Europe  which  would 
be  involved  by  an  armed  conflict 
between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia. 

Count  Berchtold  ^  replied  that 
he  was  well  aware  of  the  gravity 
of  the  situation  and  of  the  ad- 
vantages of  a  frank  explanation 
with  the  St.  Petersburgh  Cabi- 
net. He  told  me  that,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government,  who  had 
only  decided  much  against  their 
will  on  the  energetic  measures 
which  they  had  taken  against 
Servia,  could  no  longer  recede, 
nor  enter  into  any  discussion 
about  the  terms  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  note. 

Count  Berchtold  ^  added  that 
the  crisis  had  become  so  acute, 
and  that  public  opinion  had  risen 
to  such  a  pitch  of  excitement, 


1  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

2  No  despatch  containing  these  instructions  is  printed  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book. 


272  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

que  le  Gouvernement,  le  voulait-  that   the   Government,    even   if 

il,  ne  pouvait  plus  y  consentir,  they  wished  it,  could  no  longer 

d'autant   moins,   me   dit-il,    que  consent  to  such  a  course.     This 

la   reponse   meme  de  la   Serbie  was  all  the  more  impossible,  he 

donne  la  preuve  du  manque  de  said,   inasmuch   as   the   Servian 

sincerite  de  ses  promesses  pour  reply   itself   furnished   proof   of 

Tavenir.  the      insincerity      of      Servia's 

promises  for  the  future. 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  46 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  15  {28),  1914. 

The  Wolff  Bureau  has  not  published  the  text  of  the  Servian 
reply,  although  it  was  communicated  to  them.  Up  to  the  present 
this  note  has  not  appeared  in  extenso  in  any  of  the  local  papers,  which, 
to  all  appearances,  do  not  wish  to  publish  it  in  their  columns,  being 
well  aware  of  the  calming  ^  effect  which  it  would  have  on  German 
readers. 

From  Vienna 

Russian  Orange  ^ook  No.  47 

Russian  Ambassador  at   Vienna  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Vienna,  July  15  {28),  1914. 

The  order  for  general  mobilisation  has  been  signed.^ 

To  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  48 

Russian   Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassador  at 
London. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburg,  July  15  {28),  1914. 

In  face  of  the  hostilities  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia, 
it  is  necessary  that  Great  Britain  should  take  instant  mediatory 
action,^  and  that  the  military  measures  undertaken  by  Austria  against 

1  Germany  undoubtedly  waited  until  she  received  the  Austro-Hungarian  com- 
ments, which  were  sent  by  mail  from  Vienna  on  July  27  (see  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  39,  July  28).  German  newspapers  are  always  antedated,  the  paper  dated 
July  28  being  issued  on  the  evening  of  July  27. 

2  If  "signed"  means  issued,  this  information  is  probably  inaccurate.  For  a  com- 
plete discussion  of  this  subject  see  M.  P.  Price,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War, 
Chas.  Scribner's  Sons,  p.  69,  who  says  "This  confirms  the  supposition  that  Austria 
had  not  mobilised  more  than  eight  army  corps  before  August  1st." 

2  Sazonof  apparently  had  now  given  up  his  plan  of  direct  conversation  with  Austria, 
which  he  had  sought  since  July  26,  and  also  Sir  E.  Grey's  plan  of  a  conference,  and 


July  28,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  Jfi  273 

Servia    should    be    immediately    suspended.     Otherwise    mediation 
will  only  serve  as  an  excuse  to  make  the  question  drag  on,  and  will 
meanwhile  make  it  possible  for  Austria  to  crush  Servia  completely 
and  to  acquire  a  dominant  position  in  the  Balkans. 
Sent  to  Paris,  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome. 

Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  45  ^ 

Count  Leopold  Berchtold,  Au^tro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch,  Serbian  Prime  Minister  and  Min- 
ister for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  15/28,  1914. 

The  Royal  Serbian  Government  not  having  answered  in  a  satis- 
factory manner  the  note  of  July  10/23,  1914,  presented  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade,  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  are  themselves  compelled  to  see  to  the  safeguarding 
of  their  rights  and  interests,  and,  with  this  object,  to  have  recourse 
to  force  of  arms.  Austria-Hungary  consequently  considers  herself 
henceforward  in  state  of  war  with  Serbia. ^ 

To  All  Serbian  Legations 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  46 

M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  all  the  Serbian  Legations  abroad, 

(Telegraphic.)  Nish,  July  15/28,  1914. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  declared  war  on  Serbia  at 
noon  to-day  by  an  open  telegram  to  the  Serbian  Government. 

To  Petrograd 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  47 

Dr.  M.  Spalaikovitch,  Minister  at  Petrograd,  to  M.  Sazonof,  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Your  Excellency,  Petrograd,  July  15/28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  I  have  received 
from  M.  Pashitch  the  following  urgent  telegram  despatched  from 
Nish  at  2.10  p.m. 

urged  the  other  plan  of  British  direct  mediation  which  probably  had  been  outlined  in 
the  third  despatch  referred  to  in  French  Yellow  Book  No.  76,  July  28,  but  not  printed 
in  full  in  the  Yellow  Book  or  in  the  Blue  Book.  Cf.  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  44, 
July  27. 

1  For  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  44  see  July  30,  1914.  „     ,  x 

2  This  was  notified  to  the  Powers  in  a  despatch  printed  British  Blue  Book  No.  50, 
July  28. 


274  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  declared  war  on  Serbia 
to-day  at  noon  by  an  open  telegram  to  the  Serbian  Government." 

I  have  the  honour  to  inform  Your  Excellency  of  this  regrettable 
act,  which  a  Great  Power  had  the  courage  to  commit  against  a  small 
Slav  country  which  only  recently  emerged  from  a  long  series  of  heroic 
but  exhausting  battles,  and  I  beg  leave  on  this  occasion  of  deep  gravity 
for  my  country,  to  express  the  hope  that  this  act,  which  disturbs  the 
peace  of  Europe  and  revolts  her  conscience,  will  be  condemned  by  the 
whole  civilised  world  and  severely  punished  by  Russia,  the  protector 
of  Serbia.^ 

I  beg  Your  Excellency  to  be  so  kind  as  to  lay  this  petition  from 
the  whole  Serbian  nation  before  the  throne  of  His  Majesty. 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  assure  Your  Excellency  of  my  loyalty  ^ 
and  respect. 

I  have,  etc. 

1  Cf.  also  the  appeal  of  the  Serbian  Crown  Prince,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  6, 
July  24,  and  the  Czar's  reply,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  40,  July  27. 

2  According  to  one's  interpretation  of  the  Serbian  relations  to  Russia,  the  word 
"loyalty"  is  either  significant  or  merely  a  polite  phrase. 


July  29 y  1914 


275 


Wednesday,  July  29,  1914 
SUMMARY   OF  PUBLISHED   DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

London,  Petrograd, 

Paris,    Berlin,    Petro- 

Paris, and  Rome 

grad 

Berlin 

Belgium 

London  etc. 



France 

London  etc.,  London 

Rome,  Petrograd,  Brus- 
sels, Frankfort,  Mu- 
nich, Vienna,  Berlin, 
London,  Belgrade 

Germany 

Paris 

Emperor  to  Czar 

Czar  to  Emperor 

Great  Britain 

Rome,  Berlin,  Paris, 

Berlin,  Petrograd,  Vi- 

Vienna 

enna,     Rome,     Con- 

stantinople, Nish, 
from  Russian  Am- 
bassador 

Russia 

Berlin,  London  and 

Berlin,     Nish,     ^aris, 

Paris, 

London 

Serbia 

Paris 

Serbian  Crownprince 
to  Czar. 

Austria-Hungary  makes  renewed  efforts  to  convince  the  Powers  of  the  justice 
of  her  case,  and  unequivocally  accepts  Sir  E.  Grey's  first  proposal  of  mediation 
between  Petrograd  and  Vienna.  At  the  same  time,  while  refusing  to  discuss  the 
"wording  of  the  note,"  she  is  ready  to  have  direct  conversations  with  Petrograd 
on  "a  much  broader  basis  of  discussion  in  declaring  that  she  had  no  desire  to  injure 
any  Russian  interests"  nor  to  annex  territory  or  to  touch  the  "sovereignty  of 
Serbia."  She  is  much  disturbed  by  French  and  especially  Russian  mobilisation 
and  announces  that  the  latter  may  force  her  to  proceed  to  general  mobilisation 
on  her  part. 

Belgium  announces  that  she  has  "  decided  to  place  her  army  upon  a  strengthened 
peace  footing." 

France  continues  to  be  suspicious  of  Germany,  whom  she  holds  responsible  for 
Austria-Hungary's  determination  to  put  a  stop  to  Serbian  intrigues.  While 
publishing  many  notices  to  the  effect  that  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  were 
mobilising,  she  makes  no  mention  of  the  Russian  mobilisation  except  as  measures 
of  defence  forced  upon  Russia.  Several  of  the  French  despatches  published  on  this 
day  are  by  their  contents  proved  to  have  been  written  earlier. 

Germany  is  greatly  troubled  by  the  mobilisation  going  on  in  France  and  Russia 
and  declares  that  if  it  continues  she  will  have,  to  declare  Kriegsgefahr.  The 
Emperor  exchanges  telegrams  with  the  Czar  begging  him  to  intercede  for  peace. 
Germany  continues  her  pressure  on  Austria  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
Russia,  and  wishes  to  work  together  with  Great  Britain,  whose  neutrality  she 
wishes  to  secure  in  case  of  war. 

Great  Britain  believes  direct  conversations  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  "the 
best  possible  solution."  Sir  E.  Grey  is  erroneously  informed  that  Austria- 
Hungary  has  refused  them,  and  reverting  to  his  conierence  or  mediation  plan 
declares  his  willingness  to  accept  "any  method  that  Germany  thought  possible  in 
the  interests  of  peace."  In  case  of  war,  Sir  E.  Grey  declares,  England  would  "have 
to  decide  what  British  interests  required."  The  suggestion  of  a  possible  invasion 
of  Belgium  first  broached  on  this  day  is  not  denounced  as  wrong.     Sir  E.  Grey  also 


276  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

suggests  that  Austria  should  halt  after  taking  Belgrade  to  give  the  Powers  the 
chance  of  adjusting  the  difficulties. 

Russia  claims  that  Russian  interests  were  in  this  case  Serbian  interests.  She 
also  claims  that  Austria-Hungary  had  **  categorically  refused  to  continue  an 
exchange  of  ideas,"  and  mobilises  the  districts  of  Kieff,  Odessa,  Moscow,  and 
Kasan.  Receiving  France's  promise  of  unconditional  support  she  "hastens"  her 
"military  preparations." 

Serbia  does  not  publish  any  documents  of  this  day. 

Italy  suggests  that  Austria-Hungary  "convert  into  a  binding  engagement  to 
Europe"  her  declaration  that  she  wished  neither  "to  destroy  the  independence  of 
Serbia  nor  to  acquire  Serbian  territory."  Unfortunately  this  suggestion  was  not 
pressed,  for  Italy  believed  that  thus  "Russia  might  be  induced  to  remain  quiet." 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  St.  Petersburgh,  London^  Paris,  and  Rome 

AUSTROHUNGARIAN   ReD    BoOK   No.    44 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh, London,  Paris,  and  Rome. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  29,  1914. 

For  your  Excellency's  information. 

I  have  to-day  handed  to  the  Imperial  German  Ambassador  the 
following  memorandum  in  answer  to  a  demarche  made  here  by  him  :  ^ 

Memorandum 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  have  received  with  deep 
gratitude  information  of  the  communication  which  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man Ambassador  made  to  them  on  the  28th  inst.^  with  regard  to  the 
request  of  the  British  Cabinet  that  the  Imperial  German  Govern- 
ment should  use  their  influence  with  the  Vienna  Cabinet  that  they 
might  regard  the  answer  from  Belgrade  either  as  satisfactory,  or  as  a 
basis  for  discussion.  So  far  as  concerns  what  was  said  by  the  British 
Secretary  of  State  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  desire  in  the  first  place  to  draw  attention  to  the  fact 
that  the  Servian  answer  in  no  way  contains  an  acceptance  of  all  our 
demands  with  one  single  exception,  as  Sir  E.  Grey  appears  to  assume,^ 
but  rather  that  on  most  points  reservations  are  formulated,  which 
materially  detract  from  the  value  of  the  concessions  which  are  made. 
The  points  which  are  not  accepted  are,  however,  precisely  those  which 
contain  some  guarantee  for  the  real  attainment  of  the  end  in  view. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  cannot  conceal  their  aston- 
ishment at  the  assumption  that  their  action  against  Servia  was 
directed  against  Russia  and  Russian  influence  in  the  Balkans,  for 
this  implies  the  supposition  that  the  propaganda  directed  against  the 
Monarchy  has  not  merely  a  Servian  but  a  Russian  origin.^    The  basis 

1  This  seems  to  refer  to  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  15,  July  27,  and  Exhibit  14, 
July  28.     See  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  84,  July  29. 

2  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  46  and  48,  July  27. 

'  The  logic  of  this  inference  is  from  the  Austro-Hungarian  point  of  view  irrefutable. 


July  29,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  45  277 

of  our  consideration  has  hitherto  been  rather  that  official  Russia  has 
no  connection  with  these  tendencies,  which  are  hostile  to  the  Mon- 
archy, and  that  our  present  action  is  directed  exclusively  against 
Servia,  while  our  feelings  for  Russia,  as  we  can  assure  Sir  E.  Grey, 
are  entirely  friendly. 

Further,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  must  point  out  that 
to  their  great  regret  they  are  no  longer  in  a  position  to  adopt  an 
attitude  towards  the  Servian  reply  in  the  sense  of  the  British  sug- 
gestion, since  at  the  time  of  the  demarche  made  by  Germany  a  state  of 
war  between  the  Monarchy  and  Servia  had  already  arisen,  and  the 
Servian  reply  has  accordingly  already  been  outstripped  by  events. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  take  this  opportunity  of 
observing  that  the  Royal  Servian  Government,  even  before  they 
communicated  their  reply,  had  taken  steps  towards  the  mobilisation 
of  the  Servian  forces,  and  thereafter  they  allowed  three  days  to  elapse 
without  showing  any  inclination  to  abandon  the  point  of  view  con- 
tained in  their  reply,  whereupon  the  declaration  of  war  followed  on 
our  side. 

If  the  British  Cabinet  is  prepared  to  use  its  influence  on  the  Rus- 
sian Government  with  a  view  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  between 
the  Great  Powers,  and  with  a  view  to  the  localisation  of  the  war  which 
has  been  forced  upon  us  by  many  years  of  Servian  intrigues,  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  could  only  welcome  this.^ 


From  Paris 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  45 
Count  Szecsen  to  Count  BercUold. 
(Telegraphic.)        >  Paris,  July  29,  1914. 

France  is  unmistakably  making  certain  military  preparations 
as  is  announced  by  the  newspapers,  perhaps  with  a  certain  exag- 
geration. 

As  I  learn  in  strictest  confidence.  Baron  Schoen  is  commissioned 
to  discuss  these  preparations  ^  with  M.  Viviani  to-day,  and  to  point 
out  that  in  these  circumstances  Germany  may  be  compelled  to  take 
similar  measures  which  necessarily  could  not  be  kept  secret,  and 
which  could  not  fail  to  cause  great  public  excitement  when  they  be- 
came known.  In  this  way  the  two  countries,  although  they  are  only 
striving  for  peace,  will  be  compelled  to  at  least  a  partial  mobilisation, 
which  would  be  dangerous. 

Further,  in  accordance  with  these  instructions.  Baron  Schoen  will 
declare  that  Germany  has  a  lively  desire  that  the  conflict'  between  us 
and  Servia  should  remain  localised,  and  that  in  this  Germany  relies 
on  the  support  of  France. 

1  This  is  an  unequivocal  acceptance  of  Sir  E.  Grey's  original  proposal  of  mediation 
between  Petrograd  and  Vienna. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30,  referring  to  "yesterday  afternoon,"  i.e. 
July  29. 


278  Official  Diplomatic  Docuvients 

From  Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    46 

Count  Szogyeny  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  29,  1914. 

As  early  as  Sunday  the  German  Government  declared  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh  that  Russian  mobilisation  would  have  as  a  consequence  German 
mobilisation.^ 

Thereupon  there  followed  on  the  part  of  Russia  the  reply  announced 
in  my  telegram  of  the  27th  inst.^  Following  this  a  telegram  has 
to-day  been  sent  to  St.  Petersburgh,  stating  that  owing  to  the  fur- 
ther progress  of  the  Russian  measures  of  mobilisation  Germany 
might  be  brought  to  mobilise.^ 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK   No.    47 

Ccmnt  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July.29,  1914. 

As  I  have  learned  from  the  German  Ambassador  that  M.  Sazonof 
is  showing  himself  greatly  excited  over  your  Excellency's  alleged 
disinclination  to  continue  the  exchange  of  ideas  with  Russia,  and  over 
the  mobilisation  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  is  supposed  to  be  much 
more  extensive  than  is  necessary,  and,  therefore,  directed  against 
Russia,  I  visited  the  Minister  in  order  to  remove  certain  misunder- 
standings which  seemed  to  me  to  exist. 

The  Minister  began  by  making  the  point  that  Austria-Hungary 
categorically  refused  to  continue  an  exchange  of  ideas.  I  agreed 
in  view  of  your  Excellency's  telegram  of  the  28th  July  that  your 
Excellency  had  indeed  declined,  after  all  that  had  occurred,  to  dis- 
cuss the  wording  of  the  note,  and  in  general  the  Austro-Hungarian- 
Servian  conflict,  but  said  that  I  must  make  it  clear  that  I  was  in  a 
position  to  suggest  a  much  broader  basis  of  discussion  ^  in  declaring 
that  we  had  no  desire  to  injure  any  Russian  interests,  that  we  had  no 
intention,  naturally  on  the  assumption  that 'the  conflict  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia  remained  localised,  of  annexing  Servian 
territory,  and  that  we  also  had  no  idea  of  touching  the  sovereignty  of 
Servia.  I  was  convinced  that  your  Excellency  would  always  be  ready 
to  keep  in  touch  with  St.  Petersburgh  with  regard  to  Austro-Hun- 
garian  and  Russian  interests. 

M.  Sazonof  gave  me  to  understand  that  he  had  been  convinced  of 
this  so  far  as  territory  was  concerned,  but  so  far  as  the  sovereignty  of 

1  Cf.  German  White  Book  Exhibits  10  and  10&,  July  26. 

2  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  33,  July  27. 

'Not  given  in  the  German  White  Book  or  the  Russian  Orange  Book.  Cf.  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  42,  July  28. 

*  Cf.  Chancellor's  Speech,  note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28.  See  also 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  50,  July  30. 


July  29,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  4?  279 

the  country  was  in  question  he  must  continue  to  hold  the  opinion  that 
to  force  on  Servia  our  conditions  would  result  in  Servia  becoming  a 
vassal  State.  This,  however,  would  upset  the  equilibrium  in  the 
Balkans,  and  this  was  how  Russian  interests  became  involved.  He 
returned  to  the  question  of  a  discussion  of  the  note,  the  action  of 
Sir  E.  Grey,  etc.,  and  he  desired  again  to  point  out  to  me  that  Russia 
recognised  our  legitimate  interest,  and  desired  to  give  it  full  satis- 
faction, but  that  this  should  be  clothed  in  a  form  which  would  be 
acceptable  to  Servia.  I  expressed  the  view  that  this  was  not  a  Rus- 
sian but  a  Servian  interest,  whereupon  M.  Sazonof  claimed  that 
Russian  interests  ^  were  in  this  case  Servian  interests,  so  that  I  was 
obliged  to  make  an  end  of  the  vicious  circle  by  going  on  to  a  new 
topic. 

I  mentioned  that  I  had  heard  that  there  was  a  feeling  of  anxiety 
in  Russia,  because  we  had  mobilised  eight  corps  for  action  against 
Servia.  M.  Sazonof  assured  me  that  it  was  not  he  (who  knew  nothing 
about  this)  but  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  who  had  expressed  this 
anxiety.  I  endeavoured  to  convince  the  Minister  that  any  unpreju- 
diced person  could  easily  be  persuaded  that  our  southern  corps  could 
not  constitute  a  menace  for  Russia. 

I  indicated  to  the  Minister  that  it  would  be  well  if  his  Imperial 
Master  were  informed  of  the  true  situation,  more  especially  as  it  was 
urgently  necessary,  if  it  was  desired  to  maintain  peace,  that  a  speedy 
end  should  be  put  to  the  military  competition  (lizitieren)  which  now 
threatened  to  ensue  on  account  of  false  news.  M.  Sazonof  very 
characteristically  expressed  the  view  that  he  could  communicate  this 
io  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  for  he  saw  His  Majesty  every  day. 

The  Minister  further  informed  me  that  a  Ukase  would  be  signed 
to-day,  which  would  give  orders  for  a  mobilisation  in  a  somewhat 
extended  form.  He  was  able,  however,  to  assure  me  in  the  most 
official  way  that  these  troops  were  not  intended  to  attack  us.  They 
would  only  stand  to  arms  in  case  Russian  interests  in  the  Balkans 
should  he  in  danger.  An  explanatory  note  would  make  this  clear,  for 
the  question  here  was  one  of  a  measure  of  precaution  which  the 
Emperor  Nicholas  had  found  to  be  justified,  since  we,  who  in  any 
case  have  the  advantage  of  quicker  mobilisation,  have  now  also  al- 
ready so  great  a  start.  In  earnest  words  I  drew  M.  Sazonof's  atten- 
tion to  the  impression  which  such  a  measure  would  make  in  our 
country.  I  went  on  to  express  doubt  whether  the  explanatory  note 
would  be  calculated  to  soften  the  impression,  whereupon  the  Minister 
again  gave  expression  to  assurances  regarding  the  harmlessness( ! )  of 
this  measure. 

1  A  possible  explanation  of  the  remark  that  "Russian  interests  were  in  this  case 
Serbian  interests  "may  be  found  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  17,  July  25,  where  Sazonof 
cannot  allow  "Austria  to  become  the  predominant  Power  in  the  Balkans." 


280  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Berlin 

AUSTROHUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   48 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szogyeny  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  29,  1914. 

I  HAVE  just  heard  from  Herr  von  Tschirschky,  that  the  Russian 
Ambassador  has  told  him  that  he  has  been  notified  by  his  Government 
that  the  military  districts  of  Kieff,  Odessa,  Moscow  and  Kasan  are 
being  mobilised.  He  said  that  Russia  was  outraged  in  her  honour  as 
a  Great  Power/  and  was  obliged  to  take  corresponding  measures. 
The  Russian  mobilisation  is  confirmed  by  the  commanders  of  our- 
Galician  forces,  and,  according  to  a  communication  from  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Military  Attache,  in  a  conversation  which  M.  Sazonof  had 
to-day  with  the  German  Ambassador  it  was  no  longer  denied.^ 

I  request  your  Excellency  to  bring  the  above  without  delay  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  German  Government,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
emphasise  that  if  the  Russian  measures  of  mobilisation  are  not 
stopped  without  delay,  our  general  mobilisation  would  have,  on 
military  grounds,  to  follow  at  once. 

As  a  last  effort  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Europe,  I  considered  it 
desirable  that  our  representative  and  the  representative  of  Germany 
at  St.  Petersburgh,  and,  if  necessary,  at  Paris,  should  at  once  be 
instructed  to  declare  to  the  Governments  to  whom  they  are  ac- 
credited in  a  friendly  manner,  that  the  continuance  of  the  Russian 
mobilisation  would  have  as  a  result  counter-measures  in  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  which  must  lead  to  serious  consequences.^ 

Your  Excellency  will  add  that,  as  can  be  understood,  in  our  military 
operations  against  Servia  we  will  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  diverted 
from  our  path. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  at  St.  Petersburgh  and 
Paris  are  receiving  identical  instructions  to  make  the  above  declara- 
tion as  soon  as  their  German  colleague  receives  similar  instructions. 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   49 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  30,  1914. 

In  answer  to  your  Excellency's  telegram  of  the  29th  July. 
I  am  of  course  still  ready  to  explain  to  M.  Sazonof,  through  your 
Excellency,  the  various  points  contained  in  our  note  addressed  to 

1  The  reason  why  "Russia  was  outraged  in  her  honour  as  a  Great  Power"  is  not 
given.  The  interesting  part  of  this  passage  is  that  Austria-Hungary  was  not  the 
only  country  which  beUeved  that  her  honor  as  a  Great  Power  demanded  a  certain 
course  of  action  of  her. 

2  See  German  White  Book,  Narrative,  pp.  351  to  360. 

'  This  was  evidently  an  attempt  on  Austria's  part  to  keep  the  peace  among  the 
nations. 


July  29,  French  Yelloiv  Book  No.  84  281 

Servia  which  however  has  already  been  outstripped  by  recent  events. 
I  should  also  attach  special  importance,  in  accordance  with  the  sug- 
gestion made  to  me  through  M.  Schebeko,  also  to  discussing  on  this 
occasion  in  a  confidential  and  friendly  manner  the  questions  which 
affect  directly  our  relations  towards  Russia.  From  this  it  might  be 
hoped  that  it  would  be  possible  to  remove  the  ambiguities  which  have 
arisen  and  to  secure  the  development  in  a  friendly  manner  of  our 
relations  towards  our  neighbours,  which  is  so  desirable  an  object.^ 

Belgium : 

To  Berlin,  Paris,  London,  Vienna,  St  Petersburgh,  Rome,  The  Hague, 

and  Luxemburg 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  8 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Berlin,  Paris,  London,  Vienna,  St.  Petersburg, 
Rome,  The  Hague,  and  Luxemburg. 

Sir,  •  '  Brussels,  July  29,  1914. 

The  Belgian  Government  have  decided  to  place  the  army  upon  a 
strengthened  peace  footing. 

This  step  should  in  no  way  be  confused  with  mobilisation. 

Owing  to  the  small  extent  of  her  territory,  all  Belgium  consists,  in 
some  degree,  of  a  frontier  zone.  Her  army  on  the  ordinary  peace 
footing  consists  of  only  one  class  of  armed  militia ;  on  the  strengthened 
peace  footing,  owing  to  the  recall  of  three  classes,  her  army  divisions 
and  her  cavalry  division  comprise  effective  units  of  the  same  strength 
as  those  of  the  corps  permanently  maintained  in  the  frontier  zones 
of  the  neighbouring  Powers. 

This  information  will  enable  you  to  reply  to  any  questions  which 
may  be  addressed  to  you. 

France : 

From  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  84 

M.  Barrere,  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Rome,  July  29,  1914. 

The  Consulta  considers  that,  in  spite  of  the  declaration  of  war 
by  Austria  on  Servia,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  diplomatic  efforts 
for  calling  together  a  conference  at  London  with  a  view  to  mediation 
should  be  interrupted.  Barkere. 

1  This  is  another  evidence  that  Germany's  influence  upon  Vienna  was  having 
effect  or  that  Austria-Hungary  of  her  own  accord  was  willing  to  try  and  avert  a  general 
war  by  making  explanations  to  Russia. 


282  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  St.  Petersburgh,  London,  Berlin,  Rome,  Vienna,  Constantinople. 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  85 

M.   Bienxenu-Martin,   Acting   Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,   to  St. 

Petersburgh,    London,    Berlin,    Rome,    Vienna,    Constantinople, 

Belgrade. 

Paris,  July  29,  1914. 
The  Austro-German  attitude  is  becoming  clearer.  Austria,  un- 
easy concerning  the  Slav  propaganda,  has  seized  the  opportunity  ^ 
of  the  crime  of  Serajevo  in  order  to  punish  the  Servian  intrigues, 
and  to  obtain  in  this  quarter  guarantees  which,  according  as  events 
are  allowed  to  develop  or  not,  will  either  affect  only  the  Servian 
Government  and  army,  or  become  territorial  questions.  Germany 
intervenes  ^  between  her  ally  and  the  other  Powers  and  declares  that 
the  question  is  a  local  one,  namely,  the  punishment  of  a  political 
crime  committed  in  the  past,  and  for  the  future  sure  guarantees  that 
the  anti- Austrian  intrigues  will  be  put  an  end  to.  The  German 
Government  thinks  that  Russia  should  be  content  with  the  official 
and  formal  assurances  given  by  Austria,  to  the  effect  that  she  does 
not  seek  territorial  aggrandisement  and  that  she  will  respect  the  in- 
tegrity of  Servia ;  in  these  circumstances  the  danger  of  war  can  only 
come  from  Russia,  if  she  seeks  to  intervene  in  a  question  which  is 
well  defined.  In  these  circumstances  any  action  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  peace  must  therefore  take  place  at  St.  Petersburgh  alone. 

This  sophism,^  which  would  relieve  Germany  from  intervening  at 
Vienna,  has  been  maintained  unsuccessfully  at  Paris  by  Herr  von 
Schoen,  who  has  vainly  endeavoured  to  draw  us  into  identical  Franco- 
German  action  at  St.  Petersburgh ;  it  has  been  also  expounded  in 
London  to  Sir  E.  Grey.  In  France,  as  in  England,  a  reply  was  given 
that  the  St.  Petersburgh  Cabinet  have,  from  the  beginning,  given 
the  greatest  proofs  of  their  moderation,  especially  by  associating 
themselves  with  the  Powers  in  advising  Servia  to  yield  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  Austrian  note.  Russia  does  not  therefore  in  any 
way  threaten  peace ;  it  is  at  Vienna  that  action  must  be  taken ;  it 
is  from  there  that  the  danger  will  come,  from  the  moment  that  they 
refuse  to  be  content  with  the  almost  complete  submission  of  Servia 
to  exorbitant  demands ;  that  they  refuse  to  accept  the  co-operation 
of  the  Powers  in  the  discussion  of  the  points  which  remain  to  be 
arranged  between  Austria  and  Servia ;  and,  finally,  that  they  do  not 
hesitate  to  make  a  declaration  of  war  as  precipitate  as  the  original 
Austro-Hungarian  note. 

The  attitude  at  Berlin,  as  at  Vienna,  is  still  dilatory.  In  the 
former  capital,  while  protesting  that  the  Germans  desire  to  safe- 

1  The  U.  S.  diplomatic  agent,  Mr.  F.  H.  Mallett,  reported  to  the  Department  of 
State  in  Washington  at  the  time  that  the  Serajevo  murder  was  undoubtedly  instigated 
by  Serbia,  and  that  a  world  war  might  ensue.     See  New  York  Herald,  July  30,  1914. 

'  For  Germany's  explanation  of  her  action,  see  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  1, 
and  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28,  with  note. 

'  Granting  that  this  term  is  used  in  all  sincerity,  it  shows  how  widely  apart  France 
and  Germany  were  in  viewing  the  events  leading  up  to  the  war,  since  the  expression 
of  Germany's  honest  belief  appeared  as  a  "  sophism  "  to  France. 


July  29,  French  Yellow  Booh  No.  87  283 

guard  general  peace  by  common  action  between  the  four  Powers,  the 
idea  of  a  conference  is  rejected  without  any  other  expedient  being 
suggested/  and  while  they  refuse  to  take  any  positive  action  at 
Vienna.  In  the  Austrian  capital  they  would  like  to  keep  St.  Peters- 
burgh  in  play  with  the  illusion  of  an  entente  which  might  result 
from  direct  conversations,  while  they  are  taking  action  against 
Servia. 

In  these  circumstances  it  seems  essential  that  the  St.  Petersburgh 
Cabinet,  whose  desire  to  unravel  this  crisis  peacefully  is  manifest, 
should  immediately  give  their  adherence  to  the  British  proposal.^ 
This  proposal  must  be  strongly  supported  at  Berlin  in  order  to  decide 
Herr  von  Jagow  to  take  real  action  at  Vienna  capable  of  stopping 
Austria  and  preventing  her  from  supplementing  her  diplomatic  ad- 
vantage by  military  successes.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
would,  indeed,  not  be  slow  to  take  advantage  of  it  in  order  to  im- 
pose on  Servia,  under  the  elastic  expression  of  "guarantees,"  condi- 
tions which,  in  spite  of  all  assurances  that  no  territorial  aggrandise- 
ment was  being  sought,  would  in  effect  modify  the  status  of  Eastern 
Europe,  and  would  run  the  risk  of  gravely  compromising  the  general 
peace  either  at  once  or  in  the  near  future. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From  St  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  86 

M.  Paleologuey  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  29,  1914. 
I  AM  now  in  a  position  to  assure  Your  Excellency  that  the  Russian 
Government  will  acquiesce  in  any  measures  which  France  and  Great 
Britain  may  propose  in  order  to  maintain  peace.     My  British  col- 
league is  telegraphing  to  London  to  the  same  effect.^ 

Paleologue. 

From  Brussels 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  87 

M.  Klobukowski,  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Brussels,  July  29,  1914. 
I   REPORT  the   following   impressions  of  my  interview  with  M. 
Davignon  and  with  several  persons  in  a  position  to  have  exact  in- 

1  This  is  an  error,  see  Chancellor's  Speech  in  note  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July 
28. 

2  This  shows  that  Russia  had  not  accepted  the  conference  idea  on  July  29.  France 
and  Russia,  therefore,  seem  to  be  working  somewhat  at  variance  with  each  other  — 
see,  however,  next  number.  ,      c^  e,       .,i- 

3  British  Blue  Book  No.  78,  July  29,  which  gives  as  the  reason  for  Sazonof  s  willmg- 
ness  to  have  a  conference  that  the  "Austrian  Government  had  now  definitely  declined 
direct  conversation."  See,  however,  Chancellor's  Speech  in  note  to  British  Blue  Book 
No.  67,  July  28. 


284  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

formation.  The  attitude  of  Germany  is  enigmatical  and  justifies 
every  apprehension ;  it  seems  improbable  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  would  have  taken  an  initiative  which  would  lead,  ac- 
cording to  a  pre-conceived  plan,  to  a  declaration  of  war,  without 
previous  arrangement  with  the  Emperor  William.^ 

The  German  Government  stand  ''with  grounded  arms''  ready  to 
take  peaceful  or  warlike  action  as  circumstances  may  require,  but 
there  is  so  much  anxiety  everywhere  that  a  sudden  intervention 
against  us  would  not  surprise  anybody  here.  My  Russian  and 
British  colleagues  share  this  feeling. 

The  Belgian  Government  are  taking  steps  which  harmonise  with 
the  statement  made  to  me  yesterday  by  M.  Davignon  that  every- 
thing will  be  put  in  readiness  for  the  defence  of  the  neutrality  of  the 
country. 

Klobukowski. 

From  Frankfort 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  88 

M.  Ronssin,  French  Consul-General  at  Frankfort^  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Frankfort,  July  29,  1914. 

I  NOTIFY  you  of  important  movements  of  troops  yesterday  and 
to-night.  This  morning  several  regiments  in  service  dress  arrived 
here,  especially  by  the  roads  from  Darmstadt,  Cassel,  and  Mayence, 
which  are  full  of  soldiers.  The  bridges  and  railways  are  guarded 
under  the  pretext  ^  of  preparations  for  the  autumn  manoeuvres. 

Ronssin. 

From  Munich 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  89' 

M.  Allize,  French  Minister  at  Munich,  to  M.  Bienvenu- Martin,  Act- 
ing Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Munich,  July  29,  1914. 

I  AM  informed  that  the  mills  at  Illkirch  (Alsace-Lorraine)  have 
been  asked  to  stop  delivery  to  their  ordinary  clients  and  to  keep  all 
their  output  for  the  army. 

From  Strassburg  information  has  been  received  of  the  transport 
of  motor  guns  used  for  firing  on  aeroplanes  and  dirigibles. 

Under  the  pretext  of  a  change  in  the  autumn  manoeuvres  the  non- 
commissioned officers  and  men  of  the  Bavarian  infantry  regiments  at 

^  This  seems  to  have  been  France's  firm  conviction.  For  a  discussion  of  Germany's 
influence  or  lack  of  influence  on  Austria-Hungary  see  John  W.  Burgess,  The  European 
War,  A.  C.  McClurg  &  Co.,  Chicago. 

2  The  annual  manoeuvres  in  Germany  begin  in  July.  For  the  subject  of  German 
mobilisation  see  M.  G.  Price,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  Chas.  Scribner's 
Sons,  and  E.  von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  View. 

»  See  note  to  No.  88. 


July  29,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  91  285 

Metz,  who  were  on  leave  in  Bavaria  for  the  harvest,  received  orders 
yesterday  to  return  immediately. 

Allize. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  90* 

M,  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  29,  1914. 

The  French  Consul  at  Prague  confirms  the  mobilisation  of  the 
8th  army  corps  which  had  already  been  announced,  and  that  of  the 
Landwehr  division  of  this  army  corps.  The  cavalry  divisions  in 
Galicia  are  also  mobilising;  regiments  and  cavalry  divisions  from 
Vienna  and  Budapest  have  already  been  transported  to  the  Russian 
frontier.     Reservists  are  now  being  called  together  in  this  district. 

There  is  a  rumour  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  in 
order  to  be  in  a  position  to  meet  any  danger,  and  perhaps  in  order 
to  impress  St.  Petersburgh,  intend  to  decide  on  a  general  mobilisa- 
tion of  their  forces  on  the  30th  July,  or  the  1st  August.  To  conclude, 
it  is  certain  the  Emperor  will  return  from  Ischl  to  Vienna  to-morrow. 

Dumaine. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  91 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  29,  1914. 

The  direct  conversation,  to  which  the  Russian  Government  had 
invited  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  in  a  friendly  spirit,  has 
been  refused  by  the  latter.^ 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Russian  General  Staff  have  satisfied  them- 
selves that  Austria  is  hurrying  on  her  military  preparations  against 
Russia,  and  is  pressing  forward  the  mobilisation  which  has  begun  on 
the  Galician  frontier.  As  a  result  the  order  to  mobilise  will  be  de- 
spatched to-night  to  thirteen  army  corps,  which  are  destined  to 
operate  eventually  against  Austria. 

In  spite  of  the  failure  of  his  proposal,  M.  Sazonof  accepts  ^  the 
idea  of  a  conference  of  the  four  Powers  in  London ;  further,  he  does 
not  attach  any  importance  to  the  title  officially  given  to  the  discus- 
sions, and  will  support  all  British  efforts  in  favour  of  peace. 

Paleologue. 

1  See  note  to  No.  88. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  78,  July  29,  and  for  the  error  in  this  statement 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 

3  This  contains  the  information  given  above  as  a  separate  telegram,  No.  86. 


286  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  92 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Bienvenun 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  29,  1914. 

I  ASKED  the  Secretary  of  State  to-day  ^  how  the  question  of  direct 
conversations  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh,  which  seemed 
to  him  yesterday  the  best  means  of  arriving  at  a  detente,  stood.  He 
answered  that  at  St.  Petersburgh  they  seemed  well  disposed  towards 
them  and  that  he  had  asked  Vienna  to  take  this  course.  He  was 
awaiting  the  reply.  The  British  Government,  after  seeing  the  sug- 
gestion of  a  conference  rejected,  had  let  it  be  known  that  they  would 
view  with  favour  the  inception  of  such  conversations  between  Austria 
and  Russia,  and  had  asked  Germany  to  urge  Austria,  which  the  Im- 
perial Government  are  not  failing  to  do. 

I  asked  Herr  von  Jagow  if  he  had  at  last  received  the  Servian 
reply  to  Austria  and  what  he  thought  of  it.  He  replied  that  he  saw 
in  it  a  basis  for  possible  negotiation.^  I  added  that  it  was  just  on 
that  account  that  I  considered  the  rupture  by  Austria,  after  she  had 
received  such  a  document,  inexplicable. 

The  Secretary  of  State  then  remarked  that  with  Eastern  nations 
one  could  never  obtain  sufficient  guarantees,  and  that  Austria  wished 
to  be  able  to  supervise  the  carrying  out  of  promises  made  to  her,  a 
supervision  which  Servia  refused.  This,  in  the  eyes  of  the  Secretary 
of  State,  is  the  cardinal  point.  I  answered  Herr  von  Jagow  that 
Servia,  as  she  wished  to  remain  independent,  was  bound  to  reject 
the  control  of  a  single  Power,  but  that  an  International  Commission 
would  not  have  the  same  character.  The  Balkan  States  have  more 
than  one,  for  instance  the  Financial  Commission  at  Athens.  One 
could  imagine,  I  said,  for  instance,  among  other  combinations,  a  Pro- 
visional International  Commission,  charged  with  the  duty  of  control- 
ling the  police  inquiry  demanded  by  Austria ;  it  was  clear,  by  this 
instance,  that  the  reply  of  Servia  opened  the  door  to  conversations 
and  did  not  justify  a  rupture. 

1  then  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  if,  leaving  aside  direct  conver- 
sations between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  to  which  Sir  E.  Grey 
had  given  his  adherence,  he  did  not  think  that  common  action  could 
be  exercised  by  the  four  Powers  by  means  of  their  Ambassadors. 
He  answered  in  the  affirmative,  adding  that  at  this  moment  the 
London  Cabinet  were  confining  themselves  to  exercising  their  in- 
fluence in  support  of  direct  conversations. 

At  the  end  of  the  afternoon  the  Imperial  Chancellor  asked  the 

*  The  contents  of  this  telegram  seem  to  refer  to  events  of  the  previous  day. 

2  This  cannot  possibly  have  been  said  on  July  29,  since  Austria-Hungary  had  de- 
clared war  on  Serbia,  and  the  latter  had  begun  the  hostilities  on  July  27,  cf.  British 
Blue  Book  No.  56  under  date  of  July  28. 


July  29,  French  Yellow  Booh  No.  93  287 

British  Ambassador  to  come  and  see  him.^  He  spoke  to  him  of  the 
proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey  for  the  meeting  of  a  conference ;  he  told  him 
that  he  had  not  been  able  to  accept  a  proposal  which  seemed  to  im- 
pose the  authority  of  the  Powers  on  Austria;  he  assured  my  col- 
league of  his  sincere  desire  for  peace  and  of  the  efforts  he  was  mak- 
ing to  that  effect  at  Vienna,  but  he  added  that  Russia  was  alone  able 
to  maintain  peace  or  let  loose  war. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  answered  that  he  did  not  agree,  and  that  if  war 
broke  out  Austria  would  be  chiefly  responsible,  for  it  was  inadmis- 
sible for  her  to  have  broken  with  Servia  after  the  reply  of  the  latter. 

Without  discussing  this  point,  the  Chancellor  said  that  he  was 
trying  his  utmost  to  obtain  direct  conversations  between  Austria 
and  Russia;  he  knew  that  England  looked  on  such  conversations 
with  a  favourable  eye.  He  added  that  his  own  action  would  be 
rendered  very  difficult  at  Vienna,  if  it  were  true  that  Russia  had 
mobilised  fourteen  army  corps  on  the  Austrian  frontier.  He  asked 
my  colleague  to  call  Sir  E.  Grey's  attention  to  what  he  had  said. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  has  telegraphed  to  London  to  this  effect.^ 

The  attitude  of  the  Chancellor  is  very  probably  the  result  of  the 
last  interview  of  Sir  E.  Grey  with  Prince  Lichnowsky.  Up  to  quite 
the  last  days  they  flattered  themselves  here  that  England  would 
remain  out  of  the  question,  and  the  impression  produced  on  the  Ger- 
man Government  and  on  the  financiers  and  business  men  by  her 
attitude  is  profound. 

Jules  Cambon. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  93' 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Vienna,  July  29,  1914. 

The  opinion  of  my  British,  Russian  and  Italian  colleagues  agrees 
with  mine  concerning  the  impossibility  of  preventing  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  between  Austria  and  Servia,  since  all  attempts  to  avoid 
the  collision  have  failed. 

M.  Schebeko  had  asked  that  the  negotiations  begun  at  St.  Peters- 
•  burgh  by  MM.  Sazonof  and  Szapary  should  be  continued  and  made 
more  effective  by  special  powers  being  conferred  on  the  latter,  but 
Count  Berchtold  has  flatly  refused.  He  showed  in  this  way  that 
Austria-Hungary  does  not  tolerate  any  intervention  which  would 
prevent  her  from  inflicting  punishment  and  humiliation  on  Servia. 

The  Duke  of  Avarna  admits  that  it  is  very  probable  that  the  im- 
minence of  a  general  insurrection  among  the  Southern  Slav  inhab- 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  71,  July  28,  received  and  listed  under  July  29.  This 
interview  took  place  on  July  28,  and  proves  that  this  French  despatch  is  wrongly 
dated. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  71,  July  28,  but  received  and  therefore  hsted  under  July  29. 

3  This  despatch,  like  the  previous  one,  while  dated  July  29,  must  have  been  written 
before  Austria-Hungary  declared  war  on  Serbia,  which  was  on  July  28. 


288  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

itants  precipitated  the  resolutions  of  the  Monarchy.  He  still  clings 
to  the  hope  that,  after  a  first  success  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  arms, 
.but  not  before  this,  mediation  might  be  able  to  limit  the  conflict. 

DUMAINE. 

To  London,  Berlin,  St.  Petershurgh,  Rome,  Vienna,  Constantinople, 

Belgrade 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  94 

M.  Bienmnu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  London, 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburgh,  Rome,  Vienna,  Constantinople,  Belgrade. 

Paris,  July  29,  1914. 

The  following  communication  was  semi-officially  made  to  me  this 
morning  by  the  German  Ambassador :  — 

"The  German  Government  are  still  continuing  their  efforts  to 
obtain  the  consent  of  the  Austrian  Government  to  a  friendly  con- 
versation which  would  give  the  latter  an  opportunity  of  stating 
exactly  the  object  and  extent  of  the  operations  in  Servia.  The 
Berlin  Cabinet  hope  to  receive  declarations  which  will  be  of  a  kind 
to  satisfy  Russia.  The  German  efforts  are  in  no  way  impeded  by  the 
declaration  of  war  which  has  occurred."  A  similar  communication 
will  be  made  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

During  the  course  of  a  conversation  which  I  had  this  morning 
with  Baron  von  Schoen,  the  latter  stated  to  me  that  the  German 
Government  did  not  know  what  the  intentions  of  Vienna  were. 
When  Berlin  knows  how  far  Austria  wishes  to  go,  there  will  be  a 
basis  of  discussion  which  will  make  conversations  with  a  view  to 
intervention  easier. 

When  I  observed  that  the  military  operations  which  had  been 
begun  would  not  perhaps  allow  any  time  for  conversation,  and  that 
the  German  Government  ought  to  use  their  influence  at  Vienna  to 
delay  them,  the  Ambassador  answered  that  Berlin  could  not  exer- 
cise any  pressure,  but  that  he  hoped  that  the  operations  would  not 
be  pushed  forward  very  actively. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

To  London,  Berlin,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Constantinople,  Rome, 

Belgrade 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  95 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  London, 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Constantinople,  Rome,  Belgrade. 

Paris,  July  29,  1914. 

M.  IsvoLSKY  came  to  me  by  order  of  his  Government  to  commu- 
nicate a  telegram  addressed  by  M.  Sazonof  to  Berlin.^     It  appears 

*  This  telegram  is  not  published  either  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book  or  the  German 
White  Book.  It  may  be  the  telegram  British  Blue  Book  No.  70  published  under 
date  of  July  29. 


July  29,  ^French  Yellow  Book  No.  96  289 

from  this  information  that,  in  consequence  of  the  declaration  of  war 
by  Austria-Hungary  on  Servia,  the  measures  of  mobiHsation  already 
taken  with  regard  to  the  largest  part  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army, 
and  finally  the  refusal  ^  of  Count  Berchtold  to  continue  negotiations 
between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh,  Russia  had  decided  to  mobilise 
in  the  provinces  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow  and  Kazan.  While  in- 
forming the  German  Government  to  this  effect,  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Berlin  was  instructed  to  add  that  these  military  precautions 
were  not  in  any  way  directed  against  Germany,  and  also  did  not 
imply  aggressive  measures  against  Austria-Hungary;  furthermore 
the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  had  not  been  recalled. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  also  gave  me  the  substance  of  two  tele- 
grams ^  addressed  to  London  by  M.  Sazonof :  the  first,  after  point- 
ing out  that  the  declaration  of  war  on  Servia  put  an  end  to  the  con- 
versations of  the  Russian  Minister  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador, 
asked  England  to  exercise  her  influence,  as  quickly  as  possible,  with 
a  view  to  mediation  and  to  the  immediate  cessation  of  Austrian 
military  operations  (the  continuation  of  which  gave  Austria  time  to 
crush  Servia  while  mediation  was  dragging  on) ;  the  second  com- 
municated the  impression  received  by  M.  Sazonof  from  his  conver- 
sations with  the  German  Ambassador  that  Germany  favours  Austria's 
uncompromising  attitude  and  is  not  exercising  any  influence  on  her. 
The  Russian  Minister  thinks  that  the  attitude  of  Germany  is  very 
disquieting,^  and  considers  that  England  is  in  a  better  position  than 
the  other  Powers  to  take  steps  at  Berlin  with  a  view  to  exercising 
pressure  on  Vienna. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 

From  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  96 

M.  Barrere,  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  M.  Bienvenu-Martin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Rome,  July  29,  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  been  officially  informed  by 
the  Russian  Ambassador  that  his  Government,  in  consequence  of 
the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria  on  Servia  and  of  the  measures  of 
mobilisation  which  were  from  this  moment  being  taken  by  Austria, 
had  given  the  order  to  mobilise  in  the  districts  of  Kieff,  Odessa, 
Moscow  and  Kazan.^  He  added  that  this  step  had  no  aggressive 
character  against  Germany,  and  that  the  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  had  not  been  recalled. 

In  speaking  of  this  communication  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano 
told  me  that  unfortunately  throughout  this  affair  Austria  and  Ger- 
many had  been,  and  were  still,  convinced  that  Russia  would  not 

1  For  the  error  of  this  statement  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 

2  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  93,  2  and  3,  July  30.  ■,  .  . 

3  This  statement  is  not  contained  in  the  despatch  presented  in  London. 
*  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  48,  July  29. 

TJ 


290  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

move.  In  this  connection  he  read  to  me  a  despatch  from  M.  Bollati 
reporting  an  interview  which  he  had  had  yesterday  with  Herr  von 
Jagow,  in  which  the  latter  had  again  repeated  to  him  that  he  did 
not  think  that  Russia  would  move.  He  based  this  belief  on  the  fact 
that  the  Russian  Government  had  just  sent  an  agent  to  Berlin  to 
treat  about  some  financial  questions.  The  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  also  told  his  British  colleague  that  he  did  not  believe  in  a  general 
war,  since  Russia  was  not  in  the  mood  or  in  the  condition  to  make 
war.^ 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  does  not  share  this  opinion.  He 
thinks  that  if  Austria  contents  herself  with  humiliating  Servia  and 
with  exacting,  besides  the  acceptance  of  the  note,  some  material 
advantages  which  do  not  involve  her  territory,  Russia  can  still  find 
some  means  of  coming  to  an  agreement  with  her.  But  if  Austria 
wishes  either  to  dismember  Servia  or  to  destroy  her  as  an  independent 
State,  he  thinks  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  Russia  not  to  inter- 
vene by  military  measures. 

In  spite  of  the  extreme  gravity  of  the  situation,  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  does  not  seem  to  me  to  despair  of  the  possibility  of 
an  agreement.  He  thinks  that  England  can  still  exercise  a  great 
deal  of  influence  at  Berlin  in  the  direction  of  peace.  He  had  yester- 
day, he  told  me,  a  long  conversation  with  the  British  Ambassador, 
Sir  R.  Rodd,^  in  order  to  show  him  to  what  extent  British  interven- 
tion might  be  effective.  He  said  to  me  in  conclusion,  "If  your 
Government  are  of  the  same  opinion,  they  could  on  their  side  make 
representations  to  this  effect  in  London."^  Rat^rfrf 

To  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  97 

M.  RenS  Vivianiy  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London. 

Paris,  July  29,  1914. 

I  SHOULD  be  obliged  if  you  would  ask  Sir  E.  Grey  to  be  good 
enough  to  renew  as  soon  as  possible  at  Berlin,  in  the  form  which  he 
may  consider  most  opportune  and  effective,  his  proposal  of  media- 
tion by  the  four  Powers,  which  had  in  principle  ^  obtained  the  ad- 
herence of  the  German  Government. 

The  Russian  Government  on  their  side  will  have  expressed  the 
same  desire  directly  to  the  British  Government ;  the  declaration  of 
war  by  Austria  on  Servia,  her  sending  of  troops  to  the  Austro-Rus- 
sian  frontier,^  the  consequent  Russian  mobilisation  on  the  Galician 

1  This  statement,  if  true,  seems  to  disprove  the  assertion  popularly  made  that 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  wished  to  bring  about  a  general  war. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  57,  written  July  27,  but  received  and  published  under 
date  of  July  28.  Barr^re  says  "yesterday,"  which  shows  that  also  this  telegram  was 
written,  at  least  in  part,  on  July  28. 

»  For  this  interview  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  80,  July  29. 

*  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27. 

'  There  is  no  proof  given  for  this  assertion. 


July  29,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  98  291 

frontier  have  in  fact  put  an  end  to  the  direct  Austro-Russian  con- 
versations. 

The  explanations  which  the  German  Government  are  going  to 
ask  for  at  Vienna,  in  accordance  with  the  statement  of  Baron  von 
Schoen  which  I  have  reported  to  you,  in  order  to  learn  the  intention 
of  the  Austrian  Government,  will  allow  the  four  Powers  to  exercise 
effective  action  between  Vienna  and  St.  Peter sburgh  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace. 

I  would  ask  you  also  to  point  out  to  the  British  Secretary  of  State 
how  important  it  would  be  for  him  to  obtain  from  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment the  most  whole-hearted  continuance  of  their  support  in 
co-operating  in  the  action  of  the  four  Powers  in  favour  of  peace. 

Rene  Viviani. 


From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  98 

M,  Paul  Camhon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  29,  191Jf.. 

In  his  interview  to-day  with  my  German  colleague.  Sir  E.  Grey 
observed  that,  the  overtures  of  M.  Sazonof  for  direct  conversations 
between  Russia  and  Austria  not  having  been  accepted  ^  at  Vienna, 
it  would  be  well  to  return  to  his  proposal  of  friendly  intervention 
by  the  four  Powers  which  are  not  directly  interested.  This  sugges- 
tion has  been  accepted  in  principle  ^  by  the  German  Government, 
but  they  have  objected  to  the  idea  of  a  conference  or  of  mediation. 
The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  invited  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  to  ask  his  Government  that  they  should  themselves  propose 
a  new  formula.  Whatever  it  may  be,  if  it  admits  of  the  maintenance 
of  peace,  it  will  be  accepted  by  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy. 

The  German  Ambassador  was  to  have  forwarded  Sir  E.  Grey's 
request  to  Berlin  immediately.  In  giving  me  an  account  of  this 
conversation,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  added  that 
Germany's  reply  to  this  communication  and  to  that  of  Russia  con- 
cerning the  mobilisation  of  four  army  corps  on  the  Austrian  frontier 
would  allow  us  to  realise  the  intentions  of  the  German  Government. 
My  German  colleague  having  asked  Sir  E.  Grey  what  the  intentions 
of  the  British  Government  were,  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  replied  that  he  had  nothing  to  state  for  the  present. 

Sir  E.  Grey  did  not  disguise  the  fact  that  he  found  the  situation 
very  grave  and  that  he  had  little  hope  of  a  peaceful  solution. 

Paul  Cambon. 

1  This  error  makes  the  round  in  the  Entente  despatches.  Cf .  Austro-Hungarian 
Ked  Book  No.  47,  July  29,  where  Austria-Hungary,  while  unwilling  to  discuss  "the 
wording  of  the  note,"  makes  it  "clear  that  I  [Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador]  was  in  a 
position  to  suggest  a  much  broader  basis  of  discussion." 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27. 


292  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Belgrade 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  99 

M.  Boppe,  French  Minister  at  Belgrade,  to  M.  Bienvenu-AIartin, 
Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Belgrade,  July  29,  1914. 

The  Crown  Prince,  as  soon  as  the  Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum 
was  received,  telegraphed  ^  to  the  Tsar  to  ask  his  help.  My  Russian 
colleague  tells  me  that  he  has  just  communicated  to  M.  Pashitch 
His  Majesty's  reply. 

The  Tsar  thanks  ^  the  Prince  for  having  turned  to  him  at  so  critical 
a  juncture ;  he  declares  that  everything  has  been  done  to  arrive  at  a 
peaceful  solution  of  the  dispute,  and  formally  assures  the  Prince 
that,  if  this  object  cannot  be  attained,  Russia  will  never  cease  to 
interest  herself  in  the  fate  of  Servia. 

BOPPE. 

From  St.  Petershurgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  100 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petershurgh,  to  M.  Bien- 
venu-Martin,  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petershurgh,  July  29,  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  came  to  tell  M.  Sazonof  that  if  Russia 
does  not  stop  her  military  preparations  the  German  army  will  re- 
ceive the  order  to  mobilise. 

M.  Sazonof  replied  that  the  Russian  preparations  have  been 
caused,^  on  the  one  hand,  by  the  obstinate  and  uncompromising  atti- 
tude of  Austria,  and  on  the  other  hand  by  the  fact  that  eight  Austro- 
Hungarian  army  corps  are  already  mobilised. 

The  tong  in  which  Count  Pourtales  delivered  this  communication 
has  decided  the  Russian  Government  this  very  night  to  order  the 
mobilisation  of  the  thirteen  army  corps  which  are  to  operate  against 
Austria. 

Paleologue. 

Germany : 

To  Paris 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  17 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  Paris  on 
July  29th,  1914. 

News  received  here  regarding  French  preparations  of  war  multi- 
plies from  hour  to  hour.     I  request  that  you  call  the  attention  of  the 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  6,  July  24.  2  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  40,  July  27. 

'  According  to  this  despatch  part  of  the  Russian  mobilization  had  taken  place  pre- 
viously, while  part  was  to  be  ordered  on  the  evening  of  July  29.  As  regards  the  earlier 
mobilization  orders  cf.  the  word  of  honor  given  by  the  Russian  Chief  of  Staff,  German 
White  Book,  p.  556,  that  up  to  3  p.m.,  July  29,  "nowhere  there  had  been  a  mobilisa- 
tion, viz.  calling  in  of  a  single  man  or  horse." 


July  29,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  22  293 

French  Government  to  this  and  accentuate  that  such  measures  would 
call  forth  counter-measures  on  our  part.  We  should  have  to  pro- 
claim threatening  state  of  war  {drohende  Kriegsgefahr),  and  while 
this  would  not  mean  a  call  for  the  reserves  or  mobilisation,  yet  the 
tension  would  be  aggravated.  We  continue  to  hope  for  the  preser- 
vation of  peace. 

From  the  Czar 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  21 

II.  The  Czar  to  His  Majesty. 

Peterhof  Palace,  July  29th,  1  P.M. 

I  AM  glad  that  You  are  back  in  Germany.  In  this  serious  moment 
I  ask  You  earnestly  to  help  me.  An  ignominious  war  has  been 
declared  against  a  weak  country  and  in  Russia  the  indignation 
which  I  fully  share  is  tremendous.  I  fear  that  very  soon  I  shall  be 
unable  to  resist  the  pressure  exercised  upon  me  and'  that  I  shall 
be  forced  to  take  measures  which  will  lead  to  war.  To  prevent  such  a 
calamity  as  a  European  war  would  be,  I  urge  You  in  the  name  of 
our  old  friendship  to  do  all  in  Your  power  to  restrain  Your  ally 
from  going  too  far. 

(Signed)     ^  Nicolas. 

To  St.  Petersburgh 
German  White  Book  Exhibit  22 

III.  His  Majesty  to  the  Czar. 

July  29th,  6.30  P.M. 

I  HAVE  received  Your  telegram  and  I  share  Your  desire  for  the 
conservation  of  peace.  However  :  I  cannot  —  as  I  told  You  in  my 
first  telegram  —  consider  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  as  an  "  igno- 
minious war."  Austria-Hungary  knows  from  experience  that  the 
promises  of  Servia  as  long  as  they  are  merely  on  paper  are  entirely 
unreliable. 

According  to  my  opinion  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  is  to  be 
considered  as  an  attempt  to  receive  full  guaranty  that  the  promises 
of  Servia  are  effectively  translated  into  deeds.  In  this  opinion  I  am 
strengthened  by  the  explanation  of  the  Austrian  Cabinet  that  Aus- 
tria-Hungary intended  no  territorial  gain  at  the  expense  of  Servia. 
I  am  therefore  of  opinion  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  for  Russia  to 
remain  a  spectator  in  the  Austro-Servian  war  without  drawing 
Europe  into  the  most  terrible  war  it  has  ever  seen.  I  believe  that  a 
direct  understanding  is  possible  and  desirable  between  Your  Govern- 
ment and  Vienna,  an  understanding  which  —  as  I  have  already 
telegraphed  You  —  my  Government  endeavours  to  aid  with  all  pos- 
sible effort.  Naturally  military  measures  by  Russia,  which  might 
be  construed  as  a  menace  by  Austria-Hungary,  would  accelerate  a 
calamity  which  both  of  us  desire  to  avoid  and  would  undermine 


294  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

my  position  as  mediator  which  —  upon  Your  appeal  to  my  friend- 
ship and  aid  —  I  wiUingly  accepted. 

(Signed)  Wilhelm. 

Great  Britain: 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  70 

Telegrams  communicated  by  Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador 
in  London,  July  29,  1914. 

(1.)   Telegram  from  M.  Sazonof  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
dated  Jidy  28,  1914. 

In  consequence  of  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria  against  Ser- 
via,  the  Imperial  Government  will  announce  to-morrow  (29th)  the 
mobilisation  in  the  military  circumscriptions  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Mos- 
cow, and  Kazan.  Please  inform  German  Government,  confirming 
the  absence  in  Russia  of  any  aggressive  intention  against  Germany. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  has  not  been  recalled  from 
his  post. 

(2.)   Telegram  to  Courd  Benckendorff.^ 

The  Austrian  declaration  of  war  clearly  puts  an  end  ^  to  the  idea 
of  direct  communications  between  Austria  and  Russia.  Action  by 
London  Cabinet  in  order  to  set  on  foot  mediation  with  a  view  to 
suspension  of  military  operations  of  Austria  against  Servia  is  now 
most  urgent. 

Unless  military  operations  are  stopped,  mediation  would  only 
allow  matters  to  drag  on  and  give  Austria  time  to  crush  Servia.^ 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  71 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,-  July  28,  1914. 

At  invitation  of  Imperial  Chancellor,  I  called  upon  his  Excellency 
this  evening."^  He  said  that  he  wished  me  to  tell  you  that  he  was 
most  anxious  that  Germany  should  work  together  with  England  for 
maintenance  of  general  peace,  as  they  had  done  successfully  in  the 

^  Russian  Ambassador  in  London. 

2  This  seems  to  indicate  that  Sazonof  considered  the  direct  conversations  closed. 
Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29,  and  footnote  1  to  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  98,  July  29. 

'  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  95,  July  29,  where  two  telegrams  from  Sazonof  to 
Count  BenckendorfT  are  mentioned.  The  second  one  is  not  given  here.  It  was  of  a 
kind  to  arouse  suspicion  of  Germany.  There  is,  however,  nothing  either  in  the  British 
Blue  Book  or  the  Russian  Orange  Book  that  would  have  borne  it  out. 

*  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  92,  July  29. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  72  295 

last  European  crisis.  He  had  not  been  able  to  accept  your  proposal 
for  a  conference  ^  of  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers,  because  he 
did  not  think  that  it  would  be  effective,  and  because  such  a  con- 
ference would  in  his  opinion  have  had  appearance  of  an  "Areopagus" 
consisting  of  two  Powers  of  each  group  sitting  in  judgment  upon 
the  two  remaining  Powers;  but  his  inability  to  accept  proposed 
conference  must  not  be  regarded  as  militating  against  his  strong 
desire  for  effective  co-operation.  You  could  be  assured  that  he  was 
doing  his  very  best  both  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  to  get  the 
two  Governments  to  discuss  the  situation  directly  with  each  other 
and  in  a  friendly  way.  He  had  great  hopes  that  such  discussions 
would  take  place  and  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result,  but  if  the  news 
were  true  which  he  had  just  read  in  the  papers,  that  Russia  had 
mobilised  fourteen  army  corps  in  the  south,  he  thought  situation 
was  very  serious,  and  he  himself  would  be  in  a  very  difficult  position, 
as  in  these  circumstances  it  Avould  be  out  of  his  power  to  continue 
to  preach  moderation  at  Vienna.  He  added  that  Austria,  who  as 
yet  was  only  partially  mobilising,  would  have  to  take  similar  meas- 
ures, and  if  war  were  to  result,  Russia  would  be  entirely  responsible.^ 
I  ventured  to  say  that  if  Austria  refused  to  take  any  notice  of  Servian 
note,  which,  to  my  mind,  gave  way  in  nearly  every  point  demanded 
by  Austria,  and  which  in  any  case  offered  a  basis  for  discussion, 
surely  a  certain  portion  of  responsibility  would  rest  with  her.  His 
Excellency  said  that  he  did  not  wish  to  discuss  Servian  note,  but 
that  Austria's  standpoint,  and  in  this  he  agreed,  was  that  her  quarrel 
with  Servia  was  a  purely  Austrian  concern  with  which  Russia  had 
nothing  to  do.  He  reiterated  his  desire  to  co-operate  with  England 
and  his  intention  to  do  his  utmost  to  maintain  general  peace.  "A 
war  between  the  Great  Powers  must  be  avoided"  were  his  last 
words. 

Austrian  colleague  said  to  me  to-day  that  a  general  war  was  most 
unlikely,  as  Russia  neither  wanted  nor  was  in  a  position  to  make  war. 
I  think  that  that  opinion  is  shared  by  many  people  here.^ 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  72 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey.  —  {Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  28,  1914. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  begged  me  to  thank  you  for  the 
language  you  had  held  to  the  German  Ambassador,  as  reported  in 

1  From  British  Blue  Book  No.  46,  July  27,  it  appears  that  Germany  had  accepted 
"in  principle  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia  by  the  four  Powers." 

2  This  claim  made  on  July  29  is  important  because  later  France  wished  to  make  it 
appear  that  Germany  was  not  sincere  and  advanced  this  argument  too  late  to  deserve 
any  credence.     Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  127,  August  I- 

3  If  true  this  would  seem  to  disprove  the  charge  that  either  Germany  or  Austria- 
Hungary  was  plotting  to  bring  about  a  world  war. 


296  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

your  telegram  ^  to  Berlin,  substance  of  which  I  communicated  to  his 
Excellency.  He  took  a  pessimistic  view  of  the  situation,  having 
received  the  same  disquieting  ^  news  from  Vienna  as  had  reached  His 
Majesty's  Government.  I  said  it  was  important  that  we  should 
know  the  real  intentions  of  the  Imperial  Government,  and  asked  him 
whether  he  would  be  satisfied  with  the  assurances  which  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  had,  I  understood,  been  instructed  to  give  in  respect  of 
Servians  integrity  and  independence.  I  added  that  I  was  sure  any 
arrangement  for  averting  a  European  war  would  be  welcomed  by 
His  Majesty's  Government.  In  reply  his  Excellency  stated  that  if 
Servia  were  attacked  Russia  would  not  be  satisfied  with  any  engage- 
ment which  Austria  might  take  on  these  two  points,  and  that  order 
for  mobilisation  against  Austria  would  be  issued  on  the  day  that 
Austria  crossed  Servian  frontier. 

I  told  the  German  Ambassador,  who  appealed  to  me  to  give 
moderating  counsels  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  from 
the  beginning  I  had  not  ceased  to  do  so,  and  that  the  German  Am- 
bassador at  Vienna  should  now  in  his  turn  use  his  restraining  in- 
fluence. I  made  it  clear  to  his  Excellency  that,  Russia  being 
thoroughly  in  earnest,  a  general  war  could  not  be  averted  if  Servia 
were  attacked  by  Austria. 

As  regards  the  suggestion  of  conference,  the  Ambassador  had 
received  no  instructions,  and  before  acting  with  me  the  French  and 
Italian  Ambassadors  are  still  waiting  for  their  final  instructions. 


From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  73 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
—  (Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  note  verbale  from  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
stating  that,  the  Servian  Government  not  having  replied  to  note  of 
23rd  July  ^  in  a  satisfactory  manner,  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
is  compelled  itself  to  provide  for  protection  of  its  rights,  and  to  have 
recourse  for  that  object  to  force  of  arms.  Austria-Hungary  has  ad- 
dressed to  Servia  formal  declaration  according  to  article  1  of  con- 
vention of  18th  October,  1907,  relative  to  opening  of  hostilities,  and 
considers  herself  from  to-day  in  state  of  war  with  Servia.  Austria- 
Hungary  will  conform,  provided  Servia  does  so,  to  stipulations  of 
Hague  conventions  of  18th  October,  1907,  and  to  Declaration  of 
London  of  26th  February,  1909.^ 

1  See  No.  46,  July  27. 

«  Cf.  however,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 

»  See  No.  4,  July  24. 

*  In  view  of  later  events  this  declaration  of  Austria-Hungary  is  very  important. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  75  297 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  74 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
—  (Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

I  AM  informed  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  the  Russian 
Government's  suggestion^  has  been  decHned  by  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government.  The  suggestion  was  to  the  effect  that  the  means 
of  settling  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  should  be  discussed  directly 
between  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburgh,  who  should  be  authorised  accordingly. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  thinks  that  a  conference  in  London 
of  the  less  interested  Powers,  such  as  you  have  proposed,  offers  now 
the  only  prospect  of  preserving  peace  of  Europe,  and  he  is  sure  that 
the  Russian  Government  will  acquiesce  willingly  in  your  proposal. 
So  long  as  opposing  armies  have  not  actually  come  in  contact,  all 
hope  need  not  be  abandoned. 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  75 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  29,  1914. 

I  WAS  sent  for  again  to-day  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  told 
me  that  he  regretted  to  state  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment, to  whom  he  had  at  once  communicated  your  opinion,  had 
answered  that  events  had  marched  too  rapidly  and  that  it  was  there- 
fore too  late  ^  to  act  upon  your  suggestion  that  the  Servian  reply 
might  form  the  basis  of  discussion.  His  Excellency  had,  on  receiv- 
ing their  reply,  despatched  a  message  to  Vienna,  in  which  he  ex- 
plained that,  although  a  certain  desire  had,  in  his  opinion,  been 
shown  in  the  Servian  reply  to  meet  the  demands  of  Austria,  he  under- 
stood entirely  that,  without  some  sure  guarantees  that  Servia  would 
carry  out  in  their  entirety  the  demands  made  upon  her,  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  could  not  rest  satisfied  in  view  of  their  past 
experience.  He  had  then  gone  on  to  say  that  the  hostilities  which 
were  about  to  be  undertaken  against  Servia  had  presumably  the 
exclusive  object  of  securing  such  guarantees,  seeing  that  the  Aus- 
trian Government  had  already  assured  the  Russian  Government  that 
they  had  no  territorial  designs. 

He  advised  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  should  this  view 
be  correct,  to  speak  openly  in  this  sense.^    The  holding  of  such 

1  I.e.  direct  conversations.  That  this  was  an  error  appears  from  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 

2  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  44,  July  29. 

»  Austria-Hungary  did  so,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 


298  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

language  would,  he  hoped,  eliminate  all  possible  misunderstand- 
ings. 

As  yet,  he  told  me,  he  had  not  received  a  reply  from  Vienna. 

From  the  fact  that  he  had  gone  so  far  in  the  matter  of  giving 
advice  at  .Vienna,  his  Excellency  hoped  that  you  would  realise  that 
he  was  sincerely  doing  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  danger  of  Euro- 
pean complications. 

The  fact  of  his  communicating  this  information  to  you  was  a 
proof  of  the  confidence  which  he  felt  in  you  and  evidence  of  his 
anxiety  that  you  should  know  he  was  doing  his  best  to  support 
your  efforts  in  the  cause  of  general  peace,  efforts  which  he  sincerely 
appreciated. 

British  Blue  Book  No.  76 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  29,  1914. 

I  FOUND  Secretary  of  State  very  depressed  to-day.  He  reminded 
me  that  he  had  told  me  the  other  day  that  he  had  to  be  very  careful 
in  giving  advice  to  Austria,  as  any  idea  that  they  were  being  pressed 
would  be  likely  to  cause  them  to  precipitate  matters  and  present  a 
fait  accompli.  This  had,  in  fact,  now  happened,^  and  he  was  not 
sure  that  his  communication  of  your  suggestion  that  Servia's  reply 
offered  a  basis  for  discussion  had  not  hastened  declaration  of  war. 
He  was  much  troubled  by  reports  of  mobilisation  in  Russia,  and  of 
certain  military  measures,  which  he  did  not  specify,  being  taken  in 
France.  He  subsequently  spoke  of  these  measures  to  my  French 
colleague,  who  informed  him  that  French  Government  had  done 
nothing  more  than  the  German  Government  had  done,  namely,  re- 
called officers  on  leave.  His  Excellency  denied  German  Government 
had  done  this,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  true.^  iVIy  French  col- 
league said  to  Under-Secretary  of  State,  in  course  of  conversation, 
that  it  seemed  to  him  that  when  Austria  had  entered  Servia,  and  so 
satisfied  her  military  prestige,  the  moment  might  then  be  favourable 
for  four  disinterested  Powers  to ,  discuss  situation  and  come  for- 
ward with  suggestions  for  preventing  graver  complications.^  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  seemed  to  think  idea  worthy  of  consideration,  as 
he  replied  that  would  be  a  different  matter  from  conference  proposed 
by  you. 

Russian  Ambassador  returned  to-day,  and  has  informed  Imperial 
Government  that  Russia  is  mobilising  in  four  southern  governments. 

1  Germany  forwarded  Sir  E.  Grey's  proposal  to  Vienna  on  July  28,  and  on  the  same 
day  Austria-Hungary  declared  war  on  Serbia.  From  this  despatch  it  would  seem  that 
the  German  Secretary  of  State  feared  lest  it  was  his  urging  mediation  too  strongly 
that  had  induced  Vienna  to  declare  war. 

'  Whether  Sir  E.  Goschen  was  mistaken  in  this  statement  or  not,  it  is  impossible  to 
state  at  this  writing.  From  M.  P.  Price,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  Chas. 
Scribner's  Sons,  chapters  on  Mobilisation,  it  would  appear  that  the  above  statement 
was  erroneous.     See  also  E.  von  Mach,  Germany^ s  Point  of  View,  pp.  224  ff. 

'  This  seems  to  imply  France's  acquiescence  in  Austria-Hungary's  war  on  Serbia 
provided  she  did  not  press  it  too  far. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  78  299 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  77 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

I  MUCH  appreciate  the  language  of  Chancellor,  as  reported  in 
your  telegram  of  to-day.^  His  Excellency  may  rely  upon  it  that 
this  country  will  continue,  as  heretofore,  to  strain  every  effort  to 
secure  peace  and  to  avert  the  calamity  we  all  fear.  If  he  can  induce 
Austria  to  satisfy  Russia  and  to  abstain  from  going  so  far  as  to  come 
into  collision  with  her,  we  shall  all  join  in  deep  gratitude  to  his 
Excellency  for  having  saved  the  peace  of  Europe.^ 

From  St.  Petersburgh 
British  Blue  Book  No.  78 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey.  —  (Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  29,1914. 

Partial  mobilisation  was  ordered  to-day. 

I  communicated  the  substance  of  your  telegram  of  the  28th  in- 
stant ^  to  Berlin  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  accordance 
with  your  instructions,  and  informed  him  confidentially  of  remarks 
as  to  mobilisation  which  the  German  Secretary  of  State  had  made 
to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin.  This  had  already  reached  his 
Excellency  from  another  source.  The  mobilisation,  he  explained, 
would  only  be  directed  against  Austria. 

Austrian  Government  had  now  definitely  declined  ^  direct  conver- 
sation betw^een  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.  The  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  said  he  had  proposed  such  an  exchange  of  views  on 
advice  of  German  Ambassador.  He  proposed,  when  informing 
German  Ambassador  of  this  refusal  of  Austria's,  to  urge  that  a  return 
should  be  made  to  your  proposal  for  a  conference  of  four  Ambassa- 
dors, or,  at  all  events,  for  an  exchange  of  views  between  the  three 
Ambassadors  less  directly  interested,  yourself,  and  also  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  if  you  thought  it  advisable.  Any  arrangement  approved 
by  France  and  England  would  be  acceptable  to  him,  and  he  did  not 
care  what  form  such  conversations  took.  No  time  was  to  be  lost, 
and  the  only  way  to  avert  war  was  for  you  to  succeed  in  arriving, 
by  mean  of  conversations  with  Ambassadors  either  collectively  or 
individually,  at  some  formula  which  Austria  could  be  induced  to 

1  See  No.  75. 

2  This  was  written  after  Germany  had  found  herself  unable  to  accept  Sir  E. 
Grey's  first  plan  of  a  conference,  accepting  it,  however,  in  principle.  Since  the  out- 
break of  the  war  Germany  has  been  held  responsible  for  the  war  because  she  rejected 
the  conference  plan.  On  July  29  Sir  E.  Grey  apparently  did  not  hold  the  view  that 
Germainy's  refusal  of  accepting  his  conference  plan  either  indicated  Germany's  deter- 
mination to  have  war,  or  shut  the  door  to  all  pacific  efifoi:ts.  See  also  note  2  to  British 
Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28. 

3  See  No.  67,  July  28. 

^  This  is  the  same  error  previously  made  in  the  Entente  telegrams.  See  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 


300  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

accept.  Throughout  Russian  Government  had  been  perfectly  frank 
and  conciHatory,  and  had  done  all  in  their  power  to  maintain  peace. 
If  their  efforts  to  maintain  peace  failed,  he  trusted  that  it  would  be 
realised  by  the  British  pubhc  that  it  was  not  the  fault  of  the  Russian 
Government. 

I  asked  him  whether  he  would  raise  objections  if  the  suggestion 
made  in  Rome  telegram  of  the  27th  July/  which  I  mentioned  to  him, 
were  carried  out.  In  reply  his  Excellency  said  that  he  would  agree 
to  anything  arranged  by  the  four  Powers  provided  it  was  acceptable 
to  Servia;  he  could  not,  he  said,  be  more  Servian  than  Servia.^ 
Some  supplementary  statement  or  explanations  would,  however,  have 
to  be  made  in  order  to  tone  down  the  sharpness  of  the  ultimatum. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  proposal  referred  to  in  your 
telegram  of  the  28th  instant  ^  was  one  of  secondary  importance. 
Under  altered  circumstances  of  situation  he  did  not  attach  weight 
to  it.  Further,  the  German  Ambassador  had  informed  his  Excel- 
lency, so  the  latter  told  me,  that  his  Government  were  continuing  at 
Vienna  to  exert  friendly  influence.  I  fear  that  the  German  Ambas- 
sador will  not  help  to  smooth  matters  over,  if  he  uses  to  his  own 
Government  the  same  language  as  he  did  to  me  to-day.  He  accused 
the  Russian  Government  of  endangering  the  peace  of  Europe  by 
their  mobilisation,  and  said,  when  I  referred  to  all  that  had  been 
recently  done  by  Austria,  that  he  could  not  discuss  such  matters. 
I  called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  Austrian  consuls  had  warned 
all  Austrian  subjects  liable  to  military  service  to  join  the  colours, 
that  Austria  had  already  partially  mobilised,  and  had  now  declared 
war  on  Servia.  From  what  had  passed  during  the  Balkan  crisis  she 
knew  that  this  act  was  one  which  it  was  impossible  without  humilia- 
tion for  Russia  to  submit  to.  Had  not  Russia  by  mobilising  shown 
that  she  was  in  earnest,  Austria  would  have  traded  on  Russia's 
desire  for  peace,  and  would  have  believed  that  she  could  go  to  any 
lengths.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  given  me  to  understand 
that  Russia  would  not  precipitate  war  by  crossing  frontier  imme- 
diately, and  a  week  or  more  would,  in  any  case,  elapse  before  mobili- 
sation was  completed.  In  order  to  find  an  issue  out  of  a  dangerous 
situation  it  was  necessary  that  we  should  in  the  meanwhile  all  work 
together. 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  79 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna^  to  Sir  Edward 

Grey.  —  {Received  July  29.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  29,  1914. 

There  is  at  present  no  step  which  we  could  usefully  take  to  stop 
war  with  Servia,  to  which  Austro-Hungarian  Government  are  now 
fully  committed  by  the  Emperor's  appeal  to  his  people  which  has 

1  See  No.  57,  received  July  28. 

*  For  a  similar  phrase  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  47,  July  27. 

«  See  No.  69,  July  28. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  80  301 

been  published  this  morning,  and  by  the  declaration  of  war.  French 
and  Italian  Ambassadors  agree  with  me  in  this  view.  If  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  would  convert  into  a  binding  engagement 
to  Europe  the  declaration  which  has  been  made  at  St.  Petersburgh 
to  the  effect  that  she  desires  neither  to  destroy  the  independence  of 
Servia  nor  to  acquire  Servian  territory,  the  Italian  Ambassador 
thinks  that  Russia  might  be  induced  to  remain  quiet. ^  This,  how- 
ever, the  Italian  Ambassador  is  convinced  the  Austrian  Government 
would  refuse  to  do. 

From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  80 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  29,  1914. 

In  your  telegram  of  the  27th  instant  ^  to  Berlin,  German  Am- 
bassador was  reported  to  have  accepted  in  principle  the  idea  of  a 
conference.  This  is  in  contradiction  with  the  telegram  of  the  27th 
instant^  from  Berlin.^ 

Information  received  by  the  Italian  Government  from  Berlin 
shows  that  German  view  is  correctly  represented  in  Sir  E.  Goschen's 
telegram  of  the  27th  July,^  but  what  creates  difficulty  is  rather  the 
"conference,"  so  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  understands,  than 
the  principle.  He  is  going  to  urge,  in  a  telegram  which  he  is  sending 
to  Berlin  to-night,  adherence  to  the  idea  of  an  exchange  of  views  in 
London.  He  suggests  that  the  German  Secretary  of  State  might 
propose  a  formula  acceptable  to  his  Government.  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  is  of  opinion  that  this  exchange  of  views  would  keep  the 
door  open  if  direct  communication  between  Vienna  and  St.  Peters- 
burgh fails  to  have  any  result.  He  thinks  that  this  exchange  of 
views  might  be  concomitant  with  such  direct  communication. 

The  German  Government  are  also  being  informed  that  the  Italian 
Government  would  not  be  pardoned  by  public  opinion  here  unless 
they  had  taken  every  possible  step  so  as  to  avoid  war.  He  is  urging 
that  the  German  Government  must  lend  their  co-operation  in  this. 

He  added  that  there  seemed  to  be  a  difficulty  in  making  Germany 
believe  that  Russia  was  in  earnest.  As  Germany,  however,  was 
really  anxious  for  good  relations  with  ourselves,  if  she  believed  that 
Great  Britain  would  act  with  Russia  and  France  he  thought  it  would 
have  a  great  effect.^ 

1  If  the  Italian  Ambassador  was  right,  it  is  unfortunate  that  no  attempt  was 
made,  —  at  least  none  appear  in  the  despatches,  —  to  invite  Austria-Hungary^  to  take 
this  "binding  engagement." 

2  See  No.  46,  July  27. 

3  See  No.  43,  July  27. 

^  Cf.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  15,  July  27,  where  Germany  has  taken  action 
"in  the  sense  as  desired  by  Sir  Edward  Grey." 

5  See  No.  43,  July  27. 

^  It  is  interesting  to  have  Italy  use  the  same  argument  that  Russia  had  advanced 
as  early  as  July  24,  British  Blue  Book  No.  6. 


302  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Even  should  it  prove  impossible  to  induce  Germany  to  take  part, 
he  would  still  advocate  that  England  and  Italy,  each  as  representing 
one  group,  should  continue  to  exchange  views.^ 

To  Rome 
British  Blue  Book  No.  81 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Offix^e,  July  29,  1914. 

With  reference  to  your  telegram  of  yesterday.^ 

It  is  impossible  for  me  to  initiate  discussions  with  Ambassadors 
here,  as  I  understand  from  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that 
Austria  will  not  accept  any  discussion  on  basis  of  Servian  note,  and 
the  inference  of  all  I  have  heard  from  Vienna  and  Berlin  is  that  Aus- 
tria will  not  accept  any  form  of  mediation  by  the  Powers  as  between 
Austria  and  Servia.^  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  must 
therefore  speak  at  Berlin  and  Vienna.  I  shall  be  glad  if  a  favourable 
reception  is  given  to  any  suggestions  he  can  make  there. 

From  Constantinople 

British  Blue  Book  No.  82 

Mr.  Beaumont,  British  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Constantinople,  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey.  —  {Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  July  29,  1914- 

I  UNDERSTAND  that  the  designs  of  Austria  may  extend  consider- 
ably beyond  the  sanjak  and  a  punitive  occupation  of  Servian  terri- 
tory. I  gathered  this  from  a  remark  let  fall  by  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador here,  who  spoke  of  the  deplorable  economic  situation  of 
Salonica  under  Greek  administration  and  of  the  assistance  on  which 
the  Austrian  army  could  count  from  Mussulman  population  dis- 
contented with  Servian  rule.^ 

From  Nish 

British  Blue  Book  No.  83 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade,  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey.  —  {Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Nish,  July  29,  1914. 

1  HAVE  been  requested  by  Prime  Minister  to  convey  to  you  expres- 
sion of  his  deep  gratitude  for  the  statement  which  you  made  on  the 
27th  instant  in  the  House  of  Commons. 

^  For  this  entire  interview  cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  96,  July  29. 
«  See  No.  64,  July  28. 

2  Mediation  between  Austria  and  Serbia  was  the  French  wish  rejected  by  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary.  Germany  was  in  favor  of  mediation  between  Vienna  and 
Petrograd.    See  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  13,  July  25. 

*  This  despatch  stands  alone  and  unsupported  by  any  other. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  85  303 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  84 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914- 

The  German  Ambassador  has  been  instructed  by  the  German 
Chancellor  ^  to  inform  me  that  he  is  endeavouring  to  mediate  between 
Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg!!,  and  he  hopes  with  good  success.  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  seem  to  be  in  constant  touch,  and  he  is  endeavouring 
to  make  Vienna  explain  in  a  satisfactory  form  at  St.  Petersburgh 
the  scope  and  extension  of  Austrian  proceedings  in  Servia.  I  told 
the  German  Ambassador  that  an  agreement  arrived  at  direct  between 
Austria  and  Russia  would  be  the  best  possible  solution.^  I  would 
press  no  proposal  as  long  as  there  was  a  prospect  of  that,  but  my  in- 
formation this  morning  ^  was  that  the  Austrian  Government  have 
declined  the  suggestion  of  the  Russian  Government  that  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  should  be  authorised  to  discuss 
directly  with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  the  means  of 
settling  the  Austro-Servian  conflict.  The  press  correspondents  at 
St.  Petersburgh  had  been  told  that  Russian  Government  would 
mobilise.  The  German  Government  had  said  that  they  were  favour- 
able in  principle  to  mediation  between  Russia  and  Austria  if  necessary. 
They  seemed  to  think  the  particular  method  of  conference,  consul- 
tation or  discussion,  or  even  conversations  a  quatre  in  London  too 
formal  a  method.  I  urged  that  the  German  Government  should 
suggest  any  method  by  which  the  influence  of  the  four  Powers  could 
be  used  together  to  prevent  war  between  Austria  and  Russia.  France 
agreed,  Italy  agreed.  The  whole  idea  of  mediation  or  mediating 
influence  was  ready  to  be  put  into  operation  by  any  method  that 
Germany  could  suggest  if  mine  was  not  acceptable.  In  fact  media- 
tion was  ready  to  come  into  operation  by  any  method  that  Germany 
thought  possible  if  only  Germany  would  "press  the  button"  in  the 
interests  of  peace. ^ 

From  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  85  ^ 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 

—  {Received  July  29.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  29,  1914- 

I  WAS  asked  to  call  upon  the  Chancellor  to-night.  His  Excellency 
had  just  returned  from  Potsdam. 

1  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  15,  July  27.  ,  .      t,     i     t^  i.-u-x  ^^ 

2  So  long,  therefore,  as  Germany  was  trying  (see  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  14, 
July  28)  to  bring  it  about,  she  cannot  be  blamed  for  not  havmg  accepted  the  farst  con- 
ference plan.  ^  .       T^    ,  T,     ,   T.T      ^T 

3  British  Blue  Book  No.  78,  July  29,  but  see  Austro-Hunganan  Red  Book  No.  47, 
July  29. 

*  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  76,  July  29,  and  note  1.  ,        .. 

5  In  his  Introductory  Narrative,  p.  ix.  Sir  E.  Grey  calls  this  despatch  a  strange 
response"  to  his  appeal  of  mediation,  No.  84.     The  juxtaposition  of  these  despatches 


304  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

He  said  that  should  Austria  be  attacked  by  Russia  a  European 
conflagration  might,  he  feared,  become  inevitable,  owing  to  Germany's 
obligations  as  Austria's  ally,  in  spite  of  his  continued  efforts  to  main- 
tain peace.  He  then  proceeded  to  make  the  following  strong  bid 
for  British  neutrality.  He  said  that  it  was  clear,  so  far  as  he  was 
able  to  judge  the  main  principle  which  governed  British  policy, 
that  Great  Britain  would  never  stand  by  and  allow  France  to  be 
crushed  in  any  conflict  there  might  be.  That,  however,  was  not  the 
object  at  which  Germany  aimed.  Provided  that  neutrality  of  Great 
Britain  were  certain,  every  assurance  would  be  given  to  the  British 
Government  that  the  Imperial  Government  aimed  at  no  territorial 
acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  France  should  they  prove  victorious 
in  any  war  that  might  ensue. 

1  questioned  his  Excellency  about  the  French  colonies,  and  he 
said  that  he  was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking  in  that  respect. 
As  regards  Holland,  however,  his  Excellency  said  that,  so  long  as 
Germany's  adversaries  respected  the  integrity  and  neutrality  of  the* 
Netherlands,  Germany  was  ready  to  give  His  Majesty's  Government 
an  assurance  that  she  would  do  likewise.  It  depended  upon  the 
action  of  France  what  operations  Germany  might  be  forced  to  enter 
upon  in  Belgium,^  but  when  the  war  was  over,  Belgian  integrity 
would  be  respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany. 

His  Excellency  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since  he  had  been  Chan- 
cellor the  object  of  his  policy  had  been,  as  you  were  aware,  to  bring 
about  an  understanding  with  England ;  he  trusted  that  these  as- 
surances might  form  the  basis  of  that  understanding  which  he  so 
much  desired.  He  had  in  mind  a  general  neutrality  agreement 
between  England  and  Germany,  though  it  was  of  course  at  the 
present  moment  too  early  to  discuss  details,  and  an  assurance  of 
British  neutrality  in  the  conflict  which  present  crisis  might  possibly 
produce,  would  enable  him  to  look  forward  to  realisation  of  his  desire. 

In  reply  to  his  Excellency's  enquiry  how  I  thought  his  request 
would  appeal  to  you,  I  said  that  I  did  not  think  it  probable  that  at 
this  stage  of  events  you  would  care  to  bind  yourself  to  any  course 
of  action  and  that  I  was  of  opinion  that  you  would  desire  to  retain 
full  liberty. 

Our  conversation  upon  this  subject  having  come  to  an  end,  I 
communicated  the  contents  of  your  telegram  of  to-day  ^  to  his  Ex- 
cellency, who  expressed  his  best  thanks  to  you. 

helps  to  carry  out  this  suggestion.  Nor  would  it  have  been  possible  to  prove  the  error 
of  this  presentation  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  last  paragraph,  which  refers  to  No.  77 
instead  of  No.  84. 

The  German  enquiry  about  English  neutrality  was  doubtless  the  result  of  disquiet- 
ing information  not  only  from  Russia  but  also  from  Italy  about  the  attempt  made  to 
have  Great  Britain  declare  her  solidarity  with  France  and  Russia  (cf .  British  Blue  Book 
No.  80,  note  5,  July  29).  Sir  E.  Grey,  moreover,  had  two  serious  interviews  and  a 
private  talk  with  the  German  Ambassador  in  the  morning  and  on  the  afternoon  of 
July  29,  see  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  88  and  89.  This  despatch,  No.  85,  arrived  "about 
midnight,"  British  Blue  Book,  p.  ix.  In  fairness,  therefore,  it  should  have  been  printed 
after  No.  89  rather  than  after  No.  84.     See  also  note  3  to  No.  90,  July  29. 

^  This  is  the  first  mention  of  Belgium.  It  is  noteworthy  that  a  possible  invasion 
of  Belgium  does  not  call  forth  the  statement  from  Sir  E.  Goschen,  or  within  the  next 
days,  from  Sir  E.  Grey,  that  it  would  be  contrary  to  existing  treaties. 

2  See  No.  77,  same  day. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  87  305 

From  Rome 

British  Blue  Book  No.  86 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  29,  1914. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  thinks  that  moment  is  past  for  any 
further  discussions  on  basis  of  Servian  note,  in  view  of  communica- 
tion made  to-day  by  Russia  at  BerHn  regarding  partial  mobilisation. 
The  utmost  he  now  hopes  for  is  that  Germany  may  use  her  influence 
at  Vienna  to  prevent  or  moderate  any  further  demands  on  Servia. 

To  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  87 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

After  telling  M.  Cambon  ^  to-day  how  grave  the  situation  seemed 
to  be,  I  told  him  that  I  meant  to  tell  the  German  Ambassador  to-day 
that  he  must  not  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations 
into  any  sense  of  false  security  that  we  should  stand  aside  if  all  the 
efforts  to  preserve  the  peace,  which  we  were  now  making  in  common 
with  Germany,  failed.  But  I  went  on  to  say  to  M.  Cambon  ^  that  I 
thought  it  necessary  to  tell  him  also  that  public  opinion  here  ap- 
proached the  present  difficulty  from  a  quite  different  point  of  view 
from  that  taken  during  the  difficulty  as  to  Morocco  a  few  years  ago. 
In  the  case  of  Morocco  the  dispute  was  one  in  which  France  was 
primarily  interested,  and  in  which  it  appeared  that  Germany,  in  an 
attempt  to  crush  France,^  was  fastening  a  quarrel  on  France  on  a 
question  that  was  the  subject  of  a  special  agreement  between  France 
and  us.  In  the  present  case  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia 
was  not  one  in  which  we  felt  called  to  take  a  hand.^  Even  if  the 
question  became  one  between  Austria  and  Russia  we  should  not  feel 
called  upon  to  take  a  hand  in  it.  It  would  then  be  a  question  of  the 
supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav  —  a  struggle  for  supremacy  in  the  Bal- 
kans ;  and  our  idea  had  always  been  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  a 
war  over  a  Balkan  question.  If  Germany  became  involved  and 
France  became  involved,  we  had  not  made  up  our  minds  what  we 
should  do ;  it  was  a  case  that  we  should  have  to  consider.  France 
would  then  have  been  drawn  into  a  quarrel  which  was  not  hers,  but 
in  which,  owing  to  her  alliance,  her  honour  and  interest  obliged  her 
to  engage.  We  were  free  from  engagements,  and  we  should  have 
to  decide  what  British  interests  required  us  to  do.^     I  thought  it 

^  French  Ambassador  in  London. 

2  For  France's  own  point  of  view  of  the  Morocco  crisis  see  French  Yellow  Book 
No.   1,  Annex  1.     "All  Germans  resent  our  having  taken  their  share  in  Morocco." 

3  This  is  contrary  to  the  popluar  claim  that  Great  Britain  went  into  the  war  for  the 
little  nations. 

*  A  very  important  statement. 


306  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

necessary  to  say  that,  because,  as  he  knew,  we  were  taking  all  pre- 
cautions with  regard  to  our  fleet,  and  I  was  about  to  warn  Prince 
Lichnowsky  not  to  count  on  our  standing  aside,  but  it  would  not 
be  fair  that  I  should  let  M.  Cambon  be  misled  into  supposing  that 
this  meant  that  we  had  decided  what  to  do  in  a  contingency  that  I 
still  hoped  might  not  arise. 

M.  Cambon  said  that  I  had  explained  the  situation  very  clearly. 
He  understood  it  to  be  that  in  a  Balkan  quarrel,  and  in  a  struggle  for 
supremacy  between  Teuton  and  Slav  we  should  not  feel  called  to 
intervene;  should  other  issues  be  raised,  and  Germany  and  France 
become  involved,  so  that  the  question  became  one  of  the  hegemony 
of  Europe,  we  should  then  decide  what  it  was  necessary  for  us  to  do. 
He  seemed  quite  prepared  for  this  announcement,  and  made  no 
criticism  upon  it. 

He  said  French  opinion  was  calm,  but  decided.  He  anticipated  a 
demand  from  Germany  that  France  would  be  neutral  while  Germany 
attacked  Russia.  This  assurance  France,  of  course,  could  not  give  ; 
she  was  bound  to  help  Russia  if  Russia  was  attacked.^ 

I  am,  etc.,  • 

E.  Grey. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  88 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  B.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  191  If. 

I  TOLD  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  of  the  information 
that  I  had  received,  that  Russia  had  informed  Germany  respecting 
her  mobilisation.  I  also  told  him  of  the  communication  ^  made  by 
Count  Benckendorff  ,^  that  the  Austrian  declaration  of  war  manifestly 
rendered  vain  any  direct  conversations  between  Russia  and  Austria. 
I  said  that  the  hope  built  upon  those  direct  conversations  by  the 
German  Government  yesterday  had  disappeared  to-day.  To-day 
the  German  Chancellor  was  working  in  the  interest  of  mediation  in 
Vienna  and  St.  Peter sburgh.  If  he  succeeded,  well  and  good.  If 
not,  it  was  more  important  than  ever  that  Germany  should  take  up 
what  I  had  suggested  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning,^  and 
propose  some  method  by  which  the  four  Powers  should  be  able  to 
work  together  to  keep  the  peace  of  Europe.  I  pointed  out,  however, 
that  the  Russian  Government,  while  desirous  of  mediation,  regarded 
it  as  a  condition  that  the  military  operations  against  Servia  should 

1  If  this  despatch  printed  after  No.  85  and  referring  to  the  neutrality  of  England 
was  written  after  the  receipt  of  No.  85,  it  is  noteworthy  that  it  contains  no  mention  of 
Belgium.  For  the  probably  proper  order  of  the  despatches,  however,  see  note  1, 
British  Blue  Book  No.  85. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  70,  July  29. 

3  Russian  Ambassador  in  London. 

<  Probably  British  Blue  Book  No.  84,  July  29,  although  the  telegram  was  sent  to 
Berlin  not  in  the  morning  but  "about  4  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  29th,"  according 
to  the  Introductory  Narrative  of  the  British  Blue  Book.  To  call  4  o'clock  the 
"evening"  is  strange,  but  is  explained  by  the  endeavor  to  make  No.  85  appear  to  be 
an  answer  to  No.  84.     See  note  1  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  85,  same  day. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  89  307 

be  suspended,  as  otherwise  a  mediation  would  only  drag  on  matters, 
and  give  Austria  time  to  crush  Servia.  It  was,  of  course,  too  late 
for  all  military  operations  against  Servia  to  be  suspended.  In  a  short 
time,  I  supposed,  the  Austrian  forces  would  be  in  Belgrade,  and  in 
occupation  of  some  Servian  territory.  But  even  then  it  might  be 
possible  to  bring  some  mediation  into  existence,  if  Austria,  while 
saying  that  she  must  hold  the  occupied  territory  until  she  had  com- 
plete satisfaction  from  Servia,  stated  that  she  would  not  advance 
further,  pending  an  effort  of  the  Powers  to  mediate  between  her  and 
Russia.^ 

The  German  Ambassador  said  that  he  had  already  telegraphed  to 
Berlin  what  I  had  said  to  him  this  morning. 

I  am,  etc., 

E.  Grey. 
To  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  89 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  B.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Sir,  .  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  191^. 

After  speaking  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  about 
the  European  situation,  I  said  that  I  wished  to  say  to  him,  in  a  quite 
private  and  friendly  way,  something  that  was  on  my  mind.  The 
situation  was  very  grave.  While  it  was  restricted  to  the  issues  at 
present  actually  involved  we  had  no  thought  of  interfering  in  it. 
But  if  Germany  became  involved  in  it,  and  then  France,  the  issue 
might  be  so  great  that  it  would  involve  all  European  interests ;  and 
I  did  not  wish  him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversa- 
tion —  which  I  hoped  would  continue  —  into  thinking  that  we  should 
stand  aside. 

He  said  that  he  quite  understood  this,  but  he  asked  whether  I 
meant  that  we  should,  under  certain  circumstances,  intervene? 

I  replied  that  I  did  not  wish  to  say  that,  or  to  use  anything  that 
was  like  a  threat  or  an  attempt  to  apply  pressure  by  saying  that,  if 
things  became  worse,  we  should  intervene.  There  would  be  no  ques- 
tion of  our  intervening  if  Germany  was  not  involved,  or  even  if  France 
was  not  involved.  But  we  knew  very  well,  that  if  the  issue  did  be- 
come such  that  we  thought  British  interests  ^  required  us  to  inter- 
vene, we  must  intervene  at  once,  and  the  decision  would  have  to  be 
very  rapid,  just  as  the  decisions  of  other  Powers  had  to  be.  I  hoped 
that  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  would  continue  as^  at 
present,  and  that  I  should  be  able  to  keep  as  closely  in  touch  with 
the  German  Government  in  working  for  peace.  But  if  we  failed  in 
our  efforts  to  keep  the  peace,  and  if  the  issue  spread  so  that  it  in- 

1  This  is  again  Sir  E.  Grey's  original  proposal,  which  was  agreeable  to  Germany  in 
principle.  It  was  accepted  by  Austria-Hungary  even  to  include  negotiations  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia.  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51,  July  31,  and 
for  the  fact  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  acceptance,  which  was  subject  to  the  continu- 
ation of  the  war,  but  with  a  "  promise  not  to  advance  further,  "was  acceptable  to  Sir  E. 
Grey,  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  103,  July  30. 

2  This  idea  occurs  several  times  in  the  despatches  of  July  29. 


308  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

volved  practically  every  European  interest,  I  did  not  wish  to  be 
open  to  any  reproach  for  him  that  the  friendly  tone  of  all  our  con- 
versations had  misled  him  or  his  Government  into  supposing  that 
we  should  not  t-ake  action,  and  to  the  reproach  that,  if  they  had  not 
been  so  misled,  the  course  of  things  might  have  been  different. 

The  German  Ambassador  took  no  exception  to  what  I  had  said; 
indeed,  he  told  me  that  it  accorded  with  what  he  had  already  given 
in  Berlin  as  his  view  of  the  situation. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 
To  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  90 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  B,  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

In  addition  to  what  passed  with  the  German  Ambassador  this 
morning,^  as  recorded  in  my  telegram  of  the  29th  July  ^  to  your  Excel- 
lency, I  gave  the  Ambassador  a  copy  of  Sir  Rennell  Rodd's  ^  telegram 
of  the  28th  July  ^  and  of  my  reply  to  it.^  I  said  I  had  begun  to  doubt 
whether  even  a  complete  acceptance  of  the  Austrian  demands  by 
Servia  would  now  satisfy  Austria.^  But  there  appeared,  from  what 
the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  ^  had  said,  to  be  a  method  by  which,  if 
the  Powers  were  allowed  to  have  any  say  in  the  matter,  they  might 
bring  about  complete  satisfaction  for  Austria,  if  only  the  latter  would 
give  them  an  opportunity.  I  could,  however,  make  no  proposal,  for 
the  reasons  I  have  given  in  my  telegram  to  you,  and  could  only  give 
what  the  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  said  to  the  German 
Ambassador  for  information,  as  long  as  it  was  understood  that  Austria 
would  accept  no  discussion  with  the  Powers  over  her  dispute  with 
Servia.  As  to  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia,  I  said  it  could 
not  take  the  form  simply  of  urging  Russia  to  stand  on  one  side  while 
Austria  had  a  free  hand  to  go  to  any  length  she  pleased.  That 
would  not  be  mediation,  it  would  simply  be  putting  pressure  upon 
Russia  in  the  interests  of  Austria.  The  German  Ambassador  said 
the  view  of  the  German  Government  was  that  Austria  could  not  by 
force  be  humiliated,  and  could  not  abdicate  her  position  as  a  Great 
Power.  I  said  I  entirely  agreed,  but  it  was  not  a  question  of  humiliat- 
ing Austria,  it  was  a  question  of  how  far  Austria  meant  to  push  the 
humiliation  of  others.  There  must,  of  course,  be  some  humiliation 
of  Servia,  but  Austria  might  press  things  so  far  as  to  involve  the 
humiliation  of  Russia.^ 

1  The  official  reference  to  this  interview  is  No.  84,  but  see  also  No.  88. 

2  See  No.  84. 

*  British  Ambassador  in  Rome. 

*  See  No.  64. 
5  See  No.  81. 

*  The  question  whether  it  would  satisfy  Austria-Hungary  does  not  seem  to  have 
been  asked. 

7  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

8  The  tenor  of  this  summary  of  the  interview  with  the  German  Ambassador  is 
different  from  that  given  in  Nos.  84  and  88.     See  also  No.  89. 


July  29,  British  Blue  Book  No.  91  309 

The  German  Ambassador  said  that  Austria  would  not  take  Ser- 
vian territory,  as  to  which  I  observed  that,  by  taking  territory 
while  leaving  nominal  Servian  independence,  Austria  might  turn 
Servia  practically  into  a  vassal  State,  and  this  would  affect  the  whole 
position  of  Russia  in  the  Balkans. 

I  observed  that  when  there  was  danger  of  Etiropean  conflict  it 
was  impossible  to  say  who  would  not  be  drawn  into  it.  Even  the 
Netherlands  ^  apparently  were  taking  precautions. 

The  German  Ambassador  said  emphatically  that  some  means  must 
be  found  of  preserving  the  peace  of  Europe. 

I  am,  etc. 
To  Vienna  ^-  ^^^y. 

British  Blue  Book  No.  91 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  told  me  to-day  he  had  ready  a  long 
memorandum,^  which  he  proposed  to  leave,  and  which  he  said  gave  an 
account  of  the  conduct  of  Servia  towards  Austria,  and  an  explanation 
of  how  necessary  the  Austrian  action  was. 

I  said  that  I  did  not  wish  to  discuss  the  merits  of  the  question 
between  Austria  and  Servia.  The  news  to-day  seemed  to  me  very  bad 
for  the  peace  of  Europe.  The  Powers  were  not  allowed  to  help  in 
getting  satisfaction  for  Austria,  which  they  might  get  if  they  were 
given  an  opportunity,  and  European  peace  was  at  stake. 

Count  Mensdorff  ^  said  that  the  war  with  Servia  must  proceed. 
Austria  could  not  continue  to  be  exposed  to  the  necessity  of  mobilising 
again  and  again,  as  she  had  been  obliged  to  do  in  recent  years.  She 
had  no  idea  of  territorial  aggrandisement,  and  all  she  wished  was  to 
make  sure  that  her  interests  were  safeguarded. 

I  said  that  it  would  be  quite  possible,  without  nominally  interfering 
with  the  independence  of  Servia  or  taking  away  any  of  her  territory, 
to  turn  her  into  a  sort  of  vassal  State. 

Count  Mensdorff  ^  deprecated  this. 

In  reply  to  some  further  remarks  of  mine,  as  to  the  effect  that  the 
Austrian  action  might  have  upon  the  Russian  position  in  the  Balkans, 
he  said  that,  before  the  Balkan  war,  Servia  had  always  been  regarded 
as  being  in  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence.^      j  , 

E.  Grey. 

1  The  reference  to  the  Netherlands  is  omitted  in  the  accounts  of  the  interviews, 
Nos.  84,  88,  89.  Since  the  Netherlands,  however,  were  mentioned,  other  things  may- 
have  been  mentioned,  and  it. is  not  unlikely  that  No.  85,  containing  Germany's  first 
bid  for  English  neutrality,  was  the  result  of  the  despatches  received  in  Berlin  from  the 
German  Ambassador  in  London.  Unfortunately  these  are  not  printed  in  the  German 
White  Book.     See  also  note  1  to  No.  85. 

2  This  may  refer  to  the  famous  dossier,  presented  in  Paris  on  July  27,  and  printed 
in  the  Yellow  Book  on  that  date.  Parts,  if  not  the  whole,  were  surely  presented  also 
in  London  on  that  day,  as  appears  from  British  Blue  Book  No.  48,  July  27.  See  notes 
to  British  Blue  Book  No.  48  and  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25. 

^  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

^  The  proper  appraisal  of  this  remark  is  only  possible  on  the  background  of  an  ex- 
tensive knowledge  of  the  history  of  the  Balkans  since  1878. 


310 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


To  Rome 
British  Blue  Book  No.  92 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome. 
Sir,  •  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914, 

The  Italian  Ambassador  made  to  me  to-day  a  communication 
from  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  ^  suggesting  that  the  German 
objections  to  the  mediation  of  the  four  Powers,  a  mediation  that  was 
strongly  favoured  by  Italy,  might  be  removed  by  some  change  in  the 
form  of  procedure. 

I  said  that  I  had  already  anticipated  this  by  asking  the  German 
Government  to  suggest  any  form  of  procedure  under  which  the  idea 
of  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia,  already  accepted  by  the 
German  Government  in  principle,  could  be  applied. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 


Russia : 


To  Berlin 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  49 


Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires 

at  Berlin} 

(Translation.) 


Saint-Petershourg, 
le  16  {29)  juillet,  19U. 
(Telegraphique.) 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne 
m'informe,  au  nom  du  Chance- 
lier,  que  TAllemagne  n'a  pas 
cesse  d'exercer  a  Vienne  une 
influence  moderatrice  et  qu'elle 
continuera  cette  action  meme 
apres  la  declaration  de  guerre. 
Jusqu'a  ce  matin  il  n'y  avait 
aucune  nouvelle  que  les  armees 
autrichiennes  aient  franchi  la 
frontiere  serbe.  J'ai  prie  I'Am- 
bassadeur  de  transmettre  au 
Chancelier  mes  remerciements 
pour  la  teneur  amicale  de  cette 
communication.  Je  I'ai  informe 
des  mesures  militaires  prises  par 
la  Russie,  dont  aucune,  lui  dis-je, 
n'etait  dirigee  contre  I'Alle- 
magne;     j'ajoutais    qu'elles    ne 


St.  Petersburgh, 
July  16  {29),  1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

The  German  Ambassador  in- 
forms me,  in  the  name  of  the 
Chancellor,  that  Germany  has 
not  ceased  to  exercise  a  moder- 
ating influence  at  Vienna,  and 
that  she  will  continue  to  do  so 
even  after  the  declaration  of  war. 
Up  to  this  morning  there  had 
been  no  news  that  the  Austrian 
army  has  crossed  the  Servian 
frontier.  I  have  begged  the 
Ambassador  to  express  my  thanks 
to  the  Chancellor  for  the  friendly 
tenour  of  this  communication. 
I  have  informed  him  of  the  mili- 
tary measures  taken  by  Russia, 
none  of  which,  I  told  him,  were 
directed  against  Germany;  I 
added  that  neither  should  they 


1  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

*  In  the  British  Blue  Book  this  despatch  is  listed  as  having  been  sent  to  London. 


July  29,  Russian  Orange  Booh  No.  4^ 


311 


prejugeaient  pas  non  plus  des 
mesures  agressives  centre  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie,  ces  mesures  s'ex- 
pliquant  par  la  mobilisation  de 
la  plus  grande  partie  de  I'armee 
aust  ro-hongroi  se . 

L'Ambassadeur  se  pronon^ant 
en  faveur  d 'explications  directes 
avec  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  et  nous 
je  repondis  que  j'y  etais  tout 
dispose,  pour  peu  que  les  con- 
seils  du  Cabinet  de  Berlin  dont 
11  parlait  trouvent  echo  a  Vienne. 


En  meme  temps  je  signalais 
que  nous  etions  tout  disposes  a 
accepter  le  projet  d'une  con- 
ference des  quatre  Puissances, 
un  projet  auquel,  paraissait-il, 
I'Allemagne  ne  sympathisait  pas 
entierement. 

Je  dis  que,  dans  mon  opinion, 
le  meilleur  moyen  pour  mettre  a 
profit  tons  les  moyens  propres  a 
produire  une  solution  pacifique, 
consisterait  en  une  action  paral- 
lele  des  pourparlers  d'une  con- 
ference a  quatre  de  I'Allemagne, 
de  la  France,  de  I'Angleterre  et  de 
ritalie  et  d'un  contact  direct 
entre  I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  la 
Russie,  a  I'instar  a  peu  pres  de  ce 
qui  a vait  eu  lieu  aux  moments  les 
plus  critiques  de  la  crise  de  I'an 
dernier. 

Je  dis  a  I'Ambassadeur  qu'- 
apres  les  concessions  faites  par  la 
Serbie,  un  terrain  de  compromis 
pour  les  questions  restees  ou- 
vertes  ne  serait  pas  tres  difficile  a 
trouver,  a  condition  toutefois  de 
quelque  bonne  volonte  de  la  part 
de  I'Autriche  et  a  condition  que 
toutes  les  Puissances  usent  de 
toute  leur  influence  dans  un  sens 
de  conciliation. 


be  taken  as  aggressive  measures 
against  Austria-Hungary,  their 
explanation  being  the  mobilisa- 
tion of  the  greater  part  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  army.^ 

The  Ambassador  said  that  he 
was  in  favour  of  direct  explana- 
tions between  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment and  ourselves,  and  I 
replied  that  I,  too,  was  quite 
willing,  provided  that  the  advice 
of  the  German  Government,  to 
which  he  had  referred,  found  an 
echo  at  Vienna. 

I  said  at  the  same  time  that 
we  were  quite  ready  to  accept 
the  proposal  for  a  conference  of 
the  four  Powers,  a  proposal  with 
which,  apparently,  Germany  was 
not  in  entire  sympathy. 

I  told  him  that,  in  my  opinion, 
the  best  manner  of  turning  to 
account  the  most  suitable 
methods  of  finding  a  peaceful 
solution  would  be  by  arranging 
for  parallel  discussions  to  be 
carried  on  by  a  conference  of  the 
four  Powers  —  Germany,  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Italy  —  and 
by  a  direct  exchange  of  views 
between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia  on  much  the  same  lines 
as  occurred  during  the  most  criti- 
cal moments  of  last  year's  crisis. 

I  told  the  Ambassador  that, 
after  the  concessions  which  had 
been  made  by  Servia,  it  should 
not  be  very  difficult  to  find  a 
compromise  to"  settle  the  other 
questions  which  remained  out- 
standing, provided  that  Austria 
showed  some  good-will  and  that 
all  the  Powers  used  their  entire 
influence  in  the  direction  of  con- 
ciliation. 


^  Cf.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  78,  August  2,  where  it  is  stated  by  Sazonof  that 
Russia  mobilised  while  Austria-Hungary  was  "proceeding  to  a  general  mobilisation." 


312  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  London  and  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  50 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassadors  at 
London  and  Paris. 

St.  Petershurgh,  July  16  {29),  1914. 

At  the  time  of  my  interview  with  the  German  Ambassador,  dealt 
with  in  my  preceding  telegram,  I  had  not  yet  received  M.  Schebeko's 
telegram  ^\f  the  15th  (28th)  July. 

The  contents  of  this  telegram  constitute  a  refusal  of  the  Vienna 
Cabinet  to  agree  to  a  direct  exchange  of  views  with  the  Imperial 
Government. 

From  now  on,  nothing  remains  for  us  to  do  but  to  rely  entirely 
on  the  British  Government  to  take  the  initiative  in  any  steps  which 
they  may  consider  advisable. 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  51 

Russian  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  .  Berlin,  July  16  {29),  1914. 

On  my  enquiry  whether  he  had  received  from  Vienna  a  reply 
respecting  your  proposal  for  private  discussions  at  St.  Petersburg, 
the  Secretary  of  State  answered  in  the  negative.^ 

He  declares  that  it  is  very  difficult  for  him  to  produce  any  effect 
at  Vienna,  especially  openly.  He  even  added,  in  speaking  to  Cam- 
bon,  that  were  pressure  brought  to  bear  too  obviously,  Austria  would 
hasten  to  face  Germany  with  a  fait  accompli. 

The  Secretary  of  State  tells  me  that  he  received  a  telegram  to-day 
from  Pourtales,  stating  that  you  seemed  more  inclined  than  you 
previously  were  to  find  a  compromise  acceptable  to  all  parties.  I 
replied  that  presumably  you  had  been  in  favour  of  a  compromise 
from  the  outset,  provided  always  that  it  were  acceptable,  not  only 
to  Austria,  but  equally  to  Russia.  He  then  said  that  it  appeared  that 
Russia  had  begun  to  mobilise  on  the  Austrian  frontier,  and  that  he 
feared  that  this  would  make  it  more  difficult  for  Austria  to  come  to 
an  understanding  with  us,  all  the  more  so  as  Austria  was  mobilising 
against  Servia  alone,  and  was  making  no  preparations  upon  our  fron- 
tier. I  replied  that,  according  to  the  information  in  my  possession, 
Austria  was  mobilising  upon  the  Russian  frontier  also,  and  that  con- 

1  If  this  refers  to  Orange  Book  No.  45,  July  28,  compare  it  with  Austro-Hungarian 
Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29  :  "it  does  not  constitute  a  refusal."  If  it  refers  to  another 
despatch,  such  a  despatch  has  not  been  printed.  Cf.  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  51,  where  Sazonof  is  the  one  to  break  off  the  negotiations. 

2  For  the  reply  from  Vienna  in  reference  to  the  conference  plan  see  Austro-Hun- 
garian Red  Book  No.  44,  and  for  the  Russian  direct  conversation  plan  see  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  both  of  July  29. 


July  29,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  53  313 

sequently  we  had  to  take  similar  steps.^  I  added  that  whatever 
measures  we  might,  perhaps,  have  taken  on  our  side  were  in  no 
wise  directed  against  Germany. 


From  Nish 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  52 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Serbia  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Nish,  July  16  (29),  1914. 

The  Bulgarian  Minister  to-day  declared  to  Pashitch,  in  the 
name  of  his  Government,  that  Bulgaria  would  remain  neutral. 

From  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  53 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  16  {29),  1914. 

For  the  information  of  the  President  of  the  French  Republic 
on  his  return,  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  pre- 
pared a  short  summary  ^  of  the  present  political  situation,  approxi- 
mately in  the  following  terms :  Austria,  fearing  internal  disintegra- 
tion, seized  upon  the  assassination  of  the  Archduke  as  an  excuse  for 
an  attempt  to  obtain  guarantees,  which  may  assume  the  form  of  an 
occupation  of  Servian  military  lines  or  even  Servian  territory.  Ger- 
many is  supporting  Austria.  The  preservation  of  peace  depends 
upon  Russia  alone,  for  the  question  at  issue  must  be  "localised" 
between  Austria  and  Servia;  that  question  is  the  punishment  of 
Servia  for  her  previous  policy  and  the  obtaining  of  guarantees  for 
the  future.  Germany  concludes  from  this  that  a  moderating  influ- 
ence should  be  exerted  at  St.  Petersburg.  This  sophism  has  been 
refuted  both  in  Paris  and  in  London.  In  Paris,  Baron  von  Schoen 
vainly  endeavoured  to  induce  France  to  adopt  joint  action  with  Ger- 
many towards  Russia  for  the  preservation  of  peace.  The  same 
attempts  were  made  in  London.  In  both  capitals  the  answer  was 
given  that  any  action  taken  should  be  at  Vienna,  as  it  was  Austria's 
inordinate  demands,  her  refusal  to  discuss  Servians  few  reservations, 
and  her  declaration  of  war,  that  threatened  to  provoke  a  general 
war.  France  and  England  are  unable  to  bring  any  moderating 
pressure  to  bear  upon  Russia,  as,  so  far,  that  Power  has  shown  the 
greatest  moderation,  more  particularly  in  her  advice  to  Servia  to 
accept  as  much  as  was  possible  of  the  Austrian  note.  Apparently 
Germany  has  now  given  up  the  idea  of  pressure  upon  Russia  only 

1  The  important  question  is,  "Who  mobilised  first?"  In  the  Documents  very 
contrary  statements  occur. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  85,  July  29. 


314  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

and  inclines  towards  mediatory  action  both  at  St.  Petersburg  and  at 
Vienna,  but  at  the  same  time  both  Germany  and  Austria  are  endeav- 
ouring to  cause  the  question  to  drag  on.  Germany  is  opposing  the 
conference  without  suggesting  any  other  practical  course  of  action.^ 
Austria  is  continuing  discussions  at  St.  Petersburg,  which  are  mani- 
festly of  a  procrastinating  nature.  At  the  same  time  she  is  taking 
active  steps,  and  if  these  steps  are  tolerated,  her  claims  will  increase 
proportionately.  It  is  highly  desirable  that  Russia  should  lend  all 
her  support  to  the  proposal  for  mediation  which  will  be  made  by  Sir 
E.  Grey.  In  the  contrary  event,  Austria,  on  the  plea  of  "guaran- 
tees," will  be  able,  in  effect,  to  alter  the  territorial  status  of  eastern 
Europe. 

From  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  54 

Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

(Telegram.)      •  London,  July  16  {29),  1914. 

I  HAVE  communicated  the  contents  of  your  telegrams  ^  of  the 
15th  (28th)  July  to  Grey.  He  informed  the  German  Ambassador 
to-day  ^  that  the  direct  discussions  between  Russia  and  Austria  had 
been  fruitless,  and  that  press  correspondents  were  reporting  from 
St.  Petersburgh  that  Russia  was  mobilising  against  Austria  in  conse- 
quence of  the  latter's  mobilisation.  Grey  said  that,  in  principle,  the 
German  Government  had  declared  themselves  in  favour  of  mediation, 
but  that  he  was  experiencing  difficulties  with  regard  to  the  form  it 
should  take.  Grey  has  urged  that  the  German  Government  should 
indicate  the  form  which,  in  their  opinion,  would  enable  the  four 
Powers  to  have  recourse  to  mediation  to  prevent  war ;  France,  Italy, 
and  Great  Britain  having  consented,  mediation  could  only  come  into 
play  if  Germany  consented  to  range  herself  on  the  side  of  peace. 

From  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  55 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  16  {29),  1914. 

ViviANi  has  just  confirmed  to  me  the  French  Government's  firm 
determination  to  act  in  concert  with  Russia.     This  determination 

1  This  is  an  error,  for  Germany  not  only  urged  the  British  "mediation"  plan  (see 
German  White  Book,  Exhibits  15  and  16,  July  28)  but  also  the  Russian  direct  con- 
versations plan  (see  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  note  2,  July  28). 

2  This  is  a  confirmation  of  French  Yellow  Book  No.  95,  July  29,  which  states  that 
two  telegrams  were  sent.  In  the  Russian  Orange  and  British  Blue  Books  only  one  is 
given.     Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  70,  2,  July  29. 

3  Compare  this  summary  with  Sir  E.  Grey's  own  summary.  British  Blue  Book 
Nos.  84,  88,  89,  July  29. 


July  29 J  RuLSsian  Orange  'Book  No.  56  315 

is  upheld  by  all  classes  of  society  and  by  the  political  parties,  includ- 
ing the  Radical  Socialists  who  have  just  addressed  a  resolution  to  the 
Government  expressing  the  absolute  conjfidence  and  the  patriotic 
sentiments  of  their  party.  Since  his  return  to  Paris,  Viviani  has 
telegraphed  an  urgent  message  ^  to  London  that,  direct  discussions 
between  St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna  having  ended,  the  London  Cabi- 
net should  again  put  forward  their  proposal  for  mediation  by  the 
Powers  as  soon  as  possible  under  one  form  or  another.  Before  see- 
ing me  to-day  Viviani  saw  the  German  Ambassador,  and  the  latter 
again  assured  him  of  the  peaceful  intentions  of  Germany.  Viviani 
having  pointed  out  that  if  Germany  wished  for  peace  she  should 
hasten  to  give  her  support  to  the  British  proposal  for  mediation, 
Baron  von  Schoen  replied  that  the  words  "conference"  or  "arbitra- 
tion" alarmed  Austria.  Viviani  retorted  that  it  was  not  a  question 
of  words,  and  that  it  would  be  easy  to  find  some  other  form  for 
mediation.  In  the  opinion  of  Baron  von  Schoen,  it  was  necessary 
for  the  success  of  the  negotiations  between  the  Powers  to  know  what 
Austria  intended  to  demand  from  Servia.  Viviani  answered  that 
the  Berlin  Cabinet  could  quite  easily  make  this  enquiry  of  Austria, 
but  that,  meanwhile,  the  Servian  reply  might  well  form  the  basis 
of  discussion;  he  added  that  France  sincerely  desired  peace,  but 
that  she  was  determined  at  the  same  time  to  act  in  complete  har- 
mony with  her  allies  and  friends,  and  that  he.  Baron  von  Schoen, 
might  have  convinced  himself  that  this  determination  met  with  the 
warmest  approval  of  the  country. 


From  Nish 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  56  ^ 

Telegram  from  His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Alexander  of  Serbia  to 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia, 

Deeply  touched  by  the  telegram  which  your  Majesty  was  pleased 
to  address  to  me  yesterday,  I  hasten  to  thank  you  with  all  my  heart. 
Your  Majesty  may  rest  assured  that  the  cordial  sympathy  which 
your  Majesty  feels  towards  my  country  is  especially  valued  by  us, 
and  fills  our  hearts  with  the  belief  that  the  future  of  Servia  is  secure 
now  that  it  is  the  object  of  your  Majesty's  gracious  solicitude.  These 
painful  moments  cannot  but  strengthen  the  bonds  of  deep  attachment 
which  bind  Servia  to  Holy  Slav  Russia,  and  the  sentiments  of  ever- 
lasting gratitude  which  we  feel  for  the  help  and  protection  afforded 
to  us  by  your  Majesty  will  ever  be  cherished  in  the  hearts  of  all 
the  Serbs.  , 

1  French  Yellow  Book  No.  97,  July  29. 

2  Without  a  date  but  published  in  the  Russian  Orange  Book  among  the  telegrams 
of  July  29.  In  the  Serbian  Red  Book  it  was  published  as  No.  44  of  July  30.  This 
may  be  a  mistake,  or  it  may  contain  a  hint  in  the  direction  of  the  charge  sometimes 
made  that  Russia  wrote  the  Serbian  State  Papers. 


316  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Nish 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  57 

Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Serbia  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs, 

(Telegram.)  Nish,  July  16  {29),  191A. 

I  HAVE  communicated  to  Pashitch  the  text  of  the  telegraphic 
reply  returned  by  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  to  Prince  Alexander. 
On  reading  it,  Pashitch  crossed  himself  and  exclaimed :  "The  Czar 
is  great  and  merciful !"  He  then  embraced  me  and  was  overcome 
with  emotion.     The  heir-apparent  is  expected  at  Nish  late  to-night. 

To  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  58 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
(Telegram.)  8t.  Petersburgh,  July  16  {29),  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  to-day  informed  me  of  the  decision 
of  his  Government  to  mobilise,  if  Russia  did  not  stop  her  military 
preparations.  Now,  in  point  of  fact,  we  only  began  these  prep- 
arations in  consequence  of  the  mobilisation  already  undertaken 
by  Austria,  and  owing  to  her  evident  unwillingness  to  accept  any 
means  of  arriving  at  a  peaceful  settlement  of  her  dispute  with  Servia. 

As  we  cannot  comply  with  the  wishes  of  Germany,  we  have  no 
alternative  but  to  hasten^  on  our  own  military  preparations  and 
to  assume  that  war  is  probably  inevitable.  Please  inform  the 
French  Government  of  this,  and  add  that  we  are  sincerely  grateful 
to  them  for  the  declaration  ^  which  the  French  Ambassador  made 
to  me  on  their  behalf,  to  the  effect  that  we  could  count  fully  upon 
the  assistance  of  our  ally,  France.  In  the  existing  circumstances, 
that  declaration  is  especially  valuable  to  us. 

Communicated  to  the  Russian  Ambassadors  in  Great  Britain, 
Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  and  Germany. 

1  This  elicited  Viviani's  request,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30,  not  to  "take 
any  step  which  may  offer  Germany  a  pretext  for  a  total  or  partial  mobilisation  of  her 
forces,"  proving  that  on  July  30,  Viviani  believed  that  Germany  had  not  even  partially 
mobilised.  ♦ 

2  Of.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  55,  same  day. 


Thursday,  July  30,  1914 


317 


Thursday,  July  30,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 

Despatches  fbom 

Petrograd 

Petrograd  [Letter  from 

Belgian  Minister] 

London  and  Petrograd 

Petrograd,  Vienna 

London 

Berlin,  London 

Czar 

Petrograd,  Czar 

Berlin,  Paris,  Petrograd 

Vienna,        Petrograd, 

Berlin 

Paris,  Rome,    Russian 

Ambassador 

London,  etc. 

Nish,  Berlin,  London 

Czar 

Petrograd 

Foreign  Office  op 

Austria-Hungary 
Belgium 

France 

Germany 
Great  Britain 


Russia 
Serbia 

Austria-Hungary,  while  unable  to  have  her  ambassador  in  Petrograd  discuss  her 
Serbian  note  with  Sazonof,  was  willing  to  discuss  her  relations  with  Russia  on  a 
much  broader  basis,  and  had  already  done  so  with  the  Russian  Ambassador  in 
Vienna.  She  regrets  Russia's  mobilisation  against  her,  which  is  forcing  her  to 
counter  measures. 

Belgium  is  silent  on  this  day,  and  does  not  publish  the  despatch  from  her 
Minister  in  Petrograd,  dated  July  30. 

France  renews  her  promise  of  support  to  Russia,  but  warns  her  in  her  mobilisa- 
tion against  "any  step  which  may  offer  to  Germany  any  pretext  for  a  total  or 
partial  mobilisation  of  her  forces."  She  therefore  believes  that  Germany  has  not 
even  partically  mobilised,  but  nevertheless  sends  an  alarming  message  concerning 
German  military  measures  to  Sir  E.  Grey,  who  agrees  that  the  moment  has  "come 
to  consider  and  discuss  together  every  hypothesis." 

Germany  continues  her  pressure  on  Vienna,  and  by  exchanges  of  royal  tele- 
grams between  Berlin  and  London  and  Berlin  and  Petrograd  endeavours  to  avoid 
war.     The  General  Staff  urges  immediate  mobilisation  but  is  unsuccessful. 

Great  Britain  refuses  to  bind  herself  to  remain  neutral  in  case  of  war,  on  the 
conditions  proposed  by  Germany  on  the  previous  day.  Sir  E.  Grey  is  even  seri- 
ously considering  the  necessity  of  joining  France,  and  tightens  the  bond  between 
the  two  countries  by  making  known  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris  the  letters 
exchanged  in  1912  between  himself  and  the  French  Ambassador.  Great  Britain 
continues  to  mobilise,  but  does  not  publish  the  conversation  with  the  German 
Ambassador  in  which  this  subject  was  discussed.  One  of  the  most  important 
papers  of  this  day  (No.  105)  suffers  from  notable  inaccuracies. 

Russia  continues  her  mobilisation,  but  offers  to  "stop  all  military  preparations" 
if  Austria  will  declare  herself  "ready  to  eliminate  from  her  ultimatum  points  which 
violate  principle  of  sovereignty  of  Serbia."  Although  Sazonof  feels  very  hopeful 
of  the  success  of  his  new  offer,  he  alters  it  on  the  next  day  "as  requested  by  the 
British  Ambassador."  Several  Russian  despatches  printed  under  this  date  are 
misleading. 

Serbia  does  not  announce  anything  of  importance. 


318  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  St.  Petershurgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK   No.    50 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petershurgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  30,  1914. 

For  Your  Excellency's  information  and  guidance  :  — 

I  have  to-day  explained  to  M.  Schebeko  that  I  have  been  informed 
that  M.  Sazonof  has  been  hurt  by  my  flat  refusal  of  his  proposal  as 
to  a  discussion  ^  with  your  Excellency,  and  that  he  is  not  less  hurt 
that  no  exchange  of  ideas  has  taken  place  between  myself  and  M. 
Schebeko. 

With  reference  to  the  first  point,  I  had  already  permitted  your 
Excellency  by  telegram  to  give  M.  Sazonof  any  explanations  he  desired 
with  regard  to  the  note  —  which  in  any  case  appears  to  be  outstripped 
by  the  outbreak  of  war.  In  any  case  this  could  only  take  the  form  of 
subsequent  explanations,  as  it  was  never  our  intention  to  depart  in 
any  way  from  the  points  contained  in  the  note.  I  had  also  authorised 
your  Excellency  to  discuss  in  a  friendly  manner  with  M.  Sazonof  our 
special  relations  towards  Russia. 

That  M.  Sazonof  should  complain  that  no  exchange  of  ideas  had 
taken  place  between  M.  Schebeko  and  myself  must  rest  on  a  mis- 
understanding, as  M.  Schebeko  and  myself  had  discussed  the  practical 
questions  two  days  before,  a  fact  which  the  Ambassador  confirmed 
with  the  observation  that  he  had  fully  informed  M.  Sazonof  of  this 
conversation. 

M.  Schebeko  then  explained  why  our  action  against  Servia  was 
regarded  with  such  anxiety  at  St.  Petershurgh.  He  said  that  we 
were  a  Great  Power  which  was  proceeding  against  the  small  Servian 
State,  and  it  was  not  known  at  St.  Petershurgh  what  our  intentions 
in  the  matter  were ;  whether  we  desired  to  encroach  on  its  sovereignty, 
whether  we  desired  completely  to  overthrow  it,  or  even  to  crush 
it  to  the  ground.  Russia  could  not  be  indifferent  towards  the  future 
fate  of  Servia,  which  was  linked  to  Russia  by  historical  and  other 
bonds.  At  St.  Petershurgh  they  had  taken  the  trouble  to  use  all 
their  influence  at  Belgrade  to  induce  them  to  accept  all  our  condi- 
tions, though  this  was  indeed  at  a  time  when  the  conditions  after- 
wards imposed  by  us  could  not  yet  be  known.  But  even  with  refer- 
ence to  these  demands  they  would  do  everything  they  could  in  order 
to  accomplish  at  any  rate  all  that  was  possible. 

I  reminded  the  Ambassador  that  we  had  repeatedly  emphasised 
the  fact  that  we  did  not  desire  to  follow  any  policy  of  conquest  in 
Servia,  also  that  we  would  not  infringe  her  sovereignty,  but  we  only 
desired  to  establish  a  condition  of  affairs  which  would  offer  us  a 
guarantee  against  being  disturbed  by  Servia.  To  this  I  added  a  some- 
what lengthy  discussion  of  our  intolerable  relations  with  Servia.    I  also 

1  I.e.  of  the  wording  of  the  Serbian  note  and  Austro-Hungarian  Serbian  conflict  in 
general.    See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 


July  30,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  50  319 

gave  M.  Schebeko  clearly  to  understand  to  how  large  an  extent  Rus- 
sian diplomacy  was  responsible  for  these  circumstances,  even  though 
this  result  might  be  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the  responsible  author- 
ities. 

In  the  further  course  of  our  discussion  I  referred  to  the  Russian 
mobilisation  which  had  then  come  to  my  knowledge.  Since  this  was 
limited  to  the  military  districts  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow  and  Kasan 
it  had  an  appearance  of  hostility  against  the  Monarchy.  I  did  not 
know  what  the  grounds  for  this  might  be,  as  there  was  no  dispute 
between  us  and  Russia.  Austria-Hungary  had  mobilised  exclusively 
against  Servia ;  against  Russia  not  a  single  man ;  and  this  would  be 
observed  from  the  single  fact  that  the  first,  tenth  and  eleventh  corps 
had  not  been  mobilised.  In  view,  however,  of  the  fact  that  Russia 
was  openly  mobilising  against  us,  we  should  have  to  extend  our 
mobilisation  too,  and  in  this  case  I  desired  to  mention  expressly  that 
this  measure  did  not,  of  course,  imply  any  attitude  of  hostility  towards 
Russia,  and  that  it  was  exclusively  a  necessary  counter-measure 
against  the  Russian  mobilisation. 

I  asked  M.  Schebeko  to  announce  this  to  his  Government,  and  this 
he  promised  to  do. 

Belgium : 

From  Petrograd 

(This  letter  was  sent  via  Germany,  where  it  was  captured  after  war  had  been 
declared,  and  pubhshed  in  the  North  German  (official)  Gazette.  As  appears  from 
the  letter  itself  a  telegraphic  copy  of  it  was  sent  by  the  Nordisk  cable.  The 
authenticity  of  this  letter  has  never  been  officially  denied  by  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment.) 

The  Belgian  Legation,  St.  Petersburgh,  795-Jfi2.     The  Political  Con- 
dition.    July  30,  191Jf. 

Yesterday  and  the  day  before  passed  in  anticipation  of  the  events 
which  must  follow  the  Austro-Hungarian  declaration  of  war  on 
Servia.  The  most  contradictory  news  is  being  spread  and  it  has 
been  impossible  to  separate  truth  from  fiction  concerning  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Imperial  (Russian)  Government.  Only  one  fact  is  in- 
contestable ;  namely,  that  Germany  has  endeavoured  here,  as  well  as 
in  Vienna,  to  find  a  means  l3y  which  to  avoid  a  general  conflict,  but 
that  she  has  met  on  the  one  hand  the  determination  of  the  Vienna 
cabinet  not  to  yield  one  iota  and  on  the  other  the  suspicion  of  the 
Petersburgh  cabinet  as  regards  the  assurances  of  Vienna  that  it  is 
contemplating  only  the  punishment,  and  not  the  acquisition  of  Servia. 

Mr.  Sazonof  has  declared  that  it  was  impossible  for  Russia  not  to 
keep  herself  in  readiness  nor  to  mobilise,  but  that  these  measures 
were  not  taken  against  Germany.  This  morning  an  official  com- 
munique to  the  papers  announced  that  the  "reservists  in  a  certain 
number  of  governments  had  been  called  to  the  colors."  He  who 
knows  the  reticence  of  the  official  Russian  communiques  may  well 
assert  that  the  mobilisation  is  general. 


320  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  German  Ambassador  declared  this  morning  that  he  had 
reached  the  ends  of  his  endeavours  as  mediator,  pursued  incessantly 
since  Saturday,  and  that  he  had  practically  no  hope  left.  I  have 
just  been  told  that  the  British  Ambassador  had  expressed  himself 
to  the  same  effect.  Latterly  England  proposed  arbitration,  but  Mr. 
Sazonof  replied,  "We  ourselves  proposed  this  to  Austria,  who  de- 
clined." The  suggestion  of  a  conference  was  met  by  Germany  with 
the  suggestion  of  an  agreement  between  the  cabinets.  One  is 
tempted  to  ask  if  the  whole  w^orld  is  not  wanting  war,  trying  only 
to  postpone  the  declarations  of  war  in  order  to  gain  time. 

At  first  England  let  it  be  known  that  she  did  not  wish  to  be  drawn 
into  the  conflict.  Sir  George  Buchanan  openly  said  this.  To-day, 
however,  St.  Petersburg  is  convinced  —  nay,  more,  they  have  the 
assurance  that  England  will  support  France.  (Aujourd'hui  on  est 
fermement  convaincu  a  St.  Petersburgh,  on  en  a  meme  I'assurance  que 
I'Angleterre  soutiendra  la  France.)  This  assurance  carries  great 
weight,  and  has  done  not  a  little  to  give  the  upper  hand  to  the  war 
party. 

The  Russian  Government  has  given  free  rein  to  all  pro-Servian 
and  anti-Austrian  manifestations  these  past  days.  In  the  cabinet 
meeting  early  yesterday  morning  differences  of  opinion  still  existed, 
and  the  announcement  of  the  mobilisation  was  postponed.  Since 
then  a  change  has  taken  place ;  the  war  party  has  gained  the  upper 
hand,  and  to-day  at  four  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  mobilisation  was 
publicly  announced. 

The  army  believes  itself  strong  and  is  full  of  enthusiasm.  It 
bases  its  hopes  on  the  remarkable  progress  it  has  made  since  the 
Japanese  war.  The  navy  is  still  so  far  from  the  realisation  of  its 
programme  of  reconstruction  and  reorganisation  that  it  really  cannot 
be  said  to  count.  This  was  the  reason  which  gave  England's  assur- 
ances of  support  so  much  weight. 

As  I  had  the  honour  of  telegraphing  (T.  10)  you  to-day,  every  hope 
of  a  peaceful  solution  seems  to  have  vanished.  This  is  the  view  of 
the  diplomatic  corps.  For  my  telegram  I  chose  the  way  via  Stock- 
holm by  the  Nordisk  cable  as  safer  than  the  other.  This  despatch 
I  am  entrusting  to  a  private  courier,  who  will  mail  it  in  Germany. 

With  the  assurance  of  deepest  respect,  Mr.  Secretary,  I  am, 

(Signed)        B.  de  L'Escaille. 

Francie : 

To  St.  Petersburgh  and  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No,  101 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, to  the  French  Ambassadors  at  St.  Petersburgh  and  London. 

Paris,  July  30,  1914. 

M.  IsvoLSKY  came  to-night  to  tell  me  that  the  German  Am- 
bassador has  notified   M.  Sazonof  of  the  decision  of  his  Govern- 


July  30,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  102  321 

ment  to  mobilise  the  army  if  Russia  does  not  cease  her  mihtary 
preparations. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Tsar  points  out  that 
these  preparations  were  only  commenced  after  Austria  had  mobi- 
lised eight  army  corps  ^  and  had  refused  to  arrange  peacefully  her 
differences  with  Servia.  M.  Sazonof  declares  that  in  these  circum- 
stances Russia  can  only  expedite  her  arming  and  consider  war  as 
imminent,  that  she  counts  on  the  help  of  France  as  an  ally,  and  that 
she  considers  it  desirable  that  England  should  join  Russia  and 
France  without  loss  of  time. 

France  is  resolved  to  fulfil  all  the  obligations  of  her  alliance. ^ 

She  will  not  neglect,  however,  any  effort  towards  a  solution  of 
the  conflict  in  the  interests  of  universal  peace.  The  conversa- 
tion entered  into  between  the  Powers  which  are  less  directly  in- 
terested still  allows  of  the  hope  that  peace  may  be  preserved ;  I 
therefore  think  it  would  be  well  that,  in  taking  any  precautionary' 
measures  of  defence,  which  Russia  thinks  must  go  on,  she  should 
not  immediately  take  any  step  which  may  offer  to  Germany  a  pre- 
text for  a  total  or  partial  mobilisation  of  her  forces.^ 

Yesterday  in  the  late  afternoon  ^  the  German  Ambassador  came 
and  spoke  to  me  of  the  military  measures  which  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  were  taking,  adding  that  France  was  able  to  act  in  this 
way,  but  that  in  Germany  preparations  could  not  be  secret,  and  that 
French  opinion  should  not  be  alarmed  if  Germany  decided  on  them. 

I  answered  that  the  French  Government  had  not  taken  any  step 

which  could  give  their  neighbours  any  cause  for  disquietude,  and 

that  their  wish  to  lend  themselves  to  any  negotiations  for  the  purpose 

of  maintaining  peace  could  not  be  doubted.  ^      ,  ^^ 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  102 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  30,  1914. 

M.  Sazonof,  to  whom  I  communicated  your  desire  that  every 
military  measure  that  could  offer  Germany  the  pretext  for  general 
mobilisation  ^  should  be  avoided,  answered  that  in  the  course  of  last 
night  the  General  Staff  has  suspended  all  measures  of  military  pre- 

1  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  50,  July  30,  and  that  these  eight  army  corps 
had  been  mobilised  against  Serbia.     See  also  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  78,  August  2. 

2  France  had  given  this  declaration  as  early  as  July  24,  British  Blue  BQok  No.  6, 
July  24. 

3  This  is  an  important  statement  because  it  shows  that  Viviani  believed  on  July  30 
that  Germany  had  not  even  partially  mobilised,  all  earlier  despatches  notwithstanding. 
It  also  shows  that  Viviani  knew  the  danger  as  soon  as  Germany  should  feel  obliged  to 
mobilise.  This  warning  was  doubtless  given  in  reply  to  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  58, 
July  29,  Sir  E.  Grey  knew  of  this  message,  as  appears  from  British  Blue  Book  No.  104, 
July  30. 

*  That  is  on  July  29,  and  France  did  not  then  deny  having  taken  military  measures. 
6  The  wording  was  "total  or  partial  mobilisation,"  see  previous  despatch. 


322  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


i 


caution  so  that  there  should  be  no  misunderstanding.  Yesterday 
the  Chief  of  the  Russian  General  Staff  sent  for  the  Military  Attache 
of  the  German  Embassy  and  gave  him  his  word  of  honour  that  the 
mobilisation  ordered  this  morning  was  exclusively  directed  against 
Austria.^ 

Nevertheless,  in  an  interview  which  he  had  this  afternoon  with 
Count  Pourtales,  M.  Sazonof  was  forced  to  the  conclusion  that 
Germany  does  not  wish  to  pronounce  at  Vienna  the  decisive  word 
which  would  safeguard  peace.  The  Emperor  Nicholas  has  received 
the  same  impression  from  an  exchange  of  telegrams  which  he  has  just 
had  personally  with  the  Emperor  William. 

Moreover,  the  Russian  General  Staff  and  Admiralty  have  received 
disquieting  information  concerning  the  preparations  of  the  German 
army  and  navy.^ 

In  giving  me  this  information  M.  Sazonof  added  that  the  Rus- 
sian Government  are  continuing  none  the  less  their  efforts  towards 
conciliation.^     He  repeated  to  me :    "I  shall  continue  to  negotiate 

until  the  last  moment."  ^  t^ 

Paleologue. 

Fro7n  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  103^ 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  30,  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  came  to-night  and  again  urged  on 
M.  Sazonof,  but  in  less  categorical  terms,  that  Russia  should  cease 
her  military  preparations,  and  affirmed  that  Austria  would  not 
infringe  the  territorial  integrity  of  Servia  :  — 

''It  is  not  only  the  territorial  integrity  of  Servia  which  we  must 
safeguard,"  answered  M.  Sazonof,  "but  also  her  independence  and 
her  sovereignty.  We  cannot  allow  Servia  to  become  a  vassal  of 
Austria." 

M.  Sazonof  added:  "The  situation  is  too  serious  for  me  not  to 
tell  you  all  that  is  in  my  mind.  By  intervening  at  St.  Petersburgh 
while  she  refuses  to  intervene  at  Vienna,  Germany  is  only  seeking 
to  gain  time  so  as  to  allow  Austria  to  crush  the  little  Servian  king- 
dom before  Russia  can  come  to  its  aid.     But  the  Emperor  Nicholas 

1  For  a  different  version  of  the  interview  see  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  18, 
July  30. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30,  note  3. 

3  It  is  not  clear  from  the  Entente  telegrams  what  would  have  "conciliated"  Russia 
short  of  stopping  the  punishment  of  Serbia.  Since  Austria-Hungary  was  determined 
to  mete  out  this  punishment,  a  deadlock  ensued.  Austria-Hungary's  concessions 
were  her  promise  not  to  annex  any  Serbian  territory  and  not  to  touch  the  sovereignty 
of  Serbia,  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29.  It  nowhere  appears 
that  Russia  offered  any  concessions.  The  different  courses  pursued  by  the  respective 
countries  were  due  to  the  different  attitudes  assumed  by  their  allies.  Germany  exerted 
a  constant  pressure  in  Vienna,  while  England  and  France  refused  to  take  any  steps  in 
Petrograd.  Soe  French  Yellow  Bf)ok  No.  62,  July  27,  and  No.  81,  July  28.  Contrast 
with  British  Blue  Book  No.  104,  Julv  30. 

*  Cf.  note  to  British' Blue  Book  No.  97,  July  30. 
^Ibid. 


L 


July  30,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  105  323 

is  so  anxious  to  prevent  war  that  I  am  going  to  make  a  new  proposal  ^ 
to  you  in  his  name : 

"  If  Austria,  recognising  that  her  dispute  with  Servia  has  assumed 
the  character  of  a  question  of  European  interest,  declares  herself 
ready  to  eliminate  from  her  ultimatum  the  clauses  which  are  damaging 
to  the  sovereignty  of  Servia,  Russia  undertakes  to  stop  all  military 
preparations." 

Count  Pourtales  promised  to  support  this  proposal  with  his  Gov- 
ernment. 

In  the  mind  of  M.  Sazonof,  the  acceptance  of  this  proposal  by 
Austria  would  have,  as  a  logical  corollary,  the  opening  of  a  discus- 
sion by  the  Powers  in  London. 

The  Russian  Government  again  show  by  their  attitude  that  they 
are  neglecting  nothing  in  order  to  stop  the  conflict. 

Paleologue. 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  104 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  30,  1914- 
In  spite  of  the  communication  made  yesterday  by  the  Russian 
Ambassador  to  several  of  his  colleagues,  among  them  the  German 
Ambassador,  with  reference  to  the  partial  mobilisation  in  his  coun- 
try, the  Vienna  press  refrained  from  publishing  the  news.  This 
enforced  silence  has  just  been  explained  at  an  interview  of  great 
importance  between  M.  Schebeko  and  Count  Berchtold,  who  exam- 
ined at  length  the  present  formidable  difficulties  with  equal  readiness 
to  apply  to  them  mutually  acceptable  solutions.^ 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  105 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  30,  1914. 
Herr  von  Jagow  telephoned  to  me  at  2  o'clock  that  the  news 
of  the  German  mobilisation  which  had  spread  an  hour  before  was 
false,  and  asked  me  to  inform  you  of  this  urgently;  the  Imperial 
Government  is  confiscating  the  extra  editions  of  the  papers  which 
announced  it.  But  neither  this  communication  nor  these  steps 
diminish  my  apprehension  with  regard  to  the  plans  of  Germany.^ 

^  This  proposal  was  altered  later  at  the  request  of  the  British  Ambassador  to  one 
much  less  acceptable  to  Austria-Hungary.  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  113,  and  see 
for  the  discussion  of  these  changes  E.  von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  View,  pp.  142  ff. 

2  This  was  probably  due  to  German  pressure.  See  Chancellor's  Speech  in  note  2  to 
British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28. 

3  Germany  was  apparently  ready  to  mobilise  at  any  moment.  It  has  been  popu- 
larly stated  in  Germany  that  the  General  Staff  urged  this  step  ever  since  the  first  news 
of  Russian  mobilisation  had  become  known,  but  that  the  Emperor  refused  his  consent. 


324  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

It  seems  certain  that  the  Extraordinary  Council  held  yesterday 
evening  at  Potsdam  with  the  military  authorities  under  the  presi- 
dency of  the  Emperor  decided  on  mobilisation,  and  this  explains  the 
preparation  of  the  special  edition  of  the  Lokal  Anzeiger,  but  that  from 
various  causes  (the  declaration  of  Great  Britain  that  she  reserved 
her  entire  liberty  of  action,  the  exchange  of  telegrams  ^  between  the 
Tsar  and  William  11.)  the  serious  measures  which  had  been  decided 
upon  were  suspended. 

One  of  the  Ambassadors  with  whom  I  have  very  close  relations  saw 
Herr  von  Zimmermann  at  2  o'clock.  According  to  the  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  the  military  authorities  are  very  anxious  that 
mobilisation  should  be  ordered,  because  every  delay  makes  Germany 
lose  some  of  her  advantages.  Nevertheless  up  to  the  present  the 
haste  of  the  General  Staff,  which  sees  war  in  mobilisation,  had  been 
successfully  prevented.  In  any  case  mobilisation  may  be  decided 
upon  at  any  moment.  I  do  not  know  who  has  issued  in  the  Lokal 
Anzeiger,  a  paper  which  is  usually  semi-official,  premature  news  cal- 
culated to  cause  excitement  in  France. 

Further,  I  have  the  strongest  reasons  to  believe  that  all  the  meas- 
ures for  mobilisation  which  can  be  taken  before  the  publication  of 
the  general  order  of  mobilisation  have  already  been  taken  here,  and 
that  they  are  anxious  here  to  make  us  publish  our  mobilisation  ^ 
first  in  order  to  attribute  the  responsibility  to  us. 

Jules  Cambon. 

To  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  106 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London. 

Paris,  July  30,  1914. 

Please  inform  ^  Sir  E.  Gray  of  the  following  facts  concerning 
French  and  German  military  preparations.^  England  will  see  from 
this  that  if  France  is  resolved,  it  is  not  she  who  is  taking  aggressive 
steps. 

You  will  direct  the  attention  of  Sir  E.  Grey  to  the  decision  taken 
by  the  Council  of  Ministers  this  morning;  although  Germany  has 
made  her  covering  dispositions  a  few  hundred  metres  from  the  fron- 
tier along  the  whole  front  from  Luxemburg  to  the  Vosges,  and  has 
transported  her  covering  troops  to  their  war  positions,  we  have  kept 

^  These  telegrams  are  referred  to  in  the  French  Yellow  Book,  but  not  in  the  British 
Blue  Book,  nor  were  they  laid  before  Parliament  together  with  the  Blue  Book.  Many- 
people  see  in  them  a  serious  endeavor  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor  to  preserve  the  peace. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30,  note  4. 

'  This  information  is  printed  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  105,  Enclosure  3,  July  30.  If 
the  French  Yellow  Book  prints  the  original  despatch  accurately,  either  Sir  E.  Grey 
or  the  French  Ambassador  in  London  must  be  held  responsible  for  the  alterations. 
For  a  discussion  of  these  despatches  see  E.  von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  View,  pp. 
421  ff. 

*  This  despatch  to  London  should  be  compared  with  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101, 
same  day,  to  Petrograd,  which  shows  that  Viviani  believed  that  Germany  had  not  even 
partially  mobilised  on  July  30. 


July  30,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  107  325 

our  troops  ten  kilometres  from  the  frontier  and  forbidden  them  to 
approach  nearer. 

Our  plan,  conceived  in  the  spirit  of  the  offensive,  provided,  how- 
ever, that  the  fighting  positions  of  our  covering  troops  should  be 
as  near  to  the  frontier  as  possible.  By  leaving  a  strip  of  territory 
undefended  against  sudden  aggression  of  the  enemy,  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  hopes  to  prove  that  France  does  not  bear,  any  more 
than  Russia,  the  responsibility  for  the  attack. 

In  order  to  be  convinced  of  this  it  is  sufficient  to  compare  the 
steps  taken  on  the  two  sides  of  our  frontier ;  in  France,  soldiers  who 
were  on  leave  were  not  recalled  until  we  were  certain  that  Germany 
had  done  so  five  days  before. 

In  Germany,  not  only  have  the  garrison  troops  of  Metz  been 
pushed  up  to  the  frontier,  but  they  have  been  reinforced  by  units 
transported  by  train  from  garrisons  of  the  interior  such  as  Treves 
or  Cologne ;  nothing  like  this  has  been  done  in  France. 

The  arming  of  the  frontier  defences  (clearing  of  trees,  placing 
of  armament,  construction  of  batteries  and  strengthening  of  wire 
entanglements)  was  begun  in  Germany  on  Saturday,  the  25th ;  with 
us  it  is  going  to  be  begun,  for  France  can  no  longer  refrain  from 
taking  similar  measures. 

The  railway  stations  were  occupied  by  the  military  in  Germany 
on  Saturday,  the  25th ;  in  France  on  Tuesday,  the  28th. 

Finally,  in  Germany  the  reservists  by  tens  of  thousands  have  been 
recalled  by  individual  summons,  those  living  abroad  (the  classes  of 
1903  to  1911)  have  been  recalled,  the  officers  of  reserve  have  been 
summoned;  in  the  interior  the  roads  are  closed,  motor-cars  only 
circulate  with  permits.  It  is  the  last  stage  before  mobilisation. 
None  of  these  measures  has  been  taken  in  France. 

The  German  army  has  its  outposts  on  our  frontier ;  on  two  occa- 
sions yesterday  German  patrols  penetrated  our  territory.  The  whole 
16th  army  corps  from  Metz,  reinforced  by  part  of  the  8th  from 
Treves  and  Cologne,  occupies  the  frontier  from  Metz  to  Luxemburg ; 
the  15th  army  corps  from  Strassburg  is  massed  on  the  frontier. 

Under  penalty  of  being  shot,  the  inhabitants  of  the  annexed 
parts  of  Alsace-Lorraine  are  forbidden  to  cross  the  frontier. 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  107 

M,  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  30,  1914. 
The  British  Ambassador  has  not  been  informed  of  Germany's 
reply  to  Sir  E.  Grey's  request.     He  told  me  that  Berlin  had  consulted 
Vienna  and  was  still  waiting  to  hear  from  her  ally.^ 

1  This  reply,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  44,  July  29,  was  sent  by  telegram 
on  that  day  to  Petrograd,  Paris,  London,  and  Rome.  See  also  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  104,  July  30,  and  note. 


326  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

My  Russian  colleague  has  just  told  me  that  Herr  von  Jagow  (to 
whom  Count  Pourtales  had  communicated  the  conciliatory  formula 
suggested  by  M.  Sazonof  for  an  Austro-Russian  understanding)  had 
just  told  him  that  he  found  this  proposal  unacceptable  to  Austria, 
thus  showing  the  negative  ^  action  of  German  diplomacy  at  Vienna. 

Jules  Cambon. 

From  London 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  108 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  30,  1914- 

Prince  Lichnowsky  has  not  brought  any  reply  to  the  request 
addressed  to  him  by  Sir  E.  Grey  yesterday  to  obtain  from  the  Ger- 
man Government  a  formula  for  the  intervention  of  the  four  Powers 
in  the  interest  of  peace.  But  my  German  colleague  questioned  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  about  the  military  preparations 
of  England.2 

Sir  E.  Grey  replied  that  they  were  not  of  an  offensive  character, 
but  that  in  the  present  state  of  affairs  on  the  continent  it  was  natural 
to  take  some  precautions ;  that  in  England,  as  in  France,  there  was  a 
desire  to  maintain  peace,  and  that  if  in  England,  as  in  France,  defen- 
sive measures  were  under  consideration,  it  was  not  with  the  object 
of  making  any  aggression.^ 

The  information  ^  which  your  Excellency  has  addressed  to  me  on 
the  subject  of  the  military  measures  taken  by  Germany  on  the  French 
frontier  gave  me  the  opportunity  of  remarking  to  Sir  E.  Grey  that 
it  is  no  longer  a  question  of  a  conflict  of  influence  between  Russia 
and  Austria-Hungary,  but  that  there  is  a  risk  of  an  act  of  aggression 
which  might  provoke  general  war. 

Sir  E.  Grey  understood  ^  my  feelings  perfectly,  and  he  thinks, 
as  I  do,  that  the  moment  has  come  to  consider  and  discuss  together 
every  hypothesis.  Paul  Cambon. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  109 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  30,  1914. 
In  the  interview  which  I  had  to-day  with  the  Secretary  of  State, 
I  asked  Herr  von  Jagow  what  reply  he  had  made  to  Sir  E.  Grey, 

1  Cf.  Chancellor's  Speech,  note  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28,  and  British 
Blue  Book  No.  95,  July  30. 

*  No  such  questions  are  mentioned  in  the  British  Blue  Book. 

3  This  is  the  natural  excuse  for  any  modern  state  to  make,  since  self-defence  is  the 
only  excuse  for  military  preparations  anywhere. 

*  French  Yellow  Book  No.  106,  same  day. 

"  From  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  same  day,  it  appeared  that  Viviani  believed  that 
Germany  had  not  yet  even  partially  mobilised  on  July  30.  Contrary  despatches  must 
have  been  sent  for  effect.     Did  Sir  E.  Grey  understand  this,  or  was  he  imposed  upon? 


I 


July  30,  German  White  Book  Exhibit  18  327 

who  had  asked  him  to  draw  up  himself  the  formula  for  the  interven- 
tion of  the  disinterested  Powers. 

He  answered  that  "to  gain  time,"  he  had  decided  to  act  directly, 
and  that  he  had  asked  Austria  to  tell  him  the  ground  on  which 
conversations  might  be  opened  with  her.  This  answer  has  the  effect, 
under  a  pretext  of  proceeding  more  quickly,  of  eliminating  Great 
Britain,  France  and  Italy,  and  of  entrusting  to  Herr  von  Tschirscky, 
whose  Pan-German  and  Russophobe  sentiments  are  well  known,  the 
duty  of  persuading  Austria  to  adopt  a  conciliatory  attitude. 

Herr  von  Jagow  then  spoke  to  me  of  the  Russian  mobilisation 
on  the  Austrian  frontier;  he  told  me  that  this  mobilisation  com- 
promised the  success  of  all  intervention  with  Austria,  and  that 
everything  depended  on  it.  He  added  that  he  feared  that  Austria 
would  mobilise  completely  as  a  result  of  a  partial  Russian  mobilisa- 
tion, and  this  might  cause  as  a  counter-measure  complete  Russian 
mobilisation  and  consequently  that  of  Germany. 

I  pointed  out  to  the  Secretary  of  State  that  he  had  himself  told 
me  that  Germany  would  only  consider  herself  obliged  to  mobilise 
if  Russia  mobilised  on  her  German  frontiers,^  and  that  this  was 
not  being  done.  He  replied  that  this  was  true,  but  that  the  heads 
of  the  army  were  insisting  on  it,  for  every  delay  is  a  loss  of  strength 
for  the  German  army,  and  "that  the  words  of  which  I  reminded 
him  did  not  constitute  a  firm  engagement  on  his  part."  ^ 

The  impression  which  I  received  from  this  conversation  is  that 
the  chances  of  peace  have  again  decreased. 

Jules  Cambon. 

Germany : 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

German  White  Book  ExmBiT  18 

Telegram  of  the  Military  Attache  at  St.  Petersburgh  to  H.  M.  the  Kaiser 
on  July  30,  1914. 

Prince  Troubetzki  said  to  me  yesterday,^  after  causing  Your 
Majesty's  telegram  to  be  delivered  at  once  to  Czar  Nicolas :  Thank 
God  that  a  telegram  of  Your  Emperor  has  come.  He  has  just  told 
me  the  telegram  has  made  a  deep  impression  upon  the  Czar,  but  as 
the  mobilisation  against  Austria  had  already  been  ordered  and  Sazonof 
had  convinced  His  Majesty  that  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  retreat 
His  Majesty  was  sorry  he  could  not  change  it  any  more.  I  then  told 
him  that  the  guilt  for  the  measureless  consequences  lay  at  the  door 
of  premature  mobilisation  against  Austria-Hungary,  which  after  all 
was  involved  merely  in  a  local  war  with  Servia,  for  Germany's  answer 
was  clear  and  the  responsibility  rested  upon  Russia  which  ignored 

1  French  Yellow  Book  No.  67,  July  27. 

2  Immediately  followingthe  words  referred  to  above  Von  Jagow  had  said  (French 
Yellow  Book  No.  67,  July  27),  "If  Russia  attacked  Austria,  Germany  would  be  obliged 
to  attack  at  once  on  her  side."  An  attack  must  be  preceded  by  mobilisation.  Jagow, 
therefore,  cannot  have  meant  to  give  a  promise  in  the  sense  in  which  it  was  understood 
by  Jules  Cambon. 

3  For  the  French  version  of  this  interview  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  102,  July  30. 


328  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Austria-Hungary's  assurance  that  it  had  no  intentions  of  territorial 
gain  in  Servia.  Austria-Hungary  mobilised  against  Servia  and  not 
against  Russia,  and  there  was  no  ground  for  an  immediate  action  on 
the  part  of  Russia.  I  further  added  that  in  Germany  one  could  not 
understand  any  more  Russia's  phrase  that  "  she  could  not  desert  her 
brethren  in  Servia,"  after  the  horrible  crime  of  Serajevo.  I  told  him 
finally  he  need  not  wonder  if  Germany's  army  were  to  be  mobilised. 

To  St.  Petersbiirgh 
German  WmTE  Book  Exhibit  23 

IV.  Hi.  Majesty  to  the  Czar.  j^^^  ^^^^  ^^^ 

My  Ambassador  has  instructions  to  direct  the  attention  of  Your 
Government  to  the  dangers  and  serious  consequences  of  a  mobilisa- 
tion. I  have  told  You  the  same  in  my  last  telegram.  Austria-Hun- 
gary has  mobilised  only  against  Servia,  and  only  a  part  of  her  army. 
If  Russia,  as  seems  to  be  the  case,  according  to  Your  advice  and  that 
of  Your  Government,  mobilises  against  Austria-Hungary,  the  part 
of  the  mediator  with  which  You  have  entrusted  me  in  such  friendly 
manner  and  w^hich  I  have  accepted  upon  Your  express  desire,  is 
threatened  if  not  made  impossible.  The  entire  weight  of  decision 
now  rests  upon  Your  shoulders,  You  have  to  bear  the  responsibility 
for  war  or  peace.  (Signed)        Wilhelm. 

From  St,  Petersburgh 
German  White  Book  Exhibit  23a 

V.  The  Czar  to  His  Majesty. 

Peterhof,  July  30th,  1914,  1-20  P.M. 
I  THANK  You  from  my  heart  for  Your  quick  reply.  I  am  sending 
to-night  Tatisheif  (Russian  honorary  aide  to  the  Kaiser)  with  instruc- 
tions. The  military  measures  now  taking  form  were  decided  upon 
five  days  ago,  and  for  the  reason  of  defence  against  the  preparations 
of  Austria.  I  hope  with  all  my  heart  that  these  measures  will  not 
influence  in  any  manner  Your  position  as  mediator  which  I  appraise 
very  highly.  We  need  Your  strong  pressure  upon  Austria  so  that 
an  understanding  can  be  arrived  at  with  us.  Nicolas. 

Great  Britain: 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  93 

Telegrams  communicated  by  Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador 
in  London,  July  30,  1914- 

(1) 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  M.  Sazonof 

[For  text  see  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  45,  July  28.  For  93,  (2)  and  (3),  see 
under  date  of  July  29,  Russian  Orange  Book  Nos.  49  and  50.] 


July  30,  British  Blue  Book  No.  95  329 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  94 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

—  {Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  29,  1914. 

I  LEARN  that  mobiHsation  of  Russian  corps  destined  to  carry 
out  operations^  on  Austrian  frontier  has  been  ordered.  My  inform- 
ant is  Russian  Ambassador.  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  here  has 
reahsed,  though  somewhat  late  in  the  day,  that  Russia  will  not  re- 
main indifferent  in  present  crisis.  I  believe  that  the  news  of  Russian 
mobilisation  will  not  be  a  surprise  to  the  Ministry,  but  so  far  it  is 
not  generally  known  in  Vienna  this  evening.^  Unless  mediation, 
which  German  Government  declared  themselves  ready  to  offer  in 
concert  with  three  other  Great  Powers  not  immediately  interested  in 
the  Austro-Servian  dispute,  be  brought  to  bear  forthwith,  irrevocable 
steps  may  be  taken  in  present  temper  of  this  country.  German 
Ambassador  feigns  ^  surprise  that  Servian  affairs  should  be  of  such 
interest  to  Russia.  Both  my  Russian  and  French  colleagues  have 
spoken  to  him  to-day.  Russian  Ambassador  expressed  the  hope 
that  it  might  still  be  possible  to  arrange  matters,  and  explained  that 
it  was  impossible  for  Russia  to  do  otherwise  than  take  an  interest 
in  the  present  dispute.  Russia,  he  said,  had  done  what  she  could 
already  at  Belgrade  to  induce  Servian  Government  to  meet  principal 
Austrian  demand  in  a  favourable  spirit ;  ^  if  approached  in  a  proper 
manner,  he  thought  she  would  probably  go  still  further  in  this  direc- 
tion. But  she  was  justly  offended  at  having  been  completely  ig- 
nored, and  she  could  not  consent  to  be  excluded  from  the  settlement. 
German  Ambassador  said  that  if  proposals  were  put  forward  which 
opened  any  propect  of  possible  acceptance  by  both  sides,  he  per- 
sonally thought  that  Germany  might  consent  to  act  as  mediator  in 
concert  with  the  three  other  Powers. 

I  gather  from  what  Russian  Ambassador  said  to  me  that  he  is 
much  afraid  of  the  effect  that  any  serious  engagement  may  have 
upon  Russian  public  opinion.  I  gathered,  however,  that  Russia 
would  go  a  long  way  to  meet  Austrian  demands  on  Servia. 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  95 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

—  {Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  30,  1914. 

Russian  Ambassador  hopes  that  Russian  mobilisation  will  be 
regarded  by  Austria  as  what  it  is,  viz.,  a  clear  intimation  that  Russia 

1  The  meaning  of  this  phrase  is  not  perfectly  clear,  although  it  seems  to  contemplate 
war. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  107,  same  day. 

3  Expressions  of  this  kind,  implying  motives  and  not  confining  themselves  to  facts^ 
are  regrettable  in  official  documents. 

"  This  was  denied  by  Austria-Hungary ;  see  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27. 


330  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

must  be  consulted  regarding  the  fate  of  Servia,  but  he  does  not  know 
how  the  Austrian  Government  are  taking  it.  He  says  that  Russia 
must  have  an  assurance  that  Servia  will  not  be  crushed,  but  she  would 
understand  that  Austria-Hungary  is  compelled  to  exact  from  Servia 
measures  which  will  secure  her  Slav  provinces  from  the  continuance 
of  hostile  propaganda  from  Servian  territory.^ 

The  French  Ambassador  hears  from  Berlin  that  the  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  is  instructed^  to  speak  seriously  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  against  acting  in  a  manner  calculated  to 
provoke  a  European  war. 

Unfortunately  the  German  Ambassador  is  himself  so  identified 
with  extreme  anti-Russian  and  anti-Servian  feeling  prevalent  in 
Vienna  that  he  is  unlikely  to  plead  the  cause  of  peace  with  entire 
sincerity. 

Although  I  am  not  able  to  verify  it,  I  have  private  information 
that  the  German  Ambassador  knew  ^  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum to  Servia  before  it  was  despatched  and  telegraphed  it  to  the 
German  Emperor.  I  know  from  the  German  Ambassador  himself 
that  he  endorses  every  line  of  it. 


From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  96 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
—  (Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  30,  1914. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  gave  the  French  Ambassador  and 
myself  this  afternoon  at  the  French  Embassy,  where  I  happened  to 
be,  an  account  of  his  interview  with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
which  he  said  was  quite  friendly.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
had  told  him  that  as  Russia  had  mobilised,  Austria  must,  of  course, 
do  the  same.  This,  however,  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  threat, 
but  merely  as  the  adoption  of  military  precautions  similar  to  those 
which  had  been  taken  across  the  frontier.  He  said  he  had  no  objec- 
tion to  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  continuing  their  conversations,^  al- 
though he  did  not  say  that  they  could  be  resumed  on  the  basis  of 
the  Servian  reply. 

On  the  whole,  the  Russian  Ambassador  is  not  dissatisfied.  He  had 
begun  to  make  his  preparations  for  his  departure  on  the  strength  of 

1  This  is  an  eminently  fair  statement,  nor  did  Austria-Hungary  desire  more.  Cf. 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 

2  For  the  instruction  see  Chancellor's  Speech,  note  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July 
28.  Contrast  with  this,  British  despatch  based  on  French  information,  French  Yellow- 
Book  No.  107,  July  30,  where  Jules  Cambon  complains  of  "the  negative  action  of 
German  diplomacy  at  Vienna." 

'  There  is  no  proof  for  this  assertion. 

*  This  is  what  Germany  had  demanded ;  see  Chancellor's  Speech,  note  2,  British 
Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28. 


July  30,  British  Blue  Book  No.  97  331 

a  rumour  that  Austria  would  declare  war  in  reply  to  mobilisation. 
He  now  hopes  that  something  may  yet  be  done  to  prevent  war  with 
Austria. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  97  ^ 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  {Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St'.  Petersburgh,  July  30,  1914. 

French  Ambassador  and  I  visited  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
this  morning.  His  Excellency  said  that  German  Ambassador  had 
told  him  yesterday  afternoon  that  German  Government  were  willing 
to  guarantee  that  Servian  integrity  would  be  respected  by  Austria. 
To  this  he  had  replied  that  this  might  be  so,  but  nevertheless  Servia 
would  become  an  Austrian  vassal,  just  as,  in  similar  circumstances, 
Bokhara  had  become  a  Russian  vassal.  There  would  be  a  revolution 
in  Russia,  if  she  were  to  tolerate  such  a  state  of  affairs. 

M.  Sazonof  ^  told  us  that  absolute  proof  was  in  possession  of  Rus- 
sian Government  that  Germany  was  making  military  and  naval  prep- 
arations against  Russia  —  more  particularly  in  the  direction  of  the 
Gulf  of  Finland. 

German  Ambassador  had  a  second  interview  with  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  at  2  a.m.,  when  former  completely  broke  down  on 
seeing  that  war  was  inevitable.  He  appealed  to  M.  Sazonof  ^  to  make 
some  suggestion  which  he  could  telegraph  to  German  Government  as 
a  last  hope.  M.  Sazonof  ^  accordingly  drew  up  and  handed  to  Ger- 
man Ambassador  a  formula  ^  in  .French,  of  which  following  is  trans- 
lation :  — 

"  If  Austria,  recognising  that  her  conflict  with  Servia  has  assumed 
character  of  question  of  European  interest,  declares  herself  ready 
to  eliminate  from  her  ultimatum  points  which  violate  principle  of 
sovereignty  of  Servia,  Russia  engages  to  stop  all  military  prepara- 
tions." 4    . 

Preparations  for  general  mobilisation  will  be  proceeded  with  if 
this  proposal  is  rejected  by  Austria,  and  inevitable  result  will  be  a 
European  war.  Excitement  here  has  reached  such  a  pitch  that, 
if  Austria  refuses  to  make  a  concession,  Russia  cannot  hold  back, 
and  now  that  she  knows  that  Germany  is  arming,  she  can  hardly 
postpone,  for  strategical  reasons,  converting  partial  into  general 
mobilisation. 

1  This  despatch  refers  to  the  interview  described  in  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  102 
and  103,  July  30.  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  British  and  French  presentations,  see 
E.  von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  View,  pp.  428  ff. 

2  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

3  This  proposal  was  altered  at  the  request  of  the  British  Ambassador  (French  Yellow 
Book  No.  113,  July  31)  acting  according  to  the  wishes  of  Sir  E.  Grey,  British  Blue  Book 
No.  110,  July  31.  Cf.  also  British  Blue  Book  103,  July  30,  and  No.  120,  July  31,  received 
and  listed  under  date  of  August  1.  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  these  despatches  see 
E.  von  Mach,  Germany's  Point  of  View,  pp.  432  ff. 

*  The  meaning  of  this  phrase  is  "demobilisation,"  as  appears  from  British  Blue  Book 
No.  99,  same  day. 


332  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  98 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  30,  1914. 

Secretary  of  State  informs  me  that  immediately  on  receipt  of 
Prince  Lichnowsky's  ^  telegram  recording  his  last  conversation  ^  with 
you  he  asked  Austro-Hungarian  Government  whether  they  would  be 
willing  to  accept  mediation  on  basis  of  occupation  by  Austrian  troops 
of  Belgrade  or  some  other  point  and  issue  their  conditions  from  here. 
He  has  up  till  now  received  no  reply,  but  he  fears  Russian  mobili- 
sation against  Austria  will  have  increased  difficulties,  as  Austria- 
Hungary,  who  has  as  yet  only  mobilised  against  Servia,  will  probably 
find  it  necessary  also  against  Russia.  Secretary  of  State  says  if  you 
can  succeed  in  getting  Russia  to  agree  to  above  basis  for  an  arrange- 
ment and  in  persuading  her  in  the  meantime  to  take  no  steps  which 
might  be  regarded  as  an  act  of  aggression  against  Austria  he  still  sees 
some  chance  that  European  peace  may  be  preserved. 

He  begged  me  to  impress  on  you  difficulty  of  Germany's  position 
in  view  of  Russian  mobilisation  and  military  measures  which  he  hears 
are  being  taken  in  France.  Beyond  recall  of  officers  on  leave  —  a 
measure  which  had  been  officially  taken  after,  and  not  before,  visit  of 
French  ambassador  yesterday  —  Imperial  Government  had  done 
nothing  special  in  way  of  military  preparations.  Something,  how- 
ever, would  have  soon  to  be  done,  for  it  might  be  too  late,  and  when 
they  mobilised  they  would  have  to  mobilise  on  three  sides.  He 
regretted  this,  as  he  knew  France  did  not  desire  war,  but  it  would  be 
a  military  necessity. 

His  Excellency  added  that  telegram '  received  from  Prince  Lich- 
nowsky  ^  last  night  contains  matter  which  he  had  heard  with  regret, 
but  not  exactly  with  surprise,  and  at  all  events  he  thoroughly  appre- 
ciated frankness  and  loyalty  with  which  you  had  spoken. 

He  also  told  me  that  this  telegram  had  only  reached  Berlin  very 
late  last  night;  had  it  been  received  earlier  Chancellor  would,  of 
course,  not  have  spoken  to  me  in  the  way  he  had  done. 

1  German  Ambassador  in  London. 

'  This  conversation  is  not  mentioned  in  the  British  Blue  Book,  although  Sir  E.  Grey- 
related  it  to  the  French  Ambassador.  The  report  of  the  latter  is  printed  in  the  French 
Yellow  Book  No.  108,  July  30.  It  had  reference  to  the  "military  preparations,"  i.e. 
the  mobilisation  of  England.  Probably  during  the  same  conversation  the  subject  of 
the  neutrality  of  England  was  discussed  along  the  lines  mentioned  in  British  Blue  Book 
No.  102,  July  30.  The  British  Blue  Book  contains  no  footnote  to  "telegram"  in  the 
second  line  of  this  despatch,  but  gives  a  footnote  to  "telegram"  in  the  first  line  of  the 
second  before  last  paragraph,  namely  "See  No.  102."  For  the  importance  of  the 
despatch  No.  102,  see  note  to  that  despatch. 

'  See  No.  102. 


July  30,  British  Blue  Book  No.  99  .  333 

From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  99 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  30,  1914. 

President  of  the  Republic  tells  me  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment have  been  informed  ^  by  the  German  Government  that  unless 
Russia  stops  her  mobilisation  Germany  would  mobilise.  But  a 
further  report,  since  received  from  St.  Petersburgh,  states  that  the 
German  communication  had  been  modified,  ^  and  was  now  a  request 
to  be  informed  on  what  conditions  Russia  would  consent  to  demobili- 
sation.^ The  answer  given  is  that  she  agrees  to  do  so  on  condition 
that  Austria-Hungary  gives  an  assurance  that  she  will  respect  the 
sovereignty  of  Servia  and  submit  certain  of  the  demands  of  the 
Austrian  note,  which  Servia  has  not  accepted,  to  an  international 
discussion. 

President  thinks  that  these  conditions  will  not  be  accepted  by 
Austria.  He  is  convinced  that  peace  between  the  Powers  is  in  the 
hands  of  Great  Britain.  If  His  Majesty's  Government  announced 
that  England  would  come  to  the  aid  of  France  ^  in  the  event  of  a 
conflict  between  France  and  Germany  as  a  result  of  the  present 
differences  between  Austria  and  Servia,  there  would  be  no  war,  for 
Germany  would  at  once  modify  her  attitude. 

I  explained  to  him  how  difficult  it  would  be  for  His  Majesty's 
Government  to  make  such  an  announcement,  but  he  said  that  he 
must  maintain  that  it  would  be  in  the  interests  of  peace.  France, 
he  said,  is  pacific.  She  does  not  desire  war,  and  all  that  she  has 
done  at  present  is  to  make  preparations  for  mobilisation  so  as  not 
to  be  taken  unawares.  The  French  Government  will  keep  His 
Majesty's  Government  informed  of  everything  that  may  be  done 
in  that  way.  They  have  reliable  information  that  the  German  troops 
are  concentrated  round  Thionville  and  Metz  ready  for  war.  If 
there  were  a  general  war  on  the  Continent  it  would  inevitably  draw 
England  into  it  for  the  protection  of  her  vital  interests.  A  declara- 
tion now  of  her  intention  to  support  France,  whose  desire  it  is  that 
peace  should  be  maintained,  would  almost  certainly  prevent  Germany 
from  going  to  war. 

1  Not  in  Russian  Orange  Book  or  German  White  Book,  but  given  in  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  100,  July  29. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  103,  July  30,  British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  and  Russian  Orange 
Book  No.  60,  same  day. 

3  Demobihsation,  it  appears  from  this,  was  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "stop  all 
military  preparations"  given  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  same  day. 

*  A  declaration  on  the  part  of  England  of  her  "solidarity  with  Russia  and  France" 
had  been  desired  by  Sazonof  as  early  as  July  24  (British  Blue  Book  No.  6)  and  again  on 
July  27  (British  Blue  Book  No.  44).  Evidently  France  was  now  trying  to  persuade 
England  to  take  this  stand  at  least  so  far  as  France  was  concerned. 


334  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Rome 
British  Blue  Book  No.  100 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  SO,  1914. 

German  Ambassador  told  me  last  night  that  he  thought  Germany 
would  be  able  to  prevent  Austria  from  making  any  exorbitant  demands 
if  Servia  could  be  induced  to  submit,  and  to  ask  for  peace  early,  say, 
as  soon  as  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  had  been  accomplished. 

I  made  to  his  Excellency  the  personal  suggestion  that  some  formula 
might  be  devised  by  Germany  which  might  be  acceptable  for  an  ex- 
change of  views. 

I  see,  however,  that  you  have  already  made  this  suggestion.^ 

To  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  101  ^ 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  B.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

.    Your  telegram  of  29th  July.^ 

His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain  the 
Chancellor's  proposal  that  they  should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  ^ 
on  such  terms. 

WTiat  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while  French 
colonies  are  taken  and  France  is  beaten  so  long  as  Germany  does  not 
take  French  territory  as  distinct  from  the  colonies. 

From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is  unacceptable, 
for  France,  without  further  territory  being  taken  from  her,  could  be 
so  crushed  as  to  lose  her  position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  become 
subordinate  to  German  policy. 

Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make 
this  bargain  with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from 
which  the  good  name  of  this  country  would  never  recover. 

The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away  whatever 
obligation  or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 
We  could  not  entertain  that  bargain  either. 

Having  said  so  much  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine  whether  the 
prospect  of  a  future  general  neutrality  agreement  between  England 
and  Germany  offered  positive  advantages  sufficient  to  compensate 
us  for  tying  our  hands  now.  We  must  preserve  our  full  freedom  to 
act  as  circumstances  may  seem  to  us  to  require  in  any  such  unfavour- 
able and  regrettable  development  of  the  present  crisis  as  the  Chan- 
cellor contemplates. 

1  A  probable  reference  to  suggestion  contained  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  68,  July  28. 

2  For  the  substance  of  this  despatch  see  No.  102  and  note. 
» British  Blue  Book  No.  85,  July  29. 

*  From  subsequent  publications  by  the  British  and  German  Governments  it  ap- 
pears that  the  subject  of  English  neutrality  had  been  frequently  discussed  in  the 
years  immediately  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 


July  30,  British  Blue  Book  No.  103  335 

You  should  speak  to  the  Chancellor  in  the  above  sense,  and  add 
most  earnestly  that  the  one  way  of  maintaining  the  good  relations 
between  England  and  Germany  is  that  they  should  continue  to  work 
together  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe  ;  if  we  succeed  in  this  object, 
the  mutual  relations  of  Germany  and  England  will,  I  believe,  be  ipso 
facto  improved  and  strengthened.  For  that  object  His  Majesty's 
Government  will  work  in  that  way  with  all  sincerity  and  good-will. 

And  I  will  say  this  :  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and 
the  present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavour  will  be  to  promote 
some  arrangement  to  which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she 
could  be  assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  ^ 
against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or 
separately.  I  have  desired  this  and  worked  for  it,  as  far  as  I  could, 
through  the  last  Balkan  crisis,  and,  Germany  having  a  corresponding 
object,  our  relations  sensibly  improved. ^  The  idea  has  hitherto 
been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if  this 
present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone 
through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief 
and  reaction  which  will  follow  may  make  possible  some  more  definite 
rapprochement  between  the  Powers  than  has  been  possible  hitherto. 

To  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  102  ^ 

Sir  Edivard  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

I  HAVE  warned  Prince  Lichnowsky  ^  that  Germany  must  not  count 
upon  our  standing  aside  in  all  circumstances.  This  is  doubtless 
the  substance  of  the  telegram  from  Prince  Lichnowsky  to  German 
Chancellor,  to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  last  two  paragraphs  of 
your  telegram  of  30th  July.^ 

To  St.  Petersburgh 
British  Blue  Book  No.  103 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

German  Ambassador  informs  me  that  German  Government  would 
endeavour  to  influence  Austria,  after  taking  Belgrade  and  Servian 

1  Such  a  promise  at  this  time  would  seem  to  be  unthinkable  unless  Germany  here- 
tofore could  not  have  been  assured  that  "no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be 
pursued  against  her." 

2  Sir  E.  Grey  here  recognises  that  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis  Germany  had 
worked  for  peace  as  well  as  he  himself.  ,  ^ 

3  No  reason  appears  why  this  despatch  should  not  have  been  printed  immediately 
after  No.  98  to  which  it  refers.  The  conversation  there  discussed  followed  upon  the 
telegram,  British  Blue  Book  No.  85,  July  29,  and  may  be  expected  to  have  contained 
Sir  E.  Grey's  oral  answer  to  the  Chancellor's  proposal.  Unfortunately  the  whole 
conversation  is  not  given  in  the  British  Blue  Book  (see  note  to  No.  98).  Numbers  101 
and  102,  therefore,  seem  to  contain  two  answers  to  the  Chancellor's  enquiry. 

*  German  Ambassador  in  London. 
6  See  No.  98. 


336  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

territory  in  region  of  frontier,  to  promise  not  to  advance  further, 
while  Powers  endeavoured  to  arrange  that  Servia  should  give  satis- 
faction sufficient  to  pacify  Austria.^  Territory  occupied  would  of 
course  be  evacuated  when  Austria  was  satisfied.  I  suggested  this 
yesterday  as  a  possible  relief  to  the  situation,  and,  if  it  can  be  obtained, 
I  would  earnestly  hope  that  it  might  be  agreed  to  suspend  further 
military  preparations  on  all  sides. 

Russian  Ambassador  has  told  me  of  condition  laid  do^n  by  M. 
Sazonof,^  as  quoted  in  your  telegram  of  the  30th  July,^  and  fears 
it  cannot  be  modified ;  ^  but  if  Austrian  advance  were  stopped  after 
occupation  of  Belgrade,  I  think  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs' 
formula  might  be  changed  to  read  that  the  Powers  would  examine 
how  Servia  could  fully  satisfy  Austria  without  impairing  Servian 
sovereign  rights  or  independence. 

If  Austria,  having  occupied  Belgrade  and  neighbouring  Servian 
territory,  declares  herself  ready,  in  the  interest  of  European  peace, 
to  cease  her  advance  and  to  discuss  how  a  complete  settlement  can 
be  arrived  at,  I  hope  that  Russia  would  also  consent  to  discussion 
and  suspension  of  further  military  preparations,  provided  that  other 
Powers  did  the  same. 

It  is  a  slender  chance  of  preserving  peace,  but  the  only  one  I  can 
suggest  if  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  can  come  to  no  agree- 
ment at  Berlin.    You  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


To  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  104 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F,  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris, 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

You  should  inform  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  my  telegram 
to  Sir  G.  Buchanan  ^  of  to-day,^  and  say  that  I  know  that  he  has  been 
urging  Russia  not  to  precipitate  a  crisis.^  I  hope  he  may  be  able  to 
support  this  last  suggestion  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

1  This  had  been  suggested  by  Sir  E.  Grey  on  the  previous  day,  British  Blue  Book 
No.  88.  July  29. 

*  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
3  See  No.  97. 

*  It  does  not  appear  why  the  Russian  formula  needed  any  modification,  agreeing 
substantially  with  Germany's  suggestions  to  Austria-Hungary.  See  also  Russian 
Orange  Book  No.  60.  The  altered  formula  (British  Blue  Book  No.  120  under  date  of 
August  1)  was  certainly  much  less  acceptable  to  the  Teutonic  Powers. 

'  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg. 

«  See  No.  103. 

'  This  must  refer  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30,  where  Viviani  begs 
Sazonof  not  to  take  "any  step  which  may  offer  to  Germany  a  pretext  for  a  total  or 
partial  mobilisation  of  her  forces."  It  cannot  refer  to  general  pacific  pressure  brought 
to  bear  on  Russia  ;  for  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  36,  July  27,  and  No.  53,  July  29,  assert 
that  Germany  had  vainly  tried  to  get  France  to  do  so.  See  also  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  62,  July  27,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  80,  July  28. 


July  30,  British  Blue  Book  No.  105  337 

To  Paris 
British  Blue  Book  No.  105 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  30, 1914. 

M.  Cambon  reminded  me  to-day  of  the  letter  I  had  written  to  him 
two  years  ago,  in  which  we  agreed  that,  if  the  peace  of  Europe  was 
seriously  threatened,  we  would  discuss  what  we  were  prepared  to  do. 
I  enclose  for  convenience  of  reference  copies  of  the  letter  in  question 
and  of  M.  Cambon's  reply.  He  said  that  the  peace  of  Europe  was 
never  more  seriously  threatened  than  it  was  now.  He  did  not  wish 
to  ask  me  to  say  directly  that  we  would  intervene,  but  he  would  like 
me  to  say  what  we  should  do  if  certain  circumstances  arose.  The 
particular  hypothesis  he  had  in  mind  was  an  aggression  by  Germany 
on  France.  He  gave  me  a  paper,  of  which  a  copy  is  also  enclosed, 
showing  that  the  German  military  preparations  were  more  advanced 
and  more  on  the  offensive  upon  the  frontier  than  anything  France 
had  yet  done.^  He  anticipated  that  the  aggression  would  take  the 
form  of  either  a  demand  that  France  should  cease  her  preparations, 
or  a  demand  that  she  should  engage  to  remain  neutral  if  there  was 
war  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Neither  of  these  things  could 
France  admit. 

I  said  that  the  Cabinet  ^  was  to  meet  to-morrow  morning,  and  I 
would  see  him  again  to-morrow  afternoon. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 
Enclosure  1  in  No.  105 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  M.  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  in  London. 
My  dear  Ambassador,  Foreign  Office,  November  22, 1912. 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  British  naval 
and  military  experts  have  consulted  together.  It  has  always  been 
understood  that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of 
either  Government  to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to 
assist  the  other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that  consultation 
between  experts  is  not,  and  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as,  an  engage- 
ment that  commits  either  Government  to  action  in  a  contingency 
that  has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  disposition,  for  in- 
stance, of  the  French  and  British  fleets  respectively  at  the  present 
moment  is  not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Government  had 
grave  reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  it 
might  become  essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend 
upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the  other. 

1  From  British  Blue  Book  No.  104  it  appeared  that  Sir  E.  Grey  was  familiar  with 
Viviani's  despatch,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  which  shows  that  Viviani  knew  that 
Germany  had  not  yet  proceeded  even  to  partial  mobilisation. 

2  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  this  and  subsequent  Cabinet  meetings,  see  E.  von  Mach, 
Germany's  Point  of  View,  McClurg  &  Co.,  pp.  263  ff. 


338 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an 
unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  something  that  threatened 
the  general  peace,  it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other 
whether  both  Governments  should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression 
and  to  preserve  peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  pre- 
pared to  take  in  common.  If  these  measures  involved  action,  the 
plans  of  the  General  Staffs  would  at  once  be  taken  into  consideration, 
and  the  Governments  would  then  decide  what  effect  should  be  given 
to  them. 

Yours,  etc. 

Enclosure  2  in  No.  105 


M.  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  in  London,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 


L'Ambassade  de  France,  Londres, 
ce  23  novembre,  1912. 
Cher  Sir  Edward. 

Par  votre  lettre  en  date  d'hier, 
22  novembre,  vous  m'avez  rap- 
pele  que,  dans  ces  dernieres 
annees,  les  autorites  militaires 
et  navales  de  la  France  et  de  la 
Grande-Bretagne  s'etaient  con- 
sultees  de  temps  en  temps; 
qu'il  avait  toujours  ete  entendu 
que  ces  consultations  ne  restrei- 
gnaientpasla  liberte,  pour  chaque 
Gouvernement,  de  decider  dans 
I'avenir  s'ils  se  preteraient  Tun 
Tautre  le  concours  de  leurs  forces 
armees ;  que,  de  part  et  d'autre, 
ces  consultations  entre  specia- 
listes  n'etaient  et  ne  devaient 
pas  etre  considerees  comme  des 
engagements  obligeant  nos  Gou- 
vernements  a  agir  dans  certains 
cas ;  que  cependant  je  vous  avais 
fait  observer  que,  si  Tun  ou 
Tautre  des  deux  Gouvernements 
avait  de  graves  raisons  d'appre- 
hender  une  attaque  non  provo- 
quee  de  la  part  d'une  tierce 
Puissance,  il  deviendrait  essentiel 
de  savoir  s'il  pourrait  compter 
sur  Tassistance  armee  de  Tautre. 

Votre  lettre  repond  a  cette  ob- 
servation, et  je  suis  autorise  a 


(Translation.) 
French  Embassy,  London, 
November  23,  1912. 
Dear  Sir  Edward. 

You  reminded  me  in  your 
letter  of  yesterday,  22nd  Novem- 
ber, that  during  the  last  few  years 
the  military  and  naval  authorities 
of  France  and  Great  Britain  had 
consulted  with  each  other  from 
time  to  time ;  that  it  had  always 
been  understood  that  these  con- 
sultations should  not  restrict 
the  liberty  of  either  Government 
to  decide  in  the  future  whether 
they  should  lend  each  other  the 
support  of  their  armed  forces ; 
that,  on  either  side,  these  consul- 
tations between  experts  were  not 
and  should  not  be  considered 
as  engagements  binding  our 
Governments  to  take  action  in 
certain  eventualities ;  that,  how- 
ever, I  had  remarked  to  you  that, 
if  one  or  other  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments had  grave  reasons  to  fear 
an  unprovoked  attack  on  the  part 
of  a  third  Power,  it  would  become 
essential  to  know  whether  it 
could  count  on  the  armed  support 
of  the  other. 

Your  letter  answers  that  point, 
and  I  am  authorised  to  state  that. 


July  30,  British  Blue  Book  No.  105 


339 


vous  declarer  que,  dans  le  cas  ou 
Tun  de  nos  deux  Gouvernements 
aurait  un  motif  grave  d'appre- 
hender  soit  Taggression  d'une 
tierce  Puissance,  soit  quelque 
evenement  mena^ant  pour  la 
paix  generale,  ce  Gouvernement 
examinerait  immediatement  avec 
I'autre  si  les  deux  Gouvernements 
doivent  agir  de  concert  en  vue  de 
prevenir  I'aggression  ou  de  sauve- 
garder  la  paix.  Dans  ce  cas, 
les  deux  Gouvernements  deli- 
bereraient  sur  les  mesures  qu'ils 
seraient  disposes  a  prendre  en 
commun;  si  ces  mesures  com- 
portaient  une  action,  les  deux 
Gouvernements  prendraient  aus- 
sitot  en  consideration  les  plans 
de  leurs  etats  majors  et  decide- 
raient  alors  de  la  suite  qui  devrait 
etre  donnee  a  ces  plans. 

Votre  sincerement  devoue, 
Paul  Cambon. 


in  the  event  of  one  of  our  two 
Governments  having  grave 
reasons  to  fear  either  an  act  of 
aggression  from  a  third  Power, 
or  some  event  threatening  the 
general  peace,  that  Government 
would  immediately  examine  with 
the  other  the  question  whether 
both  Governments  should  act 
together  in  order  to  prevent  the 
act  of  aggression  or  preserve 
peace.  If  so,  the  two  Govern- 
ments would  deliberate  as  to  the 
measures  which  they  would  be 
prepared  to  take  in  common;  if 
those  measures  involved  action, 
the  two  Governments  would  take 
into  immediate  consideration  the 
plans  of  their  general  staffs  and 
would  then  decide  as  to  the  effect 
to  be  given  to  those  plans. 
Yours,  etc. 

Paul  Cambon. 


Enclosure  3  in  No.  105  ^ 

French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  M.  Cambon,  Frerwh  Ambassador 
in  London. 

(Translation.) 

The  German  Army  had  its 
advance-posts  on  our  frontiers 
yesterday ;  German  patrols  twice 
penetrated  on  to  our  territory. 
Our  advance-posts  are  withdrawn 
to  a  distance  of  10  kilom.  from 
the  frontier.  The  local  popula- 
tion is  protesting  against  being 
thus  abandoned  to  the  attack 
of  the  enemy's  army,  but  the 
Government  wishes  to  make  it 
clear  to  public  opinion  and  to 
the  British  Government  that  in 
no  case  will  France  be  the  aggres- 


L'Armee  allemande  a  ses 
avant-postes  sur  nos  bornes-fron- 
tieres,  hier;  par  deux  fois  des 
patrouilles  allemandes  ont  pene- 
tre  sur  notre  territoire.  Nos 
avant-postes  sont  en  retraite  a  10 
kilom.  en  arriere  de  la  frontiere. 
Les  populations  ainsi  abandon- 
nees  a  I'attaque  de  Tarmee  ad- 
verse protestent ;  mais  le  Gou- 
vernement tient  a  montrer  a 
I'opinion  publique  et  au  Gou- 
vernement britannique  que 
I'agresseur  ne  sera  en  aucun  cas 

1  Enclosure  3  in  No.  105  was  dated  in  the  first  editions  of  the  British  Blue  Book, 
namely  July  31,  while  No.  105  itself  is  dated  July  30.  The  text  of  the  Enclosure 
should  be  compared  with  French  Yellow  Book  No.  106,  on  which  it  is  based.  Whether 
the  French  Ambassador  or  Sir  E.  Grey  is  responsible  for  the  errors  and  transpositions, 
it  is  impossible  to  state.  For  a  full  discussion  see  E.  von  Mach,  Germany  s  Fomt  of 
View,  pp.  421  £f.,  and  the  same  author's  Why  Europe  is  at  War,  G.  P.  I'utnam  s 
Sons. 


340 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


la  France.  Tout  le  16®  Corps  de 
Metz  renforce  par  une  partie  du 
8®  venu  de  Treves  et  de  Cologne 
oceupe  la  frontiere  de  Metz  au 
Luxembourg.  Le  15®  Corps 
d'Armee  de  Strasbourg  a  serre 
sur  la  frontiere.  Sous  menace 
d'etre  fusilles  les  Alsaciens-Lor- 
rains  des  pays  annexes  ne  peuvent 
pas  passer  la  frontiere;  des 
reservistes  par  dizaines  de  milliers 
sont  rappeles  en  Allemagne ;  c'est 
le  dernier  stade  avant  la  mobilisa- 
tion: or,  nous  n'avons  rappele 
aucun  reserviste. 

Comme  vous  le  voyez,  I'Alle- 
magne  I'a  fait.  J'ajoute  que 
toutes  nos  informations  concor- 
dent  pour  montrer  que  les  pre- 
paratifs  allemands  ont  commence 
samedi/  le  jour  meme  de  la 
remise  de  la  note  autrichienne. 

Ces  elements,  ajoutes  a  ceux 
contenus  dans  mon  telegramme 
d'hier,  vous  permettent  de  faire 
la  preuve  au  Gouvernement  bri- 
tannique  de  la  volonte  pacifique 
de  Tun  et  des  intentions  agres- 
sives  de  Tautre. 


sor.  The  whole  16th  corps  from 
Metz,  reinforced  by  a  part  of 
the  8th  from  Treves  and  Cologne, 
is  occupying  the  frontier  at  Metz 
on  the  Luxemburg  side.  The 
15th  army  corps  from  Strassburg 
has  closed  up  on  the  frontier. 
The  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine are  prevented  by  the  threat 
of  being  shot  from  crossing  the 
frontier.  Reservists  have  been 
called  back  to  Germany  by  tens 
of  thousands.  This  is  the  last 
stage  before  mobilisation, 
whereas  w^e  have  not  called  back 
a  single  reservist. 

As  you  see,  Germany  has  done 
so.  I  would  add  that  all  my  in- 
formation goes  to  show  that  the 
German  preparations  began  on 
Saturday,^  the  very  day  on  which 
the  Austrian  note  was  handed 
in. 

These  facts,  added  to  those 
contained  in  my  telegram  of 
yesterday,  will  enable  you  to 
prove  to  the  British  Government 
the  pacific  intentions  of  the  one 
party  and  the  aggressive  inten- 
tions of  the  other. 


Russia : 


From  Nish 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  59 


Russian  Charge  d^ Affaires  in  Servia  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Nish,  July  17  (30),  19U. 
(Telegram.) 

The  Prince  Regent  yesterday  published  a  manifesto,  signed  by  all 
the  Servian  Ministers,  on  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria  against 
Servia.  The  manifesto  ends  with  the  following  words:  "Defend 
your  homes  and  Servia  with  all  your  might.''  At  the  solemn  opening 
of  the  Skupschtina  the  Regent  read  the  speech  from  the  Throne,  in 
his  own  name.     At  the  beginning  of  his  speech  he  pointed  out  that 

^  The  earlier  editions  of  the  British  Blue  Book  contained  no  footnote  to  this  errone- 
ous date.  The  later  ones  print  this  note  :  "  Sic:  in  original.  The  actual  date  of  the 
presentation  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was,  in  fact,  Thursday,  July  23.  The  Servian 
reply  was  dated  Saturday,  July  25,  and  it  is  clearly  to  the  latter  document  that 
reference  is  intended." 


July  30,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  60  341 

the  place  of  their  convocation  showed  the  importance  of  present 
events.  He  followed  this  with  a  summary  of  recent  events  —  the 
Austrian  ultimatum,  the  Servian  reply,  the  efforts  of  the  Servian 
Government  to  do  their  utmost  to  avoid  war  that  was  compatible 
with  the  dignity  of  the  State,  and,  finally,  the  armed  aggression  of 
their  most  powerful  neighbour  against  Servia,  at  whose  side  stood 
Montenegro.  Passing  in  review  the  attitude  of  the  Powers  towards 
the  dispute,  the  Prince  emphasised  in  the  first  place  the  sentiments 
which  animated  Russia,  and  the  gracious  communication  from  His 
Majesty  the  Emperor  that  Russia  would  in  no  case  abandon  Servia.^ 
At  each  mention  of  His  Majesty  the  Czar  and  of  Russia  the  hall  re- 
sounded with  loud  bursts  of  wild  cheering.  The  sympathy  shown 
by  France  and  England  ^  was  also  touched  upon  in  turn,  and  called 
forth  approving  plaudits  from  the  members.  The  speech  from  the 
throne  ended  by  declaring  the  Skupschtina  open,  and  by  expressing 
the  hope  that  everything  possible  would  be  done  to  lighten  the  task 
before  the  Government. 

To  Berlin,  Vienna,  Paris,  London,  and  Rome 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  60 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassadors  at 
Berlin,  Vienna,  Paris,  London,  and  Rome. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  17  (30),  1914. 
(Telegram.) 

The  German  Ambassador,  who  has  just  left  me,  has  asked  ^ 
whether  Russia  would  not  be  satisfied  with  the  promise  which  Austria 
might  give  —  that  she  would  not  violate  the  integrity  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Servia  —  and  whether  we  could  not  indicate  upon  what  conditions 
we  would  agree  to  suspend  our  military  preparations.  I  dictated  to 
him  the  following  declaration  to  be  forwarded  to  Berlin  for  immediate 
action : 

"Si  TAutriche,  reconnaissant  "If  Austria,  recognising  that 
que  la  question  austro-serbe  a  the  Austro-Servian  question  has 
assume  le  caractere  d'une  ques-  assumed  the  character  of  a  ques- 
tion europeenne,  se  declare  prete  tion  of  European  interest,  de- 
a  eliminer  de  son  ultimatum  les  clares  herself  ready  to  eliminate 
points  qui  portent  atteinte  aux  from  her  ultimatum  points  which 
droits  souverains  de  la  Serbie,  violate  the  sovereign  rights  of 
la  Russie  s'engage  a  cesser  ses  Servia,  Russia  engages  to  stop 
preparatifs  militaires."  her  military  preparations." 

Please  inform  me  at  once  by  telegraph  what  attitude  the  German 
Government  will  adopt  in  face  of  this  fresh  proof  of  our  desire  to  do 

1  See  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  40,  July  27. 

2  For  England's  attitude  a  few  weeks  earlier,  see  Mr.  Asquith's  speech,  London 
Times,'^ July  1,  1914,  referring  to  the  Serajevo  murder.  "We  are  once  more  confronted 
with  one  of  those  incredible  crimes  which  almost  make  us  despair  of  the  progress  of 
mankind." 

3  Cf.  note  2  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  99,  July  30. 


342  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  utmost  possible  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  question,  for  we 
cannot  allow  such  discussions  to  continue  solely  in  order  that  Germany 
and  Austria  may  gain  time  for  their  military  preparations. 

From  Berlin 
I  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  61  ^ 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  17  (30),  1914. 

I  LEARN  that  the  order  for  the  mobilisation  of  the  German  army 
and  navy  has  just  been  issued. 

From  Berlin 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  62 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  17  {30),  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  just  telephoned  that  the 
news  of  the  mobilisation  of  the  German  army  and  fleet,  which  has 
just  been  announced,  is  false ;  that  the  news  sheets  had  been  printed 
in  advance  so  as  to  be  ready  for  all  eventualities,  and  that  they  were 
put  on  sale  in  the  afternoon,  but  that  they  have  now  been  confiscated. 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  63 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

Berlin,  July  17  (30),  1914. 
(Telegram.) 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegram  of  16th  (29th)  July,^  and  have  com- 
municated the  text  of  your  proposal  ^  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  whom  I  have  just  seen.  He  told  me  that  he  had  received  an 
identic  telegram  from  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  and 
he  then  declared  that  he  considered  it  impossible  for  Austria  to  accept 
our  proposal. 

1  The  juxtaposition  of  Nos.  61  and  60  makes  it  appear  as  if  No.  61  contained  the 
reply  to  No.  60.  This  cannot  be  the  case.  From  French  Yellow  Book  No.  1 13,  July  31, 
and  British  Blue  Book  No.  120,  July  31,  printed  under  date  of  August  1,  it  appears 
that  the  formula  was  changed  by  Sazonof  probably  on  July  31.  This  would  have 
been  impossible  if  Germany  had  issued  her  order  for  the  mobilisation  of  her  army  and 
navy  on  July  30.  Cf.  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
Germany  mobilised  on  August  1  as  of  August  2.  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  142, 
August  1,  and  the  chapter  on  MobiUsation  in  M.  P.-  Price,  The  Diplomatic  History 
of  the  War. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  93,  July  30,  Enclosure  No.  2,  dated  July  29. 

'  This  proposal  was  superseded  by  the  proposal  of  July  30,  printed  above.  Orange 
Book  No.  60.  To  print  this  despatch  (No.  63)  after  No.  60  is  misleading,  because  the 
casual  reader  may  see  in  it  Austria's  refusal  to  accept  the  formula  of  No.  60,  which  is 
not  the  case. 


July  30,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  65  343 

From  London 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  64 
Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  London,  July  17  {30),  1914. 

I  HAVE  communicated  the  substance  of  your  telegrams  of  the 
16th  (29th)  1  and  17th  (30th)  July  ^  to  Grey,  who  looks  upon  the  situa- 
tion as  most  serious,  but  wishes  to  continue  the  discussions.  I 
pointed  out  to  Grey  that  —  since  you  agreed  with  him  to  accept  what- 
ever proposal  he  might  make  in  order  to  preserve  peace,  provided 
that  Austria  did  not  profit  by  any  ensuing  delays  to  crush  Servia  — 
the  situation  in  which  you  were  placed  had  apparently  been  modified. 
At  that  time  our  relations  with  Germany  had  not  been  compromised. 
After  the  declaration  made  by  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg regarding  German  mobilisation,  those  relations  had  changed,  and 
you  had  returned  the  only  reply  to  his  request  that  was  possible 
from  a  Great  Power.  When  the  German  Ambassador  again  visited 
you,  and  enquired  what  your  conditions  were,  you  had  formulated 
them  in  altogether  special  circumstances.  I  also  again  emphasised 
to  Grey  the  necessity  of  taking  into  consideration  the  new  situation 
brought  about  by  the  fault  of  Germany  in  consequence  of  the  German 
Ambassador's  action.^  Grey  replied  that  he  fully  understood  this, 
and  that  he  would  remember  these  arguments. 

From  London 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  65 
Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
(Telegram.)  London,  July  17  (30),  1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  has  asked  Grey^  why  Great  Britain 
was  taking  military  measures  both  on  land  and  sea.  Grey  replied 
that  these  measures  had  no  aggressive  character,  but  that  the  situa- 
tion was  such  that  each  Power  must  be  -ready. 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  93,  Enclosure  2,  July  30.  Since  the  Ambassador  had  com- 
municated the  entire  telegram  to  Sir  E.  Grey,  it  does  not  appear  why  he  should  here 
speak  of  communicating  the  substance.  Equally  confusing  is  the  mixture  of  two 
separate  proposals.     See  second  note  to  previous  despatch. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  July  30,  and  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  60,  same  day. 
5  This  action  is  described  in  very  different  terms  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  97, 

*  Omitted  in  British  Blue  Book,  see  above,  note  1  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  98, 
July  30,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  108,  same  day. 


344  Offijcial  Diplomatic  Documents 

Serbia : 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

^  Serbian  Blue  Bqok  No.  44 

His  Royal  Highness  the  Crown  Prince  Alexander,  to  His  Imperial 
Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 

(Telegraphic.)  Nish,  July  17/30,  1914. 

[For  the  text  see  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  56,  undated  in  the  Collected  Dip- 
lomatic Documents,  but  printed  among  the  despatches  of  July  29.  No  reason  is 
given  why  a  despatch  from  the  Serbian  Crown  Prince  was  known  in  Russia  a  day 
before  it  was  published  in  the  Serbian  Blue  Book  as  having  been  sent  from  Serbia. 
For  Serbian  Blue  Book  Nos.  45  to  47  see  under  July  28.] 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  48 

M.  Sazonofy  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Dr.  M.  Spalaiko- 
vitch,  Serbian  Minister  at  Petrograd. 

Sir,  Petrograd,  July  17/30,  19U. 

I  HAD  the  honour  to  receive  your  note  of  July  15/28/  No.  527, 
in  which  you  communicated  to  me  the  contents  of  the  telegram  re- 
ceived by  you  from  His  Excellency,  M.  Pashitch,  in  regard  to  the 
declaration  of  war  on  Serbia  by  Austria-Hungary.  I  sincerely 
regret  this  sad  event,  and  will  not  fail  to  lay  before  His  Majesty  the 
petition  by  the  Serbian  nation,  whose  interpreter  you  are. 

I  have,  etc. 

1  Not  published  in  Russian  Orange  Book  or  Serbian  Blue  Book.  If  the  date  of  the 
telegram  from  Sazonof,  July  30,  is  correct  it  would  seem  that  Sazonof  had  waited  at 
least  two  days  before  laying  Serbia's  petition  before  the  Czar.     This  seems  incredible. 


July  31,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51 


345 


Friday,  July  31,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF   DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

London  and  Petrograd, 
All  representatives  abroad 

Petrograd,  Paris 

Belgium 

London,  Berlin  and  Paris, 
All  representatives  abroad 

France 

London,  etc.,  Petrograd 

London,     Luxemburg, 

Petrograd 
Vienna,  Berlin,  Brussels 

Germany 

Rome,  Petrograd,  Paris 

Great  Britain 

Petrograd,  Berlin,  Paris 

London,      Luxemburg, 

and  Berlin,  Brussels, 

Petrograd,     Vienna, 

Paris 

Berlin,  Brussels 

Russia 

London,  etc. ;  London 

Vienna,  Berlin 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary  is  prepared  to  entertain  Sir  E.  Grey's  proposal  to  negotiate 
between  her  and  Serbia.  Russia's  mobilisation  order,  however,  posted  in  the 
early  hours  throughout  the  Russian  Empire,  induces  her  to  mobilise  her  own 
forces  in  Galicia.  She  nevertheless  continues  her  direct  conversations  with 
Russia. 

Belgium  mobilises  her  forces  but  promises  to  observe  strict  neutrality.  She 
receives  assurances  of  the  French  minister  de  suo,  and  publishes  German  assur- 
ances made  in  the  Reichstag  several  years  ago. 

France,  having  promised  her  unconditional  support  of  Russia  on  the  previous 
day,  is  trying  to  obtain  an  unconditional  promise  of  support  from  Great  Britain. 

Germany  is  deeply  stirred  by  the  Russian  order  of  general  mobilisation,  which 
came  while  Emperor  and  Czar  were  still  exchanging  telegrams.  She  says  that  this 
order  is  making  her  pacific  efforts  in  Vienna  impossible  and  endangering  her  safety. 
She  consequently  declares  **Kriegsgefahrzustand"  and  asks  Russia,  in  an  ultima- 
tum, to  demobilise  within  12  hours.  At  the  same  time  she  asks  France  to  reply 
within  18  hours,  whether  she  will  remain  neutral  in  a  Russo-German  War. 

Great  Britain :  The  Cabinet  refuses  the  request  of  France  to  make  her  a  definite 
promise  of  support.  Sir  E.  Grey,  however,  or  his  assistant.  Sir  A.  Nicolson, 
promises  to  bring  the  matter  up  again  in  the  Cabinet  on  the  next  day,  while  Sir  E. 
Grey  himself  gives  Germany  to  understand  that  Great  Britain  would  join  France 
in  case  of  war,  making  thus  a  declaration  contrary  to  the  decision  of  the  Cabinet. 
Notes  are  addressed  to  France  and  Germany  regarding  their  respective  attitudes 
toward  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  which  Sir  E.  Grey  declares  to  be  not  **a  decisive 
but  an  important  factor,  in  determining  our  attitude."  Sir  E.  Grey  requests  a 
modification  of  Sazonof's  formula  of  the  previous  day. 

Russia  alters  her  formula  of  the  previous  day  in  which  she  had  promised  to 
stop  her  military  measures,  and  orders  the  general  mobilisation  of  her  forces. 

Serbia  is  silent  on  this  day. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  London  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassadors  at  London  and 

St.  Petersburgh. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  31,  1914, 

I  AM  telegraphing  as  follows  to  Berlin :  — 

Herr  von  Tschirschky  has  in  accordance  with  his  instructions 
yesterday  communicated  a  discussion  between  Sir  E.  Grey  and  Prince 


346  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Lichnowsky  in  which  the  British  Secretary  of  State  made  the  following 
announcement  to  the  German  Ambassador :  — 

Sazonof  has  informed  the  British  Government  that  after  the  dec- 
laration of  war  by  Austria-Hungary  against  Servia,  he  is  no  longer 
in  a  position  to  deal  directly  with  Austria-Hungary/  and  he  there- 
fore requests  that  Great  Britain  will  again  take  up  her  work  of  media- 
tion. The  Russian  Government  regarded  the  preliminary  stoppage 
of  hostilities  as  a  condition  precedent  to  this. 

To  this  Russian  declaration,  Sir  E.  Grey  remarked  to  Prince 
Lichnowsky  that  Great  Britain  thought  of  a  mediation  a  quatre,  and 
that  she  regarded  this  as  urgently  necessary  if  a  general  war  was  to 
be  prevented. 

I  ask  your  Excellency  to  convey  our  warm  thanks  to  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  the  communications  made  to  us  through  Herr  von 
Tschirschky,  and  to  declare  to  him  that  in  spite  of  the  change  in  the 
situation  which  has  since  arisen  through  the  mobilisation  of  Russia, 
we  are  quite  prepared  to  entertain  the  proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey  to  nego- 
tiate between  us  and  Servia.^ 

The  conditions  of  our  acceptance  are,  nevertheless,  that  our  military 
action  against  Servia  should  continue  to  take  its  course,  and  that  the 
British  Cabinet  should  move  the  Russian  Government  to  bring  to  a 
standstill  the  Russian  mobilisation  which  is  directed  against  us,  in 
which  case,  of  course,  we  will  also  at  once  cancel  the  defensive  military 
counter-measures  in  Galicia,  which  are  occasioned  by  the  Russian 
attitude. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   52' 

Count  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  *S^.  Petersburgh,  July  31, 1914. 

The  order  for  the  general  mobilisation  of  the  entire  Army  and 
Fleet  was  issued  early  to-day. 

To  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Diplomatic  Representatives 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    53 

Count  Berchtold  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Diplomatic  Representatives. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  31,  1914- 

For  your  information  and  for  use  in  your  dealings  with  the  Govern- 
ment to  which  you  are  accredited. 

1  The  only  published  despatch  in  the  British  Blue  Book  and  Russian  Orange  Book 
to  which  this  can  refer  is  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  50,  July  29.  Here,  however,  it  is 
Sazonof,  while  there  it  is  Austria-Hungary  who  is  said  to  have  broken  off  the  conversa- 
tions.    This  despatch  is  not  printed  in  the  German  White  Book. 

2  This  is  an  enormous  concession  both  to  Great  Britain  and  France.  Heretofore 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  had  always  refused  arbitration  between  Austria  and 
Serbia  while  ready  to  accept  arbitration  between  Austria  and  Russia. 

'  The  juxtaposition  of  these  despatches,  Nos.  51  and  52,  is  as  unfortunate  as  that 
noted  above,  Russian  Orange  Book  Nos.  60  and  61,  July  30.  The  mobilisation  was 
in  neither  case  the  result  of  the  previous  despatch.  The  Russian  mobilisation  was 
the  result  of  a  decision  reached  "five  days  ago,"  according  to  the  Czar's  telegram  of 
July  30 ;    see  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  23a. 


July  31  f  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No,  55  347 

As  mobilisation  has  been  ordered  by  the  Russian  Government  on  our 
frontier,  we  find  ourselves  obliged  to  take  military  measures  in  Galicia. 

These  measures  are  purely  of  a  defensive  character  and  arise  ex- 
clusively under  the  pressure  of  the  Russian  measures,  which  we  regret 
exceedingly,  as  we  ourselves  have  no  aggressive  intentions  of  any 
kind  against  Russia,  and  desire  the  continuation  of  the  former  neigh- 
bourly relations. 

Pourparlers  between  the  Cabinets  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh 
appropriate  to  the  situation  are  meanwhile  being  continued,^  and  from 
these  we  hope  that  things  will  quiet  down  all  round. 

From  Paris 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    54 

Count  Szecsen  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

German  Ambassador  in  pursuance  of  the  instructions  of  his 
Government  has  declared  here  that  if  the  general  mobilisation  ordered 
by  the  Russian  Government  is  not  stopped  within  12  hours,  Germany 
also  will  mobilise.  At  the  same  time  Baron  Schoen  has  asked  whether 
France  will  remain  neutral  in  the  event  of  a  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia.  An  answer  to  this  is  requested  within  eighteen  hours. 
The  time  limit  expires  to-morrow  (Saturday)  at  1  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK   No.    55 

Count  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  31,  1914. 

Your  Excellency's  telegram  ^  of  the  30th  July  has  been  received. 

You  will  have  gathered  from  my  telegram  ^  of  the  29th  July,  that 
without  waiting  for  instructions  I  again  resumed  conversations  with 
M.  Sazonof  more  or  less  on  the  basis  which  has  now  been  indicated 
to  me,  but  that  the  points  of  view  on  the  two  sides  had  not  materially 
approximated  to  each  other. 

Meanwhile,  however,  it  has  appeared  from  the  conversations 
between  the  German  Ambassador  and  the  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  that  Russia  will  not  ^  accept  as  satisfactory  the 
formal  declaration  that  Austria-Hungary  will  neither  diminish  the  ter- 
ritory of  the  Servian  Kingdom  nor  infringe  on  Servian  sovereignty  nor 
injure  Russian  interests  in  the  Balkans  or  elsewhere ;  since  then  more- 
over a  general  mobilisation  ^  has  been  ordered  on  the  part  of  Russia. 

1  A  despatch  explaining  the  resumption  of  the  pourparlers  seems  to  be  lacking, 
unless  No.  55,  same  day,  explains  it. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  50,  July  30. 

3  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 

*  In  reports  of  these  conversations  this  is  only  stated  by  inference.  Cf .  British  Blue 
Book  No.  97,  July  30. 

6  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  52,  same  day. 


348  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Belgium: 

To  Berlin,  Paris,  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  9 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Berlin,  Paris,  and  London. 

Sir,  Brussels,  July  31,  1914. 

The  French  Minister  came  to  show  me  a  telegram  from  the  Agence 
Havas  reporting  a  state  of  war  ^  in  Germany,  and  said  ^ :  — 

"I  seize  this  opportunity  to  declare  that  no  incursion  of  French 
troops  into  Belgium  will  take  place,  even  if  considerable  forces  are 
massed  upon  the  frontiers  of  your  country.  France  does  not  wish  to 
incur  the  responsibility,  so  far  as  Belgium  is  concerned,  of  taking  the 
first  hostile  act.  Instructions  in  this  sense  will  be  given  to  the  French 
authorities." 

I  thanked  M.  Klobukowski  for  his  communication,  and  I  felt  bound 
to  observe  that  we  had  always  had  the  greatest  confidence  in  the  loyal 
observance  by  both  our  neighbouring  States  of  their  engagements 
towards  us.  We  have  also  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  attitude 
of  the  German  Government  will  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  French  Republic. 

To  All  Belgian  Missions  Abroad 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  10 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  all  Heads  of 
Belgian  Missions  abroad. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  July  31,  1914- 

The  Minister  of  War  informs  me  that  mobilisation  has  been  ordered^ 
and  that  Saturday,  the  1st  August,  will  be  the  first  day. 

To  Berlin,  London,  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  U 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Berlin,  London,  and  Paris. 

Sir,  Brussels,  July  31,  191^. 

The  British  Minister  asked  to  see  me  on  urgent  business,  and  made 
the  following  communication,  which  he  had  hoped  for  some  days  ^ 

1  "State  of  danger  of  war"  (Kriegsgefahrzustand) ,  see  French  Yellow  Book  No. 
119,  July  31,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  112,  same  day. 

2  It  is  an  unusual  step  in  diplomacy  for  the  Minister  to  make  such  a  declaration 
without  authority  to  that  effect  having  been  sent.  The  formal  declaration  of  the 
French  Government  was  made  later.    Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15,  August  1,  1914. 

'  It  will  be  noted  that  Belgium  ordered  the  mobilisation  of  her  troops  one  day 
earlier  than  Germany.  See  German  White  Book,  p.  559,  August  1  at  5  p.m.,  and  Brit- 
ish Blue  Book  No.  127,  August  1. 

*  No  explanation  is  given  why  the  British  Minister  could  not  have  done  so  before. 


July  31,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  12  349 

to  be  able  to  present  to  me :  Owing  to  the  possibility  of  a  Euro- 
pean war,  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  asked  the  French  and  German 
Governments  separately  if  they  were  each  of  them  ready  to  respect 
Belgian  neutrality  provided  that  no  other  Power  violated  it :  — 

"  In  view  of  existing  treaties,  I  am  instructed  ^  to  inform  the  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  above,  and  to  say  that  Sir  Edward 
Grey  presumes  that  Belgium  will  do  her  utmost  to  maintain  her 
neutrality,  and  that  she  desires  and  expects  that  the  other  Powers 
will  respect  and  maintain  it." 

I  hastened  to  thank  Sir  Francis  Villiers  for  this  communication, 
which  the  Belgian  Government  particularly  appreciate,  and  I  added 
that  Great  Britain  and  the  other  nations  guaranteeing  our  independ- 
ence could  rest  assured  that  we  would  neglect  no  effort  to  maintain 
our  neutrality,  and  that  we  were  convinced  that  the  other  Powers, 
in  view  of  the  excellent  relations  of  friendship  and  confidence  which 
had  always  existed  between  us,  would  respect  and  maintain  that 
neutrality. 

I  did  not  fail  to  state  that  our  military  forces,  which  had  been  con- 
siderably developed  in  consequence  of  our  recent  reorganisation,  were 
sufficient  to  enable  us  to  defend  ourselves  ^  energetically  in  the  event 
of  the  violation  of  our  territory. 

In  the  course  of  the  ensuing  conversation.  Sir  Francis  seemed 
to  me  somewhat  surprised  at  the  speed  with  which  we  had  decided 
to  mobilise  our  army.  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  Netherlands 
had  come  to  a  similar  decision  before  we  had  done  so,  and  that,  more- 
over, the  recent  date  of  our  new  military  system,  and  the  tem- 
porary nature  of  the  measures  upon  which  we  then  had  to  decide, 
made  it  necessary  for  us  to  take  immediate  and  thorough  precautions. 
Our  neighbours  and  guarantors  should  see  in  this  decision  our  strong 
desire  to  uphold  our  neutrality  ourselves. 

Sir  Francis  seemed  to  be  satisfied  with  my  reply,  and  stated  that  his 
Government  were  awaiting  this  reply  before  continuing  negotiations 
with  France  and  Germany,  the  result  of  which  would  be  communi- 
cated to  me. 

To  Berlin,  London,  and  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  12 

il.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Berlin,  London,  and  Paris. 

Sir,  Brussels,  July  31,  1914. 

In  the  course  of  the  conversation  which  the  Secretary-General 
of  my  Department  had  with  Herr  von  Below  this  morning,  he  ex- 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  115,  July  31. 

2  This  should  be  read  in  the  light  of  the  Brussels  Documents,  published  by  the 
German  Government,  which  reveal  the  close  military  understanding  with  Great  Britain. 
The  reader  should  decide  for  himself  whether  Belgium  was  in  a  position  to  defend 
herself  also  against  the  Allies.  Germany  says  that  this  would  have  been  impossible 
because  Belgium  had  given  all  her  military  secrets  to  Great  Britain  and,  therefore, 
also  to  France. 


350  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

plained  to  the  German  Minister  the  scope  of  the  military  measures 
which  we  had  taken,  and  said  to  him  that  they  were  a  consequence  of 
our  desire  to  fulfil  our  international  obligations,  and  that  they  in  no 
wise  implied  an  attitude  of  distrust  towards  our  neighbours. 

The  Secretary-General  then  asked  the  German  Minister  if  he 
knew  of  the  conversation  which  he  had  had  with  his  predecessor, 
Herr  von  Flotow,  and  of  the  reply  which  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
had  instructed  the  latter  to  give. 

In  the  course  of  the  controversy  which  arose  in  1911  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  Dutch  scheme  for  the  fortification  of  Flushing,  certain 
newspapers  had  maintained  that  in  the  case  of  a  Franco-German  war 
Belgian  neutrality  ^  would  be  violated  by  Germany. 

The  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs  had  suggested  that  a  declara- 
tion in  the  German  Parliament  during  a  debate  on  foreign  affairs 
would  serve  to  calm  public  opinion,  and  to  dispel  the  mistrust  which 
was  so  regrettable  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries. 

Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  replied  that  he  had  fully  appreciated 
the  feelings  which  had  inspired  our  representations.  He  declared 
that  Germany  had  no  intention  of  violating  Belgian  neutrality,  but 
he  considered  that  in  making  a  public  declaration  Germany  would 
weaken  her  military  position  in  regard  to  France,  who,  secured  on 
the  northern  side,  would  concentrate  all  her  energies  on  the  east. 

Baron  van  der  Elst,  continuing,  said  that  he  perfectly  understood 
the  objections  raised  by  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  to  the  proposed 
public  declaration,  and  he  recalled  the  fact  that  since  then,  in  1913, 
Herr  von  Jagow  had  made  reassuring  declarations  to  the  Budget 
Commission  of  the  Reichstag  respecting  the  maintenance  of  Belgian 
neutrality. 

Herr  von  Below  replied  that  he  knew  of  the  conversation  with  Herr 
von  Flotow,  and  that  he  was  certain  that  the  sentiments  expressed 
at  that  time  had  not  changed. 


Enclosure  in  No.  12 

Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Berlin,  May  2,  1913. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  bring  to  your  notice  the  declarations  re- 
specting Belgian  neutrality,  as  published  in  the  semi-official  Nord- 
deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  made  by  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the 
Minister  of  War,  at  the  meeting  of  the  Budget  Committee  of  the 
Reichstag  on  April  29th :  — 

"  A  member  of  the  Social  Democrat  Party  said :  *  The  approach 
of  a  war  between  Germany  and  France  is  viewed  with  apprehension 

*  For  a  full  discussion  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  see  A.  K.  Fuehr,  The  Neutrality 
of  Belgium,  Funk  &  Wagnalls  Co. 


July  Sly  French  Yellow  Book  No,  110  351 

in  Belgium,  for  it  is  feared  that  Germany  will  not  respect  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium.' 

"  Herr  von  Jagow,  Secretary  of  State,  replied :  '  Belgian  neutrality 
is  provided  for  by  International  Conventions  and  Germany  is  de- 
termined to  respect  those  Conventions.' 

"This  declaration  did  not  satisfy  another  member  of  the  Social 
Democrat  Party.  Herr  von  Jagow  said  that  he  had  nothing  to  add 
to  the  clear  statement  he  had  made  respecting  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  Belgium. 

"In  answer  to  fresh  enquiries  by  a  member  of  the  Social  Demo- 
crat Party,  Herr  von  Heeringen,  the  Minister  of  War,  replied: 
*  Belgium  plays  no  part  in  the  causes  which  justify  the  proposed  re- 
organisation of  the  German  military  system.  That  proposal  is 
based  on  the  situation*  in  the  East.  Germany  will  not  lose  sight  of 
the  fact  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  is  guaranteed  by  international 
treaty.' 

"  A  member  of  the  Progressive  Party  having  once  again  spoken  of 
Belgium,  Herr  von  Jagow  repeated  that  this  declaration  in  regard 
to  Belgium  was  sufficiently  clear." 

France : 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  110 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Vimani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  July  31,  1914- 

At  the  beginning  of  our  conversation  ^  to-day  Sir  E.  Grey  told  me 
that  Prince  Lichnowsky  had  asked  him  this  morning  if  Great  Britain 
would  observe  neutrality  in  the  conflict  which  is  at  hand.  The 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that,  if  the  conflict 
became  general.  Great  Britain  would  not  be  able  to  remain  neutral, 
and  especially  that  if  France  were  involved  Great  Britain  would  be 
drawn  in. 

I  then  asked  Sir  E.  Grey  concerning  the  Cabinet  Council  which 
took  place  this  morning.  He  replied  that  after  having  examined  the 
situation,  the  Cabinet  had  thought  ^  that  for  the  moment  the 
British  Government  were  unable  to  guarantee  to  us  their  inter- 
vention, that  they  intended  to  take  steps  to  obtain  from  Germany 
and  France  an  understanding  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality,  but  that 
before  considering  intervention  it  was  necessary  to  wait  for  the  situ- 
ation to  develop. 

I  asked  Sir  E.  Grey  if,  before  intervening,  the  British  Government 
would  await  the  invasion  of  French  territory.     I  insisted  on  the  fact 

1  This  conversation  is  only  very  briefly  touched  upon  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  116, 
same  day. 

2  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  119,  July  31.  This  was  the  first  vote  of  the  Cabinet 
to  "intervene"  or  "  pledge  support"  to  France.  For  the  second  vote,  likewise  refusing, 
see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  126,  August  1. 


352  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

that  the  measures  already  taken  on  our  frontier  by  Germany  showed 
an  intention  to  attack  in  the  near  future,  and  that,  if  a  renewal  of 
the  mistake  of  Europe  in  1870  was  to  be  avoided.  Great  Britain  should 
consider  at  once  the  circumstances  in  which  she  would  give  France 
the  help  on  which  she  relied.^ 

Sir  E.  Grey  replied  that  the  opinion  of  the  Cabinet  had  only  been 
formed  on  the  situation  at  the  moment,  that  the  situation  might  be 
modified,  and  that  in  that  case  a  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  would  be 
called  ^  together  at  once  in  order  to  consider  it. 

Sir  A.  Nicolson,  whom  I  saw  on  leaving  the  room  of  the  Secretary  of 
State,  told  me  that  the  Cabinet  would  meet  again  to-morrow,  and 
confidentially  gave  me  to  understand  that  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  would  be  certain  to  renew  the  discussion. 

According  to  your  instructions,  I  have  taken  the  necessary  steps 
to  secure  that  the  autograph  letter  ^  which  the  President  of  the  Re- 
public has  addressed  to  His  Majesty  the  King  of  England  should  be 
given  to  the  King  this  evening.  This  step,  which  will  certainly  be 
communicated  to  the  Prime  Minister  to-morrow  morning,  will,  I 
am  sure,  be  taken  into  serious  consideration  by  the  British  Cabinet. 

Paul  Cambon. 

From  Luxemburg 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  Ill 

M.  Mollardf  French  Minister  at  Luxemburg,  to  Rene  Vimani,  President 
of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Luxemburg,  July  31,1914. 

The  Minister  of  State  has  just  left  the  Legation ;  he  has  just  told 
me  that  the  Germans  have  closed  the  bridges  over  the  Moselle  at 
Schengen  and  at  Remich  with  vehicles  and  the  bridge  at  Wormel- 
dange  with  ropes.  The  bridges  at  Wasserbillig  and  at  D'Echternach 
over  the  SHre  have  not  been  closed,  but  the  Germans  no  longer  allow 
the  export  from  Prussia  of  corn,  cattle  or  motor  cars. 

M.  Eyschen  requested  me  —  and  this  was  the  real  object  of  his 
visit  —  to  ask  you  for  an  official  declaration  to  the  effect  that  France 
will,  in  case  of  war,  respect  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg.  When  I 
asked  him  if  he  had  received  a  similar  declaration  from  the  German 
Government,  he  told  me  that  he  was  going  to  the  German  Minister  to 
get  the  same  declaration. 

Postscript.  —  Up  to  the  present  no  special  measure  has  been  taken 
by  the  Cabinet  of  Luxemburg.  M.  Eyschen  has  returned  from 
the  German  Legation.  He  complained  of  the  measures  showing  sus- 
picion which  were  taken  against  a  neutral  neighbour.  The  Minister 
of  State  has  asked  the  German  Minister  for  an  official  declaration 

1  If  France  had  not  relied  on  the  help  of  Great  Britain  she  might  not  have  supported 
Russia. 

2  Contrast  this  with  the  assurance  given  in  the  next  paragraph. 

3  This  letter  was  published  by  Sir  E.  Grey,  after  repeated  requests  had  been  made, 
on  Feb.  20,  1915. 


July  31,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  112  353 

from  his  Government  undertaking  to  respect  the  neutrality.  Herr 
Von  Buch  is  stated  to  have  repUed,  "  That  is  a  matter  of  course,  but  it 
would  be  necessary  for  the  French  Government  to  give  the  same 
undertaking." 

MOLLARD. 

To  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna  and  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  112 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  the  French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh, 
Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Rome. 

Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

The  British  Ambassador  has  handed  me  a  note  ^  from  his  Govern- 
ment asking  the  French  Government  to  support  a  proposal  at  St. 
Petersburgh  for  the  peaceful  solution  of  the  Austro-Servian  conflict. 

This  note  shows  that  the  German  Ambassador  has  informed  Sir 
E.  Grey  of  the  intention  of  his  Government  to  try  to  exercise  influence 
on  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  after  the  capture  of  Belgrade 
and  the  occupation  of  the  districts  bordering  on  the  frontier,  in  order 
to  obtain  a  promise  not  to  advance  further,  while  the  Powers  en- 
deavoured to  secure  that  Servia  should  give  sufficient  satisfaction  to 
Austria ;  the  occupied  territory  would  be  evacuated  as  soon  as  she 
had  received  satisfaction. 

Sir  E.  Grey  made  this  suggestion  on  the  29th  July,^  and  expressed 
the  hope  that  military  preparations  would  be  suspended  on  all  sides. 
Although  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London  has  informed  the 
Secretary  of  State  that  he  fears  that  the  Russian  condition  ^  (if 
Austria,  recognising  that  her  conflict  tvith  Servia  has  assumed  the 
character  of  a  question  of  European  interest,  declares  herself  ready 
to  eliminate  from  her  tdtimatum  the  points  ivhich  endanger  the  principle 
of  Servian  sovereignty,  Russia  undertakes  to  stop  all  military  prepara- 
tions) cannot  be  modified.  Sir  E.  Grey  thinks  that,  if  Austria  stops 
her  advance  after  the  occupation  of  Belgrade,  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment could  agree  to  change  their  formula  in  the  following  way :  — 

That  the  Powers  would  examine  how  Servia  should  give  complete 
satisfaction  to  Austria  without  endangering  the  sovereignty  or  in- 
dependence of  the  Kingdom.  In  case  Austria  after  occupying 
Belgrade  and  the  neighbouring  Servian  territory  should  declare  her- 
self ready,  in  the  interests  of  Europe,  to  stop  her  advance  and  to  dis- 
cuss how  an  arrangement  might  be  arrived  at,  Russia  could  also 
consent  to  the  discussion  and  suspend  her  military  preparations,  pro- 
vided that  the  other  Powers  acted  in  the  same  way. 

In  accordance  with  the  request  of  Sir  E.  Grey,  the  French  Govern- 
ment joined  in  the  British  suggestion,  and  in  the  following  terms 

1  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  104,  July  30,  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  103,  same  day. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  88,  July  29. 

3  French  Yellow  Book  No.  103,  British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  July  30. 

2a 


354  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

asked  their  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  to  try  to  obtain,  without 
delay,  the  assent  ^  of  the  Russian  Government :  — 

"  Please  inform  M.  Sazonof  urgently  that  the  suggestion  of  Sir  E. 
Grey  appears  to  me  to  furnish  a  useful  basis  for  conversation  between 
the  Powers,  who  are  equally  desirous  of  working  for  an  honourable 
arrangement  of  the  Austro-Servian  conflict,  and  of  averting  in  this 
manner  the  dangers  which  threaten  general  peace. 

"The  plan  proposed  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
by  stopping  the  advance  of  the  Austrian  army  and  by  entrusting  to 
the  Powers  the  duty  of  examining  how  Servia  could  give  full  satis- 
faction to  Austria  without  endangering  the  sovereign  rights  and  the 
independence  of  the  Kingdom,  by  thus  affording  Russia  a  means  of 
suspending  all  military  preparations,  while  the  other  Powers  are  to 
act  in  the  same  way,  is  calculated  equally  to  give  satisfaction  to  Russia 
and  to  Austria  and  to  provide  for  Servia  an  acceptable  means  of 
issue  from  the  present  difficulty. 

"  I  would  ask  you  carefully  to  be  guided  by  the  foregoing  considera- 
tions in  earnestly  pressing  M.  Sazonof  to  give  his  adherence  ^  without 
delay  to  the  proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey,  of  which  he  will  have  been  himself 
informed." 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  113 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  31,  1914. 

The  news  of  the  bombardment  of  Belgrade  ^  during  the  night 
and  morning  of  yesterday  has  provoked  very  deep  feeling  in  Russia. 
One  cannot  understand  the  attitude  of  Austria,  whose  provocations 
since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  have  regularly  followed  Russia's 
attempts  at  conciliation  and  the  satisfactory  conversations  exchanged 
between  St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna. 

Nevertheless,  desirous  of  leaving  nothing  undone  in  order  to  prove 
his  sincere  desire  to  safeguard  peace,  M.  Sazonof  informs  me  that  he 
has  modified  ^  his  formula,  as  requested  by  the  British  Ambassador, 
in  the  following  way :  — 

"If  Austria  consents  to  stay  the  march  of  her  troops  on  Servian 
territory,  and  if,  recognising  that  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  has  as- 
sumed the  character  of  a  question  of  European  interest,  she  admits 

1  Austria-Hungary  waa  "  quite  prepared  to  entertain  the  proposal  of  Sir  E,  Grey  to 
negotiate  between  us  and  Serbia"  ;  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51,  July  31. 

2  Russia  ordered  complete  mobilisation  instead. 

'  Cf.  last  despatch,  offer  of  Sir  E.  Grey  for  an  agreement  "after  the  occupation  of 
Belgrade." 

*  The  modified  formula  must  have  been  less  satisfactory  than  the  original  one, 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  103,  July  30,  because  here  Austria  has  to  agree  to  "stay  the 
march  of  her  troops"  while  Russia  merely  agrees  to  a  "waiting  attitude,"  instead  of 
stopping  her  military  preparations  as  she  had  first  offered  to  do. 


July  31,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  11 4  355 

that  the  great  Powers  may  examine  the  satisfaction  which  Servia 
can  accord  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  without  injury 
to  her  sovereign  rights  as  a  State  and  to  her  independence,  Russia 
undertakes  to  preserve  her  waiting  attitude." 

Paleologue. 

To  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  and  Constantinople 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  114 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  the  French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin, 
Vienna,  Rome,  and  Constantinople. 

Paris,  July  31,  1914. 
The  efforts  made  up  till  now  concurrently  by  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  with  the  earnest  support  of  France  (obtained  in  advance  for 
every  peaceful  effort)  with  the  object  of  a  direct  understanding  be- 
tween Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh,  or  of  the  mediation  of  the  four 
Powers  in  the  most  appropriate  form,  are  being  united  to-day; 
Russia,  giving  a  fresh  proof  of  her  desire  for  an  understanding,  has 
hastened  to  reply  to  the  first  appearance  of  an  overture  ^  made  by 
Germany  since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  (as  to  the  conditions  on 
which  Russia  would  stop  her  military  preparations)  by  indicating  a 
formula,  and  then  modifying  ^  it  in  accordance  with  the  request  of 
Great  Britain ;  there  ought  to  be  hope,  therefore,  negotiations  having 
also  been  begun  again  between  the  Russian  and  Austrian  Ambassadors 
that  British  mediation  will  complete  at  London  that  which  is  being 
attempted  by  direct  negotiations  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Nevertheless,  the  constant  attitude  of  Germany  who,  since  the 
beginning  of  the  conflict,  while  ceaselessly  protesting  to  each  Power 
her  peaceful  intentions,  has  actually,  by  her  dilatory  or  negative^ 
attitude,  caused  the  failure  of  all  attempts  at  agreement,  and  has 
not  ceased  to  encourage  through  her  Ambassador  the  uncompromising 
attitude  of  Vienna ;  the  German  military  preparations  begun  since 
the  25th  July  ^  and  subsequently  continued  without  cessation ; 
the  immediate  opposition  ^  of  Germany  to  the  Russian  formula,  de- 
clared at  Berlin  inacceptable  for  Austria  before  that  Power  had  even 
been  consulted;  in  conclusion,  all  the  impressions  derived  from 
Berlin  bring  conviction  that  Germany  has  sought  to  humiliate 
Russia,  to  disintegrate  the  Triple  Entente,  and  if  these  results  could 
not  be  obtained,  to  make  war. 

Rene  Viviani. 

1  French  Yellow  Book  No.  103,  July  30. 

2  See  note  2  to  previous  despatch. 

3  Cf.  Chancellor's  Speech,  note  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  67,  July  28. 

^  That  this  was  an  error  appears  from  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30.  See 
also  the  chapters  on  Mobilization  in  M.  P.  Price,  The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War, 
Scribner's  Sons. 

6  There  is  no  proof  for  this  assertion.  On  the  contrary  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 
No.  51,  July  31,  seems  to  prove  that  Germany  had  agreed,  for  Austria-Hungary's  state- 
ment that  she  was  "prepared  to  entertain  the  proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey  to  negotiate  be- 
tween us  and  Serbia  "  came  as  the  result  of  a  communication  transmitted  to  her  by 
Germany.  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  67,  July  31,  while  stating  that  the  formula  was 
altered  at  the  request  of  Great  Britain,  does  not  say  that  Germany  had  opposed  the 
original  formula. 


356  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Vienna 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  115 

M,  DumainCj  French  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council ,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  July  31,  1914. 

General  mobilisation  for  all  men  from  19  to  42  years  of  age  was 
declared  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  this  morning  at  1 
o'clock. 

My  Russian  calleague  still  thinks  that  this  step  is  not  entirely  in 
contradiction  to  the  declaration  made  yesterday  by  Count  Berchtold. 

DUMAINE. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  116 

M,  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

Herr  von  Jagow  sent  for  me  and  has  just  told  me  that  he  was  very 
sorry  to  inform  me  that  in  face  of  the  total  mobilisation  of  the  Russian 
army,  Germany,  in  the  interest  of  the  security  of  the  Empire,  found 
herself  obliged  to  take  serious  precautionary  measures.  What  is 
called  "  Kriegsgef ahrzustand  "  (the  state  of  danger  of  war)  has  been 
declared,^  and  this  allows  the  authorities  to  proclaim,  if  they  deem  it 
expedient,  a  state  of  siege,  to  suspend  some  of  the  public  services,  and 
to  close  the  frontier. 

At  the  same  time  a  demand  ^  is  being  made  at  St.  Petersburgh  that 
they  should  demobilise,  as  well  on  the  Austrian  as  on  the  German 
side,  otherwise  Germany  would  be  obliged  to  mobilise  on  her  side. 
Herr  von  Jagow  told  me  that  Herr  von  Schoen  had  been  instructed  to 
inform  the  French  Government  of  the  resolution  of  the  Berlin  Cabinet 
and  to  ask  them  what  attitude  they  intended  to  adopt. 

Jules  Cambon. 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  117 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  M.  Paleologu£,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

Paris,  July  31,   1914. 

The  German  Government  decided  at  mid-day  to  take  all  military 
measures  implied  by  the  state  called  "state  of  danger  of  war." 

1  This  proves  that  the  previous  references  to  "  Kriegsgef ahr "  were  erroneous. 
See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30,  and  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  61,  same  day. 

2  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  70,  August  1  (midnight). 


July  31,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  118  357 

In  communicating  this  decision  to  me  at  7  o'clock  this  evening, 
Baron  von  Schoen  added  that  the  Government  required  at  the  same 
time  that  Russia  should  demobilise.  If  the  Russian  Government 
has  not  given  a  satisfactory  reply  within  twelve  hours  Germany 
will  mobilise  in  her  turn. 

I  replied  to  the  German  Ambassador  that  I  had  no  information 
at  all  ^  about  an  alleged  total  mobilisation  of  the  Russian  army  and 
navy  which  the  German  Government  invoked  as  the  reason  for  the 
new  military  measures  which  they  are  taking  to-day. 

Baron  von  Schoen  finally  asked  me,  in  the  name  of  his  Government, 
what  the  attitude  of  France  would  be  in  case  of  war  between  Germany 
and  Russia.  He  told  me  that  he  would  come  for  my  reply  to-morrow 
(Saturday)  at  1  o'clock. 

I  have  no  intention  of  making  any  statement  to  him  on  this  subject, 
and  I  shall  confine  myself  to  telling  him  that  France  will  have  regard 
to  her  interests.  The  Government  of  the  Republic  need  not  indeed 
give  any  account  of  her  intentions  except  to  her  ally. 

I  ask  you  to  inform  M.  Sazonof  of  this  immediately.  As  I  have 
already  told  you,  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  Imperial  Government,  in 
the  highest  interests  of  peace,  will  do  everything  on  their  part  to 
avoid  anything  that  might  render  inevitable  or  precipitate  the  crisis. 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  118 

M.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  M.  Rene 
Viviani,  President  of  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  July  31,  191 4. 

As  a  result  of  the  general  mobilisation  of  Austria  and  of  the  measures 
for  mobilisation  taken  secretly,  but  continuously,  by  Germany  for 
the  last  six  days,^  the  order  for  the  general  mobilisation  of  the  Russian 
army  has  been  given,  Russia  not  being  able,  without  most  serious 
danger,  to  allow  herself  to  be  further  out-distanced ;  really  she  is 
only  taking  military  measures  corresponding  to  those  taken  by  Ger- 
many. 

For  imperative  reasons  of  strategy  the  Russian  Government,  know- 
ing that  Germany  was  arming,  could  no  longer  delay  the  conversion 
of  her  partial  mobilisation  into  a  general  mobilisation. 

Paleologue. 

1  This  is  very  strange,  since  the  Russian  mobilisation  was  "ordered  during  the 
afternoon  of  July  31"  (German  White  Book,  p.  558),  according  to  M.  P.  Price,  The 
Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  Scribner's  Sons,  p.  103,  and  London  Times,  Sept.  11, 
letter  by  Mr.  Stephen  Graham,  who  states  on  the  Mongolian  frontier  in  Siberia  the 
first  telegram  to  mobilise  came  through  at  4  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  31st  July. 

2  For  the  error  of  this  and  similar  statements  see  M.  P.  Price's  book  referred  to  in 
note  to  previous  despatch. 


358  Official  Diplomatic  Documents  y 

From  Brussels 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  119 

M.  Klobukowskiy  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Brussels,  July  31,  1914- 

L'Agence  Havas  having  announced  that  the  state  "of  danger  of 
war"  had  been  declared  in  Germany,  I  told  M.  Davignon  that  I  could 
assure  him  that  the  Government  of  the  Republic  would  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  the  Government  of 
the  King  had  always  thought  that  this  would  be  so,  and  thanked  me. 
The  Russian  INIinister  and  the  British  Minister,  whom  I  saw  subse- 
quently, appeared  much  pleased  that  in  the  circumstances  I  gave  this 
assurance,  which  further,  as  the  British  INIinister  told  me,  was  in 
accordance  with  the  declaration  of  Sir  E.  Grey. 

Klobukowski. 
Germany : 

To  Rome 

German  WmxE  Book  Exhibit  19 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  Rome  on 
July  31st,  1914. 

We  have  continued  to  negotiate  between  Russia  and  Austria- 
Hungary  through  a  direct  exchange  of  telegrams  between  His  Majesty 
the  Kaiser  and  His  Majesty  the  Czar,  as  well  as  in  conjunction  with 
Sir  Edward  Grey.  Through  the  mobilisation  of  Russia  all  our  efforts 
have  been  greatly  handicapped  if  they  have  not  become  impossible. 
In  spite  of  pacifying  assurances  Russia  is  ^  taking  such  far-reaching 
measures  against  us  that  the  situation  is  becoming  continually  more 
menacing. 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  24 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh on  July  31st,  1914-      Urgent. 

In  spite  of  negotiations  still  pending  and  although  we  have  up  to 
this  hour  made  no  preparations  for  mobilisation,  Russia  has  mobilised 
her  entire  army  and  navy,  hence  also  against  us.  On  account  of  these 
Russian  measures,  we  have  been  forced,  for  the  safety  of  the  country, 
to  proclaim  the  threatening  state  of  war,  which  does  not  yet  imply 
mobilisation.  Mobilisation,  however,  is  bound  to  follow  if  Russia 
does  not  stop  every  measure  of  war  against  us  and  against  Austria- 

^  The  British  edition  has  this  footnote:  "The  German  text  adds  here  'alien  uns 
zugegangenen  Nachrichten  zufolge'  (according  to  all  the  information  that  has  reached 
ua"). 


July  SI,  British  Blue  Book  No.  50  359 

Hungary  within  12  hours,  and  notifies  us  definitely  to  this  effect. 
Please  to  communicte  this  at  once  to  M.  Sazonof  and  wire  hour  of 
communication.^ 

To  Paris 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  25 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  Paris  on 
July  31st,  1914'      Urgent. 

Russia  has  ordered  mobilisation  of  her  entire  army  and  fleet,  there- 
fore also  against  us  in  spite  of  our  still  pending  mediation. ^  We  have 
therefore  declared  the  threatening  state  of  war  which  is  bound  to 
be  followed  by  mobilisation  unless  Russia  stops  within  12  hours  all 
measures  of  war  against  us  and  Austria.  Mobilisation  inevitably 
implies  war.  Please  ask  French  Government  whether  it  intends  to 
remain  neutral  in  a  Russo-German  war.  Reply  must  be  made  in  18 
hours.     Wire  at  once  hour  of  inquiry.     Utmost  speed  necessary. 

Great  Britain: 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  50 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

—  {Received  July  31.) 
Sir,  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  the  text  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  note  announcing  the  declaration  of  war  against 
Servia.  I  have,  etc. 

Maurice  de  Bunsen. 

Enclosure  in  No.  50 
Copy  of  note  verbale,  dated  Vienna,  July  28,  1914 

(Translation.) 

Pour  mettre  fin  aux  menees  In  order  to  bring  to  an  end 

subversives  partant  de  Belgrade  the  subversive  intrigues  originat- 

et  dirigees  centre  Tintegrite  terri-  ing  from  Belgrade  and  aimed  at 

toriale  de  la  Monarchic  austro-  the   territorial   integrity   of   the 

hongroise,  le  Gouvernement  Im-  Austro-Hungarian       Monarchy, 

perial  et  Royal  a  fait  parvenir  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 

a  la  date  du  23  juillet,  1914,  au  ment  has  delivered  to  the  Royal 

Serbie  une  note  dans  laquelle  se  Servian     Government    a    note, 

trouvait   formulee   une    serie  de  dated  July  23,  1914,  in  which  a 

demandes  pour  T acceptation  des-  series  of  demands  were  formu- 

quelles  un  delai  de  quarante-huit  lated,  for  the  acceptance  of  which 

1  Presented  at  midnight.     See  Russian  Orange  Book  No*.  70,  August  1. 

»The  British  edition  adds  here  a  footnote:  "The  German  text  adds  here  '  und 
obwohl  wir  selbst  keinerlei  Mobilmachungsmassnahmen  getroffen^  haben'  (and  al- 
though we  ourselves  have  taken  no  measures  towards  mobilisation"). 


360 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


henres  a  ete  accorde  a  Gouverne- 
ment  Royal.  Le  Gouvernement 
Royal  de  Serbie  n'ayant  pas 
repondu  a  cette  note  d'une 
maniere  satisfaisante,  le  Gou- 
vernement Imperial  et  Royal  se 
trouve  dans  la  necessite  de  pour- 
voir  lui-meme  a  la  sauvegarde 
de  ses  droits  et  interets  et  de 
reeourir  a  cet  effet  a  la  force  des 
armes. 

L'Autriche-Hongrie,  qui  vient 
d'adresser  a  la  Serbie  une  de- 
claration formelle  conformement 
a  I'article  l"de  la  convention  du 
18  octobre,  1907,  relative  a 
Touverture  des  hostilites,  se  con- 
sidere  des  lors  en  etat  de  guerre 
avec  la  Serbie. 

En  portant  ce  qui  precede  a 
la  connaissance  de  TAmbassade 
Royale  de  Grande-Bretagne  le 
Ministere  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres  a  I'honneur  de  declarer  que 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  se  confor- 
mera  au  cours  des  hostilites, 
sous  la  reserve  d'un  procede 
analogue  de  la  part  de  la  Serbie, 
aux  stipulations  des  conventions 
de  La  Haye  du  18  octobre,  1907, 
ainsi  qu'a  celles  de  la  Declaration 
de  Londres  du  26  fevrier,  1909. 

L'Ambassade  est  priee  de 
vouloir  bien  communiquer,  d'ur- 
gence,  la  presente  notification  a 
son  Gouvernement. 


a  delay  of  forty-eight  hours  has 
been  granted  to  the  Royal 
Government.  The  Royal  Servian 
Government  not  having  answered 
this  note  in  a  satisfactory  manner, 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment are  themselves  compelled 
to  see  to  the  safeguarding  of 
their  rights  and  interests,  and, 
with  this  object,  to  have  recourse 
to  force  of  arms. 

Austria-Hungary,  who  has  just 
addressed  to  Servia  a  formal  dec- 
laration, in  conformity  with 
article  1  of  the  convention  of  the 
18th  October,  1907,  relative  to 
the  opening  of  hostilities,  con- 
siders herself  henceforward  in  a 
state  of  war  with  Servia. 

In  bringing  the  above  to  notice 
of  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Em- 
bassy, the  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs  has  the  honour  to  declare 
that  Austria-Hungary  will  act 
during  the  hostilities  in  con- 
formity with  the  terms  of  the 
Conventions  of  The  Hague  of 
the  18th  October,  1907,  as  also 
with  those  of  the  Declaration  of 
London  of  the  28th  February, 
1909,  provided  an  analogous  pro- 
cedure is  adopted  by  Servia. 

The  embassy  is  requested  to  be 
so  good  as  to  communicate  the 
present  notification  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible to  the  British  Government. 


From  Rome 
British  Blue  Book  No.  106^ 

Sir  R.  Roddy  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Rorrw,  July  30,  1914. 

I  LEARNT  from  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  sent  for  me 
this  evening,  that  the  Austrian  Government  had  declined  ^  to  continue 

1  While  printed  here  as  received  on  July  31,  the  discussion  is,  especially  in  the 
second  paragraph,  of  events  and  proposals  of  July  29  and  30. 

2  See,  however,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29.     Cf.  also  Austro- 
Hungari'an  Red  Book  No.  51,  July  31. 


July  31,  British  Blue  Book  No,  107  361 

the  direct  exchange  of  views  with  the  Russian  Government.  But  he 
had  reason  t6  beheve  that  Germany  was  now  ^  disposed  to  give  more 
concihatory  advice  to  Austria,  as  she  seemed  convinced  that  we  should 
act  with  France  and  Russia,  and  was  most  anxious  to  avoid  issue  with 
us. 

He  said  he  was  telegraphing  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to 
ask  the  German  Government  to  suggest  that  the  idea  of  an  exchange 
of  views  between  the  four  Powers  should  be  resumed  in  any  form  which 
Austria  would  consider  acceptable.  It  seemed  to  him  that  Germany 
might  invite  Austria  to  state  exactly  the  terms  which  she  would 
demand  from  Servia,  and  give  a  guarantee  that  she  would  neither 
deprive  her  of  independence  nor  annex  territory.  It  would  be  useless 
to  ask  for  anything  less  than  was  contained  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum, 
and  Germany  would  support  no  proposal  that  might  imply  non- 
success  for  Austria.  We  might,  on  the  other  hand,  ascertain  from 
Russia  what  she  would  accept,  and,  once  we  knew  the  standpoints 
of  these  two  countries,  discussions  could  be  commenced  at  once. 
There  was  still  time  so  long  as  Austria  had  received  no  check.  He  in 
any  case  was  in  favour  of  continuing  an  exchange  of  views  with  His 
Majesty's  Government  if  the  idea  of  discussions  between  the  four 
Powers  was  impossible. 


From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  107  ^ 

Sir.  E.  GoscJien,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  30,  1914. 

I  DO  not  know  whether  you  have  received  a  reply  from  the  German 
Government  to  the  communication^  which  you  made  to  them  through 
the  German  Ambassador  in  London  asking  whether  they  could  suggest 
any  method  by  which  the  four  Powers  could  use  their  mediating 
influence  between  Russia  and  Austria.  I  was  informed  last  night  ^ 
that  they  had  not  had  time  to  send  an  answer  yet.  To-day,  in  reply 
to  an  enquiry  from  the  French  Ambassador  ^  as  to  whether  the  Im- 
perial Government  had  proposed  any  course  of  action,  the  Secretary 
of  State  said  that  he  had  felt  that  time  would  be  saved  by  com- 
municating with  Vienna  direct,  and  that  he  had  asked  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  what  would  satisfy  them.  No  answer  had, 
however,  yet  been  returned.^ 

The  Chancellor  told  me  last  night  that  he  was  "pressing  the 
button"  as  hard  as  he  could,  and  that  he  was  not  sure  whether  he 

J  This  "now"  is  significant.     Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  80,  July  29. 

2  See  note  1  to  previous  despatch. 

3  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  84,  July  29. 
*  I.e.  July  29. 

6  French  Yellow  Book  Na.  109,  July  30. 

^  For  the  answer  that  was  returned,  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51,  July  31. 


362  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

has  not  gone  so  far  in  urging  moderation  at  Vienna  that  matters  had 
been  precipitated  rather  than  otherwise. 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  108 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

Chancellor  informs  me  that  his  efforts  to  preach  peace  and 
moderation  at  Vienna  have  been  seriously  handicapped  by  the  Russian 
mobilisation  against  Austria.  He  has  done  everything  possible  to 
attain  his  object  at  Vienna,  perhaps  even  rather  more  than  was  alto- 
gether palatable  at  the  Ballplatz.  He  could  not,  however,  leave  his 
country  defenceless  while  time  was  being  utilised  by  other  Powders; 
and  if,  as  he  learns  is  the  case,  military  measures  are  now  being  taken 
by  Russia  against  Germany  also,  it  w^ould  be  impossible  to  him  to 
remain  quiet.  He  wished  to  tell  me  that  it  was  quite  possible  that 
in  a  very  short  time,  to-day  perhaps,  the  German  Government  would 
take  some  very  serious  step;  he  was,  in  fact,  just  on  the  point  of 
going  to  have  an  audience  with  the  Emperor. 

His  Excellency  added  that  the  news  of  the  active  preparations  on 
the  Russo-German  frontier  had  reached  him  just  when  the  Czar 
had  appealed  to  the  Emperor,  in  the  name  of  their  old  friendship,  to 
mediate  at  Vienna,  and  when  the  Emperor  was  actually  conforming 
to  that  request. 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  109 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

I  READ  to  the  Chancellor  this  morning  your  answer  to  his  appeal 
for  British  neutrality  in  the  event  of  war,  as  contained  in  your  tele- 
gram of  yesterday.^  His  Excellency  was  so  taken  up  with  the  news 
of  the  Russian  measures  along  the  frontier,  referred  to  in  my  im- 
mediately preceding  telegram,  that  he  received  your  communication 
without  comment.  He  asked  me  to  let  him  have  the  message  that 
I  had  just  read  to  him  as  a  memorandum,  as  he  would  like  to  reflect 
upon  it  before  giving  an  answer,  and  his  mind  w^as  so  full  of  grave 
matters  that  he  could  not  be  certain  of  remembering  all  its  points. 
I  therefore  handed  to  him  the  text  of  your  message  on  the  under- 
standing that  it  should  be  regarded  merely  as  a  record  of  conversa- 
tion, and  not  as  an  official  document.^ 

His  Excellency  agreed. 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  101,  July  30. 

'  From  this  it  would  appear  that  Great  Britain  at  this  time  did  not  wish  to  bind 
herself  by  "an  oflSicial  document." 


July  31,  British  Blue  Book  No.  Ill  363 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  110 

Sir  Edtvard  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31, 1914- 

I  LEARN  from  the  German  Ambassador  that,  as  a  result  of  sug- 
gestions by  the  German  Government,  a  conversation  has  taken 
place  at  Vienna  between  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
and  the  Russian  Ambassador.  The  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburgh  has  also  been  instructed  that  he  may  converse  with  the 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  that  he  should  give  explana- 
tions about  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia,^  and  discuss  suggestions 
and  any  questions  directly  affecting  Austro-Russian  relations.  If  the 
Russian  Government  object  to  the  Austrians  mobilising  eight  army 
corps,  it  might  be  pointed  out  that  this  is  not  too  great  a  number 
against  400,000  Servians. 

The  German  Ambassador  asked  me  to  urge  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment to  show  goodwill'  in  the  discussions  and  to  suspend  their  military 
preparations. 

It  is  with  great  satisfaction  that  I  have  learnt  that  discussions  are 
being  resumed  between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  you  should  express 
this  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  tell  him  that  I  earnestly 
hope  he  will  encourage  them. 

I  informed  the  German  Ambassador  that,  as  regards  military  prep- 
arations, I  did  not  see  how  Russia  Could  be  urged  to  suspend  ^  them 
unless  some  limit  were  put  by  Austria  to  the  advance  of  her  troops 
into  Servia. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  Ill 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  191 4. 

I  HOPE  that  the  conversations  which  are  now  proceeding  between 
Austria  and  Russia  may  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result.  The  stumbling- 
block  hitherto  has  been  Austrian  mistrust  of  Servian  assurances, 
and  Russian  mistrust  of  Austrian  intentions  with  regard  to  the  in- 
dependence and  integrity  of  Servia.  It  has  occurred  to  me  that,  in 
the  event  of  this  mistrust  preventing  a  solution  being  found  by  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburgh,  Germany  might  sound  Vienna,  and  I  would 
undertake  to  sound  St.  Petersburgh,  whether  it  would  be  possible 
for  the  four  disinterested  Powers  to  offer  to  Austria  that  they  would 
undertake  to  see  that  she  obtained  full  satisfaction  of  her  demands 

1  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51,  July  31.  .        ,,     -r.  •  •  i.  -o, 

2  But  Russia  had  herself  offered  to  "stop  all  military  operations.       Bntish  Blue 
Book  No.  97,  July  30.     Cf.  also  note  2,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  113,  July  31. 


364  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

on  Servia,  provided  that  they  did  not  impair  Servian  sovereignty 
and  the  integrity  of  Servian  territory.  As  your  Excellency  is  aware, 
Austria  has  already  declared  her  willingness  to  respect  them.  Russia 
might  be  informed  by  the  four  Powers  that  they  would  undertake 
to  prevent  Austrian  demands  going  the  length  of  impairing  Servian 
sovereignty  and  integrity.  All  Powers  would  of  course  suspend 
further  military  operations  or  preparations. 

You  may  sound  the  Secretary  of  State  about  this  proposal. 

I  said  to  German  Ambassador  this  morning  that  if  Germany  could 
get  any  reasonable  proposal  put  forward  which  made  it  clear  that 
Germany  and  Austria'  were  striving  to  preserve  European  peace, 
and  that  Russia  and  France  would  be  unreasonable  if  they  rejected 
it,  I  would  support  it  at  St.  Petersburgh  and  Paris,  and  go  the  length 
of  saying  that  if  Russia  and  France  would  not  accept  it  His  Majesty's 
Government  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  consequences,^ 
but,  otherwise,  I  told  German  Ambassador  that  if  France  became 
involved  we  should  be  drawn  in.^ 

You  can  add  this  when  sounding  Chancellor  or  Secretary  of  State 
as  to  proposal  above. 


From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  112 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  •        Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

According  to  information  ^  just  received  by  German  Govern- 
ment from  their  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  whole  Russian 
army  and  fleet  are  being  mobilised.  Chancellor  tells  me  that 
"  Kriegsgef ahr  "  *  will  be  proclaimed  at  once  by  German  Government, 
as  it  can  only  be  against  Germany  that  Russian  general  mobilisation 
is  directed.  Mobilisation  would  follow  almost  immediately.  His 
Excellency  added  in  explanation  that  "Kriegsgefahr''  ^  signified  the 
taking  of  certain  precautionary  measures  consequent  upon  strained 
relations  with  a  foreign  country. 

This  news  from  St.  Petersburgh,  added  his  Excellency,  seemed  to 
him  to  put  an  end  to  all  hope  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  crisis. 
Germany  must  certainly  prepare  for  all  emergencies. 

1  This  is  an  eminently  fair  statement.  Unfortunately  it  did  not  take  into  account 
Russia's  mobilisation.  From  the  discussion  of  Sazonof's  formula,  moreover  (cf. 
British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  July  30,  and  No.  120,  July  31  printed  under  date  of  August  1), 
it  appears  that  Sir  E.  Grey  himself  induced  Sazonof  to  withdraw  his  offer  to  "stop  all 
military  operations."  The  reason  for  this  action  is  not  explained  in  any  of  the  pub- 
lished despatches. 

2  This  declaration  of  Sir  E.  Grey  was  made  before  the  Belgian  question  was  seriously 
raised.  The  defenders  of  Germany  have  always  claimed  that  the  invasion  of  Belgium 
became  necessary,  because  Great  Britain  had  decided  to  join  France  at  all  hazards- 
and  that  the  risks  of  a  French-English  attack  through  Belgium  were  too  great  for 
Germany  to  run. 

2  See  note  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  117,  July  31. 
*  "Imminence  of  War." 


July  31,  British  Blue  Book  No.  II4  365 

I  asked  him  whether  he  could  not  still  put  pressure  on  the 
authorities  at  Vienna  to  do  something  in  general  interests  to  reassure 
Russia  and  to  show  themselves  disposed  to  continue  discussions  on  a 
friendly  basis.  He  replied  that  last  night  he  had  begged  Austria 
to  reply  to  your  last  proposal/  and  that  he  had  received  a  reply  to 
the  effect  that  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  would  take  wishes 
of  the  Emperor  this  morning  in  the  matter. 


From  St.  Petershurgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  113 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petershurgh,  to  Sir  Edivard 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petershurgh,  July  31,  1914. 

It  has  been  decided  to  issue  orders  for  general  mobilisation.^ 
This  decision  was  taken  in  consequence  of  report  received  from 
E-Ussian  Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the  effect  that  Austria  is  deter- 
mined not  to  yield  to  intervention  of  Powers,  and  that  she  is  moving 
troops  against  Russia  as  well  as  against  Servia. 

Russia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  is  making  active 
military  preparations,  and  she  cannot  afford  to  let  her  get  a  start.^ 

To  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  114 

Sir  Edivard  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  and 
Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  'at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

I  STILL  trust  that  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but  in  view^  of  pros- 
pect of  mobilisation  in  Germany  it  becomes  essential  to  His  Majesty's 
Government,  in  view  of  existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  French  (Ger- 
man) Government  are  prepared  to  engage  to  respect  neutrality  of 
Belgium  so  long  as  no  other  Power  violates  it.^ 

A  similar  request  is  being  addressed  to  German  (French)  Govern- 
ment.    It  is  important  to  have  an  early  answer. 

1  This  proposal  was  accepted  by  Austria-Hungary ;  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  51,  July  31. 

2  If  this  despatch  is  correctly  dated  from  St.  Petershurgh,  July  31,  the  British  Am- 
bassador sent  this  information  rather  late.  See  note  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  117, 
July  31. 

3  Considering  that  the  Czar  telegraphed  on  July  30  (German  White  Book,  Exhibit 
23a)  that  " military  measures  now  taking  form  were  decided  upon  five  days  ago,"  this 
is  a  strange  remark. 

*  If  the  quintuple  treaty  of  1839  was  in  force  (see  Sir  E.  Grey's  phrase  "existing 
treaties"),  the  qualification  "so  long  as  no  other  Power  violates  it"  was  contrary  to 
the  treaty,  for  in  that  case  the  remaining  Powers  were  bound  to  make  joint  cause 
against  the  invader.  Germany  has  claimed  that  she  could  riot  rely  on  Great  Britain's 
defence  of  Belgium  if  France  should  have  invaded  it.  See  A.  K.  Fuehr,  The  Neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  Funk  &  Wagnalls  Co. 


366  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Brussels 
British  Blue  Book  No.  115 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914, 

In  view  of  existing  treaties,  you  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  that,  in  consideration  of  the  possibility  of  a  European  war,  I 
have  asked  French  and  German  Governments  whether  each  is  pre- 
pared to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  provided  it  is  violated  by 
no  other  Power. 

You  should  say  that  I  assume  that  the  Belgian  Government  will 
maintain  to  the  utmost  of  their  power  their  neutrality,  which  I  desire 
and  expect  other  Powers  to  uphold  and  observe. 

You  should  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  an  early  reply  is 
desired. 

To  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  116 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegram  of  yesterday's  date.^ 

Nobody  here  feels  that  in  this  dispute,  so  far  as  it  has  yet  gone, 
British  treaties  or  obligations  are  involved.  Feeling  is  quite  different 
from  what  it  was  during  the  INIorocco  question.  That  crisis  involved 
a  dispute  directly  involving  France,  whereas  in  this  case  France  is 
being  drawn  into  a  dispute  which  is  not  hers. 

I  believe  it  to  be  quite  untrue  that  our  attitude  has  been  a  decisive 
factor  in  situation .    German  Government  do  not  expect  our  neutrality.^ 

We  cannot  undertake  a  definite  pledge  to  intervene  in  a  war. 
I  have  so  told  the  French  Ambassador,  who  has  urged  His  Majesty's 
Government  to  reconsider  this  decision.^ 

I  have  told  him  that  we  should  not  be  justified  in  giving  any  pledge 
at  the  present  moment,  but  that  we  will  certainly  consider  the  situ- 
ation again  directly  there  is  a  new  development. 

From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  117 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

At  7  o'clock  this  evening  I  was  sent  for  by  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  When  I  arrived  the  German  Ambassador  was  leaving  his 
Excellency. 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  99,  July  30. 

2  This  was  probably  quite  true  on  July  31,  but  it  had  not  been  so  up  to  July  29, 
see  British  Blue  Book  No.  80,  July  29,  and  ih.  No.  106,  July  30,  listed  under  date  of 
July  31.     See  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  92,  July  29,  last  paragraph. 

»  French  Yellow  Book  No.  110,  July  31. 


July  31,  British  Blue  Book  No.  118  367 

German  Ambassador  had  informed  his  Excellency  that,  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  orders  had  been  given  for  the  total  mobilisation  of 
Russian  army  and  fleet,  German  Government  have  in  an  ultimatum 
which  they  have  addressed  to  the  Russian  Government  required  that 
Russian  forces  should  be  demobilised. 

The  German  Government  will  consider  it  necessary  to  order  the 
total  mobilisation  of  the  German  army  on  the  Russian  and  French 
frontiers  if  within  twelve  hours  the  Russian  Government  do  not  give 
an  undertaking  to  comply  with  German  demand. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  asks  me  to  communicate  this  to 
you,  and  enquires  what,  in  these  circumstances,  will  be  the  attitude  of 
England. 

German  Ambassador  could  not  say  when  the  twelve  hours  termi- 
nate. He  is  going  to  call  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  to- 
morrow (Saturday)  at  1  p.m.  in  order  to  receive  the  French  Govern- 
ment's answer  as  to  the  attitude  they  will  adopt  in  the  circumstances. 

He  intimated  the  possibility  of  his  requiring  his  passports. 

I  am  informed  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  ^  that  he  is  not  aware  of 
any  general  mobilisation  of  the  Russian  forces  having  taken  place. 

From  Vienna     • 

British  Blue  Book  No.  118 

8ir  M.  de  Sunken,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.  —  (Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  31,  1914. 

I  AM  informed  by  Count  Forgach,  Under-Secretary  of  State,  that 
although  Austria  was  compelled  to  respond  to  Russian  mobilisation, 
which  he  deplored,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  London  has  received 
instructions  to  inform  you  that  mobilisation  was  not  to  be  regarded 
as  a  necessarily  hostile  act  on  either  side.  Telegrams  were  being 
exchanged  between  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  the  German  Emperor, 
and  conversations  were  proceeding  between  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburgh  and  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  A  general 
war  might,  he  seriously  hoped,  be  staved  off  by  these  efforts.  On  my 
expressing  my  fear  that  Germany  would  mobilise,  he  said  that  Ger- 
many must  do  something,  in  his  opinion,  to  secure  her  position. ^  As 
regards  Russian  intervention  on  behalf  of  Servia,  Austria-Hungary 
found  it  difficult  to  recognise  such  a  claim.  I  called  his  attention  to 
the  fact  that  during  the  discussion  of  the  Albanian  frontier  at  the 
London  Conference  of  Ambassadors  the  Russian  Government  had 
stood  behind  Servia,  and  that  a  compromise  between  the  views  of 
Russia  and  Austria-Hungary  resulted  with  accepted  frontier  line. 

1  This  is  very  strange ;  cf.  the  Czar's  telegram  of  July  30,  German  White  Book, 
Exhibit  23a,  and  note  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  117,  July  31. 

2  The  statement  is  important  in  view  of  the  charge  that  has  been  made  that  Ger- 
many forced  the  war  by  duping  Austria-Hungary  when  the  latter  was  on  the  point 
of  settling  her  differences  with  Russia. 


368  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Although  he  spoke  in  a  conciHatory  tone,  and  did  not  regard  the  situ- 
ation as  desperate,  I  could  not  get  from  him  any  suggestion  for  a 
similar  compromise  in  the  present  case.  Count  Forgach  is  going  this 
afternoon  to  see  the  Russian  Ambassador,  whom  I  have  informed  of 
the  above  conversation. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  has  explained  that  Russia  has  no  desire 
to  interfere  unduly  with  Servia;  that,  as  compared  with  the  late 
Russian  Minister,^  the  present  Minister  at  Belgrade  is  a  man  of 
very  moderate  views ;  and  that,  as  regards  Austrian  demands,  Russia 
had  counselled  Servia  to  yield  to  them  as  far  as  she  possibly  could 
without  sacrificing  her  independence.  His  Excellency  is  exerting 
himself  strongly  in  the  interests  of  peace. 

From  Paris 
British  Blue  Book  No.  119 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914- 

M.  Cambon  ^  referred  to-day  to  a  telegram  ^  that  had  been  shown 
to  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  ^  this  morning  from  the  French  Ambassador  in 
Berlin,  saying  that  it  was  the  uncertainty  with  regard  to  whether 
we  would  intervene  which  was  the  encouraging  element  in  Berlin, 
and  that,  if  we  would  only  declare  definitely  on  the  side  of  Rus- 
sia and  France,  it  would  decide  the  German  attitude  in  favour  of 
peace. 

I  said  that  it  was  quite  wrong  to  suppose  that  we  had  left  Germany 
under  the  impression  that  we  would  not  intervene.  I  had  refused 
overtures  ^  to  promise  that  we  should  remain  neutral.  I  had  not 
only  definitely  declined  to  say  that  w^e  would  remain  neutral,  I  had 
even  gone  so  far  this  morning  as  to  say  to  the  German  Ambassador 
that,  if  France  and  Germany  became  involved  in  war,  we  should  be 
drawn  into  it.^  That,  of  course,  was  not  the  same  thing  as  taking  an 
engagement  to  France,  and  I  told  M.  Cambon  of  it  only  to  show  that 
we  had  not  left  Germany  under  the  impression  that  we  would  stand 
aside. 

M.  Cambon  then  asked  me  for  my  reply  to  what  he  had  said  yester- 
dsLyJ 

1  said  that  we  had  come  to  the  conclusion,  in  the  Cabinet  ^  to-day, 
that  we  could  not  give  any  pledge  at  the  present  time.     Though  we 

^  Mr.  von  Hartwig,  whose  very  sudden  death  after  the  Serajevo  murder  has  not 
yet  been  explained. 

2  French  Ambassador  in  London. 

3  Cf.  the  last  paragraph,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  92,  July  29. 
*  British  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

6  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  85,  July  29. 
«  British  Blue  Book  No.  Ill,  July  31. 

7  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  105,  July  30. 

8  This  was  the  first  time  the  British  Cabinet  voted  against  joining  France ;  see  also 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  110,  July  31.  On  the  next  day,  August  1,  the  Cabinet  re- 
fused for  the  second  time  to  declare  British  solidarity  with  France.  See  French  Yellow 
Book  No.  126,  August  1. 


L 


July  Sly  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  66  369 

should  have  to  put  our  policy  before  Parliament,  we  could  not  pledge 
Parliament  in  advance.  Up  to  the  present  moment,  we  did  not  feel, 
and  public  opinion  did  not  feel,  that  any  treaties  or  obligations 
of  this  country  were  involved.  Further  developments  might  alter 
this  situation  and  cause  the  Government  and  Parliament  to  take  the 
view  that  intervention  was  justified.  The  preservation  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  ^  might  be,  I  would  not  say  a  decisive,^  but 
an  important  factor,  in  determining  our  attitude.  Whether  we 
proposed  to  Parliament  to  intervene  or  not  to  intervene  in  a  war. 
Parliament  would  wish  to  know  how  we  stood  with  regard  to  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  it  might  be  that  I  should  ask  both 
France  and  Germany  whether  each  was  prepared  to  undertake  an 
engagement  that  she  would  not  be  the  first  to  violate  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium. 

M.  Cambon  repeated  his  question  whether  we  would  help  France 
if  Germany  made  an  attack  on  her. 

I  said  that  I  could  only  adhere  to  the  answer  that,  as  far  as  things 
had  gone  at  present,  we  could  not  take  any  engagement. 

M.  Cambon  urged  that  Germany  had  from  the  beginning  rejected 
proposals  that  might  have  made  for  peace.^  It  could  not  be  to  Eng- 
land's interest  that  France  should  be  crushed  by  Germany.  We 
should  then  be  in  a  very  diminished  position  with  regard  to  Germany. 
In  1870  we  had  made  a  great  mistake  in  allowing  an  enormous  in- 
crease of  German  strength,  and  we  should  now  be  repeating  the  mis- 
take. He  asked  me  whether  I  could  not  submit  his  question  to  the 
Cabinet  again. 


Russia : 

From  Vienna 

^  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  66 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Vienna,  July  18  {SI),  191^. 

In  spite  of  the  general  mobilisation,^  my  exchange  of  views  with 
Count  Berchtold  and  his  colleagues  continues.  They  all  dwell 
upon  the  absence  on  Austria's  part  of  any  hostile  intentions  whatso- 
ever against  Russia,  and  of  any  designs  of  conquest  at  the  expense  of 
Servia,  but  they  are  all  equally  insistent  that  Austria  is  bound  to 
carry  through  the  action  which  she  has  begun  and  to  give  Servia  a 
serious  lesson,  which  would  constitute  a  sure  guarantee  for  the 
future. 

1  This  is  not  mentioned  in  Cambon's  report  of  Sir  E.  Grey's  remarks  in  French 
YeUow  Book  No.  110,  July  31. 

2  This  statement  is  important. 

3  There  is  no  statement  here  that  Sir  E.  Grey  corrected  this  misconception  on  the 
part  of  the  French  Ambassador. 

4  This  may  refer  to  the  Russian  mobilisation  or  to  the  counter  measure  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  mobilisation. 

2b 


370  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  67 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassadors  at 
Rerlin,  Vienna,  Paris,  London,  and  Rome. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  18  {31),  1914. 

Please  refer  to  my  telegram  of  17  (30)  July.^  The  British  Am- 
bassador, on  the  instructions  of  his  Government,  has  informed  me 
of  the  wish  of  the  London  Cabinet  to  make  certain  modifications  ^ 
in  the  formula  which  I  suggested  yesterday  to  the  German  Am- 
bassador. I  replied  that  I  accepted  the  British  suggestion.  I 
accordingly  send  you  the  text  of  the  modified  formula  which  is  as 
follows :  — 

(Translation.) 

"Si  I'Autriche  consent  a  ar-  "If  Austria  consents  to  stay 
reter  la  marche  de  ses  armees  the  march  of  her  troops  on 
sur  le  territoire  serbe  et  si,  Servian  territory ;  and  if,  recog- 
reconnaissant  que  le  conflit  nising  that  the  Austro-Servian 
austro-serbe  a  assume  le  carac-  conflict  has  assumed  the  character 
tere  d'une  question  d'interet  of  a  question  of  European  inter- 
europeen,  elle  admet  que  les  est,  she  admits  that  the  Great 
Grandes  Puissances  examinent  Powers  may  examine  the  satisfac- 
la  satisfaction  que  la  Serbie  tion  which  Servia  can  accord  to 
pourrait  accorder  au  Gouverne-  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment d'Autriche-Hongrie  sans  ment  without  injury  to  her  rights 
laisser  porter  atteinte  a  ses  droits  as  a  sovereign  State  or  her  inde- 
d'Etat  souverain  et  a  son  inde-  pendence,  Russia  undertakes  to 
pendance,  —  la  Russie  s'engage  a  maintain  her  w^aiting  attitude." 
conserver  son  attitude  expec- 
tante." 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  68 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  July  18  {31),  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  just  told  me  that  our  discus- 
sions, which  were  already  difficult  enough  on  account  of  the  mobilisa- 
tion against  Austria,  were  becoming  even  more  so  in  view  of  the  serious 
military  measures  that  we  were  taking  against  Germany.  He  said 
that  information  on  this  subject  was  reaching  Berlin  from  all  sides, 
and  this  must  inevitably  provoke  similar  measures  on  the  part  of 
Germany.  To  this  I  replied  that,  according  to  sure  information  in  my 
possession,  which  was  confirmed  by  all  our  compatriots  arriving  from 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  60,  July  30. 

2  The  reasons  for  the  British  wish  to  have  the  original  formula  modified  are  no- 
where given.  Cf.  note  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  113,  July  31,  also  British  Blue 
Book  No.  110,  July  31. 


July  31,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  69  371 

Berlin,  Germany  also  was  very  actively  engaged  in  taking  military 
measures  against  Russia.  In  spite  of  this,  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  asserts  ^  that  the  only  step  taken  in  Germany  has  been  the 
recall  of  oflBcers  from  leave  and  of  the  troops  from  manoeuvres. 

To  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  69 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  London, 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petershurgh,  July  18  {31),  1914. 

I  HAVE  requested  the  British  Ambassador  to  express  to  Grey  my 
deep  gratitude  for  the  firm  and  friendly  tone  which  he  has  adopted 
in  the  discussions  with  Germany  and  Austria,  thanks  to  which  the 
hope  of  finding  a  peaceful  issue  ^  to  the  present  situation  need  not  yet 
be  abandoned. 

1  For  the  truth  of  this  assertion  see  chapters  on  mobilisation  in  M.  P.  Price,  The 
Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons. 

2  Cf .  note  1  British  Blue  Book  No.  119,  July  31.  Sir  E.  Grey  had  at  last  practically 
done  what  Sazonof  had  wished  him  to  do  as  early  as  July  24 ;  see  British  Blue  Book 
No.  6,  July  24. 


372 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Saturday,  August  1,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Petrograd 

Belgium 

Berlin,  Paris  and  London 
London  etc. 

London,  Berlin 

France 

London  etc. 

Berlin,  Rome 

London,  Berlin,  Brussels  etc. 

London,  Luxemburg 

London,  Luxemburg 

Germany 

Petrograd       | 

Paris 

Great  Britain 

Berlin,  Petrograd,  Vienna 

Petrograd,  Berlin,  Paris, 
Vienna,  Brussels,  Lux- 
emburg 

Russia 

All  representatives 

London,  Paris 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary  explains  her  willingness  to  continue  direct  conversations  with 
Russia,  at  the  same  time  expressing  her  deep  concern  at  the  Russian  general 
mobilisation  which  forces  her  to  decree  her  own  general  mobilisation. 

Belgium  receives  the  official  assurance  that  France  will  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  but  "in  the  event  of  this  neutrality  not  being  respected  by  another  Power, 
the  French  Government,  to  secure  their  own  defence,  might  find  it  necessary  to 
modify  their  attitude."  The  German  "reply  is  awaited."  Belgium  instructs  her 
representatives  abroad  to  notify  the  Powers  of  her  mobilisation  in  notes  prepared 
and  sent  out,  undated,  on  July  24.  She  commits  hostile  acts  against  Germany 
according  to  the  latter's  declaration,  a  ^act  which  Belgium  later  categorically 
denies. 

France  orders  general  mobiHsation,  and  in  despatches  to  London  endeavors  to 
blame  Germany  for  the  coming  war.  She  again  solicits  the  armed  intervention 
of  Great  Britain,  and  promises  to  respect  Belgian  and  Luxemburg  neutrality,  with 
a  proviso.  Her  assurances  to  Belgium  contain  no  reference  to  an  existing 
treaty,  and  are  in  wording  contrary  to  the  assumption  of  the  existence  of  a  treaty. 
Her  reply  to  Germany  is  "that  France  would  do  that  which  her  interests 
dictated." 

Germany  continues  the  exchange  of  royal  and  imperial  telegrams.  Russia  not 
having  replied  to  the  German  ultimatum  requesting  her  to  demobilise,  Germany 
declares  war  on  Russia.  To  the  British  enquiry  whether  she  would  respect 
Belgian  neutrality  her  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  replies  that  probably  no  answer 
would  be  returned,  because  by  answering  they  "could  not  but  disclose  a  certain 
amount  of  their  plan  of  campaign";  moreover,  Belgium  had  already  committed 
"certain  hostile  acts."  She  orders  general  mobilisation,  to  take  effect  the  next 
day,  August  2. 

Great  Britain ;  the  Cabinet  for  the  second  time  refuses  to  commit  itself  in  favor  of 
France.  Sir  E.  Grey,  however,  repeats  his  personal  promises  to  France,  at  the 
same  time  refusing  the  German  request  that  he  formulate  conditions  under  which 
Great  Britain  would  remain  neutral.  No  despatches  concerning  the  mobilisation 
of  the  British  army  are  published  on  this  or  any  other  day. 

Russia  refuses  to  reply  to  the  German  ultimatum  and  does  not  demobilise. 

Serbia  is  silent  on  this  day. 


Augmt  1,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  13  373 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    56^ 

Count  Szdpdry  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  August  1,  1914* 

I  VISITED  ]\I.  Sazonof  to-day,  and  told  him  that  I  had  received 
instructions/  but  that  I  must  premise  that  I  was  entirely  ignorant  of 
the  present  condition  of  affairs  created  in  Vienna,  by  the  general 
Russian  mobilisation,  and  that  in  interpreting  the  instructions  which 
I  had  received  previously,  I  must  leave  this  condition  out  of  account. 
I  said  that  the  two  instructions  of  Your  Excellency  dealt  with  the 
misunderstanding  that  we  had  declined  further  negotiations  with 
Russia.  This  was  a  mistake,  as  I  had  already,  without  instructions, 
assured  him.^  Your  Excellency  was  not  only  quite  prepared  to  deal 
with  Russia  on  the  broadest  basis  possible,  but  was  also  especially 
inclined  to  subject  the  text  of  our  note  to  a  discussion  so  far  as  its 
interpretation  was  concerned. 

I  emphasised  how  much  the  instructions  of  Your  Excellency  af- 
forded me  a  further  proof  of  goodwill,  although  I  had  to  remind  him 
that  the  situation  created  since  then  by  the  general  mobilisation  was 
unknown  to  me ;  but  I  could  only  hope  that  the  course  of  events  had 
not  already  taken  us  too  far ;  in  any  case,  I  regarded  it  as  my  duty 
in  the  present  moment  of  extreme  anxiety  to  prove  once  again  the 
goodwill  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Goverr^ment.  M.  Sazonof  replied 
that  he  took  note  with  satisfaction  of  this  proof  of  goodwill,  but  he 
desired  to  draw  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  negotiations  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh for  obvious  reasons  appeared  to  promise  less  prospect  of  success 
than  negotiations  on  the  neutral  terrain  of  London.^  I  replied  that 
Your  Excellency,  as  I  had  already  observed,  started  from  the  point 
of  view  that  direct  contact  should  be  maintained  at  St.  Petersburgh, 
so  that  I  was  not  in  a  position  to  commit  myself  with  regard  to  his 
suggestion  as  to  London,  but  I  would  communicate  on  the  subject 
with  your  Excellency. 

Belgium: 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  13 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  toM.  Davignon,  Belgian 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  London,  August  1,  1914. 

Great  Britain  has  asked  France  and  Germany  separately^  if 
they  intend  to  respect  Belgian  territory  in  the  event  of  its  not  being 

*  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51,  July  31. 

2  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  55,  July  31.  /tax 

3  If  Sazonof  is  correctly  quoted,  and  this  would  seem  to  be  the  case  (cf .  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  51,  July  31,  third  paragraph),  it  appears  that  Russia  had 
changed  her  attitude,  and  was  not  now  desirous  of  direct  conversations.  See  Russian 
Orange  Book  No.  69,  July  31.  *  British  Blue  Book  No.  114,  July  31. 


374  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

violated  by  their  adversary.     Germany's  reply  is  awaited.     France 
has  replied  in  the  affirmative.^ 

From  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  14 

Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Damgnon,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  August  1,  1914. 

The  British  Ambassador  has  been  instructed  to  inquire  of  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  whether,  in  the  event  of  war,  Germany 
would  respect  Belgian  neutrality,  and  I  understand  that  the  Minister 
replied  that  he  was  unable  to  answer  the  question.^ 

To  Berlin,  Paris,  and  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15 ' 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Berlin,  Paris,  and  London, 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  1,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  the  French  Minister  has 
made  the  following  verbal  communication  to  me :  — 

(Translation.) 

"Je  suis  autorise  a  declarer  "I  am  authorised  to  declare 
qu'en  cas  de  conflit  international,  that,  in  the  event  of  an  inter- 
le  Gouvernement  de  la  Repu-  national  war,  the  French  Govern- 
blique,  ainsi  qu'il  I'a  toujours  ment,  in  accordance  with  the 
declare,  respectera  la  neutralite  declarations  they  have  always 
de  la  Belgique.  Dans  Thypo-  made,  will  respect  the  neutrality 
these  oil  cette  neutralite  ne  serait  of  Belgium.  In  the  event  of 
pas  respectee  par  une  autre  this  neutrality  not  being  re- 
Puissance,  le  Gouvernement  spected  by  another  Power,  the 
fran^ais,  pour  assurer  sa  propre  French  Government,  to  secure 
defense,  pourrait  etre  amene  a  their  own  defence,  might  find 
modifier  son  attitude."  it    necessary    to    modify    their 


attitude. 


"  4 


^  See  below,  No.  15,  same  day. 

2  Cf .  British  Blue  Book  No.  122,  July  31,  printed  under  date  of  August  1,  and 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  123,  August  1,  giving  Germany's  reason  for  not  answering. 

'  This  despatch  should  precede  No.  13,  same  day,  where  it  is  referred  to. 

<  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  114,  July  31,  note  1,  and  mark  the  wording  of  the  French 
announcement,  which  proceeds  from  the  principle  that  France  is  released  from  any 
obligation  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  "in  the  event  of  this  neutrality  not 
being  respected  by  another  Power."  Belgium  was  a  buffer  state  between  the  bel- 
ligerents. Small  infractions  of  her  neutrality  could  not  have  been  avoided  by  either 
side.  The  principle,  therefore,  that  any  infraction  by  one  side  would  release  the  other 
side  from  all  obligations,  and  that  the  other  side  was,  of  course,  the  sole  judge  of  what 
constituted  an  infraction,  is  the  chief  reason  why  Belgium  was  invaded,  for  if  it  had 
not  been  for  this  principle  no  "  military  necessity  "  would  have  existed  for  either  side  to 
contemplate  even  the  invasion  of  Belgium.  It  was  the  principle  accepted  by  Great 
Britain  (see  British  Blue  Book  No.  114,  July  31)  and  by  France,  and  as  events  proved 
also  by  Germany.  Contrast  this  declaration  with  French  Yellow  Book  No.  122, 
same  day. 


August  1,  French  Yellow  Book  No,  120  375 

I  thanked  his  Excellency  and  added  that  we  on  our  side  had  taken 
without  delay  all  the  measures  necessary  to  ensure  that  our  inde- 
pendence and  our  frontiers  should  be  respected. 

To  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  16 

M.Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Belgian  Ministers 
at  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  1,  1914. 

Carry  out  instructions  ^  contained  in  my  despatch  of  the  25th  July. 

To  Rome,  The  Hague,  Luxemburg 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  17 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Belgian  Ministers 
at  Rome,  The  Hague,  Luxemburg. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  1,  1914. 

Carry  out  instructions  ^  contained  in  my  despatch  of  the  25th  July. 

France : 

To  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  120 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  the  French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin, 
Vienna,  Rome. 

Paris,  August  1,  1914- 

Two  demarches  were  made  yesterday  evening  by  the  Austrian 
Ambassadors  —  the  one  at  Paris,^  which  was  rather  vague,  the  other 
at  St.  Petersburgh/  precise  and  conciliatory. 

Count  Szecsen  came  to  explain  to  me  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  had  officially  informed  Russia  that  it  had  no  territorial 
ambition,  and  would  not  touch  the  sovereignty  of  Servia ;  that  it  also 
repudiates  any  intention  of  occupying  the  Sandjak;  but  that  these 
explanations  of  disinterestedness  only  retain  their  force  if  the  war 
remains  localised  to  Austria  and  Servia,  as  a  European  war  would 
open  out  eventualities  which  it  was  impossible  to  foresee.  The 
Austrian  Ambassador,  in  commenting  on  these  explanations,  gave  me 
to  understand  that  if  his  Government  could  not  answer  the  questions 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  2,  July  24,  and  note. 

2  See  note  to  previous  despatch  and  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  3,  July  24. 

3  Not  mentioned  in  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book.  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  137, 
same  day. 

*  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  55,  July  31,  and  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  56,  August  1. 


376  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

of  the  Powers  speaking  in  their  own  name,  they  would  certainly 
answer  Servia,  or  any  single  Power  asking  for  these  conditions  in  the 
name  of  Servia.  He  added  that  a  step  in  this  direction  was  perhaps 
still  possible. 

At  St.  Petersburgh  the  Austrian  Ambassador  called  on  M.  Sazonof 
and  explained  to  him  that  his  Government  was  willing  to  begin  a 
discussion  as  to  the  basis  of  the  ultimatum  addressed  to  Servia.^ 
The  Russian  Minister  declared  himself  satisfied  with  this  declaration, 
and  proposed  that  the  pourparlers  should  take  place  in  London  with 
the  participation  of  the  Powers.  M.  Sazonof  will  have  requested  the 
British  Government  to  take  the  lead  in  the  discussion;  he  pointed 
out  that  it  would  be  very  important  that  Austria  should  stop  her 
operations  in  Servia. 

The  deduction  from  these  facts  is  that  Austria  would  at  last  show 
herself  ready  to  come  to  an  agreement,  just  as  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment is  ready  ^  to  enter  into  negotiations  on  the  basis  of  the  British 
proposal. 

Unfortunately  these  arrangements  which  allowed  one  to  hope  for 
a  peaceful  solution  appear,  in  fact,  to  have  been  rendered  useless  by 
the  attitude  of  Germany.^  This  Power  has  in  fact  presented  an  ul- 
timatum giving  the  Russian  Government  twelve  hours  in  which  to 
agree  to  the  demobilisation  of  their  forces  not  only  as  against  Germany, 
but  also  as  against  Austria ;  this  time-limit  expires  at  noon.  The 
ultimatum  is  not  justified,  for  Russia  has  accepted  the  British  pro- 
posal which  implies  a  cessation  of  military  preparation  by  all  the 
Powers, 

The  attitude  of  Germany  proves  that  she  wishes  for  war.  And  she 
wishes  for  it  against  France.^  Yesterday  ^  when  Herr  von  Schoen 
came  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay  to  ask  what  attitude  France  proposed  to 
take  in  case  of  a  Russo-German  conflict,  the  German  Ambassador, 
although  there  has  been  no  direct  dispute  ^  between  France  and 
Germany,  and  although  from  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  we  have  used 
all  our  efforts  for  a  peaceful  solution  ^  and  are  still  continuing  to  do  so, 
added  that  he  asked  me  to  present  his  respects  and  thanks  to  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  Republic,  and  asked  that  we  would  be  good  enough  to 
make  arrangements  as  to  him  personally  (des  dispositions  pour  sa 

1  Viviani  calls  this  an  interview  "yesterday  evening,"  i.e.  July  31.  In  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  56,  it  appears  as  an  interview  of  "to-day,"  August  1. 

2  This  is  a  vague  description  of  the  Russian  attitude.  Cf.  note  3  to  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Red  Book  No.  56,  August  1. 

'  Viviani  blames  Germany  for  her  ultimatum.  Germany  claimed  her  ultimatum 
had  been  forced  by  Russia's  mobilisation  (British  Blue  Book  No.  121,  August  1)  which 
Viviani  does  not  deny  as  having  taken  place.  If  the  student,  therefore,  agrees  with 
Viviani  that  Germany's  ultimatum  spoiled  the  prospects  of  a  peaceful  solution,  the 
further  question  arises  "Was  Germany's  ultimatum  forced  by  Russia's  mobilisation?" 
In  the  next  sentence  Viviani  states  that  the  ultimatum  was  not  justified.  This  is  the 
crux  of  the  whole  matter.      For  Germany's  attitude  see  German  White  Book,  pp.  555  fF. 

*  Another  evidence  of  the  unfortunate  suspicion  of  the  French  Government. 

57  P.M.,  July  31,  see  German  White  Book,  p.  560.  ^ 

6  Viviani  overlooks  that  France  had  promised  her  support  to  Russia,  cf .  French 
Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30  :  British  Blue  Book  No.  6,  July  24,  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  74,  paragraph  4,  where  Cambon  says  that  the  "relations of  Germany  with  Vienna 
were  no  closer  than  those  of  France  with  Russia."  ,     r,  ■. 

7  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  the  French  attitude,  see  E.  von  Mach,  Germany  s  Point 
of  View,  pp.  216  ff. 


.     August  1,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  121  377 

'propre  personne) ;  we  know  also  that  he  has  already  put  the  archives 
of  the  Embassy  in  safety.  This  attitude  of  breaking  off  diplomatic 
relations  without  any  direct  dispute,  and  although  he  has  not  received 
any  definitely  negative  answer,  is  characteristic  of  the  determination 
of  Germany  to  make  war  against  France.  The  want  of  sincerity  in  her 
peaceful  protestations  is  shown  by  the  rupture  which  she  is  forcing 
upon  Europe  at  a  time  when  Austria  had  at  last  agreed  ^  with  Russia 
to  begin  negotiations. 

Rene  Viviani. 


From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  121 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  August  1,  1914. 

My  Russian  colleague  received  yesterday  evening  two  telegrams  ^ 
from  M.  Sazonof  advising  him  that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburgh  had  explained  ^  that  his  Government  was  ready  to 
discuss  the  note  to  Servia  with  the  Russian  Government  even  as 
to  its  basis;  M.  Sazonof  answered  that  in  his  opinion  these  con- 
versations should  take  place  in  London. 

The  ultimatum  to  Russia  ^  can  only  do  away  with  the  last  chances 
of  peace  which  these  conversations  still  seemed  to  leave.  The  ques- 
tion may  be  asked  whether  in  such  circumstances  the  acceptance  by 
Austria  was  serious,  and  had  not  the  object  of  throwing  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  conflict  on  to  Russia. 

My  British  colleague  during  the  night  made  a  pressing  appeal  ^  to 
Herr  von  Jagow's  feelings  of  humanity.  The  latter  answered  that 
the  matter  had  gone  too  far  and  that  they  must  wait  for  the  Russian 
answer  to  the  German  ultimatum.  But  he  told  Sir  Edward  Goschen 
that  the  ultimatum  required  that  the  Russians  should  countermand 
their  mobilisation,  not  only  as  against  Germany  but  also  as  against 
Austria;  my  British  colleague  was  much  astonished  at  this,  and 
said  that  it  did  not  seem  possible  for  Russia  to  accept  this  last  point.^ 
.  Germany's  ultimatum  coming  at  the  very  moment  when  an  agree- 
ment seemed  about  to  be  established  between  Vienna  and  St.  Peters- 
burgh, is  characteristic  of  her  warlike  policy. 

In  truth  the  conflict  was  between  Russia  and  Austria  only,  and 
Germany  could  only  intervene  as  an  ally  of  Austria;  in  these  cir- 
cumstances, as  the  two  Powers  which  were  interested  as  principals 

1  This  agreement  had  been  due  to  Germany's  pressure ;  see  despatches  of  previous 
days.    See  especially  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  14,  July  28. 

2  Not  given  in  Russian  Orange  Book. 

3  Austro- Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  56,  August  1. 

*  Sent  by  Germany  and  presented  at  midnight,  July  31-Aug.  1 ;  see  German  "White 
Book,  p.  559.     See  note  5  to  previous  despatch. 

5  British  Blue  Book  No.  121  under  date  of  August  1. 

6  This  is  different  from  Sir  E.  Goschen's  own  report,  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  121, 


378  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

were  prepared  for  conversations,  it  is  impossible  to  understand  ^  why 
Germany  should  send  an  ultimatum  to  Russia  instead  of  continuing 
like  all  the  other  Powers  to  work  for  a  peaceful  solution,  unless  she 
desired  war  on  her  own  account. 

J.  Cambon. 

To  London,  Berlin,  and  Brussels 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  122 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  the  French  Ambassadors  at  London,  Berlin,  and  to  the  French 
Minister  at  Brussels. 

Paris,  August  1,  1914- 

The  British  Ambassador,  under  the  instructions  of  his  Govern- 
ment, came  to  ask  me  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  the  French 
Government  as  regards  Belgium  in  case  of  conflict  with  Germany. 

I  stated  that,  in  accordance  with  the  assurance  which  we  had  re- 
peatedly given  the  Belgian  Government,  we  intended  to  respect 
their  neutrality. 

It  would  only  be  in  the  event  of  some  other  Power  violating  that 
neutrality  that  France  might  find  herself  brought  to  enter  Belgian 
territory,  with  the  object  of  fulfilling  her  obligations  as  a  guaranteeing 
Power.^ 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  123 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  August  1,  1914- 

The  British  Ambassador  has  been  instructed  ^  by  his  Government 
to  make  to  the  German  Government  a  communication  identical  with 
that  which  he  made  to  you  on  the  subject  of  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium. 

Herr  von  Jagow  answered  that  he  would  take  the  instructions  of 
the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor,  but  that  he  did  not  think  an  answer 
could  be  given,  for  Germany  could  not  disclose  her  military  plans 
in  this  way.  The  British  Ambassador  will  see  Herr  von  Jagow  to- 
morrow afternoon.^ 

J.  Cambon. 

1  A  comparison  of  this  view  with  that  presented  in  the  German  White  Book,  pp.  557  ff. 
shows  how  very  far  apart  the  governments  of  France  and  Germany  found  themselves. 

2  Contrast  the  official  French  declaration  which  contains  nothing  about  obliga- 
tions.    Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15,  August  1. 

'  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  122,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  123,  both  of  August  1. 

*  The  part  of  the  interview  with  Sir  E.  Goschen  printed  British  Blue  Book  No.  123, 
in  which  Germany  claims  that  Belgium  has  already  committed  "certain  hostile 
acts"  against  Germany,  has  been  omitted  here. 


August  1,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  125  379 

From  Rome 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  124 

M.  Barrere,  French  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President 
of  the  Council y  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Rome,  August  1,  1914. 

I  WENT  to  see  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  this  morning  at  half- 
past  eight,  in  order  to  get  precise  information  from  him  as  to  the 
attitude  of  Italy  in  view  of  the  provocative  acts  of  Germany  and  the 
results  which  they  may  have. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  answered  that  he  had  seen  the 
German  Ambassador  yesterday  evening.  Herr  von  Flotow  had 
said  to  him  that  Germany  had  requested  the  Russian.  Government 
to  suspend  mobilisation,  and  the  French  Government  to  inform 
them  as  to  their  intentions;  Germany  had  given  France  a  time 
limit  of  eighteen  hours  and  Russia  a  time  limit  of  twelve  hours. 

Herr  von  Flotow  as  a  result  of  this  communication  asked  what 
were  the  intentions  of  the  Italian  Government. 

The  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano  answered  that  as  the  war  under- 
taken by  Austria  was  aggressive  and  did  not  fall  within  the  purely 
defensive  character  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  particularly  in  view  of  the 
consequences  which  might  result  from  it  according  to  the  declaration 
of  the  German  Ambassador,  Italy  could  not  take  part  in  the  war. 

Barrere. 

To  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  Madrid,  Con- 
stantinople 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  125 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, to  the  French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh, 
Berlin,  Vienna,  Rome,  Madrid,  Constantinople. 

Paris,  August  1,  1914- 

The  German  Ambassador  came  to  see  me  again  at  11  o'clock 
this  morning.  After  having  recalled  to  his  memory  all  the  efforts 
made  by  France  towards  an  honourable  settlement  of  the  Austro- 
Servian  conflict  and  the  difficulty  between  Austria  and  Russia  which 
has  resulted  from  it,  I  put  him  in  possession  of  the  facts  as  to  the 
pourparlers  which  have  been  carried  on  since  yesterday :  — 

(1)  A  British  compromise,^  proposing,  besides  other  suggestions, 
suspension  of  military  preparations  ^  on  the  part  of  Russia, 
on  condition  that  the  other  Powers  should  act  in  the  same 
way ;  adherence  of  Russia  to  this  proposal. 

1  This  seems  to  refer  to  Sazonof  s  altered  formula.     Cf .  Russian  Orange  Book  No. 
67,  July  31. 

2  This  is  an  error,  cf .  note  to  Russian  Orange  Book  no.  67. 


380  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

(2)  Communications  from  the  Austrian  Government  ^  declaring  that 
they  did  not  desire  any  aggrandisement  in  Servia,  nor  even 
to  advance  into  the  Sandjak,  and  stating  that  they  were 
ready  to  discuss  even  the  basis  of  the  iVustro-Servian  question 
at  London  with  the  other  Powers. 

I  drew  attention  to  the  attitude  of  Germany  who,  abandoning 
all  pourparlers,  presented  an  ultimatum  to  Russia  at  the  very  moment 
when  this  Power  had  just  accepted  the  British  formula  ^  (which  im- 
plies the  cessation  of  military  preparations  ^  by  all  ^  the  countries 
which  have  been  mobilised)  and  regarded  as  imminent  a  diplomatic 
rupture  with  France. 

Baron  von  Schoen  answered  that  he  did  not  know  the  develop- 
ments which  had  taken  place  in  this  matter  for  the  last  twenty-four 
hours,  that  there  was  perhaps  in  them  a  "glimmer  of  hope"  for  some 
arrangement,  that  he  had  not  received  any  fresh  communication  ^ 
from  his  Government,  and  that  he  was  going  to  get  information.  He 
gave  renewed  protestations  of  his  sincere  desire  to  unite  his  efforts 
to  those  of  France  for  arriving  at  a  solution  of  the  conflict.  I  laid 
stress  on  the  serious  responsibility  which  the  Imperial  Government 
would  assume  if,  in  circumstances  such  as  these,  they  took  an  initia- 
tive which  was  not  justified  and  of  a  kind  which  would  irremediably 
compromise  peace. 

Baron  von  Schoen  did  not  allude  to  his  immediate  departure  and  did 
not  make  any  fresh  request  for  an  answer  to  his  question  concerning 
the  attitude  of  France  in  case  of  an  Austro-Russian  conflict.  He 
confined  himself  to  saying  of  his  own  accord  that  the  attitude  of 
France  was  not  doubtful. 

It  would  not  do  to  exaggerate  the  possibilities  which  may  result 
from  my  conversation  with  the  German  Ambassador  for,  on  their 
side,  the  Imperial  Government  continue  the  most  dangerous  prepara- 
tions on  our  frontier.  However,  we  must  not  neglect  the  possibilities, 
and  we  should  not  cease  to  work  towards  an  agreement.  On  her 
side  France  is  taking  all  military  measures  required  for  protection 
against  too  great  an  advance  in  German  military  preparations. 
She  considers  that  her  attempts  at  solution  will  only  have  a  chance 
of  success  so  far  as  it  is  felt  that  she  will  be  ready  and  resolute  if  the 
conflict  is  forced  on  her. 

Rene  Viviani. 

1  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  120,  August  1. 

2  Viviani  fails  to  mention  that  Russia  had  declared  full  mobilisation. 

^  But  not  demobilisation.  The  status  quo  cannot  be  long  maintained  when  one 
country  is  mobilised  and  the  other  is  not. 

*  The  British  fleet  was  mobilised.  (See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  55,  July  27.)  Sir 
E.  Grey  nowhere  offered  to  demobilise  it.     Cf.  next  number. 

'  Cf .  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  74,  same  day. 


August  1,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  127  381 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  126 

M.  Paul  Cavibon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris, ^  August  1,  1914. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  said  to  me  that,  at  a  meeting  this  morning, 
the  Cabinet  had  again  considered  the  situation.  As  Germany  had 
asked  Great  Britain  to  give  a  declaration  of  neutrahty  and  had  not 
obtained  it,  the  British  Government  remained  masters  of  their 
action ;  this  could  shape  itself  in  accordance  with  different  hypotheses. 

In  the  first  place,  Belgian  neutrality  is  of  great  importance  to 
Great  Britain.  France  has  immediately  renewed  her  engagement 
to  respect  it.  Germany  has  explained  "that  she  was  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  reply.''  Sir  Edward  Grey  will  put  the  Cabinet  in  possession 
of  this  answer  ^  and  will  ask  to  be  authorised  to  state  on  Monday  in 
the  House  of  Commons,  that  the  British  Government  will  not  permit 
a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

In  the  second  place  the  British  fleet  is  mobilised,^  and  Sir  Edward 
Grey  will  propose  ^  to  his  colleagues  that  he  should  state  that  it  will 
oppose  the  passage  of  the  Straits  of  Dover  by  the  German  fleet,  or, 
if  the  German  fleet  should  pass  through  (venaient  a  le  passer),  will 
oppose  any  demonstration  on  the  French  coasts.  These  two  ques- 
tions will  be  dealt  with  at  the  meeting  on  Monday.  I  drew  the 
attention  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  the  point  that,  if  during  this 
intervening  period  any  incident  took  place,  it  was  necessary  not  to 
allow  a  surprise,  and  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  think  of  inter- 
vening in  time.  Paul  Cambon. 

To  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  127 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London. 

Paris,  August  1,  1914- 
We  are  warned  through  several  channels  that  the  German  and  the 
Austrian  Governments  are  trying  at  this  moment  to  influence  Eng- 
land by  making  her  believe  that  the  responsibility  for  war,  if  it 

1  Probably  a  mistake  for  London. 

2  This  appears  as  if  the  German  "Belgian"  reply  had  not  been  discussed  at  the 
Cabinet  meeting  here  described.  Contrast  Sir  E.  Grey's  account  of  the  Cabinet 
meeting  of  August  1  to  the  German  Ambassador,  British  Blue  Book  No.  123,  August  1. 

3  Since  July  24,  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  66,  July  27. 

4  This  phrase  and  the  whole  tenor  of  the  despatch  imply  that  the  Cabinet  had  for 
the  second  time  voted  against  promising  to  France  British  support.  For  the  first 
refusal  to  vote  so  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  110,  July  31,  where  the  Cabinet  has 
declared  itself  unable  to  promise  to  France  "their  intervention,"  and  British  Blue  Book 
No.  119,  July  31. 

Sir  E.  Grey's  promise  to  "propose"  to  the  Cabinet  to  be  "authorised"  to  promise 
help  to  France  would  seem  to  imply  that  he  had  assured  the  French  Ambassador  of 
his  personal  wishes  in  this  matter.  He  gave  this  assurance,  or  from  the  despatches  just 
cited  from  the  previous  date,  renewed  it  on  the  very  day  on  which  he  refused  Germany's 
request  to  formulate  conditions  under  which  Great  Britain  would  remain  neutral.  In 
refusing  this  request  of  Germany,  he  gave  as  his  reason  that  "we  must  keep  our  hands 
free."     See  British  Blue  Book  No.  123,  August  1,  1914. 


382  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

breaks  out,  will  fall  on  Russia.^  Efforts  are  being  made  to  obtain 
the  neutrality  of  England  by  disguising  the  truth.^ 

France  has  not  ceased  in  co-operation  with  England  to  advise  mod- 
eration at  St.  Petersburgh  ;^  this  advice  has  been  listened  to. 

From  the  beginning  M.  Sazonof  has  exercised  pressure  on  Servia 
to  make  her  accept  all  those  clauses  of  the  ultimatum  which  were 
not  incompatible  with  her  sovereignty. 

He  then  engaged  in  a  direct  conversation  with  Austria ;  this  was 
fresh  evidence  of  his  conciliatory  spirit.  Finally  he  has  agreed  to 
allow  those  Powers  which  are  less  interested  to  seek  for  means  of 
composing  the  dispute. 

In  accordance  with  the  wish  expressed  to  him  by  Sir  George 
Buchanan,  M.  Sazonof  consented  to  modify  ^  the  first  formula 
which  he  had  put  forward,  and  he  has  drawn  up  a  second  which  is 
shown  not  to  differ  materially  from  the  declaration  which  Count 
Szecsen  made  yesterday  to  M.  de  Margerie.  Count  Szecsen  affirms 
that  Austria  has  no  intention  of  seeking  territorial  aggrandisement 
and  does  not  wish  to  touch  the  sovereignty  of  Servia.  He  expressly 
adds  that  Austria  has  no  designs  on  the  Sandjak  of  Novi-Bazar. 

It  would  then  seem  that  an  agreement  between  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
suggestion,  M.  Sazonof 's  formula  and  the  Austrian  declarations  could 
easily  be  reconciled. 

France  is  determined,  in  co-operation  with  England,  to  work  to  the 
very  end  for  the  realisation  of  this. 

But  while  these  negotiations  were  going  on,  and  while  Russia  in 
the  negotiations  showed  a  goodwill  which  cannot  be  disputed,  Austria 
was  the  first  ^  to  proceed  to  a  general  mobilisation. 

Russia  has  found  herself  obliged  to  imitate  Austria,  so  as  not  to 
be  left  in  an  unfavourable  position,  but  all  the  time  she  has  con- 
tinued ready  to  negotiate. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  me  to  repeat  that,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned, 
we  will,  in  co-operation  with  England,  continue  to  work  for  the  success 
of  these  pourparlers. 

But  the  attitude  of  Germany  has  made  it  absolutely  compulsory 
for  us  to  make  out  the  order  for  mobilisation  to-day. 

Last  Wednesday,  well  in  advance  of  Russian  mobilisation,  as  I 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  134,  same  day. 

2  Or  "elucidating  the  truth,"  according  to  one's  reading  of  all  the  despatches. 

3  Contrast  with  French  Yellow  Book  No.  80,  July  28,  where  Paul  Cambon  reports 
that  Sir  E.  Grey  "would  be  much  embarrassed  in  making  pacific  recommendations  to  the 
Russian  Government."  Also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  62,  July  27.  "The  French  step  " 
(Germany  had  asked  France  to  declare  that  a  solidarity  of  pacific  intentions  existed 
between  her  and  Germany)  "in  St.  Petersburgh  would  have  been  difficult  to  explain." 

*  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  67,  July  31.  Viviani  overlooks,  first,  that  the  modified 
formula  was  less  acceptable,  because  instead  of  promising  to  "stop  her  military  prep- 
prations  "  Russia  merely  undertook  "  to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude,"  while  Austria- 
Hungary  in  the  modified  formula  had  "  to  stay  the  march  of  her  troops,"  which  was  not 
demand  d  in  the  first  formula,  and  secondly  that  the  change  was  not  at  Austria's  biit  at 
Great  Britain's  request;  that  Russia,  moreover,  followed  it  up  with  full  mobilisation. 

6  This  is  an  error.  Russia's  general  mobilisation  took  place  on  the  night  of  July 
30,  while  Austria-Hungary  ordered  general  mobilisation  on  August  1.  For  an  ex- 
haustive discussion  of  this  point  and  the  contradictory  evidence  see  M.  P.  Price, 
The  Diplomatic  History  of  the  War,  Scribner's,  the  chapters  on  "Preparations  and 
Mobilisations."  See  also  British  Blue  Book  No.  113,  July  31  for  Russian  mobilisation, 
and  British  Blue  Book,  Nos.  127  and  135,  August  1,  for  Austro-Hungarian  mobilisation. 


August  1,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  128  383 

have  already  telegraphed  to  you,  Herr  von  Sehoen  announced  to  me 
the  impending  publication  of  Kriegsgefahrzustand.  This  measure  has 
been  taken  ^  by  Germany,  and  under  the  protection  of  this  screen, 
she  immediately  began  a  mobilisation  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word. 

To-day  M.  Paleologue  telegraphed  that  Count  Pourtales  had  noti- 
fied the  Russian  Government  of  German  mobilisation. ^ 

Information  which  has  been  received  by  the  Ministry  of  War 
confirms  the  fact  that  this  mobilisation  is  really  in  full  execution.^ 

Our  decree  of  mobilisation  is  then  an  essential  measure  of  protec- 
tion. The  Government  have  accompanied  it  by  a  proclamation 
signed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic  and  by  all  the  Ministers, 
in  which  they  explain  that  mobilisation  is  not  war,  and  that  in  the 
present  state  of  affairs  it  is  the  best  means  for  France  of  safeguarding 
peace,  and  that  the  Government  of  the  Republic  will  redouble  their 
efforts  to  bring  the  negotiations  to  a  conclusion. 

Will  you  be  good  enough  to  bring  all  these  points  urgently  to  the 
notice  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  to  point  out  to  him  that  we  have 
throughout  been  governed  by  the  determination  not  to  commit  any 
act  of  provocation. 

I  am  persuaded  that  in  case  war  were  to  break  out,  British  opinion 
would  see  clearly  from  which  side  aggression  comes,  and  that  it 
would  realise  the  strong  reasons  which  we  have  given  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey  for  asking  for  armed  intervention  on  the  part  of  England  in  the 
interest  of  the  future  of  the  European  balance  of  power.^ 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  Luxemburg 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  128 

M.  Mollard,  French  Minister  at  Luxemburg,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Luxemburg,  August  1,  1914- 
The  Minister  of  State  instructs  me  to  ask  from  the  French  Gov- 
ernment an  assurance  of  neutrality  similar  to  that  which  has  been 
given  to  Belgium.  M.  Eyschen  has  stated  that  at  present,  as  the 
declaration  in  question  was  made  to  the  President  of  the  Council  of 
the  Belgian  Government  by  the  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  he 
thought  that  the  same  procedure  would  be  most  suitable  with  regard 
to  the  Grand  Duchy.  ^ 

1  But  not  as  here  implied  "last  Wednesday,"  i.e.  July  29,  but  on  Friday,  i.e.  July 
31 ;   see  British  Blue  Book  No.  112,  July  31. 

2  To  begin  on  August  2,  German  White  Book,  p.  559,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  142, 
August  1,  listed  under  August  2. 

3  Seemingly  contradicted  by  British  Blue  Book  No.  142,  same  day. 

*  France  asks  for  armed  British  intervention  in  the  interest  of  the  European  balance 
of  power.  Sir  E.  Grey  had  personally  committed  himself  to  induce  the  British  Cabinet 
so  to  intervene;  see  notes  to  previous  despatch.  This  was  before  German  troops 
entered  Belgium.  It  was,  however,  subsequent  to  Germany's  refusal  to  commit 
herself  on' the  Belgian  question ;    and  no  mention  of  Belgium  is  made  here. 

s  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15,  August  1,  and  note.  The  assurance  contained 
no  reference  to  a  treaty  or  an  obligation  under  it.  The  French  Yellow  Book  despatch, 
however.  No.  122,  Aug.  1,  contained  such  a  reference.  The  wording  of  the  assurance 
given  to  Luxemburg  has  not  been  published.  The  French  despatch  (see  next  number) 
describing  it,  however,  refers  to  a  treaty. 


384  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

This  is  the  reason  why  he  has  abstained  from  making  a  request 
direct  to  the  Government  of  the  Repubhc.  As  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  meets  on  Monday,  M.  Eyschen  wishes  to  have  the  answer 
by  that  date;  a  similar  demarche  is  being  made  at  the  same  time 
with  the  German  Minister  at  Luxemburg.  Mollard. 

To  Luxemburg 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  129 

M.  Rene  Vimani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  M.  Mollard,  French  Minister  at  Luxemburg. 

Paris,  August  1,  1914- 

Be  good  enough  to  state  to  the  President  of  the  Council  that  in 
conformity  with  the  Treaty  of  London,  1867,^  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  intends  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Luxemburg,  as  they  have  shown  by  their  attitude. 

The  violation  of  this  neutrality  by  Germany  would,  however,  be 
an  act  of  a  kind  which  would  compel  France  from  that  time  to  be 
guided  in  this  matter  by  care  for  her  defence  and  her  interests. 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  130^ 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  August  1,  1914- 

Special  editions  of  newspapers  are  being  distributed  in  the  streets 
of  Berlin  announcing  that  the  general  mobilisation  of  the  army  and 
the  navy  has  been  decreed  and  that  the  first  day  of  the  mobilisation 
is  Sunday,  2nd  August.  j^^^^^  ^^^^^^ 

Germany : 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

German  White  Book  Exhibit  26 

Telegram  of  the  Chancellor  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  St.  Peters- 
burgh on  August  1st,  12.52  P.M.     Urgent. 

If  the  Russian  Government  gives  no  satisfactory  reply  to  our 
demand.  Your  Excellency  will  please  transmit  this  afternoon  5 
o'clock  (mid-European  time)  the  following  statement : 

"Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  s'est  efforce  des  les  debuts  de  la 
crise  de  la  mener  a  une  solution  pacifique.     Se  rendant  a  un  desir  que 

^  See  note  to  previous  despatch. 

2  This  despatch  should  precede  No.  127,  in  which  the  information  it  contains  is 
discussed.  In  that  case,  however.  No.  127  would  hardly  have  been  able  to  contain 
the  "information"  that  the  German  mobilisation  was  "really  in  full  execution"  on 
August  1.  Either  Viviani  had  been  erroneously  informed,  or  he  misinformed  the 
French  Ambassador  in  London. 


August  U  British  Blue  Booh  No.  120  .        385 

lui  en  avait  ete  exprime  par  Sa  Majeste  TEmpereur  de  Russie,  Sa 
Majeste  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne  d'accord  avec  TAngleterre  etait 
applique  a  aecomplir  un  role  mediateur  aupres  des  Cabinets  de  Vienne 
et  de  St.  Petersbourg,  lorsque  la  Russie,  sans  en  attendre  le  resultat, 
proceda  a  la  mobilisation  de  la  totalite  de  ses  forces  de  terre  et  de  mer. 

"A  la  suite  de  cette  mesure  mena(?ante  motivee  par  aucun  pre- 
paratif  militaire  de  la  part  de  TAllemagne,  I'Empire  Allemand  se 
trouva  vis-a-vis  d'un  danger  grave  et  imminent.  Si  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  eut  manque  de  parer  a  ce  peril  il  aurait  compromis  la  securite 
et  Pexistence  meme  de  I'Allemagne.  Par  consequent  le  Gouverne- 
ment Allemand  se  vit  force  de  s'adresser  au  Gouvernement  de  Sa 
Majeste  I'Empereur  de  toutes  les  Russies  ensistant  sur  la  cessation 
des  dits  actes  militaires.  La  Russie  ayant  refuse  de  faire  droit  a 
cette  demande  et  ayant  manifeste  par  ce  refus,  que  son  action  etait 
dirigee  contre  I'Allemagne,  j'ai  I'honneur  d'ordre  de  mon  Gouverne- 
ment de  faire  savoir  a  Votre  Excellence  ce  qui  suit : 

''  Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur,  mon  auguste  Souverain  au  nom  de  I'Em- 
pire releve  le  defi  et  Se  considere  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la  Russie." 

Please  wire  urgent  receipt  and  time  of  carrying  out  this  instruction 
by  Russian  time. 

Please  ask  for  your  passports  and  turn  over  protection  and  affairs 
to  the  American  Embassy. 

From  Paris 

German  WmxE  Book  ExmsiT  27 

Telegram  of  the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  Paris  to  the  Chancellor  on 
August  1st,  1.05  P.M. 

Upon  my  repeated  definite  inquiry  whether  France  would  remain 
neutral  in  the  event  of  a  Russo-German  war,  the  Prime  Minister  de- 
clared that  France  would  do  that  which  her  interests  dictated. 

Great  Britain: 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  120 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador    at    St.    Petersburgh,    to    Sir 
Edicard  Grey.  — {Received  August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  SI,  1914. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  sent  for  me  and  French  Ambassador 
and  asked  us  to  telegraph  to  our  respective  Governments  subjoined 
formula  ^  as  best  calculated  to  amalgamate  proposal  made  by  you  in 
your  telegram  of  30th  July  ^  with  formula  recorded  in  my  telegram  of 
30th  July.^     He  trusted  it  would  meet  with  your  approval :  ^  — 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  67,  July  31. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  103,  July  30. 

3  British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  July  30.  ,       ,  .  , 

4  There  is  no  desire  expressed  that  it  would  meet  with  Austria  s  approval,  which 
was  the  all-important  thing,  if  peace  was  to  be  preserved.     Nor  doea  it  appear  what 

2c 


386       ,  Offixiial  Diplomatic  Documents 

"Si  TAutriche  consentira  a  arreter  marche  des  ses  troupes  sur 
le  territoire  serbe,  si,  reconnaissant  que  le  conflit  austro-serbe  a  assume 
le  caractere  d'une  question  d'interet  europeen,  elle  admet  que  les 
Grandes  Puissances  examinent  la  satisfaction  que  la  Serbie  pourrait 
accorder  au  Gouvernement  d'Autriche-Hongrie  sans  laisser  porter 
atteinte  a  ses  droits  d'Etat  souverain  et  a  son  independance,  la  Russia 
s'engage  a  conserver  son  attitude  expectante/^  ^ 

His  Excellency  then  alluded  to  the  telegram  sent  to  German 
Emperor  by  Emperor  of  Russia  in  reply  to  the  former's  telegram.^ 
He  said  that  Emperor  Nicholas  had  begun  by  thanking  Emperor 
William  for  his  telegram  and  for  the  hopes  of  peaceful  solution  which 
it  held  out.  His  Majesty  had  then  proceeded  to  assure  Emperor 
William  that  no  intention  whatever  of  an  aggressive  character  was 
concealed  behind  Russian  military  preparations.  So  long  as  conver- 
sation with  Austria  continued,  His  Imperial  Majesty  undertook  that 
not  a  single  man  should  be  moved  across  the  frontier ;  it  was,  however 
of  course  impossible,  for  reasons  explained,  to  stop  a  mobilisation  which 
was  already  in  progress. 

M.  Sazonof  ^  said  that  undoubtedly  there  would  be  better  pros- 
pect of  a  peaceful  solution  if  the  suggested  conversation  were  to  take 
place  in  London,  where  the  atmosphere  w^as  far  more  favourable,  and 
he  therefore  hoped  that  you  would  see  your  way  to  agreeing  to  this. 

His  Excellency  ended  by  expressing  his  deep  gratitude  to  His 
Majesty's  Government,  who  had  done  so  much  to  save  the  situation. 
It  would  be  largely  due  to  them  if  war  were  prevented.  The  Emperor, 
the  Russian  Government,  and  the  Russian  people  would  never  forget 
the  firm  attitude  adopted  by  Great  Britain. 


From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  121 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  31st  July.^ 

I  spent  an  hour  with  Secretary  of  State  urging  him  most  earnestly 
to  accept  your  proposal  and  make  another  effort  to  prevent  terrible 
catastrophe  of  a  European  war. 

a  new  formula  could  do,  after  Russia  had  ordered  her  general  mobilisation  in  the 
mght  of  July  30-31.     See  note  5  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  127,  same  day. 

^Translation.  —  "If  Austria  will  agree  to  check  the  advance  of  her  troops  on 
Servian  territory  ;  if,  recognising  that  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  has 
assumed  a  character  of  European  interest,  she  will  allow  the  Great  Powers  to  look 
into  the  matter  and  determine  whether  Servia  could  satisfy  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  without  impairing  her  rights  as  a  sovereign  State  or  her  independence, 
Russia  will  undertake  to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude." 

.  J*  None  of  these  telegrams  were  published  in  the  British  Blue  Book  or  mentioned 
in  the  speeches  of  Sir  E.  Grey  or  Mr.  Asquith  which  induced  Parliament  to  vote  for 
war. 

'  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
*  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  Ill,  July  31. 


August  ly  British  Blue  Booh  No.  122  387 

He  expressed  himself  very  sympathetically  towards  your  proposal, 
and  appreciated  your  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace,  but  said  it 
was  impossible  for  the  Imperial  Government  to  consider  any  proposal 
until  they  had  received  an  answer  from  Russia  to  their  communica- 
tion of  to-day ;  ^  this  communication,  which  he  admitted  had  the  form 
of  an  ultimatum,  being  that,  unless  Russia  could  inform  the  Imperial 
Government  within  twelve  hours  that  she  would  immediately  counter- 
mand her  mobilisation  against  Germany  and  Austria,  Germany  would 
be  obliged  on  her  side  to  mobilise  at  once. 

I  asked  his  Excellency  why  they  had  made  their  demand  even  more 
difficult  for  Russia  to  accept  by  asking  them  to  demobilise  in  south  as 
well.  He  replied  that  it  was  in  order  to  prevent  Russia  from  saying 
all  her  mobilisation  was  only  directed  against  Austria.^ 

His  Excellency  said  that  if  the  answer  from  Russia  was  satisfactory 
he  thought  personally  that  your  proposal  merited  favourable  con- 
sideration, and  in  any  case  he  would  lay  it  before  the  Emperor  and 
Chancellor,  but  he  repeated  that  it  was  no  use  discussing  it  until  the 
Russian  Government  had  sent  in  their  answer  to  the  German 
demand.^ 

He  again  assured  me  that  both  the  Emperor  William,  at  the  request 
of  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  and  the  German  Foreign  Office  had  even 
up  till  last  night  been  urging  Austria  to  show  willingness  to  continue 
discussions  —  and  telegraphic  and  telephonic  communications  from 
Vienna  had  been  of  a  promising  nature  —  but  Russia's  mobilisation 
had  spoilt  everything.^ 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  122 

Sir  E,  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  A  ugust  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

Neutrality  of  Belgium,  referred  to  in  your  telegram  of  31st  July 
to  Sir  F.  Bertie.^ 

I  have  seen  Secretary  of  State,  who  informs  me  that  he  must  con- 
sult the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor  before  he  could  possibly  answer. 
I  gathered  from  what  he  said  that  he  thought  any  reply  they  might 
give  could  not  but  disclose  a  certain  amount  of  their  plan  of  campaign 
in  the  event  of  war  ensuing,  and  he  was  therefore  very  doubtful  whether 
they  would  return  any  answer  at  all.  His  Excellency,  nevertheless, 
took  note  of  your  request. 

It  appears  from  what  he  said  that  German  Government  consider 

1  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  24,  July  31  ;  the  German  ultimatum. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  121,  August  1,  note  5.  ,  , 

3  The  obvious  reason  for  this  was  that  Germany  felt  herself  threatened  by  the 
Russian  general  mobilisation.  ,    xr  n        t.     i    xt 

4  Contrast  this  view  with  the  one  expressed  by  France,  French  Yellow  Book  No. 
120,  August  1,  and  note  5. 

6  British  Blue  Book  No.  114,  July  31. 


388  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


1 


that  certain  hostile  acts  have  already  been  committed  by  Belgium.^ 
As  an  instance  of  this,^  he  alleged  that  a  consignment  of  corn  for 
Germany  had  been  placed  under  an  embargo  already. 

I  hope  to  see  his  Excellency  to-morrow  again  to  discuss  the  matter 
further,  but  the  prospect  of  obtaining  a  definite  answer  seems  to  me 
remote. 

In  speaking  to  me  to-day  the  Chancellor  made  it  clear  that  Germany 
would  in  any  case  desire  to  know  the  reply  ^  returned  to  you  by  the 
French  Government. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  123 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  August  1, 1914. 

I  TOLD  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  that  the  reply  ^  of  the 
German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was 
a  matter  of  very  great  regret,  because  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
affected  feeling  in  this  country.^  If  Germany  could  see  her  way  to 
give  the  same  assurance  ^  as  that  which  had  been  given  by  France  it 
would  materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and  tension  here.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
by  one  combatant  while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this  country.  I  said  that  we  had 
been  discussing  this  question  at  a  Cabinet  meeting,^  and  as  I  was 
authorised  to  tell  him  this  I  gave  him  a  memorandum  of  it. 

He  asked  me  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  violate 
Belgium  neutrality  we  would  engage  to  remain  neutral.^ 

I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that;  our  hands  were  still  free,^ 
and  we  were  considering  what  our  attitude  should  be.  All  I  could 
say  w^as  that  our  attitude  would  be  determined  largely  by  public 
opinion  here,  and  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would  appeal  very 

1  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  79  and  enclosures  where  under  date  of  August  29  Bel- 
gium explains  the  embargo  as  not  an  hostile  act.  It  is,  however,  very  remarkable 
that  this  charge  against  Belgium  could  be  made  by  Germany,  without  Great  Britain 
to  whom  it  was  made  at  once  challenging  its  accuracy.  Nor  does  it  appear  from  the 
published  documents  that  Sir  E.  Grey  was  at  all  troubled  by  it  or  enquired  about  it, 
or  felt  called  upon  to  deny  it. 

2  No  other  hostile  acts  are  mentioned  in  the  diplomatic  documents  published  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Subsequently  Germany  published  the  "Brussels  docu- 
ments" which  she  had  discovered  in  the  Belgian  archives  after  taking  Brussels.  In 
these  documents  "military  conversations"  between  Great  Britain  and  Belgium  were 
discussed.    For  these  documents  see  pp.  577  ff. 

•''  For  this  reply  see  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15,  August  1,  1914. 

*  British  Blue  Book  No.  122,  July  31,  printed  under  date  of  August  1. 

*  No  mention  is  made  of  existing  treaties,  a  violation  of  which  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many has  often  been  given  as  the  reason  for  Great  Britain  to  join  the  war. 

6  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15,  August  1.  It  must  be  remembered  that  as  European 
friendships  had  shaped  themselves,  France  and  Germany  were  not  in  the  same  posi- 
tion, although  Great  Britain  had  addressed  to  them  identical  questions.  For  France 
the  question  was  :  "Will  Great  Britain  remain  neutral  or  be  my  ally  ?  "  For  Germany 
it  was:    "Will  Great  Britain  remain  neutral  or  be  my  enemy?" 

^  Contrast  this  with  French  Yellow  Book  No.  126,  August  1,  and  note  2. 

8  This  is  what  Great  Britain  had  done  in  1870. 

^  Compare  this  with  Sir  E.  Grey's  personal  engagements  toward  France ;  French 
Yellow  Book  No.  126,  August  1,  and  note  3. 


August  1,  British  Blue  Book  No.  125  389 

strongly  to  public  opinion  here.  I  did  not  think  that  we  could  give 
a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition  alone. 

The  Ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could  not  formulate 
conditions  on  which  we  would  remain  neutral.  He  even  suggested 
that  the  integrity  of  France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed.^ 

I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to  remain 

neutral  on  similar  terms,  and  I  could  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our 

hands  free.^  , 

i  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 

From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  124 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

On  the  receipt  at  8.30  to-night  of  your  telegram  of  this  afternoon,^ 
I  sent  a  message  to  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  requesting  to  see  him. 
He  received  me  at  10.30  to-night  at  the  Elysee,  where  a  Cabinet 
Council  was  being  held.  He  took  a  note  of  the  enquiry  as  to  the 
respecting  by  France  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  which  you  in- 
structed me  to  make. 

He  told  me  that  a  communication  had  been  made  to  you  by  the 
German  Ambassador  in  London  of  the  intention  of  Germany  to  order 
a  general  mobilisation  of  her  army  if  Russia  do  not  demobilise  at 
once.  He  is  urgently  anxious  as  to  what  the  attitude  of  England  will 
be  in  the  circumstances,  and  begs  an  answer  may  be  made  by  His 
Majesty's  Government  at  the  earliest  moment  possible. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  also  told  me  that  the  German  Embassy 
is  packing  up.^ 

From  Paris 

British, Blue  Book  No..  125 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

My  immediately  preceding  telegram.^ 

Political  Director  h^s  brought  me  the  reply  of  the  Minister  for 

1  No  valid  reason  is  given  in  the  British  Blue  Book  why  Sir  E.  Grey  did  not  formulate 
such  conditions.  From  the  reference  given  in  the  previous  despatches,  however,  it 
appears  that  Sir  E.  Grey  was  personally  too  deeply  committed  to  France.  (See  es- 
pecially French  Yellow  Book  No.  126,  August  1.)  Nor  did  Sir  E.  Grey  mention  this 
German  request  either  in  the  subsequent  cabinet  meetings  or  in  Parliament.  His 
excuse  offered  weeks  later  that  the  German  Ambassador  had  niade  this  request  un- 
officially seems  to  be  contradicted  by  the  despatch  itself.  It  is  not  customary  to 
repeat  unoflEicial  offers  in  instructions  to  Ambassadors,  at  least  without  saying  so. 
Of.  for  instance  British  Blue  Book  No.  125,  August  1,  and  Belgian  Gray  Book  No. 
24,  August  3.  •• 

2  Cf .  note  9,  page  388.  *  Cf .  French  Yellow  Book  No.  120,  August  1. 

3  British  Blue  Book  No.  114,  July  31.         ^  British  Blue  Book  No.  124. 


390  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Foreign  Affairs  to  your  enquiry  respecting  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 
It  is  as  follows  :  ^  — 

French  Government  are  resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  and  it  would  only  be  in  the  event  of  some  other  Power  violat- 
ing that  neutrality  that  France  might  find  herself  under  the  necessity 
in  order  to  assure  defence  of  her  own  security,  to  act  otherwise.  This 
assurance  has  been  given  several  times.  President  of  the  Republic 
spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  and  the  French  Minister  at 
Brussels  has  spontaneously^  renewed  the  assurance  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day .^ 


From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  126 

Sir  F.  Bertie  J  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — (Re- 
ceived  Augiist  1 .) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris ,  August  1,  1914- 

1  HAVE  had  conversation  with  the  Political  Director,  w^ho  states 
that  the  German  Ambassador  was  informed,  on  calling  at  the  Ministry 
for  Foreign  Affairs  this  morning,^  that  the  French  Government  failed 
to  comprehend  the  reason  which  prompted  his  communication  of 
yesterday  evening.  It  was  pointed  out  to  his  Excellency  that  general 
mobilisation  in  Russia  had  not  been  ordered  until  after  Austria  had 
decreed  a  general  mobilisation,^  and  that  the  Russian  Government 
were  ready  to  demobilise  ^  if  all  Powers  did  likewise.  It  seemed 
strange  to  the  French  Government  that  in  view  of  this  and  of  the  fact 
that  Russia  and  Austria  were  ready  to  converse,  the  German  Govern- 
ment should  have  at  that  moment  presented  an  ultimatum  at  St. 
Petersburgh  requiring  immediate  demobilisation  by  Russia.  There 
were  no  differences  at  issue  between  France  and  Germany,  but  the 
German  Ambassador  had  made  a  menacing  communication  to 
the  French  Government .  and  had  requested  an  answer  the  next 
day,  intimating  that  he  would  have  to  break  off  relations  and  leave 
Paris  if  the  reply  were  not  satisfactory.  The  Ambassador  was  in- 
formed that  the  French  Government  considered  that  this  was  an 
extraordinary  proceeding. 

The  German  Ambassador,  who  is  to  see  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  again  this  evening,  said  nothing  about  demanding  his  pass- 
ports, but  he  stated  that  he  had  packed  up.^ 

^  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  no.  15,  August  1. 

2  Cf.  end  of  note  7,  British  Blue  Book  No.  123,  August  1. 

3  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  9,  July  31. 

*  See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  125,  same  day. 

^  This  is  an  error,  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  127,  same  day,  and  note  5 ;  also 
British  Blue  Book  No.  127,  same  date. 

*  Contrast  French  Yellow  Book  No.  125,  same  day,  "suspension  of  military  prepara- 
tions," which  is  not  the  same  as  "demobilisation."  See  also  note  5  to  this  despatch  in 
French  Yellow  Book. 

^  This  is  not  given  in  the  exhaustive  French  despatch  describing  this  interview, 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  125,  same  day. 


August  1,  British  Blue  Book  No.  130  391 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  127 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
—  {Received  August  1.) , 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  1,  1914. 

General  mobilisation  of  army  and  fleet. 

From  Brussels 
British  Blue  Book  No.  128 

Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  1,  1914. 

Belgian  neutrality. 

The  instructions  conveyed  in  your  telegram  of  yesterday  ^  have 
been  acted  upon. 

Belgium  expects  and  desires  that  other  Powers  will  observe  and 
uphold  2  her  neutrality,  which  she  intends  to  maintain  to  the  utmost  of 
her  power.  In  so  informing  me,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said 
that,  in  the  event  of  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  their  territory, 
they  believed  that  they  were  in  a  position  to  defend  themselves  against 
intrusion.  The  relations  between  Belgium  and  her  neighbours  were 
excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  suspect  their  intentions ;  but  he 
thought  it  well,  nevertheless,  to  be  prepared  against  emergencies. 

[For  British  Blue  Book  No.  129  see  under  August  2.] 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  130 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

We  are  informed  that  authorities  at  Hamburg  have  forcibly  de- 
tained steamers  belonging  to  the  Great  Central  Company  and  other 
British  merchant-ships. 

I  cannot  ascertain  on  what  grounds  the  detention  of  British  ships 
has  been  ordered. 

You  should  request  German  Government  to  send  immediate  orders 
that  they  should  be  allowed  to  proceed  without  delay.  The  effect 
on  public  opinion  here  will  be  deplorable  unless  this  is  done.  His 
Majesty's  Government,  on  their  side,  are  most  anxious  to  avoid  any 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  115,  July  31,  expecting  Belgium  to  observe  neutrality. 

2  This  seems  to  contradict  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  38,  August  4,  where  the  Belgian 
Foreign  Minister  relates  that  Belgium  had  refrained  from  appealing  to  the  guaranteeing 
Powers  as  late  as  6  a.m.  on  August  4,  and  probably  later.  On  Aug.  3,  at  10  a.m.,  the 
Belgian  Cabinet  definitely  voted  not  to  appeal  to  the  Powers. 


392  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

incident  of  an  aggressive  nature,  and  the  German  Government  will,  I 
hope,  be  equally  careful  not  to  take  any  step  which  would  make  the 
situation  between  us  impossible. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  131 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E,  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

I  STILL  believe  that  it  might  be  possible  to  secure  peace  if  only  a 
little  respite  in  time  can  be  gained  before  any  Great  Power  begins  war.^ 

The  Russian  Government  has  communicated  to  me  the  readiness  of 
Austria  to  discuss  with  Russia  and  the  readiness  of  Austria  to  accept 
a  basis  of  mediation  which  is  not  open  to  the  objections  raised  in  re- 
gard to  the  formula  which  Russia  originally  suggested. 

Things  ought  not  to  be  hopeless  so  long  as  Austria  and  Russia  are 
ready  to  converse,  and  I  hope  that  German  Government  may  be  able 
to  make  use  of  the  Russian  communications  referred  to  above,  in 
order  to  avoid  tension.  His  Majesty's  Government  are  carefully 
abstaining  from  any  act  which  may  precipitate  matters. 

From  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  132 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

Following  telegram  from  M.  Sazonof  ^  to  Count  Benckendorff  ^ 
of  the  31st  July  communicated  to  me  to-day :  ^ 
"  (Urgent.) 
"  Formule    amend ee    conf ormement    a    la    proposition    anglaise : 

*  Si  Autriche  consent  a  arreter  la  marche  de  ses  troupes  sur  le  territoire 
serbe  et  si,  reconnaissant  que  le  conflit  austro-serbe  a  assume  le  carac- 
tere  d'un  question  d'interet  europeen,  elle  admet  que  les  Grandes 
Puissances  examinent  la  satisfaction  que  la  Serbie  pourrait  accorder 
au  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  sans  laisser  porter  atteinte  a  ses 
droits  d'Etat  souverain  et  a  son  independance,  la  Russie  s'engage  a 
conserver  son  attitude  expectante.' "  ^ 

(Above  communicated  to  all  the  Powers.) 

1  Sir  E.  Grey  here  overlooks  the  fact  that  general  mobilisation  by  one  nation  on 
the  frontier  of  another  has  always  been  sufficient  cause  for  the  latter  to  "defend  itself 
by  instant  war."  See  Elihu  Root  quoted  above,  note  4  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 
No.  28,  July  26. 

Sir  E.  Grey  nowhere  asked  Russia  to  demobilise. 

2  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

3  Russian  Ambassador  in  London, 

4  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  120,  July  31,  printed  under  date  of  August  1,  and 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  67,  July  31. 

^Translation.  —  "Formula  amended  in  accordance  with  the  English  proposal; 

*  If  Austria  consents  to  stay  the  march  of  her  troops  on  Servian  territory,  and  if,  recog- 


August  1,  British  Blue  Book  No.  134  393 

From  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  133 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

M.  De  EtterI  came  to-day  to  communicate  the  contents  of  a 
telegram  from  M.  Sazonof/  dated  the  31st  July,  which  are  as 
follows :  — 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  declare^  ^  the  readiness  of 
his  Government  to  discuss  the  substance  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum 
to  Servia.  M.  Sazonof  replied  by  expressing  his  satisfaction,  and 
said  it  was  desirable  that  the  discussions  should  take  place  in  London 
with  the  participation  of  the  Great  Powers. 

"M.  Sazonof  hoped  that  the  British  Government  would  assume 
the  direction  of  these  discussions.  The  whole  of  Europe  would  be 
thankful  to  them.  It  would  be  very  important  that  Austria  should 
meanwhile  put  a  stop  provisionally  to  her  military  action  on  Servian 
territory." 

(The  above  has  been  communicated  to  the  six  Powers.) 

From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  134 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  —  (Re- 
ceived August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  1,  1914. 

President  of  the  Republic  has  informed  me  that  German  Govern- 
ment ^  were  trying  to  saddle  Russia  with  the  responsibility,  that  it  was 
only  after  a  decree  of  general  mobilisation  had  been  issued  in  Austria 
that  the  Emperor  of  Russia  ordered  a  general  mobilisation;  that, 
although  the  measures  which  the  German  Government  have  already 
taken  are  in  effect  a  general  mobilisation,  they  are  not  so  designated  ; 
that  a  French  general  mobilisation  will  become  necessary  in  self- 
defence,  and  that  France  is  already  forty-eight  hours  ^  behind  Ger- 
many as  regards  German  military  preparations;  that  the  French 
troops  have  ordered  not  to  go  nearer  to  the  German  frontier  than  a 
distance  of  10  kilom.  so  as  to  avoid  any  grounds  for  accusations  of 
provocation  to  Germany,  whereas  the  German  troops,  on  the  other 

nising  that  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  has  assumed  the  character  of  a  question  of 
European  interest,  she  admits  that  the  Great  Powers  may  examine  the  satisfaction 
which  Servia  can  accord  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  without  injury  to  her 
sovereign  rights  as  a  State  and  to  her  independence,  Russia  undertakes  to  preserve  her 
waiting  attitude." 

1  Counsellor  of  Russian  Embassy  in  London. 

2  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

3  Of.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  56,  August  1. 

*  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  127,  August  1,  where  it  reads:  "The  German  and 
the  Austrian  Governments."  For  the  several  points  see  the  notes  to  the  French 
Yellow  Book  despatch. 

6  No  such  claim  is  made  either  in  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  125  or  127,  same  date. 


394  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

hand,  are  actually  on  the  French  frontier  and  have  made  incursions 
on  it ;  ^  that,  notwithstanding  mobilisations,  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
has  expressed  himself  ready  to  continue  his  conversations  with  the 
German  Ambassador  with  a  view  to  preserving  the  peace;  that 
French  Government,  whose  wishes  are  markedly  pacific,  sincerely 
desire  the  preservation  of  peace  and  do  not  quite  despair,  even  now, 
of  its  being  possible  to  avoid  war. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  135 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914- 

Information  reaches  me  from  a  most  reliable  source  that  Austrian 
Government  have  informed  German  Government  that  though  the 
situation  has  been  changed  by  the  mobilisation  of  Russia  they  would 
in  full  appreciation  of  the  efforts  of.  England  for  the  preservation 
of  peace  be  ready  to  consider  favourably  my  proposal  for  mediation 
between  Austria  and  Servia.  The  effect  of  this  acceptance  would 
naturally  be  that  the  Austrian  military  action  against  Servia  would 
continue  for  the  present,  and  that  the  British  Government  would  urge 
upon  Russian  Government  to  stop  the  mobilisation  of  troops  directed 
against  Austria,  in  which  case  Austria  would  naturally  cancel  those 
defensive  military  counter-measures  in  Galicia,  which  have  been 
forced  upon  Austria  by  Russian  mobilisation.^ 

You  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  say  that  if, 
in  the  consideration  of  the  acceptance  of  mediation  by  Austria, 
Russia  can  agree  to  stop  mobilisation,  it  appears  still  to  be  possible 
to  preserve  peace.  Presumably  the  matter  should  be  discussed 
with  German  Government  also  by  Russian  Government. 

From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No.  136 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  1,  1914. 

Minister  of  War  informed  military  attache  this  afternoon  that 
orders  had  been  given  at  3.40  ^  for  a  general  mobilisation  of  the  French 
Army.  This  became  necessary  because  the  Minister  of  War  knows 
that,  under  the  system  of  "Kriegszustand,"  ^  the  Germans  have 

1  The  German  claim  was  to  the  very  opposite  effect ;  see  Speech  of  the  Chancellor, 
August  4,  1914. 

2  Contrast  this  with  the  French  claims  in  despatches  of  this  day  that  Russia  had 
been  forced  to  general  mobilisation  by  a  previous  Austrian  general  mobilisation. 

'  Cf.  German  White  Book,  p.  560,  5  p.m.,  the  latter  being  Berlin  instead  of  Paris 
time.  *  "State  of  war." 


August  1,  British  Blue  Book  No.  137  395 

called  up  six  classes.  Three  classes  are  sufficient  to  being  their  cover- 
ing troops  up  to  war  strength,  the  remaining  three  being  the  reserve. 
This,  he  says,  being  tantamount  to  mobilisation,  is  mobilisation 
under  another  name.^ 

The  French  forces  on  the  frontier  have  opposed  to  them  eight 
army  corps  on  a  war  footing,  and  an  attack  is  expected  at  any  moment. 
It  is  therefore  of  the  utmost  importance  to  guard  against  this.  A 
zone  of  10  kilom.  has  been  left  between  the  French  troops  and  German 
frontier.  The  French  troops  will  not  attack,  and  the  Minister  of  War 
is  anxious  that  it  should  be  explained  that  this  act  of  mobilisation  is 
one  for  purely  defensive  purposes. 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  137 
Sir  Edivard  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  191J,.. 

I  SAW  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  this  morning.  He 
supplied  me  with  the  substance  of  a  telegram  which  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  sent  to  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  in  Paris.^  In  this  telegram  his  Excellency  was  given 
instructions  to  assure  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that 
there  was  no  intention  in  the  minds  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment to  impair  the  sovereign  rights  of  Servia  or  to  obtain  territorial 
aggrandisement.  The  Ambassador  added  that  he  was  further  in- 
structed to  inform  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  there 
was  no  truth  in  the  report  which  had  been  published  in  Paris  to  the 
effect  that  x\ustria-Hungary  intended  to  occupy  the  sanjak. 

Count  Mensdorff  ^  called  again  later  at  the  Foreign  Office.  He  in- 
formed me  of  a  telegram  ^  sent  yesterday  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  by  Count  Berchtold,^  and  gave  me 
the  substance. 

It  states  that  Count  Berchtold  begged  the  Russian  Ambassador, 
whom  he  sent  for  yesterday,  to  do  his  best  to  remove  the  wholly 
erroneous  impression  in  St.  Petersburgh  that  the  '^door  had  been 
banged"  by  Austria-Hungary  on  all  further  conversations.  The 
Russian  Ambassador  promised  to  do  this.  Count  Berchtold  repeated 
on  this  occasion  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  the  assurance  which  had 
already  been  given  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  the  effect  that  neither  an 
infraction  of  Servian  sovereign  rights  nor  the  acquisition  of  Servian 
territory  was  being  contempated  by  Austria-Hungary. 

Special  attention  was  called  by  Count  Mensdorff  ^  to  the  fact  that 

1  None  of  this  seems  to  be  based  on  facts.  See  M.  P.  Price,  The  Diplomatic 
History  of  the  War,  Scribner's,  the  chapters  on  "Preparations  and  Mobilisations." 

2  Not  printed  in  French  Yellow  Book,  but  mentioned  ih.  No.  120,  same  day. 

3  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

<  Probably  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  50,  although  this  is  dated  July  30. 
and  Sir  E.  Grey  says  "sent  yesterday,"  i.e.  July  31. 
^  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


396  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

this  telegram  contains  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  conversations  at 
St.  Petersburgh  had  not  been  broken  off  by  Austria-Hungary. 

[For  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  138  and  139  see  under  August  2.] 

From  Paris 

British  Blue  Book  No,  140 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  — 
(Received  AugiLst  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  1,  1914. 

The  Minister  of  War  again  sent  for  the  military  attache  this  even- 
ing, as  he  said  he  wished  to  keep  him  informed  of  the  situation.  He 
laid  great  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  zone  of  10  kilom.,  which  he  had 
arranged  between  the  French  troops  and  the  German  frontier,  and 
which  was  still  occupied  by  peasants,  was  a  proof  of  the  French 
endeavours  to  commit  no  provocative  act.^ 

Russia : 

To  Russian  Representatives  Abroad 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  70 
Secret  Telegram  to  Russian  Representatives  abroad. 
(Telegram.)  July  19  (August  1),  1914. 

At  midnight  the  German  Ambassador  announced  ^  to  me,  on  the 
instruction  of  his  Government,  that  if  within  12  hours,  that  is  by  mid- 
night on  Saturday,  we  had  not  begin  to  demobilise,  not  only  against 
Germany,  but  also  against  Austria,  the  German  Government  would  be 
compelled  to  give  the  order  for  mobilisation.  To  my  enquiry  whether 
this  meant  war,  the  Ambassador  replied  in  the  negative,  but  added 
that  we  were  very  near  it. 

From  london 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  71 
Russian  Ambassador  at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  London,  July  19  (August  1),  1914- 

Grey  tells  me  that  he  has  telegraphed  ^  to  Berlin  that  in  his  opinion 
the  last  formula  accepted  by  the  Russian  Government  offers  the  best 
prospect  as  a  basis  of  negotiations  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the 
dispute.  At  the  same  time  he  expressed  the  hope  that  no  Great 
Power  would  open  hostilities  before  this  formula  had  been  considered. 

1  Cf.  note  3  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  134,  August  1. 

2  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  24,  July  31. 

'  Probably  British  Blue  Book  No.  131,  same  day. 


August  1,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  74  397 

From  London 

Russian  Orange  Book  No,  72 

Russian  Ambassador   at  London  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs, 

(Telegram.)  London,  July  19  {August  1),  1914. 

The  British  Government  have  enquired  ^  of  the  French  and  German 
Governments  whether  they  will  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

France  answered  in  the  affirmative,^  but  the  German  Government 
stated  ^  that  they  could  not  give  any  definite  answer  to  the  question. 

From  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  73 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  19  (August  1),  1914- 

'  The  Austrian  Ambassador  yesterday  ^  saw  Viviani  and  declared 
to  him  that  Austria,  far  from  harbouring  any  designs  against  the 
integrity  of  Servia,  was  in  fact  ready  to  discuss  the  grounds  of  her 
grievances  against  Servia  with  the  other  Powers.  The  French 
Government  are  much  exercised  at  Germany's  extraordinary  military 
activity  on  the  French  frontier,  for  they  are  convinced  that,  under 
the  guise  of  Kriegszu^tand,^  mobilisation  is  in  reality  being  carried 
out. 

From  Paris 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  74 

Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  19  {August  1),  1914- 

On  the  receipt  in  Paris  of  the  telegram  ^  from  the  French  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg,  reporting  the  communication  made  to 
you  by  the  German  Ambassador  respecting  Germany's  decision  to 
order  general  mobilisation  to-day,  the  President  of  the  French  Repub- 
lic signed  the  order  for  mobilisation.  Lists  of  the  reservists  recalled 
to  the  colours  are  being  posted  up  in  the  streets.  The  German  Am- 
bassador has  just  visited  Viviani,^  but  told  him  nothing  fresh,  alleging 
the  impossibility  of  deciphering   the  telegrams  he   has  received.^ 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  115,  July  31. 

2  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15,  August  1. 

3  British  Blue  Book  No.  122,  August  1. 

4  French  Yellow  Book  No.  120,  August  1.     British  Blue  Book  No.  137,  same  day. 
6  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  127,  August  1,  and  notes  5  and  6. 

6  No  such  telegram  is  printed  in  the  French  Yellow  Book.  On  the  eventful  August 
1  not  a  single,  despatch  exchanged  between  Paris  and  Petrograd  has  been  printed  in 
the  French  Yellow  Book. 

7  See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  125,  August  1. 

8  Cf.  ih.,  where  Viviani  quotes  the  German  Ambassador  as  saying  that  "he  had 
received  no  fresh  communication  from  his  government." 


398  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Viviani  informed  him  of  the  signature  of  the  order  for  mobiKsation 
issued  in  reply  to  that  of  Germany,  and  expressed  to  him  his  amaze- 
ment that  Germany  should  have  taken  such  a  step  at  a  moment  when 
a  friendly  exchange  of  views  w^as  still  in  progress  between  Russia, 
Austria,  and  the  Powers.  He  added  that  mobilisation  did  not  neces- 
sarily entail  war,  and  that  the  German  Ambassador  might  stay  in 
Paris  as  the  Russian  Ambassador  had  remained  in  Vienna  and  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg. 

From  Paris 
Russian  Orange  Book  No.  75 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris  to  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
(Telegram.)  Paris,  July  19  {August  i),  1914- 

I  HEAR  from  the  President  that  during  the  last  few  days  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  emphatically  assured  both  the  President  of  the  Council 
of  Ministers  and  him  that  Austria  had  declared  to  Russia  that  she  was 
ready  to  respect  both  the  territorial  integrity  of  Servia  and  also  her' 
sovereign  rights,  but  that  Russia  had  intentionally  received  this  dec- 
laration in  silence.     I  contradicted  this  flatly.^ 

From  Berlin 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  76 

Note  presented  by  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  on  July  19 
(August  1),  at  7.10  P.M. 

(Translation.) 

Le     Gouvernement     Imperial  The    Imperial    German   Gov- 

s'est  efforce  des   les   debuts   de  ernment  have  used  every  effort 

la  crise  de  la  mener  a  une  solu-  since  the  beginning  of  the  crisis 

tion    pacifique.      Se    rendant    a  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  settle- 

un   desir  qui  lui    en  avait    ete  ment.     In    compliance    with    a 

exprime  par  Sa   Majeste   I'Em-  wish  expressed  to  him  by  His 

pereur   de    Russie,    Sa    Majeste  IVIajesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia, 

I'Empereur   •  d'Allemagne     d'ac-  the  German  Emperor  had  under- 

cord    avec    I'Angleterre    s'etait  taken,    in    concert    with    Great 

applique    a    accomplir    un    role  Britain,    the    part    of    mediator 

mediateur  aupres  des   Cabinets  between  the  Cabinets  of  Vienna 

de   Vienne    et   de    Saint-Peters-  and  St.  Petersburg ;  but  Russia, 

bourg,  lorsque,  la  Russie,   sans  without  waiting  for  any  result, 

en  attendre  le  resultat,  proceda  proceeded  to  a  general  mobilisa- 

a  la  mobilisation  de  la  totalite  de  tion  of  her  forces  both  on  land 

ses  forces  de  terre  et  de  mer.     A  and  sea.     In  consequence  of  this 

la  suite  de  cette  mesure  mena-  threatening  step,  which  was  not 

^  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  Russian  Ambassador  contradicted  the  assertion,  that 
Austria-Hungary  had  made  this  declaration  or  that  Russia  had  received  it  in  silence. 
For  Austria-Hungary's  declaration  see  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  Nos.  47,  July  29, 
66,  July  31,  and  56,  August  1. 


August  1,  Rmsian  Orange  Book  No.  76 


399 


9ante  ne  motivee  par  aucun 
presage  militaire  de  la  part  de 
rAllemagne,  TEmpire  allemand 
s'est  trouve  vis-a-vis  d'un  dan- 
ger grave  et  imminent.  Si  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  eut  man- 
que de  parer  a  ce  peril,  il 
aurait  compromis  la  securite  et 
I'existence  meme  de  I'Allemagne. 
Par  consequent  le  Gouvernement 
allemand  se  vit  force  de  s'adresser 
au  Gouvernement  de  SaMajeste 
FEmpereur  de  Toutes  les  Russies 
en  insistant  sur  la  cessation  des 
dits  actes  militaires.  La  Russie 
ayant  refuse  de  faire  droit  a 
(n'ayant  pas  cru  devoir  repondre 
a  ^)  cette  demande  et  ayant  mani- 
festo par  ce  refus  (cette  atti- 
tude ^)  que  son  action  etait 
dirigee  contre  I'Allemagne,  j'ai 
I'honneur,  d'ordre  de  mon  Gou- 
vernement, de  faire  savoir  a 
votre  Excellence  ce  qui  suit :  — 

Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur,  mon 
auguste  Souverain,  au  nom  de 
TEmpire,  relevant  le  defi,  se 
considere  en  etat  de  guerre  avec 
la  Russie. 


justified  by  any  military  proceed- 
ings on  the  part  of  Germany,^ 
the  German  Empire  was  faced 
by  a  grave  and  imminent  danger. 
If  the  German  Government  had 
failed  to  guard  against  this  peril, 
they  would  have  compromised 
the  safety  and  the  very  existence 
of  Germany.  The  German 
Government  were,  therefore,  ob- 
liged to  make  representations  to 
the  Government  of  His  Maj- 
esty the  Emperor  of  All  the 
Russias  and  to  insist  upon  a  ces- 
sation of  the  aforesaid  military 
acts.  Russia  having  refused  to 
comply  with  (not  having  con- 
sidered it  necessary  to  answer  ^) 
this  demand,  and  having  shown 
by  this  refusal  (this  attitude^) 
that  her  action  was  directed 
against  Germany,  I  have  the 
honour,  on  the  instructions  of  my 
Government,  to  inform  your 
Excellency  as  follows  ;  — 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  my 
august  Sovereign,  in  the  name 
of  the  German  Empire,  accepts 
the  challenge,  and  considers  him- 
self at  war  with  Russia. 


^  Les  mots  places  entre  parentheses  se  trouvent  dans  Toriginal.  II  faut  supposer 
que  deux  variantes  avaient  ete  preparees  d'avance  et  que  par  erreur  elles  ont  6t6 
inserees  toutes  les  deux  dans  la  note. 

2  The  words  in  parentheses  occur  in  the  original.  It  rnust  be  supposed  that  two 
variations  had  been  prepared  in  advance,  and  that,  by  mistake,  they  were  both  in- 
serted in  the  note. 

3  This  sentence  contains  the  crux  of  the  question.  Students  should  ask  themselves 
(a)  Did  Russian  mobilisation  contain  an  element  of  danger  for  Germany?  (b)  If  it 
did,  was  Germany  justified  in  replying  to  it  with  an  ultimatum?  (c)  Was  the  Russian 
general  mobilisation  justified  by  any  military  action  previously  taken  by  Germany? 


400 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Sunday,  August  2,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


FoKEiGN  Office  of 

Austria-H  ungary 
Belgium 

France 


Germany 
Great  Britain 


Sent  Despatches  to 


London  etc. 

All  representatives 
London  etc. 
London 


Received 
Despatches  fbom 

Berlin 
Luxemburg 
German  Minister 
Luxemburg,   Petrograd, 

London,  German 

Ambassador 


Russia 
Serbia 


Paris,  Berlin 


Announcement  by  Sazonof 
to  all  representatives 


Berlin,  Petrograd,  Paris, 
Vienna,  Brussels,  Lux- 
emburg 


Austria-Hungary  is  notified  of  Germany's  declaration  of  war  on  Russia. 

Belgium  is  notified  of  Germany's  entry  on  Luxemburg  territory,  and  receives 
herself  an  ultimatum  from  Germany  at  7  o'clock  in  the  evening ;  i.e.  many  hours 
after  the  British  Government  had  promised  their  support  to  France. 

France  announces  to  her  representatives  instances  of  Germany's  troops  crossing 
her  frontier  and  committing  hostile  acts,  and  receives  the  promise  of  support  from 
the  British  Government  for  which  she  had  been  working  since  July  27. 

Germany  sends  troops  into  Luxemburg,  thus  violating  the  neutrality  of  the 
duchy,  but  assuring  her  that  the  military  measures  taken  are  not  a  hostile  act 
but  are  "solely  measures  intended  to  assure  the  use  of  the  railways  which  have 
been  leased  to  the  Empire  "  against  any  attack  of  the  French  army.  She  promises 
Luxemburg  a  complete  indemnity  for  any  damage. 

Germany  notifies  Belgium  that  she  has  received  "reliable  information"  of 
French  intentions  to  march  through  Belgium,  and  feels  herself  therefore  forced 
in  self-defence  to  contemplate  entering  Belgian  territory.  If  Belgium  "should 
oppose  the  German  troops,"  Germany  would  "to  her  regret  be  compelled  to  con- 
sider Belgium  as  an  enemy."  If  the  troops  are  not  opposed,  guarantees  are 
offered  for  the  future  integrity  and  independence  of  Belgium,  and  the  payment 
for  any  damage  done. 

Great  Britain  promises  her  support  to  France  during  the  forenoon,  independ- 
ently of  whether  or  no  German  troops  should  invade  Belgium.  She  is  silent  on 
the  movement  of  her  own  troops. 

Russia  defends  herself  against  Germany's  attempt  "to  foist"  on  Russia  the 
"responsibility"  for  the  war,  claiming  that  Germany  "neither  could,  nor  had 
the  right  to,  doubt"  the  many  proofs  of  Russia's  "desire  for  peace."  The  fact 
of  Russia's  general  mobilisation  is  minimised. 

Serbia  is  silent. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    57 

Count  Szogyeny  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  2,  1914- 

The  Secretary  of  State  has  just  informed  me  that  no  answer 
has  been  received  from  Russia  to  the  German  demand. 


August  2,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  19  401 

The  Russian  troops  have  crossed  the  German  frontier  at  Schwidden 
(southeast  of  Bialla). 

Russia  has  thus  attacked  Germany. 

Germany,  therefore/  regards  herself  as  at  war  with  Russia. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  has  this  morning  received  his  passports ; 
he  intends  to  leave  to-day. 

Belgium : 

From  Luxemburg 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  18 

M.  Eyschen,  President  of  the  Luxemburg  Government,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Luxemburg,  August  2,   1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  acquaint  your  Excellency  with  the  following 
facts :  On  Sunday,  the  2nd  August,  very  early,  the  German  troops, 
according  to  the  information  which  has  up  to  now  reached  the  Grand 
Ducal  Government,  penetrated  into  Luxemburg  territory  by  the 
bridges  of  Wasserbillig  and  Remich,  and  proceeded  particularly 
towards  the  south  and  in  the  direction  of  Luxemburg,  the  capital  of 
the  Grand  Duchy.  A  certain  number  of  armoured  trains  with  troops 
and  ammunition  have  been  sent  along  the  railway  line  from  Wasser- 
billig to  Luxemburg,  where  their  arrival  is  expected.  These  occur- 
rences constitute  acts  which  are  manifestly  contrary  to  the  neu- 
trality of  the  Grand  Duchy  as  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty  of  London 
of  1867.  The  Luxemburg  Government  have  not  failed  to  address 
an  energetic  protest  against  this  aggression  to  the  representatives  of 
His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor  at  Luxemburg.  An  identical  pro- 
test will  be  sent  by  telegraph  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Berlin. 

To  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  19 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Belgian  Ministers 
at  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  2,  1914. 

I  WAS  careful  to  warn  the  German  Minister  through  M.  de  Bassom- 
pierre  that  an  announcement  in  the  Brussels  press  by  M.  Klobukowski, 
French  Minister,  would  make  public  the  formal  declaration  which  the 
latter  had  made  to  me  on  the  1st  August.  When  I  next  met  Herr 
von  Below  he  thanked  me  for  this  attention,  and  added  that  up  to 
the  present  he  had  not  been  instructed  to  make  us  an  official  commu- 
nication, but  that  we  knew  his  personal  opinion  as  to  the  feelings 
of  security,  which  we  had  the  right  to  entertain  towards  our  eastern 

^  This  is  not  the  reason  given  in  the  declaration  of  war,  Russian  Orange  Book  No. 
76,  August  1. 

2d 


402 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


neighbours.  I  at  once  replied  that  all  that  we  knew  of  their  inten- 
tions, as  indicated  in  numerous  previous  conversations,  did  not  allow 
us  to  doubt  their  perfect  correctness  towards  Belgium.  I  added, 
however,  that  we  should  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  the  posses- 
sion of  a  formal  declaration,  which  the  Belgian  nation  would  hear  of 
with  joy  and  gratitude. 

From  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20 

Note  presented  by  Herr  von  Below  Salekse,  German  Minister  at  Brussels, 
to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Kaiserlich   Deutsche    Gesandtschaft   in    Belgien.     Brilssel,    den   2. 

August,  1914- 
Imperial  German  Legation  in  Belgium.  —  Brussels,  August  2,  1914- 


(Translation.) 
(Very  Confidential.)  ^ 

Reliable  information  has 
been  received  by  the  German 
Government  to  the  effect  that 
French  forces  intend  to  march  on 
the  line  of  the  IMeuse  by  Givet 
and  Namur.  This  information 
leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  inten- 
tion of  France  to  march  through 
Belgian  territory  against  Ger- 
many. 

The  German  Government  can- 
not but  fear  that  Belgium,  in 
spite  of  the  utmost  goodwill,  will 
be  unable,  without  assistance,  to 
repel  ^  so  considerable  a  French 
invasion  with  sufficient  prospect 
of  success  to  afford  an  adequate 
guarantee  against  danger  to  Ger- 
many. It  is  essential  for  the  self- 
defence  of  Germany  that  she 
should  anticipate  any  such  hostile 
attack.  The  German  Govern- 
ment would,  however,  feel  the 
deepest  regret  if  Belgium  re- 
garded   as    an    act    of   hostility 

^  This  ultimatum  was  presented  at  7  p.m.  (see  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  38,  August  4), 
i.e.  many  hours  after  the  British  Government  had  promised  their  support  to  France ; 
cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  148,  August  2,  where  Sir  E.  Grey  says :  "After  the  Cabinet 
this  morning  J  gave  M.  Cambon  the  following  memorandum." 

2  This  is  the  same  argument  Great  Britain  advanced  in  her  second  military  con- 
versation with  Belgium.  See  p.  580  and  also  note  to  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  22, 
August  3. 


(Tres  Confidentiel.) 

Der  Kaiserlichen  Regierung 
liegen  zuverlassige  Nachrichten 
vor  iiber  den  beabsichtigten  Auf- 
marsch  franzosischer  Streitkrafte 
an  der  Maas-Strecke  Givet- 
Namur.  Sie  lassen  keinen 
Zweifel  iiber  die  Absicht  Frank- 
reichs,  durch  belgisches  Gebiet 
gegen  Deutschland  vorzugehen. 

Die  Kaiserliche  Regierung 
kann  sich  der  Besorgniss  nicht 
erwehren,  dass  Belgien,  trotz 
besten  Willens,  nicht  im  vStande 
sein  wird,  ohne  Hiilfe  einen  fran- 
zosischen  Vormarsch  mit  so 
grosser  Aussicht  auf  Erfolg  abzu- 
wehren,  dass  darin  eine  ausrei- 
chende  Sicherheit  gegen  die 
Bedrohung  Deutschlands  gefun- 
den  werden  kann.  Es  ist  ein 
Gebot  der  Selbsterhaltung  fiir 
Deutschland,  dem  feindlichen  An- 
griff  zu  vorzukommen.  Mit  dem 
grossten  Bedauern  wiirde  es  daher 


August  2,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20 


403 


die  deutsche  Regierung  erfiillen, 
wenn  Belgien  einen  Akt  der 
Feindseligkeit  gegen  sich  darin 
erblicken  wiirde,  dass  die  Mass- 
nahmen  seiner  Gegner  Deutseh- 
land  zwingen,  zur  Gegenwehr 
auch  seinerseits  belgisches  Gebiet 
zu  betreten. 

Um  jede  Missdeutung  aus- 
zuschliessen,  erklart  die  Kaiser- 
liche  Regierung  das  Folgende : 

1.  Deutschland  beabsichtigt 
keinerlei  Feindseligkeiten  gegen 
Belgien.  1st  Belgien  gewillt,  in 
dem  bevorstehenden  Kriege, 
Deutschland  gegeniiber  eine 
wohlwollende  Neutralitat  einzu- 
nehmen,  so  verpflichtet  sich  die 
deutsche  Regierung,  beim  Frie- 
densschluss  Besitzstand  und 
Unabhangigkeit  des  Konigreichs 
in  vollem  Umfang  zu  garantieren. 

2.  Deutschland  verpflichtet 
sich  unter  obiger  Voraussetzung, 
das  Gebiet  des  Konigreichs  wieder 
zu  raumen,  sobald  der  Friede 
geschlossen  ist. 

3.  Bei  einer  freundschaftlicher 
Haltung  Belgiens  ist  Deutschland 
bereit,  im  Einvernehmen  mit  den 
Koniglich  Belgischen  Behorden 
alle  Bedurfnisse  seiner  Truppen 
gegen  Barzahlung  anzukaufen 
und  jeden  Schaden  zu  ersetzen,  der 
etwa  durch  deutsche  Truppen 
verursacht  werden  konnte. 

4.  Sollte  Belgien  den  deutschen 
Truppen  feindlich  entgegen  tre- 
ten,  insbesondere  ihrem  Vorgehen 
durch  Widerstand  der  Maas- 
Befestigungen  oder  durch  Zer- 
storungen  von  Eisenbahnen, 
Strassen,  Tunneln  oder  sonstigen 
Kunstbauten  Schwierigkeiten  be- 
reiten,  so  wird  Deutschland  zu 
seinem  Bedauern  gezwungen  sein, 
das  Konigreich  als  Feind  zu  be- 
trachten.     In  diesem  Falle  wiirde 


against  herself  the  fact  that  the 
measures  of  Germany's  op- 
ponents force  Germany,  for  her 
own  protection,  to  enter  Belgian 
territory. 


In  order  to  exclude  any  possi- 
bility of  misunderstanding,  the 
German  Government  make  the 
following  declaration :  — 

1.  Germany  has  in  view  no 
act  of  hostility  against  Belgium. 
In  the  event  of  Belgium  being 
prepared  in  the  coming  war  to 
maintain  an  attitude  of  friendly 
neutrality  towards  Germany,  the 
German  Government  bind  them- 
selves, at  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
to  guarantee  the  possessions  and 
independence  of  the  Belgian 
Kingdom  in  full. 

2.  Germany  undertakes,  under 
the  above-mentioned  condition, 
to  evacuate  Belgian  territory  on 
the  conclusion  of  peace. 

3.  If  Belgium  adopts  a  friendly 
attitude,  Germany  is  prepared, 
in  co-operation  with  the  Belgian 
authorities,  to  purchase  all  neces- 
saries for  her  troops  against  a 
cash  payment,  and  to  pay  an 
indemnity  for  any  damage  that 
may  have  been  caused  by 
German  troops. 

4.  Should  Belgium  oppose  the 
German  troops,  and  in  particular 
should  she  throw  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  their  march  by  a  re- 
sistance of  the  fortresses  on  the 
Meuse,  or  by  destroying  railways, 
roads,  tunnels,  or  other  similar 
works,  Germany  will,  to  her  re- 
gret, be  compelled  to  consider 
Belgium  as  an  enemy. 

In  this  event,  Germany  can 
undertake  no  obligations  towards 


404  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Deutschland     dem     Konigreich  Belgium,  but  the  eventual  adjust- 

gegeniiber  keine  Verpflichtungen  ment  of  the  relations  between  the 

iibernehmen     konnen,     sondern  two  States  must  be  left  to  the 

miisste  die  spatere  Regelung  des  decision  of  arms. 
Verhaltnisses  beider  Staaten  zu 
einander    der    Entscheidung  der 
Waffen  iiberlassen. 

Die      Kaiserliehe      Regierung  The     German     Government, 

giebt      sich      der      bestimmten  however,   entertain  the  distinct 

Hoffnung  hin,  dass  diese  Even-  hope  that  this  eventuality  will 

tualitat  nicht  eintreten,  und  dass  not  occur,  and  that  the  Belgian 

die  Konigliche  Belgische  Regie-  Government  will  know  how  to 

rung  die  geeigneten  Massnahmen  take  the  necessary  measures  to 

zu  treffen  wissen  wird,   um   zu  prevent  the  occurrence  of  inci- 

verhinderen,  dass  Vorkommnisse,  dents  such  as  those  mentioned, 

wie   die   vorstehend   erwahnten.  In    this    case   the    friendly  ties 

sich  ereignen.     In  diesem  Falle  which  bind  the  two  neighbouring 

wiirden    die    freundschaftlichen  States   will    grow    stronger   and 

Bande,  die  beide  Nachbarstaaten  more  enduring, 
verbinden,     eine     weitere     und 
dauernde  Festigung  erfahren. 


France : 

From  Luxemburg 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  131 

M.  Eyschen,  Minister  of  State  for  Luxemburg,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Luxemburg,  August  2,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  bring  to  your  Excellence's  notice  the  follow- 
ing facts : — 

On  Sunday,  the  2nd  August,  very  early,  German  troops,  according 
to  the  information  which  has  up  to  now  reached  the  Grand  Ducal 
Government,  penetrated  into  Luxemburg  territory  by  the  bridges  of 
Wasserbillig  and  Remich,  and  proceeded  particularly  towards  the 
south  and  in  the  direction  of  Luxemburg,  the  capital  of  the  Grand 
Duchy.  A  certain  number  of  armoured  trains  with  troops  and  am- 
munition have  been  sent  along  the  railway  line  from  Wasserbillig  to 
Luxemburg,  where  their  arrival  is  expected.  These  occurrences 
constitute  acts  which  are  manifestly  contrary  to  the  neutrality  of  the 
Grand  Duchy  as  guaranteed  by  the  Treaty  of  London  of  1867.  The 
Luxemburg  Government  have  not  failed  to  address  an  energetic  pro- 
test against  this  aggression  to  the  representatives  of  His  Majesty 
the  German  Emperor  at  Luxemburg.  An  identical  protest  will  be 
sent  by  telegraph  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  at 
Berlin.  The  Minister  of  State, 

President  of  the  Government. 
Eyschen. 


August  2,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  134  405 

From  Luxemburg 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  132  ^ 

M.  Mollard,  French  Minister  at  Luxemburg,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani,  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Luxemburg,  August  2, 191 4. 
The  Minister  of  State  for  Luxemburg,  M.  Eyschen,  has  just  re- 
ceived, through  Herr  von  Buch,  German  Minister  at  Luxemburg,  a 
telegram  from  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire, 
saying  that  the  military  measures  taken  by  Germany  in  Luxemburg 
do  not  constitute  a  hostile  act  against  this  country,  but  are  solely 
measures  tended  to  assure  the  use  of  the  railways  which  have  been 
leased  to  the  Empire  against  the  eventual  attack  of  a  French  army. 
Luxemburg  will  receive  a  complete  indemnity  for  any  damage. 

Mollard. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  133 

Note  handed  in  by  the  German  Ambassador. 

Paris,  August  2, 1914. 

The  German  Ambassador  has  just  been  instructed,  and  hastens 
to  inform  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  the  military  measures 
taken  by  Germany  in  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  do  not  con- 
stitute an  act  of  hostility.  They  must  be  considered  as  purely  pre- 
ventive measures  taken  for  the  protection  of  the  railways,  which, 
under  the  treaties  between  Germany  and  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxem- 
burg, are  under  German  administration. 

Von  Schoen. 

From  St.  Petersburgh 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  134 

W.  Paleologue,  French  Ambassador  at  St.   Petersburgh,  to  M.  Rene: 
Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

St.  Petersburgh,  August  2,  1914- 

Yesterday  at  ten  minutes  past  seven  in  the  evening  the  German 
Ambassador  handed  to  M.  Sazonof  a  declaration  of  war  by  his  Govern- 
ment ;  he  will  leave  St.  Petersburgh  to-day. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  has  not  received  any  instruc- 
tions from  his  Government  as  to  the  declaration  of  war. 

Paleologue. 

1  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  129,  same  day. 


4:06  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  the  Representatives  of  France  Abroad 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  135 

M.Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Coum^il,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
to  the  Representatives  of  France  abroad. 

Paris,  August  2,  1914. 
The  Russian  Ambassador  informs  me  that  Germany  has  just  de- 
clared war  on  Russia,  notwithstanding  the  negotiations  which  are 
proceeding,  and  at  a  moment  when  Austria-Hungary  w^as  agreeing  to 
discuss  with  the  Powers  even  the  basis  of  her  conflict  with  Servia. 

Rene  Viviani. 

To  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin,   Vienna,  Rome,  Madrid,  Con- 
stantinople 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  136 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  the  French  Ambassadors  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh, 
Berlin,  Vienna^  RomCy  Madrid,  Constantinople. 

Paris,  August  2,  1914- 
This  morning,  French  territory  was  violated  by  German  troops  at 
Ciry  and  near  Longwy.  They  are  marching  on  the  fort  which  bears 
the  latter  name.  Elsewhere  the  Custom  House  at  Delle  ^  has  twice 
been  fired  upon.  Finally,  German  troops  have  also  violated  this 
morning  the  neutral  territory  of  Luxemburg. 

You  will  at  once  use  this  information  to  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that 
the  German  Government  is  committing  itself  to  acts  of  war  against 
France  without  provocation  ^  on  our  part,  or  any  previous  declaration 
of  war,  whilst  we  have  scrupulously  respected  the  zone  of  ten  kilo- 
metres which  we  have  maintained,  even  since  the  mobilisation, 
between  our  troops  and  the  frontier. 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  137 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  August  2,  1914. 

After  the  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  held  this  morning,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  made  the  following  declaration  ^  to  me :  — 

"I  am  authorised  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the  German  fleet 
comes  into  the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile 

1  See  below,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  139,  same  day. 

2  The  German  Chancellor  in  his  speech  in  the  Reichstag  on  August  4  laid  the  blame 
for  the  first  border  hostilities  on  the  French.  For  translation  of  this  speech  see  pp.  573- 
676.     See  also  for  the  German  charges,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  21,  August  3. 

3  For  different  wording  see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  143,  August  3,  and  notes  to 
British  Blue  Book  No.  148,  August  2. 


August  2,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  138  407 

operations  against  French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give 
all  the  protection  in  its  power. 

"This  assurance  is  of  course  subject  to  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's 
Government  receiving  the  support  of  Parliament,  and  must  not  be 
taken  as  binding  His  Majesty's  Government  to  take  any  action  until 
the  above  contingency  of  action  by  the  German  fleet  takes  place." 

Afterwards  in  speaking  to  me  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  that 
of  Luxemburg,  the  Secretary  of  State  reminded  me  that  the  Conven- 
tion of  1867,  referring  to  the  Grand  Duchy,  differed  from  the  Treaty 
referring  to  Belgium,  in  that  Great  Britain  was  bound  to  require  the 
observance  of  this  latter  convention  without  the  assistance  of  the  other 
guaranteeing  Powers,  while  with  regard  to  Luxemburg  all  the  guaran- 
teeing Powers  were  to  act  in  concert. 

The  protection  of  Belgian  neutrality  is  here  considered  so  important 
that  Great  Britain  will  regard  its  violation  by  Germany  as  a  casu^ 
belli.  It  is  a  specially  British  interest  ^  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
British  Government,  faithful  to  the  traditions  of  their  policy,  will 
insist  upon  it,  even  if  the  business  world,  in  which  German  influence 
is  making  tenacious  efforts,  exercises  pressure  to  prevent  the  Govern- 
ment committing  itself  against  Germany. 

Paul  Cambon. 

To  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  138 

M.   Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the   Council,   Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London. 

Paris,  August  2,  1914. 

I  NOTE  the  points  contained  in  your  telegrams  of  the  27th,2  30th,^ 
31st  ^  July  and  the  1st  August,^  and  in  that  which  you  have  sent  to 
me  to-day.^ 

In  communicating  to  the  Chambers  the  declaration  which  Sir 
Edward  Grey  has  made  to  you,  the  text  of  which  is  contained  in 
your  last  telegram,  I  will  add  that  in  it  we  have  obtained  from  Great 
Britain  a  first  assistance  which  is  most  valuable  to  us. 

In  addition,  I  propose  to  indicate  that  the  help  which  Great 
Britain  intends  to  give  to  France  for  the  protection  of  the  French 
coasts  or  the  French  merchant  marine,  will  be  used  in  such  a  way 
that  our  navy  will  also,  in  case  of  a  Franco-German  conflict,  be  sup- 
ported by  the  British  fleet  in  the  Atlantic  as  well  as  in  the  North 

1  This  is  a  very  important  statement,  for  if  it  is  true,  Great  Britain,  even  if  entering 
the  war  because  Belgian  neutrality  was  infringed,  did  so  for  reasons  of  national  self- 
interest,  and  not  merely  to  defend  the  rights  of  a  smaller  nation. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  63.  Other  despatches  of  the  same  day  but  without 
bearing  on  the  question  at  hand  here,  are  Nos.  68,  69,  and  71. 

3  Ih.  No.  108. 
4/6.  No.  110. 
5/6.  No.  126. 

6/6.  No.  137.  .  .     J  .     .T      .o^ 

The  coupling  of  these  despatches  shows  that  the  final  promise  contained  in  No.  137 

is  the  result  of  diplomatic  efforts  begun  by  France,  certainly  not  later  than  on  July  27. 

Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  63,  July  27. 


408  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Sea  and  Channel.     In  addition  I  would  note  that  British  ports  could 
not  serve  as  places  for  revictualling  for  the  German  fleet. 

Rene  Viviani. 
To  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  139 

M.  Rene   Viviani,  President  of  the   Council,   Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Paris,  August  2,  1914. 

German  troops  having  to-day  violated  the  eastern  frontier  at 
several  points  I  request  you  immediately  to  protest  in  writing  to 
the  German  Government.  You  will  be  good  enough  to  take  as  your 
text  the  following  note  which,  in  the  uncertainty  of  communications 
between  Paris  and  Berlin,  I  have  addressed  directly  to  the  German 
Ambassador :  — 

"  The  French  administrative  and  military  authorities  in  the  eastern 
district  have  just  reported  several  acts  which  I  have  instructed  the 
Ambassador  of  the  Republic  at  Berlin  to  bring  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
Imperial  Government. 

"  The  first  has  taken  place  at  Delle  in  the  district  of  Belfort ;  on 
two  occasions  the  French  Customs  station  in  this  locality  has  been 
fired  upon  by  a  detachment  of  German  soldiers.  North  of  Delle  ^ 
two  German  patrols  of  the  5th  mounted  Jaegers  crossed  the  frontier 
this  morning  and  advanced  to  the  villages  of  Joncherey  and  Baron, 
more  than  ten  kilometres  from  the  frontier.  The  officer  who  com- 
manded the  first  has  blown  out  the  brains  of  a  French  soldier.  The 
German  cavalry  carried  off  some  horses  which  the  French  mayor  of 
Suarce  was  collecting  and  forced  the  inhabitants  of  the  commune  to 
lead  the  said  horses. 

"The  Ambassador  of  the  Republic  at  Berlin  has  been  instructed 
to  make  a  formal  protest  to  the  Imperial  Government  against  acts 
which  form  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  frontier  by  German  troops  in 
arms,  and  which  are  not  justified  by  anything  in  the  present  situation. 
The  Government  of  the  Republic  can  only  leave  to  the  Imperial 
Government  the  entire  responsibility  for  these  acts." 

Rene  Viviani. 
Great  Britain: 

From  Luxemburg 

British  Blue  Book  No.  129  ^ . 

Minister   of   State,    Luxemburg,    to    Sir   Edward    Grey.  —  (Received 
August  2.) 

(Translation.) 

Luxembourg,  2  aout,  1914-  Luxemburg,  August  2,  1914. 

(Telegraphique.)^  (Telegraphic.) 

MiNiSTRE  d'Etat  du  Luxem-  The  Luxemburg   Minister   of 

bourg  Eyschen  vient  de  recevoir  State,  Eyschen,  has  just  received 

1  Cf.  above,  No.  136,  same  day. 

2  Cf.  French  Yellow  Book  No.  132,  same  day. 


August  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  138  409 

par   rintermediaire  du  Ministre  through  the  German  Minister  in 

d'Allemagne  a  Luxembourg,  M.  Luxemburg,  M.  de  Buch,  a  tele- 

deBuch,untelegrammeduChan-  gram  from  the  Chancellor  of  the 

eelier  de  TEmpire  allemand  Beth-  German      Empire,      Bethmann- 

mann-Hollweg    disant    que    les  Hollweg,  to  the  effect  that  the 

mesures  militaires  a  Luxembourg  military      measures      taken     in 

ne  constituent  pas  un  acte  hostile  Luxemburg  do  not  constitute  a 

contre  le  Luxembourg,  mais  sont  hostile   act   against  Luxemburg, 

uniquement  des  mesures  destinees  but  are  only  intended  to  insure 

a  assurer  contre  attaque   even-  against   a   possible   attack   of  a 

tuelle    d'une     armee    fran9aise.  French    army.     Full    compensa- 

L'exploitation   des   voies  ferrees  tion  will  be  paid  to  Luxemburg 

affermees  a  I'Empire  Luxembourg  for  any  damage  caused  by  using 

recevra  complete  indemnite  pour  the  railways  which  are  leased  to 

dommages  eventuels.  the  Empire. 

[For  British  Blue  Book  Nos.  130  to  137  see  under  August  1.] 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  138 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  August  2.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  1,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  to-day.^ 

I  have  communicated  the  substance  of  the  above  telegram  to  the 
Secretary  of  State,  and  spent  a  long  time  arguing  with  him  that  the 
chief  dispute  was  between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  that  Germany 
was  only  drawn  in  as  Austria's  ally.  If  therefore  Austria  and  Russia 
were,  as  was  evident,  ready  to  discuss  matters  and  Germany  did  not 
desire  war  on  her  own  account,  it  seemed  to  me  only  logical  that 
Germany  should  hold  her  hand  and  continue  to  work  for  a  peaceful 
settlement.  Secretary  of  State  said  that  Austria's  readiness  to  dis- 
cuss was  the  result  of  German  influence  at  Vienna,  and,  had  not 
Russia  mobilised  against  Germany,  all  would  have  been  well.  But 
Russia  by  abstaining  from  answering  Germany's  demand  that  she 
should  demobilise,  had  caused  Germany  to  mobilise  also.  Russia 
had  said  that  her  mobilisation  did  not  necessarily  imply  war,  and 
that  she  could  perfectly  well  remain  mobilised  for  months  without 
making  war.  This  was  not  the  case  with  Germany.  She  had  the 
speed  and  Russia  had  the  numbers,  and  the  safety  of  the  German 
Empire  forbade  that  Germany  should  allow  Russia  time  to  bring 
up  masses  of  troops  from  all  parts  of  her  wide  dominions.  The  situa- 
tion now  was  that,  though  the  Imperial  Government  had  allowed  her 
several  hours  beyond  the  specified  time,  Russia  had  sent  no  answer. 
Germany  had  therefore  ordered  mobilisation,  and  the  German  repre- 
sentative at  St.  Petersburgh  had  been  instructed  within  a  certain 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  131,  August  1. 


410  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

time  to  inform  the  Russian  Government  that  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment must  regard  their  refusal  to  an  answer  as  creating  a  state  of 
war.^ 

From  St.  Peter sburgh 

British  Blue  Book  No.  139 

Sir  G.  Bicchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
^    Grey.  —  {Received  August  2.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  August  1,  191^. 

My  telegram  of  31st  July.^ 

The  Emperor  of  Russia  read  his  telegram  to  the  German  Emperor 
to  the  German  Ambassador  at  the  audience  given  to  his  Excellency 
yesterday.^     No  progress  whatever  was  made. 

In  the  evening  ^  M.  Sazonof  ^  had  an  interview  with  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  who,  not  being  definitely  instructed  by  his  Government, 
did  his  best  to  deflect  the  conversation  towards  a  general  discussion 
of  the  relations  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  instead  of 
keeping  to  the  question  of  Servia.  In  reply  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  expressed  his  desire  that  these  relations  should  remain  friendly, 
and  said  that,  taken  in  general,  they  were  perfectly  satisfactory ;  but 
the  real  question  which  they  had  to  solve  at  this  moment  was  whether 
Austria  was  to  crush  Servia  and  to  reduce  her  to  the  status  of  a  vassal,^ 
or  whether  she  was  to  leave  Servia  a  free  and  independent  State.  In 
these  circumstances,  while  the  Servian  question  was  unsolved,  the 
abstract  discussion  of  the  relations  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia  was  a  waste  of  time.  The  only  place  where  a  successful  dis- 
cussion of  this  question  could  be  expected  was  London,  and  any 
such  discussion  was  being  made  impossible  by  the  action  of  Austria- 
Hungary  in  subjecting  Belgrade,  a  virtually  unfortified  town,  to 
bombardment. 

M.  Sazonof  ^  informed  the  French  Ambassador  and  myself  this 
morning  of  his  conversation  ^  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador.  He 
went  on  to  say  that  during  the  Balkan  crisis  he  had  made  it  clear  to 
the  Austrian  Government  that  war  w^ith  Russia  must  inevitably 
follow  an  Austrian  attack  on  Servia.  It  was  clear  that  Austrian 
domination  of  Servia  was  as  intolerable  for  Russia  as  the  dependence 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  76,  August  1. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  120,  under  date  of  August  1. 

3  i.e.  yesterday  of  July  31  or  July  30.  See  French  Yellow  Book  102,  July  30. 
There  is  no  apparent  reason  why  an  event  reported  in  Paris  of  July  30  and  so  printed 
in  the  French  Yellow  Book  should  appear  in  the  British  Blue  Book  under  date  of  August  2. 

*  The  date  of  this  interview  is  doubtful.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  re- 
ceived his  instructions  by  telegram  sent  from  Vienna  July  30,  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book  No.  50,  and  acknowledged  by  him,i6.  No.  55,  July  31.  In  this  latter  despatch 
he  refers  to  an  " uninstructed "  interview  on  July  29.  "In  the  evening"  cannot  refer 
to  July  31.  It  may  refer  to  July  30,  but  since  no  such  interview  is  mentioned  by  the 
Ambassador  in  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  55,  it  possibly  refers  to  July  29. 

^  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

*  This  occurred  in  interview  between  Sazonof  and  th&  German  Ambassador  on 
July  29.     See  British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  July  30. 

^  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

*  From  the  preceding  notes  it  is  clear  that  the  date  of  this  conversation  cannot  be 
fixed. 


August  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  HI  411 

of  the  Netherlands  on  Germany  would  be  to  Great  Britain.  It  was, 
in  fact,  for  Russia  a  question  of  life  and  death.  The  policy  of  Austria 
had  throughout  been  both  tortuous  and  immoral,  and  she  thought 
that  she  could  treat  Russia  with  defiance,  secure  in  the  support  of 
her  German  ally.  Similarly  the  policy  of  Germany  had  been  an 
equivocal  and  double-faced  policy,  and  it  mattered  little  whether  the 
German  Government  knew  or  did  not  know  the  terms  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum ;  what  mattered  was  that  her  intervention  with  the  Aus- 
trian Government  had  been  postponed  until  the  moment  had  passed 
when  its  influence  would  have  been  felt.  Germany  was  unfortunate 
in  her  representatives  in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh:  the  former 
was  a  violent  Russophobe  who  had  urged  Austria  on,  the  latter  had 
reported  to  his  Government  that  Russia  would  never  go  to  war.^ 
M.  Sazonof  was  completely  weary  of  the  ceaseless  endeavours  he  had 
made  to  avoid  a  war.  No  suggestion  held  out  to  him  had  been  re- 
fused. He  had  accepted  the  proposal  for  a  conference  of  four,  for 
mediation  by  Great  Britain  and  Italy,  for  direct  conversation  between 
Austria  and  Russia ;  but  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  had  either 
rendered  these  attempts  for  peace  ineffective  by  evasive  replies  or 
had  refused  them  altogether.  The  action  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  and  the  German  preparations  had  forced  the  Russian 
Government  to  order  mobilisation,  and  the  mobilisation  of  Germany 
had  created  a  desperate  situation.^ 

M.  Sazonof  added  that  the  formula,  of  which  the  text  is  contained 
in  my  telegram  of  31st  July,^  had  been  forwarded  by  the  Russian 
Government  to  Vienna,  and  he  would  adhere  to  it  if  you  could  obtain 
its  acceptance  before  the  frontier  was  crossed  by  German  troops. 
In  no  case  would  Russia  begin  hostilities  first. 

I  now  see  no  possibility  of  a  general  war  being  avoided  unless  the 
agreement  of  France  and  Germany  can  be  obtained  to  keep  their 
armies  mobilised  on  their  own  sides  of  the  frontier,  as  Russia  has 
expressed  her  readiness  to  do,^  pending  a  last  attempt  to  reach  a 
settlement  of  the  present  crisis. 

[For  British  Blue  Book  No.  140  see  under  August  1.] 

From  Vienna 

British  Blue  Book  No.  141 

Sir  M,  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward 

Grey.  —  {Received  August  2.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  1,  1914. 

I  AM  to  be  received  to-morrow  by  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
This  afternoon  he  is  to  see  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors. 
I  have  just  be^n  informed  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  of  German 

1  For  a  similar  statement  see  British  Blue  Book  No.  71,  July  29.  ^ .,.       ^ 

2  This  almost  sounds  as  if  Russia  claimed  that  she  had  a  right  to  mobilise,  but  that 
her  neighbor  had  not. 

3  British  Blue  Book  No.  120,  under  date  of  August  1.  ,        ,  .,      , 

*  For  Germany's  reason  for  her  belief  that  Russia  could  wait,  while  she  could  not, 
see  previous  despatch. 


412  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

ultimatum  ^  requiring  that  Russia  should  demobilise  within  twelve 
hours.  On  being  asked  by  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
whether  the  inevitable  refusal  of  Russia  to  yield  to  this  curt  sum- 
mons meant  war,  the  German  Ambassador  replied  that  Germany 
would  be  forced  to  mobilise  if  Russia  refused.  Russian  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  thinks  that  war  is  almost  inevitable,  and  that  as  mobilisa- 
tion is  too  expensive  to  be  kept  for  long,  Germany  will  attack  Russia 
at  once.  He  says  that  the  so-called  mobilisation  of  Russia  amounted 
to  nothing  more  than  that  Russia  had  taken  military  measures  cor- 
responding to  those  taken  by  Germany.^  There  seems  to  be  even 
greater  tension  between  Germany  and  Russia  than  there  is  between 
Austria  and  Russia.  Russia  would,  according  to  the  Russian  Am- 
bassador, be  satisfied  even  now  w^ith  assurance  respecting  Servian 
integrity  and  independence.^  He  says  that  Russia  had  no  intention 
to  attack  Austria.  He  is  going  again  to-day  to  point  out  to  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  most  terrific  consequences  must 
ensue  from  refusal  to  make  this  slight  concession.  This  time  Russia 
would  fight  to  the  last  extremity.  I  agree  with  his  Excellency  that 
the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  desired  war  from  the  first,  and 
that  his  strong  personal  bias  probably  coloured  his  action  here.^ 
The  Russian  Ambassador  is  convinced  that  the  German  Government 
also  desired  war  from  the  first. ^ 

It  is  the  intention  of  the  French  Ambassador  to  speak  earnestly 
to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  on  the  extreme  danger  of 
the  situation,  and  to  ask  whether  proposals  to  serve  as  a  basis  of 
mediation  from  any  quarter  are  being  considered.^  There  is  great 
anxiety  to  know  what  England  will  do.  I  fear  that  nothing  can  alter 
the  determination  of  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  proceed  on 
their  present  course,  if  they  have  made  up  their  mind  with  the 
approval  of  Germany. 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  142 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  August  2.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  1,  1914- 

Orders  have  just  "^  been  issued  for  the  general  mobilisation  of  the 
navy  and  army,  the  first  day  of  mobilisation  to  be  2nd  August. 

1  This  ultimatum  was  presented  on  July  31.  German  White  Book,  Exhibit  25. 
It  seems  incredible  that  the  Russian  Ambassador  refrained  from  telling  this  to  Sir 
M.  de  Bunsen  until  the  next  day. 

2  The  despatches  of  the  previous  days  disprove  this.  Germany  sent  her  ultimatum 
after  Russia  had  mobilised,  and  did  not  herself  order  general  mobilisation  until  August 
1  to  take  effect  on  August  2.  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  138  under  date  of  August  2, 
and  next  number. 

3  They  were  guaranteed  by  Germany  on  July  29.  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  97, 
July  30. 

*  Cf .  previous  despatch  where  he  is  called  a  Russophobe. 

^  This  is  contradicted  by  the  statement  discussed  in  note  1  (page  411)  to  the  previous 
despatch.  No.  140. 

« This  statement  is  unsupported  by  any  evidence  contained  in  the  French  Yellow 
Book. 

'  This  despatch  disposes  of  the  statements  found  in  previous  despatches  to  the 
effect  that  Germany  had  mobilised  earlier. 


Augmt  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  IJfi  413 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  143 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  August  2.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  1,  191Jf. 

Detention  of  British  merchant  ships  at  Hamburg. 

Your  telegram  of  1st  August  ^  acted  on. 

Secretary  of  State,  who  expressed  the  greatest  surprise  and  annoy- 
ance, has  promised  to  send  orders  at  once  to  allow  steamers  to  pro- 
ceed without  delay. 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  144 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  August  2.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  2,  IVI4. 

Secretary  of  State  has  just  informed  me  that,  owing  ^  to  certain 
Russian  troops  having  crossed  frontier,  Germany  and  Russia  are 
now  in  a  state  of  war. 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  145 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  August  2.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  2,  191 4. 

My  telegram  of  1st  August.^ 

Secretary  of  State  informs  me  that  orders  were  sent  last  night  to 
allow  British  ships  in  Hamburg  to  proceed  on  their  way.  He  says 
that  this  must  be  regarded  as  a  special  favour  to  His  Majesty's 
Government,  as  no  other  foreign  ships  have  been  allowed  to  leave. 
Reason  of  detention  was  that  mines  were  being  laid  and  other  pre- 
cautions being  taken. 

From  Brussels 

British  Blue  Book  No.  146 

Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 

(Received  August  2). 
(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  2,  1914. 

The  news  that  a  German  force  has  entered  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxemburg  has  been  officially  confirmed  to  the  Belgian  Government.^ 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  130,  August  1.  ^,   t^       .       ^            -,,     , 

2  The  declaration  of  war  does  not  contain  this  reason.  Cf .  Russian  Orange  Book 
No.  76,  August  1. 

3  c^ee  No.  143. 

*  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  18,  August  2,  and  British  Blue  Book  next  despatch. 


414  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  Luxemburg 

British  Blue  Book  No.  147 

Minister   of   State,    Luxemburg,    to    Sir   Edward    Grey.  —  {Received 
August  2.) 

(Translation.) 


(Telegraphique.) 

Luxembourg,  le  2  aout,  19H. 

J'ai  rhonneur  de  porter  a  la 
connaissance  de  votre  Excellence 
les  faits  suivants : 

Dimanche,  2  aout,  de  grand 
matin,  les  troupes  allemandes, 
d'apres  les  informations  qui  sont 
parvenues  au  Gouvernement 
Grand  ducal  a  Theure  actuelle, 
ont  penetre  sur  le  territoire 
luxembourgeois  par  les  ponts  de 
Wasserbillig  et  de  Remich,  se 
dirigeant  specialement  vers  le 
sud  du  pays  et  vers  la  ville  de 
Luxembourg,  capitale  du  Grand 
Duche.  Un  certain  nombre  de 
trains  blindes  avec  des  troupes 
et  des  munitions  ont  ete  ache- 
mines  par  la  voie  de  chemin  de 
f  er  de  Wasserbillig  a  Luxembourg, 
ou  Ton  s'attend  de  les  voir  arriver. 
D'un  instant  a  Tautre,  ces  faits 
impliquent  des  actes  manifeste- 
ment  contraire  a  la  neutralite  du 
Grand  Duche  garantie  par  le 
Traite  de  Londres  de  1867.  Le 
Gouvernement  luxembourgeois 
n*a  pas  manque  de  protester 
energiquement  contre  cette  agres- 
sion aupres  des  representants  de 
Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur  d'Alle- 
magne  a  Luxembourg.  Une 
protestation  identique  va  etre 
transmise  telegraphiquement  au 
Secretaire  d'Etat  pour  les  Affaires 
Etrangeres  a  Berlin. 


(Telegraphic.) 

Luxemburg,  August  2,  1914- 
I   HAVE  the  honour  to  bring 
to  your  Excellency's  notice  the 
following  facts :  — 

On  Sunday,  the  2nd  August, 
very  early,  the  German  troops, 
according  to  the  information 
which  has  up  to  now  reached 
the  Grand  Ducal  Government, 
penetrated  into  Luxemburg  terri- 
tory by  the  bridges  of  Wasser- 
billig and  Remich,  and  proceeded 
particularly  towards  the  south 
and  in  the  direction  of  Luxem- 
burg, the  capital  of  the  Grand 
Duchy.  A  certain  number  of 
armoured  trains  with  troops  and 
ammunition  have  been  sent  along 
the  railway  line  from  Wasserbillig 
to  Luxemburg,  where  their  arrival 
is  expected.  These  occurrences 
constitute  acts  which  are  mani- 
festly contrary  to  the  neutrality 
of  the  Grand  Duchy  as  guaran- 
teed by  the  Treaty  of  London  of 
1867.  The  Luxemburg  Govern- 
ment have  not  failed  to  address 
an  energetic  protest  against  this 
aggression  to  the  representatives 
of  His  Majesty  the  German  Em- 
peror at  Luxemburg.  An  iden- 
tical protest  will  be  sent  by  tele- 
graph to  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs  at  Berlin. 


August  2,  British  Blue  Book  No.  I48  415 

To  Paris 

Bkitish  Blue  Book  No.  148 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  2,  1914. 

After  the  Cabinet  this  morning  ^  I  gave  M.  Cambon  the  follow- 
ing memorandum :  — 

"I  am  authorised  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the  German  fleet 
comes  into  the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile 
operations  against  French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will 
give  all  the  protection  in  its  power. 

"This  assurance  is  of  course  subject  to  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's 
Government  receiving  the  support  of  Parliament,  and  must  not  be 
taken  as  binding^  His  Majesty's  Government  to  take  any  action 
until  the  above  contingency  of  action  by  the  German  fleet  takes 
place."  ^ 

I  pointed  out  that  we  had  very  large  questions  and  most  difiicult 
issues  to  consider,  and  that  Government  felt  that  they  could  not  bind 
themselves  to  declare  war  upon  Germany  necessarily  if  war  broke 
out  between  France  and  Germany  to-morrow,  but  it  was  essential 
to  the  French  Government,  whose  fleet  had  long  been  concentrated 
in  the  Mediterranean,  to  know  how  to  make  their  dispositions  with 
their  north  coast  entirely  undefended.  We  therefore  thought  it 
necessary  to  give  them  this  assurance^  It  did  not  bind  us  to  go  to 
war  with  Germany  unless  the  German  fleet  took  the  action  indicated, 
but  it  did  give  a  security  to  France  that  would  enable  her  to  settle 
the  disposition  of  her  own  Mediterranean  fleet. 

M.  Cambon  asked  me  about  the  violation  of  Luxemburg.  I  told 
him  the  doctrine  on  that  point  laid  down  by  Lord  Derby  and  Lord 
Clarendon  in  1867.  He  asked  me  what  we  should  say  about  the 
violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  I  said  that  was  a  much  more 
important  matter;  we  were  considering  what  statement  we  should 
make  in  Parliament  to-morrow  —  in  effect,  whether  we  should  declare 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  to  be  a  casv^  belli.  I  told  him  what 
had  been  said  to  the  German  Ambassador  on  this  point .^ 

1  At  two  previous  meetings  the  Cabinet  had  refused  to  make  any  promises  to 
France;  see  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  110,  July  31,  and  126,  August  1,  and  note  4. 

This  promise  was  given  before  Germany's  ultimatum  to  Belgium,  see  Belgian  Gray 
Book  No.  201,  August  2. 

2  This  is  the  very  opposite  of  French  Yellow  Book  No.  143,  August  3 :  "is  to  be 
regarded  as  binding  the  British  Government.    Sir  E.  Grey  assured  me  of  this." 

3  This  iformula  is  different  from  the  one  given  in  French  Yellow  Book  No.  143, 
August  3,  and  quoted  by  Viviani  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  159,  August  4.  In  both  the  last  sentence  reads  "from  that  moment  on  England 
and  Germany  would  be  in  a  state  of  war."  There  are  then  two  distinct  formulas. 
The  one  appears  in  British  Blue  Book  No.  148,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  137,  Aug.  2, 
and  in  the  Speech  in  Parliament  by  Sir  E.  Grey  printed  as  an  appendix  to  the  British 
Blue  Book.  The  other  occurs  in  French  Yellow  Book  No.  143,  August  3,  and  No.  159, 
August  4. 

*  British  Blue  Book  No.  123,  August  1. 


416  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  149 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Gosclien,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  2,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  1st  August.^ 

I  regret  to  learn  that  100  tons  of  sugar  was  compulsorily  unloaded 
from  the  British  steamship  Sappho  at  Hamburg  and  detained. 
Similar  action  appears  to  have  been  taken  with  regard  to  other 
British  vessels  loaded  with  sugar. 

You  should  inform  Secretary  of  State  that,  for  reasons  stated  in 
my  telegram  of  1st  August,^  I  most  earnestly  trust  that  the  orders 
already  sent  to  Hamburg  to  allow  the  clearance  of  British  ships 
covers  also  the  release  of  their  cargoes,  the  detention  of  which  can- 
not be  justified. 

Russia : 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  77 

Announcement  by  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  respecting 
Recent  Events. 

July  20  {August  2),  1914. 

A  GARBLED  version  of  the  events  of  the  last  few  days  having  ap- 
peared in  the  foreign  press,  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
considers  it  his  duty  to  publish  the  following  brief  account  of  the 
diplomatic  discussions  during  the  period  under  review :  — 

On  the  10th  (23rd)  July,  1914,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at 
Belgrade  presented  a  note  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  Servia,  in  which 
the  Servian  Government  were  accused  of  having  fostered  the  pan- 
Serb  movement,  which  had  led  to  the  assassination  of  the  heir  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  throne.  Austria-Hungary,  therefore,  demanded 
of  the  Servian  Government,  not  only  the  condemnation  in  the  most 
formal  manner  of  the  above-mentioned  propaganda,  but  also  the 
adoption,  under  Austrian  supervision,  of  a  series  of  measures  for  the 
discovery  of  the  plot,  for  the  punishment  of  any  Servian  subjects 
who  had  taken  part  in  it,  and  for  the  prevention  of  any  future 
attempts  at  assassination  upon  Austrian  soil.  A  time  limit  of  forty- 
eight  hours  was  given  to  the  Servian  Government  within  which  to 
reply  to  this  note. 

The  Russian  Government,  to  whom  the  Austro-Hungarian  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburgh  had  communicated  the  text  of  the  note 
seventeen  hours  after  its  presentation  at  Belgrade,  having  taken 
note  of  the  demands  contained  therein,  could  not  but  perceive  that 
some  of  these  demands  were  impossible  of  execution  as  regards  their 
substance,  whilst  others  were  presented  in  a  form  which  was  incom- 
patible with  the  dignity  of  an  independent  State.  Russia  considered 
that  the  humiliation  of  Servia,  involved  in  these  demands,  and 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  143,  under  date  of  August  2. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  130,  August  1. 


August  2,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  77  417 

equally  the  evident  intention  of  Austria-Hungary  to  secure  her  own 
hegemony  in  the  Balkans,  which  underlay  her  conditions/  were  in- 
admissible. The  Russian  Government,  therefore,  pointed  out  to 
Austria-Hungary  in  the  most  friendly  manner  that  it  would  be 
desirable  to  re-examine  the  points  contained  in  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  note.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  did  not  see  their 
way  to  agree  to  a  discussion  of  the  note.  The  moderating  influence 
of  the  four  Powers  at  Vienna  was  equally  unsuccessful. 

Despite  the  fact  that  Servia  had  reprobated  the  crime,^  and  had 
shown  herself  ready  to  give  Austria  satisfaction  to  an  extent  beyond 
the  expectations,^  not  only  of  Russia,  but  also  of  the  other  Powers  — 
despite  these  facts,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade  con- 
sidered the  Servian  reply  insufficient  and  left  the  town. 

Recognising  the  exaggerated  nature  of  the  demands  made  by 
Austria,  Russia  had  previously  ^  declared  that  she  could  not  remain 
indifferent,  while  not  desisting  from  doing  her  utmost  to  find  a  peace- 
ful issue  which  might  prove  acceptable  ^  to  Austria,  and  spare  the 
latter's  self-respect  as  a  Great  Power.  At  the  same  time  Russia  let 
it  be  clearly  understood  that  she  could  accept  a  peaceful  settlement 
of  the  question  only  so  far  as  it  involved  no  humiliation  of  Servia  as 
an  independent  State.  Unhappily  all  the  efforts  of  the  Russian 
Government  to  this  end  were  fruitless.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment, which  had  shunned  any  attempt  at  conciliatory  interven- 
tion by  the  Powers  in  the  Austrian  dispute  with  Servia,  proceeded 
to  mobilise  and  declared  war  officially  against  Servia,  and  the  follow- 
ing day  Belgrade  was  bombarded.  The  manifesto  which  accom- 
panied the  declaration  of  war  openly  accuses  Servia  of  having  pre- 
pared and  carried  out  the  crime  of  Serajevo.  Such  an  accusation  of 
a  crime  at  common  law,  launched  against  a  whole  people  and  a  whole 
State,  aroused,  by  its  evident  inanity,^  widespread  sympathy  for 
Servia  throughout  all  classes  of  European  society. 

In  consequence  of  this  behaviour  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment in  spite  of  Russia's  declaration  that  she  could  not  remain 
indifferent  to  the  fate  of  Servia,  the  Russian  Government  considered 
it  necessary  to  order  mobilisation  in  the  military  districts  of  Kieff, 
Odessa,  Moscow,  and  Kazan.  This  decision  was  rendered  necessary 
by  the  fact  that  since  the  date  when  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  was 
communicated  to  the  Servian  Government,  and  since  the  first  steps 
taken  by  Russia,  five  days  had  elapsed,  and  yet  the  Vienna  Cabinet 
had  not  taken  one  step  to  meet  Russia  halfway  in  her  efforts  towards 
peace.  Indeed,  quite  the  contrary;  for  the  mobilisation  of  half  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  army  had  been  ordered. 

The  German  Government  were  kept  informed  of  the  steps  taken 

1  This  implies  to  Austria-Hungary  a  motive  which  may  or  may  not  have  been  hers. 

2  No  evidence  for. this  has  been  given. 

3  This  is  denied  by  Austria-Hungary.  See  the  despatches  of  July  26,  especially 
Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  34,  July  27. 

s  Cf.  British  Blue  Book  No.  120,  under  date  of  August  1,  note  4. 
6  The  "dossier,"  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  19,  July  25,  takes  a  different 
view. 


418  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

by  Russia.  At  the  same  time  it  was  explained  to  them  that  these 
steps  were  only  the  result  of  the  Austrian  preparations,  and  that 
they  were  not  in  any  way  aimed  at  Germany.  Simultaneously,  the 
Russian  Government  declared  that  Russia  was  ready  to  continue 
discussions  with  a  view  to  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  dispute,  either 
in  the  form  of  direct  negotiations  with  Vienna  or,  as  suggested  by 
Great  Britain,  in  the  form  of  a  conference  of  the  four  Great  Powers 
not  directly  interested,  that  is  to  say.  Great  Britain,  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Italy. 

This  attempt  on  the  part  of  Russia  was,  however,  equally  unsuc- 
cessful. Austria-Hungary  declined  ^  a  further  exchange  of  views 
with  Russia,  and  the  Vienna  Cabinet  was  unwilling  to  join  the  pro- 
posed conference  of  the  Powers. 

Nevertheless  Russia  did  not  abandon  her  efforts  for  peace.  When 
questioned  by  the  German  Ambassador  as  to  the  conditions  on  which 
we  would  still  agree  to  suspend  our  preparations,  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  declared  ^  that  these  conditions  were  Austria^s  recog- 
nition that  the  Austro-Serbian  question  had  assumed  a  European 
character,  and  a  declaration  by  her  that  she  agreed  not  to  insist 
upon  such  of  her  demands  as  were  incompatible  with  the  sovereign 
rights  of  Servia. 

Germany  considered  ^  this  Russian  proposal  unacceptable  to 
Austria-Hungary.  At  that  very  moment  news  of  the  proclamation 
of  general  mobilisation  ^  by  Austria-Hungary  reached  St.  Petersburg. 

All  this  time  hostilities  were  continuing  on  Servian  territory,  and 
Belgrade  was  bombarded  afresh. 

The  failure  of  our  proposals  for  peace  compelled  us  to  extend  the 
scope  of  our  precautionary  military  measures.^ 

The  Berlin  Cabinet  questioned  us  on  this,  and  we  replied  that 
Russia  was  compelled  to  begin  preparations  ^  so  as  to  be  ready  for 
every  emergency. 

But  while  taking  this  precautionary  step,  Russia  did  not  on  that 
account  abandon  her  strenuous  efforts  to  find  some  solution  of  the 
situation,  and  she  announced  that  she  was  ready  to  accept  any  pro- 
posed settlement  of  the  problem  that  might  be  put  forward,  provided 
it  complied  with  the  conditions  laid  down  by  her. 

In  spite  of  this  conciliatory  communication,  the  German  Govern- 
ment on  the  18th  (31st)  July  demanded  of  the  Russian  Government 
that  they  should  suspend  their  military  measures  by  midday  on  the 
19th  July  (1st  August),  and  threatened,  should  they  fail  to  comply, 
to  proceed  to  general  mobilisation.^ 

1  This  is  denied  by  Austria-Hungary.     See  Red  Book  No.  50,  July  30. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  97,  July  30. 

'  There  is  no  evidence  of  this  anywhere.  The  formula  was  changed  at  England's 
request,  British  Blue  Book  No.  132,  August  1. 

*  Russia's  general  mobilisation  took  place  on  July  31.  That  of  Austria-Hungary 
on  August  1.     See  British  Blue  Book  No.  127,  August  1. 

^  This  is  contradicted  by  the  previous  note. 

*  "Begin  preparations"  is  hardly  the  word  for  general  mobilisation. 

'  In  this  sentence  the  Russian  general  mobilisation  of  July  31  is  called  "military 
measures"  while  the  German  order  of  August  1  as  of  August  2,  is  properly  called 
what  it  is,  general  mobilisation. 


August  2,  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  78  419 

On  the  following  day,  the  19th  July  (1st  August),  the  German 
Ambassador,  on  behalf  of  his  Government,  forwarded  a  declaration 
of  war  ^  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

To  Russian  Representatives  Abroad 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  78 

Russian   Minister  for   Foreign  Affairs   to   Russian   Representatives 
abroad. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petersburg,  July  20  {August  2),  1914. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  Germany  is  now  doing  her  utmost  to  foist 
upon  us  the  responsibility  for  the  rupture.  We  were  forced  to 
mobilise  by  the  immense  responsibility  which  would  have  fallen 
upon  our  shoulders  if  we  had  not  taken  all  possible  precautionary 
measures  at  a  time  when  Austria,  while  confining  herself  to  discus- 
sions of  a  dilatory  nature,  was  bombarding  Belgrade  and  was  under- 
taking ^  general  mobilisation. 

The  Emperor  of  Russia  had  promised  the  German  Emperor  that 
he  would  take  no  aggressive  action  ^  as  long  as  the  discussions  with 
Austria  continued.  With  such  a  guarantee,  and  after  so  many 
proofs  of  Russia's  desire  for  peace,^  Germany  neither  could,  nor  had 
the  right  to,  doubt  our  declaration  that  we  would  joyfully  accept 
any  peaceful  settlement  compatible  with  the  dignity  and  independ- 
ence of  Servia.  Any  other  solution,  besides  being  entirely  incompat- 
ible with  our  own  dignity,  would  assuredly  have  upset  the  European 
balance  of  power  by  securing  the  hegemony  of  Germany.  The 
European  —  nay,  the  world-wide  —  character  of  this  dispute  ^  is 
infinitely  more  important  than  the  pretext  from  which  it  springs. 
By  her  decision  to  declare  ivar  upon  us,  at  a  moment  when  negotia- 
tions were  in  progress  between  the  Powers,  Germany  has  assumed  a 
heavy  responsibility. 

1  Russian  Orange  Book  No.  76,  August  1. 

2  This  statement  is  more  accurate  than  that  contained  in  previous  despatch.     See 
Russian  Orange  Book  No. 77  note  10. 

3  General  mobiHsation  is  universally  looked  upon  as  an  aggressive  act  in  itself. 

*  Nobody  before  had  called  a  general  mobilisation  a  "proof  of  a  desire  for  peace." 
^  The  previous  sentence  shows  that  so  far  as  Russia  is  concerned  she  did  not  believe 
that  Prussianism  or  frightfulness  or  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  but  the  European  balance 
of  power,  would  supply  the  motive  for  England  to  enter  the  war. 


420 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Monday,  August  3,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 
Belgium 

London,  etc. 
King  George 
German  Minister 

London 

France 

London,  London,  etc. 

The  Hague,    Brussels, 

All  representatives 
Berlin,  Munich 

London 
German  Ambassador 

Germany 
Great  Britain 

Paris 

Berlin,  Brussels 

Russia 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary  is  silent  on  this  day. 

Belgium  refuses  to  accede  to  the  German  ultimatum  and  appeals  to  Great 
Britain  for  ''diplomatic  intervention."  To  the  informal  offer  of  military  assist- 
ance she  replies,  to  the  French  Minister,  that  she  is  "making  no  appeal  at  present 
to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers." 

France  offers  her  military  assistance  to  Belgium,  who  declines  it  with  thanks. 
She  denies  the  German  accusations  of  having  violated  Belgian  neutrality,  and 
having  committed  hostile  acts  against  Germany.  When  the  latter  declares  war 
on  her,  she  recalls  her  diplomatic  agents  from  Germany,  and  lodges  with  the  latter 
formal  protest  against  her  violations  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgian  neutrality. 

Germany  declares  war  on  France  at  6.45  p.m.  citing  as  reasons  several  unlawful 
and  hostile  acts  on  the  part  of  France,  whom  she  also  charges  with  having  violated 
Belgian  neutrality. 

Great  Britain  issues  only  one  important  despatch.  It  contains  the  Italian 
intention  not  to  enter  the  war  on  the  side  of  her  allies  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 
This  Italian  declaration  is  sent  by  Sir  E.  Grey  to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris 
on  the  authority  of  the  French  Ambassador  in  London. 

Russia  is  silent  on  this  day. 

Serbia  is  silent. 


Belgium : 


From  Berlin 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  21 


Meinorandum  of  an  Interview  asked  for  at  1.30  A.M.,  on  August  3,  by 
Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  German  Minister,  with  Baron  van  der 
Elst,  Secretary-General  to  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

At  1.30  A.M.  the  German  Minister  asked  to  see  Baron  van  der 
Elst.  Pie  told  him  that  he  had  been  instructed  by  his  Government 
to  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  French  dirigibles  had  thrown 
bombs,  and  that  a  French  cavalry  patrol  had  crossed  the  frontier  in 
violation  of  international  law,  seeing  that  war  had  not  been  declared.^ 

The  Secretary-General  asked  Herr  von  Below  where  these  incidents 
had  happened,  and  was  told  that  it  was  in  Germany.     Baron  van  der 

1  Similar  charges  against  Germany  were  made  by  France ;  see  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  136,  August  2. 


August  3,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  22  421 

Elst  then  observed  that  in  that  case  he  could  not  understand  the 
object  of  this  communication.  Herr  von  Below  stated  that  these 
acts,  which  were  contrary  to  international  law,  were  calculated  to 
lead  to  the  supposition  that  other  acts,  contrary  to  international  law, 
would  be  committed  by  France. 

To  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  22 

Note  communicated  by  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  German  Minister. 

Brussels,  August  3,  1914  (^  A.M.). 

The  German  Government  stated  in  their  note  of  the  2nd  August,^ 
1914,  that  according  to  reliable  information  French  forces  intended 
to  march  on  the  Meuse  via  Givet  and  Namur,  and  that  Belgium,  in 
spite  of  the  best  intentions,  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  repulse, 
without  assistance,  an  advance  of  French  troops.^ 

The  German  Government,  therefore,  considered  themselves  com- 
pelled to  anticipate  this  attack  and  to  violate  Belgian  territory.  In 
these  circumstances,  Germany  proposed  to  the  Belgian  Government 
to  adopt  a  friendly  attitude  towards  her,  and  undertook,  on  the  con- 
clusion of  peace,  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  the  Kingdom  and  its 
possessions  to  their  full  extent.  The  note  added  that  if  Belgium 
put  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  advance  of  German  troops,  Germany 
would  be  compelled  to  consider  her  as  an  enemy,  and  to  leave  the 
ultimate  adjustment  of  the  relations  between  the  two  States  to  the 
decision  of  arms. 

This  note  had  made  a  deep  and  painful  impression^  upon  the  Bel- 
gian Government. 

The  intentions  attributed  to  France  by  Germany  are  in  contra-* 
diction  to  the  formal  declarations  made  to  us  on  August  1,  in  the 
name  of  the  French  Government. 

Moreover,  if,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  Belgian  neutrality 
should  be  violated  by  France,  Belgium  intends  to  fulfil  her  inter- 
national obligations  and  the  Belgian  army  would  offer  the  most 
vigorous  resistance  to  the  invader.* 

The  treaties  of  1839,  confirmed  ^  by  the  treaties  of  1870,  vouch  for 
the  independence  and  neutrality  of  Belgium  under  the  guarantee  of 
the  Powers,  and  notably  of  the  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  King 
of  Prussia. 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20,  August  2. 

2  This  is  exactly  the  same  argument  advanced  by  Great  Britain  in  the  second  of  the 
Brussels  documents  (see  p.  580)  when  the  British  officer  claimed  that  the  British 
troops  would  enter  Belgium  even  unasked. 

3  The  ring  of  sincerity  in  this  sentence  is  lessened  after  having  studied  the  document 
mentioned  in  the  previous  note. 

*  It  would,  however,  have  been  almost  hopeless,  for  since  Great  Britain  had  the  mil- 
itary secrets  of  Belgium,  France  had  them  also,  undoubtedly.  See  documents  men- 
tioned in  preceding  notes. 

6  It  had  been  claimed  in  Parliament  in  1870  that  the  treaties  of  1870  invalidated 
those  of  1839.     See  the  editor's  Germany's  Point  of  View,  the  chapters  on  Belgium. 


422  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Belgium  has  always  been  faithful  to  her  international  obligations/ 
she  has  carried  out  her  duties  in  a  spirit  of  loyal  impartiality,  and 
she  has  left  nothing  undone  to  maintain  and  enforce  respect  for  her 
neutrality. 

The  attack  upon  her  independence  ^  with  which  the  German 
Government  threaten  her  constitutes  a  flagrant  violation  of  inter- 
national law.     No  strategic  interest  justifies  such  a  violation  of  law. 

The  Belgian  Government,  if  they  were  to  accept  the  proposals  sub- 
mitted to  them,  would  sacrifice  the  honour  of  the  nation  and  betray 
their  duty  towards  Europe. 

Conscious  of  the  part  which  Belgium  has  played  for  more  than 
eighty  years  in  the  civilisation  ^  of  the  world,  they  refuse  to  believe 
that  the  independence  of  Belgium  can  only  be  preserved  at  the  price 
of  the  violation  of  her  neutrality. 

If  this  hope  is  disappointed  the  Belgian  Government  are  firmly 
resolved  to  repel,  by  all  the  means  in  their  power,  every  attack  upon 
their  rights. 

To  St.  Petersburgh,  Berlin^  London,  Paris,  Vienna,  and  The  Hague 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  23 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  St.  Petersbiirgh,  Berlin,  London,  Paris,  Vienna,  The 
Haggle. 
(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  3,  1914. 

At  7  P.M.  last  night  Germany  presented  a  note  proposing  friendly 
neutrality.  This  entailed  free  passage  through  Belgian  territory, 
while  guaranteeing  the  maintenance  of  the  independence  of  Belgium 
and  of  her  possessions  on  the  conclusion  of  peace,  and  threatened,  in 
the  event  of  refusal,  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  enemy.  A  time  limit  of 
twelve  hours  was  allowed  within  which  to  reply. 

Our  answer  ^  has  been  that  this  infringement  of  our  neutrality 
would  be  a  flagrant  violation  of  international  law.  To  accept  the 
German  proposal  would  be  to  sacrifice  the  honour  of  the  nation. 
Conscious  of  her  duty,  Belgium  is  firmly  resolved  to  repel  any  attack 
by  all  the  means  in  her  power. 

To  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petershurgh 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  24 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Paris,  Berlin,  London,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petershurgh. 
Sir,  Brussels,  August  3,  1914  U^  noon). 

As  you  are  aware,  Germany  has  delivered  to  Belgium  an  ultima- 
tum which  expires  this  morning,  3rd  August,  at  7  a.m.      As  no  act  of 

^  Germany  claims  that  this  is  not  true  in  view  of  the  Brussels  documents. 
2  Germany  had  explicitly  disclaimed  making  any  attack  on  the  "independence"  of 
Belgium. 

2  The  writer  here  forgot  the  chapter  of  Belgian  atrocities  in  the  Congo. 
*  See  preceding  despatch. 


August  3,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No,  25  423 

war  has  occurred  up  to  the  present,  the  Cabinet  has  decided  that 
there  is,  for  the  moment,  no  need  to  appeal  to  the  guaranteeing 
Powers. 

The  French  Minister  has  made  the  following  statement  to  me 
upon  the  subject :  — 

(Translation.) 

"Sans  etre  charge  d'une  decla-  "Although  I  have  received  no 

ration  de  mon  Gouvernement,  je  instructions  ^  to  make  a  declara- 

crois  cependant,  m'inspirant  de  tion  from  my  Government,  I  feel 

ses  intentions  connues,  pouvoir  justified,  in  view  of  their  wtII- 

dire    que    si    le    Gouvernement  known  intentions,  in  saying  that 

Royal  faisait  appel  au  Gouverne-  if  the  Belgian  Government  were 

ment  fran^ais,  comme  Puissance  to  appeal  to  the  French  Govern- 

garante   de   sa   neutralite,   nous  ment    as    one    of    the    Powers 

repondrions     immediatement     a  guaranteeing  their  neutrality,  the 

son  appel;    si  cet  appel  n'etait  French    Government    would    at. 

pas  formule,   il  est  probable,   a  once  respond   to    Belgium's  ap- 

moins  bien  entendu  que  le  souci  peal ;  ^    if  such  an    appeal  were 

de  sa  propre  defense  ne  determine  not   made,   it   is  probable   that 

des  mesures  exceptionnelles,  qu'il  —  unless   of   course   exceptional 

attendra  pour  intervenir  que  la  measures  were  rendered  necessary 

Belgique    ait    fait    un    acte    de  in      self-defence  —  the     French 

resistance  effective."  Government  would  not  intervene 

until   Belgium   had   taken  some 
effective  measure  of  resistance." 

I  thanked  M.  Klobukowski  for  the  support  which  the  French 
Government  had  been  good  enough  to  offer  us  in  case  of  need,  and 
I  informed  him  that  the  Belgian  Government  were  making  no  appeal 
at  present  to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers,  and  that  they  would 
decide  later  what  ought  to  be  done.^ 

To  King  George 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  25 
His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Belgians  to  His  Majesty  King  George. 
(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  3,  1914. 

Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's  friendship 
and  that  of  your  predecessor,  and  the  friendly  attitude  of  England 

1  It  is  unusual  for  diplomatic  agents  to  speak  without  instructions  or,  as  it  is  called, 
de  suo,  and  even  more  unusual  to  include  such  informal  remarks  in  the  official  books 
of  despatches.  The  French  Minister  to  Belgium  had  once  before  spoken  de  suo. 
See  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  9,  July  31. 

When  M.  Davignon  gave  a  running  review  of  the  events  leading  up  to  August  4, 
and  quoted  this  despatch  (No.  24)  in  No.  38,  he  felt  constrained  to  explain  the  unusual 
procedure  of  the  French  Minister  by  interpolating  the  words  "in  view  of  the  rapid 
march  of  events." 

2  This  appeal  it  was  decided  not  to  make  as  late  as  10  o'clock,  August  4.  See 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  38. 

3  For  this  reply  see  also  French  Yellow  Book  No.  142,  and  British  Blue  Book  No.  151, 
both  August  3.  In  the  British  Blue  Book  the  French  offer  consists  of  "five  French 
army  corps."  Since  that  can  hardly  be  interpolated,  the  above  declaration  cannot 
be  accurate,  although  it  has  been  printed  in  quotation  marks. 


424  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

in  1870  and  the  proof  of  friendship  you  have  just  given  us  again,  I 
make  a  supreme  appeal  to  the  diplomatic  intervention^  of  your 
Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  Belgium. 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  26 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  .    London,  August  3,  1914- 

1  SHOWED  your  telegram  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who 
has  laid  it  before  the  Cabinet.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has 
informed  me  that  if  our  neutrality  is  violated  it  means  war  with 
Germany.  2 

France : 

From  The  Hague 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  140 

M.  Marcelin  Pellet,  French  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  M.  Rene  Vi- 
mani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

The  Hague,  August  3,  1914- 

The  German  Minister  called  yesterday  on  the  Minister  for  For- 
eign Affairs  to  explain  the  necessity  under  which,  as  he  said,  Ger- 
many was  placed  of  violating  the  neutral  territory  of  Luxemburg, 
adding  that  he  would  have  a  fresh  communication  to  make  to  him 
to-day.  He  has  now  this  morning  announced  the  entry  of  German 
troops  into  Belgium  in  order,  as  he  has  explained,  to  prevent  an 
occupation  of  that  country  by  France.  p 

From  Brussels 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  141 

M.  Klobukowski,  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Brussels,  August  3,  1914- 

Yesterday  evening  the  German  Minister  handed  to  the  Belgian 
Government  an  ultimatum  ^  stating  that  his  Government,  having 
learnt  that  the  French  were  preparing  for  operations  in  the  districts 

^  Cf.  No.  24,  same  day,  and  No.  38,  August  4.  The  appeal  here  made  is  only  for 
"diplomatic  intervention."  Such  diplomatic  intervention  was  of  course  out  of  the 
question,  since  the  British  Cabinet,  on  August  2,  had  authorised  Sir  Edward  Grey  to 
promise  to  France  British  assistance  in  the  war  against  Germany.  Cf .  British  Blue 
Book  No.  148,  August  2. 

2  See  note  to  preceding  despatch,  and  to  French  Yellow  Book  No.  143  and  British 
Blue  Book  No.  148,  both  of  August  2,  and  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  23,  August  3. 

«  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20,  August  2. 


August  3,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  I4S  425 

of  Givet  and  of  Namur,  were  compelled  to  take  steps,  the  first  of 
which  was  to  invite  the  Belgian  Government  to  inform  them,  within 
seven  ^  hours,  if  they  were  disposed  to  facilitate  military  operations  in 
Belgium  against  France.  In  case  of  refusal  the  fortune  of  war  would 
decide. 

The  Government  of  the  King  answered  ^  that  the  information  as 
to  the  French  movements  appeared  to  them  to  be  inaccurate  in  view 
of  the  formal  assurances  which  had  been  given  by  France,  and  were 
still  quite  recent ;  that  Belgium,  which  since  the  establishment  of 
her  Kingdom,  has  taken  every  care  to  assure  the  protection  of  her 
dignity  and  of  her  interests,  and  has  devoted  all  her  efforts  to  peaceful 
development  of  progress,  strongly  protests  against  any  violation  of 
her  territory  from  whatever  quarter  it  may  come :  and  that,  sup- 
posing the  violation  takes  place,  she  will  know  how  to  defend  with 
energy  her  neutrality,  which  has  been  guaranteed  by  the  Powers, 

and  notably  by  the  King  of  Prussia.  t^ 

*^     "^  ^  Klobukowski. 

From  Brussels 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  142 

M.  Klobukowski,  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Brussels,  August  3,  1914. 

To  the  assurance  which  I  gave  him  that  if  Belgium  appealed  to  the 
guarantee  of  the  Powers  against  the  violation  of  her  neutrality  by 
Germany,  France  would  at  once  respond  to  her  appeal,  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  answered  : 

"  It  is  with  great  sincerity  that  we  thank  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  for  the  support  which  it  would  eventually  be  able  to  offer 
us,  but  under  present  conditions  we  do  not  appeal  to  the  guarantee 
of  the  Powers.  At  a  later  date  the  Government  of  the  King  will 
weigh  the  measures  which  it  may  be  necessary  to  take."  ^ 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  143 

M.  Paul  Camhon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  August  3,  1914- 
Sir  Edward  Grey  has  authorised  me  to  inform  you  that  you 
could  state  to  Parliament  that  he  was  making  explanations  to  the 

1  This  is  an  error.  It  was  12  hours,  see  also  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  38,  August  4. 
The  ultimatum  was  presented  at  7  p.m.  on  August  2,  and  expired  at  7  a.m.  on  August  3. 
It  was  presented  several  hours  after  Great  Britain  had  promised  her  support  on  the 
sea  to  France,  which  made  her  an  ally  of  France  without  any  reference  to  Belgium.  See 
British  Blue  Book  No.  148,  August  2. 

2  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  22,  August  3. 

'  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  24,  August  3,  and  note  3.  Also  British  Blue  Book. 
No.  151,  August  3. 


426  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Commons  as  to  the  present  attitude  of  the  British  Government,  and 
that  the  chief  of  these  declarations  would  be  as  follows :  — 

"In  case  the  German  fleet  came  into  the  Channel  or  entered  the 
North  Sea  in  order  to  go  round  the  British  Isles  with  the  object  of 
attacking  the  French  coasts  or  the  French  navy  and  of  harassing 
French  merchant  shipping,  the  British  fleet  would  intervene  in  order 
to  give  to  French  shipping  its  complete  protection,  in  such  a  way 
that  from  that  moment  Great  Britain  and  Germany  would  be  in  a 
state  of  war."  ^ 

Sir  Edward  Grey  explained  to  me  that  the  mention  of  an  opera- 
tion by  way  of  the  North  Sea  implied  protection  against  a  demon- 
stration in  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 

The  declaration  concerning  the  intervention  of  the  British  fleet 
must  be  considered  as  binding  ^  the  British  Government.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  has  assured  me  of  this  and  has  added  that  the  French 
Government  were  thereby  authorised  to  inform  the  Chambers  of 
this. 

On  my  return  to  the  Embassy  I  received  your  telephonic  ^  com- 
munication relating  to  the  German  ultimatum  addressed  to  Belgium. 
I  immediately  communicated  it  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Paul  Cambon. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  144 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  August  3,  1914. 

Just  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  starting  this  morning  for  the  meet- 
ing of  the  Cabinet,  my  German  colleague,  who  had  already  seen  him 
yesterday,  came  to  press  him  to  say  that  the  neutrality  of  Great 
Britain  did  not  depend  upon  respecting  Belgian  neutrality.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  refused  all  conversation  on  this  matter.^ 

The  German:  Ambassador  has  sent  to  the  press  a  communique 
saying  that  if  Great  Britain  remained  neutral  Germany  would  give 
up  all  naval  operations  and  would  not  make  use  of  the  Belgian 
coast  as  a  point  d'appui.^  My  answer  is  that  respecting  the  coast  is 
not  respecting  the  neutrality  of  the  territory,  and  that  the  German 
ultimatum  is  already  a  violation  of  this  neutrality. 

Paul  Cambon. 

1  For  the  different  wording  of  this  formula  see  notes  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  148, 
August  2,  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  137,  August  2. 

2  See  despatches  mentioned  in  preceding  note. 

'  This  is  very  important,  because  it  suggests  that  besides  the  loritten  communications 
which  are  printed  in  the  official  Books  of  documents,  other  communications  were  ex- 
changed between  London  and  Paris,  and  undoubtedly  other  places  too. 

*  This  may  account  for  the  fact  that  this  matter  is  not  mentioned  in  the  British  Blue 
Book. 

*  Obviously  done  to  allay  any  fear  of  Germany  in  Great  Britain. 


August  3,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  14?  427 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  145 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Vivianiy 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  August  3,  1914. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  made  the  statement  regarding  the  inter- 
vention of  the  British  fleet. ^  He  has  explained,  in  considering  the 
situation,  what  he  proposed  to  do  with  regard  to  Belgian  neutrality ; 
and  the  reading  of  a  letter  from  King  Albert  asking  for  the  support 
of  Great  Britain  has  deeply  stirred  the  House. 

The  House  will  this  evening  vote  the  credit  which  is  asked  for; 
from  this  moment  its  support  is  secured  to  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  it  follows  public  opinion  which  is  declaring  itself  more 
and  more  in  our  favour.  Paul  Cambon. 

To  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  146 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London. 

Paris,  August  3,  1914. 

I  AM  told  that  the  German  Ambassador  is  said  to  ha\  :  stated  to 
the  Foreign  Office  that  yesterday  morning  eighty  French  officers  in 
Prussian  uniform  had  attempted  to  cross  the  German  frontier  in 
twelve  motor  cars  at  Walbeck,  to  the  west  of  Geldern,  and  that  this 
formed  a  very  serious  violation  of  neutrality  on  the  part  of  France. 

Be  good  enough  urgently  to  contradict  this  news,  which  is  pure 
invention,  and  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  the 
German  campaign  of  false  news  which  is  beginning. 

Rene  Viviani. 

From  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  147 

Letter  handed  by  the  German  Ambassador  to  M.  Rene  Viviani,  Presi- 
dent of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  during  his  fare- 
tvell  audience,  August  3,  1914,  at  6.45  P.M. 

M.  le  President, 

The  German  administrative  and  military  authorities  have  estab- 
lished a  certain  number  of  flagrantly  hostile  acts  committed  on  Ger- 
man territory  by  French  military  aviators.  Several  of  these  have 
openly  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  flying  over  the  terri- 

1  Which  statement  did  he  make,  the  one  of  French  Yellow  Book  No.  137,  August 
2,  or  of  ih.  No.  143,  August  3?  In  Sir  E.  Grey's  speech  given  in  British  Blue  Book  of 
Sept.  28,  the  former  is  given.  In  Viviani's  speech  of  August  4,  French  Yellow  Book 
No.  159,  the  latter  is  quoted  as  having  been  given  by  Sir  E.  Grey. 


428  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

tory  of  that  country ;  one  has  attempted  to  destroy  buildings  near 
Wesel ;  others  have  been  seen  in  the  district  of  the  Eifel,  one  has 
thrown  bombs  on  the  railway  near  Carlsruhe  and  Nuremberg.^ 

I  am  instructed,  and  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  your  Excellency, 
that  in  the  presence  of  these  acts  of  aggression  the  German  Empire 
considers  itself  in  a  state  of  war  with  France  in  consequence  of  the 
acts  of  this  latter  Power. 

At  the  same  time  I  have  the  honour  to  bring  to  the  knowledge 
of  your  Excellency  that  the  German  authorities  will  detain  French 
mercantile  vessels  in  German  ports,  but  they  will  release  them  if, 
within  forty-eight  hours,  they  are  assured  of  complete  reciprocity. 

My  diplomatic  mission  having  thus  come  to  an  end,  it  only 
remains  for  me  to  request  your  Excellency  to  be  good  enough  to 
furnish  me  with  my  passports,  and  to  take  the  steps  you  consider 
suitable  to  assure  my  return  to  Germany,  with  the  staff  of  the  Em- 
bassy, as  well  as  with  the  staff  of  the  Bavarian  Legation  and  of  the 
German  Consulate  General  in  Paris. 

Be  good  enough,  M.  le  President,  to  receive  the  assurances  of  my 
deepest  respect.  (Signed)  Schoen. 

To  the  French  Representatives  Abroad 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  148 

M.   Rene   Viviani,   President  of  the   Council,   Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  the  French  Representatives  abroad. 

Paris,  August  3,  1914- 

The  German  Ambassador  has  asked  for  his  passports  and  is  leav- 
ing this  evening  with  the  staffs  of  the  Embassy,  the  German  Consu- 
late General  and  the  Bavarian  Legation.  Baron  von  Schoen  has 
given  as  his  reason  the  establishment  by  the  German  administrative 
and  military  authorities  of  acts  of  hostility  which  are  said  to  have 
been  committed  by  French  military  aviators  accused  of  having  flown 
over  territory  of  the  Empire  and  thrown  bombs.  The  Ambassador 
adds  that  the  aviators  are  said  to  have  also  violated  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  by  flying  over  Belgian  territory.  "In  the  presence  of 
these  acts  of  aggression,"  says  the  letter  of  Baron  von  Schoen,  "the 
German  Empire  considers  itself  in  a  state  of  war  with  France  in  con- 
sequence of  the  acts  of  this  latter  Power." 

I  formally  challenged  the  inaccurate  allegations  of  the  Ambassa- 
dor, and  for  my  part  I  reminded  him  that  I  had  yesterday  addressed 
to  him  a  note  ^  protesting  against  the  flagrant  violations  of  the  French 
frontier  committed  two  days  ago  by  detachments  of  German  troops. 

Rene  Viviani. 

1  Cf .  New  York  Evening  Post,  July  22,  1916,  referring  to  "Facts  about  the  War" 
published  by  the  Paris  Chamber  of  Commerce,  in  which  Dr.  Schwalbe  is  cited  as 
writing  in  the  Deutsche  Medizinische  Wochenschrift,  on  May  18,  to  the  effect  that 
his  investigations  cleared  the  French  of  the  charge  of  having  dropped  bombs  on 
Nuremberg. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  136  and  139,  August  2,  and  note  to  No.  136. 


August  3,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  150  429 

To  Berlin 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  149  • 

M.   Rene   Viviani,  President  of  the   Council,   Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegram  communicated  to  French  Representatives  abroad.) 

Paris,  August  3,  1914. 

I  REQUEST  you  to  ask  for  your  passports  and  to  leave  Berlin  at 
once  with  the  staff  of  the  Embassy,  leaving  the  charge  of  French 
interests  and  the  care  of  the  archives  to  the  Spanish  Ambassador. 
I  request  you  at  the  same  time  to  protest  in  writing  against  the  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg  by  German  troops,  of  which 
notice  has  been  given  by  the  Prime  Minister  of  Luxemburg ;  against 
the  ultimatum  addressed  to  the  Belgian  Government  by  the  German 
Minister  at  Brussels  to  force  upon  them  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  and  to  require  of  that  country  that  she  should  facilitate 
military  operations  against  France  on  Belgian  territory;  finally 
against  the  false  allegation  of  an  alleged  projected  invasion  of  these 
two  countries  by  French  armies,  by  which  he  ^  has  attempted  to 
justify  the  state  of  war  which  he  declares  henceforth  exists  between 
Germany  and  France. 

Rene  Viviani. 


To  Munich 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  150 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  M.  Allize,  French  Minister  at  Munich. 

Paris,  August  3,  191^. 

Be  good  enough  to  inform  the  Royal  Bavarian  Government  that 
you  have  received  instructions  to  adapt  your  attitude  to  that  of  our 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  and  to  leave  Munich. 

Rene  Viviani. 

1  "  He  "  does  not  refer  to  the  last  person  mentioned,  which  was  the  "German  Minister 
at  Brussels"  (for  whose  remarks  see  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20,  August  2,  1914),  but 
to  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris,  not  mentioned  in  this  despatch,  for  it  was  he  who 
"attempted  to  justify,  etc."  (see  French  Yellow  Book  No.  147,  August  3).  This 
proves  parts  of  the  original  despatch  have  been  excised. 


430  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  Vienna,  Rome,  Madrid,  Berne,  Constan- 
tinople, The  Hague,  Copenhagen,  Christiania,  Stockholm,  Bucha- 
rest, Athens,  Belgrade. 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  151 

M.  Rene  Vimani,  President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  to  the  French  Representatives  at  London,  St.  Petersburgh, 
Vienna,  Rome,  Madrid,  Berne,  Constantinople,  The  Hague,  Co- 
penhagen, Christiania,  Stockholm,  Bucharest,  Athens,  Belgrade. 

Paris,  August  3,  1914- 

I  LEARN  from  an  official  Belgian  source  ^  that  German  troops  have 
violated  Belgian  territory  at  Gemmerich  in  the  district  of  Verviers. 

Rene  Viviani. 

Great  Britain: 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  150 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
(Received  August  3.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  3,  1914- 

Your  telegram  of  2nd  August :    Detention  of  British  ships   at 
Hamburg. 

No  information  available. 


From  Brussels 

British  Blue  Book  No.  151 

Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(Received  August  3.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  3,  1914- 

French  Government  have  offered  through  their  military  attache 
the  support  of  five  French  army  corps  to  the  Belgian  Government.^ 
Following  reply  has  been  sent  to-day :  — 

"  We  are  sincerely  grateful  to  the  French  Government  for  offering 
eventual  support.  In  the  actual  circumstances,  however,  we  do  not 
propose  to  appeal  to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers.  Belgian  Govern- 
ment will  decide  later  on  the  action  which  they  may  think  it  neces- 
sary to  take." 

^  No  such  account  is  contained  in  the  Belgian  Gray  Book,  according  to  which, 
(No.  40,  August  4,)  the  "armed  forces  of  Germany"  entered  Belgium  "this  morning." 
Cf.  also  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  30,  August  4,  which  announces  the  violation  of  Belgian 
territory  at  Gemmerich.  This  French  despatch  is,  therefore,  probably  erroneously 
dated  August  3,  because  no  "ofl&cial  Belgian  source  "  could  have  made  the  above  state- 
ment truthfully  on  August  3. 

2  Cf .  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  24  and  French  Yellow  Book  No.  142,  both  of  August  3, 
and  note  3  to  Belgian  despatch. 


August  3,  British  Blue  Book  No,  152  431 

To  Paris 
British  Blue  Book  No.  152 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris, 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  August  3,  1914, 

On  the  1st  instant  the  French  Ambassador  made  the  following 
communication :  ^  — 

"In  reply  to  the  German  Government's  intimation  of  the  fact 
that  ultimatums  had  been  presented  to  France  and  Russia,  and  to 
the  question  as  to  what  were  the  intentions  of  Italy,  the  Marquis  di 
San  Giuliano  ^  replied  :  — 

"'The  war  undertaken  by  Austria,  and  the  consequences  which 
might  result,  had,  in  the  words  of  the  German  Ambassador  himself, 
an  aggressive  object.  Both  were  therefore  in  conflict  with  the  purely 
defensive  character  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  in  such  circumstances 
Italy  would  remain  neutral.'" 

In  making  this  cominunication,  M.  Cambon  ^  was  instructed  to  lay 
stress  upon  the  Italian  declaration  that  the  present  war  was  not  a 
defensive  but  an  aggressive  war,  and  that,  for  this  reason,  the  casus 
fcederis  under  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  did  not  arise. 

I  am,  etc. 

E.  Grey. 

1  No  reason  is  apparent  why  this  Italian  declaration  should  be  sent  by  Sir  E.  Grey 
to  the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris  on  the  authority  of  the  French  Ambassador  in 
London.     There  should  have  been  an  official  Italian  declaration  available. 

2  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

3  French  Ambassador  in  London. 

y 


432  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Tuesday,  August  4,  1914. 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

London 

Belgium 

London,  Paris 

The  Hague,  Berlin, 

Madrid,  Berlin 

London 

German  Minister 

Belgian     Ministers    at 

German  Minister 

Entente  capitals 

Entente    Ministers    in 

British  Minister 

Brussels 

France 

Representatives  of  the 

Brussels 

Powers  in  Paris 

London 
Copenhagen 

Germany 

Great  Britain 

Berlin,  Brussels 

Brussels,  Berlin 

Russia 

Serbia 

Berlin 

Austria-Hungary  is  discussing  the  possibility  of  maintaining  friendly  relations 
with  Great  Britain. 

Belgium  dismisses  the  German  Minister,  and  issues  to  the  Entente  Ministers 
her  version  of  the  events  leading  up  to  the  break  with  Germany.  She  decides,  at 
first,  not  to  call  on  the  armed  intervention  or  assistance  of  the  guaranteeing  Powers 
under  the  Treaty  of  1839,  but  late  in  the  day  decides  to  do  so. 

France  issues  a  protest  on  what  she  calls  Germany's  violation  of  the  Hague 
Conventions  and  the  Treaty  of  1839,  addressing  her  protest  to  **the  Representa- 
tives of  the  Powers  at  Paris." 

Germany  notifies  Belgium  that  to  her  ''deep  regret"  she  finds  herself  "compelled 
to  take  those  measures  of  defence  already  foreshadowed  as  indispensable  in  view 
of  the  menace  of  France;"  and  orders  her  troops  to  enter  Belgian  territory. 

Great  Britain  sends  an  ultimatum  to  Germany  concerning  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium.  Since  she,  however,  announces  herself  to  be  the  ally  of  France,  who  is  at 
war  with  Germany,  even  the  acceptance  by  Germany  of  the  terms  of  the  ultima- 
tum could  not  have  kept  Great  Britain  neutral.  At  the  same  time  she  urges 
Belgium  to  resist  the  expected  invasion  with  force  of  arms,  this  being  her  reply 
to  Belgium's  appeal  for  diplomatic  intervention,  which  as  the  ally  of  France  she 
could,  of  course,  not  render. 

Russia  does  not  enter  into  the  discussion  on  this  day. 

Serbia  recalls  her  minister  and  consuls  from  Germany. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   58 

Count  Mensdorff  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  London,  August  4)  1914- 

I  HAVE  just  seen  Sir  E.  Grey.  The  British  Government  have  sent 
to  Germany  an  ultimatum  ^  on  account  of  Belgium.  They  expect  a 
reply  at  12  o'clock  to-night. 

Sir  E.  Grey  said  to  me  that  at  present  there  was  no  reason  why  he 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  159,  same  day. 


August  4,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No,  27  433 

should  make  any  communication  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment, and  there  was  no  cause  why  a  conflict  should  arise  between  us, 
so  long  as  we  were  not  in  a  condition  of  war  with  France.  In  any 
case,  he  hoped  that  we  would  not  begin  hostilities  without  the  for- 
mality ^  of  a  previous  declaration  of  war.  He  does  not  intend  to 
recall  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen. 

Should  we  be  at  war  with  France,  it  would  indeed  be  difficult  for 
Great  Britain,  as  the  ally  ^  of  France,  to  co-operate  with  her  in  the 
Atlantic,  and  not  in  the  Mediterranean. 

Belgium : 

From  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  27 

Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  German  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(The  original  is  in  French.) 

Brussels,  August  4,  1914  {6  A.M.). 

(Translation.) 

Monsieur  le  Ministre,  Sir, 

J'ai  ete  charge  et  j'ai  I'honneur  In  accordance  with  my  instruc- 

d' informer  votre  Excellence  que  tions,  I  have  the  honour  to  inform 

par  suite  du  refus  oppose  par  le  your    Excellency    that    in    con- 

Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  le  sequence   of  the   refusal   of  the 

Roi  aux  propositions  bien  inten-  Belgian  Government  to  entertain 

tionnees  que  lui  avait  soumises  the    well-intentioned     proposals 

le  Gouvernement  Imperial,  celui-  made  to  them  by  the  German 

ci  se  verra,  a  son  plus  vif  regret,  Government,  the  latter,  to  their 

force  d'executer  —  au  besoin  par  deep     regret,     find     themselves 

la  force  des  armes  —  les  mesures  compelled  to  take  —  if  necessary 

de  securite  exposees  comme  indis-  by  force  of  arms  —  those  meas- 

pensables  vis-a-vis  des  menaces  ures    of   defence    already    fore- 

fran9aises.  shadowed  ^   as   indispensable,  in 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc.  view  of  the  menace  of  France. 
(Signe)     VON  Below. 

1  The  use  of  this  word  is  strange  here  in  view  of  III  Convention  2d  Hague  Con- 
ference, Article  1  : 

.  "The  contracting  powers  recognize  that  hostilities  between  themselves  must  not 
commence  without  previous  and  explicit  warning."  This  Convention  had  been 
ratified  by  Austria-Hungary,  Belgium,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  asked  how  Belgium  could  ratify  a  Convention  con- 
cerning the  opening  of  hostilities,  if  she  was  regarded,  in  1907,  as  possessing  a  neutrality 
guaranteed  by  treaty. 

2  If  Sir  E.  Grey  is  correctly  quoted,  the  use  of  this  word  is  significant ;  and  the  ques- 
tion naturally  arises  "Since  when  was  Great  Britain  the  ally  of  France? "  Sir  E.  Grey 
had  been  authorised  by  the  British  Cabinet  in  the  morning  of  August  2  (British  Blue 
Book  No.  148)  to  promise  France  their  support.  If  Great  Britain  was  the  ally  of  France 
when  she  sent  her  ultimatum  about  Belgium  to  Germany,  the  ethics  of  such  a  course 
are  doubtful,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  France  and  Germany  were  at  war.  Cf.  also 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  158,  August  4,  where  President  Poincar6  refers  to  Great 
Britain  as  an  ally  of  France.  Cf.  also  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  38,  July  25.  The  whole 
sentence  is,  of  course,  a  future  condition,  refering  to  the  possibility  of  a  war  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  France.  No  futurity  idea,  however,  attaches  to  the  term  "  as 
the  ally  of  France." 

3  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20,  August  2. 

2f 


434  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  28 

Note   communicated   by    Sir   Francis    Villiers,    British   Minister   at 
Brussels,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Brussels,  August  4-,  1914. 

I  AM  instructed  to  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  if  Germany 
brings  pressure  to  bear  upon  Belgium  with  the  object  of  forcing  her  to 
abandon  her  attitude  of  neutrality,  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment expect  Belgium  to  resist  with  all  the  means  at  her  disposal.^ 

In  that  event,  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  are  pre- 
pared to  join  Russia  and  France,  should  Belgium  so  desire,  in  ten- 
dering at  once  joint  assistance  to  the  Belgian  Government  with  a 
view  to  resisting  any  forcible  measures  adopted  by  Germany  against 
Belgium,  and  also  offering  a  guarantee  ^  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
future  independence  and  integrity  of  Belgium. 

From  the  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  29 

Baron  Fallon,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  The  Hague,  August  4,  1914- 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  told  me  yesterday  evening 
that  the  Netherlands  Government  would  perhaps  be  obliged,  owing 
to  the  gravity  of  the  present  situation,  to  institute  war  buoying 
on  the  Scheldt. 

M.  Loudon  read  me  the  draft  of  the  note  which  would  announce 
this  decision  to  me. 

I  have  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  a  copy  of  the  note 
in  question  which  was  communicated  to  me  yesterday  evening. 

As  you  will  observe,  the  Scheldt  will  only  be  closed  at  night. 
By  day  navigation  will  be  possible,  but  only  with  Dutch  pilots  who 
have  been  furnished  with  the  necessary  nautical  instructions.  In 
this  way  both  Dutch  interests  in  the  defence  of  their  territory,  and 
Belgian  interests  in  the  navigation  of  Antwerp  will  be  safeguarded. 

You  will  note  that  the  Netherlands  Government  further  ask  that 
in  the  event  of  the  war  buoying  being  carried  out,  we  should  cause 
the  lightships  Wielingen  and  Wandelaar  to  be  withdrawn  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  maintenance  of  the  neutrality  of  Dutch  territory. 

I  would  point  out  that  the  phrase  used  in  this  note,  "sailing  up 
the  Scheldt,"  is  not  sufficiently  explicit;    sailing  down  would  be 

1  Belgium  had  asked  for  British  "diplomatic  intervention,"  Belgian  Gray  Book 
No.  25,  August  3. 

2  This  is  the  same  guarantee  as  was  offered  by  Germany,  who  guaranteed  "the 
possessions  and  the  independence  of  the  Belgian  Kingdom  in  full"  (Belgian  Gray 
Book  No.  20,  August  2).  "Neutrality"  is  omitted  both  in  the  British  and  German 
guarantees.     Of.  British  Blue  Book  No.  155,  August  4. 


August  4,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  31  435 

permitted  under  the  same  conditions.  The  Minister  has,  how- 
ever, given  me  this  assurance. 

As  soon  as  the  Netherlands  Government  have  decided  upon  this 
exceptional  measure  I  shall  be  informed  of  it. 

About  six  hours  are  necessary  to  carry  out  war  buoying. 

I  will  at  once  telegraph  to  you. 


Note  enclosed  in  No.  29 


The  Netherlands  Government  may  be  compelled,  in  order  to 
maintain  the  neutrality  of  Dutch  territory,  to  institute  war  buoying 
upon  the  Scheldt,  that  is  to  say,  to  move  or  modify  a  portion  of 
the  actual  arrangement  of  buoys  and  lights. 

At  the  same  time  this  special  arrangement  of  buoys  has  been  so 
drawn  up  that  when  it  is  brought  into  force  it  will  still  be  possible 
to  sail  up  the  Scheldt  as  far  as  Antwerp  by  day,  but  only  with  Dutch 
pilots  who  have  been  furnished  with  the  necessary  nautical  instruc- 
tions. In  thus  acting  the  Netherlands  Government  are  convinced 
that  they  will  be  able  to  serve  equally  both  the  Dutch  interests  in 
the  defence  of  Netherlands  territory  and  Belgian  interests  in  the 
navigation  of  Antwerp. 

After  the  establishment  of  war  buoying  on  the  Scheldt,  there 
would  be  no  further  reason  to  enter  the  tidal  water  of  Flushing  at 
night,  and  as  the  presence  of  the  lightships  Wielingen  and  Wandelaar 
is  not  indispensable  to  navigation  by  day,  the  Netherlands  Govern- 
ment* would  be  much  obliged  if  the  Belgian  Government  would  be  good 
enough,  in  the  event  of  the  establishment  of  war  buoying,  to  with- 
draw these  boats  in  order  to  facilitate  the  maintenance  of  the  neu- 
trality of  Dutch  territory. 

To  London  and  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  30 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Belgian  Min- 
isters at  London  and  Paris. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  ^,  1914' 

The  General  Staff  announces  that  Belgian  territory  has  been 
violated  at  Gemmenich.^ 

To  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  31 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Herr  von  Below 
Saleske,  German  Minister  at  Brussels. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  4,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  your  Excellency  that  from  to-day 
the  Belgian  Government  are  unable  to  recognise  your   diplomatic 

1  See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  151,  August  3,  and  note. 


436  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

status  and  cease  to  have  official  relations  with  you.  Your  Excel- 
lency will  find  enclosed  the  passports  necessary  for  your  departure 
with  the  staff  of  the  legation. 

From  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  32 

Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  German  Minister  at  Britssels,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  4,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  Excel- 
lency's note  of  the  4th  August,  and  to  inform  you  that  I  have  en- 
trusted the  custody  of  the  German  Legation  of  Brussels  to  the  care 
of  my  United  States  colleague. 

To  Madrid 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  33 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Grenier, 
Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  4,  1914- 

Please  ask  the  Spanish  Government  if  they  will  be  good  enough 
to  take  charge  of  Belgian  interests  in  Germany,  and  whether  in  that 
event  they  will  issue  the  necessary  instructions  to  their  Ambassador 
at  Berlin. 

To  Berlin 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  34 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Barcm  Beyens, 
Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  4,  1914- 

The  German  Minister  is  leaving  to-night ;  ^  you  should  ask  for 
your  passports.  We  are  requesting  the  Spanish  Government  to 
authorise  the  Spanish  Ambassador  to  be  good  enough  to  take  charge 
of  Belgian  interests  in  Germany. 

From  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  35 

Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Berlin,  August  4,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  a  translation  of 
part  of  the  speech  made  to-day  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Imperial 

1  At  the  request  of  Belgium ;    see  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  31,  same  date. 


August  4f  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  36  437 

Chancellor  on  the  subject  of  the  infamous  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality :  — 

"We  are  in  a  state  of  legitimate  defence,  and  necessity  knows  no  law. 

"  Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg  and  have  perhaps  already 
entered  Belgium.  This  is  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  international 
law.  France  has,  it  is  true,  declared  at  Brussels  that  she  was  pre- 
pared to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  it  was  respected 
by  her  adversary.  But  we  knew  that  France  was  ready  to  invade 
Belgium.  France  could  wait;  we  could  not.  A  French  attack 
upon  our  flank  in  the  region  of  the  Lower  Rhine  might  have  been 
fatal.  We  were,  therefore,  compelled  to  ride  roughshod  over  the 
legitimate  protests  of  the  Governments  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium. 
For  the  wrong  which  we  are  thus  doing,  we  will  make  reparation  as 
soon  as  our  military  object  is  attained. 

"  Anyone  in  such  grave  danger  as  ourselves,  and  who  is  struggling 
for  his  supreme  welfare,  can  only  be  concerned  with  the  means  of 
extricating  himself;   we  stand  side  by  side  with  Austria." 

It  is  noteworthy  that  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  recognises, 
without  the  slightest  disguise,  that  Germany  is  violating  international 
law  by  her  invasion  of  Belgian  territory  and  that  she  is  committing 
a  wrong  against  us. 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  36 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  London,  August  4,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  in  the  House  of  Commons 
this  afternoon  the  Prime  Minister  made  a  fresh  statement  with 
regard  to  the  European  crisis. 

After  recalling  the  principal  points  set  forth  yesterday  by  Sir  E. 
Grey,  the  Prime  Minister  read  :  — 

1.  A  telegram  received  from  Sir  F.  Villiers  this  morning  which 
gave  the  substance  of  the  second  ultimatum  ^  presented  to  the  Bel- 
gian Government  by  the  German  Government,  which  had  been  sent 
to  you  this  morning  (see  No.  27). 

2.  Your  telegram  informing  me  of  the  violation  of  the  frontier  at 
Gemmenich,2  a  copy  of  which  I  have  given  to  Sir  A.  Nicolson. 

3.  A  telegram  which  the  German  Government  addressed  to  its 
Ambassador  in  London  this  morning  with  the  evident  intention  of 
misleading  popular  opinion  as  to  its  attitude.  Here  is  the  translation 
as  published  in  one  of  this  evening's  newspapers :  — 

"Please^  dispel  any  mistrust  which  may  subsist  on  the  part  of 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  27,  same  day.     This  is  in  no  sense  a  second  ultimatum, 
but  rather  a  declaration  of  the  entrance  of  armed  German  forces. 

2  Ih.  No.  30,  same  day. 

3  See  British  Blue  Book  No.  157,  August  4. 


438  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  British  Government  with  regard  to  our  intentions,  by  repeat- 
ing most  positively  the  formal  assurance  that,  even  in  the  case  of 
armed  conjQiict  with  Belgium,  Germany  will,  under  no  pretence 
whatever,  annex  Belgian  territory. 

"Sincerity  of  this  declaration  is  borne  out  by  fact  that  we  solemnly 
pledged  our  word  to  Holland  strictly  to  respect  her  neutrality. 

"It  is  obvious  that  we  could  not  profitably  annex  Belgian  terri- 
tory without  making  at  the  time  territorial  acquisitions  at  the 
expense  of  Holland. 

"Please  impress  upon  Sir  E.  Grey  that  German  army  could  not 
be  exposed  to  French  attack  across  Belgium,  which  was  planned 
according  to  absolutely  unimpeachable  information.^ 

"Germany  had  consequently  to  disregard  Belgian  neutrality,  it 
being  for  her  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent  French  advance." 

Mr.  Asquith  then  informed  the  House  that  in  answer  to  this  note 
of  the  German  Government  the  British  Government  had  repeated 
their  proposal  ^  of  last  week,  namely,  that  the  German  Government 
should  give  the  same  assurances  as  to  Belgian  neutrality  as  France 
had  given  last  week  both  to  England  and  to  Belgium.  The  British 
Cabinet  allowed  the  Berlin  Cabinet  till  midnight  to  reply .^ 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  37  * 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to  M,  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  London,  August  4,  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  informed  the  British  Min- 
ters  in  Norway,  Holland,  and  Belgium,  that  Great  Britain  expects 
that  these  three  kingdoms  will  resist  German  pressure  and  observe 
neutrality.^  Should  they  resist  they  will  have  the  support  of  Great 
Britain,  who  is  ready  in  that  event,  should  the  three  above-mentioned 
Governments  desire  it,  to  join  France  and  Russia,  in  offering  an  alli- 
ance to  the  said  Governments,  for  the  purpose  of  resisting  the  use 
of  force  by  Germany  against  them,  and  a  guarantee  to  maintain  the 

1  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20,  August  2.  Germany  has  not  published  this  in- 
formation. 

2  Germany  could  have,  and  according  to  British  Blue  Book  No.  123,  August  1,  last 
two  paragraphs,  probably  would  have  accepted  this  proposal  if  Great  Britain  would 
have  coupled  with  it  the  promise  that  she  would  do  what  she  had  done  in  1870,  i.e. 
agree  to  make  common  cause  in  the  interest  of  Belgium  with  either  France  or  Germany 
against  the  one  who  would  violate  Belgian  neutrality.  This  Great  Britain,  however, 
could  not  do,  because  she  had  promised  her  support  to  France  on  August  2.  British 
Blue  Book  No.  148. 

'  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  58,  same  day.  Mr.  Asquith  neglected  to 
tell  Parliament  that  when  Great  Britain  sent  her  request  to  Germany  concerning 
Belgium,  she  was  no  longer  neutral,  but  bound  by  a  vote  of  the  Cabinet  (cf .  British  Blue 
Book  No.  148,  August  2)  to  support  France  who  since  6.45  p.m.  the  previous  day  had 
been  at  war  with  Germany. 

*  This  despatch  was  later  cancelled,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  39,  same  day.  It  has 
been  omitted  from  the  British  Blue  Book. 

5  This  despatch  is  important,  because  Sir  E.  Grey  is  here  quoted  as  placing  the 
neutrahty  of  Norway,  Holland,  and  Belgium  on  a  par.  It  has  often  been  claimed 
since  that  Belgian  neutrality  was  of  a  different  order,  not  voluntary,  but  imposed  by 
the  treaty  of  1839. 


August  4y  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  38  439 

future  independence  and  integrity  of  the  three  kingdoms.^  I  ob- 
served to  him  that  Belgium  was  neutral  in  perpetuity.  The  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  answered:  This  is  in  case  her  neutrality  is 
violated.^ 


To  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  38 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Belgian  Min- 
isters at  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  4,  191 4. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  you  of  the  course  of  recent  events 
as  regards  the  relations  of  Belgium  with  certain  of  the  Powers  which 
guarantee  her  neutrality  and  independence. 

On  the  31st  July  the  British  Minister  made  me  a  verbal  com- 
munication^ according  to  which  Sir  E.  Grey,  in  anticipation  of  a 
European  war,  had  asked  the  German  and  French  Governments 
separately  if  each  of  them  were  resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  should  that  neutrality  not  be  violated  by  any  other 
Power.  * 

In  view  of  existing  treaties.  Sir  F.  Villiers  was  instructed  to  bring 
this  step  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Belgian  Government,  adding  that 
Sir  E.  Grey  presumed  that  Belgium  was  resolved  to  maintain  her 
neutrality,  and  that  she  expected  other  Powers  to  respect  it. 

I  told  the  British  Minister  that  we  highly  appreciated  this  com- 
munication, which  was  in  accordance  with  our  expectation,  and 
I  added  that  Great  Britain,  as  well  as  the  other  Powers  who  had 
guaranteed  our  independence,  might  rest  fully  assured  of  our  firm 
determination  to  maintain  our  neutrality;  nor  did  it  seem  pos- 
sible that  our  neutrality  could  be  threatened  by  any  of  those  States, 
with  whom  we  enjoyed  the  most  cordial  and  frank  relations.  The 
Belgian  Government,  I  added,  had  given  proof  of  this  resolution 
by  taking  from  now  on  all  such  military  measures  as  seemed  to  them 
to  be  necessitated  by  the  situation. 

In  his  turn  the  French  Minister  made  a  verbal  communication  ^ 
on  August  1st  to  the  effect  that  he  was  authorised  to  inform  the 
Belgian  Government  that  in  case  of  an  international  war  the  French 
Government,  in  conformity  with  their  repeated  declarations,  would 
respect  Belgian  territory,  and  that  they  would  not  be  induced  to 
modify  their  attitude  except  in  the  event  of  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  by  another  Power^ 

1  There  is  no  promise  here  of  maintaining  the  "treaty-imposed  neutrality"  of 
Belgium, 

2Cf.  the  "Brussels  documents,"  pp.  577  ff.  The  Belgian  Minister  wished  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  neutrality  of  his  country,  and  the  neutrality  of  the  other  two 
kingdoms. 

The  omission  of  Sweden  and  Denmark  in  this  despatch  is  noteworthy. 

3  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  11,  July  31. 

<  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  15,  August  1,  but  see  also  ih.  No.  9,  July  31. 


440  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

I  thanked  his  Excellency,  and  added  that  we  had  already  taken 
all  the  necessary  precautions  to  ensure  respect  of  our  independ- 
ence and  our  frontiers. 

On  the  morning  of  the  2nd  August  I  had  a  fresh  conversation  ^ 
with  Sir  F.  Villiers,  in  the  course  of  which  he  told  me  that  he  had 
lost  no  time  in  telegraphing  our  conversation  of  July  31st  to  his 
Government,  and  that  he  had  been  careful  to  quote  accurately  the 
solemn  declaration  which  he  had  received  of  Belgium's  intention  to 
defend  her  frontiers  from  whichever  side  they  might  be  invaded.  He 
added :  "We  know  that  France  has  given  you  formal  assurances,  but 
Great  Britain  has  received  no  reply  from  Berlin  on  this  subject." 

The  latter  fact  did  not  particularly  affect  me,  since  a  declaration 
from  the  German  Government  might  appear  superfluous  in  view  of 
existing  treaties. ^  Moreover,  the  Secretary  of  State  had  reaffirmed, 
at  the  meeting  of  the  committee  of  the  Reichstag  of  April  29th,  1913, 
"that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  is  established  by  treaty  which  Ger- 
many intends  to  respect." 

The  same  day  Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  the  German  Minister, 
called  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  7  o'clock,  and  handed 
to  me  the  enclosed  note  (see  No.  20).  The  German  Government 
gave  the  Belgian  Government  a  time  limit  of  twelve  hours  within 
which  to  communicate  their  decision. 

No  hesitation  was  possible  as  to  the  reply  called  for  by  the  amaz- 
ing proposal  of  the  German  Government.  You  will  find  a  copy 
enclosed.     (See  No.  22.) 

The  ultimatum  expired  at  7  a.m.  on  August  3rd.  As  at  10  o'clock  no 
act  of  war  had  been  committed,  the  Belgian  Cabinet  decided  that  there 
was  no  reason  for  the  moment  to  appeal  to  the  guaranteeing  powers. 

Towards  mid-day  the  French  Minister  questioned  me  upon  this 
point,  and  said :  — 

"  Although  in  view  of  the  rapid  march  of  events  ^  I  have  as  yet 
received  no  instructions  to  make  a  declaration  from  my  Govern- 
ment, I  feel  justified,  in  view  of  their  well-known  intentions,  in 
saying  that  if  the  Belgian  Government  were  to  appeal  to  the  French 
Government  as  one  of  the  Powers  guaranteeing  their  neutrality,  the 
French  Government  would  at  once  respond  to  Belgium's  appeal; 
if  such  an  appeal  were  not  made  it  is  probable  that  —  unless,  of 
course,  exceptional  measures  were  rendered  necessary  in  self-defence 
—  the  French  Government  would  not  intervene  until  Belgium, had 
taken  some  effective  measure  of  resistance." 

I  thanked  M.  Klobukowski  for  the  support  which  the  French 
Government  had  been  good  enough  to  offer  us  in  case  of  need,  and 
I  informed  him  that  the  Belgian  Goveri^ent  were  making  no  appeal 
at  present  to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers,  and  that  they  would  decide 
later  what  ought  to  be  done. 

1  Not  previously  mentioned  in  the  Belgian  Gray  Book. 

2  "Treaties"  do  not  seem  to  have  been  mentioned  in  the  conversation  with  the 
German  Minister.     See  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  19,  August  2. 

*  These  words  are  added  here  to  the  despatch  as  published  Belgian  Gray  Book  No. 
24,  August  3. 


August  4,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  Jfi  441 

Finally,  at  6  a.m.  on  August  4th,  the  German  Minister  made  the 
following  communication  to  me.     (See  No.  27.) 

The  Cabinet  is  at  the  present  moment  deliberating  on  the  ques- 
tion of  an  appeal  to  the  Powers  guaranteeing  our  neutrality. 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  39 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  ,  London,  August  4,  1914. 

Great  Britain  this  morning  called^  upon  Germany  to  respect 
Belgian  neutrality.  The  ultimatum  says  that  whereas  the  note 
addressed  by  Germany  to  Belgium  threatens  the  latter  with  an 
appeal  to  the  force  of  arms  if  she  opposes  the  passage  of  German 
troops;  and  whereas  Belgian  territory  has  been  violated  at  Gem- 
menich;  and  whereas  Germany  has  refused  to  give  Great  Britain 
a  similar  assurance  to  that  given  last  week  by  France;  therefore 
Great  Britain  must  once  again  demand  a  satisfactory  reply  on  the 
subject  of  the  respect  of  Belgian  neutrality  and  of  the  treaty  to  which 
Germany,  no  less  than  Great  Britain,  is  a  signatory.  The  ultimatum 
expires  at  midnight. 

In  consequence  of  the  British  ultimatum  to  Germany,  the  British 
proposal  which  I  telegraphed  to  you  is  cancelled  for  the  time  being. 
(See  No.  37.) 

To  London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  40 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  British,  French, 
and  Russian  Ministers  at  Brussels. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  4,  1914- 

The  Belgian  Government  regret  to  have  to  announce  to  your 
Excellency  that  this  morning  the  armed  forces  of  Germany  entered 
Belgian  territory  in  violation  of  treaty  engagements. 

.  The  Belgian  Government  are  firmly  determined  to  resist  by  all 
the  means  in  their  power.^ 

Belgium  appeals  to  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  to  co- 
operate as  guaranteeing  Powers  in  the  defence  of  her  territory.^ 

There  should  be  concerted  and  joint  action,  to  oppose  the  forcible 
measures  taken  by  Germany  against  Belgium,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  to  guarantee  the  future  maintenance  of  the  independence 
and  integrity  ^  of  Belgium. 

1  British  Blue  Book  No.  159,  August  4. 

2  This  is  in  reply  to  Great  Britain's  request,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  28,  August  4. 

3  This  decision  was  apparently  reached  at  the  Cabinet  meeting  mentioned  in  the 
last  paragralph  of  No.  38,  same  day.     See  also  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  42,  August  5. 

*  Of.  note  2  to  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  28,  same  day. 


442  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Belgium  is  happy  to  be  able  to  declare  that  she  will  undertake  the 
defence  of  her  fortified  places, 

France : 

From  Brussels 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  152 

M.  Klobukowski,  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Brussels,  August  ^,  1914. 

The  Chief  of  the  Cabinet  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  sends 
me  a  letter  by  which  "the  Government  of  the  King  declare  that 
they  are  firmly  decided  to  resist  ^  the  aggression  of  Germany  by  all 
means  in  their  power.  Belgium  appeals  to  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Russia  to  co-operate  as  guarantors  in  the  defence  of  her  territory. 

"There  would  be  a  concerted  and  common  action  having  as  its 
object  the  resistance  of  forcible  measures  employed  by  Germany 
against  Belgium,  and  at  the  same  time  to  guarantee  the  maintenance 
of  the  independence  and  integrity  of  Belgium  in  the  future. 

"Belgium  is  glad  to  be  able  to  declare  that  she  will  ensure  the 
defence  of  her  fortified  places." 

Klobukowski. 

From  London 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  153 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  London,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

London,  August  4,  1914- 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  asked  me  to  come  and  see  him  immediately 
in  order  to  tell  me  that  the  Prime  Minister  would  to-day  make  a 
statement  ^  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  Germany  had  been 
invited  to  withdraw  her  ultimatum  to  Belgium  and  to  give  her 
answer  to  Great  Britain  before  12  o'clock  to-night. 

Paul  Cambon. 

From  Brussels 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  154 

M.  Klobukowski,  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Rene  Viviani, 
President  of  the  Council,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Brussels,  August  4t  1914' 

This  morning  the  German  Minister  informs  ^  the  Belgian  Ministry 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  in  consequence  of  the  refusal  of  the  Belgian 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  40,  same  day. 

2  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  36,  same  day. 
«  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  27,  same  day. 


August  4,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  157  443 

Government  the  Imperial  Government  jBnd  themselves  compelled 
to  carry  out  by  force  of  arms  those  measures  of  protection  which 
are  rendered  indispensable  by  the  French  threats. 

Klobukowski. 

[For  French  Yellow  Book  No.  155  see  under  August  6,  and  for  No.  156  see  under 
August  5.] 

To  the  Representatives  of  all  the  Powers  at  Paris 
French  Yellow  Book  No.  157 

Notification  hy  the  French  Government  to  the  Representatives  of  the 
Powers  at  Paris. 

The  German  Imperial  Government,  after  having  allowed  its 
armed  forces  to  cross  the  frontier,  and  to  permit  various  acts  of 
murder  and  pillage  on  French  territory;  after  having  violated  the 
neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg  in  defiance  of  the 
stipulations  of  the  Convention  of  London,  11th  May,  1867,  and 
of  Convention  V.  of  the  Hague,  18th  October,  1907,  on  the  rights 
and  duties  of  Powers  and  persons  in  case  of  war  on  land  (Articles  1 
and  2),  Conventions  which  have  been  signed  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment; after  having  addressed  an  ultimatum  to  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment of  Belgium  with  the  object  of  requiring  passage  for  German 
troops  through  Belgian  territory  in  violation  of  the  Treaties  of  the 
19th  April,  1839,  which  had  been  signed  by  them,^  and  in  violation 
of  the  above  Convention  of  the  Hague 

Have  declared  war  on  France  at  6.45  p.m.  on  the  3rd  August,  1914. 

In  these  circumstances  the  Government  of  the  Republic  find 
themselves  obliged  on  their  side  to  have  recourse  to  arms. 

They  have  in  consequence  the  honour  of  informing  by  these 
presents  the  Government  of  .  .  .  that  a  state  of  war  exists  between 
France  and  Germany  dating  from  6.45  p.m.  on  3rd  August,  1914. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  protest  before  all  civilised 
nations,  and  especially  those  Governments  ^  which  have  signed  the 
Conventions  and  Treaties  referred  to  above,  against  the  violation 
by  the  German  Empire  of  their  international  engagements,  and  they 
reserve  full  right  for  reprisals  which  they  might  find  themselves 
brought  to  exercise  against  an  enemy  so  little  regardful  of  its  plighted 
word. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic,  who  propose  to  observe  the 
principles  of  the  law  of  nations,  will,  during  the  hostilities,  and 
assuming  that  reciprocity  will  be  observed,  act  in  accordance  with 
the  International  Conventions  signed  by  France  concerning  the  law 
of  war  on  land  and  sea. 

1  Only  in  so  far  as  one  assumes  that  signatures  of  the  kingdom  of  Prussia  are  bind- 
ing on  the  German  Empire.  In  1871  the  kingdom  of  Prussia  ceased  to  exist  as  a 
Power  in  relation  to  foreign  Powers,  voluntarily  sinking  herself  in  the  Federation  of 
German  States,  called  the  German  Empire.  See  chapter  on  German  Constitution 
in  the  editor's  Germany's  Point  of  View. 

2  This  includes  the  Government  of  the  United  States.  The  American  Government 
has  not  published  its  reply. 


444  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  present  notification,  made  in  accordance  with  Article  2  of 
the  Third  Convention  of  the  Hague  of  the  18th  October,  1907,  relat- 
ing to  the  opening  of  hostilities  and  handed  to  .  .  . 

Paris,  August  4,  1914,  ^  P-M. 


French  Yellow  Book  No.  158 

Message  from  M.  Poincare,  President  of  the  Republic,  read  at  the 
Extraordinary  Session  of  Parliament,  August  4,  1914- 

{Journal  Officiel  of  the  5th  August,  1914-) 

{The  Chamber  rises  and  remains  standing  during  the  reading  of  the 
message.) 

"  Gentlemen, 

"France  has  just  been  the  object  of  a  violent  and  premeditated 
attack,  which  is  an  insolent  defiance  of  the  law  of  nations.  Before 
any  declaration  of  war  had  been  sent  to  us,  even  before  the  German 
Ambassador  had  asked  for  his  passports,  our  territory  has  been 
violated.^  The  German  Empire  has  waited  till  yesterday  evening  to 
give  at  this  late  stage  the  true  name  to  a  state  of  things  which  it  had 
already  created. 

"For  more  than  forty  years  the  French,  in  sincere  love  of  peace, 
have  buried  at  the  bottom  of  their  heart  the  desire  for  legitimate 
reparation. 

"They  have  given  to  the  world  the  example  of  a  great  nation 
which,  definitely  raised  from  defeat  by  the  exercise  of  will,  patience 
and  labour,  has  only  used  its  renewed  and  rejuvenated  strength  in 
the  interest  of  progress  and  for  the  good  of  humanity. 

"  Since  the  ultimatum  ^  of  Austria  opened  a  crisis  which  threat- 
ened the  whole  of  Europe,  France  has  persisted  in  following  and  in 
recommending  on  all  sides  a  policy  of  prudence,  wisdom  and  modera- 
tion. 

"To  her  there  can  be  imputed  no  act,  no  movement,  no  word, 
which  has  not  been  peaceful  and  conciliatory. 

"At  the  hour  when  the  struggle  is  beginning,  she  has  the  right, 
in  justice  to  herself,  of  solemnly  declaring  that  she  has  made,  up  to 
the  last  moment,  supreme  efforts  ^  to  avert  the  war  now  about  to 
break  out,  the  crushing  responsibility  for  which  the  German  Empire 
will  have  to  bear  before  history.     ( Unanimous  and  repeated  applause.) 

"  On  the  very  morrow  of  the  day  when  we  and  our  allies  ^  were 

1  Cf .  note  to  French  Yellow  Books  No.  136,  also  ih.  No.  139,  both  of  August  2 ;  also 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  21,  August  3. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  8  under  date  of  July  22. 

2  See  the  discussion  of  these  efforts  in  the  editor's  Germany's  Point  of  View,  chapters 
on  the  French  Yellow  Book. 

*  Since  Russia  was  the  only  other  ally  of  France  at  tliis  time,  this  includes  Great 
Britain,  although  the  time  limit  of  her  ultimatum  had  not  expired  when  this  speech 
was  delivered.  See  also  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  58,  same  day.  Even  more 
important  is  the  time  reference  here,  August  1,  implying  that  France  considered  Great 
Britain  an  ally  even  then  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  British  Government  had  repeatedly 
denied  that  an  alliance  existed  between  them  and  France.     Cf.  below,  note  7. 


August  4,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  158  445 

• 
publicly  expressing  our  hope  of  seeing  negotiations  which  had  been 
begun  under  the  auspices  of  the  London  Cabinet  carried  to  a  peace- 
ful conclusion,  Germany  suddenly  declared  war  upon  Russia,  she 
has  invaded  the  territory  of  Luxemburg,  she  has  outrageously  in- 
sulted the  noble  Belgian  nation  {loud  and  unanimous  applause),  our 
neighbour  and  our  friend,  and  attempted  treacherously  to  fall  upon 
us  while  we  were  in  the  midst  of  diplomatic  conversation.  (Fresh 
and  repeated  unanimous  applause.) 

"But  France  was  watching.  As  alert  as  she  was  peaceful,  she 
was  prepared ;  ^  and  our  enemies  will  meet  on  their  path  our  valiant 
covering  troops,  who  are  at  their  post  and  will  provide  the  screen 
behind  which  the  mobilisation  of  our  national  forces  will  be  methodi- 
cally completed. 

"  Our  fine  and  courageous  army,  which  France  to-day  accompanies 
with  her  maternal  thought  (loud  applause)  has  risen  eager  to  defend 
the  honour  of  the  flag  and  the  soil  of  the  country.  (Unanimous  and 
repeated  applause.) 

"  The  President  of  the  Republic,  interpreting  the  unanimous  feeling 
of  the  country,  expresses  to  our  troops  by  land  and  sea  the  admira- 
tion and  confidence  of  every  Frenchman  (loud  and  prolonged  applause). 

"Closely  united  in  a  common  feeling,  the  nation  will  persevere 
with  the  cool  self-restraint  of  which,  since  the  beginning  of  the 
crisis,  she  has  given  daily  proof.  Now,  as  always,  she  will  know 
how  to  harmonise  the  most  noble  daring  and  most  ardent  enthu- 
siasm with  that  self-control  which  is  the  sign  of  enduring  energy  and 
is  the  best  guarantee  of  victory  (applause). 

"In  the  war  which  is  beginning  France  will  have  Right  on  her 
side,  the  eternal  power  of  which  cannot  with  impunity  be  disregarded 
by  nations  any  more  than  by  individuals  (loud  and  unanimous 
applause) . 

"She  will  be  heroically  defended  by  all  her  sons;  nothing  will 
break  their  sacred  union  before  the  enemy;  to-day  they  are  joined 
together  as  brothers  in  a  common  indignation  against  the  aggressor, 
and  in  a  common  patriotic  faith  (loud  and  prolonged  applause  and 
cries  of  '  Vive  la  France'). 

"  She  is  faithfully  helped  by  Russia,  her  ally  (loud  and  unanimous 
applause) ;  she  is  supported  by  the  loyal  friendship  ^  of  Great  Britain 
(loud  and  unanimous  applause). 

"And  already  from  every  part  of  the  civilised  world  sympathy 
and  good  wishes  are  coming  to  her.  For  to-day  once  again  she  stands 
before  the  universe  for  Liberty,  Justice  and  Reason  (loud  and  re- 
peated applause) .  '  Haut  les  coeurs  et  vive  la  France ! '  (unanimous 
and  prolonged  applause) . 

"Raymond  Poincare." 

1  Much  injustice  has  been  done  to  France  by  her  pro-allies  friends  who  have  claimed 
that  France  was  unprepared. 

2  Cf.  above,  note  6.  Here,  but  not  there,  a  distinction  is  made  between  the  re- 
lations of  France  with  Russia  and  those  with  Great  Britain. 


446  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  159 

Speech  delivered  by  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  August  4,  1914. 

{Journal  Offix;iel,  August  5,  1914-) 
M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  of  the  Council, 

Gentlemen, 

The  German  Ambassador  yesterday  left  Paris  after  notifying  us 
of  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war. 

The  Government  owe  to  Parliament  a  true  account  of  the  events 
which  in  less  than  ten  days  have  unloosed  a  European  war  and 
compelled  France,  peaceful  and  valiant,  to  defend  her  frontier  against 
an  attack,  the  hateful  injustice  of  which  is  emphasised  by  its  calcu- 
lated unexpectedness. 

This  attack,  which  has  no  excuse,  and  which  began  before  we  were 
notified  of  any  declaration  of  war,  is  the  last  act  of  a  plan,  whose 
origin  and  object  I  propose  to  declare  before  our  own  democracy  and 
before  the  opinion  of  the  civilised  world. 

As  a  consequence  of  the  abominable  crime  which  cost  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Heir-Apparent  and  the  Duchess  of  Hohenburg  their 
lives,  difficulties  arose  between  the  Cabinets  of  Vienna  and  Belgrade. 

The  majority  of  the  Powers  were  only  semi-officially  informed 
of  these  difficulties  up  till  Friday,  July  24th,  the  date  on  which  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassadors  communicated  to  them  a  circular 
which  the  press  has  published. 

The  object  of  this  circular  was  to  explain  and  justify  an  ultimatum 
delivered  the  evening  before  to  Servia  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Minister  at  Belgrade. 

This  ultimatum  in  alleging  the  complicity  of  numerous  Servian 
subjects  and  associations  in  the  Serajevo  crime,  hinted  that  the 
official  Servian  authorities  themselves  were  no  strangers  to  it.  It 
demanded  a  reply  from  Servia  by  6  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  Satur- 
day, July  25th. 

The  Austrian  demands,  or  at  any  rate  many  of  them,^  without 
doubt  struck  a  blow  at  the  rights  of  a  sovereign  State.  Notwith- 
standing their  excessive  character,  Servia,  on  July  25th,  declared 
that  she  submitted  to  them  almost  without  reserve.^ 

This  submission,  which  constituted  a  success  for  Austria-Hungary 
a  guarantee  for  the  peace  of  Europe,  ^as  not  unconnected  with  the 
advice  tendered  to  Belgrade  from  the  first  moment  by  France,  Rus- 
sia and  Great  Britain.^ 

The  value  of  this  advice  was  all  the  greater  since  the  Austro- 

*  Cf.  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  31,  July  27,  where  Sazonof  "found  seven  of 
the  ten  points  admissible  without  very  great  difficulty ;  only  the  two  points  .  .  . 
seemed  to  him  to  be  unacceptable  in  their  present  form,"  etc. 

2  Cf,  Introductory  remarks  to  the  despatches  of  July  26. 

'  Cf .  the  despatches  of  July  24,  25,  26  where  it  is  pointed  out  that  no  such  advice 
was  actually  given. 


August  4)  French  Yellow  Booh  No.  159  447 

Hungarian  demands  had  been  concealed  ^  from  the  Chanceries  of 
the  Triple  Entente,  to  whom  in  the  three  preceding  weeks  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  had  on  several  occasions  given  an;  assurance 
that  their  claims  would  be  extremely  moderate. 

It  was,  therefore,  with  natural  astonishment  that  the  Cabinets 
of  Paris,  St.  Petersburgh  and  London  learned  on  26th  July  that  the 
Austrian  Minister  at  Belgrade,  after  a  few  minutes'  examination, 
declared  that  the  Servian  reply  was  inacceptable,  and  broke  off 
diplomatic  relations. 

This  astonishment  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  on  Friday,  the 
24th,  the  German  Ambassador  came  and  read  to  the  French  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  a  note  verbale  ^  asserting  that  the  Austro-Servian 
dispute  must  remain  localised,  without  intervention  by  the  great 
Powers,  or  otherwise  "  incalculable  consequences "  were  to  be  feared. 
A  similar  demarche  was  made  on  Saturday,  the  25th,^  at  London  and 
at  St.  Petersburgh.^ 

Need  I,  Gentlemen,  point  out  to  you  the  contrast  between  the 
threatening  expressions  used  by  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris 
and  the  conciliatory  sentiments  which  the  Powers  of  the  Triple 
Entente  had  just  manifested  by  the  advice  which  they  gave  to  Servia 
to  submit  ?  ^ 

Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  extraordinary  character  of  the  Ger- 
man demarche,  we  immediately,  in  agreement  with  our  Allies  ^  and 
our  friends,  took  a  conciliatory  course  and  invited  Germany  to 
join  in  it. 

We  have  had  from  the  first  moment  regretfully  to  recognise  that 
our  intentions  and  our  efforts  met  with  no  response  at  Berlin. 

Not  only  did  Germany  appear  wholly  unwilling  to  give  to  Austria- 
Hungary  the  friendly  advice  which  her  position  gave  her  the  right 
to  offer,  but  from  this  moment  and  still  more  in  the  following  days, 
she  seemed  to  intervene  between  the  Cabinet  at  Vienna  and  the  com- 
promises suggested  by  the  other  Powers.^ 

On  Tuesday,  28th  July,  Austria-Hungary  declared  war  on  Servia. 
This  declaration  of  war,  with  its  aggravation  of  the  state  of  affairs 
brought  about  by  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  three  days 
before,  gave  ground  for  believing  that  there  was  a  deliberate  desire 
for  war,  and  a  systematic  programme  for  the  enslavement  ^  of  Servia. 

Thus  there  was  now  involved  in  the  dispute  not  only  the  inde- 
pendence of  a  brave  people,  but  the  balance  of  power  ^  in  the  Bal- 

1  France  knew  of  them  before  Austria-Hungary  published  them,  French  Yellow 
Book  Nos.  13  and  14,  July  19. 

2  French  Yellow  Book  No.  28,  July  24. 

3  This  is  a  mistake.     See  British  Blue  Book  No.  9,  July  24. 
^  Russian  Orange  BooJk:  No.  8,  also  July  24. 

B  See  note  3,  p.  446. 

^  Note  the  plural  which  seems  to  include  Great  Britain. 

^  For  the  error  of  this  view  see  the  French  despatches  of  those  days,  and  the  dis- 
cussion of  them  in  the  editor's  Germany's  Point  of  View,  chapters  on  the  French 
Yellow  Book. 

8  Cf .  Austria-Hungary's  promise  not  to  annex  Serbian  territory  nor  to  touch  the 
sovereignty  of  Serbia.     Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  47,  July  29. 

«  This  was  the  question  which  interested  Russia  most ;  cf .  British  Blue  Book 
No.  17,  July  25,  last  paragraph. 


448  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

kans,  embodied  in  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  of  1913,  and  consecrated 
by  the  moral  support  of  all  the  great  Powers. 

However,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  British  Government  with  its 
constant  and  firm  attachment  to  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  of 
Europe,  the  negotiations  were  continued,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately, 
the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  tried  to  continue  them. 

From  this  common  desire  sprang  the  proposal  for  action  ^  ])y  the 
Four  Powers,  England,  France,  Germany  and  Italy,  which  was 
intended,  by  assuring  to  Austria  all  legitimate  satisfaction,  to  bring 
about  an  equitable  adjustment  of  the  dispute. 

On  Wednesday,  the  29th,2  the  Russian  Government,  noting  the 
persistent  failure  of  these  efforts,  and  faced  by  the  Austrian  mobi- 
lisation and  declaration  of  war,  fearing  the  military  destruction  of 
Servia,  decided  as  a  precautionary  measure  to  mobilise  the  troops  of 
four  military  districts,  that  is  to  say,  the  formations  echeloned  along 
the  Austro-Hungarian  frontier  exclusively. 

In  taking  this  step,  the  Russian  Government  were  careful  to  in- 
form the  German  Government  that  their  measures,  restricted  as 
they  were  and  without  any  offensive  character  towards  Austria, 
were  not  in  any  degree  directed  against  Germany. 

In  a  conversation  with  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  the 
German  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  acknowledged  this 
without  demur. 

On  the  other  hand,  all  the  efforts  made  by  Great  Britain,  with 
the  adherence  of  Russia  and  the  support  of  France,  to  bring  Austria 
and  Servia  into  touch  under  the  moral  patronage  of  Europe  were 
encountered  at  Berlin  with  a  predetermined  negative  of  which  the 
diplomatic  despatches  afford  the  clearest  proof. 

This  was  a  disquieting  situation  which  made  it  probable  that 
there  existed  at  Berlin  intentions  which  had  not  been  disclosed. 
Some  hours  afterwards  this  alarming  suspicion  was  destined  to  become 
a  certainty. 

In  fact  Germany's  negative  attitude  gave  place  thirty-six  hours 
later  to  positive  steps  which  were  truly  alarming.  On  the  31st  July 
Germany,  by  proclaiming  "a  state  of  danger  of  war,"  ^  cut  the  com- 
munications between  herself  and  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  obtained 
for  herself  complete  freedom  to  pursue  against  France  in  absolute 
secrecy  military  preparations  which,  as  you  have  seen,  nothing  could 
justify. 

Already  for  some  days,  and  in  circumstances  difficult  to  explain, 
Germany  had  prepared  for  the  transition  of  her  army  from  a  peace 
footing  to  a  war  footing.^ 

From  the  morning  of  the  25th  July,  that  is  to  say  even  before  the 
expiration  of  the  time  limit  given  to  Servia  by  Austria,  she  had 

1  Cf.  the  Introductory  Remarks  to  the  despatches  of  these  days,  and  the  letter 
from  the  Belgian  Minister  in  Petrograd  printed  under  date  of  July  30. 

2  According  to  the  Czar's  telegram  to  the  German  Emperor  of  July  30,  the  Russian 
mobilisation  was  decided  upon  five  days  before,  i.e.  July  25. 

3  Viviani  entirely  omits  to  mention  that  this  was  the  result  of  Russia's  order  of 
general  mobilisation. 

*  There  is  no  evidence  for  this  statement. 


August  4,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  159  449 

confined  to  barracks  the  garrisons  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  same 
day  she  had  placed  the  frontier-works  in  a  complete  state  of  defence. 
On  the  26th,  she  had  indicated  to  the  railways  the  measures  prepara- 
tory for  concentration.  On  the  27th,  she  had  completed*  requisi- 
tions and  placed  her  covering  troops  in  position.  On  the  28th,  the 
summons  of  individual  reservists  had  begun  and  units  which  were 
distant  from  the  frontier  had  been  brought  up  to  it.^ 

Could  all  these  measures,  pursued  with  implacable  method,  leave 
us  in  doubt  of  German's  intentions? 

Such  was  the  situation  when,  on  the  evening  of  the  31st  July,  the  Ger- 
man Government,  which,  since  the  24th,  had  not  participated  by  any 
active  step  in  the  conciliatory  efforts  of  the  Triple  Entente,^  addressed 
an  ultimatum  to  the  Russian  Government  under  the  pretext  that 
Russia  had  ordered  a  general  mobilisation  ^  of  her  armies,  and  de- 
manded that  this  mobilisation  should  be  stopped  within  twelve  hours. 

This  demand,  which  was  all  the  more  insulting  in  form  because 
a  few  hours  earlier  the  Emperor  Nicholas  II.,  with  a  movement 
at  once  confiding  and  spontaneous,  had  asked  the  German  Emperor 
for  his  mediation,  was  put  forward  at  a  moment  when,  on  the  request 
of  England  ^  and  with  the  knowledge  of  Germany,^  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment was  accepting  a  formula  of  such  a  nature  as  to  lay  the 
foundation  for  a  friendly  settlement  of  the  Austro-Servian  dispute 
and  of  the  Austro-Russian  difficulties  by  the  simultaneous  arrest  of 
military  operations  and  of  military  preparations. 

The  same  day  this  unfriendly  demarche  towards  Russia  was  sup- 
plemented by  acts  which  were  frankly  hostile  towards  France; 
the  rupture  of  communications  by  road,  railway,  telegraph  and  tele- 
phone, the  seizure  of  French  locomotives  on  their  arrival  at  the 
frontier,  the  placing  of  machine  guns  in  the  middle  of  the  permanent 
way  which  had  been  cut,  and  the  concentration  of  troops  on  this 
frontier. 

From  this  moment  we  were  no  longer  justified  in  believing  in  the 
sincerity  of  the  pacific  declarations  which  the  German  representative 
continued  to  shower  upon  us  {hear,  hear).' 

We  knew  that  Germany  was  mobilising  under  the  shelter  of  the 
"state  of  danger  of  war." 

We  learnt  that  six  classes  of  reservists  had  been  called  up,  and 
that  transport  was  being  collected  even  for  those  army  corps  which 
were  stationed  a  considerable  distance  from  the  frontier. 

As  these  events  unfolded  themselves,  the  Government,  watchful 
and  vigilant,  took  from  day  to  day,  and  even  from  hour  to  hour,  the 
measures  of  precaution  which  the  situation  required;  the  general 
mobilisation  of  our  forces  on  land  and  sea  was  ordered. 

1  There  is  no  evidence  for  these  statements,  all  of  which  seem  to  be  disproved 
by  French  Yellow  Book  No.  101,  July  30,  where  Viviani  acknowledges  that  Germany 
had  taken,  up  to  then,  no  steps  for  even  partial  mobilisation,  for  if  she  had,  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  urge  Russia  not  to  take  any  measures  which  "may  offer  to  Ger- 
many a  pretext  for  a  total  or  partial  mobilisation  of  her  forces." 

2  This  is  disproved  by  the  despatches  of  those  days. 

3  No  excuse  for  the  general  Russian  mobilisation  is  offered. 
*  British  Blue  Book  No.  132,  August  1,  and  note. 

6  No  evidence  for  this  statement  has  been  published. 
2g 


450  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  same  evening,  at  7.30,  Germany,  without  waiting^  for  the 
acceptance  by  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburgh  of  the  Enghsh  propo- 
sal, which  I  have  already  mentioned,  declared  war  on  Russia. 

The  next  day,  Sunday,  the  2nd  August,  without  regard  for  the 
extreme  moderation  of  France,  in  contradiction  to  the  peaceful 
declarations  of  the  German  Ambassador  at  Paris,  and  in  defiance 
of  the  rules  of  international  law,  German  troops  crossed  our  frontier 
at  three  different  points. 

At  the  same  time,  in  violation  of  the  Treaty  of  1867,  which  guar- 
anteed with  the  signature  of  Prussia  the  neutrality  of  Luxemburg, 
they  invaded  the  territory  of  the  Grand  Duchy  and  so  gave  cause 
for  a  protest  by  the  Luxemburg  Government. 

Finally,  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  also  was  threatened.  The 
German  Minister,  on  the  evening  of  the  2nd  August,  presented 
to  the  Belgian  Government  an  ultimatum  ^  requesting  facilities  in 
Belgium  for  military  operations  against  France,  under  the  lying 
pretext  that  Belgian  neutrality  was  threatened  by  us;  the  Belgian 
Government  refused,  and  declared  ^  that  they  were  resolved  to 
defend  with  vigour  their  neutrality,  which  was  respected  by  France 
and  guaranteed  by  treaties,  and  in  particular  by  the  King  of  Prussia. 
{Unanimous  and  prolonged  applause.) 

Since  then.  Gentlemen,  the  German  attacks  have  been  renewed, 
multiplied,  and  accentuated.  At  more  than  fifteen  points  our  fron- 
tier has  been  violated.  Shots  have  been  fired  at  our  soldiers  and 
Customs  officers.  Men  have  been  killed  and  wounded.  Yesterday  ^ 
a  German  military  aviator  dropped  three  bombs  on  Luneville.^ 

The  German  Ambassador,  to  whom  as  well  as  to  all  the  great 
Powers,  we  communicated  these  facts,  did  not  deny  them  or  express 
his  regrets  for  them.  On  the  contrary,  he  came  yesterday  evening 
to  ask  me  for  his  passports,  and  to  notify  us  of  the  existence  of  a 
state  of  war,  giving  as  his  reason,  in  the  teeth  of  all  the  facts,  hostile 
acts  committed  by  French  aviators  in  German  territory  in  the  Eifel 
district,  and  even  on  the  railway  near  Carlsruhe  and  near  Nuremberg. 
This  is  the  letter  ^  which  he  handed  to  me  on  the  subject :  — 

"M.  le  President, 

"The  German  administrative  and  military  authorities  have 
established  a  certain  number  of  flagrantly  hostile  acts  committed  on 
German  territory  by  French  military  aviators.  Several  of  these 
have  openly  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  flying  over  the 
territory  of  that  country;  one  has  attempted  to  destroy  buildings 
near  Wesel ;  others  have  been  seen  in  the  district  of  the  Eifel,  one 
has  thrown  bombs  on  the  railway  near  Carlsruhe  and  Nuremburg. 


1  Because  the  time  limit  had  expired. 

2  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20,  August  2. 
'  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  22,  August  3. 
*  Belgian  Gray  Book,  August  3. 

5  For  a  similar  charge  made  by  Germany  against  France,  see  Belgian  Gray  Book, 
No.  21,  August  3.  Since  the  interview  there  mentioned  took  place  at  1.30  a.m.  the 
French  attacks  there  mentioned  must  have  taken  place  on  August  2. 

«  French  Yellow  Book  No.  147,  August  3. 


August  4,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  159  451 

"  I  am  instructed,  and  I  have  the  honour  to  inform  your  Excellency 
that  in  the  presence  of  these  acts  of  aggression  the  German  Empire 
considers  itself  in  a  state  of  war  with  France  in  consequence  of  the 
acts  of  this  latter  Power. 

"At  the  same  time,  I  have  the  honour  to  bring  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  your  Excellency  that  the  German  authorities  will  retain 
French  mercantile  vessels  in  German  ports,  but  they  will  release  them 
if,  within  forty-eight  hours,  they  are  assured  of  complete  reciprocity. 

"My  diplomatic  mission  having  thus  come  to  an  end  it  only  re- 
mains for  me  to  request  your  Excellency  to  be  good  enough  to  fur- 
nish me  with  my  passports,  and  to  take  the  steps  you  consider  suit- 
able to  assure  my  return  to  Germany,  with  the  staff  of  the  Embassy, 
as  well  as  with  the  staff  of  the  Bavarian  Legation  and  of  the  German 
Consulate  General  in  Paris. 

"Be  good  enough,  M.  le  President,  to  receive  the  assurances  of 
my  deepest  respect.  (Signed)  Schoen." 

•Need  I,  Gentlemen,  lay  stress  on  the  absurdities  of  these  pre- 
texts which  they  would  put  forward  as  grievances  ?  At  no  time  has 
any  French  aviator  penetrated  into  Belgium,  nor  has  any  French 
aviator  committed  either  in  Bavaria  or  any  other  part  of  Germany 
any  hostile  act.  The  opinion  of  Europe  has  already  done  justice 
to  these  wretched  inventions.     {Loud  and  unanimous  applause.) 

Against  these  attacks,  which  violate  all  the  laws  of  justice  and 
all  the  principles  of  public  law,  we  have  now  taken  all  the  necessary 
steps ;  they  are  being  carried  out  strictly,  regularly,  and  with  calmness. 

The  mobilisation  of  the  Russian  army  also  continues  with  remark- 
able vigour  and  unrestrained  enthusiasm  {unanimous  and  pro- 
longed applause,  all  the  deputies  rising  from  their  seats.)  The  Belgian 
army,  mobilised  with  250,000  men,  prepares  with  a  splendid  passion 
and  magnificent  ardour  to  defend  the  neutrality  and  independence 
of  their  country.     {Renewed  loud  and  unanimous  applause.) 

The  entire  British  fleet  is  mobilised  ^  and  orders  have  been  given 
to  mobilise  the  land  forces. ^  {Loud  cheers,  all  the  deputies  rising  to 
their  feet.) 

Since  1912  ^  pourparlers  had  taken  place  between  English  and 
French  General  Staffs  and  were  concluded  by  an  exchange  of  letters 
between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  M.  Paul  Cambon.  The  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  yesterday  evening  communicated  these 
letters  to  the  House  of  Commons,  and  I  have  the  honour,  with  the 
consent  of  the  British  Government,  to  acquaint  you  with  the  con- 
tents of  these  two  documents. 

My  dear  Ambassador,  Foreign  Office,  November  22,  1912. 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  British  naval 
and  military  experts  have  consulted  together.     It  has  always  been 

1  And  had  been  mobilised  since  July  24.     See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  66,  July  27. 

2  No  date  is  given  for  this  order,  nor  is  it  mentioned  in  the  British  Blue  Book. 

3  This  is  an  error.  The  letters  referred  to  were  of  1912,  but  these  pourparlers  had 
been  taking  place  for  years  previous.     See  first  line  of  first  letter  below. 


452  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

understood  that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of 
either  Government  to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to 
assist  the  other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that  consultation 
between  experts  is  not,  and  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as,  an  engage- 
ment that  commits  either  Government  to  action  in  a  contingency 
that  has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  disposition,  for 
instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets  respectively  at  the  present 
moment  is  not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Government  had 
grave  reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power, 
it  might  become  essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event 
depend  upon  the  armed  resistance  of  the  other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect 
an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  something  that  threat- 
ened the  general  peace,  it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other 
whether  both  Governments  should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression 
and  to  preserve  peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  pre- 
pared to  take  in  common.  If  these  measures  involved  action,  the 
plans  of  the  General  Staffs  would  at  once  be  taken  into  consideration, 
and  the  Governments  would  then  decide  what  effect  should  be  given 
to  them. 

Yours,  etc., 

E.  Grey. 

To  this  letter  our  Ambassador,  M.  Paul  Cambon,  replied  on  the 
23rd  November,  1912  :  — 

Dear  Sir  Edward,  London,  November  23,  1912, 

You  reminded  me  in  your  letter  of  yesterday,  22nd  November, 
that  during  the  last  few  years  the  military  and  naval  authorities  of 
France  and  Great  Britain  had  consulted  with  each  other  from  time 
to  time;  that  it  had  always  been  understood  that  these  consulta- 
tions should  not  restrict  the  liberty  of  either  Government  to  decide 
in  the  future  whether  they  should  lend  each  other  the  support  of 
their  armed  forces ;  that,  on  either  side,  these  consultations  between 
experts  were  not  and  should  not  be  considered  as  engagements  bind- 
ing our  Governments  to  take  action  in  certain  eventualities;  that, 
however,  I  had  remarked  to  you  that,  if  one  or  other  of  the  two 
Governments  had  grave  reasons  to  fear  an  unprovoked  attack  on 
the  part  of  a  third  Power,  it  would  become  essential  to  know  whether 
it  could  count  on  the  armed  support  of  the  other. 

Your  letter  answers  that  point,  and  I  am  authorised  to  state  that, 
in  the  event  of  one  of  our  two  Governments  having  grave  reasons  to 
fear  either  an  act  of  aggression  from  a  third  Power,  or  some  event 
threatening  the  general  peace,  that  Government  would  immediately 
examine  with  the  other  the  question  whether  both  Governments 
should  act  together  in  order  to  prevent  the  act  of  aggression  or  pre- 
serve peace.  If  so,  the  two  Governments  would  deliberate  as  to  the 
measures  which  they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common ;  if  those 


August  4)  French  Yellow  Book  No.  159  453 

measures  involved  action,  the  two  Governments  would  take  into 
immediate  consideration  the  plans  of  their  general  staffs  and  would 
then  decide  as  to  the  effect  to  be  given  to  those  plans. 

Yours,  etc., 

Paul  Cambon. 

In  the  House  of  Commons  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  spoke  ^  of  France  amidst  the  applause  of  the  members  in  a 
noble  and  warm-hearted  manner  and  his  language  has  already 
found  an  echo  deep  in  the  hearts  of  all  Frenchmen  {loud  and  unani- 
mous applause).  I  wish  in  the  name  of  the  Government  of  the 
Republic  to  thank  the  British  Government  from  this  tribune  for  their 
cordial  words  and  the  Parliament  of  France  will  associate  itself  in 
this  sentiment  {renewed,  prolonged  and  unanimous  applause). 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  made  in  particular  the 
following  declaration :  ^ 

"In  case  the  German  fleet  came  into  the  Channel  or  entered  the 
North  Sea  in  order  to  go  round  the  British  Isles  with  the  object  of 
attacking  the  French  coasts  or  the  French  navy  and  of  harassing 
French  merchant  shipping,  the  British  fleet  would  intervene  in  order 
to  give  to  French  shipping  its  complete  protection  in  such  a  way  that 
from  that  moment  Great  Britain  and  Germany  would  be  in  a  state 
of  war." 

From  now  onwards,  the  British  fleet  protects  our  northern  and 
western  coasts  against  a  German  attack.  Gentlemen,  these  are 
the  facts.  I  believe  that  the  simple  recital  of  them  is  sufficient  to 
justify  the  acts  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic.  I  wish,  how- 
ever, to  make  clear  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  my  story  and 
to  give  its  true  meaning  to  the  unheard-of  attack  of  which  France 
is  the  victim. 

The  victors  of  1870  have,  at  different  times,  as  you  know,  desired  ^ 
to  repeat  the  blows  which  they  dealt  us  then.  In  1875,  the  war 
which  was  intended  to  complete  the  destruction  of  conquered  France 
was  only  prevented  by  the  intervention  of  the  two  Powers  to  whom 
we  were  to  become  united  at  a  later  date  by  ties  of  alliance  and  of 
friendship  {unanimous  applause),  by  the  intervention  of  Russia  and 
of  Great  Britain  {prolonged  applause,  all  the  deputies  rising  to  their 
feet]. 

Since  then  the  French  Republic,  by  the  restoration  of  her  national 
forces  and  the  conclusion  of  diplomatic  agreements  unswervingly 
adhered  to,  has  succeeded  in  liberating  herself  from  the  yoke  which 
even  in  a  period  of  profound  peace  Bismarck  was  able  to  impose 
upon  Europe. 

She  has  re-established  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,^  a  guarantee 
of  the  liberty  and  dignity  of  all. 

1  No  date  is  here  given.     It  was  August  3.     See  Sir  E.  Grey's  speech  of  that  date. 

2  For  the  wording  of  this  declaration  which  is  different  from  that  published  in  the 
British  Blue  Book  see  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  137,  August  2  ;  and  143,  August  3  and 
notes. 

^  Germany  has  always  denied  this  desire. 

*  A  noteworthy  reference  to  this  bugbear  of  European  politics. 


454  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Gentleman,  I  do  not  know  if  I  am  mistaken,  but  it  seems  to  me 
that  this  work  of  peaceful  reparation,  of  liberation  and  honour  finally 
ratified  in  1904  and  1907,  with  the  genial  co-operation  of  King  Edward 
VII  of  England  and  the  Government  of  the  Crown  (applause),  this 
is  what  the  German  Empire  wishes  to  destroy  to-day  by  one  daring 
stroke. 

Germany  can  reproach  us  with  nothing. 

Bearing  in  silence  in  our  bosom  for  half  a  century  the  wound  which 
Germany  dealt  us  we  have  offered  to  peace  an  unprecedented  sacrifice 
(loud  and  unanimous  applause). 

We  have  offered  other  sacrifices  in  all  the  discussions  which  since 
1904  German  diplomacy  has  systematically  provoked,  whether  in 
Morocco  or  elsewhere  in  1905,  in  1906,  in  1908,  in  1911.^ 

Russia  also  has  given  proof  of  great  moderation  at  the  time  of  the 
events  of  1908,  as  she  has  done  in  the  present  crisis. 

She  observed  the  same  moderation,  and  the  Triple  Entente  with 
her,  when  in  the  Eastern  crisis  of  1912  Austria  and  Germany  formu- 
lated demands,  whether  against  Servia  or  against  Greece,  which  still 
were,  as  the  event  proved,  capable  of  settlement  by  discussion. 

Useless  sacrifices,  barren  negotiations,  empty  efforts,  since  to-day 
in  the  very  act  of  conciliation  we,  our  allies  and  ourselves,  are  attacked 
by  surprise  {prolonged  applause). 

No  one  can  honestly  believe  that  we  are  the  aggressors.  Vain 
is  the  desire  to  overthrow  the  sacred  principles  of  right  and  of  liberty 
to  which  nations,  as  well  as  individuals,  are  subject ;  Italy  with  that 
clarity  of  insight  possessed  by  the  Latin  intellect,  has  notified  us  that 
she  proposes  to  preserve  neutrality  {prolonged  applause,  all  the  deputies 
rising  to  their  feet) . 

This  decision  has  found  in  all  France  an  echo  of  sincerest  joy.  I 
made  myself  the  interpreter  of  this  feeling  to  the  Italian  Charge 
d'Affaires  when  I  told  him  how  much  I  congratulated  myself  that  the 
two  Latin  sisters,  who  have  the  same  origin  and  the  same  ideal,  a 
common  and  glorious  past,  are  not  now  opposed  to  one  another 
{renewed  applause). 

Gentlemen,  we  proclaim  loudly  the  object  of  their  attack —  it 
is  the  independence,  the  honour,  the  safety,  which  the  Triple  Entente 
has  regained  in  the  balance  of  power  ^  for  the  service  of  peace.  The 
object  of  attack  is  the  liberties  of  Europe,  which  France,  her  allies 
and  her  friends,  are  proud  to  defend  {loud  applause). 

We  are  going  to  defend  these  liberties,  for  it  is  they  that  are  in 
dispute,  and  all  the  rest  is  but  a  pretext. 

France,  unjustly  provoked,  did  not  desire  war,  she  has  done 
everything  to  avert  it.  Since  it  is  forced  upon  her,  she  will  defend 
herself  against  Germany  and  against  every  Power  which  has  not  yet 
declared  its  intentions,  but  joins  with  the  latter  in  a  conflict  between 
the  two  countries.     {Applause,  all  the  deputies  rising  to  their  feet.) 

^  For  France's  attitude  toward  Germany  as  it  appears  from  the  despatches  of  the 
French  Yellow  Book,  see  the  editor's  Germany's  Point  of  View,  chapters  on  the 
French  Yellow  Book. 

2  See  above. 


August  4,  British  Blue  Book  No.  153  455 

A  free  and  valiant  people  that  sustains  an  eternal  ideal,  and  is 
wholly  united  to  defend  its  existence;  a  democracy  which  knows 
how  to  discipline  its  military  strength,  and  was  not  afraid  a  year  ago 
to  increase  its  burden  as  an  answer  to  the  armaments  of  its  neighbour ; 
a  nation  armed,  struggling  for  its  own  life  and  for  the  independence 
of  Europe  —  here  is  a  sight  which  we  are  proud  to  offer  to  the  on- 
lookers in  this  desperate  struggle,  that  has  for  some  days  been  pre- 
paring with  the  greatest  calmness  and  method.  We  are  without 
reproach.  We  shall  be  without  fear.  {Loud  applause,  all  the  depu- 
ties rising  to  their  feet.)  France  has  often  proved  in  less  favourable 
circumstances  that  she  is  a  most  formidable  adversary  when  she 
fights,  as  she  does  to-day,  for  liberty  and  for  right  (applause). 

In  submitting  our  actions  to  you.  Gentlemen,  who  are  our  judges, 
we  have,  to  help  us  in  bearing  the  burden  of  our  heavy  responsibility, 
the  comfort  of  a  clear  conscience  and  the  conviction  that  we  have 
done  our  duty  (prolonged  applause,  all  the  deputies  rising  to  their  feet), 

Rene  Viviani. 

Great  Britain: 

To  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  153 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914. 

The  King  of  the  Belgians  has  made  an  appeal  ^  to  His  Majesty 
the  King  for  diplomatic  intervention  on  behalf  of  Belgium  in  the 
following  terms :  — 

"Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's  friendship 
and  that  of  your  predecessor,  and  the  friendly  attitude  of  England 
in  1870  and  the  proof  of  friendship  you  have  just  given  us  again,  I 
make  a  supreme  appeal  to  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  your 
Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  Belgium." 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  also  informed  that  the  German 
Government  have  delivered  to  the  Belgian  Government  a  note  ^ 
proposing  friendly  neutrality  entailing  free  passage  through  Belgian 
territory,  and  promising  to  maintain  the  independence  and  integrity 
of .  the  kingdom  and  its  possessions  at  the  conclusion  of  peace, 
threatening  in  case  of  refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  enemy.  An 
answer  was  requested  within  twelve  hours. 

We  also  understand  that  Belgium  has  categorically  refused^  this 
as  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  law  of  nations. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  bound  to  protect  against  this  vio- 
lation of  a  treaty^  to  which  Germany  is  a  party  in  common  with 
themselves,  and  must  request  an  assurance  that  the  demand  made 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  25,  August  3. 

2  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  20,  August  2. 

3  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  22,  August  3. 

*  Of.  Sir  E.  Grey's  despatch,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  37,  August  4. 


456  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

upon  Belgium  will  not  be  proceeded  with  and  that  her  neutrality 
will  be  respected  by  Germany.  You  should  ask  for  an  immediate 
reply. 

From  Brussels 

British  Blue  Book  No.  154 

Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  August  4-) 

(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  4,  1914. 

German  Minister  has  this  morning  addressed  note  ^  to  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that  as  Belgian  Government  have  declined 
the  well-intentioned  proposals  submitted  to  them  by  the  Imperial 
Government,  the  latter  will,  deeply  to  their  regret,  be  compelled  to 
carry  out,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures  considered 
indispensable  in  view  of  the  French  menaces. 

To  Brussels 
British  Blue  Book  No.  155 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914- 

You  should  inform  Belgian  Government  that  if  pressure  is  applied 
to  them  by  Germany  to  induce  them  to  depart  from  neutrality,  His 
Majesty's  Government  expect  that  they  will  resist  by  any  means  in 
their  power,^  and  that  His  Majesty's  Government  will  support  them 
in  offering  such  resistance,  and  that  His  Majesty's  Government  in 
this  event  are  prepared  to  join  Russia  and  France,  if  desired,  in  offer- 
ing to  the  Belgian  Government  at  once  common  action  for  the  pur- 
pose of  resisting  use  of  force  by  Germany  against  them,  and  a  guaran- 
tee to  maintain  their  independence  and  integrity  in  future  years. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  156 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914- 

I  CONTINUE  to  receive  numerous  complaints  from  British  firms  as 
to  the  detention  pf  their  ships  at  Hamburg,  Cuxhaven,  and  other 
German  ports.  This  action  on  the  part  of  the  German  authorities 
is  totally  unjustifiable.     It  is  in  direct  contravention  of  international 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  27,  same  day. 

2  This  is  in  reply  to  the  appeal  for  "diplomatic  intervention,"  see  British  Blue 
Book  No.  153,  same  day,  and  notes  to  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  24,  August  3,  and  No.  38, 
August  4. 


August  4,  British  Blue  Book  No,  159  457 

law  and  of  the  assurances  given  to  your  Excellency  by  the  Imperial 
Chancellor.  You  should  demand  the  immediate  release  of  all  British 
ships  if  such  release  has  not  yet  been  given. 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  157  ^ 

German  Foreign  Secretary  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador 
in  London.  —  {Communicated  by  German  Embassy,  August  4.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  4,  1914. 

Please  dispel  any  mistrust  that  may  subsist  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Government  with  regard  to  our  intentions,  by  repeating 
most  positively  formal  assurance  that,  even  in  the  case  of  armed 
conflict  with  Belgium,  Germany  will,  under  no  pretence  whatever, 
annex  Belgian  territory.  Sincerity  of  this  declaration  is  borne  out 
by  fact  that  we  solemnly  pledged  our  word  to  Holland  strictly  to 
respect  her  neutrality.  It  is  obvious  that  we  could  not  profitably 
annex  Belgian  territory  without  making  at  the  same  time  territorial 
acquisitions  at  expense  of  Holland.  Please  impress  upon  Sir  E.  Grey 
that  German  army  could  not  be  exposed  to  French  attack  across 
Belgium,  which  was  planned  according  to  absolutely  unimpeachable 
information.  Germany  had  consequently  to  disregard  Belgian  neu- 
trality, it  being  for  her  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent  French 
advance. 

From  Brussels 

British  Blue  Book  No.  158 

Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 
{Received  August  4-) 

(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  4,  1914- 

Military  attache  has  been  informed  at  War  Office  that  German 
troops  have  entered  Belgian  territory,^  and  that  Liege  has  been  sum- 
moned to  surrender  by  small  party  of  Germans  who,  however,  were 
repulsed. 

To  Berlin 
British  Blue  Book  No.  159 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4j  1914- 

We  hear  that  Germany  has  addressed  note  ^  to  Belgian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that  German  Government  will  be  com- 

1  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  36,  same  day. 

2  Cf.  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  30,  same  day. 
8  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  27,  same  day. 


458  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

pelled  to  carry  out,  if  necessary,  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures  con- 
sidered indispensable. 

We  are  also  informed  ^  that  Belgian  territory  has  been  violated  at 
Gemmenich. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany 
declined  ^  to  give  the  same  assurance  respecting  Belgium  as  France 
gave  last  week  in  reply  to  our  request  made  simultaneously  at  Berlin 
and  Paris,  we  must  repeat  that  request,  and  ask  that  a  satisfactory 
reply  to  it  and  to  my  telegram  of  this  morning  ^  be  received  here  by 
12  o'clock  to-night.  If  not,  you  are  instructed  to  ask  for  your 
passports,  and  to  say  that  His  Majesty's  Government  feel  bound  to 
take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  party 
as  ourselves. 

Serbia : 

From  Nish 

Sei^bian  Blue  Book  No.  49 

M.  N.  Pashitch,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to 
Dr.  M.  Yovanomtch,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Nish,  July  22/ August  4,  1914. 

Please  inform  the  Imperial  Government  that  you  have  received 
instructions  to  leave  ^  Germany,  together  with  the  staffs  of  the  Lega- 
tion and  Consulate.     You  should  leave  immediately. 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  30,  same  day. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  122,  under  date  of  August  1. 

3  British  Blue  Book  No.  153,  same  date. 

*  This  was  a  natural  order,  because  Austria-Hungary  was  at  war  with  Serbia,  and 
Germany  was  the  former's  ally.  The  diplomatic  documents  do  not  contain  the  dec- 
laration of  war  between  Germany  and  Serbia. 


August  5,  Au^tro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  59 


459 


Wednesday,  August  5,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 


Foreign  Office  of 

Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  from 

Austria-Hungary 

Petrograd 

Belgium 

Ministers    at   Entente 

London,  Berlin,  Mad- 

Capitals                        ^ 

rid 

All    Representatives 

Paris,  The  Hague 

abroad 

British  Minister 

Madrid 

France 

President's  message 
Viviani's  speech 

Luxemburg 

Germany 

Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary  sends  note  to  her  Ambassador  in  Russia  declaring  war  on 
Russia. 

Belgium  protests  against  the  invasion  of  her  territory  to  all  ''Countries  having 
Diplomatic  Relations"  with  her. 

France  joins  Great  Britain  and  Russia  in  declaring  their  willingness  to  co- 
operate '*in  the  defence  of  Belgian  territory." 

Germany  requests  the  departure  from  Luxemburg  of  the  Entente  Ministers. 

Great  Britain  declares  war  on  Germany  as  of  11  a.m.,  and  informs  Belgium  that 
she  considers  "joint  action  with  a  view  to  resisting  Germany  to  be  in  force." 

Russia  declares  her  willingness  to  cooperate  with  France  and  Great  Britain 
"in  the  defence  of  Belgian  territory." 


Austria-Hungary : 

To  St.  Petersburgh 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    59 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szdpdry  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

{Translated  from  the  French.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  5,  1914. 

I  ASK  Your  Excellency  to  hand  over  the  following  note  to  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  :  — 

"On  the  instructions  of  his  Government,  the  undersigned,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  has  the  honour  to  inform  His  Excel- 
lency the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  as  follows :  — 

"In  view  of  the  threatening  attitude  adopted  by  Russia  in  the 
conflict  between  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  and  Servia ;  and 
of  the  fact  that,  according  to  a  communication  from  the  Berlin  Cabi- 
net, Russia  has  seen  fit,  as  a  result  of  that  conflict,  to  open  hostilities 
against  Germany;  and  whereas  Germany  is  consequently  at  war 
with  Russia;  Austria-Hungary  therefore  considers  herself  also  at 
war  with  Russia  from  the  present  moment." 

After  handing  over  this  note  Your  Excellency  will  ask  that  pass- 
ports may  be  prepared,  and  you  will  leave  withiout  delay  with  the 


460  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

entire  staff  of  the  Embassy  with  the  exception  of  any  members  who 
are  to  be  left  behind.  At  the  same  time  M.  Schebeko  is  being  fur- 
nished with  his  passport  by  us. 

Belgium : 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  41 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to  M,  Damgnon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  London,  August  5,  1914- 

Germany,  having  rejected  the  British  proposals,  Great  Britain 
has  informed  her  that  a  state  of  war  existed  between*  the  two  coun- 
tries as  from  11  o'clock. 

To  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  42 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  5,  1914. 

After  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory  at  Gemmenich,^  Belgium 
appealed  ^  to  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  through  their  repre- 
sentatives at  Brussels,  to  co-operate  as  guaranteeing  Powers  in  the 
defence  of  her  territory. 

Belgium  undertakes  the  defence  of  her  fortified  places. 

To  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  43 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  5,  1914- 

In  my  despatch  of  August  4  (see  No.  38)  I  had  the  honour  to  in- 
form you  of  the  sequence  of  events  which  had  attended  the  inter- 
national relations  of  Belgium  from  July  31st  to  August  4th.  I  added 
that  the  Cabinet  was  considering  the  question  whether  Belgium, 
whose  territory  had  been  invaded  since  the  morning,  should  appeal 
to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers. 

The  Cabinet  had  decided  in  the  affirmative  when  the  British 
Minister  informed  me  that  the  proposal  which  he  had  communicated 
to  me,  and  according  to  which  the  British  Government  were  disposed 
to  respond  favourably  to  our  appeal  to  her  as  a  guaranteeing  Power, 
was  cancelled  for  the  time  being.^     (See  No.  37.) 

1  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  30,  August  4. 

2  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  40,  same  day. 

3  This  paragraph  is  txot  clear.  What  had  Sir  E.  Grey's  offer,  Belgian  Gray  Book 
No.  37,  or  Its  cancellation,  ib.  No.  39,  to  do  with  the  decision  of  the  Cabinet  ? 


August  5,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  44  461 

A  telegram  from  London  made  it  clear  that  this  change  of  atti- 
tude was  caused  by  an  ultimatum  from  Great  Britain  giving  Ger- 
many a  time  limit  of  ten  hours  within  which  to  evacuate  Belgian 
territory  and  to  respect  Belgian  neutrality.  (See  No.  39.)  During 
the  evening,  the  Belgian  Government  addressed  to  France,  Great 
Britain,  and  Russia,  through  their  respective  representatives  at  Brus- 
sels, a  note,  of  which  a  copy  is  enclosed  herewith.     (See  No.  40.) 

As  you  will  observe,  Belgium  appeals  to  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia  to  co-operate  as  guaranteeing  Powers  in  the  defence  of 
her  territory  and  in  the  maintenance  for  the  future  of  the  independ- 
ence and  integrity  of  her  territory.  She  will  herself  undertake  the 
defence  of  her  fortified  places. 

As  yet  we  are  not  aware  how  our  appeal  has  been  received. 

To  the  Belgian  Heads  of  Missions  in  all  Countries  having  Diplomatic 
Relations  with  Belgium. 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  44 

M.  Damgnouy  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Heads  of  Missions  in  all  Countries  ^  having  Diplomatic  Relations 
with  Belgium. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  5,  1914- 

By  the  treaty  of  April  18th,  1839,  Prussia,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Austria,  and  Russia  declared  themselves  guarantors  of  the  treaty 
concluded  on  the  same  day  between  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the 
Belgians  and  His  Majesty  the  King  of  the  Netherlands.  The  treaty 
runs :  "  Belgium  shall  form  a  State  independent  and  perpetually 
neutral."  Belgium  has  fulfilled  all  her  international  obligations,  she 
has  accomplished  her  duty  in  a  spirit  of  loyal  impartiality,^  she  has 
neglected  no  effort  to  maintain  her  neutrality  and  to  cause  that  neu- 
trality to  be  respected. 

In  these  circumstances  the  Belgian  Government  have  learnt  with 
deep  pain  that  the  armed  forces  of  Germany,  a  Power  guaranteeing 
Belgian  neutrality,  have  entered  Belgian  territory  in  violation  of  the 
obligations  undertaken  by  treaty. 

It  is  our  duty  to  protest  with  indignation  against  an  outrage 
against  international  law  provoked  by  no  act  of  ours. 

The  Belgian  Government  are  firmly  determined  to  repel  by  all 
the  means  in  their  power  the  attack  thus  made  upon  their  neutrality, 
and  they  recall  the  fact  that,  in  virtue  of  article  10  of  The  Hague 
Convention  of  1907  respecting  the  rights  and  duties  of  neutral 
Powers  and  persons  in  the  case  of  war  by  land,  if  a  neutral  Power 
repels,  even  by  force,  attacks  on  her  neutrality  such  action  cannot  be 
considered  as  a  hostile  act. 

I  have  to  request  that  you  will  ask  at  once  for  an  audience  with 

1  This  includes  the  United  States. 

2  This  is  denied  by  Germany  in  view  of  the  Brussels  documents  which  show  that 
Belgium  had  given  her  military  secrets  to  Great  Britain. 


462  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  read  this  despatch  to  his  Excel- 
lency, handing  him  a  copy.  If  the  interview  cannot  be  granted  at 
once  you  should  make  the  communication  in  question  in  writing. 

From  Berlin 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  45 

Baron  Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin^  to  M.  Damgnon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Berlin,  August  5,  19H, 

I  HAVE  received  my  passports  and  shall  leave  Berlin  to-morrow 
morning  for  Holland  with  the  staff  of  the  legation. 

From  Madrid 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  46 

Baron  Grenier,  Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Sebastian,  August  5,  1914- 

The  Spanish  Government  undertake  the  custody  of  Belgian  in- 
terests in  Germany,  and  are  to-day  sending  telegraphic  instructions 
to  their  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(See  No.  33.) 

From  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  47 

Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Sir,  Paris,  August  5,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  enclose  herewith  a  copy  of  the  notification 
of  a  state  of  war  between  France  and  Germany,  which  has  been 
communicated  to  me  to-day. 


Enclosure  in  No.  47. 
(See  French  Yellow  Book  No.  157,  August  4.) 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  48 

Communication  of  August  5,  from  Sir  Francis  Villiers,  British  Minis- 
ter  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

I  AM  instructed  to  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  His  Bri- 
tannic Majesty's  Government  consider  joint  action  with  a  view  to 


August  5,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  52  463 

resisting  Germany  to  be  in  force  and  to  be  justified  by  the  Treaty 
of  1839. 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  49 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  London,  August  5,  1914. 

Great  Britain  agrees  to  take  joint  action  in  her  capacity  of 
guaranteeing  Power  for  the  defence  of  Belgian  territory.  The 
British  fleet  will  ensure  the  free  passage  of  the  Scheldt  for  the  pro- 
visioning of  Antwerp. 

From  The  Hague 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  50 

Baron  Fallon,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  The  Hague,  August  5,  191^. 

The  war  buoying  is  about  to  be  established. 

(See  No.  29.) 

To  Madrid 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  51 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Grenier, 
Belgian  Minister  at  Madrid. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  5,  1914- 

Please  express  to  the  Spanish  Government  the  sincere  thanks  of 
the  Belgian  Government. 

(See  No.  46.) 

To  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  52 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Sir,  ~  Brussels,  August  5,  1914. 

I  have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  the  French  and  Russian 
Ministers  made  a  communication  to  me  this  morning  informing  me 
of  the  willingness  of  their  Governments  to  respond  to  our  appeal, 
and  to  co-operate  with  Great  Britain  in  the  defence  of  Belgian  terri- 
tory. 


464  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

France : 

From  Luxemburg 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  156 

M.  Mollard,  French  Minister  at  Luxemburg,  to  M.  Doumergue,  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Paris,  August  5,  1914- 

The  Minister  of  State  came  to  see  me  at  the  Legation  this  morn- 
ing, Tuesday,  4th  August,  1914,  at  about  half-past  eight  o'clock,  in 
order  to  notify  me  that  the  German  military  authorities  required  my 
departure.  On  my  answering  that  I  would  only  give  way  to  force 
M.  Eyschen  said  that  he  understood  my  feelings  in  this  matter,  and 
it  was  just  for  that  reason  that  he  had  himself  come  to  make  this 
communication  which  cost  him  so  much,  for  it  was  just  because  force 
was  used  that  he  asked  me  to  leave.  He  added  that  he  was  going 
to  bring  me  written  proof  of  this. 

I  did  not  conceal  from  M.  Eyschen  the  grief  and  anxiety  which  I 
had  in  leaving  my  fellow-countrymen  without  defence,  and  asked 
him  to  be  good  enough  to  undertake  their  protection ;  this  he  promised 
to  do. 

Just  as  he  was  leaving  he  handed  me  the  enclosed  letter  (En- 
closure I.)  which  is  the  answer  of  the  Luxemburg  Government  to  the 
declaration  which  I  had  made  the  evening  before,  according  to  tele- 
graphic instructions  of  M.  Viviani. 

About  10  o'clock,  the  Minister  of  State  came  again  to  the  Lega- 
tion and  left  me  with  a  short  note  from  himself,  a  certified  copy  of 
the  letter  which  the  German  Minister  had  addressed  to  him  on 
the  subject  of  my  departure  from  Luxemburg.     (Enclosures  IL  and 

III.) 

At  the  same  time  he  told  me  that  he  had  informed  Herr  von  Buch 
that  the  Luxemburg  Government  would  be  entrusted  with  the  pro- 
tection of  the  French  and  would  have  charge  of  the  Legation  and 
the  Chancery.  This  news  did  not  seem  to  be  agreeable  to  my  Ger- 
man colleague,  w^ho  advised  M.  Eyschen  to  move  me  to  entrust  this 
responsibility  to  the  Belgian  IMinister.  I  explained  to  the  Minister 
of  State  that  the  situation  was  peculiar.  As  I  was  accredited  to  Her 
Royal  Highness  the  Grand  Duchess  and  as  my  country  was  not 
in  a  state  of  war  with  Luxemburg,  it  was  in  these  circumstances 
clearly  indicated  that  it  should  be  the  Luxemburg  Government  which 
should  look  after  the  safety  of  my  fellow-countrymen.  M.  Eyschen 
did  not  insist,  and  again  accepted  the  service  which  I  entrusted  to 
him. 

The  Minister  of  State  then  asked  me  to  be  good  enough  to  leave 
quietly  in  order  to  avoid  any  demonstration,  which,  as  he  said, 
would  not  fail  to  bring  about  reprisals  on  the  part  of  the  German 
military  authorities  against  the  French.  I  answered  that  I  attached 
too  much  value  to  the  safety  of  my  countrymen  to  compromise  it 
and  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear. 


August  5,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  156  465 

^  My  departure,  which  was  required  to  take  place  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, was  fixed  for  two  o'clock ;  it  was  at  the  same  time  understood 
that  I  should  leave  in  my  motor  car.  As  to  a  safe  conduct,  M. 
Eyschen  told  me  that  the  German  Minister  was  at  that  very  moment 
at  the  German  headquarters  to  ask  for  it,  and  that  he  would  take 
care  that  I  received  it  in  good  time. 

At  a  quarter-past  two  the  Minister  of  State  accompanied  by  M. 
Henrion,  Councillor  of  the  Government,  came  to  take  leave  of 
me  and  to  receive  the  keys  of  the  Legation  and  those  of  the 
Chancery. 

He  told  me  that  orders  had  been  given  for  my  free  passage,  and 
that  I  must  make  for  Arlon  by  way  of  the  Merle,  Mamers  and  Arlon 
roads.  He  added  that  a  German  officer  would  wait  for  me  at  the 
Merle  road  in  order  to  go  in  front  of  my  motor  car. 

I  then  left  the  Legation  and  made  my  w^ay  to  Arlon  by  the  road 
which  had  been  determined  on,  but  I  did  not  meet  anyone. 

Your  Excellency  will  have  the  goodness  to  find  the  enclosed  text 
of  the  letter  which  I  sent  to  the  Minister  of  State  before  leaving  my 
post  (Enclosure  IV.).  Mollard. 


Enclosure  I 

M.  Eyschen,  Minister  of  State,  President  of  the  Government,  to  M, 
Mollard,  French  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipoten- 
tiary at  Luxemburg. 

Sir,  Luxemburg,  August  4,  1914. 

In  an  oral  communication  made  yesterday  evening,  your  Excel- 
lency has  had  the  goodness  to  bring  to  my  knowledge  that  in  accord- 
ance with  the  Treaty  of  London  of  1867,  the  Government  of  the  Re- 
public intended  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Luxemburg  as  they  had  shown  by  their  attitude,  but  that  the  viola- 
tion of  this  neutrality  by  Germany  was  nevertheless  of  such  a  kind 
as  to  compel  France  henceforth  to  be  influenced  in  this  matter  by 
the  care  for  her  defence  and  her  interests. 

You  will  allow  me  to  point  out  clearly  that  the  decision  of  the 
Government  of  the  Republic  is  based  solely  on  the  act  of  a  third 
Power  for  which  in  truth  the  Grand  Duchy  is  not  responsible. 

The  rights  of  Luxemburg  must  then  remain  intact. 

The  German  Empire  has  formally  declared  that  only  a  temporary 
occupation  of  Luxemburg  entered  into  their  intentions. 

I  am  glad  to  believe  that  the  Government  of  the  Republic  will 
have  no  difficulty  in  establishing  with  me  the  fact  that  at  all  times 
and  in  all  circumstances  the  Grand  Duchy  has  fully  and  loyally  ful- 
filled all  the  obligations  of  every  kind  which  rested  on  it  in  virtue  of 
the  Treaty  of  1867.  I  remain,  etc., 

Eyschen. 
Minister  of  State,  President  of  the  Government. 
2h 


466  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Enclosure  II 

Private  Letter  from  M.  Eyschen,  Minister  of  State,  President  of  the 
Government,  to  M.  Mollard,  French  Minister,  at  Luxemburg. 

Sir, 

A  SHORT  time  ago  I  had  with  very  great  regret  to  inform  you  of 
the  intentions  of  General  von  Fuchs  with  regard  to  your  sojourn  in 
Luxemburg. 

As  I  had  the  honour  to  tell  you,  I  asked  for  confirmation  in  writ- 
ing of  the  decision  taken  by  the  military  authorities  in  this  matter. 

Enclosed  is  a  copy  of  a  letter  which  I  have  at  this  moment  re- 
ceived from  the  German  Minister. 

He  has  assured  me  that  in  carrying  out  this  step  there  will  be  no 
want  of  the  respect  due  to  your  position  and  person. 

Be  good  enough  to  receive  the  renewed  expression  of  my  regret 
and  my  deep  regard.  Eyschen. 


Enclosure  III 
To  His  Excellency  the  Minister  of  State,  Dr.  Eyschen, 

Your  Excellency, 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  his  Excellency  General 
Fuchs,  I  have  the  honour  to  ask  you  to  be  good  enough  to  request 
the  French  Minister,  M.  Mollard,  to  leave  Luxemburg  as  soon  as 
possible  and  to  return  to  France;  otherwise  the  German  military 
authorities  would  find  themselves  under  the  painful  necessity  of 
placing  M.  Mollard  under  the  charge  of  a  military  escort  and  in  the 
last  extremity  of  proceeding  to  his  arrest. 

I  beg  your  Excellency  to  have  the  goodness  on  this  occasion  to 
receive  the  assurance  of  my  deepest  regard.  Von  Buch. 


Enclosure  IV 

M.  Mollard,  French  Minister  at  Luxemburg,  to  His  Excellency  M. 
Eyschen,  Minister  of  State,  President  of  the  Government  of  Luxem- 
burg. 

Sir,  Luxemburg,  August  4)  1914- 

I  HAVE  just  received  your  communication  and  I  submit  to  force. 
Before  leaving  Luxemburg  it  is  my  duty  to  provide  for  the  for- 
tunes and  safety  of  my  fellow-countrymen.  Knowing  the  spirit  of 
justice  and  equity  of  the  Luxemburg  Government,  I  have  the  honour 
to  ask  your  Excellency  to  take  them  under  your  protection,  and  to 
watch  over  the  safety  of  their  lives  and  goods. 


August  5,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  156  467 

At  the  same  time  I  will  ask  your  Excellency  to  take  charge  of  the 
Legation  and  the  offices  of  the  Chancery. 

I  should  be  much  obliged  to  your  Excellency  if  you  would  be  good 
enough  to  lay  before  Her  Royal  Highness  the  Grand  Duchess  the 
expression  of  my  deepest  respect,  and  my  excuses  for  not  having  been 
able  myself  to  express  them  to  her. 

In  thankmg  you  for  all  the  marks  of  sympathy  which  you  have 
given  me  I  beg  you  to  receive  renewed  assurances  of  my  deep  regard. 

Armand  Mollard. 


Sent  Despatches  to 

Received 
Despatches  fkom 

London 
The  Hague 

The  Hague 

German  Legation 

Austro-Hungarian 

Ambassador 
BerHn 

468  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Thiirsday,  August  6,  1914 
SUMMARY  OF  PUBLISHED  DESPATCHES 

Foreign  Office  of 

Austria-Hungary 

Belgium 

France 

Germany 

Great  Britain 

Russia 

Serbia 

Austria-Hungary  presents  her  declaration  of  war  to  Russia. 

Belgium  is  informed  by  Holland  of  war  regulations  established  for  the  naviga- 
tion of  the  Scheldt. 

Germany  and  Serbia  sever  diplomatic  relations,  and  the  former  in  so  doing  lays 
the  entire  blame  for  the  war  on  Russia  for  having  ordered  general  mobiUsation 
just  when  Germany  was  hopeful  of  success  in  her  attempt  at  mediation. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  London 

Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  60 
Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Mensdorff  at  London. 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  6,  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  Your  Excellency's  telegram  of  the  4th  August.^ 
I  ask  you  to  assure  Sir  E.  Grey  that  we  will  in  no  case  open  hostili- 
ties against  Great  Britain  without  a  previous  formal  declaration  of 
war,  but  that  we  also  expect  that  Great  Britain  will  observe  towards 
us  a  similar  attitude,  and  that  she  will  not  undertake  any  hostile  act 
against  us  before  formally  declaring  war. 

Belgium : 

From  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  53 

Jonkheer  de  Weede,  Netherlands  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  6,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  transmit  to  your  Excellency  herewith  a  copy 
of  the  special  edition  of  the  Staatscourant,  containing  the  declara- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands  in  the  war  between  Bel- 
gium and  Germany,  and  between  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  58,  August  4. 


August  6,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  53 


469 


Enclosure  to  No.  53 

Laws,  Decrees,  Nominations,  etc. 

Ministries  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Justice,  Marine,  War,  and  the  Colonies, 

(Translation.) 
The  Ministers  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Justice,  Marine,  War, 
and  the  Colonies,  authorised  to 
that  effect  by  her  Majesty  the 
Queen,  make  known  to  all  whom 
it  may  concern  that  the  Nether- 
lands Government  will  observe 
strict  neutrality  in  the  war 
which  has  broken  out  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany,  and 
Belgium  and  Germany,  Powers 
friendly  to  the  Netherlands,  and 
that,  with  a  view  of  the  observ- 
ance of  this  neutrality,  the  fol- 
lowing dispositions  have  been 
taken :  — 


^  Les  Ministres  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres,  de  la  Justice,  de  la 
Marine,  de  la  Guerre  et  des 
Colonies,  autorises  a  cette  fin  par 
Sa  Majeste  la  Reine,  portent  a  la 
connaissance  de  tons  ceux  que  la 
chose  concerne,  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment  neerlandais  observera  dans 
la  guerre  qui  a  eclate  entre  les 
Puissances  amies  des  Pays-Bas, 
Grande-Bretagne  et  Allemagne, 
et  Belgique  et  Allemagne,  une 
stricte  neutralite,  et  qu'en  vue  de 
I'observation  de  cette  neutralite 
les  dispositions  suivantes  ont  ete 
arretees : 


Article  1 

Dans  les  limites  du  territoire 
de  I'Etat,  comprenant  le  territoire 
du  Royaume  en  Europe,  outre 
les  colonies  et  possessions  dans 
d'autres  parties  du  monde,  aucun 
genre  d'hostilites  n'est.permis  et 
ce  territoire  ne  pent  servir  de  base 
pour  des  operations  hostiles. 


Article  2 

Ni  I'occupation  d'une  partie 
quelconque  du  territoire  de  I'Etat 
par  un  belligerant,  ni  le  passage 
a  travers  ce  territoire  par  voie  de 
terre  par  des  troupes  ou  des  con- 
vois  de  munitions  appartenanta 
un  des  belligerants  ne  sont  permis 
non  plus  que  le  passage  a  travers 
le  territoire  situe  a  Finterieur  des 
eaux  territoriales  neerlandaises 
par  des  navires  de  guerre  ou  des 
batiments  des  belligerants  as- 
similes  a  ceux-ci. 


Article  1 

Within  the  limits  of  the  terri- 
tory of  the  State,  including  the 
territory  of  the  Kingdom  in 
Europe  and  the  colonies  and 
possessions  in  other  parts  of  the 
world,  no  hostilities  of  any  kind 
are  permitted,  neither  may  this 
territory  serve  as  a  base  for 
hostile  operations. 

Article  2 

Neither  the  occupation  of  any 
part  of  the  territory  of  the  State 
by  a  belligerent  nor  the  passage 
across  this  territory  by  land  is 
permitted  to  the  troops  or  con- 
voys of  munitions  belonging  to 
the  beUigerents,  nor  is  the  pas- 
sage across  the  territory  situated 
within  the  territorial  waters  of 
the  Netherlands  by  the  warships 
or  ships  assimilated  thereto  of 
the  belligerents  permitted. 


470 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Article  3 

Les  troupes  ou  les  militaires, 
appartenant  aux  belligerants  ou 
destines  a  ceux-ci  et  arrivant  sur 
le  territoire  de  I'Etat  par  voie 
de  terre  seront  immediatement 
desarmes  et  internes  jusqu'a  la 
fin  de  la  guerre. 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  bati- 
ments  assimiles  a  ces  derniers, 
appartenant  a  un  belligerant,  qui 
contreviendront  aux  prescriptions 
des  articles  2,  4  ou  7,  ne  pourront 
quitter  ce  territoire  avant  la  fin 
de  la  guerre. 

Article  4 

Les  navires  de  guerre  oubati- 
ments  assimiles  a  ces  derniers, 
qui  appartiennent  a  un  belli- 
gerant, n'auro^nt  pas  acces  au 
territoire  de  TEtat. 


Article  3 

Troops  or  soldiers  belonging  to 
the  belligerents  or  destined  for 
them  arriving  in  the  territory  of 
the  State  by  land  will  be  imme- 
diately disarmed  and  interned 
until  the  termination  of  the  war. 

Warships  or  ships  assimilated 
thereto  belonging  to  a  belligerent, 
who  contravenes  the  provisions  of 
articles  2,  4,  or  7  will  not  be  per- 
mitted to  leave  the  said  territory 
until  the  end  of  the  war. 


Article  4 

No  warships  or  ships  assimi- 
lated thereto  belonging  to  any  of 
the  belligerents  shall  have  access 
to  the  said  territory. 


Article  5 

La  disposition  de  Tarticle  4 
n'est  pas  applicable : 

1°  aux  navires  de  guerre  ou 
batiments  d'un  belligerant  assi- 
miles a  ces  derniers,  et  qui  par 
suite  d'avarie  ou  de  I'etat  de  la 
mer  sont  tenus  d'entrer  dans  un 
des  ports  ou  rades  de  I'Etat.  Les 
navires  pourront  quitter  les  dits 
ports  ou  rades  des  que  les  circon- 
stances  qui  les  ont  contraints  de 
s'y  refugier  auront  cesse  d'exister ; 

2°  aux  navires  de  guerre  ou 
batiments  assimiles,  appartenant 
a  un  belligerant,  et  qui  font  escale 
dans  un  port  ou  une  rade  situes 
dans  le  territoire  des  colonies  et 
possessions  d'cutre-mer,  exclu- 
sivement  dans  le  but  de  completer 
leur  provision  de  denrees  alimen- 
taires  ou  de  combustibles.  Ces 
navires  devront  repartir  des  que 
les  circonstances  qui  \es  ont  forces 


Article  5 

The  provisions  of  article  4  do 
not  apply  to  :  — 

L  Warships  or  ships  assimi- 
lated thereto  which  are  forced  to 
enter  the'  ports  or  roadstead  of 
the  State  on  account  of  damages 
or  the  state  of  the  sea.  Such 
ships  may  leave  the  said  ports  or 
roadsteads  as  soon  as  the  circum- 
stances which  have  driven  them 
to  take  shelter  there  shall  have 
ceased  to  exist. 

2.  Warships  or  ships  assimi- 
lated thereto  belonging  to  a  bel- 
ligerent which  anchor  in  a  port 
or  roadstead  in  the  colonies  or 
oversea  possessions  exclusively 
with  the  object  of  completing 
their  provision  of  foodstuffs  or 
fuel.  These  ships  must  leave  as 
soon  as  the  circumstances  which 
have  forced  them  to  anchor  shall 
have  ceased  to  exist,  subject  to 


August  6,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  S3 


471 


a  faire  escale  ont  cesse  d'exister, 
avec  cette  condition  que  le  sejour 
en  rade  ou  dans  le  port  ne  pourra 
durer  plus  de  vingt-quatre  heures ; 
3°  aux  navires  de  guerre  ou 
batiments  assimiles,  appartenant 
a  un  belligerant,  et  qui  sont 
utilises  exclusivement  pour  une 
mission  religieuse,  scientifique,  ou 
humanitaire. 


the  condition  that  their  stay  in 
the  roadstead  or  port  shall  not 
exceed  twenty-four  hours. 

3.  Warships  or  ships  assimi- 
lated thereto  belonging  to  a  bel- 
ligerent employed  exclusively  on 
a  religious,  scientific,  or  human- 
itarian mission. 


Article  6 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  bati- 
ments assimiles  appartenant  a 
un  belligerant,  ne  peuvent  reparer 
leurs  avaries  dans  les  ports  ou 
rades  de  I'Etat  qu'en  tant  que 
cette  reparation  est  indispensable 
a  la  securite  de  la  navigation,  et 
ils  ne  pourront  en  aucune  fa9on 
accroitre  leurs  capacites  de 
combat. 


Article  6 

Warships  or  ships  assimilated 
thereto  belonging  to  a  belligerent 
may  only  execute  such  repairs  in 
the  ports  and  roadsteads  of  the 
State  as  are  indispensable  to 
their  seaworthiness,  and  they 
may  in  no  way  increase  their 
fighting  capacities. 


Article  7 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  bati- 
ments assimiles,  appartenant  a 
un  belligerant,  et  qui,  au  com- 
mencement de  la  guerre,  se  trou- 
veraient  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat, 
sont  tenus  de  le  quitter  dans  les 
vingt-quatre  heures  de  la  publi- 
cation de  la  presente. 


Article  7 

Warships  or  ships  assimilated 
thereto  belonging  to  a  belligerent 
who  may  at  the  commencement 
of  war  be  within  the  territory  of 
the  State  must  leave  within 
twenty-four  hours  from  the  mo- 
ment of  the  publication  of  this 
declaration. 


Article  8 

Si  des  navires  de  guerre  ou 
batiments  assimiles  appartenant 
a  divers  belligerants  se  trouvent 
en  meme  temps,  dans  les  con- 
ditions visees  a  I'article  5,  dans 
une  meme  partie  du  monde,  et 
sur  le  territoire  de  TEtat,  un  delai 
d'au  moins  vingt-quatre  heures 
doit  s'ecouler  entre  le  depart  des 
navires  de  chacun  des  belli- 
gerants. A  moins  de  circon- 
stances  speciales,  I'ordre  de  de- 
part  est  determine  par   Tordre 


Article  8 

If  warships  or  ships  assimilated 
thereto  belonging  to  different  bel- 
ligerents find  themselves  at  the 
same  time,  in  the  conditions  set 
forth  in  article  5,  in  the  same  part 
of  the  world  and  within  the  terri- 
tory of  the  State,  a  delay  of  at 
least  twenty-four  hours  must 
elapse  between  the  departure  of 
each  respective  belligerent  ship. 
Except  in  special  circumstances, 
the  order  of  departure  shall  be 
determined  by  the  order  of  arrival. 


472 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


d'arrivee.  Un  navire  de  guerre 
ou  un  batiment  assimile,  appar- 
tenant  a  un  belligerant,  ^ne  pent 
quitter  le  territoire  de  TEtat  que 
vingt-quatre  heures  apres  le 
depart  d'un  navire  de  commerce 
portant  le  pavilion  de  Tautre 
belligerant. 


A  warship  or  ship  assimilated 
thereto  belonging  to  a  belligerent 
may  only  leave  the  territory  of 
the  State  twenty-four  hours  after 
the  departure  of  a  merchant  ship 
which  flies  the  flag  of  another 
belligerent. 


Article  9 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  bati- 
ments  assimiles,  appartenant  a 
un  belligerant,  vises  a  I'article 
5  et  a  I'article  7,  ne  peuvent  etre 
ravitailles  en  denrees  alimentaires 
dans  les  ports  et  les  rades  du  pays 
que  dans  la  mesure  necessaire 
pour  parfaire  leurs  provisions 
jusqu'a  la  limite  normale  du 
temps  de  paix. 

De  meme,  ils  ne  peuvent 
charger  de  combustible  que  dans 
la  mesure  necessaire  pour  pouvoir 
atteindre,  avec  la  provision  qu'ils 
ont  encore  a  bord,  le  port  le  plus 
rapproche  de  leur  propre  pays. 

Un  meme  batiment  ne  pent 
etre  ravitaille  a  nouveau  en  com- 
bustible qu'a  I'expiration  d'une 
periode  de  trois  mois  au  moins 
apres  son  precedent  ravitaille- 
ment  dans  le  territoire  de  I'Etat. 


Article  9 

Warships  or  ships  assimilated 
thereto  belonging  to  a  belligerent 
to  which  articles  5  and  7  are  appli- 
cable may  only  be  provisioned 
with  foodstuffs  in  the  ports  and 
roadsteads  of  the  country  to  the 
extent  necessary  to  bring  their 
provisions  up  to  the  normal  limit 
in  time  of  peace. 

Similarly  they  can  only  be 
supplied  with  fuel  to  the  extent 
necessary  to  enable  them,  with 
the  stock  they  already  have  on 
board,  to  reach  the  nearest  port 
of  their  own  country. 

The  same  vessel  cannot  again 
be  provided  with  fuel  until  a 
period  of  at  least  three  months 
shall  have  elapsed  since  it  was 
last  provisioned  in  the  territory 
of  the  State. 


Article  10 

Une  prise  ne  pent  etre  amenee 
dans  le  territoire  que  lorsqu'elle 
est  incapable  de  naviguer,  qu'elle 
tient  mal  la  mer,  qu'elle  manque 
de  combustible  ou  de  denrees 
alimentaires. 

Elle  doit  s'eloigner  des  que  la 
cause  de  son  entree  dans  le  terri- 
toire cesse  d'exister. 

Si  elle  ne  le  fait  pas,  Tordre 
lui  sera  donne  de  partir  imme- 
diatement;    en  cas  de  refus,  il 


Article  10 

A  prize  may  only  be  brought 
into  Dutch  territory  if  such  prize 
is  unnavigable,  or  unseaworthy, 
or  short  of  fuel  or  foodstuffs. 


Such  prize  must  leave  as  soon 
as  the  reasons  which  caused  her 
to  enter  Dutch  territory  cease  to 
exist. 

Should  such  prize  fail  to  do  so, 
immediate  orders  shall  be  given 
her  to  leave.     In  the  event  of  a 


August  6,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  53 


473 


sera  fait  usage  des  moyens  dis- 
ponibles  pour  liberer  la  prise  avec 
ses  officiers  et  son  equipage  et 
pour  interner  I'equipage  place  a 
bord  par  le  belligerant  qui  a  fait 
la  prise. 


refusal,  all  possible  means  shall 
be  employed  to  liberate  the  prize, 
with  her  officers  and  crew,  and  to 
intern  the  crew  placed  on  board 
by  the  belligerent  who  has  taken 
it  as  prize. 


Article  11 

II  e^st  interdit,  sur  le  territoire 
de  TEtat,  de  former  des  corps 
combattants  ou  d'ouvrir  des 
bureaux  de  recrutement  au  profit 
des  belligerants. 


Article  U 

It  is  forbidden  in  State  terri- 
tory, to  form  a  corps  of  com- 
batants or  to  open  recruiting 
offices  on  behalf  of  the  bellig- 
erents. 


Article  12 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire 
de  I'Etat,  de  prendre  du  service 
a  bord  de  navires  de  guerre  ou  de 
batiments  assimiles. 


Article  12 

It  is  forbidden,  in  State  terri- 
tory, to  take  service  on  board 
warships  or  ships  assimilated 
thereto. 


Article  13 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire 
de  TEtat,  d'amenager,  d'armer  ou 
d'equiper  des  navires  destines  a 
des  fins  militaires  au  profit  d'un 
belligerant,  ou  de  fournir  ou  con- 
duire  a  un  belligerant  de  tels 
navires. 


Article  13 

It  is  forbidden,  in  State  terri- 
tory, to  equip,  arm,  or  man  vessels 
intended  for  military  purposes  on 
behalf  of  a  belligerent,  or  to 
furnish  or  deliver  such  vessels  to 
a  belligerent. 


Article  14 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire 
de  I'Etat,  de  fournir  des  armes  ou 
des  munitions  a  des  navires  de 
guerre  jdu  batiments  assimiles 
appartenant  a  un  belligerant,  ou 
de  leur  venir  en  aide  d'une 
maniere  quelconque  en  vue  de 
I'augmentation  de  leur  equipage 
ou  de  leur  amenagement. 


Article  14 

It  is  forbidden  in  State  terri- 
tory to  supply  arms  or  ammu- 
nition to  warships  or  ships 
assimilated  thereto  belonging  to 
a  belligerent,  or  to  come  to  their 
assistance  in  any  manner  what- 
soever with  a  view  to  augment 
their  crew  or  their  equipment. 


Article  15 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire 
de  I'Etat,  sauf  autorisation  pre- 
alable  des  autorites  locales  com- 
petentes,  de  faire  des  reparations 


Article  15 

It  is  forbidden  in  State  terri- 
tory failing  previous  authorisa- 
tion by  the  competent  local  au- 
thorities, to  repair  warships  or 


474 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


aux  navires  de  guerre  ou  bati- 
.ments  assimiles  appartenant  a 
un  belligerant,  ou  de  leur  fournir 
des  provisions  de  bouche  ou  de 
combustible. 


ships  assimilated  thereto  belong- 
ing to  a  belligerent,  or  to  supply 
them  with  victuals  or  fuel. 


Article  16 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire 
de  I'Etat,  de  cooperer  au  degree- 
ment  ou  a  la  reparation  de  prises, 
sauf  en  ce  qui  est  necessaire  pour 
les  rendre  propres  a  tenir  la  mer ; 
ainsi  que  d'acheter  des  prises  ou 
des  marchandises  confisquees,  et 
de  les  recevoir  en  echange,  en 
don  ou  en  depot. 


Article  16 

It  is  forbidden  in  State  terri- 
tory to  take  part  in  the  dis- 
mantling or  repairing  of  prizes 
except  in  so  far  as  is  necessary  to 
make  them  seaworthy;  also  to 
purchase  prizes  or  confiscated 
goods,  and  to  receive  them  in 
exchange,  in  gift,  or  on  deposit. 


Article  17 

Le  territoire  de  FEtat  comprend 
la  mer  cotiere  sur  une  largeur  de 
3  milles  marins  a  raison  de  60  par 
degre  de  latitude,  a  partir  de  la 
laisse  de  la  basse  mer. 

En  ce  qui  concerne  les  bales 
cette  distance  de  3  milles  marins 
est  mesuree  a  partir  d'une  ligne 
droite  tiree  a  travers  la  bale  aussi 
pres  que  possible  de  I'entree,  au 
point  ou  I'ouverture  de  la  bale  ne 
depasse  pas  10  milles  marins,  a 
raison  de  60  par  degre  de  latitude. 


Article  17 

The  State  territory  comprises 
the  coastal  waters  to  a  distance 
of  3  nautical  miles,  reckoning 
60  to  the  degree  of  latitude,  from 
low-water  mark. 

As  regards  inlets,  this  distance 
of  3  nautical  miles  is  measured 
from  a  straight  line  drawn  across 
the  inlet  at  the  point  nearest  the 
entrance  where  the  mouth  of  the 
inlet  is  not  wider  than  10  nautical 
miles,  reckoning  60  to  the  degree 
of  latitude. 


Article  18 

.  En  outre,  Tintention  est  attiree 
sur  les  articles  100,  1°,  et  205  du 
Code  penal ;  Indisch  Staats- 
blad,  1905,  No.  62 ;  Art.  7,  4°, 
de  la  loi  sur  la  qualite  de  Neer- 
landais  et  sur  le  domicile 
{Nederlandsch  Staatsblad,  1892, 
No.  268;  1910,  No.  216); 
art.  2,  No.  3,  de  la  loi  sur  la 
qualite  de  sujet  neerlandais 
(Nederlandsch  Staatsblad,  1910, 
No.  55 ;  Indisch  Staatsblad, 
1910,   No.    296;   art.   54  et  55 


Article  18 

Further,  attention  is  called  to 
Articles  100,  Section  l,^and  205 
of  the  Penal  Code;  Indisch 
Staatsblad,  1905,  No.  62;  Ar- 
ticle 7,  Section  4,  of  the  Law 
respecting  the  status  of  Nether- 
lands nationality,  and  respecting 
domicile  {Nederlandsch  Staats- 
blad, 1892,  No.  268;  1910, 
No.  216);  Article  2,  No.  3,  of 
the  Law  respecting  the  sta- 
tus of  Netherlands  nationality 
(Nederlandsch    Staatsblad,    1910, 


August  6,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  5^ 


475 


du  Code  penal  de  Suriname; 
art.  54  et  55  du  Code  penal  de 
Cura9ao). 


De  meme,  Fattention  des  com- 
mandants de  navires,  armateurs 
et  affreteurs,  est  attiree  sur  le 
danger  et  les  inconvenients,  aux- 
quels  ils  s'exposeraient  en  ne 
respectant  pas  le  blocus  effectif 
des  belligerants,  en  transportant 
de  la  contrebande  de  guerre  ou 
des  depeches  militaires  pour  les 
belligerants  (a  moins  qu'il  ne 
s'agisse  du  service  postal  regulier) 
ou  en  executant  pour  eux  d'autres 
services  de  transport. 

Quiconque  se  rendrait  coupable 
d'actes  prevus  ci-dessus,  s'ex- 
poserait  a  toutes  les  consequences 
de  ces  actes,  et  ne  pourrait 
obtenir  a  cet  egard  aucune  pro- 
tection ni  intervention  du  Gou- 
vernement  neerlandais. 


No.  55;  Indisch  Staatsblad, 
1910,  No.  296 ;  Articles  54  and 
55  of  the  Penal  Code  of  Suri- 
nam; Articles  54  and  55  of  the 
Penal  Code  of  Cura9oa). 

Similarly,  the  attention  of  com- 
manding officers,  owners,  and 
charterers  of  ships  is  called  to 
the  dangers  and  inconveniences 
to  which  they  would  expose 
themselves  by  disregarding  the 
effective  blockade  of  belligerents, 
by  carrying  contraband  of  war, 
or  military  despatches  for  bel- 
ligerents (except  in  the  course 
of  the  regular  postal  service),  or 
by  rendering  them  other  trans- 
port services. 

Any  person  guilty  of  the  acts 
aforesaid  would  expose  himself  to 
all  the  consequences  of  those  acts 
and  would  not  be  able,  as  regards 
them,  to  obtain  any  protection  or 
intervention  on  the  part  of  the 
Netherlands  Government. 


To  the  Hague 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  54 


M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Fallon, 
Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague. 


(Telegram.) 


Brussels,  August  6,  1914- 


Please  communicate  the  following  note  to  the  Netherlands 
Government :  — 

The  Belgian  Government  have  taken  note  of  the  establishment 
of  war  buoying  on  the  Scheldt  and  of  the  fact  that  the  Netherlands 
Government  will  ensure  the  maintenance  of  navigation. 

It  would  be  convenient  that  navigation  should  be  possible  from 
30  minutes  before  sunrise  to  30  minutes  after  sunset,  and  that 
the  exchange  of  pilots  should  take  place  at  Bath. 

With  every  desire  to  fall  in  with  the  requests  of  the  Netherlands 
Government,  the  Belgian  Government  think  that  it  is  desirable  in 
the  interests  of  the  littoral  ports  to  retain  the  lightships  of  Wielingen 
and  of  Wandelaar,  and  also  the  buoys  of  the  Wielingen  Channel. 


476  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

(See  No.  50.) 

From  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  55 

Baron  Fallon,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  M.  Damgnon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  The  Hague,  August  6,  1914. 

Navigation  on  the  Scheldt  is  allowed  from  daybreak  and  so  long 
as  it  is  light.  The  Wielingen  buoys  will  be  replaced.  The  exchange 
of  pilots  at  Hansweert  is  easier  and  better  organised.  Are  you  par- 
ticularly anxious  to  have  Bath? 

France : 

From  Copenhagen 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  155 

M.  Bapst,  French  Minister  at  Copenhagen,  to  M.  Doumergue,  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Copenhagen,  August  6,  1914- 

The  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  asks  me  to  communicate  to 
your  Excellency  the  following  telegram  :  — 

I  have  been  sent  to  Denmark  by  the  German  Government. 
I  have  just  arrived  at  Copenhagen.  I  am  accompanied  by  all  the 
staff  of  the  Embassy  and  the  Russian  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Darm- 
stadt with  his  family.  The  treatment  which  we  have  received  is  of 
such  a  nature  that  I  have  thought  it  desirable  to  make  a  complete 
report  on  it  to  your  Excellency  by  telegram. 

On  the  morning  of  Monday,  the  3rd  August,  after  I  had,  in  ac- 
cordance with  your  instructions,  addressed  to  Herr  von  Jagow  a 
protest  against  the  acts  of  aggression  committed  on  French  territory 
by  German  troops,  the  Secretary  of  State  came  to  see  me.  Herr 
von  Jagow  came  to  complain  of  acts  of  aggression  which  he  alleged 
had  been  committed  in  Germany,  especially  at  Nuremberg  and  Co- 
blenz  by  French  aviators,  who  according  to  his  statement  "had 
come  from  Belgium."  I  answered  that  I  had  not  the  slightest  in- 
formation as  to  the  facts  to  which  he  attached  so  much  importance 
and  the  improbability  of  which  seemed  to  me  obvious ;  on  my  part 
I  asked  him  if  he  had  read  the  note  v/hich  I  had  addressed  to  him 
with  regard  to  the  invasion  of  our  territory  by  detachments  of  the 
German  army.  As  the  Secretary  of  State  said  that  he  had  not  yet 
read  this  note  I  explained  its  contents  to  him.  I  called  his  attention 
to  the  act  committed  by  the  officer  commanding  one  of  the  detach- 
ments who  had  advanced  to  the  French  village  of  Joncherey,  ten 
kilometres  within  our  frontier,  and  had  blown  out  the  brains  of  a 
French  soldier  whom  he  had  met  there.  After  having  given  my 
opinion  of  this  act  I  added  :   "  You  will  admit  that  under  no  circum- 


August  6,  French  Yelloiv  Book  No.  155  477 

stances  could  there  be  any  comparison  between  this  and  the  flight 
of  an  aeroplane  over  foreign  territory  carried  out  by  private  persons 
animated  by  that  spirit  of  individual  courage  by  which  aviators  are 
distinguished. 

"An  act  of  aggression  committed  on  the  territory  of  a  neighbour 
by  detachments  of  regular  troops  commanded  by  officers  assumes  an 
importance  of  quite  a  different  nature." 

Herr  von  Jagow  explained  to  me  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
facts  of  which  I  was  speaking  to  him,  and  he  added  that  it  was  diffi- 
cult for  events  of  this  kind  not  to  take  place  when  two  armies  filled 
with  the  feelings  •  which  animated  our  troops  found  themselves  face 
to  face  on  either  side  of  the  frontier. 

At  this  moment  the  crowds  which  thronged  the  Pariser  Platz  in 
front  of  the  Embassy  and  whom  we  could  see  through  the  window 
of  my  study,  which  was  half-open,  uttered  shouts  against  France. 
I  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  when  all  this  would  come  to  an  end. 

"The  Government  has  not  yet  come  to  a  decision,"  Herr  von 
Jagow  answered.  "It  is  probable  that  Herr  von  Schoen  will  receive 
orders  to-day  to  ask  for  his  passports  and  then  you  will  receive 
yours."  The  Secretary  of  State  assured  me  that  I  need  not  have  any 
anxiety  with  regard  to  my  departure,  and  that  all  the  proprieties 
would  be  observed  with  regard  to  me  as  well  as  my  staff.  We  w^ere 
not  to  see  one  another  any  more  and  we  took  leave  of  one  another 
after  an  interview  which  had  been  courteous  and  could  not  make  me 
anticipate  what  w^as  in  store  for  me. 

Before  leaving  Herr  von  Jagow  I  expressed  to  him  my  wish  to 
make  a  personal  call  on  the  Chancellor,  as  that  would  be  the  last 
opportunity  that  I  should  have  of  seeing  him. 

Herr  von  Jagow  answered  that  he  did  not  advise  me  to  carry  out 
this  intention  as  this  interview  would  serve  no  purpose  and  could 
not  fail  to  be  painful. 

At  6  o'clock  in  the  evening  Herr  von  Langwerth  brought  me  my 
passports.  In  the  name  of  his  Government  he  refused  to  agree  to 
the  wish  which  I  expressed  to  him  that  I  should  be  permitted  to 
travel  by  Holland  or  Belgium.  He.  suggested  to  me  that  I  should 
go  either  by  way  of  Copenhagen,  although  he  could  not  assure  me 
a  free  passage  by  sea,  or  through  Switzerland  via  Constance. 

I  accepted  this  last  route ;  Herr  von  Langwerth  having  asked  me 
to  leave  as  soon  as  I  possibly  could  it  was  agreed,  in  consideration 
of  the  necessity  I  was  under  of  making  arrangements  with  the  Spanish 
Ambassador,  who  was  undertaking  the  charge  of  our  interests,  that 
I  should  leave  on  the  next  day,  the  4th  August,  at  10  o'clock  at  night. 

At  7  o'clock,  an  hour  after  Herr  von  Langwerth  had  left,  Herr 
von  Lancken,  formerly  Councillor  of  the  Embassy  at  Paris,  came 
from  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  tell  me  to  request  the  staff 
of  my  Embassy  to  cease  taking  meals  in  the  restaurants.  This  order 
was  so  strict  that  on  the  next  day,  Tuesday,  I  had  to  have  recourse 
to  the  authority  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse  to  get  the  Hotel  Bristol  to 
send  our  meals  to  the  Embassy. 


478  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

At  11  o'clock  on  the  same  evening,  Monday,  Herr  von  Langwerth 
came  back  to  tell  me  that  his  Government  would  not  allow  our  return 
by  way  of  Switzerland  under  the  pretext  that  it  would  take  three 
days  and  three  nights  to  take  me  to  Constance.  He  announced 
that  I  should  be  sent  by  way  of  Vienna.  I  only  agreed  to  this  altera- 
tion under  reserve,  and  during  the  night  I  wrote  the  following  letter 
to  Herr  von  Langwerth :  — 

"M.  le  Baron,  Berlin,  August  3,  1914-. 

"  I  have  been  thinking  over  the  route  for  my  return  to  my  coun- 
try about  which  you  came  to  speak  to  me  this  evening.  You  pro- 
pose that  I  shall  travel  by  Vienna.  I  run  the  risk  of  finding  myself 
detained  in  that  town,  if  not  by  the  action  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, at  least  owing  to  the  mobilisation  which  creates  great  difficul- 
ties similar  to  those  existing  in  Germany  as  to  the  movements  of 
trains. 

"  Under  these  circumstances  I  must  ask  the  German  Government 
for  a  promise  made  on  their  honour  that  the  Austrian  Government 
will  send  me  to  Switzerland,  and  that  the  Swiss  Government  will 
not  close  its  frontier  either  to  me  or  to  the  persons  by  whom  I  am 
accompanied,  as  I  am  told  that  that  frontier  has  been  firmly  closed 
to  foreigners. 

"  I  cannot  then  accept  the  proposal  that  you  have  made  to  me 
unless  I  have  the  security  which  I  ask  for,  and  unless  I  am  assured 
that  I  shall  not  be  detained  for  some  months  outside  my  country. 

"Jules  Cambon." 

In  answer  to  this  letter  on  the  next  morning,  Tuesday,  the  4th 
August,  Herr  von  Langwerth  gave  me  in  writing  an  assurance  that 
the  Austrian  and  Swiss  authorities  had  received  communications  to 
this  effect. 

At  the  same  time  M.  Miladowski,  attached  to  the  Consulate  at 
Berlin,  as  well  as  other  Frenchmen,  was  arrested  in  his  own  house 
while  in  bed.  M.  Miladowski,  for  whom  a  diplomatic  passport  had 
been  requested,  was  released  after  four  hours. 

I  was  preparing  to  leave  for  Vienna  when,  at  a  quarter  to  five, 
Herr  von  Langwerth  came  back  to  inform  me  that  I  would  have  to 
leave  with  the  persons  accompanying  me  at  10  o'clock  in  the  even- 
ing, but  that  I  should  be  taken  to  Denmark.  On  this  new  require- 
ment I  asked  if  I  should  be  confined  in  a  fortress  supposing  I  did  not 
comply.  Herr  von  Langwerth  simply  answered  that  he  would  re- 
turn to  receive  my  answer  in  half  an  hour.  I  did  not  wish  to  give 
the  German  Government  the  pretext  for  saying  that  I  had  refused 
to  depart  from  Germany.  I  therefore  told  Herr  von  Langwerth 
when  he  came  back  that  I  would  submit  to  the  order  which  had  been 
given  to  me  but  "that  I  protested." 

I  at  once  wrote  to  Herr  von  Jagow  a  letter  of  which  the  following 
is  a  copy : 


August  6,  French  Yellow  Book  No.  155  479 

"Sir,  Berlin,  August  4,  1914- 

''More  than  once  your  Excellency  has  said  to  me  that  the  Imperial 
Government,  in  accordance  with  the  usages  of  international  courtesy, 
would  facilitate  my  return  to  my  own  country  and  would  give  me 
every  means  of  getting  back  to  it  quickly. 

"Yesterday,  however,  Baron  von  Langwerth,  after  refusing  me 
access  to  Belgium  and  Holland,  informed  me  that  I  should  travel  to 
Switzerland  via  Constance.  During  the  night  I  was  informed  that 
I  should  be  sent  to  Austria,  a  country  which  is  taking  part  in  the 
present  war  on  the  side  of  Germany.  As  I  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
intentions  of  Austria  towards  me,  since  on  Austrian  soil  I  am  noth- 
ing but  an  ordinary  private  individual,  I  wrote  to  Baron  von  Lang- 
werth that  I  requested  the  Imperial  Government  to  give  me  a  promise 
that  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Austrian  authorities  would  give  me  all 
possible  facilities  for  continuing  my  journey  and  that  Switzerland 
would  not  be  closed  to  me.  Herr  von  Langwerth  has  been  good 
enough  to  answer  me  in  writing  that  I  could  be  assured  of  an  easy 
journey  and  that  the  Austrian  authorities  would  do  all  that  was 
necessary. 

"It  is  nearly  five  o'clock,  and  Baron  von  Langwerth  has  just  an- 
nounced to  me  that  I  shall  be  sent  to  Denmark.  In  view  of 
the  present  situation,  there  is  no  security  that  I  shall  find  a  ship  to 
take  me  to  England  and  it  is  this  consideration  which  made  me  reject 
this  proposal,  with  the  approval  of  Herr  von  Langwerth. 

"  In  truth  no  liberty  is  left  me  and  I  am  treated  almost  as  a  prisoner. 
I  am  obliged  to  submit,  having  no  means  of  obtaining  that  the  rules 
of  international  courtesy  should  be  observed  towards  me,  but  I 
hasten  to  protest  to  your  Excellency  against  the  manner  in  which  I 
am  being  treated.  Jules  Cambon." 

Whilst  my  letter  was  being  delivered  I  was  told  that  the  journey 
would  not  be  made  direct  but  by  way  of  Schleswig.  At  10  o'clock 
in  the  evening,  I  left  the  Embassy  with  my  staff  in  the  middle  of  a 
great  assembly  of  foot  and  mounted  police. 

At  the  station  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  was  only  repre- 
sented by  an  officer  of  inferior  rank. 

The  journey  took  place  with  extreme  slowness.  We  took  more 
than  twenty-four  hours  to  reach  the  frontier.  It  seemed  that  at 
every  station  they  had  to  wait  for  orders  to  proceed.  I  was  accom- 
panied by  Major  von  Rheinbaben  of  the  Alesandra  Regiment  of  the 
Guard  and  by  a  police  officer.  In  the  neighbourhood  of  the  Kiel 
Canal  the  soldiers  entered  our  carriages.  The  windows  were  shut 
and  the  curtains  of  the  carriages  drawn  down;  each  of  us  had  to 
remain  isolated  in  his  compartment  and  was  forbidden  to  get  up  or 
to  touch  his  luggage.  A  soldier  stood  in  the  corridor  of  the  carriage 
before  the  door  of  each  of  our  compartments  which  were  kept  open, 
revolver  in  hand  and  finger  on  the  trigger.  The  Russian  Charge 
d 'Affaires,  the  women  and  children  and  everyone  were  subjected  to 
the  same  treatment. 


480  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

At  the  last  German  station  about  11  o'clock  at  night,  Major  von 
Rheinbaben  came  to  take  leave  of  me.  I  handed  to  him  the  follow- 
ing letter  to  Herr  von  Jagow. 

"Sir,  Wednesday  Evening,  August  5,  1914- 

"Yesterday  before  leaving  Berlin,  I  protested  in  writing  to  your 
Excellency  against  the  repeated  change  of  route  which  was  imposed 
upon  me  by  the  Imperial  Government  on  my  journey  from  Germany. 

"To-day,  as  the  train  in  which  I  was  passed  over  the  Kiel  Canal 
an  attempt  was  made  to  search  all  our  luggage  as  if  we  might  have 
hidden  some  instrument  of  destruction.  Thanks  to  the  interference 
of  Major  von  Rheinbaben,  we  were  spared  this  insult.  But  they 
went  further. 

"They  obliged  us  to  remain  each  in  his  own  compartment,  the 
windows  and  blinds  having  been  closed.  During  this  time,  in  the 
corridors  of  the  carriages  at  the  dcor  of  each  compartment  and  fac- 
ing each  one  of  us,  stood  a  soldier,  revolver  in  hand,  finger  on  the 
trigger,  for  nearly  half  an  hour. 

"I  consider  it  my  duty  to  protest  against  this  threat  of  violence  to 
the  Ambassador  of  the  Republic  and  the  staff  of  his  Embassy,  vio- 
lence which  nothing  could  even  have  made  me  anticipate.  Yester- 
day I  had  the  honour  of  writing  to  your  Excellency  that  I  was  being 
treated  almost  as  a  prisoner.  To-day  I  am  being  treated  as  a  dan- 
gerous prisoner.  Also  I  must  record  that  during  our  journey  which 
from  Berlin  to  Denmark  has  taken  twenty-four  hours,  no  food  has 
been  prepared  nor  provided  for  me  nor  for  the  persons  who  were 
travelling  with  me  to  the  frontier.  Jules  Cambon.'' 

I  thought  that  our  troubles  had  finished,  when  shortly  afterwards 
Major  von  Rheinbaben  came,  rather  embarrassed,  to  inform  me 
that  the  train  would  not  proceed  to  the  Danish  frontier  if  I  did  not 
pay  the  cost  of  this  train.  I  expressed  my  astonishment  that  I  had 
not  been  made  to  pay  at  Berlin  and  that  at  any  rate  I  had  not  been 
forewarned  of  this.  I  offered  to  pay  by  a  cheque  on  one  of  the  largest 
Berlin  banks.  This  facility  was  refused  me.  With  the  help  of  my 
companions  I  was  able  to  collect,  in  gold,  the  sum  which  was  re- 
quired from  me  at  once,  and  which  amounted  to  3,611  marks  75 
pfennig.  This  is  about  5,000  francs  in  accordance  with  the  present 
rate  of  exchange.^ 

After  this  last  incident,  I  thought  it  necessary  to  ask  Major  von 
Rheinbaben  for  his  word  of  honour  as  an  officer  and  a  gentleman  that 
we  should  be  taken  to  the  Danish  frontier.  He  gave  it  to  me,  and  I 
required  that  the  policeman  who  was  with  us  should  accompany  us. 

In  this  way  we  arrived  at  the  first  Danish  station,  where  the  Danish 
Government  had  had  a  train  made  ready  to  take  us  to  Copenhagen. 

I  am  assured  that  my  British  colleague  and  the  Belgian  Minister, 
although  they  left  Berlin  after  I  did,  travelled  by  the  direct  route  to 

1  Subsequently  the  sum  thus  required  from  M.  Jules  Cambon  was  given  to  the 
Spanish  Ambassador  to  be  repaid  to  the  French  Ambassador. 


Aiigust  6,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  60  481 

Holland.  I  am  struck  by  this  difference  of  treatment,  and  as  Den- 
mark and  Norway  are,  at  this  moment,  infested  with  spies,  if  I  suc- 
ceed in  embarking  in  Norway,  there  is  a  danger  that  I  may  be  arrested 
at  sea  with  the  officials  who  accompany  me. 

I  do  not  wish  to  conclude  this  despatch  without  notifying  your 
Excellency  of  the  energy  and  devotion  of  which  the  whole  staff  of 
the  Embassy  has  given  unceasing  proof  during  the  course  of  this 
crisis.  I  shall  be  glad  that  account  should  be  taken  of  the  services 
which  on  this  occasion  have  been  rendered  to  the  Government  of 
the  Republic,  in  particular  by  the  Secretaries  of  the  Embassy  and 
by  the  Military  and  Naval  Attaches.  Jules  Cambon. 


Russia  : 

From  Vienna 

Russian  Orange  Book  No.  79 

Note  presented  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh 
to  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  July  24  (August  6), 
1914,  at  6  P.M. 

On  the  instructions  of  his  Government,  the  undersigned,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador,  has  the  honour  to  inform  his  Excel- 
lency the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  as  follows :  — 

(Translation.) 
"Vu      I'attitude      mena^ante         "in    view  of  the  threatening 

prise  par  la  Russie  dans  le  con-  attitude   adopted   by   Russia  in 

flit   entre  la  Monarchic  austro-  the  conflict  between  the  Austro- 

hongroise    et    la    Serbie    et    en  Hungarian        Monarchy        and 

presence  du  fait  qu'en  suite  de  Servia;    and   of   the   fact   that, 

ce  conflit  la  Russie  d'apres  une  according   to    a    communication 

communication    du    Cabinet   de  from  the  Berlin  Cabinet,  Russia 

Berlin   a   cru   devoir   ouvrir   les  has  seen  fit,  as  a  result  of  that 

hostilites   contre   TAllemagne  et  conflict,      to      open     hostilities 

que  celle-ci  se  trouve  par  conse-  against  Germany;    and  whereas 

quent  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la-  Germany  is  consequently  at  war 

dite   Puissance,    I'Autriche-Hon-  with    Russia;     Austria-Hungary 

grie   se   considere    egalement  en  therefore   considers   herself   also 

etat  de  guerre  avec  la  Russie  a  at   war   with    Russia   from   the 

partir  du  present  moment."  present  moment." 

Serbia : 

To  Berlin 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  50 

The  Royal  Serbian  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  German  Lega- 
tion at  Nish. 

Nish,  July  21 /August  6,  1914. 

The  Royal  Serbian  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  the  honour 
to  inform  the  Imperial  Legation  that,  in  view  of  the  state  of  war 
2i 


482  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

which  now  exists  between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary,  and  of  that 
between  Russia  and  Germany,  the  ally  of  Austria-Hungary,  the 
Royal  Serbian  Government,  in  view  of  the  solidarity  of  her  interests 
with  Russia  and  her  allies,  considers  the  mission  of  Baron  Gieslingen, 
the  Imperial  German  Minister  Plenipotentiary  and  Envoy  Extraor- 
dinary, to  be  at  an  end.  The  Royal  Serbian  Government  requests 
His  Excellency  to  leave  Serbian  territory  with  the  staff  of  the  Lega- 
tion.    The  necessary  passports  are  enclosed  herewith. 

From  Berlin 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  51 

Dr.  M.  Yovanovitch,  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  July  24/ August  6,  1914. 

On  the  occasion  of  my  visit  to  the  Under-Secretary  of  State,  M. 
Zimmermann,  for  the  purpose  of  breaking  off  diplomatic  relations, 
he  stated,  in  the  course  of  conversation,  that  Germany  had  always 
cherished  friendly  feelings  towards  Serbia,  and  that  he  regretted  that 
owing  to  the  political  groupement  our  relations  had  to  be  broken  off. 
He  blames  Russia  only,  as  the  instigator  of  Serbia,  for  the  develop- 
ments which  have  occurred,  and  which  will  have  grave  consequences 
for  all  nations.  If  Russia,  at  the  last  moment  —  just  when  it  ap- 
peared possible  that  an  armed  conflict  might  be  avoided  —  had  not 
ordered  the  mobilisation  of  her  whole  forces,  there  would  have  been 
no  war,  for  Germany  had  used  her  whole  influence  in  Austria-Hungary 
in  order  to  bring  about  an  understanding  with  Russia.  Austria- 
Hungary  would  have  probably  been  satisfied  with  the  occupation  of 
Belgrade,  when  negotiations  would  have  begun  with  a  view  to  regu- 
larising the  relations  between  Serbia  and  Austria. 


Friday,  August  7,   1914 

Despatches  published  only  by   Belgium  who   suggests  that  the  European 
war  between  the  white  races  be  not  carried  into  Africa. 


To  the  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  56 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs^  to  Baron  Fallon, 
Belgian  Minister  at  the  Hague. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  7,  191J,.. 

Please  express  to  the  Netherlands  Government  the  sincere 
thanks  of  the  Belgian  Government  for  the  measures  taken  to  secure 
navigation  on  the  Scheldt.     The  Belgian  Government  are  in  agree- 


August  7,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  58  483 

ment  with  the  Netherlands  Government  on  the  subject  of  the  ex- 
tent of  navigation.  They  had  proposed  Bath,  but  accept  Hanswert, 
since  this  port  has  better  facilities  for  the  exchange  of  pilots. 

To  Paris  and  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  57 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  Paris  and  London, 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  7,  1914. 

Belgium  trusts  that  the  war  will  not  be  extended  to  Central 
Africa.  The  Governor  of  the  Belgian  Congo  has  received  instruc- 
tions to  maintain  a  strictly  defensive  attitude.  Please  ask  the 
French  Government  [British  Government]  whether  they  intend  to 
proclaim  the  neutrality  of  the  French  Congo  [British  colonies  in  the 
conventional  basin  of  the  Congo],  in  accordance  with  article  11  of 
the  General  Act  of  Berlin.  A  telegram  from  Boma  reports  that 
hostilities  are  probable  between  the  French  and  Germans  in  the 
Ubangi. 

To  Paris  and  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  58 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 

Ministers  at  Paris  and  London. 
Sir,  Brussels,  August  7,  191^. 

With  reference  to  my  telegram  of  this  morning,  I  have  the  honour 
to  request  you  to  bring  to  the  notice  of  the  French  [British]  Govern- 
ment the  following  information  :  — 

While  instructions  have  been  sent  to  the  Governor-General  of 
the  Congo  to  take  defensive  measures  on  the  common  frontiers  of  the 
Belgian  colony  and  of  the  German  colonies  of  East  Africa  and  the 
Cameroons,  the  Belgian  Government  have  suggested  to  that  officer 
that  he  should  abstain  from  all  offensive  action  against  those  colonies. 

In  view  of  the  civilising  mission  common  to  colonising  nations, 
the  Belgian  Government  desire,  in  effect,  for  humanitarian  reasons, 
not  to  extend  the  field  of  hostilities  to  Central  Africa.  They  will, 
therefore,  not  take  the  initiative  of  putting  such  a  strain  on  civilisa- 
tion in  that  region,  and  the  military  forces  which  they  possess  there 
will  only  go  into  action  in  the  event  of  their  having  to  repel  a  direct 
attack  on  their  African  possessions. 

I  should  be  glad  to  learn  whether  the  French  [British]  Govern- 
ment share  this  view  and  in  that  case  whether  it  is  their  intention, 
during  the  present  conflict,  to  avail  themselves  of  article  11  of  the 
General  Act  of  Berlin  to  neutralise  such  of  their  colonies  as  are  con- 
tained in  the  conventional  basin  of  the  Congo. 

I  am  addressing  an  identic  communication  to  your  colleague  at 
London  (Paris). 


484  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Saturday,  August  8,  1914 

France  complains  of  Austro-Hungarian  troops  having  been  sent  to  Germany ; 
and  seems  favorably  inclined  to  accept  the  Belgian  proposal  that  the  war  be  not 
carried  into  Africa. 

Great  Britain  publishes  as  an  addition  to  her  White  Papers  (later  called  Blue 
Book)  Sir  E.  Goschen's  final  report  including  a  description  of  the  last  interview 
with  the  German  Chancellor  in  which  the  now  famous  expression  **a  scrap  of 
paper"  occurs. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Paris 

AusTRO-HuNG  - JiiAN  Red  Book  No.  61 

Count  Szecsen  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Translated  from  the  French,) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  8,  1914. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  asked  me  to  go  and  see  him  in  order 
to  communicate  to  me  that,  according  to  positive  information  which 
has  reached  him,  the  Innsbruck  Army  Corps  has  been  brought  to  the 
French  frontier.  M.  Doumergue  wishes  to  know  without  delay  if  this 
information  is  correct,  and  if  it  is  so,  what  is  the  intention  of  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government.  As  France  is  at  war  with  Germany 
the  despatch  of  our  troops  to  the  French  frontier  is,  according  to  the 
views  held  by  the  Minister,  not  consistent  with  the  existing  condition 
of  peace  between  Austria-Hungary  and  France.  M.  Dumaine  is 
commissioned  to  make  a  similar  communication  to  Your  Excellency. 

Belgium : 

From  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  59 

Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Paris,  August  8,  1914- 

I  HAVE  had  the  honour  of  speaking  to  the  President  of  the  Republic 
with  respect  to  your  telegram  of  yesterday.  I  had  received  it 
during  the  evening  and  had  immediately  communicated  it  to  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs.  They  asked  for  time  to  consider  it 
before  answering. 

M.  Poincare  has  promised  me  to  speak  on  this  subject  to-day 
to  the  Minister  of  the  Colonies.  At  first  sight  he  could  see  little 
difficulty  in  proclaiming  the  neutrality  of  the  French  Congo,  but  he 
nevertheless  reserves  his  reply.  He  believes  that  acts  of  war  have 
already  taken  place  in  the  Ubangi.  He  has  taken  the  opportunity 
to  remind  me  that  the  protection  accorded  us  by  France  extends 
also  to  our  colonies  and  that  we  have  nothing  to  fear. 


August  8,  British  Blue  Book  No.  160  485 

Great  Britain: 

From  Berlin 

British  Blue  Book  No.  160  ^ 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Sir,  London,  August  8,  1914, 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  your  telegram 
of  the  4th  instant  ^  I  called  upon  the  Secretary  of  State  that  afternoon 
and  enquired,  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  whether  the 
Imperial  Government  would  refrain  from  violating  Belgian  neutrality. 
Herr  von  Jagow  ^  at  once  replied  that  he  was  sorry  to  say  that  his 
answer  must  be  "No,"  as,  in  consequence  of  the  German  troops 
having  crossed  the  frontier  that  morning,  Belgian  neutrality  had 
been  already  violated.  Herr  von  Jagow  again  went  into  the  reasons 
why  the  Imperial  Government  had  been  obliged  to  take  this  step, 
namely,  that  they  had  to  advance  into  France  by  the  quickest  and 
easiest  way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead  with  their  operations 
and  endeavour  to  strike  some  decisive  blow  as  early  as  possible.  It 
was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  them,  as  if  they  had  gone  by  the 
more  southern  route  they  could  not  have  hoped,  in  view  of  the  paucity 
of  roads  and  the  strength  of  the  fortresses,  to  have  got  through  with- 
out formidable  opposition  entailing  great  loss  of  time.  This  loss  of 
time  would  have  meant  time  gained  by  the  Russians  for  bringing  up 
their  troops  to  the  German  frontier.  Rapidity  of  action  was  the  great 
German  asset,  while  that  of  Russia  was  an  inexhaustible  supply  of 
troops.  I  pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  this  fait  accompli  of 
the  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  rendered,  as  he  would  readily 
understand,  the  situation  exceedingly  grave,  and  I  asked  him  whether 
there  was  not  still  time  to  draw  back  and  avoid  possible  consequences, 
which  both  he  and  I  would  deplore.  He  replied  that,  for  the  reasons 
he  had  given  me,  it  was  now  impossible  for  them  to  draw  back. 

During  the  afternoon  I  received  your  further  telegram  of  the 
same  date,^  and,  in  compliance  with  the  instructions  therein  con- 
tained, I  again  proceeded  to  the  Imperial  Foreign  Office  and  informed 
the  Secretary  of  State  that  unless  the  Imperial  Government  could 
give  the  assurance  by  12  o'clock  that  night  that  they  would  proceed 
no  further  with  their  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  and  stop  their 
advance,  I  had  been  instructed  to  demand  my  passports  and  inform 
the  Imperial  Government  that  His  Majesty's  Government  would  have 
to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  was  as  much  a 
party  as  themselves. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  to  his  great  regret  he  could  give  no 
other  answer  than  that  which  he  had  given  me  earlier  in  the  day, 
namely,  that  the  safety  of  the  Empire  rendered  it  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  Imperial  troops  should  advance  through  Belgium.     I  gave 

1  This  despatch  was  not  contained  in  the  original  edition  of  the  Blue  Book.  It  con- 
tains Sir  E.  Goschen's  recollections  of  his  last  day  in  Berlin. 

2  See  No.  153,  August  4.      ^  German  Secretary  of  State.      *  See  No.  159,  August  4. 


486  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

his  Excellency  a  written  summary  of  your  telegram  and,  pointing 
out  that  you  had  mentioned  12  o'clock  as  the  time  when  His  Majesty's 
Government  would  expect  an  answer,  asked  him  whether,  in  view 
of  the  terrible  consequences  which  would  necessarily  ensue,  it  were 
not  possible  even  at  the  last  moment  that  their  answer  should  be 
reconsidered.  He  replied  that  if  the  time  given  were  even  twenty- 
four  hours  or  more,  his  answer  must  be  the  same.  I  said  that  in  that 
case  I  should  have  to  demand  my  passports.  This  interview  took 
place  at  about  7  o'clock.  In  a  short  conversation  which  ensued  Herr 
von  Jagow  ^  expressed  his  poignant  regret  at  the  crumbling  of  his 
entire  policy  and  that  of  the  Chancellor,  which  had  been  to  make 
friends  with  Great  Britain,  and  then,  through  Great  Britain,  to  get 
closer  to  France.  I  said  that  this  sudden  end  to  my  work  in  Berlin 
was  to  me  also  a  matter  of  deep  regret  and  disappointment,  but  that 
he  must  understand  that  under  the  circumstances  and  in  view  of  our 
engagements,  His  Majesty's  Government  could  not  possibly  have 
acted  otherwise  than  they  had  done.  i 

1  then  said  that  I  should  like  to  go  and  see  the  Chancellor,  as  it 
might  be,  perhaps,  the  last  time  I  should  have  an  opportunity  of  see- 
ing him.  He  begged  me  to  do  so.  I  found  the  Chancellor  very  agi- 
tated.^ His  Excellency  at  once  began  a  harangue,  which  lasted  for  about 
twenty  minutes.  He  said  that  the  step  taken  by  His  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment was  terrible  to  a  degree ;  just  for  a  word  —  "  neutrality,"  a  word 
which  in  war  time  had  so  often  been  disregarded  —  just  for  a  scrap  of 
paper  Great  Britain  was  going  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  de- 
sired nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with  her.  All  his  efforts  in  that 
direction  had  been  rendered  useless  by  this  last  terrible  step,  and  the 
policy  to  which,  as  I  knew,  he  had  devoted  himself  since  his  accession 
to  office  had  tumbled  down  like  a  house  of  cards.  What  we  had 
done  was  unthinkable ;  it  was  like  striking  a  man  from  behind  while 
he  was  fighting  for  his  life  against  two  assailants.  He  held  Great 
Britain  responsible  for  all  the  terrible  events  that  might  happen.  I 
protested  strongly  against  that  statement,  and  said  that,  in  the  same 
way  as  he  and  Herr  von  Jagow  ^  wished  me  to  understand  that  for 
strategical  reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  Germany  to 
advance  through  Belgium  and  violate  the  latter's  neutrality,  so  I 
would  wish  him  to  understand  that  it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  matter  of 
"life  and  death"  for  the  honour  of  Great  Britain  that  she  should 
keep  her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost  to  defend  Belgium's 
neutrality  if  attacked.  That  solemn  compact  simply  had  to  be  kept, 
or  what  confidence  could  anyone  have  in  engagements  given  by  Great 
Britain  in  the  future?  The  Chancellor  said,  "But  at  what  price  will 
that  compact  have  been  kept.  Has  the  British  Government  thought 
of  that?"  I  hinted  to  his  Excellency  as  plainly  as  I  could  that 
fear  of  consequences  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  excuse  for  break- 

^  German  Secretary  of  State. 

2  For  the  Chancellor's  account  of  this  interview  see  his  speech  in  the  Reichstag,  June 
5,  1916  :  "  Sir  Edward  Goschen  was  during  this  interview  so  shaken  to  his  depths  that 
from  a  natural  feeling  of  decency  I  have  always  refrained  from  speaking  of  it  publicly, 
since  what  happened  was  personal  and  human." 


August  8,  British  Blue  Book  No.  160  487 

ing  solemn  engagements,  but  his  Excellency  was  so  excited,  so  evi- 
dently overcome  by  the  news  of  our  action,  and  so  little  disposed  to 
hear  reason  that  I  refrained  from  adding  fuel  to  the  flame  by  further 
argument.  As  I  was  leaving  he  said  that  the  blow  of  Great  Britain 
joining  Germany's  enemies  was  all  the  greater  that  almost  up  to  the 
last  moment  he  and  his  Government  had  been  working  with  us  and 
supporting  our  efforts  to  maintain  peace  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
I  said  that  this  was  part  of  the  tragedy  which  saw  the  two  nations 
fall  apart  just  at  the  moment  when  the  relations  between  them  had 
been  more  friendly  and  cordial  than  they  had  been  for  years.  Unfor- 
tunately, notwithstanding  our  efforts  to  maintain  peace  between 
Russia  and  Austria,  the  war  had  spread  and  had  brought  us  face  to 
face  with  a  situation  which,  if  we  held  to  our  engagements,  we  could 
not  possibly  avoid,  and  which  unfortunately  entailed  our  separation 
from  our  late  fellow-workers.  He  would  readily  understand  that  no 
one  regretted  this  more  than  I. 

After  this  somewhat  painful  interview  I  returned  to  the  embassy 
and  drew  up  a  telegraphic  report  of  what  had  passed.  This  telegram 
was  handed  in  at  the  Central  Telegraph  Office  a  little  before  9  p.m. 
It  was  accepted  by  that  office,  but  apparently  never  despatched.^ 

At  about  9.30  p.m.  Herr  von  Zimmermann,  the  Under-Secretary  of 
State,  came  to  see  me.  After  expressing  his  deep  regret  that  the 
very  friendly  official  and  personal  relations  between  us  were  about 
to  cease,  he  asked  me  casually  whether  a  demand  for  passports  was 
equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war.  I  said  that  such  an  authority 
on  international  law  as  he  was  known  to  be  must  know  as  well  or 
better  than  I  what  was  usual  in  such  cases.  I  added  that  there  were 
many  cases  where  diplomatic  relations  had  been  broken  off,  and, 
nevertheless,  war  had  not  ensued ;  but  that  in  this  case  he  would 
have  seen  from  my  instructions,  of  which  I  had  given  Herr  von  Jagow  ^ 
a  written  summary,  that  His  Majesty's  Government  expected  an 
answer  to  a  definite  question  by  12  o'clock  that  night  and  that  in 
default  of  a  satisfactory  answer  they  would  be  forced  to  take  such  steps 
as  their  engagements  required.  Herr  Zimmermann  ^  said  that  that 
was,  in  fact,  a  declaration  of  war,  as  the  Imperial  Government  could 
not  possibly  give  the  assurance  required  either  that  night  or  any 
other  night. 

In  the  meantime,  after  Herr  Zimmermann  ^  left  me,  a  flying  sheet, 
issued  by  the  Berliner  Tageblatt,  was  circulated  stating  that  Great 
Britain  had  declared  war  against  Germany.  The  immediate  result 
of  this  news  was  the  assemblage  of  an  exceedingly  excited  and  unruly 
mob  before  His  Majesty's  Embassy.  The  small  force  of  police  which 
had  been  sent  to  guard  the  embassy  was  soon  overpowered,  and  the 
attitude  of  the  mob  became  more  threatening.  We  took  no  notice 
of  this  demonstration  as  long  as  it  was  confined  to  noise,  but  when 
the  crash  of  glass  and  the  landing  of  cobble  stones  into  the  drawing- 
room,  where  we  were  all  sitting,  warned  us  that  the  situation  was 

1  This  telegram  never  reached  the  Foreign  Office. 

2  German  Secretary  of  State.  ^  German  Under-Secretary  of  State. 


488  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

getting  unpleasant,  I  telephoned  to  the  Foreign  Office  an  account  of 
what  was  happening.  Herr  von  Jagow  ^  at  once  informed  the  Chief 
of  Police,  and  an  adequate  force  of  mounted  police,  sent  with  great 
promptness,  very  soon  cleared  the  street.  From  that  moment  on  we 
were  well  guarded,  and  no  more  direct  unpleasantness  occurred. 

After  order  had  been  restored  Herr  von  Jagow  ^  came  to  see  me 
and  expressed  his  most  heartfelt  regrets  at  what  had  occurred.  He 
said  that  the  behaviour  of  his  countrymen  had  made  him  feel  more 
ashamed  than  he  had  words  to  express.  It  was  an  indelible  stain  on 
the  reputation  of  Berlin.  He  said  that  the  flying  sheet  circulated  in 
the  streets  had  not  been  authorised  by  the  Government ;  in  fact,  the 
Chancellor  had  asked  him  by  telephone  whether  he  thought  that  such 
a  statement  should  be  issued,  and  he  had  replied,  "Certainly  not, 
until  the  morning."  It  was  in  consequence  of  his  decision  to  that 
effect  that  only  a  small  force  of  police  had  been  sent  to  the  neighbour- 
hood of  the  embassy,  as  he  had  thought  that  the  presence  of  a  large 
force  would  inevitably  attract  attention  and  perhaps  lead  to  dis- 
turbances. It  was  the  "pestilential  'Tageblatt/  "  which  had  some- 
how got  hold  of  the  news,  that  had  upset  his  calculations.  He 
had  heard  rumours  that  the  mob  had  been  excited  to  violence  by 
gestures  made  and  missiles  thrown  from  the  embassy,  but  he  felt 
sure  that  that  was  not  true  (I  was  able  soon  to  assure  him  that  the 
report  had  no  foundation  whatever),  and  even  if  it  was,  it  was  no 
excuse  for  the  disgraceful  scenes  which  had  taken  place.  He  feared 
that  I  would  take  home  with  me  a  sorry  impression  of  Berlin  manners 
in  moments  of  excitement.  In  fact,  no  apology  could  have  been 
more  full  and  complete. 

On  the  following  morning,  the  5th  August,  the  Emperor  sent 
one  of  His  Majesty's  aides-de-camp  to  me  with  the  following  mes- 
sage :  — 

"The  Emperor  has  charged  me  to  express  to  your  Excellency  his 
regret  for  the  occurrences  of  last  night,  but  to  tell  you  at  the  same 
time  that  you  will  gather  from  those  occurrences  an  idea  of  the  feelings 
of  his  people  respecting  the  action  of  Great  Britain  in  joining  with 
other  nations  against  her  old  allies  of  Waterloo.  His  Majesty  also 
begs  that  you  will  tell  the  King  that  he  has  been  proud  of  the  titles 
of  British  Field-Marshal  and  British  Admiral,  but  that  in  consequence 
of  what  has  occurred  he  must  now  at  once  divest  himself  of  those 
titles." 

I  would  add  that  the  above  message  lost  none  of  its  acerbity  by 
the  manner  of  its  delivery. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  should  like  to  state  that  I  received  all  through 
this  trying  time  nothing  but  courtesy  at  the  hands  of  Herr  von  Jagow  ^ 
and  the  officials  of  the  Imperial  Foreign  Office.  At  about  11  o'clock 
on  the  same  morning  Count  Wed  el  handed  me  my  passports  —  which 
I  had  earlier  in  the  day  demanded  in  writing  —  and  told  me  that  he 
had  been  instructed  to  confer  with  me  as  to  the  route  which  I  should 
follow  for  my  return  to  England.     He  said  that  he  had  understood 

1  German  Secretary  of  State. 


August  8,  British  Blue  Book  No.  160  489 

that  I  preferred  the  route  via  the  Hook  of  Holland  to  that  via  Copen- 
hagen ;  they  had  therefore  arranged  that  I  should  go  by  the  former 
route,  only  I  should  have  to  wait  till  the  following  morning.  I 
agreed  to  this,  and  he  said  that  I  might  be  quite  assured  that  there 
would  be  no  repetition  of  the  disgraceful  scenes  of  the  preceding 
night  as  full  precautions  would  be  taken.  He  added  that  they  were 
doing  all  in  their  power  to  have  a  restaurant  car  attached  to  the  train, 
but  it  was  rather  a  difficult  matter.  He  also  brought  me  a  charming 
letter  from  Herr  von  Jagow  couched  in  the  most  friendly  terms. 
The  day  was  passed  in  packing  up  such  articles  as  time  allowed. 

The  night  passed  quietly  without  any  incident.  In  the  morning  a 
strong  force  of  police  was  posted  along  the  usual  route  to  the  Lehrter 
Station,  while  the  embassy  was  smuggled  away  in  taxi-cabs  to  the 
station  by  side  streets.  We  there  suffered  no  molestation  whatever, 
and  avoided  the  treatment  meted  out  by  the  crowd  to  my  Russian 
and  French  colleagues.  Count  Wedel  met  us  at  the  station  to  say 
good-bye  on  behalf  of  Herr  von  Jagow  and  to  see  that  all  the  arrange- 
ments ordered  for  our  comfort  had  been  properly  carried  out.  A 
retired  colonel  of  the  Guards  accompanied  the  train  to  the  Dutch 
frontier  and  was  exceedingly  kind  in  his  efforts  to  prevent  the  great 
crowds  which  thronged  the  platforms  at  every  station  where  we 
stopped  from  insulting  us ;  but  beyond  the  yelling  of  patriotic  songs 
and  a  few  jeers  and  insulting  gestures  we  had  really  nothing  to 
complain  of  during  our  tedious  journey  to  the  Dutch  frontier. 

Before  closing  this  long  account  of  our  last  days  in  Berlin  I  should 
like  to  place  on  record  and  bring  to  your  notice  the  quite  admirable 
behaviour  of  my  staff  under  the  most  trying  circumstances  possible. 
One  and  all,  they  worked  night  and  day  with  scarcely  any  rest,  and 
I  cannot  praise  too  highly  the  cheerful  zeal  with  which  counsellor, 
naval  and  military  attaches,  secretaries,  and  the  two  young  attaches 
buckled  to  their  work  and  kept  their  nerve  with  often  a  yelling  mob 
outside  and  inside  hundreds  of  British  subjects  clamouring  for  advice 
and  assistance.  I  was  proud  to  have  such  a  staff  to  work  with,  and 
feel  most  grateful  to  them  all  for  the  invaluable  assistance  and  support, 
often  exposing  them  to  considerable  personal  risk,  which  they  so 
readily  and  cheerfully  gave  to  me. 

I  should  also  like  to  mention  the  great  assistance  rendered  to  us  all 
by  my  American  colleague,  INIr.  Gerard,^  and  his  staff.  Undeterred 
by  the  hooting  and  hisses  with  which  he  was  often  greeted  by  the 
mob  on  entering  and  leaving  the  embassy,  his  Excellency  came 
repeatedly  to  see  me  to  ask  how  he  could  help  us  and  to  make  arrange- 
ments for  the  safety  of  stranded  British  subjects.  He  extricated 
many  of  these  from  extremely  difficult  situations  at  some  personal 
risk  to  himself,  and  his  calmness  and  savoir-faire  and  his  firmness  in 
dealing  with  the  Imperial  authorities  gave  full  assurance  that  the 
protection  of  British  subjects  and  interests  could  not  have  been  left 
in  more  efficient  and  able  hands.  j  }^ave  etc. 

W.   E.   GOSCHEN. 
1  American  Ambassador  in  Berlin. 


490  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Sunday,  August  9,  1914 

Austria-Hungary  denies  the  participation  of  her  troops  in  the  war  against 
France. 

Belgium  receives  a  courteous  note  from  Germany  offering  peace,  the  fortress  of 
Liege  having  fallen  into  German  hands. 

France  wishes  to  offer  to  Germany  the  neutrahty  of  the  possessions  in  the 
Congo  basin  in  Africa. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  Paris 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK   No.    62 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Szecsen  at  Paris. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  9,  1914. 

With  reference  to  Your  Excellency's  telegram  of  the  Sth  instant.^ 
After  conferring  with  the  General  Staff  I  authorise  Your  Excellency 
to  inform  the  French  Government  that  the  information  regarding  the 
participation  of  our  troops  in  the  Franco-German  war  is  a  complete 
invention.  I  have  expressed  myself  in  a  similar  manner  to  M. 
Dumaine. 

Belgium : 

From  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  60 

Baron  Fallon,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  M.  Damgnon,  BeU 
gian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  The  Hague,  August  9,  1914- 

The  Netherlands  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  begged  me  to 
convey  to  you  the  following  information,  the  United  States  Minister 
at  Brussels  having  declined  to  do  so :  ^ 

The  fortress  of  Liege  has  been  taken  by  assault  after  a  brave  de- 
fence. The  German  Government  most  deeply  regret  that  bloody- 
encounters  should  have  resulted  from  the  attitude  of  the  Belgian 
Government  towards  Germany.  Germany  is  not  coming  as  an  enemy 
into  Belgium,  it  is  only  through  the  force  of  circumstances  that  she 
has  had,  owing  to  the  military  measures  of  France,  to  take  the  grave 
decision  of  entering  Belgium  and  occupying  Liege  as  a  base  for  her 
further  military  operations.  Now  that  the  Belgian  army  has  upheld 
the  honour  of  its  arms  by  its  heroic  resistance  to  a  very  superior  force, 
the  German  Government  beg  the  King  of  the  Belgians  and  the  Bel- 
gian Government  to  spare  Belgium  the  further  horrors  of  war.  The 
German  Government  are  ready  for  any  compact  with  Belgium  which 
can  be  reconciled  with  their  arrangements  with  France.  (See  No. 
70.)     Germany  once  more  gives  her  solemn  assurance  that  it  is  not 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  61. 


August  10,  Au^tro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  63  491 

her  intention  to  appropriate  Belgian  territory  to  herself  and  that  such 
an  intention  is  far  from  her  thoughts.  Germany  is  still  ready  to 
evacuate  Belgium  as  soon  as  the  state  of  war  will  allow  her  to  do  so. 
The  United  States  Ambassador  had  asked  his  colleague  to  under- 
take this  attempt  at  mediation.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
has  accepted  this  mission  without  enthusiasm.  I  have  undertaken 
it  to  oblige  him. 

From  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  61 

Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  Paris,  August  9,  1914. 

The  French  Government  are  strongly  inclined  to  proclaim  the 
neutrality  of  the  possessions  in  the  conventional  basin  of  the  Congo 
and  are  begging  Spain  to  make  the  suggestion  at  Berlin. 


Monday,  August  10,  1914 

France  breaks  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Austria-Hungary. 
Belgium  refuses  the  German  offer  of  peace. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Paris 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    63 

Count  Szecsen  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Translated  from  the  French.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  10,  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegram  of  the  9th  August  ^  and  communi- 
cated at  once  the  contents  to  M.  Doumergue.  The  Minister,  who  had 
received  a  similar  telegraphic  report  from  M.  Dumaine  concerning  his 
conversation  with  Your  Excellency,  admitted  that  our  troops  are  not 
on  the  French  frontier,  but  he  maintains  that  he  has  positive  informa- 
tion that  an  Austro-Hungarian  army  corps  has  been  brought  to  Ger- 
many, and  that  this  makes  it  possible' for  that  Empire  to  withdraw  her 
troops  from  those  districts  which  are  occupied  by  our  soldiers,  and 
that  in  the  opinion  of  the  Minister  this  amounts  to  a  facilitation  of 
German  military  operations.  I  repeatedly  drew  the  attention  of  the 
Minister  to  the  wording  of  the  answer  of  Your  Excellency,  and  he  has 
admitted  that  it  is  not  possible  to  speak  of  an  effective  participation  of 
our  troops  in  the  Franco-German  war,  but  he  insisted  that  it  is  unde- 
niable that  our  troops  are  present  on  German  territory,  and  that  this 
is  equivalent  to  the  provision  of  military  assistance  to  Germany.     In 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  62. 


492  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

these  circumstances  he  has  authorised  the  French  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  to  ask  for  his  passports  without  delay,  and  to  leave  Vienna 
to-day  with  the  entire  staff  of  the  Embassy.  The  Minister  informed 
me  that  in  view  of  this  position,  my  presence  here  can  be  of  no  use ; 
indeed  in  view  of  the  excitement  of  the  populace  it  might  give  occa- 
sion to  regrettable  occurrences  which  he  desired  to  avoid.  He 
offered  to  place  a  train  at  my  disposal  from  to-night  onwards  in  order 
that  I  might  leave  France.  I  answered  that  it  was  impossible  for 
me  to  receive  instructions  from  Your  Excellency  before  the  evening, 
but  that  in  view  of  the  recall  of  M.  Dumaine,  I  asked  him  to  have  my 
passport  prepared. 

Belgium : 

From  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  62 

Baron  Fallon,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  The  Hague,  August  10,  1914. 

In  response  to  a  call  on  the  telephone,  yesterday  evening  at  9 
o'clock,  I  went  to  the  Department  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Jonkheer  Loudon  told  me  that  my  German  colleague  had  just  left 
his  room,  and  had  handed  him  a  document  which  the  United  States 
representative  at  Brussels  had  declined  to  forward  to  you. 

The  United  States  official  in  charge  of  the  German  Legation  at 
Brussels  stated  that  he  had  received  no  special  instructions  from 
Washington  to  intervene  officially  with  the  Belgian  Government  in 
the  interest  of  Germany. 

The  United  States  Minister  consequently  telegraphed  to  his  col- 
league at  The  Hague,  who  informed  the  German  representative  of 
Mr.  Whitlock's  refusal. 

The  German  Government,  therefore,  took  the  initial  step  by 
approaching  the  United  States  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  urgency  of  these  mat- 
ters, Herr  von  Miiller  begged  Jonkheer  Loudon  to  act  as  the  inter- 
mediary of  the  German  Government  in  this  negotiation  with  you. 

His  Excellency  read  me  the  German  text  of  the  document.  I  did 
not  hide  my  astonishment  at  this  attempt  at  mediation,  and  its  poor 
chance  of  success  in  this  form;  but,  solely  in  order  to  oblige  the 
Netherlands  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  I  promised  to  telegraph 
to  you  immediately;   and  this  I  did  yesterday. 

You  will  find  the  German  document  enclosed  in  original  and 
translation. 

Enclosure  1  in  No.  62.  Enclosure  2  in  No.  62. 

(Translation) 
Die  Festung  Liittich  ist  nach         The  fortress  of  Liege  has  been 
tapfrer  Gegenwehr  im  Sturm  ge-     taken  by  assault  after  a  brave 


August  10,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No,  62 


493 


nommen  worden.  Die  Deutsche 
Regierimg  bedauert  es  auf 
das  tiefste,  dass  es  infolge  der 
Stellungnahme  der  Belgischen 
Regierung  gegen  Deutschland 
zu  bliitigen  Zusammenstossen 
gekommen  ist.  Deutschland 
kommt  nicht  als  Feind  nach 
Belgien.  Nur  unter  dem  Zwang 
der  Verhaltnisse  hat  es  angesichts 
der  militarischen  Massnahmen 
Frankreichs  den  schweren  Ent- 
schluss  fassen  miissen,  in  Belgien 
einzuriicken  und  Liittich  als 
Stiitzpunkt  f  (ir  seine  weiteren  mi- 
litarischen Operationen  besetzen 
zu  miissen.  Nachdem  die  Belg- 
ische  Armee  in  heldenmutigem 
Widerstand  gegen  die  grosse 
Uberlengenheit  ihre  Waffenehre 
auf  das  glanzendste  gewahrt  hat, 
bittet  die  Deutsche  Regierung 
seine  Ma  jest  at  den  Konig  und 
die  Belgische  Regierung,  Belgien 
die  weiteren  Schrecken  des 
Krieges  zu  ersparen.  Die 
Deutsche  Regierung  ist  zu  je- 
dem  Abkommen  mit  Belgien 
bereit  das  sich  irgendwie  mit 
Riicksicht  auf  seine  {voir  piece 
No.  70)  Auseinandersetzung  mit 
Frankreich  vereinigen  lasst. 
Deutschland  versichert  nochmals 
feierlichst,  dass  es  nicht  von  der 
Absicht  geleitet  gewesen  ist  sich 
Belgisches  Gebiet  anzueignen, 
und  dass  ihm  diese  Absicht 
durchaus  fern  liegt.  Deutsch- 
land is  noch  immer  bereit  das 
Belgische  Konigreich  unverziig- 
lich  zu  raumen,  sobald  die  Kriegs- 
lage  es  ihm  gestattet.  "  Der  hie- 
sige  Amerikanische  Botschafter 
ist  mit  diesem  Vermittlungsver- 
such  seines  Briisseler  Kollegen 
einverstanden." 


defence.  The  German  Govern- 
ment most  deeply  regret  that 
bloody  encounters  should  have 
resulted  from  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment's attitude  towards  Ger- 
many. Germany  is  not  coming 
as  an  enemy  into  Belgium.  It  is 
only  through  the  force  of  cir- 
cumstances that  she  has  had, 
owing  to  the  military  measures 
of  France,  to  take  the  grave  de- 
cision of  entering  Belgium  and 
occupying  Liege  as  a  base  for 
her  further  military  operations. 
Now  that  the  Belgian  army  has 
upheld  the  honour  of  its  arms  in 
the  most  brilliant  manner  by  its 
heroic  resistance  to  a  very  su- 
perior force,  the  German  Gov- 
ernment beg  the  King  of  the 
Belgians  and  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment to  spare  Belgium  the 
horrors  of  war.  The  German 
Government  are  ready  for  any 
compact  with  Belgium  which  can 
in  any  way  be  reconciled  with 
their  arrangements  with  France. 
(See  No.  70.)  Germany  gives 
once  more  her  solemn  assurance 
that  she  has  not  been  animated 
by  the  intention  of  appropriating 
Belgian  territory  for  herself,  and 
that  such  an  intention  is  far 
from  her  thoughts.  Germany  is 
still  ready  to  evacuate  Belgium 
as  soon  as  the  state  of  war  will 
allow  her  to  do  so. 

The  United  States  Ambassa- 
dor here  concurs  in  this  attempt 
at  mediation  by  his  colleague  in 
Brussels. 


494  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  63 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Fallon, 
Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  10,  1914. 

The  Belgian  Government  have  received  the  proposals  made  to 
them  by  the  German  Government  through  the  intermediary  of  the 
Netherlands  Government.     They  will  forward  a  reply  shortly. 

(See  No.  62  Enclosures.) 

To  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  64 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Fallon, 
Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  10,  1914- 

Doubt  exists  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  "  Auseinander- 
setzung,''  which  you  translate  by  "arrangement."  Please  ascertain 
whether  the  German  Government  have  in  mind  any  arrangements 
which  we  may  have  come  to  with  France,  or  a  settlement  of  the  dis- 
pute between  France  and  Germany. 

To  London,  St.  Petersburgh,  and  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  65 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  British, 
Russian,  and  French  Ministers  at  Brussels. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  10,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  your  Excellency  that  the  Belgian 
Minister  at  The  Hague,  at  the  request  of  the  Netherlands  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  has  forwarded  to  us  the  following  proposal  from 
the  German  Government.     (See  No.  62,  Enclosure  2.) 

The  Belgian  Government  propose  to  return  the  following  reply 
to  this  communication  :  — 

(Translation.) 

"La  proposition  que  nous  fait  "The  proposal  made  to  us  by 
le  Gouvernement  allemand  re-  the  German  Government  repeats 
produit  la  proposition  qui  avait  the  proposal  formulated  in  their 
ete  formulee  dans  Tultimatum  du  ultimatum  of  August  2.  Faith- 
2  aoiit.  Fidele  a  ses  devoirs  ful  to  her  international  obliga- 
internationaux,  la  Belgique  ne  tions,  Belgium  can  only  reiterate 
pent  que  reiterer  sa  reponse  a  cet  her  reply  to  that  ultimatum,  the 
ultimatum,    d'autant    plus    que     more  so  as  since  August  3  her 


August  10 y  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  66  495 

depuis  le  3  aout  sa  neutralite  a  neutrality  has  been  violated,   a 

ete  violee,   qu'une    guerre   dou-  distressing  war  has  been  waged 

loureuse  a  ete  portee  sur  son  ter-  on  her  territory,  and  the  guar- 

ritoire,  et  que  les  garants  de  sa  antors    of    her    neutrality    have 

neutralite  ont  loyalement  et  im-  responded   loyally  and    without 

mediatement     repondu     a     son  delay  to  her  appeal/' 
appel." 

The  Belgian  Government  consider  that  the  Powers  guaranteeing 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  should  have  cognisance  of  these  documents. 

To  London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  66 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  Belgian 
Ministers  at  london,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  10,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  you  of  the  circumstances  which  led 
to  the  departure  of  the  Belgian  representative  from  Luxemburg. 

The  General  Officer  commanding  the  German  troops  in  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg  informed  the  German  Minister  in  that  town, 
on  August  8,  of  the  desire  of  the  military  authorities  for  the  de- 
parture of  the  Belgian  representative  at  the  Grand  Ducal  Court. 

Herr  von  Buch  addressed  to  Monsieur  Eyschen,  President  of  the 
Government,  a  note,  of  which  the  following  is  a  translation  :  — 

"Your  Excellency,  ''Luxemburg,  August  8,  1914- 

"In  consequence  of  the  completely  hostile  attitude  adopted  by 
Belgium  towards  Germany,  the  military  authorities  find  themselves 
obliged  to  insist  upon  the  departure  of  the  Belgian  Minister  from 
Luxemburg. 

"His  Excellency  the  General  Officer  commanding  begs  Count 
van  den  Steen  de  Jehay  to  arrange  his  journey  home  in  such  a  way 
that  he  may  be  able,  within  twenty-four  hours,  to  see  General  von 
Ploetz  at  Coblentz,  with  a  view  to  settling  the  details  of  the  further 
stages  of  his  journey.  It  is  impossible  for  him  to  travel  except 
via  Treves-Coblentz. 

(Signed)     "von  Buch.'^ 

Monsieur  Eyschen  forwarded  this  note  the  same  day  to  Count 
van  den  Steen  de  Jehay,  accompanied  by  a  letter  in  the  following 
terms :  — 

"Sir,  ''Luxemburg,  August  8,  1914- 

"I  greatly  regret  to  have  to  communicate  to  you  the  enclosed 
copy  of  a  note  from  the  German  Minister,  informing  me  that  the 
German  military  authorities  demand  your  departure. 

"You  will  find  in  it  the  conditions  which  they  attach  thereto. 

"Herr  von  Buch  told  me  that  the  military  authorities  advise  you 


496  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

to  travel  by  railway,  as  an  attempt  to  carry  out  your  journey  by 
motor  would  expose  you  to  being  too  frequently  stopped  for  reasons 
connected  with  the  control  of  the  roads.     But  the  choice  is  left  to  you. 

"The  German  Minister  will  come  to  me  for  your  answer. 

"I  cannot  tell  you  how  painful  it  is  to  me  to  fulfil  my  present 
task.  I  shall  never  forget  the  pleasant  relations  which  have  existed 
between  us,  and  I  hope  that  your  journey  may  be  carried  out  under 
the  best  possible  conditions.  ^Si^^^j^     "Eyschen." 

The  Belgian  Government,  considering  that  the  Grand  Ducal 
Government  had  no  choice  in  their  attitude,  and  that  the  course 
they  had  been  obliged  to  adopt  in  no  way  implied  any  discourteous 
intentions  towards  the  King  of  the  Belgians  or  towards  Belgium, 
decided  that  there  was  no  reason,  in  these  circumstances,  for  request- 
ing- the  Luxemburg  Charge  d'Affaires  to  leave  Belgium. 


Tuesday,  August  11,  1914 
Austria-Hungary  endeavors  to  maintain  friendly  relations  with  Great  Britain. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN   ReD   BoOK  No.    64 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Mensdorff  at  London. 

Vienna,  August  11,  1914- 
The  French  Government  have  commissioned  their  Ambassador 
here  to  ask  for  his  passports  on  the  ground  that  an  Austro-Hungarian 
army  corps  has  been  sent  to  Germany,  whereby  it  has  been  possible 
for  the  German  army  staff  to  withdraw  their  troops  from  those  Ger- 
man districts  which  are  occupied  by  our  contingents.  This  measure 
of  our  general  staff  indicates  in  his  view  the  grant  of  military  assist- 
ance to  Germany. 

Your  Excellency  should  bring  to  the  knowledge  of  the  British 
Government  that  according  to  information  obtained  from  a  reliable 
source  the  assertion  made  by  the  French  Government  is  unfounded. 

Belgium : 

From  Washington 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  67 

Mr.  Wkitlock,  United  States  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  11,  1914.. 

The  United  States  Legation  received  a  telegram  to-day  from 
Washington,  conveying  the  information  that  the  United  States 
Government  had,  at  the  request  of  the  German  Government,  con- 


August  11,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  69  497 

sented,  as  a  matter  of  international  courtesy,  to  undertake  the  pro- 
tection of  German  subjects  in  Belgium. 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  this  telegram, 
we  will,  therefore,  if  you  see  no  objection,  undertake  to  use  our  good 
and  friendly  offices  with  the  Belgian  Government  for  the  protection 
of  German  subjects.  The  pleasant  relations  which  we  have  had 
with  you  in  this  matter  up  to  the  present  convince  me  that  we  may 
continue  them  with  the  same  object  on  the  same  pleasant  footing. 


From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  68 

Sir  Francis  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  11,  1914- 

I  HAVE  telegraphed  to  Sir  E.  Gray  the  German  communication  and 
the  proposed  reply. 

I  have  received  instructions  to  express  to  your  Excellency  the 
entire  concurrence  of  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Government.  The 
latter  can  only  declare  their  approval  of  the  terms  of  the  reply  which 
the  Belgian  Government  propose  to  give  to  this  attempt  to  sow  dis- 
cord between  the  Powers  at  present  united  for  the  defence  of  the 
treaties  violated  by  Germany. 

From  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  69 

M.  Klohukowski,  French  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  11,  1914- 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  inform  your  Excellency  that  the  French 
Government  give  their  entire  concurrence  to  the  reply  which  the 
Belgian  Government  propose  to  return  to  the  new  German  ultimatum. 

That  reply  is  one  which  was  to  be  expected  from  a  Government 
and  a  people  who  have  so  heroically  resisted  the  hateful  violation  of 
their  territory. 

France  will  continue  to  fulfil  her  duties  as  a  guaranteeing  Power  of 
Belgian  neutrality  and  as  a  faithful  friend  of  Belgium. 

(See  No.  65) 


498  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Wednesday,  August  12,  1914 

Great  Britain  declares  war  on  Austria-Hungary. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  London 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.    65 

Count  Mensdorff  to  Count  Berchtold. 

{Translated  from  the  French.) 

(Telegraphic.)  London,  August  12,  1914. 

I  HAVE  just  received  from  Sir  E.  Grey  the  following  communica- 
tion :  — 

At  the  request  of  the  French  Government,  who  are  not  in  a  position 
to  communicate  direct  with  your  Government,  I  have  to  make  to  you 
the  following  communication  :  — 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  after  declaring  war  on  Servia, 
and  thus  taking  the  first  initiative  to  the  hostilities  in  Europe,  have, 
without  any  provocation  on  the  part  of  the  Government  of  the  French 
Republic,  extended  the  war  to  France  :  — 

(1)  After  Germany  had  in  succession  declared  war  on  Russia  and 
France,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  have  joined  in  the  con- 
flict by  declaring  war  against  Russia,  which  was  already  fighting 
on  the  side  of  France. 

(2)  According  to  information  from  numerous  trustworthy  sources 
Austria  has  sent  troops  to  the  German  frontier  under  circumstances 
which  amounted  to  a  direct  menace  to  France. 

In  view  of  these  facts  the  French  Government  are  obliged  to  inform 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  that  they  will  take  all  measures 
which  make  it  possible  for  them  to  answer  these  actions  and  these 
threats. 

Sir  E.  Grey  adds :  — 

As  a  breach  with  France  has  been  brought  about  in  this  way  the 
British  Government  feel  themselves  obliged  to  announce  that  Great 
Britain  and  Austria-Hungary  will  be  in  a  state  of  war  as  from  12 
o'clock  to-night. 

Belgium : 

From  The  Hagy£ 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  70 

Baron  Fallon,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hagu£,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  The  Hague,  August  12,  1914. 

The  German  text  contained  a  mistake:  instead  of  ^^ seine  Aus- 
einandersetzung,'^  it  should  read  ''ihre,''  and  thus  be  translated  "their 
conflict  with  France." 

(See  No.  64.) 


August  13,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  73  499 

To  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  71 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Fallon, 
Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague. 

(Telegram.)  Brussels,  August  12,  1914-. 

Please  communicate  the  following  telegram  to  the  Netherlands 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  :  — 

"The  proposal  made  to  us  by  the  German  Government  repeats 
the  proposal  which  was  formulated  in  the  ultimatum  of  August  2nd. 
Faithful  to  her  international  obligations,  Belgium  can  only  reiterate 
her  reply  to  that  ultimatum,  the  more  so  as  since  August  3rd,  her 
neutrality  has  been  violated,  a  distressing  war  has  been  waged  on 
her  territority,  and  the  guarantors  of  her  neutrality  have  responded 
loyally  and  without  delay  to  her  appeal. 

Thursday,  August  13,   1914 

Belgium : 

From  St.  Petershurgh 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  72 

M.  Sazonof,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  M.  Davignon, 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Telegram.)  St.  Petershurgh,  August  13,  1914. 

Please  thank  the  Belgian  Government  for  their  communication, 
and  express  to  them  the  pleasure  which  the  Russian  Government 
feel  at  their  firm  and  dignified  attitude,  upon  which  they  are  heartily 
to  be  congratulated. 

(See  No.  65.) 

From  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  73 

Baron  Fallon,  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  The  Hague,  August  13,  1914. 

I  HAD  the  honour  to  receive  your  telegram  of  yesterday,  and  I 
at  once  communicated  to  the  Netherlands  Minister  for  Foreign 
Aifairs,  the  Belgian  reply  to  the  second  German  proposal. 

His  Excellency  undertook  to  forward  the  Belgian  communication 
to  the  German  Minister  forthwith. 

(See  No.  71.) 

[Of  Friday,  August  14,  and  Saturday,  August  15,  no  despatches  are  published.] 


500  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


Sunday,  August  16,  1914 

France  changes  her  attitude  about  not  carrying  the  war  into  Africa. 
Serbia  pubHshes  the  recollections  of  her  former  Minister  in  Vienna  of  the  events 
leading  up  to  the  war. 

Belgium : 

From  Paris 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  74 

Baron  Guillaume,  Belgian  Minister  at  Paris,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Paris,  August  16,  1914. 

In  the  course  of  a  conversation  which  I  had  this  morning  with 
M.  de  Margerie,  I  turned  the  conversation  to  colonial  affairs  and  to 
the  action  which  you  had  instructed  me  to  take  in  your  telegram 
and  your  despatch  of  the  7th  instant. 

M.  de  Margerie  reminded  me  that  the  French  Government  had 
approached  Spain,  but  the  latter  had  not  answered  before  knowing 
the  views  of  Great  Britain.  It  seems  that  the  latter  has  still  given 
no  answer. 

M.  de  Margerie  considered  that  in  view  of  the  present  situation 
Germany  should  be  attacked  wherever  possible;  he  believes  that 
such  is  also  the  opinion  of  Great  Britain,  who  certainly  has  claims 
to  satisfy ;  France  wishes  to  get  back  that  part  of  the  Congo  which 
she  had  been  compelled  to  give  up  in  consequence  of  the  Agadir 
incident. 

M.  de  Margerie  added  that  a  success  would  not  be  difficult  to 
obtain. 

(See  Nos.  57  and  58.) 

Serbia : 

From  Vienna 

Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  52 

M.   Yox.  M.   Yovanovitch,  Minister  at  Vienna,  to  M.  N.  Pashitch, 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Sir,  Nish,  August  3/16,  1914. 

From  June  17/30  the  Serbian  Legation  at  Vienna  was  practically 
surrounded  by  police  and  gendarmes,  while  the  staff  were  under 
constant  police  supervision.  Our  movements  and  our  communica- 
tions with  the  outer  world  were,  as  you  can  imagine,  rendered  ex- 
tremely difficult ;  the  attitude  of  the  population  towards  the  Legation 
and  its  staff  was  inclined  to  be  menacing. 

After  the  beginning  of  July  (o.s.)  even  telegraphic  communication 
with  you  became  difficult,  while  matters  developed  with  such  rapidity 


August  16,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  52  501 

that  I  was  unable  to  report  to  you  some  of  the  events  which  preceded 
our  armed  conflict  with  Austria-Hungary.     I  accordingly  do  so  now. 

Up  to  the  end  of  June  (o.s.)  the  whole  question  of  the  Serajevo 
outrage  appeared  to  be  developing  normally.  At  the  commencement 
of  July,  however,  a  change  took  place  as  regards  the  question  of  the 
consequences  of  the  Serajevo  affair.  There  were  no  tangible  proofs 
that  a  radical  change  had  taken  place,  but  it  was  to  some  extent 
indicated  by  certain  vague  signs  and  symptoms  which  betrayed 
the  existence  of  some  hidden  intentions.  First  of  all,  the  Vienna 
and  Budapest  press,  in  conformity  with  instructions  issued  by  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  ceased  to  publish  reports  of  the  magis- 
terial enquiry  relating  to  the  Serajevo  outrage.  The  press  began 
also  to  represent  the  whole  matter  as  a  question  which  must  be  settled 
between  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  alone  —  eventually  by  war. 

Moreover,  statements  to  this  effect  were  communicated  to  the 
leading  Vienna  newspapers  by  the  German  Embassy.-  Exceptions 
were :  the  semi-official  Fremdenblatt,  which  was,  in  general,  more 
moderate  in  the  tone  of  its  articles;  Die  Zeit;  and  the  Arbeiter 
Zeitung. 

Simultaneously  with  this  new  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  press, 
a  very  unsettled  condition  of  affairs  developed  on  the  Bourse,  such  as 
it  had  not  witnessed  during  the  whole  course  of  recent  events  in  the 
Balkans.  In  private  conversations  also  and  in  high  financial  circles 
the  "settlement  with  Serbia"  was  declared  to  be  the  only  way  out 
of  the  general  financial  and  economic  crisis  prevailing  in  Austria- 
Hungary  ever  since  the  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
Under  secret  instructions  it  was  ordered  that  gold  should  be  gradually 
withdrawn  from  circulation,  and  a  corresponding  rise  in  exchange 
took  place. 

A  further  indication  was  the  clumsy  explanation  given  of  the 
reasons  which  had  induced  the  Minister  for  War,  Krobatin,  and  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Hetzendorf,  to  interrupt  their  leave  of 
absence  and  return  to  Vienna.  The  Chief  of  Staff  constantly  trav- 
elled to  the  south,  east,  and  north  of  Austria,  and  at  that  time  had 
had  an  interview  with  the  Chief  of  the  German  General  Staff,  Count 
Moltke,  in  Bohemia,  I  believe,  at  Carlsbad. 

All  the  reserves  which  had  been  called  out  for  the  June  manoeuvres 
in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  kept  with  the  colours  beyond  the 
stipulated  period. 

The  number  of  soldiers  belonging  to  the  permanent  establishment 
in  Austria-Hungary  allowed  to  go  home  on  short  leave  of  absence  in 
order  to  gather  in  the  harvest,  and  to  attend  to  other  private  affairs, 
was  much  larger  than  is  usually  the  case;  at  the  same  time  those 
whose  duties  were  of  a  military-administrative  nature  were  called 
upon  in  ever  increasing  numbers. 

Another  indication  was  the  non-committal  nature  of  the  answers 
given  to  several  interpellations  in  the  Hungarian  Diet  by  the  Hun- 
garian Prime  Minister,  Count  Tisza,  a  statesman  who  is  very  clear 
in  his  political  statements. 


502  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  attitude  of  the  Ballplatz  was  especially  characteristic.  None 
of  the  usual  weekly  receptions  by  Count  Berchtold  was  held.  They 
suddenly  ceased  at  the  Ballplatz  to  discuss  the  Serajevo  outrage  with 
the  representatives  of  foreign  countries;  or,  if  discussion  did  arise, 
it  seemed  as  if  instructions  had  been  issued  on  the  subject ;  that  is  to 
say,  it  was  mentioned  to  everyone  in  such  a  manner  as  to  dispel  all 
apprehensions  and  suspicion  that  Austria-Hungary  was  preparing  some 
serious  step  against  Serbia.  They  acknowledged  that  some  step 
would  be  undertaken  at  Belgrade  as  soon  as  the  results  of  the  magis- 
terial enquiry  should  have  sufficiently  established  the  connection 
between  Belgrade  and  the  Serajevo  outrage.  But  at  the  same  time 
it  was  said  that  this  step  would  not  be  such  as  to  give  rise  to  any 
uneasiness.  The  Russian  Ambassador,  who  spoke  several  times  on 
the  subject  with  Count  Forgach,  in  the  absence  of  Count  Berchtold, 
was  unable  to  discover  the  true  nature  of  Austria's  intentions.  M. 
Schebeko  told  me  that  Count  Szapary,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  at  Petrograd,  who,  for  family  reasons,  was  at  that  time 
stopping  in  Vienna,  had  said  to  him  that  the  step  to  be  taken  at 
Belgrade  would  be  of  conciliatory  character.  According  to  M. 
Schebeko,  Count  Szapary  had  also  assured  M.  Sazonof  that  the 
intended  Austro-Hungarian  Note  to  Serbia  would  not  be  such  as  to 
cause  Russia  any  dissatisfaction.  The  French  Ambassador,  M. 
Dumaine,  who,  under  instructions  from  his  Government,  had  drawn 
the  attention  of  the  Ballplatz  to  the  complications  which  might  arise 
should  the  eventual  demands  which  it  was  intended  to  make  of  Serbia 
not  be  of  a  moderate  nature,  was  told  by  the  principal  Under-Secretary 
Baron  Macchio,  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  appreciating 
the  friendly  and  conciliatory  action  of  the  French  Government,  would 
only  put  forward  such  demands,  embodied  in  a  note  to  the  Serbian 
Government,  as  Serbia  would  be  able  to  accept  without  difficulty. 
I  drew  the  attention  of  the  Ambassadors  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  the 
fact  that  such  an  assurance  might  well  conceal  the  true  nature  of  the 
intentions  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  and  that  the  Powers 
of  the  Triple  Entente  might  then  be  confronted  by  certain  faits 
accomplis  which  Europe  would  be  compelled  to  accept  in  order  to 
avoid  a  general  European  war.     ' 

The  line  followed  by  the  Ballplatz  was,  moreover,  comparatively 
successful,  as  all  those  of  my  colleagues  whom  I  saw  during  that 
period  were  more  or  less  dissuaded  from  believing  that  Austria- 
Hungary  contemplated  any  serious  step  which  could  provoke  Euro- 
pean complications.  Many  of  the  members  of  the  diplomatic  body 
were  so  firmly  convinced  of  this  that  they  were  preparing  at  that  time 
to  quit  Vienna  on  long  leave  of  absence  at  various  watering  places. 

Nevertheless,  it  was  known  that  a  note  was  being  drawn  up  at 
the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  which  would  contain  the  accusations 
against  Serbia,  and  also  the  demands  of  Austria-Hungary.  This  task 
was  entrusted  to  Count  Forgach,  formerly  Austro-Hungarian  Min- 
ister in  Serbia.  At  the  same  time  it  was  universally  believed  that  of 
the  foreign  representatives,   the   German   Ambassador,   Herr   von 


August  16,  Serbian  Blue  Book  No.  52  503 

Tschirsky,  was  the  only  one  who  was  kept  informed  of  the  note  even 
in  its  minutest  details,  while  I  had  reason  to  believe  that  he  was  also 
co-operating  in  drafting  it.  In  view  of  the  above,  the  representatives 
of  the  friendly  Powers  agreed  with  me  in  thinking  that  the  note 
would  impose  very  difficult  terms  on  Serbia,  but  that  there  would  be 
no  inacceptable  demands.  When  the  contents  of  the  note  were  pub- 
lished all  of  them  were  surprised,  not  to  say  dumfounded. 

In  the  same  way  as  the  contents  of  the  note  were  kept  secret, 
a  similar  amount  of  secrecy  was  observed  in  regard  to  the  date  of  its 
presentation.  On  the  very  day  that  the  note  was  presented  at  Bel- 
grade, the  French  Ambassador  had  a  prolonged  conversation  with 
the  Principal  Under-Secretary  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs 
—  Count  Berchtold  was  again  absent  at  Ischl  —  on  the  subject  of 
the  note.  Yet  Baron  Macchio  did  not  tell  M.  Dumaine  that  the 
note  would  be  presented  at  Belgrade  that  afternoon,  and  published  in 
the  newspapers  on  the  following  day. 

On  the  publication  in  the  Vienna  papers  on  the  morning  of  July 
11/24  of  the  contents  of  the  note,  which  Baron  Giesl  had  presented  to 
the  Serbian  Government,  a  feeling  of  dejection  came  over  the  friends 
both  of  Serbia  and  of  the  peace  of  Europe.  It  was  only  then  realised 
that  serious  European  complications  might  ensue,  though  it  was  not 
believed  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment to  provoke  them.  This  feeling  of  depression  was  increased  by 
the  tone  of  the  articles  in  the  Viennese  newspapers,  with  the  exception 
of  Die  Zeit  and  Arheiter  Zeitung,  and  by  demonstrations  in  the  streets, 
which  clearly  showed  that  war  would  be  a  most  welcome  solution  — 
a  war  with  Serbia,  of  course. 

On  that  day,  after  having  two  or  three  conversations,  I  realised 
that  an  armed  conflict  between  Serbia  and  the  Dual  Monarchy  was 
inevitable,  even  should  Serbia  accept  all  the  demands  contained  in  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Note,  from  the  first  to  the  last.  The  attitude  of 
the  people  in  the  streets  towards  our  Legation  was  such  that  I  expected 
even  personal  attacks  upon  the  members  of  the  staff. 

The  French  Ambassador,  the  British  Ambassador,  and  the  Russian 
Charge  d'Affaires  held  the  view  that  the  step  taken  by  Austria-Hun- 
gary should  be  considered  not  as  a  note  but  as  an  ultimatum.  They 
disapproved  of  the  form,  the  contents,  and  the  time  limit  of  the  note; 
they  also  declared  it  to  be  inacceptable. 

In  the  course  of  conversation  with  them  on  the  subject  of  the 
note  I  pointed  out  that  those  passages  in  it  which  dealt  with  the  order 
by  the  King  to  the  Army,  with  the  dismissal  of  officers  and  Govern- 
ment officials,  and  especially  that  which  referred  to  the  co-operation 
of  Austro-Hungarian  officials  in  the  "Suppression  of  the  subversive 
movement  in  Serbia  against  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Mon- 
archy," would  be  inacceptable  as  not  being  compatible  with  the 
dignity  and  sovereignty  of  Serbia.  Only  a  victorious  war,  I  said, 
could  enforce  the  acceptance  of  conditions  which  were  so  humiliat- 
ing to  an  independent  State.  In  reply  to  their  enquiry  whether  it 
would  not  perhaps  be  better  to  accept  the  conditions  and  avoid  war 


504  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

for  the  present,  I  said  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Note,  which 
amounted  in  fact  to  a  declaration  of  war  upon  Serbia,  was  worded 
in  such  a  way  that,  even  if  Serbia  should  accept  all  the  conditions 
without  reserve,  Austria-Hungary  would  still  find  an  excuse  for  her 
army  to  march  into  Serbia  at  any  time.  It  was  in  the  belief  that  the 
conflict  would  be  limited  to  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  that  Austria- 
Hungary  had  drafted  such  a  note. 

To  M.  Dumaine,  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  and  the  Russian  Charge 
d'Affaires,  the  unexpected  character  of  the  note  was  the  cause  not  only 
of  surprise  but  also  of  alarm,  in  view  of  the  complications  which  they 
feared  might  ensue.  The  Russian  Ambassador,  M.  Schebeko, 
previously  to  the  presentation  of  the  note,  had  stated  on  several 
occasions  to  his  colleagues  that  Russia  could  not  remain  indifferent 
to  any  step  taken  by  Austria-Hungary,  w^hich  might  have  as  an  object 
the  humiliation  of  Serbia.  He  also  expressed  the  same  view  at  the 
Ballplatz.  Hence  the  apprehension  felt  by  the  three  Ambassa- 
dors, who  at  once  foresaw  the  possibility  of  war  between  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary. 

The  day  after  the  note  was  presented.  Prince  Koudacheff  went  to 
see  Count  Berchtold  to  discuss  the  matter.  In  reply  to  his  statement, 
that  the  note  as  it  stood  was  inacceptable,  and  that  Russia  could 
not  watch  with  indifference  the  humiliation  of  Serbia,  Count  Berchtold 
said  that  Austria-Hungary  had  been  obliged  to  take  this  step,  as  her 
very  existence  was  threatened;  that  she  could  not  withdraw  nor 
alter  the  demands  made  in  the  note,  and  that  he  considered  that  the 
matter  in  dispute  concerned  Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  alone  and 
that  no  other  Power  had  any  grounds  for  interference. 

Count  Berchtold's  reply  did  not  allow  of  any  further  doubts  as  to 
the  intention  of  Austria-Hungary  to  chastise  Serbia  by  force  of  arms 
without  the  consent  of  the  European  concert.  From  conversations 
which  I  had  at  that  time  with  the  Ambassadors  of  the  Triple  Entente 
—  who  during  the  whole  of  that  difficult  period  showed  every  kind- 
ness and  attention  to  me  and  to  the  staff  of  the  Legation  —  it  seemed 
quite  clear  that  Austria-Hungary  had  been  assured,  and  felt  con- 
vinced, that  the  Serbo-Austro-Hungarian  conflict  would  be  localised, 
as  she  would  otherwise  not  have  decided  upon  a  note  which  undoubt- 
edly meant  war.  It  was  also  clear  that  Austria-Hungary  was  con- 
firmed in  this  impression  especially  —  and  perhaps  solely  —  by  Herr 
von  Tschirsky,  the  German  Ambassador  in  Vienna.  Herr  von 
Tschirsky  was  the  only  one  who  thought,  and  even  stated  publicly, 
that  Russia  would  remain  quiet  while  Austria-Hungary  carried  out 
her  punitive  expedition  against  Serbia.  He  declared  that  the  Rus- 
sian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  would  easily  control  the  Panslavists, 
in  the  same  way  as  he  had  done  last  year,  and  that  Russia  was  not 
disposed  at  the  moment  to  begin  a  discussion  of  the  many  vexed 
questions  in  Europe  and  Asia  which  were  her  main  concern.  It  was 
necessary,  according  to  Herr  von  Tschirsky,  to  give  Serbia  a  lesson. 
Russia  had  no  right  to  interfere.  As  far  as  Germany,  he  said,  was 
concerned,  she  was  in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word  conscious  of 


Augmt  17,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  75  505 

what  she  was  doing  in  giving  Austria-Hungary  her  support  in  the 
matter. 

These  statements  of  Herr  von  Tsehirsky  have  induced  many  to 
hold  the  opinion  that  Germany  desired  to  provoke  a  European  war, 
on  the  ground  that  it  was  better  to  have  war  with  Russia  before  the 
latter  had  completed  her  military  reorganisation,  i.e.,  before  the  spring 
of  1917.  This  point  of  view  had  formerly  been  freely  discussed  and 
even  written  about  in  Vienna.  "The  longer  the  matter  is  postponed 
the  smaller  will  become  the  chances  of  success  of  the  Triple  Alliance." 
On  the  other  hand,  rumours  from  the  most  authoritative  diplomatic 
sources  in  Berlin  reached  me  in  Vienna,  to  the  effect  that  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse  did  not  approve  of  Austria's  policy  on  this  question,  and  that 
Herr  von  Tsehirsky  has  exceeded  the  instructions  given  to  him. 

The  Russian  Ambassador,  M.  Schebeko,  on  his  return  from 
Petrograd,  did  his  utmost  at  the  Ballplatz  to  obtain  an  extension  of 
the  brief  time  limit  given  the  Serbian  Government  for  a  reply  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Note,  and  to  discover  some  way  which  might  lead 
to  an  exchange  of  views  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  in  regard  to 
the  whole  question,  but  until  July  13/26,  when  we  met,  his  efforts 
had  proved  unavailing.  From  the  conversations  I  then  had  with  him, 
I  gathered  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Note,  in  its  contents  and  in  its 
form,  was  regarded  as  a  challenge  to  Russia  and  not  to  Serbia,  and 
that  Russia  would  not  permit  the  humiliation  of  Serbia,  even  if  war 
were  to  be  the  price. 

On  the  day  of  my  departure  from  Vienna,  M.  Schebeko  told 
me  that,  in  spite  of  the  many  great  difficulties  to  be  overcome, 
there  was  a  prospect  of  arriving  at  a  solution  by  which  an  armed 
conflict  might  be  avoided  by  means  of  discussion  between  the  Russian 
Government  and  Count  Szapary.  A  feeling  of  depression,  however, 
prevailed  in  Vienna  as  soon  as  reports  began  to  be  spread  that  the 
Austro-Serbian  conflict  would  bring  about  a  war  between  Russia  and 
the  Dual  Monarchy. 


Monday,  August  17,  1914 
Great  Britain  declines  the  Belgian  proposal  not  to  carry  the  war  into  Africa. 

Belgium : 

From  London 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  75 

Count  de  Lalaing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London,  to  M.  Davignon,  Bel- 
gian Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Sir,  London,  August  17,  1914- 

In  reply  to  your  despatch  of  August  7th,  I  have  the  honour  to 
inform  you  that  the  British  Government  cannot  agree  to  the  Bel- 


506  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

gian  proposal  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  belligerent  powers  in 
the  conventional  basin  of  the  Congo. 

German  troops  from  German  East  Africa  have  already  taken 
the  offensive  against  the  British  Central  African  Protectorate. 
Furthermore,  British  troops  have  already  attacked  the  German 
port  of  Dar-es-Salaam,  where  they  have  dsetroyed  the  wireless 
telegraphy  station. 

In  these  circumstances,  the  British  Government,  even  if  they 
were  convinced  from  the  political  and  strategical  point  of  view  of 
the  utility  of  the  Belgian  proposal,  would  be  unable  to  adopt  it. 

The  British  Government  believe  that  the  forces  they  are  sending 
to  Africa  will  be  sufficient  to  overcome  all  opposition.  They  will 
take  every  step  in  their  power  to  prevent  any  risings  of  the  native 
population. 

France  is  of  the  same  opinion  as  Great  Britain  on  account  of  Ger- 
man activity  which  has  been  noticed  near  Bonar  and  Ekododo. 

(See  Nos.  57  and  58.) 

[Of  Tuesday,  and  Wednesday,  August  18,  and  19,  no  despatches  have  been 
published.] 


Thursday,  August  20,  1914 

Austria-Hungary  receives  from  Japan  a  copy  of  the  latter's  ultimatum  to  Ger- 
many. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Tokio 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   66 

The  Japanese  Ambassador  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Translated  from  the  English.) 

My  Lord,  Vienna,  August  20,  1914- 

Your  Excellency  will  doubtless  have  already  received  information 
from  his  Excellency  Baron  Miiller  of  the  communication  which  was 
addressed  to  the  German  Government  by  my  Government  on  the 
15th  inst.  Nevertheless  I  take  the  liberty,  although  I  have  not 
received  any  instructions  to  do  so,  to  enclose  herewith  for  your  Excel- 
lency's personal  information,  a  copy  of  a  telegram  bearing  on  the 
matter  which  I  have  received  from  Tokio. 

Enclosure 

The  Japanese  Government,  who  have  taken  the  present  situation 
into  their  earnest  consideration,  have,  in  accordance  with  a  complete 
understanding  made  with  the  British  Government,  for  the  purpose 
of  strengthening  and  maintaining  general  peace  in  the  regions  of 
Eastern  Asia,  which  is  one  of  the  aims  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance, 
decided  to  take  common  action  with  Great  Britain  in  giving  effect  to 


August  22y  Au^tro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  67  507 

the  necessary  measures  for  this  purpose.  Nevertheless,  before  pro- 
ceeding with  measures  of  this  kind,  the  Japanese  Government  have 
thought  it  proper  to  address  a  friendly  request  to  the  German  Govern- 
ment, which  was  communicated  to  them  on  the  15th  August,  1914, 
in  the  following  words  :  — 

"(1)  All  German  warships  must  be  withdrawn  at  once  from  the 
waters  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Japan  and  China.  The  ships  that 
cannot  be  withdrawn  must  be  disarmed. 

"  (2)  The  German  Government  must  unconditionally  and  without 
compensation  hand  over  to  the  Japanese  authorities  the  whole  of  the 
leased  territory  of  Kiao-chau  before  the  16th  September,  1914,  for 
the  purpose  of  handing  this  territory  back  to  China. 

"  The  Japanese  Government  have  informed  the  German  Government 
that,  in  case  an  answer  intimating  unconditional  compliance  with  the 
above-mentioned  demands  is  not  received  before  Sunday,  the  23rd, 
at  mid-day,  they  will  proceed  as  appears  necessary  to  them. 

"  It  is  earnestly  to  be  hoped  that  the  above-mentioned  demands,  for 
a  reply  to  which  so  ample  time  is  given,  will  be  agreed  to  by  the  German 
Government ;  should  they,  however,  not  comply  with  this  demand,  a 
course  of  action  which  would  be  deplored,  the  Japanese  Government 
will  be  obliged  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  attain  their  end." 

The  grounds  on  which  the  Imperial  Government  base  their  present 
attitude  is,  as  already  mentioned,  none  other  than  to  maintain  the 
common  interests  of  Japan  and  Great  Britain,  which  are  set  out  in 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance,  by  establishing  a  basis  of  a  lasting 
peace  in  the  territory  of  Eastern  Asia.  The  Japanese  Government 
have  in  no  respect  the  intention  of  embarking  upon  a  policy  of  terri- 
torial expansion,  nor  do  they  entertain  any  other  selfish  designs. 
For  this  reason  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  are  resolved  to 
respect  with  the  greatest  care  the  interests  of  third  Powers  in  Eastern 
Asia  and  to  refrain  from  injuring  them  in  any  degree. 

[Of  Friday,  August  21,  no  despatches  have  been  published.] 


Saturday,  August  22,  1914 

Austria-Hungary  declares  war  on  Belgium. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  Brussels 

AusTRO-HxmGARiAN  Red  Book  No.  67^ 

Count  Berchtold  to  Count  Clary  at  Brussels. 

(Translated  from  the  French.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  22,  1914. 

I  ASK  your  Excellency  to  communicate  the  following  to  the  Royal 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  once :  — 

"I  have  the  honour  to  bring  the  following  to  the  knowledge  of 

1  See  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  77,  August  28. 


508  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

your  Excellency  in  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  our  Govern- 
ment :  — 

Whereas  Belgium,  having  refused  to  accept  the  proposals  made 
to  her  on  several  occasions  by  Germany,  is  affording  her  military 
assistance  to  France  and  Great  Britain,  both  of  which  Powers  have 
declared  war  upon  Austria-Hungary,  and  whereas  as  has  just  been 
proved,  Austrian  and  Hungarian  nationals  in  Belgium  have  had  to 
submit,  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  Belgian  authorities,  to  treatment 
contrary  to  the  most  primitive  demands  of  humanity,  and  inadmis- 
sible even  towards  subjects  of  an  enemy  State,  therefore  Austria- 
Hungary  finds  herself  obliged  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations,  and 
considers  herself,  from  this  moment,  in  a  state  of  war  with  Belgium. 

I  am  leaving  the  country  with  the  staff  of  the  Legation,  and  I  am 
entrusting  the  protection  of  my  countrymen  to  the  Minister  of  the 
United  States  in  Belgium. 

Count  Errembault  de  Dudzeele  has  received  his  passports  from 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government. 

Sunday,  August  23,  1914 

Germany  refuses  to  reply  to  the  Japanese  ultimatum  and  gives  the  Japanese 
Ambassador  his  passports. 

Austria-Hungary : 

From  Berlin 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD   BoOK  No.   68 

Prince  Hohenlohe  to  Count  Berchtold. 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  23,  1914. 

The  Foreign  Office  has  informed  the  Japanese  Charge  d' Affaires  that 
the  Imperial  German  Government  do  not  intend  to  send  an  answer  to 
the  Japanese  ultimatum.  The  German  Government  have  instructed 
their  Ambassador  at  Tokio,  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  allowed  by 
Japan  at  12  o'clock  to-day,  to  leave  Japan,  and  they  will,  at  the  same 
time,  furnish  the  Japanese  Charge  d'Affaires  here  with  his  passports. 

At  mid-day  the  Charge  d'Affaires  was  furnished  with  his  passports, 
and  he  will  leave  Berlin  early  to-morrow  morning  with  the  staff  of 
the  Embassy. 

Monday,  August  24,  1914 

Austria-Hungary  makes  common  cause  with  Germany  against  Japan. 

Austria-Hungary : 

To  Tokio 

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ReD  BoOK  No.   69 

Count  Berchtold  to  Freiherr  von  Miiller  at  Tokio. 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  2 4,  1914- 

The  Commander  of  S.M.S.  Elisabeth  has  been  instructed  to 
take  part  in  the  fighting  at  Tsingtau.     I  ask  your  Excellency,  in  view 


August  28,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  77  509 

of  the  action  taken  by  Japan  against  our  Ally,  the  German  Empire, 
to  ask  for  your  passports.  You  should  inform  the  Consulates,  and 
you  should  travel  to  America  with  the  colony  and  the  staff  of  the 
Embassy  and  of  the  Consulates.  Your  Excellency  should  entrust 
the  protection  of  our  countrymen  and  their  interests  to  the  American 
Ambassador.  The  Japanese  Ambassador  here  is  being  furnished 
with  his  passports. 

Wednesday,  August  26,  1914 

Belgium : 

From  Elizabethmlle 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  76 

M.  Tomheur,  Belgian  Vice-Gowrnor  of  the  Katanga,  to  M.  Renkin, 
Belgian  Minister  for  the  Colonies. 

(Telegram.)  Elizahethville,  August  26,  1914- 

The  Germans  are  continuing  their  skirmishes  on  Tanganyika  and 
attacked  the  port  of  Lukuga,  on  August  22nd.  Two  of  their  natives 
were  killed  and  two  wounded.     Fresh  attacks  are  expected. 

[Of  Thursday,  August  27,  1914,  no  despatches  have  been  published.l 

Friday,  August  28,  1914 

Belgium : 

From  The  Hague 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  77  ^ 

Count    Clary   and   Aldringen,    Au^tro-Hungarian   Minister   at    The 
Hague,  to  M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

(Forwarded  through  the  Netherlands  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.) 

(Telegram.)  The  Hague,  August  28,  1914. 

On  the  instructions  of  my  Government,  I  have  the  honour  to  in- 
form your  Excellency  as  follows :  — 

(Translation.) 

"Vu  que  la  Belgique,  apres  "Whereas  Belgium,  having  re- 
avoir  refuse  d'accepter  les  pro-  fused  to  accept  the  proposals 
positions  qui  lui  avaient  ete  made  to  her  on  several  occasions 
adressees  a  plusieurs  reprises  par  by  Germany,  is  affording  her 
TAllemagne,  prete  sa  cooperation  military  assistance  to  France  and 
militaire  a  la  France  et  a  la  Great  Britain,  both  of  which 
Grande-Bretagne,  qui,  toutes  Powers  have  declared  war  upon 
deux  ont  declare  la  guerre  a  I'Au-     Austria-Hungary,    and    whereas 

1  See  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  No.  67,  August  22.  No  reason  appears  why  this 
despatch  is  printed  here  with  a  delay  of  six  days. 


510 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


triche-Hongrie,  et  en  presence 
du  fait  que,  comme  il  vient  d'etre 
constate,  les  ressortissants  autri- 
chiens  et  hongrois  se  trouvant  en 
Belgique  ont,  sous  les  yeux  des 
autorites  Royales,  du  subir  un 
traitement  contraire  aux  exi- 
gences les  plus  primitives  de 
rhumanite  et  inadmissibles  meme 
vis-a-vis  des  sujets  d'un  Etat 
ennemi,  TAutriche-Hongrie  se 
voit  dans  la  necessite  de  rompre 
les  relations  diplomatiques  et  se 
considere  des  ce  moment  en  etat 
de  guerre  avec  la  Belgique.  Je 
quitte  le  pays  avec  le  personnel 
de  la  legation  et  coniie  la  protec- 
tion de  mes  administres  au  Mi- 
nistre  des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique 
en  Belgique.  De  la  part  du 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
les  passeports  sont  remis  au 
Comte  Errembault  de  Dudzeele. 
(Signe)     "  Clary." 


as  has  just  been  proved,  Austrian 
and  Hungarian  nationals  in  Bel- 
gium have  had  to  submit,  under 
the  very  eyes  of  the  Belgian 
authorities,  to  treatment  con- 
trary to  the  most  primitive  de- 
mands of  humanity  and  inadmis- 
sible even  towards  subjects  of  an 
enemy  State,  therefore  Austria 
finds  herself  obliged  to  break  off 
diplomatic  relations  and  con- 
siders herself  from  this  moment 
in  a  state  of  war  with  Belgium. 
I  am  leaving  the  country  with 
the  staff  of  the  legation  and  I 
am  entrusting  the  protection  of 
Austrian  interests  to  the  United 
States  Minister  in  Belgium.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  Government 
are  forwarding  his  passports  to 
Count  Errembault  de  Dudzeele." 


Saturday,  August  29,  1914 

Belgium  defends  herself  against  the  charge  of  having  committed,  previous  to 
August  1,  "certain  hostile  acts"  against  Germany. 


Belgium : 


To  The  Hague 
Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  78 


M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Baron  Fallon, 
Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague. 

(Telegram.)  Antiverp,  August  29,  1914- 

Please  inform  the  Austrian  Legation  through  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  that  I  have  received  Austria-Hungary's  declaration 
of  war  against  Belgium,  and  add  the  following :  — 

"La  Belgique  a  toujours  entre- 
tenu  des  relations  d'amitie  avec 
tous  ses  voisins  sans  distinction. 
Elle  a  scrupuleusement  rempLi 
les  devoirs  que  la  neutralite  lui 
impose.     Si    elle    n'a    pas    cru 


"Belgium  has  always  enter- 
tained friendly  relations  with  all 
her  neighbours  without  distinc- 
tion. She  had  scrupulously  ful- 
filled the  duties  imposed  upon 
her  by   her   neutrality.     If   she 


August  29 J  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  78 


511 


pouvoir  accepter  les  propositions 
de  rAllemagne,  c'est  que  celles-ci 
avaient  pour  objet  la  violation 
des  engagements  qu'elle  a  pris  a 
la  face  de  I'Europe,  engagements 
qui  ont  ete  les  conditions  de  la 
creation  du  Royaume  de  Bel- 
gique.  Elle  n'a  pas  cru  qu'un 
peuple,  quelque  faible  qu'il  soit, 
puisse  meconnaitre  ses  devoirs  et 
sacrifier  son  honneur  en  s'incli- 
nant  devant  la  force.  Le  Gou- 
vernement  a  attendu,  non  seule- 
ment  les  delais  de  I'ultimatum, 
mais  la  violation  de  son  territoire 
par  les  troupes  allemandes  avant 
de  faire  appel  a  la  France  et  a 
I'Angleterre,  garantes  de  sa  neu- 
tralite  au  meme  titre  que  I'Alle- 
magne  et  I'Autriche-Hongrie, 
pour  cooperer  au  nom  et  en  vertu 
des  traites  a  la  defense  du  terri- 
toire beige. 

"  En  repoussant  par  les  armes 
les  envahisseurs,  elle  n'a  meme 
pas  accompli  un  acte  d'hostilite 
aux  termes  de  Tarticle  10  de  la 
Convention  de  La  Haye  sur  les 
droits  et  devoirs  des  Puissances 
neutres. 

"  L'Allemagne  a  reconnu  elle- 
meme  que  son  agression  constitue 
une  violation  du  droit  des  gens, 
et  ne  pouvant  la  justifier  elle  a 
invoque  son  interet  strategique. 

"  La  Belgique  oppose  un  de- 
menti formel  a  I'affirmation  que 
les  ressortissants  autrichiens  et 
hongrois  auraient  subi  en  Bel- 
gique un  traitement  contraire  aux 
exigences  les  plus  primitives  de 
I'humanite. 

"  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  a 
donne,  des  le  debut  des  hostilites, 
les  ordres  les  plus  stricts  quant  a 
la  sauvegarde  des  personnes  et 
des  proprietes  austro-hongroises. 
(Signe)     "Davignon." 


has  not  been  able  to  accept  Ger- 
many's proposals,  it  is  because 
those  proposals  contemplated  the 
violation  of  her  engagements 
toward  Europe,  engagements 
which  form  the  conditions  of  the 
creation  of  the  Belgian  Kingdom. 
She  has  been  unable  to  admit  that 
a  people,  however  weak  they  may 
be,  can  fail  in  their  duty  and 
sacrifice  their  honour  by  yield- 
ing to  force.  The  Government 
have  waited,  not  only  until  the 
ultimatum  had  expired,  but  also 
until  Belgian  territory  had  been 
violated  by  German  troops,  be- 
fore appealing  to  France  and 
Great  Britain,  guarantors  of  her 
neutrality,  under  the  same  terms 
as  are  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  to  co-operate  in  the 
name  and  in  virtue  of  the  treaties 
in  defence  of  Belgian  territory. 
By  repelling  the  invaders  by 
force  of  arms,  she  has  not  even 
committed  an  hostile  act  as  laid 
down  by  the  provisions  of  article 
10  of  The  Hague  Convention 
respecting  the  rights  and  duties 
of  neutral  Powers. 

"Germany  herself  has  recog- 
nised that  her  attack  constitutes 
a  violation  of  international  law, 
and,  being  unable  to  justify  it, 
she  has  pleaded  her  strategical 
interests. 

"Belgium  formally  denies  the 
allegation  that  Austrian  and 
Hungarian  nationals  have  suf- 
fered treatment  in  Belgium  con- 
trary to  the  most  primitive  de- 
mands of  humanity. 

"The  Belgian  Government, 
from  the  very  commencement  of 
hostilities,  have  issued  the 
strictest  orders  for  the  protection 
of  Austro-Hungarian  persons  and 
property." 


512  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

To  Belgian  Ministers  Abroad 

Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  79 

M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Belgian  Minis- 
ters abroad. 
Sir,  Antwerp  J  August  29,  191 4. 

Under  date  of  the  17th  August,  I  addressed  a  despatch  ^  to  the 
Belgian  Minister  at  London,  in  which  I  felt  bound  to  call  attention 
to  certain  allegations  made  by  the  German  Government  which  are 
mentioned  in  the  Blue  Book^  recently  published  by  the  British 
Government. 

I  have  the  honour  to  enclose  for  your  information  a  copy  of  the 
despatch  in  question  and  of  its  enclosures. 

I  request  that  you  will  bring  its  contents  to  the  notice  of  the 
Government  to  which  you  are  accredited. 


Enclosure  1  in  No.  79. 


M.  Davignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count  de  La- 

laing,  Belgian  Minister  at  London. 
Sir,  Brussels,  August  17,  1914- 

The  Blue  Book  recently  published  by  the  British  Government 
contains  (see  No.  122,  p.  92)  the  text  of  a  telegram  despatched  from 
Berlin  on  the  3 1st  July  by  Sir  E.  Goschen  to  Sir  E.  Grey,  in  w^hich 
the  following  passage  occurs :  — 

"It  appears  from  what  he  [his  Excellency  the  Secretary  of  State] 
said,  that  the  German  Government  consider  that  certain  hostile 
acts  have  already  been  committed  by  Belgium.  As  an  instance  of 
this,  he  alleged  that  a  consignment  of  corn  for  Germany  had  been 
placed  under  an  embargo  already." 

The  incident  to  which  the  German  Secretary  of  State  alluded  in 
his  conversation  with  Sir  E.  Goschen,  and  which  he  considered  as  a 
hostile  act  on  the  part  of  Belgium,  doubtless  refers  to  the  application 
of  the  Royal  decree  of  the  30th  July,  which  provisionally  prohibited 
the  export  from  Belgium  of  certain  products.  As  you  will  see  from 
the  explanation  in  the  following  paragraph,  the  incident  with  which 
we  are  reproached  has  in  no  wise  the  character  which  Germany  has 
wished  to  attribute  to  it. 

The  Royal  decrees  dated  the  30th  July  and  published  in  the 
Moniteur  beige  the  following  day  forbade,  provisionally,  the  export, 
both  by  land  and  by  sea,  of  a  series  of  products,  more  especially  of 
cereals.  On  the  31st  July  the  German  Minister  at  Brussels  called 
my  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Antwerp  customs  were  detaining 
cargoes  of  grain  addressed  to  Germany,  which,  as  they  were  merely 
transshipped  in  our  port,  were  in  reality  only  in  transit.     Herr  von 

1  Not  previously  printed. 

2  British  Blue  Book  No.  122,  July  31,  printed  under  date  of  August  1. 


August  29,  Belgian  Gray  Book  No.  79     '  513 

Below  Saleske  requested  that  the  vessels  carrying  these  cargoes 
should  be  allowed  to  depart  freely.  The  very  day  on  which  the 
German  Minister's  request  was  received,  the  Foreign  Office  brought 
the  matter  to  the  notice  of  the  Mihistry  of  Finance,  and  the  follow- 
ing day,  the  2nd  August,  that  Department  informed  us  that  instruc- 
tions had  been  forwarded  to  the  Belgian  Customs  giving  full  and 
entire  satisfaction  to  Germany. 

I  cannot  do  better  than  enclose,  for  your  information,  copies  of  the 
correspondence  exchanged  on  this  subject  with  Herr  Below  Saleske. 
You  will  observe  that  nothing  in  our  attitude  can  be  taken  as  show- 
ing any  hostile  dispositions  towards  Germany;  the  steps  taken  by 
the  Belgian  Government  at  that  time  were  nothing  more  than  those 
simple  precautions  which  it  is  the  right  and  duty  of  every  State  to 
adopt  in  such  exceptional  circumstances. 

It  would  be  as  well  that  you  should  address  a  communication  to 
the  British  Government  in  order  to  explain  the  real  facts  of  the  case. 


Enclosure  2  in  No.  79. 


Herr  von  Below  Saleske,  German  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  M.  Bavignon, 

Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Sir,  Brussels,  July  31,  1914- 

I  AM  informed  from  Antwerp  that  the  Customs  have  forbidden  the 
despatch  of  vessels  containing  cargoes  of  grain  for  Germany. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  it  is  not  in  this  case  a  question  of  the  export 
of  grain,  but  of  grain  in  transit,  the  goods  in  question  having  been 
merely  transshipped  at  Antwerp,  I  have  the  honour  to  ask  your  good 
offices  in  order  that  the  vessels  in  question  may  be  allowed  to  leave 
for  Germany. 

At  the  same  time  I  beg  your  Excellency  to  inform  me  if  the  port 
of  Antwerp  is  closed  for  the  transit  of  those  goods  specified  in  the 
Moniteur  of  to-day. 

Awaiting  your  Excellency's  reply  at  your  earliest  possible  con- 
venience, I  have,  etc. 


Enclosure  3  in  No.  79. 


M.  Bavignon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Herr  von  Below 

Saleske,  German  Minister  at  Brussels. 
Sir,  Brussels,  August  1,  1914- 

In  reply  to  your  Excellency's  note  of  the  31st  July,  I  have  the 
honour  to  inform  you  that  the  Belgian  decree  of  the  30th  July  con- 
cerns only  the  export  and  not  the  transit  of  the  products  mentioned. 

I  at  once  communicated  your  note  to  the  Minister  of  Finance  and 
begged  him  to  issue  precise  instructions  to  the  Customs  officials  in 
order  that  any  error  in  the  application  of  the  above-mentioned  decree 
might  be  avoided. 
2l^ 


514  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Enclosure  4  in  No.  79. 

M.  Damgnon,  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,    to  Herr  von  Be- 
low Saleske,  German  Minister  at  Brussels. 

Sir,  Brussels,  August  3,  1914. 

With  reference  to  the  note  which  your  Excellency  was  good 
enough  to  address  to  me  on  the  31st  July,  I  have  the  honour  to  in- 
form you  that  the  Minister  of  Finance  has  instructed  the  Customs 
that  the  prohibitions  established  by  the  Royal  decrees  of  the  30th 
July  last,  only  apply  to  actual  exports,  and  do  not,  therefore,  extend 
to  goods  regularly  declared  in  transit  at  the  time  of  import.  More- 
over, when  duty-free  goods  are  declared  to  be  for  actual  consump- 
tion, although  they  are  really  intended  for  export,  they  are  commonly 
the  object  of  special  declarations  of  free  entry  which  are  considered 
as  transit  documents.  In  short,  if  it  should  happen  that  such  goods 
had  been  declared  as  for  consumption  without  restriction,  as  though 
they  were  to  remain  in  the  country,  the  Customs  would  still  allow 
them  to  leave  the  country  as  soon  as  it  had  been  duly  established  by 
despatch  receipts,  bills  of  lading,  etc.,  that  they  were  to  be  exported 
forthwith  in  transit. 

I  would  add  that  the  export  of  grain  with  which  your  note  deals 
was  authorised  on  the  1st  August. 

(See  note,  page  509.) 

Tuesday,  September  1,  1914 

Great  Britain  publishes  as  an  addition  to  her  White  Papers  (later  Blue  Book)  Sir 
Maurice  de  Bunsen's,  former  British  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  recollections  of  the 
events  of  the  last  days  preceding  the  war. 

From  Vienna 
British  Blue  Book  No.  161 
Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
Sir,  London,  September  1,  1914- 

The  rapidity  of  the  march  of  events  during  the  days  which  led 
up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war  made  it  difficult,  at  the  time, 
to  do  more  than  record  their  progress  by  telegraph.  I  propose  now 
to  add  a  few  comments. 

The  delivery  at  Belgrade  on  the  23rd  July  of  the  Austrian  note  to 
Servia  was  preceded  by  a  period  of  absolute  silence  at  the  Ballplatz. 
Except  Herr  von  Tschirscky,^  who  must  have  been  aware  of  the  tenour 
if  not  of  the  actual  words  of  the  note,  none  of  my  colleagues  were 
allowed  to  see  through  the  veil.  On  the  22nd  and  23rd  July,  M. 
Dumaine,  French  Ambassador,  had  long  interviews  with  Baron 
Macchio,  one  of  the  Under-Secretaries  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 

1  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 


September  1,  British  Blue  Book  No.  161  515 

by  whom  he  was  left  under  the  impression  that  the  words  of  warning 
he  had  been  instructed  to  speak  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
had  not  been  unavailing,  and  that  the  note  which  was  being  drawn 
up  would  be  found  to  contain  nothing  with  which  a  self-respecting 
State  need  hesitate  to  comply.  At  the  second  of  these  interviews 
he  was  not  even  informed  that  the  note  was  at  that  very  moment 
being  presented  at  Belgrade,  or  that  it  would  be  published  in  Vienna 
on  the  following  morning.  Count  Forgach,  the  other  Under-Secre- 
tary of  State,  had  indeed  been  good  enough  to  confide  to  me  on  the 
same  day  the  true  character  of  the  note,  and  the  fact  of  its  presen- 
tation about  the  time  we  were  speaking. 

So  little  had  the  Russian  Ambassador  been  made  aware  of  what 
was  preparing  that  he  actually  left  Vienna  on  a  fortnight's  leave  of 
absence  about  the  20th  July.  He  had  only  been  absent  a  few  days 
when  events  compelled  him  to  return.  It  might  have  been  supposed 
that  Duke  Avarna,  Ambassador  of  the  allied  Italian  Kingdom,  which 
was  bound  to  be  so  closely  affected  by  fresh  complications  in  the 
Balkans,  would  have  been  taken  fully  into  the  confidence  of  Count 
Berchtold  ^  during  this  critical  time.  In  point  of  fact  his  Excellency 
was  left  completely  in  the  dark.  As  for  myself,  no  indication  was 
given  me  by  Count  Berchtold  of  the  impending  storm,  and  it  was 
from  a  private  source  that  I  received  on  the  15th  July  the  forecast 
of  what  was  about  to  happen  which  I  telegraphed  to  you  the  follow- 
ing day.  It  is  true  that  during  all  this  time  the  Neue  Freie  Presse 
and  other  leading  Viennese  new^spapers  were  using  language  which 
pointed  unmistakably  to  war  with  Servia.  The  official  Fremderb- 
blatt,  however,  was  more  cautious,  and  till  the  note  was  published, 
the  prevailing  opinion  among  my  colleagues  was  that  Austria  would 
shrink  from  courses  calculated  to  involve  her  in  grave  European 
complications. 

On  the  24th  July  the  note  was  published  in  the  newspapers.  By 
common  consent  it  was  at  once  styled  an  ultimatum.  Its  integral 
acceptance  by  Servia  was  neither  expected  nor  desired,  and  when, 
on  the  following  afternoon,  it  was  at  first  rumoured  in  Vienna  that 
it  had  been  unconditionally  accepted,  there  was  a  moment  of  keen 
disappointment.  The  mistake  was  quickly  corrected,  and  as  soon 
as  it  was  known  later  in  the  evening  that  the  Servian  reply  had  been 
rejected  and  that  Baron  Giesl  ^  had  broken  off  relations  at  Belgrade, 
Vienna  burst  into  a  frenzy  of  delight,  vast  crowds  parading  the  streets 
and  singing  patriotic  songs  till  the  small  hours  of  the  morning. 

The  demonstrations  were  perfectly  orderly,  consisting  for  the 
most  part  of  organised  processions  through  the  principal  streets  ending 
up  at  the  Ministry  of  War.  One  or  two  attempts  to  make  hostile 
manifestations  against  the  Russian  Embassy  were  frustrated  by  the 
strong  guard  of  police  which  held  the  approaches  to  the  principal  em- 
bassies during  those  days.  The  demeanour  of  the  people  at  Vienna 
and,  as  I  was  informed,  in  many  other  principal  cities  of  the  Mon- 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Belgrade. 


516  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

archy,  showed  plainly  the  popularity  of  the  idea  of  war  with  Servia, 
and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  small  body  of  Austrian  and  Hun- 
garian statesmen  by  whom  this  momentous  step  was  adopted  gauged 
rightly  the  sense,  and  it  may  even  be  said  the  determination,  of  the 
people,  except  presumably  in  portions  of  the  provinces  inhabited  by 
the  Slav  races.  There  had  been  much  disappointment  in  many 
quarters  at  the  avoidance  of  war  with  Servia  during  the  annexation 
crisis  in  1908  and  again  in  connection  with  the  recent  Balkan  war. 
Count  Berchtold's  ^  peace  policy  had  met  with  little  sympathy  in  the 
Delegation.  Now  the  flood-gates  were  opened,  and  the  entire  people 
and  press  clamoured  impatiently  for  immediate  and  condign  punish- 
ment of  the  hated  Servian  race.  The  country  certainly  believed 
that  it  had  before  it  only  the  alternative  of  subduing  Servia  or  of 
submitting  sooner  or  later  to  mutilation  at  her  hands.  But  a  peaceful 
solution  should  first  have  been  attempted.  Few  seemed  to  reflect 
that  the  forcible  intervention  of  a  Great  Power  in  the  Balkans  must 
inevitably  call  other  Great  Powers  into  the  field.  So  just  was  the 
cause  of  Austria  held  to  be,  that  it  seemed  to  her  people  inconceivable 
that  any  country  should  place  itself  in  her  path,  or  that  questions 
of  mere  policy  or  prestige  should  be  regarded  anywhere  as  super- 
seding the  necessity  which  had  arisen  to  exact  summary  vengeance 
for  the  crime  of  Serajevo.  The  conviction  had  been  expressed  to 
me  by  the  German  Ambassador  on  the  24th  July  that  Russia  would 
stand  aside.  This  feeling,  which  was  also  held  at  the  Ballplatz,  in- 
fluenced no  doubt  the  course  of  events,  and  it  is  deplorable  that  no 
effort  should  have  been  made  to  secure  by  means  of  diplomatic  nego- 
tiations the  acquiescence  of  Russia  and  Europe  as  a  whole  in  some 
peaceful  compromise  of  the  Servian  question  by  which  Austrian 
fears  of  Servian  aggression  and  intrigue  might  have  been  removed 
for  the  future.  Instead  of  adopting  this  course  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  resolved  upon  war.  The  inevitable  consequence  en- 
sued. Russia  replied  to  a  partial  Austrian  mobilisation  and  decla- 
ration of  war  against  Servia  by  a  partial  Russian  mobilisation  against 
Austria.  Austria  met  this  move  by  completing  her  own  mobilisa- 
tion, and  Russia  again  responded  with  results  which  have  passed 
into  history.  The  fate  of  the  proposals  put  forward  by  His  Majesty's 
Government  for  the  preservation  of  peace  is  recorded  in  the  White 
Paper  on  the  European  Crisis.^  On  the  28th  July  I  saw  Count 
Berchtold  and  urged  as  strongly  as  I  could  that  the  scheme  of  media- 
tion mentioned  in  your  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  ^  on  the 
previous  day  should  be  accepted  as  offering  an  honourable  and  peace- 
ful settlement  of  the  question  at  issue.  His  Excellency  himself  read 
to  me  a  telegraphic  report  of  the  speech,  but  added  that  matters  had 
gone  too  far ;  Austria  was  that  day  declaring  war  on  Servia,  and  she 
could  never  accept  the  conference  which  you  had  suggested  should 
take  place  between  the  less  interested  Powers  on  the  basis  of  the 

^  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

2  "Miscellaneous,  No.  6  (1914)." 

'See  "Hansard,"  Vol.  65,  No.  107,  columns  931-933. 


,  September  1,  British  Blue  Book  No.  161  517 

Servian  reply.  This  was  a  matter  which  must  be  settled  directly 
between  the  two  parties  immediately  concerned.  I  said  His  Majesty's 
Government  would  hear  with  regret  that  hostilities  could  not  be 
arrested,  as  you  feared  they  would  lead  to  European  complications. 
I  disclaimed  any  British  lack  of  sympathy  with  Austria  in  the  matter 
of  her  legitimate  grievances  against  Servia,  and  pointed  out  that 
whereas  Austria  seemed  to  be  making  these  the  starting  point  of  her 
policy,  His  Majesty's  Government  were  bound  to  look  at  the  question 
primarily  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  maintenance  of  the  peace 
of  Europe.     In  this  way  the  two  countries  might  easily  drift  apart. 

His  Excellency  said  that  he  too  was  keeping  the  European  aspect 
of  the  question  in  sight.  He  thought,  however,  that  Russia  would 
have  no  right  to  intervene  after  receiving  his  assurance  that  Austria 
sought  no  territorial  aggrandisement.  His  Excellency  remarked  to 
me  in  the  course  of  his  conversation  that,  though  he  had  been  glad 
to  co-operate  towards  bringing  about  the  settlement  which  had  re- 
sulted from  the  ambassadorial  conferences  in  London  during  the 
Balkan  crisis,  he  had  never  had  much  belief  in  the  permanency  of  that 
settlement,  which  was  necessarily  of  a  highly  artificial  character,  in- 
asmuch as  the  interests  which  it  sought  to  harmonise  were  in  them- 
selves profoundly  divergent.  His  Excellency  maintained  a  most 
friendly  demeanour  throughout  the  interview,  but  left  no  doubt  in 
my  mind  as  to  the  determination  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment to  proceed  with  the  invasion  of  Servia. 

The  German  Government  claim  to  have  persevered  to  the  end  in 
the  endeavour  to  support  at  Vienna  your  successive  proposals  in 
the  interest  of  peace.  Herr  von  Tschirscky  ^  abstained  from  inviting 
my  co-operation  or  that  of  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors  in 
carrying  out  his  instructions  to  that  effect,  and  I  had  no  means  of 
knowing  what  response  he  was  receiving  from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government.  I  was,  however,  kept  fully  informed  by  M.  Schebeko, 
the  Russian  Ambassador,  of  his  own  direct  negotiations  with  Count 
Berchtold.  M.  Schebeko  endeavoured  on  the  28th  July  to  persuade 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  furnish  Count  Szapary  ^  with 
full  powers  to  continue  at  St.  Petersburgh  the  hopeful  conversations 
which  had  there  been  taking  place  between  the  latter  and  M.  Sazonof  .^ 
Count  Berchtold  ^  refused  at  the  time,  but  two  days  later  (30th  July), 
though  in  the  meantime  Russia  had  partially  mobilised  against  Aus- 
tria, he  received  M.  Schebeko  ^  again,  in  a  perfectly  friendly  manner, 
and  gave  his  consent  to  the  continuance  of  the  conversations  at  St. 
Petersburgh.  From  now  onwards  the  tension  between  Russia  and 
Germany  was  much  greater  than  between  Russia  and  Austria.  As 
between  the  latter  an  arrangement  seemed  almost  in  sight,  and  on 
the  1st  August  I  was  informed  by  M.  Schebeko^  that  Count  Szapary  ^ 
had  at  last  conceded  the  main  point  at  issue  by  announcing  to  M. 

1  German  Ambassador  in  Vienna. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

3  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

<  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
'  Russian  Ambassador  in  Vienna. 


518  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Sazonof  ^  that  Austria  would  consent  to  submit  to  mediation  the 
points  in  the  note  to  Servia  which  seemed  incompatible  with  the 
maintenance  of  Servian  independence.  M.  Sazonof/  M.  Schebeko  ^ 
added,  had  accepted  this  proposal  on  condition  that  Austria  would 
refrain  from  the  actual  invasion  of  Servia.  Austria,  in  fact,  had 
finally  yielded,  and  that  she  herself  had  at  this  point  good  hopes  of  a 
peaceful  issue  is  shown  by  the  communication  made  to  you  on  the 
1st  August  by  Count  IMensdorff,^  to  the  effect  that  Austria  had 
neither  "banged  the  door"  on  compromise  nor  cut  off  the  conversa- 
tions.^ M.  Schebeko  ^  to  the  end  was  working  hard  for  peace.  He 
was  holding  the  most  conciliatory  language  to  Count  Berchtold,^  and 
he  informed  me  that  the  latter,  as  well  as  Count  Forgach,^  had  re- 
sponded in  the  same  spirit.  Certainly  it  was  too  much  for  Russia  to 
expect  that  Austria  w  ould  hold  back  her  armies,  but  this  matter  could 
probably  have  been  settled  by  negotiation,  and  M.  Schebeko  ^  repeat- 
edly told  me  he  was  prepared  to  accept  any  reasonable  compromise. 

Unfortunately  these  conversations  at  St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna 
were  cut  short  by  the  transfer  of  the  dispute  to  the  more  dangerous 
ground  of  a  direct  conflict  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Germany 
intervened  on  the  31st  July  by  means  of  her  double  ultimatums  to 
St.  Petersburgh  and  Paris.  The  ultimatums  were  of  a  kind  to  which 
only  one  answer  is  possible,  and  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia 
on  the  1st  August,  and  on  France  on  the  3rd  August.  A  few  days' 
delay  might  in  all  probability  have  saved  Europe  from  one  of  the 
greatest  calamities  in  history. 

Russia  still  abstained  from  attacking  Austria,  and  M.  Schebeko  ^ 
had  been  instructed  to  remain  at  his  post  till  war  should  actually  be 
declared  against  her  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  This 
only  happened  on  the  6th  August,  when  Count  Berchtold  ^  informed 
the  foreign  missions  at  Vienna  that  "the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambas- 
sador at  St.  Petersburgh  had  been  instructed  to  notify  the  Russian 
Government  that,  in  view  of  the  menacing  attitude  of  Russia  in  the 
Austro-Servian  conflict  and  the  fact  that  Russia  had  commenced 
hostilities  against  Germany,  Austria-Hungary  considered  herself 
also  at  war  with  Russia." 

M.  Schebeko  ^  left  quietly  in  a  special  train  provided  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  on  the  7th  August.  He  had  urgently  re- 
quested to  be  conveyed  to  the  Roumanian  frontier,  so  that  he  might 
be  able  to  proceed  to  his  own  country,  but  was  taken  instead  to  the 
Swiss  frontier,  and  ten  days  later  I  found  him  at  Berne. 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador,  stayed  on  till  the  12th  August. 
On  the  previous  day  he  had  been  instructed  to  demand  his  passport 
on  the  ground  that  Austrian  troops  were  being  employed  against 
France.     This  point  was  not  fully  cleared  up  when  I  left  Vienna. 

^  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

'  Russian  Ambassador  in  Vienna, 

'  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

<See  No.  137,  August  1. 

^  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

« Austro-Hungarian  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


September  1,  British  Blue  Book  No.  161  519 

On  the  9th  August,  M.  Dumaine  had  received  from  Count  Berchtold  ^ 
the  categorical  declaration  that  no  Austrian  troops  were  being  moved 
to  Alsace.  The  next  day  this  statement  was  supplemented  by  a 
further  one,  in  writing,  giving  Count  Berchtold's  assurance  that  not 
only  had  no  Austrian  troops  been  moved  actually  to  the  French  fron- 
tier, but  that  none  were  moving  from  Austria  in  a  westerly  direction 
into  Germany  in  such  a  way  that  they  might  replace  German  troops 
employed  at  the  front.  These  two  statements  were  made  by  Count 
Berchtold  in  reply  to  precise  questions  put  to  him  by  M.  Dumaine, 
under  instructions  from  his  Government.  The  French  Ambassador's 
departure  was  not  attended  by  any  hostile  demonstration,  but  his 
Excellency  before  leaving  had  been  justly  offended  by  a  harangue 
made  by  the  Chief  Burgomaster  of  Vienna  to  the  crowd  assembled 
before  the  steps  of  the  town  hall,  in  which  he  assured  the  people  that 
Paris  was  in  the  throes  of  a  revolution,  and  that  the  President  of  the 
Republic  had  been  assassinated. 

,  The  British  declaration  of  war  on  Germany  was  made  known  in 
Vienna  by  special  editions  of  the  newspapers  about  midday  on  the 
4th  August.  An  abstract  of  your  speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons, 
and  also  of  the  German  Chancellor's  speech  in  the  Reichstag  of  the 
4th  August,  appeared  the  same  day,  as  well  as  the  text  of  the  German 
ultimatum  to  Belgium.  Otherwise  few  details  of  the  great  events  of 
these  days  transpired.  The  Neue  Freie  Presse  was  violently  in- 
sulting towards  England.  The  Fremdenblatt  was  not  offensive, 
but  little  or  nothing  was  said  in  the  columns  of  any  Vienna  paper  to 
explain  that  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  had  left  His  Majesty's 
Government  no  alternative  but  to  take  part  in  the  war. 

The  declaration  of  Italian  neutrality  was  bitterly  felt  in  Vienna, 
but  scarcely  mentioned  in  the  newspapers. 

On  the  5th  August  I  had  the  honour  to  receive  your  instruction  of 
the  previous  day  preparing  me  for  the  immediate  outbreak  of  war 
with  Germany,  but  adding  that,  Austria  being  understood  to  be  not 
yet  at  that  date  at  war  with  Russia  and  France,  you  did  not  desire  me 
to  ask  for  my  passport  or  to  make  any  particular  communication  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  You  stated  at  the  same  time 
that  His  Majesty's  Government  of  course  expected  Austria  not  to 
commit  any  act  of  war  against  us  without  the  notice  required  by 
diplomatic  usage. 

On  Thursday  morning,  the  13th  August,  I  had  the  honour  to  re- 
ceive your  telegram  of  the  12th,  stating  that  you  had  been  compelled 
to  inform  Count  Mensdorff,^  at  the  request  of  the  French  Government, 
that  a  complete  rupture  had  occurred  between  France  and  Austria,  on 
the  ground  that  Austria  had  declared  war  on  Russia  who  was  already 
fighting  on  the  side  of  France,  and  that  Austria  had  sent  troops  to  the 
German  frontier  under  conditions  that  were  a  direct  menace  to  France. 
The  rupture  having  been  brought  about  with  France  in  this  way,  I 
was  to  ask  for  my  passport,  and  your  telegram  stated,  in  conclusion, 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

2  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 


520  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

that  you  had  informed  Count  Mensdorff  that  a  state  of  war  would 
exist  between  the  two  countries  from  midnight  of  the  12th  August. 

After  seeing  Mr.  Penfield,  the  United  States  Ambassador,  who 
accepted  immediately  in  the  most  friendly  spirit  my  request  that  his 
Excellency  would  take  charge  provisionally  of  British  interests  in 
Austria-Hungary  during  the  unfortunate  interruption  of  relations, 
I  proceeded,  with  Mr.  Theo  Russell,  Counsellor  of  His  Majesty's 
Embassy,  to  the  Ballplatz.  Count  Berchtold  ^  received  me  at  mid- 
day. I  delivered  my  message,  for  which  his  Excellency  did  not  seem 
to  be  unprepared,  although  he  told  me  that  a  long  telegram  from 
Count  Mensdorff  ^  has  just  come  in  but  had  not  yet  been  brought  to 
him.  His  Excellency  received  my  qpmmunication  with  the  courtesy 
which  never  leaves  him.  He  deplored  the  unhappy  complications 
which  were  drawing  such  good  friends  as  Austria  and  England  into 
war.  In  point  of  fact,  he  added,  Austria  did  not  consider  herself 
then  at  war  with  France,  though  diplomatic  relations  with  that  coun- 
try had  been  broken  off.  I  explained  in  a  few  words  how  circum- 
stances had  forced  this  unwelcome  conflict  upon  us.  We  both  avoided 
useless  argument.  Then  I  ventured  to  recommend  to  his  Excellency's 
consideration  the  case  of  the  numerous  stranded  British  subjects  at 
Carlsbad,  Vienna,  and  other  places  throughout  the  country.  I  had 
already  had  some  correspondence  with  him  on  the  subject,  and  his 
Excellency  took  a  note  of  what  I  said,  and  promised  to  see  what  could 
be  done  to  get  them  away  when  the  stress  of  mobilisation  should  be 
over.  Count  Berchtold  agreed  to  Mr.  Phillpotts,  till  then  British 
consul  at  Vienna  under  Consul-General  Sir  Frederick  Duncan,  being 
left  by  me  at  the  Embassy  in  the  capacity  of  Charge  des  Archives. 
He  presumed  a  similar  privilege  would  not  be  refused  in  England 
if  desired  on  behalf  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  I  took 
leave  of  Count  Berchtold  with  sincere  regret,  having  received  from  the 
day  of  my  arrival  in  Vienna,  not  quite  nine  months  before,  many 
marks  of  friendship  and  consideration  from  his  Excellency.  As  I  left 
I  begged  his  Excellency  to  present  my  profound  respects  to  the  Em- 
peror Francis  Joseph,  together  with  an  expression  of  my  hope  that 
His  Majesty  would  pass  through  these  sad  times  with  unimpaired 
health  and  strength.  Count  Berchtold  was  pleased  to  say  he  would 
deliver  my  message. 

Count  Walterskirchen,  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Office, 
was  deputed  the  following  morning  to  bring  me  my  passport  and  to 
acquaint  me  with  the  arrangements  made  for  my  departure  that 
evening  (14th  August).  In  the  course  of  the  day  Countess  Berchtold 
and  other  ladies  of  Vienna  society  called  to  take  leave  of  Lady  de 
Bunsen  at  the  embassy.  We  left  the  railway  station  by  special  train 
for  the  Swiss  frontier  at  7  p.m.  No  disagreeable  incidents  occurred. 
Count  Walterskirchen  was  present  at  the  station  on  behalf  of  Count 
Berchtold.  The  journey  was  necessarily  slow,  owing  to  the  encum- 
bered state  of  the  line.     We  reached  Buchs,  on  the  Swiss  frontier, 

1  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
*  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 


September  4>  French  Yellow  Book  No.  160  521 

early  in  the  morning  of  the  17th  August.  At  the  first  halting  place 
there  had  been  some  hooting  and  stone  throwing  on  the  part  of  the 
entraining  troops  and  station  officials,  but  no  inconvenience  was 
caused,  and  at  the  other  large  stations  on  our  route  we  found  that 
ample  measures  had  been  taken  to  preserve  us  from  molestation  as 
well  as  to  provide  us  with  food.  I  was  left  in  no  doubt  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  desired  that  the  journey  should 
be  performed  under  the  most  comfortable  conditions  possible,  and 
that  I  should  receive  on  my  departure  all  the  marks  of  consideration 
due  to  His  Majesty's  representative.  I  was  accompanied  by  my  own 
family  and  the  entire  staff  of  the  embassy,  for  whose  untiring  zeal 
and  efficient  help  in  trying  times  I  desire  to  express  my  sincere  thanks. 
The  Swiss  Government  also  showed  courtesy  in  providing  comfortable 
accommodation  during  our  journey  from  the  frontier  to  Berne,  and, 
after  three  days'  stay  there,  on  to  Geneva,  at  which  place  we  found 
that  every  provision  had  been  made  by  the  French  Government,  at 
the  request  of  Sir  Francis  Bertie,  for  our  speedy  conveyance  to  Paris. 
We  reached  England  on  Saturday  morning,  the  22nd  August. 

I  have,  etc.  Maurice  de  Bunsen. 

(See  note,  p.  509.) 

Friday,  September  4,  1914 
France : 

To  the  French  Ambassadors  and  Ministers  Abroad 

French  Yellow  Book  No.  160 

DECLARATION  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE 

(September  4,  1914) 


Declaration 
M.  Delcasse,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the  French  Ambassadors 
and  Ministers  abroad.  p^^^^  September  4,  1914. 

The  following  declaration  has  this  morning  been  signed  at  the 
Foreign  Office  at  London  :  — 

"The  undersigned  duly  authorised  thereto  by  their  respective 
Governments  hereby  declare  as  follows  :  — 

"The  British,  French  and  Russian  Governments  mutually  engage 
not  to  conclude  peace  separately  during  the  present  war.  The  three 
Governments  agree  that  when  terms  of  peace  come  to  be  discussed, 
no  one  of  the  Allies  w  ill  demand  terms  of  peace  without  the  previous 
agreement  of  each  of  the  other  Allies. 

(Signed)  "Paul  Cambon. 

Count  Benckendorff. 
Edward  Grey.'' 

This  declaration  will  be  published  to-day.  Delcasse 


PART  TWO 

THE  PARTS  OF  THE  SEVERAL  OFFICIAL  PUBLICATIONS 
OF  DIPLOMATIC  DOCUMENTS  NOT  PRINTED  UNDER 
PART  ONE 


I.   The  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book 

Servian  names  are  spelt  as  in  the  German  original  according  to  the  Croatian 
system.     The  following  is  the  signification  of  the  sounds :  — 

s  =   sh  in  the  English  "  ship." 

c  =  ch  in  the  English  "  church." 

c  =    (the  same,  softer). 

c  =   ts  in  the  English  "  mats." 

j  =  y  in  the  English  "  yell." 

gj  =   dj  in  the  EngUsh  "  adjourn." 

z  =  j  in  the  French    "jour." 

INTRODUCTION 

Since  the  dynasty  of  the  Karageorgevic  ascended  the  blood-stained 
throne  of  Servia,  and  surrounded  itself  with  those  who  had  conspired 
against  the  life  of  King  Alexander,  the  Kingdom  has  continually, 
though  by  different  paths  and  with  varied  intensity,  pursued  the  aim 
of  undermining  by  hostile  propaganda  and  revolutionary  plots,  those 
territories  of  Austria-Hungary  which  are  inhabited  by  the  Southern 
Slavs,  in  order  to  tear  them  away  from  the  Monarchy,  whenever  the 
general  political  condition  might  be  favourable  to  the  realisation  of 
the  Great-Servian  claims. 

To  what  a  pitch  the  hopes  of  the  kingdom  on  the  Save  had  been 
raised,  and  how  near  she  thought  herself  to  the  attainment  of  their 
aspirations,  appeared  in  the  embittered  animosity  and  the  deep  dis- 
appointment which  were  created  in  this  crazy  and  deluded  country 
by  the  anexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  which  brought  her 
to  the  verge  of  war. 

Left  in  the  lurch  by  Russia,  the  protecting  Power,  who  did  not  at 
the  moment  consider  herself  sufficiently  prepared,  in  the  spring  of 
1909  the  Servian  Government  found  themselves  compelled  to  give  a 
solemn  declaration  before  Europe,  that  they  recognised  the  new 
political  and  international  conditions  which  had  been  created  by  the 
annexation,  and  to  acknowledge  that  the  interests  of  Servia  had 
not  been  affected  thereby.  They  were  also  compelled  to  dissolve 
the  gangs  of  armed  men  which  had  been  raised  against  the  Monarchy, 
and  to  undertake  for  the  future  to  maintain  friendly  relations  with 
Austria-Hungary. 

The  expectations  were  not  fulfilled  that  it  would  now  be  possible 
for  the  Monarchy  to  live  in  peace  and  good  neighbourly  relations 
with  Servia,  as  she  had  lived  during  the  rule  of  the  Obrenovic,  and, 
as  was  then  the  case,  to  show  good  will  to,  and  further  the  interests  of 
this  State,  which  owes  to  Austria-Hungary  the  recognition  of  her 
independence  at  the  Berlin  Congress.     The  Servian  Government  who, 

525 


526  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

by  their  promise,  were  under  an  obligation  to  maintain  friendly  and 
neighbourly  relations  with  Austria-Hungary,  permitted  their  press  to 
foment  hatred  against  the  Monarchy  in  an  unprecedented  way ;  they 
permitted  associations  formed  on  Servian  territory  under  the  leader- 
ship of  high  officers,  civil  servants,  teachers  and  judges,  publicly  to 
pursue  their  aims  with  the  object  of  stirring  up  revolution  in  the 
territories  of  Austria-Hungary;  they  did  not  prevent  prominent 
members  of  their  military  and  civil  administration  from  poisoning 
the  public  conscience  in  such  a  way  that  common  assassination  was 
regarded  as  the  best  weapon  in  the  struggle  against  the  Monarchy. 
From  the  atmosphere  created  by  this  malicious  agitation  there  sprang 
up  a  whole  series  of  murderous  attacks  on  high  functionaries  of  the 
Monarchy,  which  ended  in  the  execrable  crime  against  the  exalted 
person  of  the  heir  to  the  throne,  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand,  which 
had  been  carefully  prepared  in  Servia.  However,  the  sacrifice  of  his 
life  for  the  Fatherland,  by  which  our  enemies  in  their  mad  folly 
expected  that  the  downfall  of  the  Monarchy  would  be  accelerated, 
brought  all  the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary  together  in  fiery  unanim- 
ity around  the  dynasty.  The  whole  world  learned  how  unshakable 
were  the  foundations  on  which  the  Monarchy  rests,  and  how  firmly 
and  loyally  her  sons  cling  to  one  another.  All  felt  it ;  there  was  no 
room  for  any  doubt  that  our  honour,  our  self-respect  and  our  deepest 
interest  peremptorily  demanded  that  we  should  deal  with  the  criminal 
conspiracies  of  Servia  and  obtain  guarantees  for  the  security  of 
Austria-Hungary. 

The  unhappy  experience  which  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment had  had  with  this  dishonest  neighbour  showed  us  the  only  way 
by  which  our  interests  could  be  secured. 

It  was  necessary  to  present  to  Servia  all  such  demands  and  to 
require  from  her  such  guarantees  as  would  ensure  the  punishment 
of  the  accomplices  in  this  shameful  outrage  and  the  suppression  of  the 
Great-Servian  projects.  Since  the  unparalleled  patience  of  Austria- 
Hungary  had  been  interpreted  as  weakness  by  Servia,  the  Belgrade 
Government  must  be  made  to  understand  that  the  Monarchy  was 
determined  if  necessary  to  go  to  the  utmost  limit  in  order  to  maintain 
her  prestige  and  the  integrity  of  her  territories ;  and  that  she  could 
not  tolerate  any  longer  the  intrigues  of  the  Save  Kingdom,  which  were 
meant  to  deceive  the  Powers,  by  an  apparent  agreement  to  the  de- 
mands of  Austria-Hungary,  while  at  the  same  time  she  kept  open  the 
possibility  of  continuing  her  underhand  attack  against  the  Monarchy 
as  she  had  done  after  the  solemn  promise  of  1909.  Against  the  usual 
Servian  tactics  of  using  the  most  reprehensible  means  to  work  for 
the  separation  of  the  Southern-Slav  territories  of  Austria-Hungary, 
and  then,  when  the  Monarchy  called  her  to  account,  of  seeking 
protection  and  impunity  from  the  Powers,  there  was  only  one  way 
open  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  of  protecting  their 
territory,  and  making  an  end  of  the  injury  done  to  their  commercial 
life  by  the  constant  repetition  of  the  intolerable  attacks  engendered 
by  Servian  aspirations  if  they  were  to  avoid  endangering  the  peace 


AiLstro-Hungarian  Red  Book  527 

of  Europe.  From  the  beginning,  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
met  the  apprehensions  of  the  Powers  with  the  assurance  that  the 
Monarchy  would  not  go  beyond  what  was  necessary  for  the  protection 
of  her  own  interests,  and  did  not  propose  any  annexation  of  territory. 
Within  these  limits,  which  she  had  imposed  upon  herself,  she  must, 
however,  insist  that  the  controversy  with  Servia  should  be  carried 
through  as  a  question  directly  concerning  Austria-Hungary  and  this 
State.  The  request  made  by  Russia  for  an  extension  of  the  time 
given  to  Servia  for  answering  our  demands  would  have  given  the 
Belgrade  Government  an  opportunity  for  new  subterfuges  and  for 
further  procrastination,  and  would  have  opened  the  door  to  the  inter- 
ference of  single  Powers  in  the  interests  of  Servia.  It  was  therefore 
necessary  to  refuse  any  prolongation  of  the  time  limit.  Although 
before  sending  her  crafty  and  evasive  answer,  Servia  had  ordered 
general  mobilisation,  and  thereby  publicly  proclaimed  her  hostility, 
the  Monarchy  waited  two  days  before  proceeding  to  a  declaration 
of  war.  The  suggestion  of  the  British  Government  that  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Servian  controversy  should  be  entrusted  to  a  conference 
of  the  Powers  did  not  reach  Vienna  until  after  the  opening  of  hostili- 
ties, and  was  therefore  outstripped  by  events.  This  proposal  was, 
however,  in  itself,  not  well  suited  to  securing  the  interests  of  the 
Monarchy.  Nothing  but  the  integral  acceptance  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  demands  on  the  part  of  the  Belgrade  Government  would 
have  given  a  guarantee  for  a  tolerable  relationship  with  Servia.  The 
Entente  Powers,  however,  were  guided  by  the  desire  of  substituting 
for  the  effective  demands  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  were  painful  to 
Servia,  a  method  of  compromise,  by  which  every  security  for  a  future 
correct  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Save  Kingdom  would  have  been 
lost,  and  Servia  would  have  been  encouraged  to  continue  her  en- 
deavours to  bring  about  a  separation  of  the  Southern  territories  of 
Austria-Hungary. 

When  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  demanded  from  Servia 
that  she  should  punish  those  accomplices  in  the  crime  of  Serajevo  who 
were  in  Servian  territory,  and  fulfil  the  duties  which  are  a  necessary 
condition  for  friendly  relationship  between  neighbouring  States, 
their  only  object  was  to  protect  our  dynasty  from  outrage  and  the 
territory  of  the  Monarchy  from  criminal  intrigues.  They  w^ere  repre- 
senting the  common  interest  of  the  civilised  world  that  murder  and 
outrage  should  not  be  used  with  impunity  as  a  weapon  in  political 
controversy,  and  that  Servia  should  not  continue  incessantly  to 
menace  the  peace  of  Europe  by  her  aspirations. 

The  Entente  Powers  were  guilty  of  a  serious  wrong  when,  under  the 
spell  of  their  own  political  interests,  they  closed  their  ears  to  these 
postulates  of  public  morality  and  humanity,  and  ranged  themselves 
beside  the  Kingdom  with  its  load  of  guilt.  Had  they  listened  to  the 
assurances  of  the  Monarchy  which,  by  her  conservative  policy  and  her 
love  of  peace  during  the  violent  changes  which  had  taken  place  in  the 
Balkan  Peninsula,  had  gained  full  right  to  their  confidence,  and  had 
they  maintained  a  waiting  attitude  towards  the  Servian  conflict,  the 


528  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

world-war  would  have  been  avoided.  It  is  they  who  must  be  made 
answerable  before  history  for-^the  immeasurable  suffering  which  has 
come  upon  the  human  race. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  small  Servian  State  would  never 
have  ventured,  with  an  animosity  which  was  scarcely  concealed,  to 
work  for  the  separation  from  the  great  neighbouring  Monarchy  of 
the  territories  which  were  inhabited  by  Southern  Slavs,  if  she  had  not 
been  sure  of  the  secret  approval  and  protection  of  Russia,  and  if  she 
had  not  been  able  to  depend  on  the  powerful  pan-Slavist  tendency  in 
the  Empire  of  the  Czar  forcing  the  Russian  Government,  if  necessary, 
to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Kingdom  in  her  struggle  for  the  realisa- 
tion of  the  Great-Servian  projects. 

In  the  course  of  the  two  last  centuries  the  Russian  Empire  has 
extended  over  gigantic  areas  with  the  elementary  force  of  a  glacier, 
and  has,  again  and  again,  subdued  fresh  races  under  the  Musco- 
vite rule,  suppressing  their  culture,  religion  and  language.  As 
the  supreme  and  inflexible  aim  of  this  restless  pressure  towards 
universal  dominion  there  stands  before  her  the  possession  of  the 
Dardanelles,  which  would  secure  to  the  Russian  Empire  predominance 
in  the  near  East  and  in  Asia  Minor,  and  gain  for  Russian  exports  an 
opening  independent  of  the  will  of  other  countries. 

As  the  realisation  of  these  plans  would  injure  important  interests 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  and  as  it  was  therefore  bound  to 
encounter  the  inevitable  opposition  of  these  Powers,  it  was  the  en- 
deavour of  Russian  policy  to  weaken  their  power  of  resistance.  The 
powerful  central  European  union  which  barred  the  way  to  the  uni- 
versal dominion  of  Russia  must  be  shattered,  and  Germany  must  be 
isolated.  The  first  step  was  to  hem  in  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  by 
the  creation  of  the  Balkan  Union,  and  to  undermine  its  authority 
by  the  pan-Slavist  and  Servian  intrigues  in  its  frontier  territories. 
A  necessary  condition  for  carrying  out  this  plan  was  the  overthrow 
and  expulsion  of  the  Turks  in  order  that  the  increased  power  of  the 
Christian  Balkan  States  should  be  available  against  the  two  central 
Powers. 

When  the  Balkan  Union  broke  up  owing  to  the  quarrel  over  the 
territory  which  had  been  torn  from  Turkey,  and  the  Russian  plans 
were  threatened  with  failure,  "the  Protector  of  the  Slavs"  allowed 
Bulgaria  to  be  overthrown,  humiliated  and  deprived  of  the  largest 
share  of  the  territory  which  she  had  won.  The  Balkan  Union  which, 
after  the  overthrow  of  the  Turks,  could  now  be  directed  rather  against 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  and  could  be  used  by  Russia  and 
France  for  changing  the  relations  of  the  European  Powers,  was  to 
be  set  on  foot  again  by  the  prospect  of  the  acquisition  of  fresh  terri- 
tories, planned  at  the  cost  of  the  jNIonarchy,  through  a  successive 
pushing  forward  of  frontier  from  east  to  west.  In  this  criminal 
game  of  Russian  diplomacy,  which  threatened  the  existence  of  the 
Monarchy  and  the  peace  of  the  world,  Servia  was  a  catspaw^  which 
Russia  would  not  give  up  even  in  order  to  avoid  general  war. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  —  and  the  documents  pro- 


Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book  529 

vided  in  this  collection  give  ample  evidence  of  this  —  again  and  again 
almost  up  to  the  outbreak  of  war  assured  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Peters- 
burgh  that  they  would  not  violate  any  Russian  interest,  would  not 
annex  any  Servian  territory,  and  would  not  touch  the  sovereignty 
of  Servia,  and  that  they  were  ready  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
the  Russian  Government  on  Austro-Hungarian  and  Russian  interests. 
'  Russia,  however,  had  not  expressed  herself  as  satisfied  with  the 
solemn  declarations  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government;  as 
early  as  the  24th  July,  in  the  communique  of  that  date,  she  assumed 
a  threatening  tone,  and  on  the  29th  July,  although  Austria-Hungary 
had  not  mobilised  a  single  man  against  Russia,  she  ordered  the 
mobilisation  of  the  military  districts  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow  and 
Kasan ;  this  was  a  threat  to  the  Monarchy ;  on  the  31st  July  she 
ordered  general  mobilisation,  disregarding  the  repeated  warnings  of 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassador,  and  the  declaration  of  the 
German  Goverment,  which  had  been  made  on  the  26th,  that  prepara- 
tory military  measures  on  the  part  of  Russia  would  force  Germany 
to  counter  measures  w^hich  must  consist  in  the  mobilisation  of  the 
army,  and  that  mobilisation  meant  war. 

On  the  24th  July  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Ambassador  in  conversa- 
tion with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  laid  stress  on  the 
peaceful  disposition  of  the  Monarchy.  Her  only  object  was  to  make 
an  end  to  the  menace  to  our  dynasty  from  Servian  bombs,  and  to  our 
territory  from  the  revolutionary  machinations  of  Servia. 

The  attainment  of  this  end  was  a  vital  question  to  the  Monarchy. 
She  could  not,  therefore,  allow  herself  to  be  terrorised  by  the  possi- 
bility of  a  conflict  with  Russia,  in  the  event  of  that  country  taking 
Servia  under  her  protection ;  she  must  make  an  end  of  the  intolerable 
situation,  that  a  Russian  charter  should  give  the  Servian  Kingdom 
continued  impunity  in  her  hostility  to  Austria-Hungary. 

On  the  30th  July  the  British  Secretary  of  State  again  suggested 
that  Austria-Hungary,  in  her  conflict  with  Servia,  should  avail  herself 
of  the  mediation  of  the  Powers.  Guided  by  their  desire  to  do  the 
utmost  in  their  power  to  maintain  general  peace,  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  declared  themselves  ready  to  accept  this  media- 
tion. The  honour  and  the  interest  of  Austria-Hungary,  however, 
required  that  this  should  not  take  place  under  the  pressure  of  the 
threatening  measures  of  Russia.  It  was,  therefore,  a  paramount 
necessity  for  her  to  require  that  the  hostile  measures  of  mobilisation 
in  the  Empire  of  the  Czar  should,  first  of  all,  be  revoked.  This 
demand  the  St.  Petersburgh  Cabinet  answered  by  mobilising  the 
whole  of  the  Russian  forces. 

In  alliance  with  the  self-seeking  policy  of  Great  Britain,  and  the 
desire  for  revanche  of  the  French  Republic,  the  St.  Petersburgh 
Government  disdained  no  means  of  securing  predominance  in  Europe 
to  the  Triple  Entente  and  paving  the  way  for  their  boldest  schemes. 

Russia's  unscrupulous  hands  tried  to  weave  the  threads  of  her 
policy  into  a  snare  to  be  cast  over  the  head  of  the  Monarchy.     When 
Austria-Hungary,  following  the  dictates  of  self-preservation,  deter- 
2m 


530  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

mined  to  tear  the  web  to  pieces,  Russia  attempted  to  stay  the  hand  of 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  and  to  humiliate  the  Monarchy. 

Exposed  to  the  greatest  danger  in  their  vital  interests,  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany  saw  themselves  confronted  with  the  choice  of 
protecting  their  rights  and  their  safety,  or  of  giving  way  before  the 
threats  of  Russia. 

They  took  the  road  pointed  out  by  honour  and  duty. 


French  Yellow  Book  531 

n.   The  French  YeUow  Book 

CHAPTER  I 
WARNINGS   (1913) 


No.  1 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to   M.  Jonnart, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  March  17,  1913. 

Our  naval  and  military  attaches  are  sending  to  their  respective 
Ministers  reports  on  the  new  German  military  law.  I  take  this 
opportunity  of  drawing  the  attention  of  your  Excellency  to  these 
important  documents. 

The  consideration  of  the  financial  expedients  by  which  Germany 
intends  to  provide  for  these  military  measures  is  the  sole  cause  of  the 
delay  in  the  publication  of  the  definite  proposals  of  the  Government. 
In  spite  of  the  patriotism  with  which  the  rich  classes  affect  to  accept 
the  sacrifices  asked  of  them,  they  are  none  the  less,  particularly  the 
business  circles,  dissatisfied  with  the  financial  measures  which  have 
been  announced,  and  they  feel  that  a  compulsory  levy  imposed  in 
times  of  peace  creates  a  formidable  precedent  for  the  future.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  Federal  Governments  have  strongly  opposed  an 
innovation  which  grants  to  the  Empire  resources  derived  from  direct 
taxation.  Hitherto,  taxation  of  this  kind  has  been  reserved  to  the 
Federal  States,  and  the  latter  see  in  the  surrender  of  this  principle  a 
new  declaration  of  the  corporate  unity  (personalite)  of  the  Empire, 
constituting  a  distinct  diminution  of  their  own  sovereign  power. 

However  this  may  be,  in  increasing  the  strength  of  the  German 
army  the  Empire  desires  to  leave  nothing  to  chance  in  the  event  of  a 
possible  crisis. 

The  German  changes  have  produced  a  result  unexpected  by  that 
country,  viz.,  the  proposal  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  to  re- 
establish the  three  years'  service,  and  the  manly  determination  with 
which  this  proposal  has  been  welcomed  in  France.  The  surprise 
occasioned  by  these  proposals  has  been  utilised  by  the  Imperial 
Government  for  the  purpose  of  insisting  on  the  absolute  necessity  of 
an  increase  of  German  military  strength ;  the  German  proposals  are 
represented  as  a  reply  to  our  own.  The  reverse  is  the  case,  since  the 
immense  military  effort  which  France  is  undertaking  is  but  the  conse- 
quence of  German  initiative. 

The  Imperial  Government  is  constantly  rousing  patriotic  senti- 
ment. Every  day  the  Emperor  delights  to  revive  memories  of  1813. 
Yesterday  evening  a  military  tattoo  went  through  the  streets  of  Berlin, 
and  speeches  were  delivered  in  which  the  present  situation  was  com- 
pared to  that  of  a  hundred  years  ago.  The  trend  of  public  opinion 
will  find  an  echo  in  the  speeches  which  will  be  delivered  next  month 


532  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

in  the  Reichstag,  and  I  have  reason  to  fear  that  the  Chancellor  himself 
will  be  forced  to  allude  in  his  statements  to  the  relations  of  France 
and  Germany.  It  was  of  course  to  be  expected  that  national  patri- 
otism would  be  worked  up  just  when  fresh  sacrifices  are  being  required, 
but  to  compare  the  present  time  to  1813  is  to  misuse  an  historical 
analogy.  If,  to-day,  there  is  anything  corresponding  to  the  movement 
which  a  hundred  years  ago  roused  Germans  to  fight  the  man  of  genius 
who  aspired  to  universal  dominion,  it  is  in  France  that  such  a  counter- 
part would  have  to  be  sought,  since  the  French  nation  seeks  but  to 
protect  itself  against  the  domination  of  force. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that  the  state  of  public  opinion  in  both 
countries  makes  the  situation  grave.  Jules  Cambon. 


Enclosure  I 

Report  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Serret,  Military  Attache  to  the  French 
Embassy  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Etienne,  Minister  of  War. 

Berlin,  March  15,  1913. 

The  patriotic  movement  which  has  manifested  itself  in  France  has 
caused  real  anger  in  certain  circles. 

I  do  not,  indeed,  mean  to  say  that  the  virulent  article  in  the 
Kolnische  Zeitung  is  the  expression  of  prevalent  opinion.  It  is  rather 
the  angry  outburst  of  an  impulsive  journalist,  which  has  been  im- 
mediately disavowed  by  the  Government. 

However,  in  spite  of  its  want  of  good  manners  the  article  in  the 
Kolnische  Zeitung  cannot  be  disregarded;  several  important  news- 
papers have  approved  of  its  substance,  if  not  of  its  form,  and  it  appears 
to  express  a  real  feeling,  a  latent  anger. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  this  fact,  because  it  throws  very  vivid  light 
on  the  meaning  of  the  present  armaments. 

For  some  time  now  it  has  been  quite  a  common  thing  to  meet 
people  who  declare  that  the  military  plans  of  France  are  extraordinary 
and  unjustified.  In  a  drawing  room  a  member  of  the  Reichstag  who 
is  not  a  fanatic,  speaking  of  the  three  years'  service  in  France,  went 
so  far  as  to  say,  "It  is  a  provocation;  we  will  not  allow  it."  More 
moderate  persons,  military  and  civil,  glibly  voice  the  opinion  that 
France  with  her  forty  million  inhabitants  has  no  right  to  compete  in 
this  way  with  Germany. 

To  sum  up,  people  are  angry,  and  this  anger  is  not  caused  by  the 
shrieking  of  certain  French  papers,  to  which  sober-minded  people  pay 
little  attention.  It  is  a  case  of  vexation.  People  are  angry  at  realis- 
ing that  in  spite  of  the  enormous  effort  made  last  year,  continued  and 
even  increased  this  year,  it  will  probably  not  be  possible  this  time  to 
outrun  France  completely. 

To  outdistance  us,  since  we  neither  will  nor  can  be  allied  with  her,  is 
Germany's  real  aim.  I  cannot  insist  too  much  on  the  fact  that  the 
impending  legislation,  which  French  public  opinion  is  too  apt  to  con- 


French  Yellow  Booh  533 

sider  as  a  spontaneous  outburst,  is  but  the  inevitable  and  expected 
consequence  of  the  law  of  June,  1912. 

This  law,  while  creating  two  new  army  corps,  had  deliberately, 
according  to  German  fashion,  left  regiments  and  other  large  units 
incomplete.  It  was  evident  that  there  would  be  no  long  delay  in 
filling  in  the  gaps.^  The  Balkan  crisis,  coming  just  at  the  right  mo- 
ment, furnished  a  wonderful  opportunity  for  exploiting  the  centenary 
of  the  War  of  Liberation,  and  obtaining  with  greater  ease  sacrifices 
through  the  memory  of  those  made  in  days  gone  by,  and  that  too  at  a 
time  when  Germany  was  opposed  to  France. 

In  order  to  show  clearly  the  genesis  of  this  military  programme,  I 
beg  to  recall  what  was  written  by  my  predecessor  Colonel  Pelle  a  year 
ago,  when  the  law  of  1912  was  published : 

"  We  are  discovering  every  day  how  deep  and  lasting  are  the  feelings 
of  injured  pride  and  revenge  provoked  against  us  by  the  events  of  last 
year. 

"The  Treaty  of  the  4th  November  1911  has  proved  a  complete 
disillusion. 

"  The  feeling  is  the  same  in  all  parties.  All  Germans,  even  the 
Socialists,  bear  us  a  grudge  for  having  taken  away  their  share  in 
Morocco. 

"  It  seemed  a  year  or  so  ago,  as  if  the  Germans  had  set  out  to  con- 
quer the  world.  They  considered  themselves  so  strong  that  no  one 
would  dare  to  oppose  them.  Limitless  possibilities  were  opening  out 
for  German  manufactures,  German  trade,  German  expansion. 

"Needless  to  say,  these  ideas  and  ambitions  have  not  disappeared 
to-day.  Germany  still  requires  outlets  for  commercial  and  colonial 
expansion.  They  consider  that  they  are  entitled  to  them,  because 
their  population  is  increasing  every  day,  because  the  future  belongs 
to  them.  They  consider  us,  with  our  forty  million  inhabitants,  as  a 
second  rate  power. 

"In  the  crisis  of  1911,  however,  this  second  rate  power  successfully 
withstood  them,  and  the  Emperor  and  the  Government  gave  way. 
Public  opinion  has  forgiven  neither  them  nor  us.  People  are  deter- 
mined that  such  a  thing  shall  never  happen  again.'' 

And  at  the  moment  when  the  second  and  formidable  part  of  the 
programme  is  about  to  be  realised,  when  German  military  strength  is 
on  the  point  of  acquiring  that  final  superiority  which,  should  the  occa- 
sion arise,  would  force  us  to  submit  to  humiliation  or  destruction, 
France  suddenly  refuses  to  abdicate,  and  shows,  as  Renan  said,  "  her 
eternal  power  of  renaissance  and  resurrection."  The  disgust  of 
Germany  can  well  be  understood. 

Of  course  the  Government  points  to  the  general  situation  in  Europe 
and  speaks  of  the  "Slav  Peril.''  As  far  as  I  can  see,  however,  public 
opinion  really  seems  indifferent  to  this  "Peril,"  and  yet  it  has  ac- 
cepted with  a  good  grace,  if  not  with  welcome,  the  enormous  burdens 
of  these  two  successive  laws. 

1  The  problem  which  is  set  us  to-day  would,  therefore,  only  be  set  again  a  few  years 
later,  and  in  a  much  more  acute  fashion,  since  the  decrease  of  our  contingents  is  con- 
tinually lowering  the  number  of  our  effectives  on  a  peace  footing. 


534  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

On  the  10th  March  last,  being  the  centenary  of  the  levee  en  masse  of 
Germany  against  France,  in  spite  of  a  downpour  of  rain,  a  huge  crowd 
surged  to  the  miUtary  parade  in  front  of  the  Schloss,  in  the  middle  of 
the  Tiergarten,  in  front  of  the  statues  of  Queen  Louise  and  Frederick 
William  III.,  which  were  surrounded  by  heaps  of  flowers. 

These  anniversaries,  recalling  as  they  do  the  fight  with  France, 
will  be  repeated  the  whole  year  through.  In  1914  there  will  be  a 
centenary  of  the  first  campaign  in  France,  the  first  entry  of  the 
Prussians  into  Paris. 

To  sum  up,  if  public  opinion  does  not  actually  point  at  France,  as 
does  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  we  are  in  fact,  and  shall  long  remain,  the 
nation  aimed  at.  Germany  considers  that  for  our  forty  millions  of 
inhabitants  our  place  in  the  sun  is  really  too  large. 

Germans  wish  for  peace  —  so  they  keep  on  proclaiming,  and  the 
Emperor  more  than  anyone  —  but  they  do  not  understand  peace  as 
involving  either  mutual  concessions  or  a  balance  of  armaments.  They 
want  to  be  feared  and  they  are  at  present  engaged  in  making  the  neces- 
sary sacrifices.  If  on  some  occasion  their  national  vanity  is  wounded, 
the  confidence  which  the  country  will  feel  in  the  enormous  superiority 
of  its  army  will  be  favourable  to  an  explosion  of  national  anger,  in  the 
face  of  which  the  moderation  of  the  Imperial  Government  will 
perhaps  be  powerless. 

It  must  be  emphasised  again  that  the  Government  is  doing  every- 
thing to  increase  patriotic  sentiment  by  celebrating  with  eclat  all  the 
various  anniversaries  of  1813. 

The  trend  of  public  opinion  would  result  in  giving  a  war  a  more 
or  less  national  character.  By  whatever  pretext  Germany  should 
justify  the  European. conflagration,  nothing  can  prevent  the  first 
decisive  blows  being  struck  at  France. 


Enclosure  II 

M.  de  Faramond,  Naval  Attache  to  the  French  Embassy  at  Berlin,  to 
M.  Baudin,  Minister  of  Marine. 

Berlin,  March  15,  1913, 

In  reporting  on  the  examination  of  the  Naval  budget  by  the  Finan- 
cial Committee  of  the  Reichstag,  I  said  that  no  Naval  law  would  be 
introduced  this  year  having  as  its  object  an  increase  of  the  fleet,  and 
that  the  whole  of  the  military  effort  would  be  directed  against  us. 

Although  the  new  Bill,  having  for  its  object  the  increase  of  the 
German  effectives,  has  not  yet  been  presented  to  the  Reichstag,  we 
know  that  it  deals  with  "  an  increase  of  military  strength  of  immense 
scope,"  to  use  the  expression  of  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung. 

The  official  newspapers  have  also  referred  to  the  military  proposal 
in  terms  which  enable  us  to  consider  the  communique  of  the  Lokal 
Anzeiger  as  accurate. 

The  German  effectives  reach  at  the  present  moment  720,000  men. 
We  are,  therefore,  entitled  to  conclude  that  on  the  1st  October,  1914, 


French  Yellow  Book  535 

the  Imperial  army  will  be  raised  to  a  figure  not  far  removed  from 
860,000. 

The  importance  of  this  figure  would  not  be  so  great  if  the  provisions 
of  the  proposed  legislation  (as  far  as  one  can  gather  from  the  official 
newspapers)  did  not  tend,  as,  in  fact,  those  of  the  law  of  1912  tend, 
to  place  the  army  corps  nearest  to  our  frontier  in  a  state  which  most 
nearly  approaches  a  war  footing,  in  order  to  be  able  on  the  very  day 
of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  to  attack  us  suddenly  with  forces  very 
much  stronger  than  our  own.  It  is  absolutely  imperative  for  the 
Imperial  Government  to  obtain  success  at  the  very  outset  of  the 
operations. 

The  conditions  under  which  the  German  Emperor  would  nowadays 
commence  a  campaign  against  France  are  not  those  of  forty  years  ago. 
At  the  commencement  of  the  war  of  1870  the  Prussian  General  Staff 
had  considered  the  possibility  of  a  victorious  French  offensive,  and 
Moltke,  seeing  that  we  might  conceivably  get  as  far  as  Mayence, 
remarked  to  his  sovereign,  "  There  they  will  come  to  a  stop."  William 
II.  cannot  allow  a  retreat  to  enter  into  his  calculations,  although  the 
German  soldier  is  no  longer  to-day  what  he  was  forty  years  ago,  a 
plain  religious  man,  ready  to  die  at  the  order  of  his  king.  When  it  is 
remembered  that  at  the  last  elections  4,000,000  votes  were  cast  by 
the  Socialists  and  that  the  franchise  is  only  obtained  in  Germany  at 
the  age  of  25,  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  active  army,  composed  of 
young  men  from  20  to  25,  must  contain  in  its  ranks  a  considerable 
proportion  of  Socialists. 

It  would  indeed  be  foolish  to  think  that  the  German  Socialists  will 
throw  down  their  rifles  on  the  day  when  France  and  Germany  come  to 
blows ;  but  it  will  be  very  important  that  the  Imperial  Government 
should  persuade  them  that  on  the  one  hand  we  are  the  aggressors,  and 
on  the  other  that  they  can  have  entire  confidence  in  the  direction  of 
the  campaign  and  its  final  result. 

On  the  last  occasion  when  the  recruits  for  the  Guard  took  the  oath 
at  Potsdam  I  was  struck  to  hear  the  Emperor  take  as  a  theme  for  his 
address  to  the  young  soldiers  "the  duty  of  being  braver  and  more 
disciplined  in  adversity  than  in  success.'' 

And  it  is  because  a  German  defeat  at  the  outset  would  have  such  an 
incalculable  effect  on  the  Empire,  that  we  find  in  all  the  plans  worked 
out  by  the  General  Staff  proposals  for  a  crushing  offensive  movement 
against  France. 

In  reality  the  Imperial  Government  wishes  to  be  in  a  position  to 
meet  all  possible  eventualities.  It  is  from  the  direction  of  France 
that  the  danger  seems  to  them  greatest.  The  Kdlnische  Zeitiing  has 
said  as  much  in  an  article  both  spiteful  and  violent,  the  form  rather 
than  the  substance  of  which  has  been  disavowed  by  the  Wilhelmstrasse. 

But  w^e  must  be  willing  to  realise  that  the  opinion  expressed  by  the 
Kdlnische  Zeitung  is  at  the  present  moment  that  of  the  immense 
majority  of  the  German  people. 

In  this  connection  I  think  it  is  interesting  to  quote  a  conversation 
which  a  member  of  our  Embassy  had  the  other  evening  with  the  old 


536  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

Prince  Henckel  von  Donnersmarck,  as  it  may  serve  to  reflect  the 
opinions  which  dominate  Court  circles. 

Referring  to  the  new  German  miHtary  proposals  Prince  Donners- 
marck  spoke  as  follows  :  — 

"  French  people  are  quite  wrong  in  thinking  that  we  harbour  evil 
designs  and  want  war.  But  we  cannot  forget  that  in  1870  popular 
opinion  forced  the  French  Government  to  make  a  foolish  attack  on  us 
before  they  were  ready.  Who  can  assure  us  that  public  opinion, 
which  in  France  is  so  easily  inflamed,  will  not  force  the  Government 
to  declare  war?  It  is  against  this  danger  that  we  wish  to  protect 
ourselves." 

And  the  Prince  added :  "  I  have  even  been  considered  in  France  as 
one  of  those  responsible  for  the  war  of  1870.  That  is  quite  false. 
Even  if  I  took  part  in  the  war  after  it  had  begun,  I  did  my  utmost  to 
prevent  its  outbreak.  A  short  time  before  the  war,  happening  to  be 
at  a  dinner  where  there  were  some  of  the  most  important  personages 
of  the  Imperial  Government,  I  expressed  my  regret  at  the  hostile 
sentiments  which  were  already  becoming  manifest  between  France 
and  Prussia.  The  answer  was  that,  if  I  spoke  like  that,  it  was  because 
I  was  afraid  of  a  struggle  in  which  the  issue  would  certainly  be  un- 
favourable to  Prussia.  I  replied,  *  No,  it  is  not  because  I  am  afraid 
that  I  repudiate  the  idea  of  war  between  France  and  Prussia,  but 
rather  because  I  think  that  it  is  in  the  interest  of  both  countries  to 
avoid  war.  And  since  you  have  referred  to  the  possible  result  of  such 
a  struggle  I  will  give  you  my  opinion.  I  am  convinced  that  you  will 
be  beaten  and  for  this  reason.  In  spite  of  the  brilliant  qualities  which 
I  recognise  are  possessed  by  the  French  and  which  I  admire,  you  are  not 
sufficiently  accurate ;  by  accuracy  I  do  not  mean  arriving  in  time  at 
a  meeting,  but  I  mean  punctuality  in  the  whole  sense  of  the  word. 
Frenchmen,  who  have  a  great  facility  for  work,  are  not  as  punctual  as 
Germans  in  the  fulfilment  of  their  duty.  In  the  coming  war  that  na- 
tion will  be  victorious  whose  servants  from  the  top  of  the  ladder  to  the 
bottom  will  do  their  duty  with  absolute  exactitude,  however  important 
or  small  it  may  be.' "  And  Prince  Donnersmarck  added :  "  An  exacti- 
tude which  played  so  great  a  role  forty  years  ago  in  moving  an  army  of 
500,000  men  will  have  a  far  greater  importance  in  the  next  war,  when 
it  will  be  a  question  of  moving  masses  far  more  numerous." 

In  this  way  the  old  Prince  gave  expression  to  the  confidence  shared 
by  all  Germans  in  the  superiority  of  their  military  organisation. 

When  I  spoke  above  of  the  new  German  proposal  I  only  alluded  to 
increased  effectives.  But  the  proposal  will  include  also  an  increase  of 
material  and  of  defence  works,  the  details  of  which  are  not  known,  but 
some  idea  of  which  may  be  gained  by  the  figure  estimated  to  be  neces- 
sary to  meet  the  expenses,  viz.,  1,250,000,000  francs. 

The  carrying  into  effect  of  the  law  of  the  quinquennium  of  1911  did 
not  necessitate  any  special  financial  measures. 

The  military  and  naval  law  of  1912  has  been  provisionally  covered 
by  the  Budget  surplus  of  the  years  1910  and  1911,  by  the  reform 
of  the  law  with  regard  to  alcohol  and  by  delaying  the  reduction 


French  Yellow  Book  537 

of  the  tax  on  sugar.  (These  last  two  resources  only  represent  to- 
gether the  sum  of  60,000,000  francs.) 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  large  loans  have  recently  been 
raised  by  the  Empire  and  Prussia :  500,000,000  marks  on  the  29th 
January,  1912,  and  350,000,000  marks  on  the  7th  March,  1913.  Quite 
an  important  part  of  these  loans  must  have  been  applied  to  military 
expenses. 

The  military  law  of  1913  will  require  quite  exceptional  financial 
measures. 

According  to  the  indications  given  by  the  semi-official  press,  the 
"non-recurring"  expenditure  will  amount  to  a  milliard  marks,  while 
the  "permanent"  annual  expenditure  resulting  from  the  increase  of 
effectives  will  exceed  200,000,000  marks. 

It  seems  certain  that  the  "non-recurring"  expenditure  will  be 
covered  by  a  war  contribution  levied  on  capital.  Small  fortunes 
would  be  exempted  and  those  above  20,000  marks  would  be  subject 
to  a  progressive  tax.  Presented  in  this  guise  the  war  tax  would  not 
be  objected  to  by  the  Socialists,  who  will  be  able,  in  accordance  with 
their  usual  tactics,  to  reject  the  principle  of  the  military  law  and 
at  the  same  time  to  pass  the  votes  which  assure  its  being  carried  into 
effect. 

The  Government  are  afraid  that  among  the  rich  and  bourgeois 
classes  this  extraordinary  tax  of  a  milliard  levied  exclusively  on 
acquired  capital  will  cause  permanent  discontent.  Accordingly  they 
are  doing  everything  in  their  power  to  persuade  those  on  whom  so 
heavy  an  exaction  is  to  be  levied  that  the  security  of  the  Empire  is 
threatened,  establishing  for  the  purpose  an  analogy  between  the  war- 
like times  of  1813  and  the  present  day. 

By  noisy  celebrations  of  the  centenary  of  the  War  of  Independence 
it  is  desired  to  convince  people  of  the  necessity  of  sacrifice,  and  to 
remind  them  that  France  is  to-day,  as  100  years  ago,  their  hereditary 
enemy. 

If  it  is  established  that  the  German  Government  are  doing  their 
utmost  to  secure  that  the  payment  of  this  enormous  tax  should  be 
made  in  full,  and  not  by  way  of  instalment,  and  if,  as  some  of  the 
newspapers  say,  the  whole  payment  is  to  be  complete  before  1st 
July,  1914,  these  facts  have  a  formidable  significance  for  us,  for  nothing 
can  explain  such  haste  on  the  part  of  the  military  authorities  to  ob- 
tain war  treasure  in  cash  to  the  amount  of  a  milliard. 

With  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  the  permanent  expenditure 
resulting  from  the  application  of  the  laws  of  1912  to  1913  is  to  be  met, 
nothing  has  yet  been  said.  Further  legislation  will  certainly  be  neces- 
sary in  order  that  the  required  annual  amounts  may  be  forthcoming. 

To  sum  up  :  In  Germany  the  execution  of  military  reforms  always 
follows  very  closely  the  decision  to  carry  them  out.  All  the  provi- 
sions made  by  the  law  of  the  quinquennium  of  1911  and  by  the  law 
of  1912  have  already  been  put  into  operation.  It  is  quite  possible 
that  part  of  the  material,  the  purchase  of  which  will  be  authorised 
by  the  new  law,  is  already  in  course  of  manufacture.     Military  secrets 


538  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

are  so  well  kept  here  that  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  follow  the  changes 
in  personnel  and  materiel. 

With  700,000  men  under  arms  (without  counting  the  very  large 
number  of  reservists  who  are  at  the  present  time  in  training),  a  perfect 
military  organisation  and  a  public  opinion  which  can  be  swayed  by 
the  warlike  appeals  of  the  Military  and  Naval  Leagues,  the  German 
people  is  at  the  present  moment  a  very  dangerous  neighbour. 

If  the  three  years'  service  is  adopted  and  immediately  applied  in 
France,  the  conditions  will  be  less  unequal  next  year.  The  German 
effectives  will  still  be  considerably  more  numerous  than  ours,  but  the 
call  to  the  Colours  of  all  available  contingents  will  no  longer  allow 
any  selection,  and  will  bring  into  the  ranks  of  the  German  army 
elements  of  inferior  quality  and  even  some  undesirable  individuals. 
The  morale  of  the  active  army  will  deteriorate. 

Germany  has  wished  to  upset  the  equilibrium  of  the  two  camps 
which  divide  Europe  by  a  supreme  effort  beyond  which  they  can 
do  little  more. 

They  did  not  think  that  France  wa3  capable  of  a  great  sacrifice. 
Our  adoption  of  the  three  years'  service  will  upset  their  calculations. 

Faramond. 


No.  2 

M.  EtiennCf  Minister  of  War,  to  M.  Jonnart,  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs. 

Paris,  April  2,  1913. 

I  HAVE  just  received  from  a  reliable  source  an  official  secret  report 
concerning  the  strengthening  of  the  German  army.  The  report  is 
divided  into  two  parts;  the  first  consisting  of  general  statements, 
the  second  dealing  with  technicalities  and  describing  in  the  greatest 
detail,  for  each  branch  of  the  service,  the  measures  to  be  adopted. 
Especially  striking  are  the  instructions  with  regard  to  the  employ- 
ment of  motor-traction  and  the  utilisation  of  aircraft. 

I  have  the  honour  to  enclose  a  copy  of  the  first  part  of ^  this  docu- 
ment, which  seems  to  merit  your  attention.  Etienne. 


Enclosure 

Memorandum  on  the  strengthening  of  the  German  Army. 

Berlin,  March  19,  1913. 

I.  —  General  Memorandum  on  the  new  Military  Laws 

The  increase  has  taken  place  in  three  stages :  — 

(1)  The  Conference  of  Algeciras  has  removed  the  last  doubt  with 
regard  to  the  existence  of  an  Entente  between  France,  Great  Britain, 
and  Russia.     Moreover  we  have  seen  that  Austria-Hungary  was 


French  Yellow  Book  539 

obliged  to  keep  some  of  her  forces  mobilised  against  Servia  and 
Italy;  finally  our  fleet  was  not  at  that  time  sufficiently  strong.  At 
the  end  of  the  dispute  the  first  matter  taken  in  hand  was  the  strengthen- 
ing of  our  coast  defences  and  the  increase  of  our  naval  forces.  To 
meet  the  British  plan  of  sending  an  Expeditionary  Force  of  100,000 
men  to  the  Continent,  it  would  be  necessary  to  make  a  better  forma- 
tion of  reserves  to  be  used  according  to  circumstances  in  the  protec- 
tion of  the  Coast,  in  fortresses  and  in  siege  operations.  It  was  already 
clear  at  that  time  that  it  would  be  absolutely  necessary  to  make  a 
great  effort. 

(2)  The  French  having  violated  the  Morocco  Conventions  brought 
on  the  incident  of  Agadir.  At  that  time  the  progress  made  by  the 
French  army,  the  moral  recovery  of  the  nation,  the  technical  advance 
in  the  realm  of  aviation  and  of  machine  guns  rendered  an  attack  on 
France  less  easy  than  in  the  previous  period.  Further,  an  attack  by 
the  British  fleet  had  to  be  considered.  This  difficult  situation  opened 
our  eyes  to  the  necessity  for  an  increase  in  the  army.  This  increase 
was  from  this  moment  considered  as  a  minimum. 

(3)  The  war  in  the  Balkans  might  have  involved  us  in  a  war  in 
support  of  our  ally.  The  new  situation  in  the  south  of  Austria- 
Hungary  lessened  the  value  of  the  help  which  this  ally  could  give  us. 
On  the  other  hand,  France  was  strengthened  by  a  new  hi  des  cadres; 
it  was  accordingly  necessary  to  anticipate  the  date  of  execution  con- 
templated by  the  new  military  law. 

Public  opinion  is  being  prepared  for  a  new  increase  in  the  active 
army,  which  would  ensure  Germany  an  honourable  peace  and  the 
possibility  of  properly  ensuring  her  influence  in  the  affairs  of  the  world. 
The  new  army  law  and  the  supplementary  law  which  should  follow 
will  enable  her  almost  completely  to  attain  this  end. 

Neither  ridiculous  shriekings  for  revenge  by  French  chauvinists, 
nor  the  Englishmen's  gnashing  of  teeth,  nor  the  wild  gestures  of  the 
Slavs  will  turn  us  from  our  aim  of  protecting  and  extending  Deutsch- 
tum  (German  influence)  all  the  world  over. 

The  French  may  arm  as  much  as  they  wish,  they  cannot  in  one 
day  increase  their  population.  The  employment  of  an  army  of  black 
men  in  the  theatre  of  European  operations  will  remain  for  a  long  time 
a  dream,  and  in  any  case  be  devoid  of  beauty. 

II.  —  Aim  and  Obligations  of  our  National  Policy,  of  our  Army, 

AND   OF  THE   SPECIAL  ORGANISATIONS   FOR  ArMY   PURPOSES 

Our  new  army  law  is  only  an  extension  of  the  military  education  of 
the  German  nation.  Our  ancestors  of  1813  made  greater  sacrifices. 
It  is  our  sacred  duty  to  sharpen  the  sword  that  has  been  pyt  into  our 
hands  and  to  hold  it  ready  for, defence  as  well  as  for  offence.  We  must 
allow  the  idea  to  sink  into  the  minds  of  our  people  that  our  armaments  are 
an  answer  to  the  armaments  and  policy  of  the  French.  We  must  accus- 
tom them  to  think  that  an  offensive  war  on  our  part  is  a  necessity,  in 
order  to  combat  the  provocations  of  our  adversaries.     We  must  act 


540  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

with  prudence  so  as  not  to  arouse  suspicion,  and  to  avoid  the  crises 
which  might  injure  our  economic  existence.  We  must  so  manage 
matters  that  under  the  heavy  weight  of  powerful  armaments,  con- 
siderable sacrifices,  and  strained  political  relations,  an  outbreak 
(Losschlagen)  should  be  considered  as  a  relief,  because  after  it  would 
come  decades  of  peace  and  prosperity,  as  after  1870.  We  must 
prepare  for  war  from  the  financial  point  of  view ;  there  is  much  to  be 
done  in  this  direction.  We  must  not  arouse  the  distrust  of  our 
financiers,  but  there  are  many  things  which  cannot  be  concealed. 

We  must  not  be  anxious  about  the  fate  of  our  colonies.  The  final 
i;esult  in  Europe  will  settle  their  position.  On  the  other  hand  we  must 
stir  up  trouble  in  the  north  of  Africa  and  in  Russia.  It  is  a  means  of 
keeping  the  forces  of  the  enemy  engaged.  It  is,  therefore,  absolutely 
necessary  that  we  should  open  up  relations,  by  means  of  well-chosen 
agents,  with  influential  people  in  Egypt,  Tunis,  Algeria,  and  Morocco, 
in  order  to  prepare  the  measures  which  would  be  necessary  in  the  case 
of  a  European  war.  Of  course  in  case  of  war  we  should  openly  recog- 
nise these  secret  allies;  and  on  the  conclusion  of  peace  we  should 
secure  to  them  the  advantages  which  they  had  gained.  These  aims 
are  capable  of  realisation.  The  first  attempt  which  was  made  some 
years  ago  opened  up  for  us  the  desired  relations.  Unfortunately 
these  relations  were  not  sufficiently  consolidated.  Whether  we  like 
it  or  not  it  will  be  necessary  to  resort  to  preparations  of  this  kind,  in 
order  to  bring  a  campaign  rapidly  to  a  conclusion. 

Risings  provoked  in  time  of  war  by  political  agents  need  to  be 
carefully  prepared  and  by  material  means.  They  must  break  out 
simultaneously  with  the  destruction  of  the  means  of  communication ; 
they  must  have  a  controlling  head  to  be  found  among  the  influential 
leaders,  religious  or  political.  The  Egyptian  School  is  particularly 
suited  to  this  purpose ;  more  and  more  it  serves  as  a  bond  between 
the  intellectuals  of  the  Mohammedan  World. 

However  this  may  be,  we  must  be  strong  in  order  to  annihilate 
at  one  powerful  swoop  our  enemies  in  the  east  and  west.  But  in 
the  next  European  war  it  will  also  be  necessary  that  the  small  states 
should  be  forced  to  follow  us  or  be  subdued.  In  certain  conditions 
their  armies  and-  their  fortified  places  can  be  rapidly  conquered  or 
neutralised ;  this  would  probably  be  the  case  with  Belgium  and  Hol- 
land, so  as  to  prevent  our  enemy  in  the  west  from  gaining  territory 
which  they  could  use  as  a  base  of  operations  against  our  flank.  In  the 
north  we  have  nothing  to  fear  from  Denmark  or  Scandinavia,  espe- 
cially as  in  any  event  we  shall  provide  for  the  concentration  of  a  strong 
northern  army,  capable  of  replying  to  any  menace  from  this  direction. 
In  the  most  unfavourable  case,  Denmark  might  be  forced  by  Great 
Britain  to.  abandon  her  neutrality ;  but  by  this  time  the  decision 
would  already  hav^  been  reached  both  on  land  and  on  sea.  Our 
northern  army,  the  strength  of  which  could  be  largely  increased  by 
Dutch  formations,  would  oppose  a  very  active  defence  to  any  offen- 
sive measures  from  this  quarter. 

In  the  south,  Switzerland  forms  an  extremely  solid  bulwark,  and 


French  Yellow  Book  541 

we  can  rely  on  her  energetically  defending  her  neutrality  against 
France,  and  thus  protecting  our  flank. 

As  was  stated  above,  the  situation  with  regard  to  the  small  states 
on  our  northwestern  frontier  cannot  be  viewed  in  quite  the  same 
light.  This  will  be  a  vital  question  for  us,  and  our  aim  must  be  to 
take  the  offensive  with  a  large  superiority  from  the  first  days.  For  this 
purpose  it  will  be  necessary  to  concentrate  a  large  army,  followed  up 
by  strong  Landwehr  formations,  which  will  induce  the  small  states 
to  follow  us  or  at  least  to  remain  inactive  in  the  theatre  of  operations, 
and  which  would  crush  them  in  the  event  of  armed  resistance.  If  we 
could  induce  these  states  to  organise  their  system  of  fortification  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  constitute  an  effective  protection  for  our  flank  we 
could  abandon  the  proposed  invasion.  But  for  this,  army  reorganisa- 
tion, particularly  in  Belgium,  would  be  necessary  in  order  that  it 
might  really  guarantee  an  effective  resistance.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
their  defensive  organisation  was  established  against  us,  thus  giving 
definite  advantages  to  our  adversary  in  the  west,  we  could  in  no 
circumstances  offer  Belgium  a  guarantee  for  the  security  of  her 
neutrality.  Accordingly,  a  vast  field  is  open  to  our  diplomacy  to 
work  in  this  country  on  the  lines  of  our  interests. 

The  arrangements  made  with  this  end  in  view  allow  us  to  hope 
that  it  will  be  possible  to  take  the  offensive  immediately  after  the 
complete  concentration  of  the  army  of  the  Lower  Rhine.  An  ultima- 
tum with  a  short  time-limit,  to  be  followed  immediately  by  invasion, 
would  allow  a  sufficient  justification  for  our  action  in  international 
law. 

Such  are  the  duties  which  devolve  on  our  army  and  which  demand 
a  striking  force  of  considerable  numbers.  If  the  enemy  attacks  us, 
or  if  we  wish  to  overcome  him,  we  will  act  as  our  brothers  did  a  hun- 
dred years  ago;  the  eagle  thus. provoked  will  soar  in  his  flight,  will 
seize  the  enemy  in  his  steel  claws  and  render  him  harmless.  We  will 
then  remember  that  the  provinces  of  the  ancient  German  Empire, 
the  County  of  Burgundy  and  a  large  part  of  Lorraine,  are  still  in 
the  hands  of  the  French;  that  thousands  of  brother  Germans  in  thei 
Baltic  provinces  are  groaning  under  the  Slav  yoke.  It  is  a  national 
question  that  Germany's  former  possessions  should  be  restored  to  her. 


No.  3 

M.  Jules  Camhon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Stephen  Pichon, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  May  6,  1913. 

I  WAS  talking  this  evening  to  the  Secretary  of  State  about  the 
conference  of  Ambassadors  and  the  results  obtained  at  the  meeting 
in  London  yesterday.  The  crisis  with  which  Europe  was  threatened 
is  in  his  opinion  over,  but  only  temporarily.  "It  seems  to  me,"  said 
Herr  von  Jagow,  "that  we  are  travelling  in  a  mountainous  district. 
We  have  just  reached  a  difficult  pass  and  we  see  other  heights  rising 


542  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

in  front  of  us/'  "The  height  which  we  have  just  surmounted,"  I 
repUed,  "was,  perhaps,  the  most  difficult  to  cross." 

The  crisis  which  we  have  just  gone  through  has  been  very  serious. 
Here  the  danger  of  war  has  been  considered  imminent.  I  have  proof 
of  the  anxiety  of  the  German  Government  by  a  number  of  facts  which 
it  is  important  that  your  Excellency  should  know. 

I  received  yesterday  a  visit  from  one  of  my  colleagues  with  whom  I 
maintain  special  and  cordial  relations.  On  the  occasion  of  the  visit 
he  paid  to  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  latter  asked  my  colleague  confiden- 
tially what  was  exactly  the  situation  of  Russia  in  the  Far  East,  and 
whether  this  Power  had  at  the  present  time  any  cause  for  fear  which, 
might  necessitate  the  retention  of  its  troops  in  that  quarter.  The 
Ambassador  answered  him  that  he  knew  of  nothing,  absolutely  noth- 
ing, which  could  be  a  cause  of  preoccupation  for  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, and  that  the  latter  have  their  hands  free  in  Europe. 

I  said  above  that  the  danger  of  war  had  been  regarded  here  as 
extremely  near.  The  Government  have  not  been  satisfied  with 
investigating  the  position  in  the  Far  East ;  preparations  have  even 
been  made  here. 

The  mobilisation  of  the  German  army  is  not  restricted  to  the  recall 
of  reservists  to  their  barracks.  There  is  in  Germany  a  preliminary 
measure  which  we  have  not  got,  and  which  consists  in  warning  officers 
and  men  of  the  reserve  to  hold  themselves  ready  for  the  call,  in  order 
that  they  may  make  the  necessary  arrangements.  It  is  a  general  call 
to  "attention,"  and  it  requires  an  incredible  spirit  of  submission, 
discipline,  and  secrecy  such  as  exists  in  this  country,  to  make  a  step  of 
this  kind  possible.  If  such  a  warning  were  given  in  France,  a  thrill 
would  run  through  the  whole  country,  and  it  would  be  in  the  papers 
the  next  day. 

This  warning  was  given  in  1911  during  the  negotiations  which  I  was 
carrying  on  w^ith  regard  to  Morocco. 

Now  it  has  been  given  again  about  ten  days  ago  —  that  is  to  say, 
at  the  moment  of  the  Austro- Albanian  tension.  I  know  that  this 
is  so,  and  I  have  it  from  several  different  sources,  notably  from  officers 
of  the  reserve  who  have  told  it  to  their  friends  in  the  strictest  con- 
fidence. These  gentlemen  have  taken  the  necessary  measures  to  put 
aside  in  a  safe  the  means  of  existence  for  their  families  for  a  year. 
It  has  even  been  said  that  it  was  for  this  reason  that  the  Crown  Prince, 
who  was  to  make  the  trial  trip  on  the  Imperator,  did  not  embark. 

The  decision  which  occasioned  this  preliminary  mobilisation  order 
IS  quite  in  keeping  with  the  ideas  of  the  General  Staff.  On  this  point 
I  have  been  informed  of  some  remarks  made  in  a  German  milieu  by 
General  von  Moltke,  who  is  considered  here  as  the  most  distinguished 
officer  of  the  German  army. 

The  intention  of  the  General  Staff  is  to  act  by  surprise.  "  We  must 
put  on  one  side,"  said  General  von  Moltke,  "all  commonplaces 
as  to  the  responsibility  of  the  aggressor.  When  war  has  become 
necessary  it  is  essential  to  carry  it  on  in  such  a  way  as  to  place  all  the 
chances  in  one's  own  favour.     Success  alone  justifies  war.     Germany 


French  Yellow  Book  543 

cannot  and  ought  not  to  leave  Russia  time  to  mobilise,  for  she  would 
then  be  obliged  to  maintain  on  her  Eastern  frontier  so  large  an  army 
that  she  would  be  placed  in  a  position  of  equality,  if  not  of  inferiority, 
to  that  of  France.  Acordingly,"  added  the  General,  "we  must 
anticipate  our  principal  adversary  as  soon  as  there  are  nine  chances 
to  one  of  going  to  war,  and  begin  it  without  delay  in  order  ruthlessly 
to  crush  all  resistance." 

This  represents  exactly  the  attitude  of  military  circles  and  it  cor- 
responds to  that  of  political  circles ;  the  latter,  however,  do  not  con- 
sider Russia,  in  contradistinction  to  us,  as  a  necessary  enemy. 

This  is  what  was  being  thought  and  said  privately  a  fortnight  ago. 

From  these  events  the  following  conclusions  may  be  drawn  which 
comprise  the  facts  stated  above ;  these  people  are  not  afraid  of  war, 
they  fully  accept  its  possibility  and  they  have  consequently  taken  the 
necessary  steps.     They  wish  to  he  always  ready. 

As  I  said,  this  demands  qualities  of  secrecy,  discipline  and  of  per- 
sistence ;  enthusiasm  alone  is  not  sufficient.  This  lesson  may  form 
a  useful  subject  of  meditation  when  the  Government  of  the  Republic 
ask  Parliament  for  the  means  of  strengthening  the  defences  of  the 
country.  Jules  Cambon. 


No.  4 

M.  Allize,  French  Minister  in  Bavaria,  to  M.  Stephen  Pichon,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Munich,  July  10,  1913. 

From  a  political  point  of  view  people  are  asking  what  is  the 
object  of  the  new  armaments.  Recognising  that  no  one  threatens 
Germany,  they  consider  that  German  diplomacy  had  already  at  its 
disposal  forces  sufficiently  large  and  alliances  sufficiently  powerful 
to  protect  German  interests  with  success.  As  I  pointed  out  the  day 
after  the  Morocco  agreement  of  1911,  it  is  thought  that  the  Imperial 
Chancery  will  be  as  incapable  in  the  future  as  in  the  past,  of  adopting 
an  active  foreign  policy  and  of  achieving,  at  least  in  this  sphere, 
successes  which  would  justify  the  burdens  which  the  nation  has 
assumed. 

This  frame  of  mind  is  all  the  more  a  cause  of  anxiety  as  the  Imperial 
Government  would  find  themselves  supported  by  public  opinion  in 
any  enterprise  on  which  they  might  energetically  embark,  even  at  the 
risk  of  a  confiict.  The  state  of  war  to  which  all  the  events  in  the 
East  have  accustomed  people's  minds  for  the  last  two  years  appears 
no  longer  like  some  distant  catastrophe,  but  as  a  solution  of  the  polit- 
ical and  economic  difficulties  which  will  continue  to  increase. 

May  the  example  of  Bulgaria  exercise  a  salutary  influence  on  Ger- 
many. As  the  Prince  Regent  recently  said  to  me,  "  The  fortune  of 
war  is  always  uncertain ;  every  war  is  an  adventure,  and  the  man  is  a 
fool  who  risks  it  believing  himself  sure  of  victory." 

Allize. 


544  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

No.  5 

Report  to  M.  Stephen  Pichon,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  (on  Public 
Opinion  in  Germany  according  to  the  Reports  of  the  Diplomatic  and 
Consular  Agents). 

Paris,  July  30,  1913. 

From  observations  which  our  agents  in  Germany  have  been  able 
to  collect  from  persons  having  access  to  the  most  diverse  circles,  it 
is  possible  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  two  feelings  sway  and  irritate 
men's  minds :  — 

(1)  The  Treaty  of  the  4th  November,  1912,  is  considered  a  dis- 
appointment for  Germany ; 

(2)  France  —  a  new  France  —  undreamed  of  prior  to  the  summer 
of  1911  is  considered  to  be  a  warlike  country,  and  to  want  war. 

Members  of  all  the  parties  in  the  Reichstag,  from  the  Conservatives 
to  the  Socialists,  representing  the  most  different  districts  of  Germany, 
university  people  from  Berlin,  Halle,  Jena,  and  Marburg,  students, 
elementary  school  teachers,  commercial  clerks,  bank  clerks,  bankers, 
artisans,  merchants,  manufacturers,  doctors,  law^^ers,  editors  of 
Democratic  and  Socialistic  newspapers,  Jewish  publicists,  members  of 
trade  unions,  clergymen  and  shopkeepers  from  the  Mark  of  Branden- 
burg, country  squires  from  Pomerania  and  shoemakers  from  Stettin 
celebrating  the  505th  anniversary  of  their  association,  country  gentle- 
men, officials,  priests,  and  large  farmers  from  Westphalia,  are  unan- 
imous on  these  two  points,  with  very  slight  differences  corresponding 
to  their  position  in  society  or  their  political  party.  Here  is  a  syn- 
thesis of  all  these  opinions : 

The  Treaty  of  the  4thiNovember  is  a  diplomatic  defeat,  a  proof  of 
the  incapacity  of  German  diplomacy  and  the  carelessness  of  the 
Government  (so  often  denounced),  a  proof  that  the  future  of  the 
Empire  is  not  safe  without  a  new  Bismarck ;  it  is  a  national  humilia- 
tion, a  lowering  in  the  eyes  of  Europe,  a  blow  to  German  prestige,  all 
the  more  serious  because  up  to  1911  the  military  supremacy  of  Ger- 
many was  unchallenged,  and  French  anarchy  and  the  powerlessness  of 
the  Republic  were  a  sort  of  German  dogma. 

In  July,  1911,  the  "Coup  of  Agadir''  made  the  Morocco  question 
for  the  first  time  a  national  question  affecting  the  life  and  expansion 
of  the  Empire.  The  revelations  and  the  press  campaign  which 
followed,  have  sufficiently  proved  how  the  campaign  has  been  organ- 
ised, what  Pan-German  greed  it  had  awakened,  and  what  hatred 
it  had  left  behind.  If  the  Emperor  was  discussed,  the  Chancellor 
unpopular,  Herr  von  Kiderlen  was  the  best-hated  man  in  Germany 
last  winter.  However,  he  begins  to  be  merely  thought  little  of,  for 
he  allows  it  to  be  known  that  he  will  have  his  revenge. 

Thus,  during  the  summer  of  1911,  German  public  opinion  became 
restive  when  confronted  with  French  opinion  with  regard  to  Morocco. 
And  the  attitude  of  France,  her  calmness,  her  re-born  spiritual  unity, 
her  resolution  to  make  good  her  rights  right  up  to  the  end,  the  fact 
that  she  has  the  audacity  not  to  be  afraid  of  war,  these  things  are  the 


French  Yellow  Booh  545 

most  persistent  and  the  gravest  cause  of  anxiety  and  bad  temper  on 
the  part  of  German  public  opinion. 

Why  then  did  not  Germany  go  to  war  during  the  summer  of  1911, 
since  pubhc  opinion  although  not  so  unanimous  and  determined  as 
French  public  opinion,  was  certainly  favourable?  Apart  from  the 
pacific  disposition  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor,  military  and 
financial  reasons  made  themselves  felt. 

But  these  events  of  1911  have  caused  a  profound  disillusionment 
in  Germany.  A  new  France  united,  determined,  resolved  not  to  be 
intimidated  any  longer,  has  emerged  from  the  shroud  in  which  she 
had  been  seen  burying  herself  for  the  last  ten  years.  Public  opinion 
in  Germ-any,  from  December  to  May,  from  the  columns  of  the  press 
of  all  parties,  which  reproached  the  Imperial  Government  for  their 
incapacity  and  cowardice  has  discovered  with  surprise  mingled  with 
irritation  that  the  country  conquered  in  1870  had  never  ceased  since 
then  to  carry  on  war,  to  float  her  flag  and  maintain  the  prestige  of  her 
arms  in  Asia  and  Africa,  and  to  conquer  vast  territories ;  that  Ger- 
many on  the  other  hand  had  lived  on  her  reputation,  that  Turkey  is 
the  only  country  in  which  during  the  reign  of  William  II.  she  had  made 
moral  conquests,  and  these  were  now  compromised  by  the  disgrace 
of  the  Morocco  solution.  Each  time  that  France  made  a  colonial 
conquest  this  consolation  was  offered:  —  "Yes,  but  that  does  not 
prevent  the  decadence,  anarchy,  and  dismemberment  of  France  at 
home." 

The  public  were  mistaken  and  public  opinion  was  misled. 

Given  this  German  public  opinion  that  considers  France  as  longing 
for  war,  what  can  be  augured  for  the  future  as  regards  the  possibility 
and  proximity  of  war  ? 

German  public  opinion  is  divided  into  two  currents  on  the  question 
of  the  possibility  and  proximity  of  war. 

There  are  in  the  country  forces  making  for  peace,  but  they  are 
unorganised  and  have  no  popular  leaders.  They  consider  that  war 
would  be  a  social  misfortune  for  Germany,  and  that  caste  pride, 
Prussian  domination,  and  the  manufacturers  of  guns  and  armour 
plate  would  get  the  greatest  benefit,  but  above  all  that  war  would 
profit  Great  Britain. 

The  forces  consist  of  the  following  elements :  — 

The  bulk  of  the  workmen,  artisans  and  peasants,  who  are  peace- 
loving  by  instinct. 

Those  members  of  the  nobility  detached  from  military  interests  and 
engaged  in  business,  such  as  the  grands  seigneurs  of  Silesia  and  a  few 
other  personages  very  influential  at  Court,  who  are  sufficiently  en- 
lightened to  realise  the  disastrous  political  and  social  consequences 
of  war,  even  if  successful. 

Numerous  manufacturers,  merchants  and  financiers  in  a  moderate 
way  of  business,  to  whom  war,  even  if  successful,  would  mean  bank- 
ruptcy, because  their  enterprises  depend  on  credit,  and  are  chiefly 
supported  by  foreign  capital. 

Poles,  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  Schleswg-Holstein  — 
2> 


546  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

conquered,  but  not  assimilated  and  sullenly  hostile  to  Prussian  policy. 
There  are  about  7,000,000  of  these  annexed  Germans. 

Finally,  the  Governments  and  the  governing  classes  in  the  large 
southern  states  —  Saxony,  Bavaria,  Wurtemburg,  and  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Baden  —  are  divided  by  these  two  opinions  :  —'an  unsuc- 
cessful war  would  compromise  the  Federation  from  which  they  have 
derived  great  economic  advantages;  a  successful  war  would  only 
profit  Prussia  and  Prussianisation,  against  which  they  have  diffi- 
culty in  defending  their  political  independence  and  administrative 
autonomy. 

These  classes  of  people  either  consciously  or  instinctively  prefer 
peace  to  war ;  but  they  are  only  a  sort  of  makeweight  in  political 
matters,  with  limited  influence  on  public  opinion,  or  they  are  silent 
social  forces,  passive  and  defenceless  against  the  infection  of  a  wave 
of  warlike  feeling. 

An  example  will  make  this  idea  clear :  —  The  110  Socialist  members 
of  the  Reichstag  are  in  favour  of  peace.  They  would  be  unable  to 
prevent  war,  for  war  does  not  depend  upon  a  vote  of  the  Reichstag, 
and  in  the  presence  of  such  an  eventuality  the  greater  part  of  their 
number  would  join  the  rest  of  the  country  in  a  chorus  of  angry  excite- 
ment and  enthusiasm. 

Finally  it  must  be  observed  that  these  supporters  of  peace  believe 
in  war  in  the  mass  because  they  do  not  see  any  other  solution  for  the 
present  situation.  In  certain  contracts,  especially  in  publishers' 
contracts,  a  clause  has  been  introduced  cancelling  the  contract  in  the 
case  of  war.  They  hope,  however,  that  the  will  of  the  Emperor  on 
the  one  side,  France's  difficulties  in  Morocco  on  the  other,  will  be 
for  some  time  a  guarantee  of  peace.  Be  that  as  it  may,  their  pes- 
simism gives  free  play  to  those  who  favour  war. 

People  sometimes  speak  of  a  military  party  in  Germany.  The 
expression  is  inaccurate,  even  if  it  is  intended  to  convey  the  idea  that 
Germany  is  the  country  where  military  power  is  supreme,  as  it  is  said 
of  France  that  it  is  the  country  where  the  civil  power  is  supreme. 
There  exists  a  state  of  mind  which  is  more  worthy  of  attention  than 
this  historical  fact,  because  it  constitutes  a  danger  more  evident  and 
more  recent.  There  is  a  war  party,  with  leaders,  and  followers,  a 
press  either  convinced  or  subsidised  for  the  purpose  of  creating  public 
opinion ;  it  has  means  both  varied  and  formidable  for  the  intimida- 
tion of  the  Government.  It  goes  to  work  in  the  country  with  clear 
ideas,  burning  aspirations,  and  a  determination  that  is  at  once  thrilling 
and  fixed. 

Those  in  favour  of  war  are  divided  into  several  categories ;  each  of 
these  derives  from  its  social  caste,  its  class,  its  intellectual  and  moral 
education,  its  interests,  its  hates,  special  arguments  which  create  a 
general  attitude  of  mind  and  increase  the  strength  and  rapidity  of  the 
stream  of  warlike  desire. 

Some  want  war  because  in  the  present  circumstances  they  think  it  is 
inevitable.    And,  as  far  as  Germany  is  concerned,  the  sooner  the  better. 

Others  regar^  war  as  necessary  for  economic  reasons  based  on  over- 


French  Yellow  Book  547 

population,  over-production,  the  need  for  markets  and  outlets;  or 
for  social  reasons,  i.e.,  to  provide  the  outside  interests  that  alone  can 
prevent  or  retard  the  rise  to  power  of  the  democratic  and  socialist 
masses. 

Others,  uneasy  for  the  safety  of  the  Empire,  and  believing  that  time 
is  on  the  side  of  France,  think  that  events  should  be  brought  to  an 
immediate  head.  It  is  not  unusual  to  meet,  in  the  course  of  conversa- 
tion or  in  the  pages  of  patriotic  pamphlets,  the  vague  but  deeply 
rooted  conviction  that  a  free  Germany  and  a  regenerated  France  are 
two  historical  facts  mutually  incompatible. 

Others  are  bellicose  from  "  Bismarckism "  as  it  may  be  termed. 
They  feel  themselves  humiliated  at  having  to  enter  into  discussions 
with  France,  at  being  obliged  to  talk  in  terms  of  law  and  right  in 
negotiations  and  conferences  where  they  have  not  always  found  it 
easy  to  get  right  on  their  side,  even  when  they  have  a  preponderating 
force.  From  their  still  recent  past  they  derive  a  sense  of  pride  ever 
fed  by  personal  memories  of  former  exploits,  by  oral  traditions,  and 
by  books,  and  irritated  by  the  events  of  recent  years.  Angry  dis- 
appointment is  the  unifying  force  of  the  Wehrvereine,  and  other  asso- 
ciations of  Young  Germany. 

Others  again  want  war  from  a  mystic  hatred  of  revolutionary 
France ;  others  finally  from  a  feeling  of  rancour.  These  last  are  the 
people  who  heap  up  pretexts  for  war. 

Coming  to  actual  facts,  these  feelings  take  concrete  form  as  follows  : 
—  The  country  squires  represented  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Conserva- 
tive party  want  at  all  costs  to  escape  the  death  duties,  which  are 
bound  to  come  if  peace  continues.  In  the  last  sitting  of  the  session 
which  has  just  closed,  the  Reichstag  agreed  to  these  duties  in  principle. 
It  is  a  serious  attack  on  the  interests  and  privileges  of  the  landed 
gentry.  On  the  other  hand  this  aristocracy  is  military  in  character, 
and  it  is  instructive  to  compare  the  Army  List  with  the  year  book  of 
the  nobility.  War  alone  can  prolong  its  prestige  and  support  its 
family  interest.  During  the  discussions  on  the  Army  Bill,  a  Conser- 
vative speaker  put  forward  the  need  for  promotion  among  officers  as 
an  argument  in  its  favour.  Finally,  this  social  class  which  forms  a 
hierarchy  with  the  King  of  Prussia  as  its  supreme  head,  realises  with 
dread  the  democratisation  of  Germany  and  the  increasiilg  power  of 
the  Socialist  party,  and  considers  its  own  days  numbered.  Not 
only  does  a  formidable  movement  hostile  to  agrarian  protection 
threaten  its  material  interests,  but  in  addition,  the  number  of  its 
political  representatives  decreases  with  each  legislative  period.  In 
the  Reichstag  of  1878,  out  of  397  members,  162  belonged  to  the 
aristocracy ;  in  1898,  83 ;  in  1912,  57.  Out  of  this  number  27  alone 
belong  to  the  Right,  14  to  the  Centre,  7  to  the  Left,  and  one  sits 
among  the  Socialists. 

The  higher  bourgeoisie,  represented  by  the  National  Liberal  Party, 
the  party  of  the  contented  spirits,  have  not  the  same  reasons  as  the 
squires  for  wanting  war.  With  a  few  exceptions,  however,  they  are 
bellicose.     They  have  their  reasons,  social  in  character. 


548  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

The  higher  bourgeoisie  is  no  less  troubled  than  the  aristocracy  at 
the  democratisation  of  Germany.  In  1871  they  had  125  members  in 
the  Reichstag ;  in  1874,  155 ;  in  1887,  99 ;  in  1912,  45.  They  do  not 
forget  that  in  the  years  succeeding  the  war  they  played  the  leading 
role  in  parliament,  helping  Bismarck  in  his  schemes  against  the 
country  squires.  Uneasily  balanced  to-day  between  Conservative 
instincts  and  Liberal  ideas,  they  look  to  war  to  settle  problems  which 
their  parliamentary  representatives  are  painfully  incapable  of  solving. 
In  addition,  doctrinaire  manufacturers  declare  that  the  difficulties 
between  themselves  and  their  workmen  originate  in  France,  the  home 
of  revolutionary  ideas  of  freedom  —  without  France  industrial  unrest 
would  be  unknown. 

Lastly,  there  are  the  manufacturers  of  guns  and  armour  plate,  big 
merchants  who  demand  bigger  markets,  bankers  who  are  speculating 
on  the  coming  of  the  golden  age  and  the  next  war  indemnity  —  all 
these  regard  war  as  good  business. 

Amongst  the  "  Bismarckians "  must  be  reckoned  officials  of  all 
kinds,  represented  fairly  closely  in  the  Reichstag  by  the  Free  Con- 
servatives or  Imperial  Party.  This  is  the  party  of  the  "pensioned," 
whose  impetuous  sentiments  are  poured  out  in  the  Post.  They  find 
disciples  and  political  sympathisers  in  the  various  groups  of  young 
men  whose  minds  have  been  trained  and  formed  in  the  public  schools 
and  universities. 

The  universities,  if  we  except  a  few  distinguished  spirits,  develop 
a  warlike  philosophy.  Economists  demonstrate  by  statistics  Ger- 
many's need  for  a  colonial  and  commercial  empire  commensurate 
with  the  industrial  output  of  the  Empire.  There  are  sociological 
fanatics  who  go  even  further.  The  armed  peace,  so  they  say,  is  a 
crushing  burden  on  the  nations,  it  checks  improvement  in  the  lot  of 
the  masses,  and  assists  the  growth  of  socialism.  France  by  clinging 
obstinately  to  her  desire  for  revenge  opposes  disarmament.  Once  for 
all  she  must  be  reduced,  for  a  century,  to  a  state  of  impotence ;  that 
is  the  best  and  speediest  way  of  solving  the  social  problem. 

Historians,  philosophers,  political  pamphleteers  and  other  apolo- 
gists of  German  Kultur  wish  to  impose  upon  the  world  a  way  of  think- 
ing and  feeling  specifically  German.  They  wish  to  wrest  from  France 
that  intellectual  supremacy  which  according  to  the  clearest  thinkers  is 
still  her  possession.  From  this  source  is  derived  the  phraseology  of 
the  Pan-Germans  and  the  ideas  and  adherents  of  the  Kriegsvereine, 
Wehrvereine  and  other  similar  associations  too  well  known  to  need 
particular  description.  It  is  enough  to  note  that  the  dissatisfaction 
caused  by  the  treaty  of  November  4th  has  considerably  swelled  the 
membership  of  colonial  societies. 

We  come  finally  to  those  whose  support  of  the  war  policy  is  inspired 
by  rancour  and  resentment.  These  are  the  most  dangerous.  They 
are  recruited  chiefly  among  diplomatists.  German  diplomatists  are 
now  in  very  bad  odour  in  public  opinion.  The  most  bitter  are  those 
who  since  1905  have  been  engaged  in  the  negotiations  between  France 
and  Germany;    they  are  heaping  together  and  reckoning  up  their 


French  Yellow  Book  549 

grievances  against  us,  and  one  day  they  will  present  their  accounts 
in  the  war  press.  It  seems  as  if  they  were  looking  for  grievances 
chiefly  in  Morocco,  though  an  incident  is  always  possible  in  any  part 
of  the  globe  where  France  and  Germany  are  in  contact. 

They  must  have  their  revenge,  for  they  complain  that  they  have 
been  duped.  During  the  discussion  on  the  Army  Bill  one  of  these 
warlike  diplomatists  exclaimed,  "Germany  will  not  be  able  to  have 
any  serious  conversation  with  France  until  she  has  every  sound  man 
under  arms." 

In  what  terms  will  this  conversation  be  couched  ?  The  opinion 
is  fairly  widely  spread,  even  in  Pan-German  circles,  that  Germany 
will  not  declare  war  in  view  of  the  system  of  defensive  alliances  and 
the  tendencies  of  the  Emperor.  But  when  the  moment  comes,  she 
will  have  to  try  in  every  possible  way  to  force  France  to  attack  her. 
Offence  will  be  given  if  necessary.     That  is  the  Prussian  tradition. 

Must  war  then  be  considered  as  inevitable  ? 

It  is  hardly  likely  that  Germany  will  take  the  risk,  if  France  can 
make  it  clear  to  the  world  that  the  Entente  Cordiale  and  the  Russian 
alliance  are  not  mere  diplomatic  fictions  but  realities  which  exist  and 
will  make  themselves  felt.  The  British  fleet  inspires  a  wholesome 
terror.  It  is  well  known,  however,  that  victory  on  sea  will  leave 
everything  in  suspense.  On  land  alone  can  a  decisive  issue  be  ob- 
tained. 

As  for  Russia,  even  though  she  carries  greater  weight  in  political 
and  military  circles  than  was  the  case  three  or  four  years  ago,  it  is  not 
believed  that  her  co-operation  will  be  sufficiently  rapid  and  energetic 
to  be  effective. 

People's  minds  are  thus  getting  used  to  consider  the  next  war  as  a 
duel  between  France  and  Germany. 


No.  6 

M,  Jules  Camhon,  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  M.  Stephen  Pichon, 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Berlin,  November  22,  1913. 

I  HAVE  received  from  an  absolutely  reliable  source  an  account  of  a 
conversation  which  took  place  a  fornight  ago  between  the  Emperor 
and  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  in  the  presence  of  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  —  General  von  Moltke.  This  conversation,  it  appears, 
has  made  a  profound  impression  on  King  Albert.  I  am  in  no  way 
surprised  at  the  impression  he  gathered,  which  corresponds  with 
what  I  have  myself  felt  for  some  time.  Enmity  against  us  is  increas- 
ing, and  the  Emperor  has  ceased  to  be  the  friend  of  peace. 

The  person  addressed  by  the  Emperor  had  thought  up  till  then,  as 
did  all  the  world,  that  William  II.,  whose  personal  influence  had  been 
exerted  on  many  critical  occasions  in  support  of  peace,  was  still  in 
the  same  state  of  mind.  He  found  him  this  time  completely  changed. 
The  German  Emperor  is  no  longer  in  his  eyes  the  champion  of  peace 
against  the  warlike  tendencies  of  certain  parties  in  Germany.    William 


550  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

II.  has  come  to  think  that  war  with  France  is  inevitable,  and  that  it 
must  come  sooner  or  later.  Naturally  he  believes  in  the  crushing 
superiority  of  the  German  army  and  in  its  certain  success. 

General  von  Moltke  spoke  exactly  in  the  same  strain  as  his  sovereign. 
He,  too,  declared  war  to  be  necessary  and  inevitable,  but  he  showed 
himself  still  more  assured  of  success,  "for,"  he  said  to  the  King,  "this 
time  the  matter  must  be  settled,  and  your  Majesty  can  have  no  con- 
ception of  the  irresistible  enthusiasm  with  which  the  whole  German 
people  will  be  carried  away  when  that  day  comes." 

The  King  of  the  Belgians  protested  that  it  was  a  travesty  of  the 
intentions  of  the  French  Government  to  interpret  them  in  that  sense ; 
and  to  let  oneself  be  misled  as  to  the  sentiments  of  the  French  nation 
by  the  ebullitions  of  a  few  irresponsible  spirits  or  the  intrigues  of 
unscrupulous  agitators. 

The  Emperor  and  his  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  nevertheless  per- 
sisted in  their  point  of  view. 

During  the  course  of  this  conversation  the  Emperor  moreover 
seemed  overstrained  and  irritable.  As  William  II.  advances  in  years, 
family  traditions,  the  reactionary  tendencies  of  the  court,  and  espe- 
cially the  impatience  of  the  soldiers,  obtain  a  greater  empire  over  his 
mind.  Perhaps  he  feels  some  slight  jealousy  of  the  popularity  ac- 
quired by  his  son,  who  flatters  the  passions  of  the  Pan-Germans,  and 
who  does  not  regard  the  position  occupied  by  the  Empire  in  the  world 
as  commensurate  with  its  power.  Perhaps  the  reply  of  France  to 
the  last  increase  of  the  German  army,  the  object  of  which  was  to 
establish  the  incontestable  supremacy  of  Germany,  is,  to  a  certain 
extent,  responsible  for  his  bitterness,  for,  whatever  may  be  said,  it  is 
realised  that  Germany  cannot  go  much  further. 

One  may  well  ponder  over  the  significance  of  this  conversation. 
The  Emperor  and  his  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  may  have  wished  to 
impress  the  King  of  the  Belgians  and  induce  him  not  to  make  any 
opposition  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  us.  Perhaps  Germany 
would  be  glad  to  see  Belgium  less  hostile  to  certain  aspirations  lately 
manifested  here  with  regard  to  the  Belgian  Congo,  but  this  last 
hypothesis  does  not  seem  to  me  to  fit  in  with  the  interposition  of  Gen- 
eral von  Moltke. 

For  the  rest,  the  Emperor  William  is  less  master  of  his  impatience 
than  is  usually  supposed.  I  have  known  him  more  than  once  to 
allow  his  real  thoughts  escape  him.  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
object  of  the  conversation  related  to  me,  the  revelation  is  none  the 
less  of  extreme  gravity.  It  tallies  with  the  precariousness  of  the  gen- 
eral situation  and  with  the  state  of  a  certain  shade  of  public  opinion 
in  France  and  Germany. 

If  I  may  be  allowed  to  draw  a  conclusion,  I  would  submit  that  it 
would  be  well  to  take  account  of  this  new  factor,  namely,  that  the 
Emperor  is  becoming  used  to  an  order  of  ideas  which  were  formerly 
repugnant  to  him,  and  that,  to  borrow  from  him  a  phrase  which  he 
likes  to  use,  "we  must  keep  our  powder  dr}." 

Jules  Cambon. 


German  White  Book  551 


III.   The  German  White  Book 


Foreign  Office,  Berlin,  August,  1914. 

On  June  28th  the  Austro-Hungarian  successor  to  the  throne,  Arch- 
Duke  Franz  Ferdinand,  and  his  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg,  were 
assassinated  by  a  member  of  a  band  of  Servian  conspirators.  The 
investigation  of  the  crime  through  the  Austro-Hungarian  authorities 
has  yielded  the  fact  that  the  conspiracy  against  the  hfe  of  the  Arch- 
Duke  and  successor  to  the  throne  was  prepared  and  abetted  in  Bel- 
grade with  the  co-operation  of  Servian  officials,  and  executed  with 
arms  from  the  Servian  State  arsenal.  This  crime  must  have  opened 
the  eyes  of  the  entire  civilised  world,  not  only  in  regard  to  the  aims  of 
the  Servian  policies  directed  against  the  conservation  and  integrity 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy,  but  also  concerning  the  criminal 
means  which  the  pan-Serb  propaganda  in  Servia  had  no  hesitation  in 
employing  for  the  achievement  of  these  aims. 

The  goal  of  these  policies  was  the  gradual  revolutionising  and  final 
separation  of  the  southeasterly  districts  from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy  and  their  union  with  Servia.  This  direction  of  Servians 
policy  has  not  been  altered  in  the  least  in  spite  of  the  repeated  and 
solemn  declarations  of  Servia  in  which  it  vouchsafed  a  change  in  these 
policies  towards  Austria-Hungary  as  well  as  the  cultivation  of  good 
and  neighbourly  relations. 

In  this  manner  for  the  third  time  in  the  course  of  the  last  6  years 
Servia  has  led  Europe  to  the  brink  of  a  world-war. 

It  could  only  do  this  because  it  believed  itself  supported  in  its 
intentions  by  Russia. 

Russia,  soon  after  the  events  brought  about  by  the  Turkish  revolu- 
tion in  1908,  endeavoured  to  found  a  union  of  the  Balkan  states  under 
Russian  patronage  and  directed  against  the  existence  of  Turkey. 
This  union,  which  succeeded  in  1911  in  driving  out  Turkey  from  a 
greater  part  of  her  European  possessions,  collapsed  over  the  question 
of  the  distribution  of  spoils.  The  Russian  policies  were  not  dis- 
mayed over  this  failure.  According  to  the  idea  of  the  Russian  states- 
men a  new  Balkan  union  under  Russian  patronage  should  be  called 
into  existence,  headed  no  longer  against  Turkey,  now  dislodged  from 
the  Balkans,  but  against  the  existence  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy.  It  was  the  idea  that  Servia  should  cede  to  Bulgaria  those 
parts  of  Macedonia  which  it  had  received  during  the  last  Balkan  war, 
in  exchange  for  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina  which  were  to  be  taken 
from  Austria.  To  oblige  Bulgaria  to  fall  in  with  this  plan  it  was  to  be 
isolated,  Roumania  attached  to  Russia  with  the  aid  of  French  propa- 
ganda, and  Servia  promised  Bosnia  and  the  Herzegovina. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  clear  to  Austria  that  it  was  not 
compatible  with  the  dignity  and  the  spirit  of  self-preservation  of  the 
monarchy  to  view  idly  any  longer  this  agitation  across  the  border. 
The  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  appraised  Germany  of  this  con- 
ception and  asked  for  our  opinion.     With  all  our  heart  we  were  able 


552  Official  Diplomatic  Documents  . 

to  agree  with  our  ally's  estimate  of  the  situation,  and  assure  him  that 
any  action  considered  necessary  to  end  the  movement  in  Servia 
directed  against  the  conservation  of  the  monarchy  would  meet  with 
our  approval. 

We  were  perfectly  aware  that  a  possible  warlike  attitude  of  Austria- 
Hungary  against  Servia  might  bring  Russia  upon  the  field,  and  that 
it  might  therefore  involve  us  in  a  war,  in  accordance  with  our  duty  as 
allies.  We  could  not,  however,  in  these  vital  interests  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  which  were  at  stake,  advise  our  ally  to  take  a  yielding 
attitude  not  compatible  with  his  dignity,  nor  deny  him  our  assistance 
in  these  trying  days.  We  could  do  this  all  the  less  as  our  own  interests 
were  menaced  through  the  continued  Serb  agitation.  If  the  Serbs 
continued  with  the  aid  of  Russia  and  France  to  menace  the  existence 
of  Austria-Hungary,  the  gradual  collapse  of  Austria  and  the  subjec- 
tion of  all  the  Slavs  under  one  Russian  sceptre  would  be  the  conse- 
quence, thus  making  untenable  the  position  of  the  Teutonic  race  in 
Central  Europe.  A  morally  weakened  Austria  under  the  pressure  of 
Russian  pan-Slavism  would  be  no  longer  an  ally  on  whom  we  could 
count  and  in  whom  we  could  have  confidence,  as  we  must  be  able  to 
have,  in  view  of  the  ever  more  menacing  attitude  of  our  easterly  and 
westerly  neighbours.  We,  therefore,  permitted  Austria  a  completely 
free  hand  in  her  action  towards  Servia,  but  have  not  participated  in 
her  preparations. 

Austria  chose  the  method  of  presenting  to  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment a  note,  in  which  the  direct  connection  between  the  murder  at 
Serajievo  and  the  pan-Serb  movement,  as  not  only  countenanced  but 
actively  supported  by  the  Servian  Government,  was  explained,  and 
in  which  a  complete  cessation  of  this  agitation,  as  well  as  a  punishment 
of  the  guilty,  was  requested.  At  the  same  time  Austria-Hungary 
demanded  as  necessary  guarantee  for  the  accomplishment  of  her  desire 
the  participation  of  some  Austrian  officials  in  the  preliminary  examina- 
tion on  Servian  territory  and  the  final  dissolution  of  the  pan-Serb 
societies  agitating  against  Austria-Hungary^  The  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  gave  a  period  of  48  hours  for  the .  unconditional  ac- 
ceptance of  its  demands. 

The  Servian  Government  started  the  mobilisation  of  its  army  one 
day  after  the  transmission  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note. 

As  after  the  stipulated  date  the  Servian  Government  rendered  a 
reply  which,  though  complying  in  some  points  with  the  conditions  of 
Austria-Hungary,  yet  showed  in  all  essentials  the  endeavour  through 
procrastination  and  new  negotiations  to  escape  from  the  just  demands 
of  the  monarchy,  the  latter  discontinued  her  diplomatic  relations 
with  Servia  without  indulging  in  further  negotiations  or  accepting 
,  further  Servian  assurances,  whose  value,  to  its  loss,  she  had  sufficiently 
experienced. 

From  this  moment  Austria  was  in  fact  in  a  state  of  war  with  Servia, 
which  it  proclaimed  officially  on  the  28th  of  July  by  declaring  war. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  conflict  we  assumed  the  position  that 
there  were  here  concerned  the  affairs  of  Austria  aloney  which  it  would 


German  White  Book 


553 


See  exhibits 
1  and  2. 


See  exhibit 
3. 


See  exhibit 
4. 


See  exhibit 
5. 


have  to  settle  with  Servia.  We  therefore  directed  our 
efforts  toward  the  locaHsing  of  the  war,  and  toward  con- 
vincing the  other  powers  that  Austria-Hungary  had  to 
appeal  to  arms  in  justifiable  self-defence,  forced  upon  her 
by  the  conditions.  We  emphatically  took  the  position 
that  no  civilised  country  possessed  the  right  to  stay  the 
arm  of  Austria  in  this  struggle  with  barbarism  and  politi- 
cal crime,  and  to  shield  the  Servians  against  their  just 
punishment.  In  this  sense  we  instructed  our  representa- 
tives with  the  foreign  powers. 

Simultaneously  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  com- 
municated to  the  Russian  Government  that  the  step 
undertaken  against  Servia  implied  merely  a  defensive 
measure  against  the  Serb  agitation,  but  that  Austria- 
Hungary  must  of  necessity  demand  guarantees  for  a 
continued  friendly  behaviour  of  Servia  towards  the  mon- 
archy. Austria-Hungary  had  no  intention  whatsoever 
to  shift  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkan. 

In  answer  to  our  declaration  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment desired,  and  aimed  at,  a  localisation  of  the  conflict, 
both  the  French  and  the  English  Governments  promised 
an  action  in  the  same  direction.  But  these  endeavours 
did  not  succeed  in  preventing  the  interposition  of  Russia 
in  the  Austro-Servian  disagreement. 

The  Russian  Government  submitted  an  official  com- 
munique on  July  24th,  according  to  which  Russia  could 
not  possibly  remain  indifferent  in  the  Servo-Austrian 
conflict.  ^  The  same  was  declared  by  the  Russian  Secre- 
tary of  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Sasonof,  to  the  German 
Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales,  in  the  afternoon  of  July 
26th.  The  German  Government  declared  again,  through 
its  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  that  Austria-Hungary 
had  no  desire  for  conquest  and  only  wished  peace  at 
her  frontiers.  After  the  official  explanation  by  Austria- 
Hungary  to  Russia  that  it  did  not  claim  territorial  gain 
in  Servia,  the  decision  concerning  the  peace  of  the  world 
rested  exclusively  with  St.  Petersburgh. 

1  Note,  —  This  passage  takes  a  somewhat  different  form  in  the  German 
text,  a  translation  of  which  is  as  follows  :  — 

"The  same  was  declared  by  the  Russian  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
M.  Sasonof,  to  the  Imperial  Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales.  (See  exhibit 
4.)  On  the  afternoon  of  July  26th  the  Imperial  and  Royal  {that  is  the 
Austrian)  Government  declared  again  through  its  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburgh  that  Austria-Hungary  had  no  desire  for  conquest  and  only 
wished  peace  on  her  frontiers.  (See  exhibit  5.)  In  the  course  of  the 
same  day,  however,  the  first  news  of  Russian  mobilisation  reached  Berlin. 
(See  exhibits  6,  7,  8,  and  9.)  On  the  evening  of  the  26th,  the  German 
Ambassadors  at  London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburgh  were  instructed 
energetically  to  point  out  the  danger  of  this  Russian  mobilisation.  (See 
exhibits  10,  10a,  and  106.)  After  the  official  explanation  by  Austria- 
Hungary  to  Russia  that  she  did  not  claim  territorial  gain  in  Servia,  the 
decision  concerning  the  peace  of  the  world  rested  exclusively  with  St. 
Petersburgh.  On  the  same  day  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
■  burgh  was  also  directed  to  make  the  following  declaration  to  the  Russian 
Government." 


554 


Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


See  exhibits 
10. 10a,  10b. 


The  same  day  the  first  news  of  Russian  mobiUsation  g^^  exhibits 
reached  BerKn  in  the  evening.  6,  7, 8,  9. 

The  German  Ambassadors  at  London,  Paris,  and  St. 
Petersburgh  were  instructed  to  energetically  point  out  the 
danger  of  this  Russian  mobilisation.  The  Imperial  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburgh  was  also  directed  to  make  the 
following  declaration  to  the  Russian  Government :  ^ 

"  Preparatory  military  measures  by  Russia  will  force  us 
to  counter-measures  which  must  consist  in  mobilising  the 
army. 

"  But  mobilisation  means  war. 

"  As  we  know  the  obligations  of  France  towards  Russia, 
this  mobilisation  would  be  directed  against  both  Russia 
and  France.  We  cannot  assume  that  Russia  desires  to 
unchain  such  a  European  war.  Since  Austria-Hungary 
will  not  touch  the  existence  of  the  Servian  kingdom,  we 
are  of  the  opinion  that  Russia  can  afford  to  assume  an 
attitude  of  waiting.  We  can  all  the  more  support  the 
desire  of  Russia  to  protect  the  integrity  of  Servia  as 
Austria-Hungary  does  not  intend  to  question  the  latter. 
It  will  be  easy  in  the  further  development  of  the  affair 
to  find  a  basis  for  an  understanding." 

On  July  27th  the  Russian  Secretary  of  War,  M.  Suchom- 
linof,  gave  the  German  military  attache  his  word  of 
honour  that  no  order  to  mobilise  had  been  issued,  merely 
preparations  were  being  made,  but  not  a  horse  mustered, 
nor  reserves  called  in.  If  Austria-Hungary  crossed  the 
Servian  frontier,  the  militar^^  districts  directed  towards 
Austria,  i.e.,  Kiev,  Odessa,  Moscow,  Kazan,  would  be  mobi- 
lised, under  no  circumstances  those  situated  on  the  German 
frontier,  i.e.,  St.  Petersburg,  Vilna,  and  Warsaw.  Upon  gge  exhibit 
inquiry  into  the  object  of  the  mobilisation  against  Austria-  n. 
Hungary,  the  Russian  Minister  of  War  replied  by  shrugging 
his  shoulders  and  referring  to  the  diplomats.  The  military 
attache  then  pointed  to  these  mobilisation  measures  against 
Austria-Hungary  as  extremely  menacing  also  for  Germany. 
In  the  succeeding  days  news  concerning  Russian  mobili- 
sation came  at  a  rapid  rate.  Among  it  was  also  news 
about  preparations  on  the  German-Russian  frontier,  as 
for  instance  the  announcement  of  the  state  of  war  in 
Kovno,  the  departure  of  the  Warsaw  garrison,  and  the 
strengthening  of  the  Alexandrovo  garrison. 

On  July  27th,  the  first  information  was  received  con- 
cerning preparatory  measures  taken  by  France  :  the  14th 
Corps  discontinued  the  manoeuvres  and  returned  to  its 
garrison. 

In  the  meantime  we  had  endeavoured  to  localise  the 
conflict  by  most  emphatic  steps. 

1  See  note  on  preceding  page. 


German  White  Book 


555 


See  exhibit 
12. 


See  exhibits 

13, 

14. 


See  exhibit 
15. 


See  exhibit 
16. 


See  exhibit 
17. 


On  July  26th,  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  made  the  proposal 
to  submit  the  differences  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia  to  a  ^conference  of  the  Ambassadors  of  Germany, 
France,  and  Italy  under  his  chairmanship.  We  declared 
in  regard  to  this  proposal  that  we  could  not,  however 
much  we  approved  the  idea,  participate  in  such  a  con- 
ference, as  we  could  not  call  Austria  in  her  dispute  with 
Servia  before  a  European  tribunal. 

France  consented  to  the  proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
but  it  foundered  upon  Austria's  declining  it,  as  was  to  be 
expected. 

Faithful  to  our  principle  that  mediation  should  not  extend 
to  the  Austro-Servian  conflict,  which  is  to  he  considered  as  a 
purely  Austro-Hungarian  affair,  but  merely  to  the  relations 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  we  continued  our 
endeavours  to  bring  about  an  understanding  between  these 
two  powers. 

We  further  declared  ourselves  ready,  after  failure  of  the 
conference  idea,  to  transmit  a  second  proposal  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey's  to  Vienna  in  which  he  suggested  Austria-Hungary 
should  decide  that  either  the  Servian  reply  was  sufficient,  or 
that  it  be  used  as  a  basis  for  further  negotiations.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  remarked  with  full  apprecia- 
tion of  our  action  that  it  had  come  too  late,  the  hostilities 
having  already  been  opened. 

In  spite  of  this  we  continued  our  attempts  to  the  utmost, 
and  we  advised  Vienna  to  show  every  possible  advance  com- 
patible with  the  dignity  of  the  monarchy. 

Unfortunately,  all  these  proposals  were  overtaken  by 
the  military  preparations  of  Russia  and  France. 

On  July  29th,  the  Russian  Government  made  the  official 
notification  in  Berlin  that  four  army  districts  had  been 
mobilised.  At  the  same  time  further  news  was  received 
concerning  rapidly  progressing  military  preparations  of 
France,  both  on  water  and  on  land. 

On  the  same  day  the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  St. 
Petersburgh  had  an  interview  with  the  Russian  Foreign 
Secretary,  in  regard  to  which  he  reported  by  telegraph,  as 
follows : 

"  The  Secretary  tried  to  persuade  me  that  I  should  urge 
my  Government  to  participate  in  a  quadruple  conference  ^ 
to  find  means  to  induce  Austria-Hungary  to  give  up  those 
demands  which  touch  upon  the  sovereignty  of  Servia.  I 
could  merely  promise  to  report  the  conversation  and  took 
the  position  that,  after  Russia  had  decided  upon  the 
baneful  step  of  mobilisation,  every  exchange  of  ideas  ap- 


1  Note.  —  The  German  word  translated  "  conference"  is  Konversation : 
the  German  text  also  contains  the  words  auf  freundscha/tlichem  Wege  ("in 
a  friendly  manner"). 


556  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

peared  now  extremely  difficult,  if  not  impossible.  Besides, 
Russia  now  was  demanding  from  us  in  regard  to  Austria- 
Hungary  the  same  which  Austria-Hungary  was  being 
blamed  for  with  regard  to  Servia,  i.e.,  an  infraction  of 
sovereignty.  Austria-Hungary  having  promised  to  con- 
sider the  Russian  interests  by  disclaiming  any  territorial 
aspiration  —  a  great  concession  on  the  part  of  a  state 
engaged  in  war  — should  therefore  be  permitted  to  attend 
to  its  affairs  with  Servia  alone.  There  would  be  time  at 
the  peace  conference  to  return  to  the  matter  of  forbearance 
towards  the  sovereignty  of  Servia. 

"  I  added  very  solemnly  that  at  this  moment  the  entire 
Austro-Servian  affair  was  eclipsed  by  the  danger  of  a 
general  European  conflagration,  and  I  endeavoured  to 
present  to  the  Secretary  the  magnitude  of  this  danger. 

"It  was  impossible  to  dissuade  Sasonof  from  the  idea 
that  Servia  could  not  now  be  deserted  by  Russia." 

On  July  29th,  the  German  Military  Attache  at  St. 
Petersburgh  wired  the  following  report  on  a  conversation 
with  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Russian  army : 

"The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  has  asked  me  to  call  on 
him,  and  he  has  told  me  that  he  has  just  come  from  His 
Majesty.  He  has  been  requested  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  to  reiterate  once  more  that  everything  had  remained 
as  the  Secretary  had  informed  me  two  days  ago.  He 
offered  confirmation  in  writing  and  gave  me  his  word  of 
honour  in  the  most  solemn  manner  that  nowhere  there 
had  been  a  mobilisation,  viz.,  calling  in  of  a  single  man 
or  horse  up  to  the  present  time,  i.e.,  3  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon.  He  could  not  assume  a  guarantee  for  the 
future,  but  he  could  emphasise  that  in  the  fronts  directed 
towards  our  frontiers  His  Majesty  desired  no  mobilisation. 

"As,  however,  I  had  received  here  many  pieces  of  news 
concerning  the  calling  in  of  the  reserves  in  different  parts 
of  the  country,  also  in  Warsaw  and  in  Vilna,  I  told  the 
general  that  his  statements  placed  me  before  a  riddle. 
On  his  officer's  word  of  honour  he  replied  that  such  news 
was  wrong,  but  that  possibly  here  and  there  a  false  alarm 
might  have  been  given. 

"I  must  consider  this  conversation  as  an  attempt  to 
mislead  us  as  to  the  extent  of  the  measures  hitherto  taken 
in  view  of  the  abundant  and  positive  information  about 
the  calling  in  of  reserves." 

In  reply  to  various  inquiries  concerning  reasons  for  its 
threatening  attitude,  the  Russian  Government  repeatedly 
pointed  out  that  Austria-Hungary  had  commenced  no 
conversation  in  St.  Petersburgh.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburgh  was  therefore  instructed  on 
July  29th,  at  our  suggestion,  to  enter  into  such  conversa- 


German  White  Book 


557 


See    exhibit 
19. 


See  exhibits 
18,  20,  21, 
22,  23,  23a. 


tion  with  Sasonof.  Count  Szapary  was  empowered  to 
explain  to  the  Russian  minister  the  note  to  Servia,  though 
it  had  been  overtaken  by  the  state  of  war,  and  to  accept 
any  suggestion  on  the  part  of  Russia  as  well  as  to  discuss 
with  Sasonof  all  questions  touching  directly  upon  the 
Austro-Russian  relations. 

Shoulder  to  shoulder  with  England  we  laboured  inces- 
santly and  supported  every  proposal  in  Vienna  from  which 
we  hoped  to  gain  the  possibility  of  a  peaceable  solution 
of  the  conflict.  We  even  as  late  as  the  30th  of  July 
forwarded  the  English  proposal  to  Vienna,  as  basis 
for  negotiations,  that  Austria-Hungary  should  dictate 
her  conditions  in  Servia,  i.e.,  after  her  march  into 
Servia.  We  thought  that  Russia  would  accept^  this 
basis. 

During  the  interval  from  July  29th  to  July  31st  ^  there 
appeared  renewed  and  cumulative  news  concerning  Russian 
measures  of  mobilisation.  Accumulation  of  troops  on  the 
East  Prussian  frontier  and  the  declaration  of  the  state  of 
war  over  all  important  parts  of  the  Russian  west  frontier 
allowed  no  further  doubt  that  the  Russian  mobilisation 
was  in  full  swing  against  us,  while  simultaneously  all  such 
measures  were  denied  to  our  representative  in  St.  Peters- 
burgh  on  word  of  honour. 

Nay,  even  before  the  reply  from  Vienna  regarding  the 
Anglo-German  mediation,  whose  tendencies  and  basis 
must  have  been  known  in  St.  Petersburgh,  could  possibly 
have  been  received  in  Berlin,  Russia  ordered  a  general 
mobilisation. 

During  the  same  days,  there  took  place  between  His 
Majesty  the  Kaiser  and  Czar  Nicolas  an  exchange  of 
telegrams  in  which  His  Majesty  called  the  attention 
of  the  Czar  to  the  menacing  character  of  the  Russian 
mobilisation  during  the  continuance  of  his  own  mediating 
activities. 

On  July  31st,  the  Czar  directed  the  following  telegram 
to  His  Majesty  the  Kaiser : 

"  I  thank  You  cordially  for  Your  mediation  which  per- 
mits the  hope  that  everything  may  yet  end  peaceably.  It 
is  technically  impossible  to  discontinue  our  military  prepa- 
rations which  have  been  made  necessary  by  the  Austrian 
mobilisation.  It  is  far  from  us  to  want  war.  As  long  as 
the  negotiations  between  Austria  and  Servia  continue,  my 
troops  will  undertake  no  provocative  action.  I  give  You 
my  solemn  word  thereon.     I  confide  with  all  my  faith  in 

1  Note.  —  The  following  words  appear  here   in   the   German   text : 

wahrend  diese  unsere  Bemuhungen  um  Vermittelung,  von  der  englischen 
Diplomatie  unterstiXtzt,  mit  steigender  Dringlichkeit  fortgefuhrt  wurden 
("whilst  these  endeavours  of  ours  for  mediation  were  being  continued 
with  increasing  energy,  supported  by  English  diplomacy  "). 


558  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

the  grace  of  God,  and  I  hope  for  the  success  of  Your  medi- 
ation in  Vienna  for  the  welfare  of  our  countries  and  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

"  Your  cordially  devoted 

"Nicolas." 

This  telegram  of  the  Czar  crossed  with  the  following, 
sent  by  H.  M.  the  Kaiser,  also  on  July  31st,  at  2  p.m. : 

"  Upon  Your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and  Your  request 
for  my  aid  I  have  engaged  in  mediation  between  Your 
Government  and  the  Government  of  Austria-Hungary. 
While  this  action  was  taking  place.  Your  troops  were  be- 
ing mobilised  against  my  ally  Austria-Hungary,  whereby, 
as  I  have  already  communicated  to  You,  my  mediation 
has  become  almost  illusory.  In  spite  of  this,  I  have  con- 
tinued it,  and  now  I  receive  reliable  news  that  serious 
preparations  for  war  are  going  on  on  my  eastern  frontier. 
The  responsibility  for  the  security  of  my  country  forces 
me  to  measures  of  defence.  I  have  gone  to  the  extreme 
limit  of  the  possible  in  my  efforts  for  the  preservation  of 
the  peace  of  the  world.  It  is  not  I  who  bear  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  misfortune  which  now  threatens  the  entire 
civilised  world.  It  rests  in  your  hand  to  avert  it.  No 
one  threatens  the  honour  and  peace  of  Russia  which  might 
well  have  awaited  the  success  of  my  mediation.  The 
friendship  for  You  and  Your  country,  bequeathed  to  me 
by  my  grandfather  on  his  deathbed,  has  always  been  sacred 
to  me,  and  I  have  stood  faithfully  by  Russia  while  it  was 
in  serious  affliction,  especially  during  its  last  war.  The 
peace  of  Europe  can  still  be  preserved  by  You  if  Russia 
decides  to  discontinue  those  military  preparations  which 
menace  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary." 

Before  this  telegram  reached  its  destination,  the  mobili- 
sation of  all  the  Russian  forces,  obviously  directed  against 
us  and  already  ordered  during  the  afternoon  ^  of  the  31st 
of  July,  was  in  full  swing.  Notwithstanding,  the  telegram 
of  the  Czar  was  sent  at  2  o'clock  that  same  afternoon. 

After  the  Russian  general  mobilisation  became  known 
in  Berlin,  the  Imperial  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  was 
instructed  on  the  afternoon  of  July  31st  to  explain  to 
the  Russian  Government  that  Germany  declared  the  state  See  exhibit 
of  war  as  counter-measure  against  the  general  mobilisa- 
tion of  the  Russian  army  and  navy  which  must  be  fol- 
lowed by  mobilisation  if  Russia  did  not  cease  its  military 
measures  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  within 
12  hours,  and  notified  Germany  thereof. 

At  the  same  time  the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  Paris 
was  instructed  to  demand  from  the  French  Government  a 

»  Note.  —  The  German  text  says  here  Vormittag  (morning). 


25 


German  White  Book  559 

declaration  within  18  hours,  whether  it  would  remain  neu- 
See  exhibit     tral  in  a  Russo-German  war. 

The  Russian  Government  destroyed  through  its  mobili- 
sation, menacing  the  security  of  our  country,  the  labori- 
ous action  at  mediation  of  the  European  cabinets.^  The 
Russian  mobilisation,  in  regard  to  the  seriousness  of  which 
the  Russian  Government  was  never  allowed  by  us  to  en- 
tertain a  doubt,  in  connection  with  its  continued  denial, 
shows  clearly  that  Russia  wanted  war. 

The  Imperial  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  delivered 
his  note  to  M.  Sasonof  on  July  31st  at  12  o'clock  midnight. 

The  reply  of  the  Russian  Government  has  never  reached 
us. 

Two  hours  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  the  Czar 
telegraphed  to  H.M.  the  Kaiser,  as  follows : 

"I  have  received  Your  telegram.  I  comprehend  that 
.  You  are  forced  to  mobilise,  but  I  should  like  to  have  from 
You  the  same  guarantee  which  I  have  given  You,  viz., 
that  these  measures  do  not  mean  war,  and  that  we  shall 
continue  to  negotiate  for  the  welfare  of  our  two  countries 
and  the  universal  peace  which  is  so  dear  to  our  hearts. 
With  the  aid  of  God  it  must  be  possible  to  our  long  tried 
friendship  to  prevent  the  shedding  of  blood.  I  expect 
with  full  confidence  Your  urgent  reply." 

To  this  H.M.  the  Kaiser  replied  : 

"  I  thank  You  for  Your  telegram.  I  have  shown  yester- 
day to  Your  Government  the  way  through  which  alone 
war  may  yet  be  averted.  Although  I  asked  for  a  reply 
by  to-day  noon,  no  telegram  from  my  Ambassador  has 
reached  me  with  the  reply  of  Your  Government.  I  there- 
fore have  been  forced  to  mobilise  my  army.  An  immedi- 
ate, clear  and  unmistakable  reply  of  Your  Government  is 
the  sole  way  to  avoid  endless  misery.  Until  I  receive  this 
reply  I  am  unable,  to  my  great  grief,  to  enter  upon  the 
subject  of  Your  telegram.  I  must  ask  most  earnestly 
that  You,  without  delay,  order  Your  troops  to  commit, 
under  no  circumstances,  the  slightest  violation  of  our 
frontiers." 

As  the  time  limit  given  to  Russia  had  expired  without 
the  receipt  of  a  reply  to  our  inquiry,  H.M.  the  Kaiser 
ordered  the  mobilisation  of  the  entire  German  Army  and 
Navy  on  August  1st  at  5  p.m. 

The  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  was  in- 
structed that,  in  the  event  of  the  Russian  Government  not 
giving  a  satisfactory  reply  within  the  stipulated  time,  he 
should  declare  that  we  considered  ourselves  in  a  state  of 
war  after  the  refusal  of  our  demands.     However,  before  a 

1  Note.  —  The  German  text  adds  here  kurz  vor  dem  Erfolge  ("just  aa 
it  was  on  the  point  of  succeeding"). 


560  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

confirmation  of  the  execution  of  this  order  had  been  re- 
ceived, that  is  to  say,  already  in  the  afternoon  of  August  See  exhibit 
1st,  i.e.,  the  same  afternoon  on  which  the  telegram  of  the 
Czar,  cited  above,  was  sent,  Russian  troops  crossed  our 
frontier  and  marched  into  German  territory. 

Thus  Russia  began  the  war  against  us. 

Meanwhile  the  Imperial  Ambassador  in  Paris  put  our 
question  to  the  French  Cabinet  on  July  31st  at  7  p.m. 

The  French  Prime  Minister  gave  an  equivocal  and 
unsatisfactory  reply  on  August  1st  at  1  p.m.,  which  gave  See  exhibit 
no  clear  idea  of  the  position  of  France,  as  he  limited  him-  ^^* 
self  to  the  explanation  that  France  would  do  that  which 
her  interests  demanded.  A  few  hours  later,  at  5  p.m.,  the 
mobilisation  of  the  entire  French  Army  and  Navy  was 
ordered. 

On  the  morning  of  the  next  day  France  opened  hostili- 
ties. 


British  Blue  Book  561 

IV.   The  British  Blue  Book 
INTRODUCTORY  NARRATIVE  OF  EVENTS 

(1) 

On  the  23rd  June,  1914,  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  nephew 
of  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  Heir  to  the  Throne,  and  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Army,  left  Vienna  to  attend  army  manoeuvres  in  the 
Province  of  Bosnia.  On  Sunday,  the  28th,  he  visited  Serajevo,  the 
capital  of  the  province,  and  made  a  progress  through  the  town  accom- 
panied by  his  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg.  While  passing  through 
the  streets  their  automobile  was  fired  on  by  an  assassin.  Both  the 
Archduke  and  Duchess  were  killed. 

No  crime  has  ever  aroused  deeper  or  more  general  horror  throughout 
Europe;  none  has  ever  been  less  justified.  Sympathy  for  Austria 
was  universal.  Both  the  Governments  and  the  public  opinion  of 
Europe  were  ready  to  support  her  in  any  measures,  however  severe, 
which  she  might  think  it  necessary  to  take  for  the  punishment  of  the 
murderer  and  his  accomplices. 

It  immediately  appeared,  from  the  reports  of  our  representatives 
abroad,  that  the  press  and  public  opinion  of  Austria-Hungary  attrib- 
uted much  of  the  responsibility  for  the  crime  to  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment, which  was  said  to  have  encouraged  a  revolutionary  movement 
amongst  the  Serb  populations  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 

That  there  had  for  many  years  been  a  strong  Serb  nationalist 
movement  in  these  two  provinces  there  is  no  doubt.  This  movement 
in  an  earlier  form  had  swept  the  provinces,  then  part  of  the  Turkish 
Empire,  into  the  insurrection  against  the  Turkish  Government  in  the 
seventies  of  last  century,  culminating  in  the  war  of  1877-8  between 
Russia  and  Turkey.  It  had  continued  when  Austria  took  over  the 
administration  of  the  provinces  under  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878. 
Austria  then  pledged  her  word  to  Turkey  that  her  occupation  should 
not  "  detract  from  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  His  Majesty  the  Sultan 
over  these  provinces.''  Thirty  years  later,  however,  in  1908,  she 
suddenly  proclaimed  their  annexation  to  her  Empire.  On  the  7th 
October  of  that  year,  the  annexation  was  celebrated  in  Serajevo  by 
the  firing  of  salutes  and  ringing  of  cathedral  bells,  amid  scenes  of 
official  rejoicing  and  popular  apathy.  Servian  nationalist  feeling 
immediately  asserted  itself,  and  the  Servian  Government  protested  to 
the  Powers  against  the  annexation  as  a  "deep  injury  done  to  the 
feelings,  interests,  and  rights  of  the  Servian  people."  Servia's  atti- 
tude, coupled  with  the  resentment  felt  by  Russia  and  certain  other 
Great  Powers,  nearly  brought  about  a  European  war ;  but  after  six 
months  of  extreme  tension  she  was  induced  to  make  a  declaration 
abandoning  her  protest  and  promising  to  live  on  good  terms  with 
Austria.  Her  nationalist  aspirations  still  continued,  however,  and 
were  strengthened  by  her  successes  in  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13 
2o 


562  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

—  successes  which  were  compromised  by  Austria's  opposition  to  her 
territorial  expansion.  As  Servia  grew,  Austrian  suspicion  of  her 
designs  deepened. 

(2) 

In  the  light  of  this  history  the  storm  of  anti-Servian  feeling  which 
swept  Austria-Hungary  after  the  Serajevo  murders  is  easily  under- 
stood. It  was  a  feeling  based  on  patriotism  and  loyalty.  Europe 
was  disposed  to  excuse  its  exaggerations  and  to  sympathise  with  its 
motives. 

But  the  dangers  to  European  peace  which  it  involved  were  imme- 
diately evident  from  the  reports  which  reached  the  Government  in 
London.  Anti-Serb  riots  took  place  at  Serajevo  and  Agram.  The 
members  of  the  Serb  party  in  the  Provincial  Council  of  Croatia  were 
assailed  by  their  colleagues  with  cries  of  "Servian  assassins."  Mobs 
in  Vienna  threatened  the  Servian  Legation.  The  Austrian  press, 
almost  without  exception,  used  the  most  unbridled  language,  and 
called  for  the  condign  punishment  of  Servia.  There  were  signs 
that  the  popular  resentment  was  shared,  and  perhaps  encouraged,  by 
the  Austrian  Government.  Both  the  British  and  also  the  German 
Government  knew  that  the  peace  might  be  disturbed. 

In  view  of  these  reports,  it  naturally  became  incumbent  on  dis- 
interested Powers  to  exercise  what  influence  they  possessed  in  a  direc- 
tion which  would  reconcile  justice  with  peace.  Unfortunately, 
though  the  attitude  of  public  opinion  in  Austria,  and,  to  a  less  degree, 
also  in  Germany,  was  plain,  the  intentions  of  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment remained  almost  equally  obscure.  The  Austrian  Foreign  Office 
maintained  an  attitude  of  reticence  towards  the  British  and  Russian 
Ambassadors.  On  the  7th  July  the  Government  were  careful  to 
make  a  public  announcement  that  a  joint  meeting  of  the  Cabinets  of 
Austria  and  Hungary,  which  had  just  taken  place,  was  only  concerned 
with  the  question  of  domestic  measures  to  repress  the  Pan-Serb 
propaganda  in  Bosnia.  On  the  8th  July  the  Minister-President  of 
Hungary  made,  on  the  whole,  a  pacific  speech  in  the  Hungarian  Parlia- 
ment, defending  the  loyalty  of  the  majority  of  the  Serb  subjects  of  the 
Empire.  On  the  11th  July  the  Servian  Minister  at  Vienna  had  no 
reason  to  anticipate  a  threatening  communication  from  the  Austrian 
Government,  and  as  late  as  the  22nd  July,  the  day  before  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum  was  delivered  at  Belgrade,  the  Minister-President 
of  Hungary  stated  in  Parliament  that  the  situation  did  not  war- 
rant the  opinion  that  a  serious  turn  of  events  was  necessary  or  even 
probable. 

His  Majesty^s  Government  had  therefore  largely  to  fall  back  on 
conjecture.  It  was  known  that  the  situation  might  become  serious, 
but  it  was  also  known  that  Servia  had  made  professions  of  readiness 
to  accept  any  demands  compatible  with  the  sovereignty  of  an  inde- 
pendent State.  It  was  known  that  the  opinibn  of  the  Russian  and 
French  —  and  also  of  the   German  —  Governments  was  that  the 


>  British  Blue  Book  563 

Servian  Government  was  not  itself  to  blame  for  the  crime,  but  that 
Servia  must  be  ready  to  investigate  and  put  an  end  to  the  propaganda 
which  had  apparently  led  to  it,  and  which  was  said  to  have  originated 
in  part  on  Servian  soil.  Sir  E.  Grey  advised  Servia  to  show  herself 
moderate  and  conciliatory.  He  promised  the  German  Ambassador 
to  use  his  influence  with  the  Russian  Governmeat  in  the  same  direc- 
tion. More  could  not  be  done,  for  no  actual  evidence  had  yet  been 
furnished  that  Servian  territory  had  in  fact  been  made  the  base  for 
revolutionary  operations.  It  was  only  known  that  a  court-martial 
had  been  set  up  at  Serajevo,  the  proceedings  before  which  were  secret. 
The  Servian  Government  stated  that  they  were  only  waiting  for  the 
Austrian  Government  to  communicate  the  evidence  thus  collected 
before  setting  their  own  investigations  on  foot.  The  Servian  Govern- 
ment also  stated  that  both  the  assassins  implicated  were  Austrian 
subjects,  and  that  on  a  previous  occasion  the  Austrian  Government 
had  informed  the  Servian  Government,  in  reply  to  enquiries,  that  one 
of  these  men  was  harmless  and  was  under  their  protection.  It  was 
remembered  that  Austria  had  tried  on  previous  occasions  to  fasten 
guilt  on  the  Servian  Government  by  means  of  police  evidence  brought 
forward  in  Austrian  courts,  and  had  failed.  It  was  therefore  assumed 
on  all  sides  that,  before  Austria  took  any  action,  she  would  disclose 
to  the  public  her  case  against  Servia.  When  Sir  E.  Grey  said  this 
to  the  German  Ambassador  on  the  20th  July,  the  latter  replied  that  he 
certainly  assumed  that  Austria  would  act  upon  some  case  that  would 
be  known;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  His  Majesty's  Government 
did  not  receive  any  statement  of  the  evidence  on  which  Austria  had 
founded  her  ultimatum  till  the  7th  August. 

It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  wait.  The  situation  was  as  clear  as 
it  could  be  made  till  Austria  would  consent  to  throw  off  her  reticence. 
There  was  nothing  doubtful  in  the  general  international  situation,  no 
incalculable  element  which  Austria  could  not  take  into  full  considera- 
tion. Whatever  she  did,  she  would  know  accurately  the  consequences 
of  her  action.  The  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Entente  remained 
as  they  had  always  been.  We  had  been  quite  recently  assured  that 
no  new  secret  element  had  been  introduced  into  the  former,  and  Sir  E. 
Grey  had  stated  emphatically  in  Parliament  on  the  11th  June  that 
the  latter  had  remained  unchanged  so  far  as  we  were  concerned. 
Russia's  interest  in  the  Balkans  was  well  known.  As  late  as  the  23rd 
May  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  reaffirmed  in  the 
Duma  the  policy  of  the  "Balkans  for  the  Balkans,"  and  it  was  known 
that  any  attack  on  a  Balkan  State  by  any  great  European  Power 
would  be  regarded  as  a  menace  to  that  policy.  If  Servia  was,  as  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  said  to  Sir  E.  Grey  on  the  29th  July,  "  regarded 
as  being  in  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence";  if  Servia  was  to  be 
humiliated ;  then  assuredly  Russia  could  not  remain  indifferent.  It 
was  not  a  question  of  the  policy  of  Russian  statesmen  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh,  but  of  the  deep  hereditary  feeling  for  the  Balkan  populations 
bred  in  the  Russian  people  by  more  than  two  centuries  of  development. 
These  things  had  been,  as  Sir  E.  Grey  said  to  Parliament  in  March, 


564  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

1913,  in  discussing  the  Balkan  war,  "a  commonplace  in  European 
diplomacy  in  the  past."  They  were  the  facts  of  the  European  situa- 
tion, the  products  of  years  of  development,  tested  and  retested  during 
the  last  decade.  Patient  work  might  change  them,  but  the  product 
of  years  could  not  be  pushed  aside  in  a  day. 

(3) 

Yet  two  days  were  as  much  as  Austria  decided  to  allow  for  the  task. 
On  the  23rd  July  she  showed  her  hand.  She  delivered  an  ultimatum 
at  Belgrade  and  required  an  answer  in  forty-eight  hours.  She  made 
ten  demands,  directed  towards  the  elimination  from  Servian  national 
life  of  everything  which  was  hostile  to  Austria.  These  demands 
involved  the  suppression  of  newspapers  and  literature,  the  suppression 
of  nationalist  societies,  a  reorganisation  of  the  Government  schools, 
the  dismissal  of  officers  from  the  army,  the  participation  of  Austrian 
officials  in  judicial  proceedings  in  Servia,  the  arrest  of  two  specified 
men,  the  prevention  of  all  traffic  in  arms  across  the  frontier,  a  full 
explanation  of  anti-Austrian  utterances,  and  immediate  notification 
of  the  enforcement  of  these  measures.  In  addition,  the  Servian 
Government  was  to  publish  on  the  front  page  of  the  Official  Journal 
a  prescribed  statement,  which  amounted  to  a  full  recantation  of  her 
alleged  errors,  and  a  promise  of  amendment.  A  very  brief  summary 
was  annexed  to  the  ultimatum,  giving  the  bare  findings  of  the  secret 
trial  at  Serajevo,  with  no  corroborative  evidence.  No  independent 
nation  had  ever  been  called  on  to  accept  a  greater  humiliation. 

Between  the  delivery  of  this  ultimatum  and  the  declaration  of  war 
between  Great  Britain  and  Germany  there  was  an  interval  of  only 
twelve  days.  In  the  whirl  of  negotiations  which  now  followed,  there 
was  no  time  to  draw  breath  and  ponder.  At  the  outset,  therefore,  it 
may  be  well  to  explain  definitely  the  British  attitude  towards  the 
Austrian  ultimatum. 

Austria  was  under  provocation.  She  had  to  complain  of  a  danger- 
ous popular  movement  against  her  government.  What  evidence  she 
might  have  against  the  Servian  Government  no  one  in  Europe  then 
knew.  Great  Britain  had  no  interest  in  the  Balkans,  except  one. 
She  desired  the  consolidation  and  progressive  government  of  the 
Balkan  States ;  she  desired,  in  the  words  recently  used  by  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  before  the  Duma,  that  "the  Balkan 
Governments  should  recognise  that,  in  the  matter  of  strengthening  a 
State,  the  acquisition  of  territory  is  insufficient;  the  devotion  and 
confidence  of  the  new  citizens  must  be  enlisted."  The  dispute  between 
Austria  and  Servia  did  not  necessarily  affect  that  interest ;  it  was  a 
dispute  between  two  Governments  with  which  Great  Britain  had 
nothing  to  do.  Sir  E.  Grey,  therefore,  consistently  stated  that  he  had 
no  concern  in  that  dispute ;  that  he  had  no  title  to  intervene  between 
Austria  and  Servia ;  that  he  would  express  no  opinion  on  the  merits  of 
the  ultimatum.  But  there  was  the  other  side.  If  the  dispute  af- 
fected the  interests  of  Russia,  then  the  peace  of  Europe  was  at  stake ; 


British  Blue  Book  565 

and,  from  the  first,  Sir  E.  Grey  told  the  Austrian  Government  that 
he  did  not  see  how  Russia,  interested  as  she  was  in  Servia,  could  take 
any  but  a  most  serious  view  of  such  a  formidable  document  as  the 
ultimatum.  The  peace  of  Europe  must  be  maintained,  and  it  could 
only  be  maintained,  as  Mr.  Asquith  had  said  to  Parliament  in  March, 
1913,  in  discussing  the  Balkan  crisis,  by  a  "spirit  of  forbearance, 
patience,  and  self-sacrifice"  —  by  a  "loyal  spirit  of  give  and  take 
on  the  part  of  the  Great  Powers  directly  concerned.''  It  was  as  the 
agent  of  this  spirit  of  conciliation  alone  that  Great  Britain  intervened 
in  the  European  crisis. 

(4) 

On  the  23rd  July  the  Austrian  Ambassador  told  Sir  E.  Grey  that  an 
ultimatum  was  being  handed  to  Servia.  For  the  first  time  Sir  E. 
Grey  heard  that  "there  would  be  something  in  the  nature  of  a  time 
limit."  He  immediately  expressed  his  grave  alarm.  Next  morning 
the  text  of  the  ultimatum  was  handed  to  him,  and  he  learnt  that  the 
time  limit  was  forty-eight  hours.  He  confessed  to  the  German  Am- 
bassador that,  as  no  time  had  been  left  for  deliberation,  he  felt  helpless. 
There  was  no  time  to  advise  Russia  or  to  influence  Servia. 

At  this  critical  moment  everything  depended  on  Germany.  As  the 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  a  little  later,  "  the  key  of  the 
situation  was  to  be  found  in  Berlin."  What  was  Germany's  attitude  ? 
Privately,  the  German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  expressed  his 
doubts  as  to  the  ultimatum ;  officially,  the  German  Government  called 
it  "  equitable  and  moderate,"  and  said  that  they  "  desired  urgently  the 
localisation  of  the  conflict."  Everyone  desired  that ;  but  it  was  no 
time  for  phrases.  The  same  morning  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  had  summoned  the  French  and  British  Ambassadors  in  St. 
Petersburgh,  had  said  that  Austria's  step  meant  imminent  war,  and 
had  asked  for  the  support  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  The  French 
Ambassador  had  pledged  the  support  of  France,  as  was  well  known 
to  be  inevitable  under  the  terms  of  her  alliance.  The  next  morning 
the  Russian  Government  stated  publicly  that  Russia  could  not  remain 
indifferent  to  the  Austro-Servian  conflict.  The  next  evening  troops  in 
Vienna  had  to  be  called  out  to  guard  the  Russian  Embassy  from  hos- 
tile crowds.  "Localisation"  was  a  good  phrase,  but  we  had  to  deal 
with  facts.  Austria  had  surprised  Europe,  and  with  surprise  had 
come  universal  alarm. 

During  these  forty-eight  hours  Great  Britain  made  three  attempts 
at  peace.  Before  all  things,  the  time-limit  of  the  ultimatum  had  to  be 
extended.  Great  Britain  and  Russia  urged  this  at  Vienna.  Great 
Britain  urged  Germany  to  join  in  pressing  the  Austrian  Government. 
All  that  Berlin  consented  to  do  was  to  "pass  on"  the  message  to 
Vienna. 

Secondly,  Sir  E.  Grey  urged  that  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany, 
and  Italy  should  work  together  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  in 
favour  of  conciliation.     Italy  assented;    France  assented;    Russia 


566  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

declared  herself  ready;  Germany  said  she  had  no  objection,  "if 
relations  between  Austria  and  Russia  became  threatening." 

Thirdly,  the  Russian,  French,  and  British  representatives  at  Bel- 
grade were  instructed  to  advise  Servia  to  go  as  far  as  possible  to  meet 
Austria. 

But  it  was  too  late.  The  time-limit,  which  Austria  would  not  ex- 
tend, had  expired ;  and  after  all  Servia  did  not  need  advice.  On  the 
afternoon  of  Saturday,  the  25th,  she  returned  to  Austria  a  reply  which 
amounted  to  an  acceptance  of  all  Austria's  demands,  subject  on 
certain  points  to  the  delays  necessary  for  passing  new  laws  and 
amending  her  Constitution,  and  subject  to  an  explanation  by  Austria- 
Hungary  of  her  precise  wishes  with  regard  to  the  participation  of 
Austro-Hungarian  officials  in  Servian  judicial  proceedings.  The  reply 
went  far  beyond  anything  which  any  Power  —  Germany  not  excepted 
—  had  ever  thought  probable.  But  the  same  day  the  British  Am- 
bassador at  Vienna  reported  that  the  tone  of  the  Austrian  press  left 
the  impression  that  a  settlement  was  not  desired,  and  he  later  reported 
that  the  impression  left  on  his  mijid  was  that  the  Austrian  note  was  so 
drawn  up  as  to  make  war  inevitable.  In  spite  of  the  conciliatory 
nature  of  Servia's  reply,  the  Austrian  Minister  left  Belgrade  the  same 
evening,  and  Servia  ordered  a  general  mobilisation. 

But  an  outline  of  the  Servian  reply  had  been  communicated  to 
Sir  E.  Grey  an  hour  or  two  before  it  was  delivered.  He  immediately 
expressed  to  Germany  the  hope  that  she  would  urge  Austria  to  accept 
it.  Berlin  again  contented  itself  with  "passing  on"  the  expression  of 
Sir  E.  Grey's  hope  to  Vienna  through  the  German  Ambassador  there. 
The  fate  of  the  message  so  passed  on  may  be  guessed  from  the  fact 
that  the  German  Ambassador  told  the  British  Ambassador  directly 
afterwards  that  Servia  had  only  made  a  pretence  of  giving  way,  and 
that  her  concessions  were  all  a  sham. 

(5) 

During  the  next  four  days,  26th  to  29th  July,  there  was  only  one 
question  before  Europe  —  how  could  Russia  and  Austria  be  brought 
to  an  agreement?  It  was  evident  that  Russia  did  not  believe  that 
Austria  would,  or  could,  stop  short  of  the  absolute  ruin  of  the  Servian 
State,  if  she  once  actually  attacked  it.  Here  again,  the  question  was 
not  merely  one  of  Government  policy ;  the  popular  sentiment  of  two 
nations  was  involved.  Austria  indeed  professed,  no  doubt  with  per- 
fect honesty,  that  she  would  take  no  territory  from  Servia.  But  the 
Austrian  Ministers  were  being  borne  along  on  a  wave  of  violent  popu- 
lar enthusiasm.  They  said  themselves  that  they  would  be  swept 
from  power  if  they  did  not  follow  the  popular  desire  for  a  conflict  with 
Servia.  Would  this  popular  enthusiasm  be  content  with  any  mere 
punitive  expedition  against  the  enemy?  Surely  not.  Russia,  there- 
fore, openly  said  that  she  would  have  to  intervene  if  Servia  were 
attacked ;  but  she  promised  Austria  on  the  27th  that  she  would  use 
all  her  influence  at  Belgrade  to  induce  the  Servian  Government  to 


British  Blue  Book  567 

give  satisfaction  to  Austria,  and  only  asked  Austria  to  delay  hostili- 
ties in  order  to  give  time  for  deliberation.  Austria  refused,  saying  it 
was  too  late.  She  declared  war  on  Servia  on  the  28th.  Russia 
ordered  a  partial  mobilisation  on  the  29th. 

But  meanwhile  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  proposed  that  the  German, 
Italian,  and  French  Ambassadors  should  meet  him  in  London,  to  dis- 
cuss the  best  means  towards  a  settlement.  Italy  and  France  at  once 
accepted ;  Russia  said  she  was  ready  to  stand  aside ;  but  Germany 
refused.  She  did  not  like  what  she  called  "a  court  of  arbitration," 
and  proposed  instead  direct  negotiations  between  Russia  and  Austria. 
These  negotiations  actually  began,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last  para- 
graph, but  they  were  cut  short  by  the  Austrian  declaration  of  war 
against  Servia.  Austria  then  apparently  considered  that  the  moment 
for  such  negotiations  was  passed.  She  had,  moreover,  refused  to  dis- 
cuss the  Servian  reply  in  any  way,  and  it  was  difficult  to  see,  after  that 
refusal,  what  Russia  could  negotiate  with  her  about.  Russia,  there- 
fore, fell  back  on  Sir  E.  Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference  of  Ambassa- 
dors in  London,  which  she  had  originally  expressed  her  readiness  to 
accept.  The  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  urged  Sir  E.  Grey 
to  induce  Germany  to  indicate  in  what  way  she  w^ould  consent  to 
work  for  a  settlement. 

This  brings  the  narrative  of  events  down  to  Wednesday,  the  29th 
July.  Russia  was  mobilising  partially  in  her  southern  provinces. 
Austrian  troops  were  bombarding  Belgrade.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
better  news  was  coming  from  Berlin.  Up  to  the  28th  at  least,  both 
Germany  and  Austria  had  seemed  unwilling  to  admit  that  the  situ- 
ation was  really  serious ;  Russia,  it  was  said,  was  unprepared,  and 
France  was  in  no  condition  to  go  to  war.  Germany  had  said,  in  reply 
to  Sir  E.  Grey's  repeated  advances,  that  she  did  not  like  to  make 
representations  to  Vienna  for  fear  of  stiffening  Austria's  attitude. 
But  on  the  evening  of  the  28th  the  German  Chancellor  assured  the 
British  Ambassador  that  he  was  trying  to  mediate  at  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburgh.  On  the  strength  of  this  assurance  and  similar  assur- 
ances made  by  the  German  Ambassador  in  London  on  the  29th,  Sir 
E.  Grey  telegraphed  to  Berlin  once  more,  in  accordance  with  the 
request  of  the  Russian  Government,  urging  the  German  Government, 
if  they  did  not  like  the  idea  of  the  Ambassadors'  conference  m  the 
form  he  had  suggested  it,  to  suggest  any  other  form  they  pleased. 
"Mediation,"  he  said,  "was  ready  to  come  into  operation  by  any 
method  that  Germany  thought  possible  if  only  Germany  would 
press  the  button  on  the  interests  of  peace."  The  telegram  was 
despatched  at  about  4  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  29th. 

(6) 

This  appeal  was  followed  almost  immediately  by  a  strange  re- 
sponse. About  midnight,  a  telegram  arrived  at  the  Foreign  Office 
from  His  Majesty's  Ambassador  at  Berlin.  The  German  Chancellor 
had  sent  for  him  late  at  night.     He  had  asked  if  Great  Britain  would 


568  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

promise  to  remain  neutral  in  a  war,  provided  Germany  did  not  touch 
Holland  and  took  nothing  from  France  but  her  colonies.  He  refused 
to  give  any  undertaking  that  Germany  would  not  invade  Belgium, 
but  he  promised  that,  if  Belgium  remained  passive,  no  territory  would 
be  taken  from  her. 

Sir  E.  Grey's  answer  was  a  peremptory  refusal,  but  he  added  an 
exhortation  and  an  offer.  The  business  of  Europe  was  to  work  for 
peace.  That  was  the  only  question  with  which  Great  Britain  was 
concerned.  If  Germany  would  prove  by  her  actions  now  that  she 
desired  peace.  Great  Britain  would  warmly  welcome  a  future  agree- 
ment with  her  whereby  the  whole  weight  of  the  two  nations  would  be 
thrown  permanently  into  the  scale  of  peace  in  years  to  come. 

For  the  next  two  days  peace  proposals  and  negotiations  continued, 
some  initiated  and  all  supported  by  Great  Britain.  There  remained 
a  spark  of  hope.  But  from  the  British  point  of  view  the  face  of 
Europe  henceforward  was  changed.  On  the  29th  July  the  only 
conflict  in  progress  had  been  on  the  frontiers  of  Servia  and  Austria ; 
the  only  fear  of  further  war  had  lain  in  the  relations  of  Russia  and 
Austria.  Germany's  declarations  were  pacific ;  Russia  had  said  she 
desired  nothing  but  a  period  of  peace  to  allow  for  her  internal  develop- 
ment ;  France  would  not  fight  except  to  help  her  ally.  There  had 
seemed  no  insuperable  difficulty  in  keeping  the  peace ;  it  was  only  a 
question  of  allaying  the  mutual  suspicion  between  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburgh.  But  now  a  new  element  of  danger  had  been  introduced. 
Great  Britain  now  knew  that  Germany  was  contemplating  an  attack 
on  France.  She  knew  more.  The  independence  of  the  Low  Countries 
had  for  centuries  been  considered  as  one  of  the  strongest  means  of 
securing  the  peace  of  Europe.  Their  position  and  the  nature  of  the 
country  rendered  them  the  natural  battlefield  of  Northern  Europe. 
If  it  was  made  impossible  for  a  Great  Power  to  invade  them,  war 
would  become  increasingly  difficult  and  dangerous.  With  the  growth 
of  the  idea  of  a  fixed  system  of  international  law  founded  on  treaties, 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  had  been  devised  as  a  permanent  safeguard 
to  this  end.  As  such,  it  had  been  consecrated  by  two  international 
treaties  signed  by  all  the  Powers,  and  recognised  by  two  generations 
of  statesmen.  Now,  when  the  peace  of  Europe  was  our  one  object, 
it  was  found  that  Germany  was  preparing  to  tear  out  the  main  rivet 
of  that  peace. 

Germany's  position  must  be  understood.  She  had  fulfilled  her 
treaty  obligations  in  the  past ;  her  action  now  was  not  wanton.  Bel- 
gium was  of  supreme  military  importance  in  a  war  with  France;  if 
such  a  war  occurred,  it  would  be  one  of  life  and  death;  Germany 
feared  that,  if  she  did  not  occupy  Belgium,  France  might  do  so.  In 
face  of  this  suspicion,  there  was  only  one  thing  to  do.  The  neutrality 
of  Belgium  had  not  been  devised  as  a  pretext  for  wars,  but  to  prevent 
the  outbreak  of  wars.  The  Powers  must  reaffirm  Belgian  neutrality 
in  order  to  prevent  the  war  now  threatened.  The  British  Govern- 
ment, therefore,  on  Friday,  the  31st  July,  asked  the  German  and 
French  Governments  for  an  engagement  to  respect  Belgium's  neutral- 


British  Blue  Book  569 

ity,  and  the  Belgian  Government  for  an  engagement  to  uphold  it. 
France  gave  the  necessary  engagement  the  same  day ;  Belgium  gave 
it  the  day  after ;  Germany  returned  no  reply.  Henceforward  there 
could  be  no  doubt  of  German  designs. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  30th  and  31st  negotiations  continued  between 
Russia  and  Austria.  On  the  29th  Germany  had  suggested  to  Austria 
that  she  should  stop  as  soon  as  her  troops  had  occupied  Belgrade. 
Late  on  the  same  night  Russia  offered  to  stop  all  military  preparations, 
if  Austria  would  recognise  that  the  conflict  with  Servia  had  become  a 
question  of  general  European  interest,  and  would  eliminate  from  her 
ultimatum  the  points  which  involved  a  violation  of  the  sovereignty  of 
Servia.  As  the  result  of  this  offer,  Russia  was  able  to  inform  His 
Majesty's  Government  on  the  31st  that  Austria  had  at  last  agreed  to 
do  the  very  thing  she  had  refused  to  do  in  the  first  days  of  the  crisis 
namely,  to  discuss  the  whole  question  of  her  ultimatum  to  Servia. 
Russia  asked  the  British  Government  to  assume  the  direction  of  these 
discussions.     For  a  few  hours  there  seemed  t^  be  a  hope  of  peace. 

(7) 

At  this  moment,  on  Friday,  the  31st,  Germany  suddenly  despatched 
an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  demanding  that  she  should  countermand  her 
mobilisation  within  twelve  hours.  Every  allowance  must  be  made 
for  the  natural  nervousness  which,  as  history  has  repeatedly  shown, 
overtakes  nations  when  mobilisation  is  under  way.  All  that  can  be 
said  is  that,  according  to  the  information  in  the  possession  of  His 
Majesty's  Government,  mobilisation  had  not  at  the  time  proceeded 
as  far  in  Russia  as  in  Germany,  although  general  mobilisation  was  not 
publicly  proclaimed  in  Germany  till  the  next  day,  the  1st  August. 
France  also  began  to  mobilise  on  that  day.  The  German  Secretary  of 
State  refused  to  discuss  a  last  proposal  from  Sir  E.  Grey  for  joint 
action  with  Germany,  France,  and  Italy  until  Russia's  reply  should  be 
received,  and  in  the  afternoon  the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh  presented  a  declaration  of  war.  Yet  on  this  same  day,  Satur- 
day, the  1st,  Russia  assured  Great  Britain  that  she  would  on  no 
account  commence  hostilities  if  the  Germans  did  not  cross  the  frontier, 
and  France  declared  that  her  troops  would  be  kept  6  miles  from  her 
frontier  so  as  to  prevent  a  collision.  This  was  the  situation  when  very 
early  on  Sunday  morning,. the  2nd  August,  German  troops  invaded 
Luxemburg,  a  small  independent  State  whose  neutrality  had  been 
guaranteed  by  all  the  Powers  with  the  same  object  as  the  similar 
guarantee  of  Belgium.  The  die  was  cast.  War  between  Germany, 
Russia,  and  France  had  become  inevitable. 

Only  one  question  now  remained  for  this  country.  His  Majesty's 
Government  failed  in  their  attempts  to  secure  a  general  peace.  Should 
they  now  remain  neutral  ?  The  grounds  on  which  that  question  was 
decided  are  clearly  set  forth  in  the  statements  of  Sir  E.  Grey  and  Mr. 
Asquith  in  Parliament,  which  are  contained  in  this  volume,^  and  no 

1  See  Part  II. 


570  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

additional  explanations  are  needed  here.  But  one  fact  may  be  em- 
phasised. From  the  24th  July,  when  Russia  first  asked  for  British 
support,  to  the  2nd  August,  when  a  conditional  promise  of  naval 
assistance  was  given  to  France,  Sir  E.  Grey  had  consistently  declined 
to  give  any  promise  of  support  to  either  of  our  present  allies.  He 
maintained  that  the  position  of  Great  Britain  was  that  of  a  disinter- 
ested party  whose  influence  for  peace  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  would  be 
enhanced  by  the  knowledge  that  we  were  not  committed  absolutely 
to  either  side  in  the  existing  dispute.  He  refused  to  believe  that  the 
best  road  to  European  peace  lay  through  a  show  of  force.  We  took 
no  mobilisation  measures  except  to  keep  our  fleet  assembled,  and  we 
confined  ourselves  to  indicating  clearly^ to  Austria  on  the  27th  July, 
and  to  Germany  on  the  29th  July,  that  we  could  not  engage  to  remain 
neutral  if  a  European  conflagration  took  place.  We  gave  no  pledge 
to  our  present  allies,  but  to  Germany  we  gave  three  times  —  on  the 
30th  July,  the  31st  July,  and  the  1st  August  —  a  clear  warning  of  the 
effect  which  would  be  produced  on  our  attitude  and  on  the  sentiment 
of  the  British  people  by* a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

After  Germany's  declaration  of  war  on  Russia  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  1st,  the  Tsar  telegraphed  to  His  Majesty  the  King  as  follows : 
"  In  this  solemn  hour  I  wish  to  assure  you  once  more  that  I  have  done 
all  in  my  power  to  avert  war."  It  is  right  to  say  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  believe  this  to  be  a  true  statement  of  the  attitude  both  of 
Russia  and  France  throughout  this  crisis.  On  the  other  hand,  with 
every  wish  to  be  fair  and  just,  it  will  be  admitted  that  the  response  of 
Germany  and  Austria  gave  no  evidence  of  a  sincere  desire  to  save  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

Foreign  Office,  Sept  28,  1914. 


PART  THREE 

DOCUMENTS  FREQUENTLY  QUOTED  BUT  NOT  CON- 
TAINED IN  THE  OFFICIAL  PUBLICATIONS  OF  COL- 
LECTED DIPLOMATIC  DOCUMENTS 


I.  THE    CHANCELLOR'S   SPEECH   IN   THE   REICHSTAG 

August  4,  1914 

[Translated  from  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  of  August  5,  1914] 

A  TERRIBLE  fate  is  breaking  over  Europe.  For  forty-four  years 
after  winning  in  war  the  respect  of  the  world  for  our  German  Em- 
pire, we  have  lived  in  peace,  and  have  guarded  the  peace  of  Europe. 
In  peaceful  labour  we  have  grown  strong  and  mighty ;  and  people 
have  envied  us.  In  nervy  patience  we  have  suffered  hostilities  to 
be  fanned  in  the  east  and  the  west,  and  fetters  to  be  forged  against 
us.  The  wind  was  sown  there  and  now  we  have  the  whirlwind. 
We  wanted  to  go  on  living  and  working  in  peace,  and  like  a  silent 
vow,  from  the  Emperor  down  to  the  youngest  recruit,  this  was  the 
will:  "Our  sword  shall  not  be  drawn  except  in  a  just  cause."  Now 
the  day  has  come  when  we  must  draw  it.  Russia  has  put  the  torch 
to  our  house.  We  have  been  forced  into  a  war  with  Russia  and 
France. 

Gentlemen,  a  number  of  papers  penned  in  the  stress  of  hurrying 
events  have  been  distributed  to .  you.  Let  me  single  out  the  facts 
which  characterise  our  action. 

From  the  first  moment  of  the  Austrian  conflict  we  strove  and  la- 
boured that  this  conflict  might  be  confined  to  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia.  All  the  cabinets,  notably  the  English  cabinet,  took  the 
same  ground,  only  Russia  insisted  that  she  should  have  to  say  a  word. 
This  was  the  beginning  of  the  danger  threatening  Europe.  As  soon 
as  the  first  definite  news  of  military  preparations  in  Russia  reached 
us  we  declared  in  St.  Petersburgh,  kindly  but  firmly,  that  military  prep- 
arations against  us  would  force  us  to  take  similar  steps,  and  that 
mobilisation  and  war  are  not  far  apart.  Russia  assured  us  in  the 
most  friendly  way  that  she  was  taking  no  measures  against  us.  Eng- 
land in  the  meanwhile  was  trying  to  mediate  between  Austria  and 
Servia,  and  was  receiving  our  hearty  support.  On  July  28,  the 
Emperor  telegraphed  to  the  Czar  asking  him  to  consider  that  Austria 
had  the  right  and  the  duty  to  protect  herself  against  the  Greater- 
Servian  plots  which  threatened  to  undermine  her  existence.  The 
Emperor  called  the  Czar's  attention  to  their  common  monarchical 
interest  against  the  crime  of  Serajevo,  and  asked  the  Czar  to  help 
him  personally  to  smooth  away  the  difficulties  between  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg.  At  about  the  same  time,  and  before  he  had  received 
this  telegram,  the  Czar  asked  the  Emperor  to  help  him  and  to  counsel 
moderation  in  Vienna.  The  Emperor  accepted  the  part  of  mediator, 
but  he  had  hardly  begun  to  act,  when  Russia  mobilised  all  her  troops 

573 


574  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

against  Austria-Hungary.  Austria-Hungary  on  the  other  hand  had 
mobihsed  only  her  army  corps  on  the  Servian  frontier,  and  two  other 
corps  in  the  north,  but  far  removed  from  Russia.  The  Emperor 
at  once  pointed  out  to  the  Czar  that  the  Russian  mobilisation  made 
his  mediation,  undertaken  at  the  Czar's  request,  very  difficult  if 
not  impossible.  We  nevertheless  continued  our  mediation,  —  even 
to  the  extreme  limit  permitted  by  our  alliance.  During  this  time, 
Russia  of  her  own  accord  repeated  her  assurance  that  she  was  mak- 
ing no  military  preparations  against  us. 

Then  came  July  31.  In  Vienna  a  decision  was  due.  We  had 
already  succeeded  so  far  that  Vienna  had  renewed  her  personal 
exchange  of  opinion  with  St.  Petersburgh,  which  had  stopped  for 
some  time.  But  even  before  a  decision  was  taken  in  Vienna,  we 
received  the  news  that  Russia  was  mobilising  her  entire  army  — 
that  is,  she  was  mobilising  also  against  us.  The  Russian  Govern- 
ment, which  from  our  repeated  representations  knew  what  a  mobili- 
sation on  our  frontier  meant,  did  not  notify  us,  and  gave  us  no  ex- 
planatory reply.  Nor  until  the  afternoon  of  July  31st  a  telegram 
was  received  from  the  Czar  in  which  he  said  that  his  army  was  tak- 
ing no  provocative  attitude  toward  us.  The  Russian  mobilisation, 
however,  on  our  frontier  had  been  vigorously  begun  as  early  as  dur- 
ing the  night  of  July  30th.  Thus  while  we  were  still  trying  to  medi- 
ate in  Vienna,  at  Russia's  request,  the  whole  Russian  military  force 
rose  on  our  long,  almost  open  frontier.  And  France,  while  she  was 
not  yet  mobilising,  confessed  that  she  was  making  military  prepara- 
tions. And  we?  We  had  intentionally  refrained,  up  to  that  mo- 
ment, from  calling  a  single  reservist  to  the  colors  —  for  the  sake  of 
the  peace  of  Europe.  Should  we  now  be  waiting  longer,  and  until 
the  Powers  between  whom  we  are  wedged  in  would  choose  their  own 
moment  of  attack  ? 

To  expose  Germany  to  this  danger  would  have  been  a  crime ! 
For  this  reason  we  demanded  at  once,  on  July  31st,  that  Russia 
demobilise,  which  action  alone  could  still  have  preserved  the  peace 
of  Europe.  The  Imperial  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburgh  was  simul- 
taneously instructed  to  declare  that  we  should  have  to  consider 
ourselves  at  war  with  Russia  if  she  declined.  The  Imperial  Ambas- 
sador has  followed  his  instructions. 

Even  to-day  we  do  not  yet  know  Russia's  reply  to  our  demand 
that  she  demobilise.  No  telegraphic  news  has  reached  us,  although 
the  telegraph  went  on  for  a  while  communicating  many  less  impor- 
tant matters.  So  it  came  that  when  the  time  limit  was  long  past  the 
Emperor  was  obliged  to  mobilise  our  military  forces,  at  five  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  of  August  1st. 

At  the  same  time,  we  had  to  ask  for  assurances  as  to  the  attitude 
of  France.  She  replied  to  our  definite  enquiry  whether  she  would 
be  neutral  in  a  Russian-German  war  by  saying  that  she  would  do 
what  her  interests  demanded.  This  was  an  evasion  of  our  question, 
if  not  a  negative  reply.  The  Emperor  nevertheless  ordered  that 
the  French  frontier  be  respected  in  its  entirety.    This  order  has  been 


The  Chancellor's  Speech  in  the  Reichstag  575 

rigorously  obeyed  with  one  single  exception.  France,  who  mobi- 
lized at  the  same  hour  that  we  did  declared  that  she  would  respect 
a  zone  of  ten  kilometers  on  our  frontier.  And  what  did  really  happen  ? 
Bomb  throwing,  flyers,  cavalry  scouts,  and  companies  invading 
Alsace-Lorraine.  Thus  France  attacked  us  before  war  had  been 
declared. 

As  regards  the  one  exception  mentioned,  I  have  received  this 
report  from  the  General  Staff:  "As  regards  France's  complaints 
concerning  our  transgressing  her  frontier,  only  one  case  is  to  be  ac- 
knowledged. Contrary  to  definite  orders,  a  patrol  of  the  14th  Army 
Corp^,  led  it  would  seem  by  an  officer,  crossed  the  frontier  on  August 
2d.  It  appears  that  all  were  shot  except  one  man,  ^ho  returned. 
But  long  before  this  one  act  of  crossing  the  frontier  took  place, 
French  flyers  dropped  bombs  as  far  from  France  as  South  Germany, 
and  near  the  Schlucht  pass,  French  troops  made  an  attack  on  our 
frontier  guards.  Thus  far  our  troops  have  confined  themselves  to  the 
protection  of  our  frontier."     This  is  the  report  of  the  General  Staff. 

We  have'  been  forced  into  a  state  of  self-defence,  and  the  necessity 
of  self-defence  knows  no  other  law.  Our  troops  have  occupied 
Luxemburg,  and  have  perhaps  already  been  obliged  to  enter  Belgian 
territory.  That  is  against  the  rules  of  international  law.  It  is 
true  that  the  French  government  announced  in  Brussels  that  it 
would  respect  Belgian  neutrality  as  long  as  its  opponents  would 
do  so.  But  we  knew  that  France  was  ready  for  an  invasion  of 
Belgium. 

France  could  afford  to  wait.  We  could  not  wait.  An  attack 
on  our  flank  might  have  been  fatal.  We  were  therefore  obliged  to 
disregard  the  protest  of  the  Luxemburg  and  Belgian  governments. 
For  the  wrong  we  have  done  thereby  we  shall  try  to  atone,  as  soon 
as  our  military  end  is  obtained.  People,  who  like  ourselves,  are 
fighting  for  their  lives  and  homes  must  think  of  naught  but  how  they 
may  survive.^ 

Gentlemen,  we  are  standing  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Austria- 
Hungary.  As  regards  the  attitude  of  England,  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
remarks  in  the  lower  house  of  Parliament  yesterday  have  shown  what 
her  stand  will  be.  We  have  assured  the  English  government  that 
we  shall  not  attack  the  north  coast  of  France  as  long  as  England 
remains  neutral,  and  that  we  shall  not  infringe  the  territorial  integrity 
and  independence  of  Belgium.  This  assurance  I  here  repeat  before 
the  whole  world ;  and  I  may  add,  that  as  long  as  England  remains 
neutral,  we  shall  not  even  take  any  hostile  measures  against  the 
French  merchant  marine,  provided  France  will  treat  our  merchant- 
men in  the  same  way. 

Gentlemen,  this  was  the  course  of  events.  Germany  enters  this 
war  with  a  clear  conscience.     We  are  fighting  to  protect  the  fruits 

1  The  German  word  durchhauen  has  been  translated  in  the  English  press  "hack 
their  way  through."  While  the  German  word  hauen  and  the  English  word  "hack" 
are  akin,  their  meanings,  and  even  more  their  connotated  meanings  are  very  different. 
"Hack  their  way  through"  suggests  brutal  methods,  which  the  word  durchhauen 
does  not. 


576  Offixiial  Diplomatic  Documents 

of  our  peaceful  labor  and  our  heritage  of  the  great  past:  We  are 
fighting  for  our  future.  The  fifty  years  are  not  yet  past  during  which 
Moltke  used  to  say  we  should  have  to  remain  armed  if  we  were  to 
protect  our  heritage  and  our  achievements  of  1870. 

Now  the  supreme  hour  has  come  which  will  test  our  people.  But 
it  finds  us  ready  and  full  of  confidence.  Our  army  is  in  the  field, 
our  fleet  is  well  prepared,  and  back  of  them  stands  the  whole  Ger- 
man people.  —  The  Whole  German  People  ! 

[For  Sir  E.  Grey's  two  speeches,  August  3,  1914,  and  Mr.  Asquith's  three 
speeches,  August  4,  5,  6,  1914,  see  the  facsimile  reproduction  of  the  British  Blue 
Book,  pp.  89  to  98. 

For  President  Poincare's  message  August  5,  and  M.  Viviani's  speech  on  the 
same  day,  see  French  Yellow  Book  Nos.  158,  159,  August  5,  1914.1 


The  ''Brussels'''  Documents  577 


II.   THE   "BRUSSELS"   DOCUMENTS 

Found  by  the  German  Government  in  Brussels  and  published  in  facsimile 
in  a  special  Supplement  to  the  "  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung" 
of  November  25,  1914. 

(1) 
(Translation) 

Letter  [from  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff]  to  the  [Belgian] 

Minister  of  War  respecting  the  Confidential  Interviews. 
(Confidential.) 

Sir,  Brussels,  April  10,  1906. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  furnish  herewith  a  summary  of  the  conversa- 
tions which  I  have  had  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  which 
I  have  already  reported  to  you  verbally. 

His  first  visit  was  in  the  middle  of  January.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardiston  told  me  of  the  pre-occupation  of  the  British  General 
Staff  concerning  the  general  political  situation  and  the  existing  possi- 
bilities of  war.  Should  Belgium  be  attacked,  it  was  proposed  to  send 
about  100,000  men. 

The  lieutenant-colonel  having  asked  me  how  we  should  interpret 
such  a  step,  I  answered  that,  from  the  military  point  of  view,  it  could 
only  be  advantageous;  but  that  this  question  of  intervention  had 
also  a  political  side,  and  that  I  must  accordingly  consult  the  Minister 
of  War. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  replied  that  his  Minister  at 
Brussels  would  speak  about  it  to  our  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

He  continued  as  follows  :  The  disembarkation  of  the  British  troops 
would  take  place  on  the  French  coast,  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Dunkirk  and  Calais,  in  such  a  manner  that  the  operation  might  be 
carried  out  in  the  quickest  possible  way.^  Landing  at  Antwerp  would 
take  much  longer,  as  larger  transports  would  be  required,  and,  more- 
over, the  risk  would  be  greater. 

This  being  so,  several  other  points  remained  to  be  decided,  viz., 
transport  by  rail,  the  question  of  requisitions  to  which  the  British 
Army  might  have  recourse,  the  question  of  the  chief  command  of  the 
allied  forces. 

He  enquired  whether  our  arrangements  were  adequate  to  secure 
the  defence  of  the  country  during  the  crossing  and  transport  of  the 
British  troops  —  a  period  which  he  estimated  at  about  ten  days.^ 

I  answered  that  the  fortresses  of  Namur  and  Liege  were  safe  against 
a  surprise  attack,  and  that  in  four  days  our  field  army  of  100,000  men 

1  The  following  marginal  note  occurs  in  the  facsimile  :  — 

(Translation) 
"The  entry  of  the  Enghsh  into  Belgium  would  only  take  place  after  the  violation 
of  our  neutrality  by  Germany." 
2p 


578  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

would  be  ready  to  take  the  field.  After  having  expresssed  his  entire 
satisfaction  at  what  I  had  said,  my  visitor  emphasised  the  following 
points:  (1)  Our  conversation  was  absolutely  confidential ;  (2)  it  was 
in  no  way  binding  on  his  Government ;  (3)  his  Minister,  the  British 
General  Staff,  he,  and  myself  were  the  only  persons  then  aware  of  the 
matter ;  (4)  he  did  not  know  whether  his  Sovereign  had  been  consulted. 

At  a  subsequent  meeting  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  assured 
me  that  he  had  never  received  any  confidential  information  from  other 
military  attaches  about  our  army.  He  then  gave  me  a  detailed 
statement  of  the  strength  of  the  British  forces :  we  might  rely  on  it 
that,  in  twelve  or  thirteen  days,  two  army  corps,  four  cavalry  brigades, 
and  two  brigades  of  mounted  infantry  would  be  landed. 

He  asked  me  to  study  the  question  of  the  transport  of  these  forces 
to  that  part  of  the  country  where  they  would  be  most  useful,  and  with 
this  object  in  view  he  promised  me  a  detailed  statement  of  the  com- 
position of  the  landing  force. 

He  reverted  to  the  question  of  the  effective  strength  of  our  field 
army,  and  considered  it  important  that  no  detachments  from  that 
army  should  be  sent  to  Namur  and  Liege,  as  those  fortresses  were 
provided  with  adequate  garrisons. 

He  drew  my  attention  to  the  necessity  of  letting  the  British  Army 
take  full  advantage  of  the  facilities  afforded  under  our  regulations 
respecting  military  requirements.  Finally,  he  laid  stress  on  the  ques- 
tion of  the  chief  command. 

I  replied  that  I  could  say  nothing  on  the  latter  point,  and  I  promised 
that  I  would  study  the  other  questions  with  care. 

Later,  the  British  military  attache  confirmed  his  previous  estimate : 
twelve  days  at  least  were  indispensable  to  carry  out  the  landing  on  the 
coast  of  France.  It  would  take  much  longer  (from  one  to  two  and  a 
half  months)  to  land  100,000  men  at  Antwerp. 

On  my  objecting  that  it  would  be  useless  to  wait  till  the  disembarka- 
tion was  finished,  before  beginning  the  transport  by  rail,  and  that  it 
would  be  better  to  send  on  the  troops  by  degrees  as  they  arrived  on 
the  coast,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  promised  me  precise 
details  of  the  daily  disembarkation  table. 

With  regard  to  the  question  of  military  requirements,  I  informed 
my  visitor  that  that  question  would  easily  be  arranged. 

As  the  plans  of  the  British  General  Staff  advanced,  the  details  of  the 
problem  were  worked  out  with  greater  precision.  The  colonel  assured 
me  that  half  the  British  Army  could  be  landed  in  eight  days,  and  the 
remainder  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth  or  thirteenth  day,  except  the 
mounted  infantry,  on  which  we  could  not  count  till  later. 

Nevertheless,  I  felt  bound  once  more  to  urge  the  necessity  of  know- 
ing the  numbers  to  be  landed  daily,  so  as  to  work  out  the  railway 
arrangements  for  each  day. 

The  British  attache  then  spoke  to  me  of  various  other  questions, 
viz. :  (1)  The  necessity  of  maintaining  secrecy  about  the  operations, 
and  of  ensuring  that  the  Press  should  observe  this  carefully ;  (2)  the 
advantages  there  would  be  in  attaching  a  Belgian  officer  to  each 


The  "  Brussels  "  Documents  579 

British  staff,  an  interpreter  to  each  commanding  officer,  and  gen- 
darmes to  each  unit  to  help  the  British  miUtary  poUce. 

At  another  interview  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston  and  I 
examined  the  question  of  combined  operations  in  the  event  of  a 
German  attack  directed  against  Antwerp,  and  on  the  hypothesis 
of  our  country  being  crossed  in  order  to  reach. the  French  Ardennes. 

Later  on,  the  colonel  signified  his  concurrence  in  the  scheme  I  had 
laid  before  him,  and  assured  me  of  the  assent  of  General  Grierson, 
Chief  of  the  British  General  Staff. 

Other  questions  of  secondary  importance  were  likewise  disposed 
of,  particularly  those  respecting  intermediary  officers,  interpreters, 
gendarmes,  maps,  illustrations  of  uniforms,  English  translations  of 
extracts  from  certain  Belgian  regulations,  the  regulation  of  customs 
dues  chargeable  on  the  British  supplies,  hospital  accommodation  for 
the  wounded  of  the  allied  army,  etc.  Nothing  was  settled  as  to  the 
possible  control  of  the  Press  by  the  Government  or  the  military 
authorities. 

In  the  course  of  the  last  meetings  which  I  had  with  the  British 
attache  he  communicated  to  me  the  daily  disembarkation  table  of  the 
troops  to  be  landed  at  Boulogne,  Calais  and  Cherbourg.  The  distance 
of  the  latter  place,  included  owing  to  certain  technical  considerations, 
would  cause  a  certain  delay.  The  first  corps  would  be  landed  on  the 
tenth  day,  the  second  corps  on  the  fifteenth  day.  Our  railways  would 
carry  out  the  transport  operations  in  such  a  way  that  the  arrival  of 
the  first  corps,  either  towards  Brussels-Lou  vain  or  towards  Namur- 
Dinant,  would  be  completed  on  the  eleventh  day  and  that  of  the 
second  corps  on  the  sixteenth  day. 

I  finally  urged  once  again,  as  forcibly  as  was  within  my  power,  the 
necessity  of  accelerating  the  transport  by  sea  in  order  that  the  British 
troops  might  be  with  us  between  the  eleventh  and  the  twelfth  day ; 
the  very  best  and  most  favourable  results  would  accrue  from  the 
concerted  and  simultaneous  action  by  the  allied  forces.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  serious  check  would  ensue  if  such  co-operation  could  not  be 
achieved.  Colonel  Barnardiston  assured  me  that  everything  would 
be  done  with  that  end  in  view. 

In  the  course  of  our  conversations  I  took  the  opportunity  of  con- 
vincing the  military  attache  of  our  resolve  to  impede  the  enemies' 
movements  as  far  as  lay  within  our  power,  and  not  to  take  refuge  in 
Antwerp  from  the  outset.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardiston,  on  his 
side,  informed  me  that  he  had  at  present  little  confidence  in  the  sup- 
port or  intervention  of  Holland.  He  likewise  confided  to  me  that  his 
Government  intended  to  move  the  British  base  of  supplies  from  the 
French  coast  to  Antwerp  as  soon  as  the  North  Sea  had  been  cleared 
of  all  German  warships. 

At  all  our  interviews  the  colonel  regularly  communicated  to  me  any 
confidential  information  he  possessed  respecting  the  military  condi- 
tion and  general  situation  of  our  eastern  neighbour,  etc.  At  the  same 
time  he  laid  stress  on  the  imperative  need  for  Belgium  to  keep  herself 
well  informed  of  what  was  going  on  in  the  neighbouring  Rhine  country. 


580  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

I  had  to  admit  to  him  that  in  our  country  the  intelligence  service 
beyond  the  frontier  was  not,  in  times  of  peace,  directly  under  our 
General  Staff.  We  had  no  military  attaches  at  our  legations.  I 
took  care,  however,  not  to  admit  to  him  that  I  was  unaware  whether 
the  secret  service,  prescribed  in  our  regulations,  was  organised  or  not. 
But  it  is  my  duty  here  to  call  attention  to  this  state  of  affairs,  which 
places  us  in  a  position  of  glaring  inferiority  to  that  of  our  neighbours, 
our  possible  enemies. 

Major-General, 

Chief  of  General  Staff. 

(Initialled) 

Note.  —  When  I  met  General  Grierson  at  Compiegne  at  the  ma- 
noeuvres of  1906  he  assured  me  that  the  reorganisation  of  the  British 
army  would  result  not  only  in  ensuring  the  landing  of  150,000  men, 
but  in  enabling  them  to  take  the  field  in  a  shorter  period  than  had  been 
previously  estimated. 

End  of  September  1906, 

(Initialled) 


(2) 
(Translation) 

(Confidential.) 

The  British  military  attache  asked  to  see  General  Jungbluth. 
These  gentlemen  met  on  the  23rd  April. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Bridges  told  the  general  that  Great  Britain  had, 
available  for  despatch  to  the  Continent,  an  army  composed  of  six 
divisions  of  infantry  and  eight  brigades  of  cavalry,  in  all  160,000 
men.  She  had  also  all  that  she  needed  for  home  defence.  Every- 
thing was  ready. 

The  British  Government,  at  the  time  of  the  recent  events,  would 
have  immediately  landed  troops  on  our  territory,  even  if  we  had  not 
asked  for  help. 

The  general  protested  that  our  consent  would  be  necessary  for  this. 

The  military  attache  answered  that  he  knew  that,  but  that  as  we 
were  not  in  a  position  to  prevent  the  Germans  passing  through  our 
territory.  Great  Britain  would  have  landed  her  troops  in  any  event. 

As  to  the  place  of  landing,  the  military  attache  was  not  explicit. 
He  said  the  coast  was  rather  long ;  but  the  general  knows  that  Mr. 
Bridges  made  daily  visits  to  Zeebrugge  from  Ostend  during  the 
Easter  holidays. 

The  general  added  that,  after  all,  we  were,  besides,  perfectly  able 
to  prevent  the  Germans  from  going  through. 

April  24,  1912, 


The  Allied  Ansioer  to  the  '' Brussels  ^^  Documents  581 


III.  THE   ALLIED   ANSWER   TO    THE   "BRUSSELS" 

DOCUMENTS 

No.  1 

Sir  Edward  Grey,  British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Sir  F, 
Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels} 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  April  7,  1913. 

In  speaking  to  the  Belgian  Minister  to-day  I  said,  speaking  unoffi- 
cially, that  it  had  been  brought  to  my  knowledge  that  there  was 
apprehension  in  Belgium  lest  we  should  be  the  first  to  violate  Belgian 
neutrality.  I  did  not  think  that  this  apprehension  could  have  come 
from  a  British  source. 

The  Belgian  Minister  informed  me  that  there  had  been  talk,  in  a 
British  source  which  he  could  not  name,  of  the  landing  of  troops  in 
Belgium  by  Great  Britain,  in  order  to  anticipate  a  possible  despatch 
of  German  troops  through  Belgium  to  France. 

I  said  that  I  was  sure  that  this  Government  would  not  be  the  first 
to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  I  did  not  believe  that  any 
British  Government  would  be  the  first  to  do  so,  nor  would  public 
opinion  here  ever  approve  of  it.  What  we  had  to  consider,  and  it  w^as 
a  somewhat  embarrassing  question,  was  what  it  would  be  desirable 
and  necessary  for  us,  as  one  of  the  guarantors  of  Belgian  neutrality, 
to  do  if  Belgian  neutrality  was  violated  by  any  Power.  For  us  to  be 
the  first  to  violate  it  and  to  send  troops  into  Belgium  would  be  to 
give  Germany,  for  instance,  justification  for  sending  troops  into 
Belgium  also.  What  we  desired  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  as  in  that  of 
other  neutral  countries,  was  that  their  neutrality  should  be  respected, 
and  as  long  as  it  was  not  violated  by  any  other  Power  we  should 
certainly  not  send  troops  ourselves  into  their  territory. 

I  am,  etc., 
E.  Grey. 

No.  2 

Extract  from  a  Despatch  from  Baron  Greindl,  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin, 
to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  dated  December  23, 191 1 . 
{From  the  "  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,''  October  13,  1914.) 

(Translation) 

From  the  French  side  the  danger  threatens  not  only  in  the  south 
from  Luxemburg ;  it  threatens  us  along  our  whole  common  frontier. 
For  this  assertion  we  are  not  dependent  only  on  surmises.  We  have 
positive  facts  to  go  upon. 

The  combinations  of  the  Entente  cordiale  include,  without  doubt, 
the  thought  of  an  enveloping  movement  from  the  north.     If  that  were 

1  A  record  of  this  dispatch  was  communicated  by  Sir  F.  Villiers  to  the  Belgian  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs. 


582  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

not  the  case,  the  plan  of  fortifying  Flushing  would  not  have  evoked 
such  an  outcry  in  Paris  and  London.  No  secret  was  made  there 
about  the  reasons  why  it  was  wished  that  the  Scheldt  should  remain 
unfortified.  The  object  was  to  be  able  to  ship  a  British  garrison  with- 
out hindrance  to  Antwerp,  and  to  obtain  in  our  country  a  base  of  oper- 
ations for  an  offensive  in  the  direction  of  the  Lower  Rhine  and  West- 
phaha,  and  then  to  carry  us  along  with  them,  which  would  not  have 
been  difficult.  For  after  giving  up  our  national  place  of  refuge,  we 
should  by  our  own  fault  have  deprived  ourselves  of  any  possibility  of 
resisting  the  demands  of  our  doubtful  protectors  after  being  so  foolish 
as  to  admit  them  to  it.  The  equally  perfidious  and  naif  revelations 
of  Colonel  Barnardiston  at  the  time  of  the  conclusion  of  the  Entente 
cordiale  showed  us  clearly  what  was  intended.  When  it  became 
evident  that  we  were  not  to  be  intimidated  by  the  alleged  threaten- 
ing danger  of  the  closing  of  the  Scheldt,  the  plan  was  not  indeed 
abandoned,  but  altered  in  so  far  as  the  British  auxiliary  force  was  not 
to  be  landed  on  the  Belgian  coast,  but  in  the  nearest  French  harbours. 
The  revelations  of  Captain  Faber,  which  have  been  no  more  denied 
than  the  information  of  the  newspapers  by  which  they  were  confirmed 
or  elaborated  in  certain  particulars,  are  evidence  of  this.  This  British 
army,  landed  at  Calais  and  Dunkirk,  would  not  march  along  our 
frontier  to  Longwy  in  order  to  reach  Germany.  It  would  immediately 
invade  us  from  the  north-west.  This  would  gain  for  it  the  advantage 
of  going  into  action  at  once,  of  meeting  the  Belgian  army  in  a  region 
where  we  cannot  obtain  support  from  any  fortress,  in  the  event  of  our 
wishing  to  risk  a  battle.  It  would  make  it  possible  for  it  to  occupy 
provinces  rich  in  every  kind  of  resource,  but  in  any  case  to  hinder 
our  mobilisation  or  to  allow  it  only  when  we  had  formally  pledged 
ourselves  to  complete  mobilisation  solely  for  the  benefit  of  Great 
Britain  and  her  allies. 

I  would  strongly  urge  that  a  plan  of  action  should  be  drawn  up 
for  this  eventuality  also.  This  is  demanded  as  much  by  the  require- 
ments of  our  military  defence  as  by  the  conduct  of  our  foreign  policy 
in  the  case  of  a  war  between  Germany  and  France. 

No.  3 

Circular  Telegram  addressed  to  His  Britannic  Majesty^ s  Representatives 
abroad} 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  October  H,  1914. 

The  story  of  an  alleged  Anglo-Belgian  agreement  of  1906  published 
in  the  German  press,  and  based  on  documents  said  to  have  been 
found  at  Brussels,  is  only  a  story  which  has  been  reproduced  in  various 
forms  and  denied  on  several  occasions.  No  such  agreement  has  ever 
existed. 

As  the  Germans  well  know,  General  Grierson  is  dead,  and  Colonel 

1  This  telegram  was  sent  on  receipt  of  a  summary  of  the  documents  contained  in 
No.  4,  issued  by  the  German  Government  on  the  13th  October  in  advance  of  the  publi- 
cation of  the  documents  themselves. 


The  Allied  Answer  to  the  "  Brmsels  "  Documents  583 

(now  General)  Barnardiston  is  commanding  the  British  forces  before 
Tsing-tao.  In  1906  General  Grierson  was  on  the  General  Staff  at  the 
War  Office  and  Colonel  Barnardiston  was  military  attache  at  Brussels. 
In  view  of  the  solemn  guarantee  given  by  Great  Britain  to  protect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  against  violation  from  any  side,  some 
academic  discussions  may,  through  the  instrumentality  of  Colonel 
Barnardiston,  have  taken  place  between  General  Grierson  and  the 
Belgian  military  authorities  as  to  what  assistance  the  British  army 
might  be  able  to  afford  to  Belgium  should  one  of  her  neighbours 
violate  that  neutrality.  Some  notes  with  reference  to  the  subject  may 
exist  in  the  archives  at  Brussels. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  date  mentioned,  namely,  1906,  was  the 
year  following  that  in  which  Germany  had,  as  in  1911,  adopted  a 
threatening  attitude  towards  France  with  regard  to  Morocco,  and, 
in  view  of  the  apprehensions  existing  of  an  attack  on  France  through 
Belgium,  it  was  natural  that  possible  eventualities  should  be  discussed. 

The  impossibility  of  Belgium  having  been  a  party  to  any  agree- 
ment of  the  nature  indicated,  or  to  any  design  for  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality,  is  clearly  shown  by  the  reiterated  declarations 
that  she  has  made  for  many  years  past  that  she  would  resist  to  the 
utmost  any  violation  of  her  neutrality  from  whatever  quarter  and  in 
whatever  form  such  violation  might  come. 

It  is  worthy  of  attention  that  these  charges  of  aggressive  designs 
on  the  part  of  other  Powers  are  made  by  Germany,  who,  since  1906, 
has  established  an  elaborate  network  of  strategical  railways  leading 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  Belgian  frontier  through  a  barren  thinly-popu- 
lated tract,  deliberately  constructed  to  permit  of  the  sudden  attack 
upon  Belgium  which  was  carried  out  two  months  ago. 

No.  4 

Viscount  Haldane,  Lord  High  Chancellor,  to  Dr.  A.  E.  Shipley,  Master 
of  Christ's  College,  Cambridge. 

Dear  Master  of  Christ's,  November  14,  1914- 

The  enclosed  memoranda  have  been  specially  prepared  for  me  by 
the  Foreign  Office  in  answer  to  your  question. 

Yours  truly, 

(Signed)     Haldane. 


Enclosure  1 
Memorandum 

It  is  quite  untrue  that  the  British  Government  had  ever  arranged 
with  Belgium  to  trespass  on  her  country  in  case  of  war,  or  that  Belgium 
had  agreed  to  this.  The  strategic  dispositions  of  Germany,  especially 
as  regards  railways,  have  for  some  years  given  rise  to  the  apprehension 
that  Germany  would  attack  France  through  Belgium.     Whatever 


584  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

military  discussions  have  taken  place  before  this  war  have  been 
limited  entirely  to  the  suggestion  of  what  could  be  done  to  defend 
France  if  Germany  attacked  her  through  Belgium.  The  Germans 
have  stated  that  we  contemplated  sending  troops  to  Belgium.  We 
had  never  committed  ourselves  at  all  to  the  sending  of  troops  to  the 
Continent,  and  we  had  never  contemplated  the  possibility  of  sending 
troops  to  Belgium  to  attack  Germany.  The  Germans  have  stated 
that  British  military  stores  had  been  placed  at  Maubeuge,  a  French 
fortress  near  the  Belgian  frontier,  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
and  that  this  is  evidence  of  an  intention  to  attack  Germany  through 
Belgium.  No  British  soldiers  and  no  British  stores  were  landed  on 
the  Continent  till  after  Germany  had  invaded  Belgium,  and  Belgium 
had  appealed  to  France  and  England  for  assistance.  It  was  only 
after  this  appeal  that  British  troops  were  sent  to  France;  and,  if 
the  Germans  found  British  munitions  of  war  in  Maubeuge,  these 
munitions  were  sent  with  our  expedition  to  France  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  war.  The  idea  of  violating  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  never 
discussed  or  contemplated  by  the  British  Government. 

The  extract  enclosed,  which  is  taken  from  an  official  publication 
of  the  Belgian  Government,  and  the  extract  from  an  official  statement 
by  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War,  prove  that  the  Belgian  Government 
had  never  connived,  or  been  willing  to  connive,  at  a  breach  of  the 
Treaty  that  made  the  maintenance  of  Belgian  neutrality  an  inter- 
national obligation.  The  moment  that  there  appeared  to  be  danger 
that  this  Treaty  might  be  violated,  the  British  Government  made  an 
appeal  for  an  assurance  from  both  France  and  Germany,  as  had  been 
done  in  1870  by  Mr.  Gladstone,  that  neither  of  those  countries  would 
violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  if  the  other  country  respected  it. 
The  French  agreed,  the  Germans  declined  to  agree.  The  appeal  made 
by  the  British  Government  is  to  be  found  in  the  Parliamentary  White 
Paper  published  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  (see  No.  114  of  British 
Correspondence,  page  87).  The  reason  why  Germany  would  not 
agree  was  stated  very  frankly  by  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  German  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  our  Ambassador  in  Berlin ; 
and  it  is  recorded  in  the  second  White  Paper  (see  No.  160  of  British 
Correspondence,  page  110)  that  we  published.  The  attitude  of  the 
British  Government  throughout  has  been  to  endeavour  to  preserve 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  we  never  thought  of  sending  troops  to 
Belgium  until  Germany  had  invaded  it,  and  Belgium  had  appealed  for 
assistance  to  maintain  the  international  Treaty. 

We  have  known  for  some  years  past  that,  in  Holland,  in  Denmark, 
and  in  Norway,  the  Germans  have  inspired  the  apprehension  that, 
if  England  was  at  war  with  Germany,  England  would  violate  the 
neutrality  of  those  countries  and  seize  some  of  their  harbours.  This 
allegation  is  as  baseless  as  the  allegation  about  our  intention  to  violate 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  events  have  shown  it  to  be  so.  But 
it  seems  to  be  a  rule  with  Germany  to  attribute  to  others  the  designs 
that  she  herself  entertains;  as  it  is  clear  now  that,  for  some  long 
time  past,  it  has  been  a  settled  part  of  her  strategic  plans  to  attack 


The  Allied  Answer  to  the  "  Brussels  "  Documents         585 

France  through  Belgium.  A  statement  is  enclosed  which  was  issued 
by  us  on  October  14  last,  dealing  with  this  point. 

This  memorandum  and  its  enclosures  should  provide  ample  material 
for  a  reply  to  the  German  statements. 

Foreign  Office,  9th  November,  1914- 


Enclosure  2 
Despatch  No.  22  in  the  Belgian  Gray  Book. 


Enclosure  3 
Extract  from  "  The  Times''  of  30th  September,  1914. 

Neutrality  of  Belgium 
Official  Statement 

The  German  press  has  been  attempting  to  persuade  the  public  that 
if  Germany  herself  had  not  violated  Belgian  neutrality  France  or 
Great  Britain  would  have  done  so.  It  has  declared  that  French  and 
British  troops  had  marched  into  Belgium  before  the  outbreak  of  war. 
We  have  received  from  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War  an  official  state- 
ment which  denies  absolutely  these  allegations.  It  declares,  on  the 
one  hand,  that  "  before  August  3  not  a  single  French  soldier  had  set 
foot  on  Belgian  territory,"  and  again,  "it  is  untrue  that  on  August  4 
there  was  a  single  English  soldier  in  Belgium."     It  adds  :  — 

For  long  past  Great  Britain  knew  that  the  Belgian  army  would 
oppose  by  force  a  "preventive"  disembarkation  of  British  troops  in 
Belgium.  The  Belgian  Government  did  not  hesitate  at  the  time  of 
theAgadir  crises  to  warn  foreign  Ambassadors,  in  terms  which  could 
not  be  misunderstood,  of  its  formal  intention  to  compel  respect  for 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  every  means  at  its  disposal,  and  against 
attempts  upon  it  from  any  and  every  quarter. 


Enclosure  4 

Circular  Telegram  addressed  to  His  Britannic  Majesty's  Representatives 
abroad  on  the  14th  October,  1914- 

See  above  No.  3  of  "  The  Allied  Answer  to  the  Brussels  Documents." 


586  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

IV.  NEGOTIATIONS    OF    PRINCE    LICHNOWSKY    WITH 
SIR  EDWARD  GREY 

(Published  in  the  North  German  Gazette,  September  6,  1914) 

According  to  reports  to  hand,  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  in  the 
House  of  Commons  that  the  publication  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment of  the  German-English  exchange  of  telegrams  before  the  war 
was  incomplete.  Prince  Lichnowsky,  it  is  declared,  cancelled  by 
telegram  his  report  on  the  well-known  telephone  conversation  imme- 
diately he  was  informed  that  a  misunderstanding  existed.  This 
telegram,  it  is  asserted,  was  not  published.  The  Times,  appar- 
ently upon  information  from  official  sources,  made  the  same  asser- 
tion, adding  the  comment  that  the  telegram  had  been  suppressed 
by  the  German  Government  in  order  that  it  might  accuse  England 
of  perfidy  and  prove  Germany's  love  of  peace. 

In  answer  to  this  we  are  able  to  state  that  such  a  telegram  is  non- 
existent. Apart  from  the  telegram  already  published,  which  was 
dispatched  from  London  at  11  a.m..  Prince  Lichnowsky  on  August 
1st  sent  the  following  telegram : 

First,  at  1.15  p.m. 

"...  Sir  Edward  Grey's  private  secretary  has  just  been  to  see 
me  to  say  that  the  Minister  desired  to  make  proposals  to  me  regard- 
ing England's  neutrality,  even  for  the  event  that  we  should  go  to 
war  with  Russia  as  well  as  with  France.  I  shall  see  Sir  Edward 
Grey  this  afternoon,  and  shall  report  immediately." 

Second,  at  5.30  p.m. 

"  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  read  to  me  the  following  declaration, 
which  has  been  unanimously  framed  by  the  cabinet : 

" '  The  reply  of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  is  a  matter  of  very  great  regret,  because  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  does  affect  feeling  in  this  country.  If  Germany 
could  see  her  way  clear  to  give  the  same  positive  reply  as  that  which 
has  been  given  by  France,  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve 
anxiety  and  tension  here,  while  on  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a 
violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant  while  the 
other  respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public 
feeling  in  this  country.' 

"  In  answer  to  my  question  as  to  whether,  on  condition  that  we 
respected  the  Belgian  neutrality,  he  could  give  me  a  definite  declara- 
tion concerning  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  the  Minister  replied 
that  that  was  impossible  for  him  to  do,  but  that  this  question  would 
nevertheless  play  an  important  part  In  public  opinion  here.  If  we 
should  violate  the  Belgian  neutrality  in  a  war  with  France,  a  reversal 
of  sentiment  would  certainly  result  and  this  would  make  it  difficult 
for  the  Government  here  to  assume  a  friendly  neutrality.     For  the 


Negotiations  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  with  Sir  Edward  Grey     587 

present  there  was  not  the  slightest  intention  of  taking  hostile  action 
against  us.  It  would  be  the  desire  to  avoid  that  if  it  should  be  in 
any  way  possible.  It  would,  however,  be  difficult  to  draw  a  line 
marking  how  far  we  might  go  before  there  would  be  intervention 
from  here.  He  recurred  again  and  again  to  Belgian  neutrality  and 
expressed  the  opinion  that  this  question  would  play  an  important 
part  in  any  event.  He  had  wondered  whether  it  were  not  possible 
that  we  and  France  should  remain  armed  against  each  other  without 
attacking  each  other  in  case  of  a  Russian  war.  I  asked  him  whether 
he  was  in  a  position  to  declare  to  me  that  France  would  enter  into  a 
compact  to  that  effect.  Since  we  neither  desired  to  destroy  France 
nor  to  acquire  parts  of  her  territory,  I  was  able  to  believe  that  we 
could  enter  into  an  agreement  of  such  a  sort,  which  would  insure  us 
the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain. 

"  The  Minister  said  he  would  make  inquiries ;  he  did  not  overlook 
the  difficulties  of  holding  the  armies  of  both  sides  inactive." 

Third,  at  8.30  p.m.  : 

"My  report  made  early  to-day  is  cancelled  by  my  report  of  this 
evening.  Since  absolutely  no  positive  English  proposal  has  been 
submitted,  further  steps  along  the  line  of  the  instructions  given  me 
are  superfluous." 

As  will  be  observed,  these  telegrams  contain  no  sort  of  indication 
that  there  had  been  a  misunderstanding,  and  nothing  concerning 
the  assertion  made  from  the  English  side  of  a  clearing  up  of  the 
alleged  misunderstanding. 


588  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 


V.  DOCUMENTS  FOUND  IN  THE  POSSESSION  OF  MR. 
GRANT-WATSON,  SECRETARY  OF  THE  BRITISH 
LEGATION 

,  (Published  in  the  North  German  Gazette,  December  15th,  1914) 

New  and  important  proofs  have  been  found  of  the  Anglo-Belgian 
complicity.  Some  time  ago  Mr.  Grant- Watson,  the  Secretary  of  the 
British  Legation,  was  arrested  in  Brussels.  He  had  remained  at  the 
legation  quarters,  after  the  legation  had  been  transferred  to  Ant- 
werp and  later  to  Havre.  The  said  gentleman  was  recently  caught 
trying  to  do  away  with  some  documents,  which  he  had  carried  away 
unnoticed  from  the  legation  when  arrested.  An  examination  of  the 
papers  revealed  that  they  were  official  documents,  with  data  of  the 
most  intimate  character  concerning  the  Belgian  mobilisation  and 
the  defence  of  Antwerp,  dating  from  the  years  1913  and  1914.  They 
include  circular  orders  to  the  higher  Belgian  officers  in  command, 
bearing  the  signature  in  facsimile  of  the  Belgian  Minister  of  War 
and  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff,  and  also  a  note  concerning  a  con- 
ference of  the  "  Commission  de  la  base  d'approvisionnements  a  Anvers/* 
on  May  27th,  1913.  The  fact  that  these  papers  were  found  in  the 
British  Legation  shows  sufficiently  that  the  Belgian  Government 
had  no  military  secrets  to  hide  from  the  British  Government,  and 
that  both  governments,  with  regard  to  military  matters,  are  in  very 
close  touch  with  each  other. 

There  is  also  a  hand-written  note  of  special  interest  which  was 
found  among  the  papers  that  the  British  Secretary  endeavoured  to 
destroy.     It  follows : 

Renseignements  ^ 

1.  Les  officiers  fran^ais  ont  re9U  ordre  de  rejoindre  des  le  27, 
apres-midi. 

2.  Le  meme  jour  le  chef  de  Gare  de  Feignies  a  re^u  ordre  de  con- 
centrer  vers  Maubeuge  tous  les  wagons  fermes  disponible,  en  vue 
du  transport  de  troupes. 

Communique  par  la  Brigade  de  gendarmerie  de  Frameries. 

Feignies,  it  may  be  remarked,  is  a  railway  station  in  France  on 
the  road  from  Maubeuge  to  Mons,  about  three  kilometres  from  the 
Belgian  frontier ;  Frameries  is  on  the  same  line  in  Belgium,  ten  kilo- 
metres from  the  frontier. 

From  this  notice  it  must  be  gathered  that  France  had  already 
made  her  first  mobilisation  plans  on  July  27,  and  that  the  British 

1  Translation :  1.  The  French  officers  have  received  orders  to  join  the  colors  by 
the  27th  in  the  afternoon. 

2.  For  the  same  day  the  Superintendent  of  the  railway  station  of  Feignies  has  received 
orders  to  collect  in  the  direction  of  Maubeuge  all  available  closed  coaches,  with  a  view 
to  the  transport  of  troops. 


Documents  Found  in  the  Possession  of  Mr.  Grant-Watsmi     589 

Legation  immediately  received   information  thereof  from    Belgian 
sources. 

The  material  thus  discovered  furnishes  an  additional  and  valu- 
able proof  —  if  indeed  any  may  be  needed  —  of  the  relations  existing 
between  England  and  Belgimn.  It  shows  anew  that  Belgium  had 
sacrificed  her  own  neutrality  in  favor  of  the  Entente,  and  that  she 
was  an  active  member  of  the  coalition  which  had  been  formed  to 
fight  the  German  Empire.  For  England,  on  the  other  hand,  Bel- 
gian neutrality  really  was  nothing  but  a  "scrap  of  paper,''  to  which 
she  appealed  when  it  was  in  her  interest,  and  which  she  disregarded 
when  she  found  it  expedient  to  do  so.  It  is  obvious  that  the  British 
Government  made  use  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by  Ger- 
many only  as  a  pretext  to  justify  the  war  against  us  before  the  world 
and  before  the  British  people. 


590  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

VI.  TELEGRAMS  AND  LETTERS  EXCHANGED  BETWEEN 
THE  ROYAL  AND  IMPERIAL  COURTS  OF  LONDON, 
BERLIN,  AND  PETROGRAD,  AND  BETWEEN  KING 
GEORGE  AND   PRESIDENT  POINCARE 


Telegrams  Exchanged  between  His  Majesty  King  George  and 
His  Majesty  the  Czar 

(Published  in  the  British  Press  on  the  5th  August,  1914) 

No.  1 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan  {St.  Petersburgh) . 

Foreign  Office,  1st  August,  191^. 

You  should  at  once  apply  for  an  audience  with  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor,  and  convey  to  him  the  following  personal  message  from  the 
King:  — 

"My  Government  has  received  the  following  statement  from  the 
German  Government :  — 

" '  On  July  29  the  Russian  Emperor  requested  the  German  Emperor 
by  telegraph  to  mediate  between  Russia  and  Austria.  The  Emperor 
immediately  declared  his  readiness  to  do  so.  He  informed  the 
Russian  Emperor  of  this  by  telegraph,  and  took  the  required  action 
at  Vienna.  Without  waiting  for  the  result  of  this  action  Russia 
mobilised  against  Austria.  By  telegraph  the  German  Emperor 
pointed  out  to  the  Russian  Emperor  that  hereby  his  attempt  at  media- 
tion would  be  rendered  illusory.  The  Emperor  further  asked  the 
Russian  Emperor  to  suspend  the  military  operations  against  Austria. 
This,  however,  did  not  happen.  In  spite  of  this  the  German  Govern- 
ment continued  its  mediation  at  Vienna.  In  this  matter  the  German 
Government  have  gone  to  the  farthest  limit  of  what  can  be  suggested 
to  a  Sovereign  State  which  is  the  ally  of  Germany.  The  proposals 
made  by  the  German  Government  at  Vienna  were  conceived  entirely 
on  the  lines  suggested  by  Great  Britain,  and  the  German  Government 
recommended  them  at  Vienna  for  their  serious  consideration.  They 
were  taken  into  consideration  at  Vienna  this  morning.  During  the 
deliberations  of  the  ( ?Austrian)  Cabinet,  and  before  they  were  con- 
cluded, the  German  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  reported  the 
mobilisation  of  the  entire  Russian  army  and  fleet.  Owing  to  this 
action  on  the  part  of  Russia  the  Austrian  answer  to  the  German 
proposals  for  mediation,  which  were  still  under  consideration,  was 
not  given.  This  action  on  the  part  of  Russia  is  also  directed  against 
Germany  —  that  is  to  say,  the  Power  whose  mediation  had  been  in- 
voked by  the  Russian  Emperor.  We  were  bound  to  reply  with  serious 
counter  measures  to  this  action,  which  we  were  obUged  to  consider 
as  hostile,  unless  we  were  prepared  to  endanger  the  safety  of  our 


Royal  and  Imperial  Telegrams  and  Letters  591 

country.  We  are  unable  to  remain  inactive  in  face  of  the  Russian 
mobilisation  on  our  frontier.  We  have  therefore  informed  Russia  that 
unless  she  were  prepared  to  suspend  within  twelve  hours  the  warlike 
measure  against  Germany  and  Austria,  we  should  be  obliged  to 
mobilise,  and  this  would  mean  war.  We  have  asked  France  if  she 
would  remain  neutral  during  a  German-Russian  war.' 

"I  cannot  help  thinking  that  some  misunderstanding  has  pro- 
duced this  deadlock.  I  am  most  anxious  not  to  miss  any  possibility 
of  avoiding  the  terrible  calamity  which  at  present  threatens  the 
whole  world.  I  therefore  make  a  personal  appeal  to  you  to  remove 
the  misapprehension  which  I  feel  must  have  occurred,  and  to  leave 
still  open  grounds  for  negotiation*  and  possible  peace.  If  you  think 
I  can  in  any  way  contribute  to  that  all-important  purpose,  I  will  do 
everything  in  my  power  to  assist  in  reopening  the  interrupted  con- 
versations between  the  Powers  concerned.  I  feel  confident  that  you 
are  as  anxious  as  I  am  that  all  that  is  possible  should  be  done  to 
secure  the  peace  of  the  world." 


No.  2 
His  Majesty  the  Czar  to  His  Majesty  King  George, 

1st  August,  1914.' 

I  would  gladly  have  accepted  your  proposals  had  not  German 
Ambassador  this  afternoon  presented  a  note  to  my  Government 
declaring  war.  Ever  since  presentation  of  the  ultimatum  at  Belgrade, 
Russia  has  devoted  all  her  efforts  to  finding  some  pacific  solution  of 
the  question  raised  by  Austria's  action.  Object  of  that  action  was 
to  crush  Servia  and  make  her  a  vassal  of  Austria.  Effect  of  this 
would  have  been  to  upset  balance  of  power  in  Balkans,  which  is  of 
such  vital  interest  to  my  Empire.  Every  proposal,  including  that  of 
your  Government,  was  rejected  by  Germany  and  Austria,  and  it  was 
only  when  favourable  moment  for  bringing  pressure  to  bear  on  Austria 
had  passed  that  Germany  showed  any  disposition  to  mediate.  Even 
then  she  did  not  put  forward  any  precise  proposal.  Austria's  declara- 
tion of  war  on  Servia  forced  me  to  order  a  partial  mobilisation,  though, 
in  view  of  threatening  situation,  my  military  advisers  strongly  advised 
a  general  mobilisation  owing  to  quickness  with  which  Germany  can 
mobilise  in  comparison  with  Russia.  I  was  eventually  compelled  to 
take  this  course  in  consequence  of  complete  Austrian  mobilisation, 
of  the  bombardment  of  Belgrade,  of  concentration  of  Austrian  troops 
in  Galicia,  and  of  secret  military  preparations  being  made  in  Ger- 
many. That  I  was  justified  in  doing  so  is  proved  by  Germany's 
sudden  declaration  of  war,  which  was  quite  unexpected  by  me,  as 
I  have  given  most  categorical  assurances  to  the  Emperor  William 
that  my  troops  would  not  move  so  long  as  mediation  negotiations 
continued. 

In  this  solemn  hour  I  wish  to  assure  you  once  more  that  I  have 


592  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

done  all  in  my  power  to  avert  war.  Now  that  it  has  been  forced  on 
me,  I  trust  your  country  will  not  fail  to  support  France  and  Russia. 
God  bless  and  protect  you. 

II 

Telegrams  Exchanged  between  London  and  Berlin,  30th  July- 

2nd  August,  1914 

(Published   in   the  Norddeutsche  AUgemeine   Zeitung   of   the   20th 

August,  1914) 

No.  1 

His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  to  His  Majesty  King 
George,  dated  30th  July,  191  Jj.. 

I  ARRIVED  here  yesterday  and  have  communicated  what  you  were 
so  good  as  to  say  to  me  at  Buckingham  Palace  last  Sunday  to  William, 
who  was  very  thankful  to  receive  your  message. 

William,  who  is  very  anxious,  is  doing  his  utmost  to  comply  with 
the  request  of  Nicholas  to  work  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  He  is 
in  continual  telegraphic  communication  with  Nicholas,  who  has 
to-day  confirmed  the  news  that  he  has  ordered  military  measures 
which  amount  to  mobilisation,  and  that  these  measures  were  taken 
five  days  ago. 

We  have  also  received  information  that  France  is  making  military 
preparations  while  we  have  not  taken  measures  of  any  kind,  but 
may  be  obliged  to  do  so  at  any  moment  if  our  neighbours  continue 
their  preparations.     This  would  then  mean  a  European  war. 

If  you  seriously  and  earnestly  desire  to  prevent  this  terrible  mis- 
fortune, may  I  propose  to  you  to  use  your  influence  on  France  and 
also  on  Russia  that  they  should  remain  neutral.  In  my  view  this 
would  be  of  the  greatest  use.  I  consider  that  this  is  a  certain  and, 
perhaps,  the  only  possible  way  of  maintaining  the  peace  of  Europe. 
I  might  add  that  Germany  and  England  should  now  more  than  ever 
give  each  other  mutual  support  in  order  to  prevent  a  terrible  disaster, 
which  otherwise  appears  inevitable. 

Believe  me  that  William  is  inspired  by  the  greatest  sincerity  in 
his  efforts  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  But  the  military  prepara- 
tions of  his  two  neighbours  may  end  in  compelling  him  to  follow  their 
example  for  the  safety  of  his  own  country,  which  otherwise  would 
remain  defenceless.  I  have  informed  William  of  my  telegram  to 
you,  and  I  hope  that  you  will  receive  my  communication  in  the  same 
friendly  spirit  which  has  inspired  it. 

(Signed)     Henry. 


No.  2 

His  Majesty  King  George  to  His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Henry  of 
Prussia,  dated  30th  July,  1914. 
Thanks  for  your  telegram.     I  am  very  glad  to  hear  of  William's 
efforts  to  act  with  Nicholas  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.     I  earnestly 


Royal  and  Imperial  Telegrams  and  Letters  593 

desire  that  such  a  misfortune  as  a  European  war  —  the  evil  of  which 
could  not  be  remedied  —  may  be  prevented.  My  Government  is 
doing  the  utmost  possible  in  order  to  induce  Russia  and  France  to 
postpone  further  military  preparations,  provided  that  Austria  declares 
herself  satisfied  with  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  and  the  neighbouring 
Servian  territory  as  a  pledge  for  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  her 
demands,  while  at  the  same  time  the  other  countries  suspend  their 
preparations  for  war.  I  rely  on  William  applying  his  great  influence 
in  order  to  induce  Austria  to  accept  this  proposal.  In  this  way  he 
will  prove  that  Germany  and  England  are  working  together  to 
prevent  what  would  be  an  international  catastrophe.  Please  assure 
William  that  I  am  doing  all  I  can,  and  will  continue  to  do  all  that 
lies  in  my  power,  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Europe. 

(Signed)     George. 


No.  3 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  William  to  His  Majesty  King  George,  dated 
31st  July,  1914. 
Many  thanks  for  your  friendly  communication.  Your  proposals 
coincide  with  my  ideas  and  with  the  communication  which  I  have  this 
evening  received  from  Vienna,  and  which  I  have  passed  on  to  London. 
I  have  just  heard  from  the  Chancellor  that  intelligence  has  just 
reached  him  that  Nicholas  this  evening  has  ordered  the  mobilisation 
of  his  entire  army  and  fleet.  He  has  not  even  awaited  the  result  of 
the  mediation  in  which  I  am  engaged,  and  he  has  left  me  completely 
without  information.  I  am  travelling  to  Berlin  to  assure  the  safety 
of  my  eastern  frontier,  where  strong  Russian  forces  have  already 
taken  up  their  position.  (gigged)     William. 


No.  4 

His  Majesty  King  George  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  William,  dated 
1st  August,  1914-' 
Many  thanks  for  your  telegram  of  last  night.  I  have  sent  an 
urgent  telegram  ^  to  Nicholas,  in  which  I  have  assured  him  of  my 
readiness  to  do  everything  in  my  power  to  further  the  resumption  of 
the  negotiations  between  the  powers  concerned. 

(Signed)     George. 


No.  5 

German  Ambassador  at  London  to  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor, 

dated  1st  August,  1914- 
'  Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  called  me  to  the  telephone  and  has 
asked  me  whether  I  thought  I  could  declare  that  in  the  event  of 

1  See  page  590. 
2q 


594  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

France  remaining  neutral  in  a  German-Russian  war  we  would  not 
attack  the  French.  I  told  him  that  I  believed  that  I  could  assume 
responsibility  for  this.  (Signed)     Lichnowsky. 


No.  6 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  William  to  His  Majesty  King  George,  dated 
1st  August,  1914' 

I  HAVE  just  received  the  communication  of  your  Government 
offering  French  neutrality  under  the  guarantee  of  Great  Britain. 
To  this  offer  there  was  added  the  question  whether,  under  these 
conditions,  Germany  would  refrain  from  attacking  France.  For 
technical  reasons  the  mobilisation  which  I  have  already  ordered  this 
afternoon  on  two  fronts  —  east  and  west  —  must  proceed  according  to 
the  arrangements  made.  A  counter  order  cannot  now  be  given,  as 
your  telegram  unfortunately  came  too  late,  but  if  France  offers  me 
her  neutrality,  which  must  be  guaranteed  by  the  English  army  and 
navy,  I  will  naturally  give  up  the  idea  of  an  attack  on  France  and 
employ  my  troops  elsewhere.  I  hope  that  France  will  not  be  nervous. 
The  troops  on  my  frontier  are  at  this  moment  being  kept  back  by 
telegraph  and  by  telephone  from  crossing  the  French  frontier. 

(Signed)    William. 


No.  7 

German  Imperial  Chancellor  to  the  German  Ambassador  at  London, 
dated  1st  August,  1914- 

Germany  is  ready  to  agree  to  the  English  proposal  in  the  event  of 
England  guaranteeing  with  all  her  forces  the  unconditional  neutrality 
of  France  in  the  conflict  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Owing  to 
the  Russian  challenge  German  mobilisation  occurred  to-day  before 
the  English  proposals  were  received.  In  consequence  our  advance 
to  the  French  frontier  cannot  now  be  altered.  We  guarantee,  how- 
ever, that  the  French  frontier  will  not  be  crossed  by  our  troops  until 
Monday,  the  3rd  of  August,  at  seven  p.m.,  in  case  England's  assent  is 
received  by  that  time.  (gjg^^d)    Bethmann-Hollweg. 


No.  8 

His  Majesty  King  George  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  William,  dated 
1st  AugvM,  1914- 

In  answer  to  your  telegram,  which  has  just  been  received,  I  be- 
lieve that  there  must  be  a  misunderstanding  with  regard  to  a  sugges- 
tion which  was  made  in  a  friendly  conversation  between  Prince 
Lichnowsky  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  when  they  were  discussing  how 


Royal  and  Imperial  Telegrams  and  Letters  595 

an  actual  conflict  between  the  German  and  the  French  army  might 
be  avoided,  so  long  as  there  is  still  a  possibility  of  an  agreement  being 
arrived  at  between  Austria  and  Russia.  Sir  Edward  Grey  will  see 
Prince  Lichnowsky  early  to-morrow  morning  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  there  is  any  misunderstanding  on  his  side. 

(Signed)     George. 


No.  9 

German  Ambassador  at  London  to  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor^ 
dated  2nd  August j  1914- 

The  suggestions  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  based  on  the  desire  of  creat- 
ing the  possibility  of  lasting  neutrality  on  the  part  of  England,  were 
made  without  any  previous  inquiry  of  France  and  w^ithout  knowledge 
of  the  mobilisation,  and  have  since  been  given  up  as  quite  imprac- 
ticable. 

(Signed)    Lichnowsky. 


Ill 

Telegrams  from  the  German  Ambassador  at  London  to  the 
German  Imperial  Chancellor,  1st  August,  1914 

(Published    in   the    Norddeutsche   Allgemeine    Zeitung   of   the    6th 

September,  1914) 

No.  1 

1st  August,  1.15  p.m. 
.  .  .  Sir  Edward  Grey's  Private  Secretary  has  just  been  to  see 
me  in  order  to  say  that  the  Minister  wishes  to  make  proposals  to  me 
for  the  neutrality  of  England,  even  in  the  case  that  we  had  war  with 
Russia  and  France.  I  see  Sir  Edward  Grey  this  afternoon  and  will 
communicate  at  once. 


No.  2 

1st  August,  5.30  p.m. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  has  just  read  to  me  the  following  declaration 
which  has  been  unanimously  adopted  by  the  Cabinet :  — 

"  The  reply  of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  is  a  matter  of  very  great  regret,  because  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  does  affect  feeling  in  this  country.  If  Germany  could  see 
her  w^ay  to  give  the  same  positive  reply  as  that  which  has  been  given 
by  France,  it  would  materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and 
tension  here,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant  while  the  other  respected  it, 


596  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this  coun- 

On  my  question  whether,  on  condition  that  we  would  maintain 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  he  could  give  me  a  definite  declaration 
with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  the  Minister  answered 
that  that  was  impossible,  but  that  this  question  would  play  a  great 
part  in  public  opinion  in  this  country.  If  we  violated  Belgian  neutral- 
ity in  a  war  with  France  there  would  certainly  be  a  change  in  public 
opinion  which  would  make  it  difficult  for  the  Cabinet  here  to  maintain 
friendly  neutrality.  For  the  time  there  was  not  the  slightest  intention 
to  proceed  in  a  hostile  manner  against  us.  It  would  be  their  desire 
to  avoid  this  if  there  was  any  possibility  of  doing  so.  It  was, 
however,  difficult  to  draw  a  line  up  to  which  we  could  go  without 
intervention  on  this  side.  He  turned  again  and  again  to  Belgian 
neutrality,  and  was  of  opinion  that  this  question  would  also  play  a 
great  part. 

He  had  also  thought  whether  it  was  not  possible  that  we  and  France 
should,  in  case  of  a  Russian  war,  stand  armed  opposite  to  one  another 
without  attacking.  I  asked  him  if  he  would  be  in  a  position  to  arrange 
that  France  would  assent  to  an  agreement  of  this  kind.  As  we 
wanted  neither  to  destroy  France  nor  to  annex  portions  of  French 
territory,  I  could  think  that  we  w^ould  give  our  assent  to  an  arrange- 
ment of  this  kind  which  would  secure  for  us  the  neutrality  of  Great 
Britain.  The  Minister  said  he  would  make  inquiries ;  he  also  recog- 
nised the  difficulties  of  holding  back  the  military  on  both  sides. 


No.  3 

1st  August,  8.30  p.m. 

My  communication  of  this  morning  is  cancelled  by  my  communica- 
tion of  this  evening.  As  there  is  no  positive  English  proposal  before 
us,  any  further  step  in  the  sense  of  the  message  I  sent  is  superfluous. 

IV 

Telegram  from  His  Majesty  the  Czar  to  His  Majesty  the 

Emperor  William 

(Published  in  the  Russian  Press  on  the  31st  January,  1915) 

29th  July,  1914. 

Thanks  for  your  telegram,^  which  is  conciliatory  and  friendly, 
whereas  the  official  message  presented  to-day  by  your  Ambassador 
to  my  Minister  was  conveyed  in  a  very  different  tone.  I  beg  you  to 
explain  this  divergency.  It  would  be  right  to  give  over  the  Austro- 
Serbian  problem  to  The  Hague  Tribunal.  I  trust  in  your  wisdom 
and  friendship. 

1  German  White  Book,  No.  20. 


Royal  and  Imperial  Telegrams  and  Letters  597 


Letters  exchanged  between  His  Majesty  King  George  and 
THE  President  of  the  French  Republic 

(Published  in  the  British  Press  on  the  20th  February,  1915) 

No.  1 
The  President  of  the  French  Republic  to  His  Majesty  King  George. 
Dear  and  Great  Friend,  Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

In  the  grave  events  through  which  Europe  is  passing,  I  feel  bound 
to  convey  to  your  Majesty  the  information  which  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  have  received  from  Germany.  The  military  prepara- 
tions which  are  being  undertaken  by  the  Imperial  Government, 
especially  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of  the  French  frontier,  are 
being  pushed  forward  every  day  with  fresh  vigour  and  speed.  France, 
resolved  to  continue  to  the  very  end  to  do  all  that  lies  within  her 
power  to  maintain  peace,  has,  up  to  the  present,  confined  herself  solely 
to  the  most  indispensable  precautionary  measures.  But  it  does  not 
appear  that  her  prudence  and  moderation  serve  to  check  Germany's 
action ;  indeed,  quite  the  reverse.  We  are,  perhaps,  then,  in  spite  of 
the  moderation  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic  and  the  calm  of 
public  opinion,  on  the  eve  of  the  most  terrible  events. 

From  all  the  information  which  reaches  us  it  would  seem  that  war 
would  be  inevitable  if  Germany  were  convinced  that  the  British 
Government  would  not  intervene  in  a  conflict  in  which  France  might 
be  engaged ;  if,  on  the  other  hand,  Germany  were  convinced  that  the 
entente  cordiale  would  be  affirmed,  in  case  of  need,  even  to  the  extent 
of  taking  the  field  side  by  side,  there  would  be  the  greatest  chance 
that  peace  would  remain  unbroken. 

It  is  true  that  our  military  and  naval  arrangements  leave  complete 
liberty  to  your  Majesty's  Government,  and  that,  in  the  letters  ex- 
changed in  1912  ^  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  M.  Paul  Cambon, 
Great  Britain  and  France  entered  into  nothing  more  than  a  mutual 
agreement  to  consult  one  another  in  the  event  of  European  tension, 
and  to  examine  in  concert  whether  common  action  were  advisable. 

But  the  character  of  close  friendship  which  public  feeling  has  given 
in  both  countries  to  the  entente  between  Great  Britain  and  France, 
the  confidence  with  which  our  two  Governments  have  never  ceased  to 
work  for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  the  signs  of  sympathy  which 
your  Majesty  has  ever  shown  to  France,  justify  me  in  informing  you 
quite  frankly  of  my  impressions,  which  are  those  of  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  and  of  all  France. 

It  is,  I  consider,  on  the  language  and  the  action  of  the  British 
Government  that  henceforward  the  last  chances  of  a  peaceful  settle- 
ment depend. 

We,  ourselves,  from  the  initial  stages  of  the  crisis,  have  enjoined 
upon  our  Ally  an  attitude  of  moderation  from  which  they  have  not 

1  See  pp.  337  f .,  and  Facsimile  of  British  Blue  Book,  pp.  90  f. 


598  Official  Diplomatic  Documents 

swerved.  In  concert  with  Your  Majesty's  Government,  and  in  con- 
formity with  Sir  E.  Grey's  latest  suggestions,  we  will  continue  to  act 
on  the  same  lines. 

But  if  all  efforts  at  conciliation  emanate  from  one  side,  and  if 
Germany  and  Austria  can  speculate  on  the  abstention  of  Great 
Britain,  Austria's  demands  will  remain  inflexible,  and  an  agreement 
between  her  and  Russia  will  become  impossible.  I  am  profoundly 
convinced  that  at  the  present  moment,  the  more  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia  can  give  a  deep  impression  that  they  are  united  in  their 
diplomatic  action,  the  more  possible  will  it  be  to  count  upon  the 
preservation  of  peace. 

I  beg  that  your  Majesty  will  excuse  a  step  which  is  only  inspired 
by  the  hope  of  seeing  the  European  balance  of  power  definitely  re- 
affirmed. 

Pray  accept  the  expression  of  my  most  cordial  sentiments. 

R.    PO  INC  ARE. 


No.  2 
His  Majesty  King  George  to  the  President  of  the  French  Republic. 
Dear  and  Great  Friend,  Buckingham  Palace,  August  1,  1914- 

I  MOST  highly  appreciate  the  sentiments  which  moved  you  to  write 
to  me  in  so  cordial  and  friendly  a  spirit,  and  I  am  grateful  to  you  for 
having  stated  your  views  so  fully  and  frankly. 

You  may  be  assured  that  the  present  situation  in  Europe  has  been 
the  cause  of  much  anxiety  and  preoccupation  to  me,  and  I  am  glad 
to  think  that  our  two  Governments  have  worked  so  amicably  together 
in  endeavouring  to  find  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  questions  at  issue. 

It  would  a  be  a  source  of  real  satisfaction  to  me  if  our  united  efforts 
were  to  meet  with  success,  and  I  am  still  not  without  hope  that  the 
terrible  events  which  seem  so  near  may  be  averted. 

I  admire  the  restraint  which  you  and  your  Government  are  exercis- 
ing in  refraining  from  taking  undue  military  measures  on  the  frontier 
and  not  adopting  an  attitude  which  could  in  any  wise  be  interpreted 
as  a  provocative  one. 

I  am  personally  using  my  best  endeavours  with  the  Emperors  of 
Russia  and  of  Germany  towards  finding  some  solution  by  which  actual 
military  operations  may  at  any  rate  be  postponed,  and  time  be  thus 
given  for  calm  discussion  between  the  Powers.  I  intend  to  prosecute 
these  efforts  without  intermission  so  long  as  any  hope  remains  of  an 
amicable  settlement. 

As  to  the  attitude  of  my  country,  events  are  changing  so  rapidly 

that  it  is  difficult  to  forecast  future  developments;   but  you  may 

be  assured  that  my  Government  will  continue  to  discuss  freely  and 

frankly  any  point  which  might  arise  of  interest  to  our  two  nations 

with  M.  Cambon.  t>  t 

Uelieve  me, 

M.  le  President, 

(Signed)     George  R.  I. 


INDEX 


Africa, 

British  Attacks  on  German  Territory, 

506. 
C»ngo.     See  that  Title. 
German  Offensive  against  British  Cen- 
tral   African    Protectorate,    506, 
509. 
Great  Britain  declines  proposal  not  to 
carry  war  into  Africa,  506. 
Alsace-Lorraine, 

Inhabitants  forbidden  to  cross  frontier, 
325. 
Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium  — 

War  declared  with,  507,  509. 
Belgian  Reply,  510. 
British  Ambassador  — 

Comments  on  events  from  22  July, 

514. 
Final  Interview  with  Count  Berch- 
told,  520. 
British  relations  with,  432,  468. 

War  declared  by  Great  Britain,  498. 
Communications  with   Representatives 
at  — 
Belgrade,  2,  3,  36,  40,  141,  241. 
Berlin,   51,    101,    180,   203,   241,   246, 

247,  278,  280,  400,  507,  508. 
Constantinople,  51,  101. 
London,  12,  51,  57,  65,  66,   101,  180, 
203,  243,  244,  276,  345,  432,  468, 
496,  498. 
Nish,  14. 
Paris,  12,  67,  68,  51,  180,   203,  276, 

277,  347,  484,  490,  491. 
Rome,  51,  101,  180,  203,  276. 
St.  Petersburgh,  51,  68,  69,  71,  101, 
141,    145,    148,    179,    180,    202, 
203,  243,  276,  278,  280,  318,  345, 
346,  347,  373,  459. 
Semlin,  142. 
Tokio,  241,  508. 
Uskub,  6. 

Vienna,  140,  346,  506. 
General  Mobilization  of  Army  and  Fleet, 

197,  272,  356,  391. 
Japan  —  Relations  broken  off,  508. 
Mediation  proposals.  Attitude  towards, 
68,    142,    484,    490,-252,    287, 
329,  392,   393,   394,-302,   385, 
386,-237,   270,   274,  310,  312. 
Military  Preparations,  285. 
Notification    to    Powers    of    Great-Ser- 
bian   propaganda    and    its    con- 
nection with  the  Serajevo  mur- 
der, 101. 
Notification  of  state  of  war  with  Servia, 
276. 


Austria-Hungary  —  CorU. 
Russia,  Relations  with  — 

Direct   Conversations,    proposals   for 
mediation    &c.,    277,    301,    302, 
310,  336,  347,  363. 
Refusal  by  Austria  of   Russian  sug- 
gestions, 297,  309,  328. 
German  efforts  to  prevent  danger,  297. 
Mediation    proposals.     See    that    Sub- 
head, above. 
Russia  will   stop  military  preparations 
only    upon    certain    conditions, 
331,  333. 
Russia's  threatening  attitude   leads   to 

war,  459. 
War  declared  by  Austria,  459. 
Sandjak,  no  intentions  to  advance  into 

or  occupy  the,  385,  389. 
Serbia,  Relations  with  — 

Austrian  Attitude,  19,  85,  329,  —  67, 
68,  69,  140,  180,  277,  373,  484, 
—  34,  56,  61,  86,  87,  89,  90,  92, 
93,  160,  161,  163,  164,  165,  166, 
168,  192,  —  77,  82,  153. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  proposals. 
Austrian  Dossier  sent  to  the  Powers, 

101. 
Austrian    Intentions,    85,    329,    385, 

389,  —  218,  302. 
Austrian  official  reports    as    to  Ser- 
bian  feelings    towards    Austria, 
2,  3,  6,  14,  36. 
British  Attitude,   164,  165,   174,   192, 
193,    194,    195,    196,    226,    265, 
268,  332,  359. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
French  Attitude  and  French  Reports 
of  Events  from  Date  of  Serajevo 
Murder  to  Austria's  Declaration 
of  War,  1,  8,  12,  15,  19,  23,  29, 
38,   39,   53,   54,    58,    59,   74,  77, 
78,    80,    81,    82,    83,    84,     149, 
150,  151,  152,  153,  154,  155,  156, 
157,    158,    181,    183,    184,    185, 
186,    187,    190,    213,    215,    216, 
217,    218,    219,    220,    221,    222, 
224,  (247),  286. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
German  Attitude,   39,   53,   54,   59,   78, 
80,    81,    90,    92,    97,    151,    153, 
155,  157,  181,  186,  187,  213,  215, 
226,    254,    255,    256,    257,    283, 
293,  327,  328,  551. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
Localization   of   the    Dispute,    German 
View  and  Efforts,     35,     56,     78, 
91,  159,  194,  226,  256,  257,  552, 
553,  554. 


599 


600 


Index 


Austria-Hungary  —  Cont. 

Mediation  Proposals,  See  separate  Title. 

Military  action  not  intended  by  Austria, 
153,  167. 

Military  Operations  not  to  be  under- 
taken immediately,  166,  167. 

Non-interference  by  other  Powers  — 
German  View  and  Efforts.  See 
Subheading :  Localization  of  the 
Dispute,  above. 

Narodna  Odbrana,   101. 

Narodna  Odbrana,  Extract  from  (1911), 
116. 

Narodna  Odbrana  Society  — 

Confidential  Reports  of  the  — ,  130. 
Nish  Local  Committee  — ,  Attitude  on 

Serajevo  Murders,  138. 
Organization  and  Work  of,  101. 
Servian  Official  Gazette  in  the  Service 

of  the  — ,  123. 
Work     of  — ,  Deposition    by    Trifko 
Krstanovio,  124. 

Occupation  of  Belgrade  or  other  Towns 
as  a  Basis  for  Negotiations,  332, 
335,  353. 

Russian  Attitude,  191,  225,  328,  358, 
—  71,  179,  202,  243,  246,  278, 
280,  347,  373,-87,  89,  161, 
193,  228,  261,  193,  228,  261, 
367,  —  15,  54,  58,  74,  82,  83, 
84,  152,  153,  154,  155,  156, 
181,  184,  185,  217. 

See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 

Serbia's  alleged  willingness  to  enter- 
tain Austrian  requirements,  pro- 
vided that  only  judicial  coopera- 
tion is  asked,  38. 

Serbian  Attitude,  14,  51,  53,  54,  58,  78, 
180. 

Serbia's  General  Mobilization  before 
delivery  of  answer  to  Austrian 
Note,  180. 

Serbian  Note  of  1908,  65,  262. 

Serbian  Press,  opinions  of,  prior  to  the 
Serajevo  Murders,  112. 

Serbian  Press  on  the  Assassination,  135. 

Serbian  sovereign  rights,  no  infraction 
of  — ,  395. 

Serbian  Territory  not  to  be  seized,  69, 
190,  203,  308,  309,  385,  395. 

Serbian  War  Office  —  Pictures  of  a  nature 
hostile  to  Dual  Monarchy,  140. 

Situation  before  Presentation  of  Ulti- 
matum of  23  July,  2,  3,  6. 

Sokol  Society  Dusan  the  Strong  — 
Report  of  the  activities  of,  in  Kragu- 
jevac  (1912-13),  121. 

Special  Points  for  Great  Britain,  243. 

Telegrams  between  French  and  Russian 
Representatives  delayed,  236. 

Turkish  Views,  217. 

Ultimatum  of  23  July,  63,  64,  75,  78, 
84,  86,  97,  99,  158. 
Austrian  Commentary,  523. 
Austrian  Statement  that   Note  is  not 
an  Ultimatum,  but  a  Demarche 
with  a  time-limit,  65,  150,  160. 


Austria- Hungary  —  Cont. 
Ultimatum  —  Cont. 

Austro-Hungarian  Views,  86,   89. 
British  Attitude,  86,  91,   92,  93,  162, 

165,  —  66. 
French   Attitude  and  Views,  67,  87, 

91,  160,  161. 
Germany  had  no  knowledge,  39,  53, 
75,  82,   149,   154,   163,   165,   173, 
174,  187,  189,  250. 
Germany  approves  Austrian  point   of 

view,  173,  174. 
Italian  Views,  267. 

Point  5 — ,  Austrian  Explanation,  146. 
Redrafting  of  certain  Articles  proposed 
by  Russia,  197. 
German  Attitude,  237. 
Russian  Attitude  and  Views,  87,  89, 

94,  161,  171,  228,  261,  367. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
Serbian  Reply,  142,  156,  157,  158,  175, 

180,  243. 
Austrian  Commentaries,  529. 
Austrian  Views,  221,  251. 
British  Views,  227,  229,  231. 
German  Views,  192,  193,  194. 
Non-publication  of,  in  German  Press, 

272. 
Refusal  of  Austria-Hungary  to  accept, 

174,  231,  241. 
Russian  Views,  235. 
Special  Points  to  be  brought    before 

Great  Britain,  57,  65. 
Time  Chosen  for  Presentation,  signif- 
icance of,  36,  149. 
Time  Limit  — 
Dangers  of,  62. 

Proposals  for  Extension,   152,   153, 
154,  155,  156,  158,  170,  171,  172, 
181. 
Austrian  Refusal,  140,  141. 
British  Attitude,  93. 
German  Views,  163, 
Italian  Views,   196. 
Russian  Views,  66,  145,  243. 
Unconditional  acceptance  demanded, 
164. 
War  declared  by  Austria-Hungary,  181, 
231,  241,  247,  268,  273,  296. 
Belgium, 

Agreement  for  Joint  Action  to  Resist 

Germany,  462,  463. 
Appeal  to  Great  Britain,    France  and 

Russia,  441,  442,  460. 
Austria  declares  War,  507,  509. 

Belgian  Reply,  510. 
Communications  with    Representatives 
at  — 
Belgrade,  149. 
Berlin,  72,  212,   281,  348,  349,  374, 

375,  401,  422,  436,  462. 
Hague,  148,  281,  375,  422,  434,  490, 

492,  494,  498,  499,  509,  510. 
London,  72,  281,  348,  349,  373,  374, 
375,  401,  422,  424,  435,  437,  438, 
439,    441,    460,    463,    483.    495, 
505,  512. 


Index 


601 


Belgium  —  Cont. 

Communications    with  Representatives 
at  —  Cont. 
Luxemburg,  148,  281,  375. 
Madrid,  436,  462,  463. 
Paris,   72,    281,    348,    349,    374,    375, 
401,    422,    435,    439,    460,    462, 
463,  483,  484,  491,  495,  500. 
Rome,  148,  281,  375. 
St.  Petersburgh,  72,  281,  375,  401,  422, 

439,  460,  463,  495. 
Vienna,  72,  247,  281,  375,  401,  422. 
Congo.     See  that  Title. 
Despatch    to    Representatives    Abroad 
for  Presentation  to  the  respective 
Governments,  461. 
Documents  of  Secret  Military  Arrange- 
ments    between     Great     Britain 
and  Belgium,    577. 
French   Offer   of   Support   and   Belgian 

Reply,  422,  425,  430. 
German  Assurance  that  Territory  would 

not  be  annexed,  457. 
German  Minister,  Departure  of,  435, 436. 
German      Minister's    ♦'Notification      to 
Belgian     Foreign     Secretary     of 
Breaches    of    International    Law 
by  France,  420. 
German  Proposal  to,  after  Fall  of  Liege, 
490,  492,  494,  498. 
Belgian  Reply,  494,  499. 
British  Approval  of  Reply,  497. 
French  Approval,  497. 
Russian  Approval,  499. 
German    Request    of    Free  Passage    of 
Troops    through,  —  Belgian    Re- 
fusal and  British  Protest,  455. 
German    Ultimatum    and    Reply,    402, 

421,  424. 

Germany  declares  War,  452. 

Germany  discovers  Documents  of  Secret 

Military  Arrangements  between 

Great  Britain  and  Belgium,  577. 

Great  Britain,  Relations  with,  previous 

to  the  Outbreak  of  War,  577. 
Hostile  Acts  against  Germany,  387. 

Belgian  Reply,  512. 
Integrity  of  — ,  German  Attitude,  303, 

357.     British  Attitude,  456. 
Interests  in  Germany  entrusted  to  Span- 
ish Ambassador,  436,  462,  463. 
King  Albert's  Appeal  to  King  George, 

423,  455. 
Military  Arrangements  between  Great 

Britain  and  Belgium,  677-680. 
Military  Preparations,  72,  283,  281,  442. 
Minister  at  Luxemburg,  495. 
Minister  leaves  Berlin,  462. 
Mobilization  ordered,  348. 
Neutrality  of  — 

Belgian  Request  for  Assurance  from 

Germany,  401. 
British  Action  in  case  of  Violation, 
406,  415,  424,  434,  438,  441,  456, 
460,  595. 
British  Inquiry  to  Belgium,  351,  365, 
366,  457. 


Belgium  —  Cont. 

Neutrality  of  —  Cont. 

French    Reply,    221,    358,    373,    374, 

378,  389. 
German    Reply    (Refusal)    374,    378, 
381,  387,  388,  397,  457. 
French  Assurances,  348. 
German  Assurance  in  1911,  349. 
German  Assurance  in  1913,  349. 
Violation,  alleged  Violation  of  Belgian — ■ 
by  Germany,  424,  430,  435,  441, 
442,  457. 
Violation   through   Secret   Military  Ar- 
rangements between  Great  Brit- 
ain and  Belgium,  577-580. 
German  Chancellor's  View,  436,  437. 
German  Justification,   457. 
German    Note    to    Belgian    Govern- 
ment, 433,  435,  441. 
Note  sent  to  Representatives  abroad  to  be 
delivered  to  the  Various  Powers 
if  occasion  should  arise,  72,  148. 
Presentation  of,  375. 
Scheldt,  Navigation  of  — ,  Correspond- 
ence    with     Netherlands,     475, 
476,  482. 
Telegram    to    Representatives    abroad 
announcing  German    Ultimatum 
and  Reply,  422. 
Belgrade, 

Bombardment  of,  354. 
Berlin, 

Alleged  Attack  on  British  Embassy,  485. 
Demonstrations  by  Public,  156,  181,  199. 
Bulgaria, 

Declaration  of  Neutrality,  313. 
Congo, 

Belgian  Attitude  as  to,  483. 
British  Attitude,  483,  505. 
French  Attitude,  483,  500. 
France, 

Ambassador  to  Germany  — ,  Departure, 

476. 
Army  Officers  on  Leave  recalled,  298. 
Attitude  in   case  of  Attack   on   Great 

Britain,  337,  451. 
Attitude  in  case  of  War  between  Ger- 
many   and   Russia,    German   In- 
quiry concerning,  347,  356. 
Austro-Hungarian  Troops  believed    on 
French  Frontier,  484,  490,  491, 
496. 
Austro-Serbian    Relations  — 

See  Title  :  Austria-Hungary,  Serbia, 
Relations  with  — ,  French  Re- 
ports of  Events  from  Date  of 
Serajevo  Murders  to  Austria's 
Declaration  of  War. 
Ultimatum  of  23  July  — 

Advice  to  Servia  regarding  Reply, 

160. 
Attitude  and  Views,  87,  91,  161,  167. 
Views  on  and  Efforts,  53,  74,  77, 
78,  81,  84,  187,  286. 
See  also  Title  :   Mediation  Proposals. 
Belgian  Reply  to  German  Proposal  after 
Fall  of  Li6ge. 


602 


Index 


France  —  Cont. 

Belgian  Reply  —  Cont. 

Approval  of,  497. 
Belgium  — 

Appeal  from  — ,  348,  442. 
Assurance   to,   of   Respect  for   Neu- 
trality, 348. 
Neutrality  of  — 

Agreement  for  Joint  Action  in  De- 
fence, 463. 
Reply  to  British  Inquiry,  373,  374, 

378,  389,  397. 
Breach  of  International  Law,  420. 
Offer  of  Support  to  Belgium,  422, 

425,  430. 
Colonies  —  German  refusal  to  give 

undertakings  as  to,  303. 
Communications  with  Representa- 
tives at  — 
Athens,  430. 
Basle,  213. 
Bavaria,  543. 
Belgrade,  75,  77,  78,  84,  156,  282, 

288,  292,  430. 
Beriin,  12,  38,  58,  75,  77,  78,  80, 
81,  84,  149,  150,  153,  154,  155, 
157,  181,    186,  213,  217,    218, 
222,  224,    250,  252,  282,    286, 
288,  323,  325,  326,   353,   355, 
356,   375,  377,  378,  379,  384, 
406,  408,  429. 
Berne,  430. 
.     Brussels,  283,  358,  378,  424,  442. 
Bucharest,  430. 
Budapest,  19. 
Christiania,  190,  430. 
Constantinople,    217,    282,    288, 

355,  379,  406,  430. 
Copenhagen,  430,  476. 
Frankfort,  283. 
Hague,  424,  430. 
London.  39,  53,  54,  58,  75,  77,  78, 
83,    84.     150,    151,    153,    181, 
184,    186,    213,  215,  216,  218, 
219,    220,    224,  250,  251,  282, 
288,    290,    291,  320,  324,  326, 
351,    353,    355,  375,  378,  379, 
381,    406,   407,  425,  426,  427, 
430,  442. 
Luxemburg,  190,  352,  383,  384, 

404,  405,  464. 
Madrid,  379,  406,  430. 
Munich,  59,  284,  429. 
Rome,  39,  53,  58,  75,  77,  78,  84, 
155,   181,    183,    184,  186,  213, 
221,  250,    281,    282,  288,  289, 
353,  355,  375,  379,  406,  430. 
St.  Peterstfurgh,  15,  39,  53,  58,  75, 

77,  78,  82,  84,   150,   152,   181, 

184,  186,  213,  215,  217,  224, 
250,  254,  282,  283,  285,  288, 
292,  320,  321,  322,  353,  354, 
355,  356,  357,  375,  379,  405, 
406,  430. 

Stockholm,  1,  8,  23,  29,  53,  75,  77, 

78,  84,  150,  152,  156,  158,  181, 

185,  186,  213,   215,    224,  250, 


France  —  Cont. 

Belgium,  Neutrality  of  —  Cont. 

251, 282,  285,  287,  288,  323,  353, 
355.  356,  375,  379,  406,  430. 
Vienna,  1,  8,  23,  29,  53,  75,  77, 
78,  84,  150,  152,  156,  158,  181, 
185,    186,  213,    224,  250,  251, 
254,    282,    285,  287,  288,  323, 
353,    355,  356,    375,  379,  406, 
430. 
Congo.     See  that  Title. 
Declaration  of  Determination   to  sup- 
port Russia,  314,  316. 
Germany,  Relations  with  — 

German    Ambassador    leaves    Paris, 

389,  390. 
German     assurance    not     to     attack 
France  if  France  remains  neutral 
in  case  of  German-Russian  War, 
593. 
German  territory  violated  by  French, 
and  French  view,  427,  428,  429, 
476. 
War  declared  by  Germany,  427,  429, 
462. 
Government     Notification     to     Repre- 
sentatives    of     the     Powers     at 
Paris,  443. 
London  Embassy  —  Note  regarding  the 
interview  communicated  by,  260. 
Mediation  Proposals,  91,  220,  227,  237, 
248,    251,    252,    258,    260,    264, 
286,  290,  313,  314. 
Military  Attach6  at  Berlin — ,  Letter  to 

Minister  of  War,  532. 
Military  Preparations,  277,  320. 
Mobilisation  Ordered,  394,  397. 
Naval   Attache    at  Berlin  — ,  Letter  to 

Minister  of  Marine,  534. 
Peace,    Declaration    not    to    conclude 

separate  peace  during  war,  521. 
President's    Letter    to    King    George, 
351,  597. 
The  King's  Reply,  598. 
President's  Message  to  French   Parlia- 
ment (4  August,  1914),  444. 
President   of   the    Council's   Speech   in 
the    Chamber     of    Deputies    (4 
August,  1914),  446. 
Press,  Note  to  —  suggested  by  German 

Ambassador,  187,  215. 
Report  to  Minister  of   Foreign  Affairs 

(30  July,  1913),  541. 
Summary  of  Events  by  Foreign  Min- 
ister, 313. 
Telegram    to    French    Representatives 
Abroad  on  Declaration  of  War, 
429. 
Territory, 

German     Territory     violated,     427, 

428,  429,  476. 
French  Allegations  of  French  —  vio- 
lated by  Germany,  406,  408,  476. 
Troops  on  the  Border,  324,   393,  394, 

396. 
Warnings  from  Reports  of  Ambassadors 
in  1913,  531. 


Index 


603 


Germany, 

Africa  —  Attacks,  505,  509. 

Aims  and  Ambitions  (French  View  in 

1913),  531. 
Ambassador  preparing  to  leave  Paris, 

389,  390. 
Army  Officers  on  Leave  Recalled,  213, 

298. 
Attitude  if  Russia  mobilized  on  Aus- 
trian Frontier  only,  218,  326. 
Attitude  toward  France  if  she  remains 
Neutral    in     case     of    German- 
Russian  War,  544. 
Austro-Russian    Relations,    Advice    to 
Austria,  297. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
Austro-Serbian  Relations, 

Localisation  of  the  Dispute  desired, 

56,  78,  90,  150,  172. 
Mediation  Proposals.     See  that  Title. 
Ultimatum  of  23  July  — 

Denial    of    Prior    Knowledge,    163, 
166,-38,     53,     81,     149,     150, 
153,   157,  250,  —  172,   173,   174. 
Prior  Knowledge  of  — ,  "Private  In- 
formation unable  to  verify,"  329. 
Redrafting  of  certain  articles  pro- 
posed by  Russia,  197,  237. 
Serbian  Reply  — 

Non-publication  of — (July   15), 

272. 
Views  on,  192,  194. 
Support  of  Austrian  Action,  Views 
on,  90,  92,  —  12,  39,  53,  54,  58, 
59,  78,  80,  81,  151,  153,  155,  157, 
181,  186,  187,  213,  215,  254,  282, 
283,    286,    288,    379,-97,    172, 
173,    174,    198,-21,   25,  27,— 
500,  551. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
Belgian  Minister  leaves  Berlin,  462. 
Belgium, 

Brussels  Documents,  577. 

Corn    for    Germany    placed    under 

Embargo,  378. 
Hostile  Acts  committed  by  Belgium 

against  Germany,  378. 
Military    Preparations  —  Secret    Ar- 
rangements with  Germany,  577. 
Belgian   Defence    against    charges, 
510. 
Neutrality  of  — 

Alleged    Violation    of,    424,    430, 

435,  441,  442,  457. 
Belgian  Request  for  Formal  Decla- 
ration, 401. 
French     Attack     upon     Germany 

through  Belgium,  457. 
Necessity  to  protect  German  Army 
from     French     attack     through 
Belgium,  457. 
Notification    to    Belgian    Govern- 
ment, 433,  435,  441. 
Refusal  to  Reply  to  British  Inquiry, 
374,  387,  388,  397,  475. 
Proposal    after    Fall    of    Li^ge,    490, 
492,  494,  498. 


Germany  —  Cont. 

Belgium,  Neutrality  of  —  Cont, 
Belgian  Reply,  494,  499. 
British  Approval,  497. 
French  Approval,  497. 
Russian  Approval,  499. 
Request  for  free  Passage  of  Troops 
—  Belgian  Refusal,  British  Pro- 
test, 455. 
Ultimatum  to,  and  Reply,  402,  421, 

442. 
War  declared  by  Germany,  442. 
British    Ambassador's    final    Interview 
and  Departure  from  Berlin,  485. 
Communications  with   Representatives 
at  — 
Berne,  225. 
Kovno,  225. 

London,  59,  159,  191,  226,  457. 
Paris,  59,  191,  192,  292,  385,  395. 
Rome,  358. 
St.  Petersburg,  59,  86,  159,  190,  191, 

192,  225,  256,  327,  358,  384. 
Vienna,  85,  257. 
Congo.     See  that  Title. 
Emperor  — 

British    Military    and    Naval    Titles, 

Renunciation  of,  488. 
Conversation     with     King     of     the 
Belgians     in     the     presence     of 
General  von  Moltke  in  1913  — 
Attitude,  549. 
Czar's  Telegrams  from  and  to,  362, 

367,  410,  557,  596. 
King     George,     Telegrams     to     and 

from,  592,  593,  594. 
Returns  to  Berlin  (26  July),  193. 
France,  relations  with  — 

Allegations    of    Violations    of    Terri- 
tory, 420,  427,  428,  429,  477,  — 
406,  408,  477. 
Inquiry  as  to  Attitude  in  event  of 
War     between     Germany     and 
Russia,  347. 
French     Reply:      "France    would 
do  that  which  her  interests  dic- 
tated," 347,  385. 
War  declared  by  Germany,  427,  429. 
French   Ambassador's   Departure    (Re- 
port) ,  476. 
French     Colonies  —  Refusal     to     give 

Undertaking  as  to,  303. 
French   Military  and   Naval  Attache's 
Letter  to  Ministers  (1913),  532, 
534. 
Great  Britain  — 

Military    and    Naval    Preparations, 
Assurance    that    Measures    had 
no  aggressive  character,  343. 
Neutrality  — 

Efforts    to    obtain    Assurance    of, 
303,  381,  426. 
British  Reply,  334,  362. 
Views  on,  286. 
Ships,  Detention  of,  391,  413,  416,  430, 

456. 
Ultimatum  from,  432,  437,  441,  442. 


604 


Index 


Germany  —  Cont. 

Great  Britain  —  cont. 

War  declared  by  Great  Britain,  460. 
Imperial   Chancellor's   Speech  before 
Reichstag,  on  4  August,  573. 
Interests     in     Belgium     entrusted     to 
United  States  Minister,  436,  496. 
Japanese  Ultimatum,  506. 

German  decision  not  to  reply,  508. 
* '  Kriegsgef ahrzustand ' '    declared,    356, 

364,  394. 
Luxemburg  —  Neutrality,  352,  401,  404, 
405,  408,  413,  414,  415,  424,  430. 
Chancellor's  View,  436. 
Mediation  proposals.  Attitude  towards, 
34,  163,  227,  229,  261,  265,  294, 
301,    303,    310,    329,    360,    361, 
362,-213,  218,    222,   249,  250, 
252,  286,  325,    326,    355,-198, 
235,    312,    313,    314,    341,    342, 
—  212,  —  159,     226,     241,     256, 
257,  554,  555,  557,  594,  595. 
Military  and  Naval  Preparations,  331. 
Commencement,  284,  340,  364,  365. 
Minister  leaves  Serbia,  481. 
Mobilization, 

Action  to  be  taken  in  event  of  Rus- 
sian Mobilization,  227,  364. 
Alleged    Mobilization   of   Army    and 

Navy,  342,  384,  412. 
Official  Denial,  323. 
Ordered,  409. 
Preliminary  Steps,  323,  324,  356,  364, 

370,  394. 
Secret  —  Alleged     Secret     Measures, 
357,  381,  397. 
Naval  Preparations,  190,  321. 
Notification  to  Belgium  of  Breaches  of 
International  Law  by  France,  420. 
Seeking     to     gain     time  —  Russian 
view,  322. 
Prince  Henry  —  Telegrams  to  and  from 

King  George,  592. 
Reservists  ordered  to  hold  themselves 
in  readiness,  French  Report,  190. 
Responsibility   for   War   on    Russia,  — 

Russian  Defence,  419. 
Russia,  relations  with  — 

Ultimatum  to  Russia  requiring  De- 
mobilization, 278,  292,  316,  320, 
322,  347,  356,  366,  375,  377,  386, 
389,  390,  395,  396,  401. 
War  declared  by  Germany,  398,  400, 
405,  406. 
Secret  French  Report  concerning  Arms, 
Aims    and    Obligations    of    the 
National  Policy,  538. 
Summary  of  Events,  551. 
Support  of  Austria-Hungary,  172,  173, 

174,  261. 
War  not  desired,  161,  163. 

Contrary  British  and  French  Reports, 
375,  377,  411. 
Great  Britain, 

Ambassador  to  Austria  Hungary  — 
Summary  of  Events  from  22 
July,  514. 


Great  Britain  —  Cont. 

Ambassador  to  Berlin,  Final  Interview 

and  Departure,  485. 
Assurance    to    France    that    Fleet    will 
protect  French  Coasts  and  Ship- 
ping against  German  Fleet,  415. 
Attitude    if    France  and  Russia  reject 

Reasonable  Proposal,  363. 
Attitude  in   case  of  Violation   of  Bel- 
gium, 595. 
Attitude  in  case  of  War  between  Ger- 
many,  Russia  and  France,   595, 
596. 
Attitude    in    Event    of    an    Attack    on 
France,  or  a  General  War,   174, 
216,  238,  241,  305,  307,  326,  334, 
335,  337,  351,  366,  368,  381,  388, 
415. 
Correspondence  between  Sir  E.  Grey 
and  M.  Paul  Cambon  (Novem- 
ber, 1912),  337. 
Russia    expects    that    England    will 
side  definitely  with  her,  172. 
Austria-Hungary  — 

Relations  with,  432,  468. 
War  declared  by  Great  Britain,  498, 
520. 
Austro-Russian  Relations  — 

Attitude,  305. 
Austro-Servian  Relations  — 

Attitude,    54,    74,    83,    84,    150,    151, 
153,    181,    213,    218,    219,    243, 
244,  291,  305.     See  also  Media- 
tion Proposals. 
Ultimatum  of  23  July  — 

Attitude,  66,  86,  91,  92,  93,   161, 
165. 
Servian   Reply,    Views   on,    93,    165, 

229,  238,  281. 
Time-limit,      Extension,      Proposals 
for  — 
Attitude,  92. 
Belgian  King's  Appeal  to  King  George, 
423,  455. 
Belgian   Reply  to   German   Proposal 
after  Fall  of  Li6ge,  Approval  of, 
497. 
Belgium  — 

Appeal  from,  442. 
Neutrality  of  — 

Actions  to   be  taken,   406,   415, 
424,  426,  434,  438,  441,  456, 
460,  595,  596. 
Agreement  for   Joint   Action,    462, 

463. 
Inquiry  to  Belgium,  348,  366. 

Belgian  Reply,  391. 
Inquiry  to  France  and  Germany, 
351,  365,  366,  457. 
French  Reply,  358,  378. 
German  Refusal  to  Reply,  378, 
381. 
Protest   against   German    Demand 
to    Belgium  to  allow  Free  Pas- 
sage of  Troops,  455. 
Relations  previous  to  the  Outbreak 
of  the  War,  577. 


Index 


605; 


Great  Britain  —  Cont. 

Communications  with   Representatives 
at  — 

Belgrade,  90,  93,  164,  165,  196, 
267,  268,  302. 

Berlin,  34,  56,  92,  163,  166,  168, 
193,  194,  227,  229,  265,  268, 
270,  294,  297,  298,  299,  303, 
306,  307,  308,  332,  334,  335,  361, 
362,  364,  365,  386,  387,  388,  391, 

392,  393,    409,    412,    413,    416, 
430,  455,  456,  457. 

Brussels,  366,  391,  413,  430,  456, 
457. 

Constantinople,  302. 

Luxemburg,  408,  414. 

Paris,  91,  160,  161,  168,  194,  195, 
227,  258,  264,  305,  333,  336, 
337,    365,    366,    368,    389,    390, 

393,  394,  396,  415,  431. 
Rome,  61,  164,  168,  194,  233,  263, 

266,    267,    301,    302,    305,    310, 
334,  360. 
St.  Petersburgh,  87,  160,  161,  165, 
168,  228,  229,  230,  261,  270,  295, 
299,    300,    335,    363,    365,    385, 

394,  410. 

Vienna,  61,  86,  89,   164,   167,   192, 

196,  226,  231,  259,  262,  265,  296, 

297,    300,    309,    329,    330,    367, 

391,  395,  411,  514. 

Congo.     See  that  Title. 

Declaration    of    Intention    to    support 

France,  333. 
Fleet  — 

Mobilized,  381. 

Non-dispersal  of,  after  Review,  218, 

230,  231. 
Protection  assured  to  French  Coasts 
and  French  Shipping,  381,  406, 
407,  425,  453. 
Germany  — 

Ultimatum  to,  432,  437,  441,  442,  457. 
War  declared  by  Great  Britain,  460, 
488. 
King  George  — 

Letters  from  French  President,  351, 
392. 
The  King's  Reply,  598. 
Personal  Message  to  the  Czar,  590. 

The  Czar's  Reply,  591. 
Telegrams  from  and  to  German  Em- 
peror, 593,  594. 
Telegrams  to  and  from  Prince  Henry 
of  Prussia,  592. 
Luxemburg  —  Neutrality,  British   Atti- 
tude, 406. 
Mediation    Proposals,    241,    247,  —  91, 
92,  194,  195,  228,  265,  268,  270, 
294,  305,  306,  308,    363,  — -  213 
219,    291,    —  174,    233,    396,  — 
590,  592,  593,  594. 
Military  and  Naval  Preparations  — 
German  Inquiry  and  British  Reply, 

343. 
Secret  —  with  Belgium,  577. 
Navy  —  See  Subheading:    Fleet  above. 


Great  Britain  — '■  Cont. 

Neutrality  of,  87,  161,  165,  230. 

German  Efforts  to  obtain  Assurance 

of,  303,  381,  426. 
British  Reply,  334,  362. 
German  Views,  286. 
Parliament  —  Support   of   Government 

PoHcy,  427. 
Peace  —  Agreement    not    to     conclude 
separate     Peace      during     War, 
621. 
Serbian  Appeal,  99,  219. 
Serbian    Prime    Minister's    Thanks    for 
Speech    in    House    of    Commons 
on  27  July,  302. 
Ships,  Detention  of,  391,  413,  416,  430, 
456. 
Holland.     See  Title:  Netherlands. 
Italy, 

Austro-Serbian  Relations  — 

Mediation  Proposals,  See  Title:  Me- 
diation Proposals. 
Ultimatum  of  23  July,  Time  limit  — 
Extension,  proposals  for,  and  atti- 
tude, 196. 
Views   on,    and   Efforts,    28,    53,    78, 

168,  181,  183,  184,  267. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
Declaration  of  Neutrality,  379,  431. 
Mediation    Proposals,    194,    220,    221, 

233,  263,  281,  360. 
Position  of,  with  regard  to  the  Austrian 
Note   to    Servia,    149,    181,    183, 
184,  186,  221. 
Japan, 

Austria-Hungary  —  Relations      broken 

off,  508. 
Declaration    of    Neutrality    as    regards 
Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  and 
Russia,  while  having  no  interest 
in  Servia,  241. 
Ultimatum  to  Germany,  506. 

German  Decision  not  to  Reply,  508. 
Luxemburg, 

Belgian  Minister's  Departure,  495. 
French  Minister's  Departure,  464. 
Minister   of   State  —  Telegrams   to   Sir 

E.  Grey  (2  August),  408,  414. 
Neutrality  of  — 

British  Attitude,  406. 

Inquiry    to    France    and    Germany, 

352,  383. 
French  Reply,  384. 
German  Reply,  405. 
German  Military  Measures  to  insure 
against  attack  by  French  Army, 
352,    401,    404,    405,    408,    413, 
414,  415,  424. 
Chancellor's  View,  436. 
Mediation  Proposals,  163,  165,  166. 

Austria-Hungary,  Attitude,  241,  276, 
278,  280,  345,  373,-265,  302, 
328,  329,  392,  393,  394,  —  254, 
375,  377,  397. 
France,  Attitude,  91,  227,  258,  260, 
264,-220,  248,  251,  252,  286, 
290,  —  237,  313,  314. 


606 


Index 


Mediation  Proposals  —  Cont. 

Germany,    Attitude,     592,     593,     594, 

—  34,  163,  227,  229,  261,  265, 
294,  301,  303,  310,  329,  360,  361, 
362,-213,  218,  222,  249,  250, 
252,  286,  325,  326,  355,  —  198, 
235,  312,  314,  341,   342,-212, 

—  554,  —  159,  226,  241,  256,  257. 
Great   Britain,  Attitude,   241,    247,   — 

590,  592,  593,  594,-91,  92, 
194,  195,  228,  265,  268,  270, 
299,   305,   306,   308,   363,-213, 

219,  291,  —  174,  233,  396. 
Italian   Views,    194,    233,   263,    360,— 

220,  221,  281. 

Occupation  of  Belgrade  or  other  point 
a  condition  of  accepting  Media- 
tion, 332,  335,  353. 
Russia,     Attitude,  —  243,     278,  —  590, 
596,-260,   261,   262,  294,   297, 
299,  328,   385,   392,   393,-283, 
321,  322,  323,  353,  354,  381,— 
272,  341,  370. 
Serbia,  Attitude,  53,  54,  58,  78. 
Urgency  of  Action,  272. 
Netherlands, 

British  Information  that  Great  Britain 
expects  —  will  resist  German  pres- 
sure and  Offer  of  Support,  195. 
Declaration  of  Neutrality,  468. 
Integrity  of  —  German  Assurance,  303. 
War  Buoying  in  the  Scheldt,  434,  463, 
475,  476,  482. 
Norway, 

British  Information  that  Great  Britain 
expects  —  will     resist      German 
pressure  and   Offer  of   Support, 
195. 
Peace, 

Agreement   of   Allies   not   to    conclude 
separate  Peace  during  War,  521. 
Efforts.    See  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 
Russia, 

Austro-Hungary,   Relations  with  — 
Direct  Conversations,   proposals  for, 
185,    229,    251,    252,    254,    286, 
323,  363. 
Refusal,  285,  287,  297. 
Engagement   to  stop  Military  Prep- 
arations  if    Austria    takes    cer- 
tain course,  331,  333. 
German  Advice,  297. 
Mediation  Proposals.     See  that  Title. 
War  declared  by  Austria,  459,  481. 
Austro-Serbian  Relations  — 

Austrian  Statement  that  her  Declara^ 
tion  of  Readiness  to  respect  Ser- 
bian Integrity  and  Sovereign 
Rights  had  been  received  by 
Russia  in  Silence  —  Contradic- 
tion by  Russian  Ambassador  in 
Paris,  398. 
Ultimatum  of  23  July  — 

Redrafting  of  certain  Articles  pro- 
posed by  Russia,  197. 
German  Attitude,  237. 
Serbian  Reply,  Views  on,  235. 


Russia  —  Cont. 

Austro-Serbian  Relations  —  Cont. 
Ultimatum  of  23  July  —  Cont. 

Time    limit,    Extension,    proposals 
for,  views  on,  160,  167,  196. 
Views  on  and  Attitude,  71,  179,  202, 
278,    280,    347,    373,-87,    89, 
161,  168,   193,  228,  261,  367,— 
15,  53,   58,  74,   82,  83,  84,   152, 
153,  154,  155,  156,  181,  184,  185, 
217,  —  170,  196,  237,  238. 
*See  also  Mediation  Proposals. 
Belgium  — 

Appeal  from,  442. 
Neutrality  of  — 

Agreement  for  Joint  Action,  463. 
Reply   to   German    Proposal   after 
Fall  of  Li6ge,  499. 
Communications     with     Representa- 
tives at  — 
Belgrade,  63,  94,  98,  170,  174. 
Berlin,  96,  97,  171,  198,  199,  235, 
237,  272,  294,  310,  312,  341,  342, 
370. 
Fiume,  270. 

London,    260,    261,    294,    328,— 
94,  96,   171,  172,   174,  233,  234, 
235,  238,  270,  272,  312,  314,  341, 
333,  370,  371,  396,  397. 
Nish,  316,  340. 

Paris,   94,   96,   97,    171,    173,    198, 
199,    234,    235,    312,    314,    316, 
341,  370,  397,  398. 
Prague,  197. 

Rome,  94,  96,  196,  235,  341,  370. 
Vienna,    94,    170,    197,    235,    238, 
271,  272,  328,  341,  369,  370. 
Czar  — 

Personal      Message      from      King 
George,  590. 
The  Czar's  Reply,  591. 
Telegrams    to    and    from    German 
Emperor,    362,    367,    410,    454, 
596. 
French  Declaration  of  Determination 

to  Support,  314,  316. 
Germany  puts  Responsibility  for  War 

on  Russia,  215,  282,  381,  482. 
Germany,  Relations  with,  63. 
German    Ultimatum    requiring    De- 
mobilization, 366,  386,  389,  390, 
409,  411,  316,  396,  278,  347. 
Germany    declares    War,    405,    406, 

—  398,  —  400. 
Germany's    Reasons    for    War    with 

Russia,  551. 

Great     Britain,     Expectations     that 

England    will    side    with    Russia 

and  France,  172. 

Mediation    Proposals,    Attitude    and 

Efforts,  260,  261,  262,  294,  297, 

299,   328,   385,  392,   393,-283, 

321,  322,  323,  353,  354,  381,— 

237,  341,  370,  —  243,  278,  —  586. 

Mobilisation,     294,     298,     299,     362, 

364,     365,     391, 288,     289, 

292,  320,  323,   357,-288,   289, 


Index 


607 


Russia  —  Cont. 

Mobilisation  —  Cont. 

292,     320,     323,     357,-225,— 
312,  370,  —  246,  280,  346. 
Denial,    Russian  —  of    Mobilisa- 
tion, 179. 
Offer  to  Stop  Military  Prepara- 
tions if  Austria  takes  certain 
course,  322. 
Suspension  of,  321. 
Vienna    Press    did    not    publish 
Russian    Communication,    Ex- 
planation, 323. 
Mobilisation      against      Austria 
immediately,        if        Austrian 
Troops  Cross  Servian  Frontier, 
295. 
Peace,   Declaration  not  to   con- 
clude   separate    Peace    during 
War,  521. 
Troops  Cross  German  Frontier, 

413. 
Unreadiness  for  War,  294. 
Salonica, 

Austrian  Designs  as  to,  British  View, 
302. 
Sandjak, 

Austria   has  no  intentions   to  advance 
into  or  occupy,  385,  389. 
British  View,  302. 
Scheldt, 

War  Buoying  Measures,  434,  464,  475, 
476,  482. 
Serajevo  Murders, 

1,  2,  3,  4,  8. 

Austrian  Dossier  sent  to  the  Powers,  101. 

Austrian  a^d  Serbian  View,  2,  3,  4, 
5,  6,  7,  8,  9,  13,  15,  18,  20,  21, 
22,  25,  27,  28,  31,  500,  527. 

Austrian  Official  Reports  of  State  of 
Serbian  Feeling,  2,  3,  6,  14,  36. 

Criminal  Inquiry,  Conclusions  of,  86. 

Extracts  from  Records  of  the  Court 
at  Serajevo  touching  the  Pro- 
ceedings against  Gavrilo  Princip 
and  Confederate,  130. 

Nish  Local  Committee  of  Narodna 
Odbrana,  138. 

Origin  of  the  Plot,  131. 

Origin  of  the  Bombs,  132. 

Reports  from  Austria  and  Serbian  Alle- 
gations, 4,  5,  6,  7. 

Serbian  Press  Comments,  135. 

Transport  of  Assailants,  and  of  the  Wea- 
pons from  Servia  to  Bosnia,  133. 
Serbia, 

Amsfeld   Anniversary,    Celebration    of, 

2,  6. 

Appeal  to  Great  Britain,  99,  219. 
Appeal  to  the  Powers,  98. 
Austro-Hungary,  Relations  with  — 
Austrian  Intentions,  302,  369. 
Austrian    Minister    leaves    Belgrade, 
174,  —  158, 186,  —  165,  192,  194. 
Austrian     Official     Reports     as      to 
Serbian  Feelings  towards  Austria, 
2,  3,  6,  14,  36. 


Serbia  —  Cont. 

Austro-Hungary,  Relations  with — Cont. 
Austrian  Statement  that  her  Decla- 
ration of  Readiness  to  Respect 
Serbian  Integrity  and  Sovereign 
Rights  had  been  Received  by 
Russia  in  Silence  —  Contradic- 
tion, 398. 
See  also  Title;  Mediation  Proposals. 

Berlin  Press,  Attitude,  97. 

British    Attitude,    305,  —  54,    74,    83, 
84,  150,  151,  153,  181,  213,  218, 
219,  291,  —  174,  —  243,  244. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 

Events  from  Date  of  Serajevo  Mur- 
ders to  Presentation  of  Austrian 
Note  to  Serbia  of  23  July  — 
French  Reports,  and  French 
Attitude  and  Reports.  See  Title: 
Austria-Hungary,  French  Atti- 
tude and  French  Reports. 

German  Views  and  Attitude,  551,  — 
21,  25,  27,  —  482,  500,  —  12, 
39,  53,  54,  58,  59,  78,  80,  81, 
151,  153,  155,  157,  181,  186, 
187,  213,  215,  254,  282,  283, 
286,  288,  379,-97,  172,  173, 
174,  198. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 

Italian  Views  and  Attitude,  53,  78, 
181,  183,  184,  —  28. 

Localisation  of  the  Dispute,  —  German 
Statement,  56,  78,  90,  150,  172. 

Mediation  Proposals.      See  that  Title. 

Military  Action,  163,  196,  226. 

Military  Operations  not  to  be  under- 
taken immediately,   166,  167. 

Narodna  Odbrana  Society  — 

Appeal  of,  in  Servian  Official  Gazette, 

123. 
Nish     Local     Committee  —  Attitude 

on   Serajevo   Murders,    138. 
Organization   and   Work   of — ,    101, 

116,  124. 
Work    of  — ,  Deposition     by    Trifko 
Krstanovic,  124. 

Non-interference  by  the  Powers.  See 
Subhead,  Localisation  of  Dispute, 
above. 

Occupation  of  Belgrade  or  other  Towns 
as  a  Basis  for  Negotiations,  332, 
335,  353. 

Russian  Views  and  Attitude,  71,  179, 
202,  278,  280,  347,  373,-168, 
193,  —  15,  53,  58,  74.  82,  83, 
84,  152,  153,  154,  155,  196, 
237,  238. 
See  also  Title:  Mediation  Proposals. 

Serbia's  willingness  to  entertain  require- 
ments, provided  that  only  judi- 
cial cooperation  is  asked  by 
Austria,  38. 

Serbian  Appeal  to  the  Powers,  Possi- 
bility of,  161. 

Serbian  Attitude  and  Views,  53,  54, 
78,  —  4,  6,  31. 

Serbian  Note  of  1908,  86,  161,  261. 


608 


Index 


Serbia  —  Cont. 

Serbian    Preparations   before    Delivery 

of  Austrian  Note,  141,  180. 
Serbian    Press,    Hostile   Attitude   prior 

to  Serajevo  Murders,  112. 
Serbian    Territory    not    to    be    seized, 

14,  203,  —  163,  308,  309,  395. 
Serbian  War  Office — Pictures  of  a  nature 
hostile  to  Austria-Hungary,  140. 
Situation   before   Presentation   of   Ulti- 
matum of  23  July,  34,  56,  61,  86. 
Sokol  Society  Dusan  the  Strong  — 
Report    on    the   Activities    of  — ,    in 
Kragujevac,  121. 
Special  Points  for  Great  Britain,  243. 
Turkish  Views,  217. 

Ultimatum  of  23  July,  86,  90,  —  63,  — 
64,  98,  99,-75,  78,  158. 
Austrian  Official  Commentary,  51. 
Austrian  Statement  that  Note  is  not 
an  Ultimatum   but   a   D-marche 
with  a  time  limit,  160,  161,  236. 
Austro-Hungarian  Views,   86,   89. 
British  Views  regarding  Reply,  93,  165. 
British  Attitude,  66,-86,  91,  92,  93, 

161,  165. 
French  Advice  to   Serbia   Regarding 

Reply,  160. 
French  Attitude  and  Views,  87,  91, 

160,  161,  —  67. 

German  Attitude  and  Views,  90,  92. 

German  Denial  of  Prior  Knowledge, 

163,  166,  —  38,  53,  81,  149,  150, 

153,  187,  250,  —  172,  173,  174. 

German   Prior    Knowledge   ("unable 

to  confirm"),  329. 
German  Support  of  Austrian  Action, 

172,  173,  174. 
Italian  Views,  267. 

Point  5  —  Austrian  Explanation,  148. 
Redrafting  of  certain  articles  proposed 
by  Russia,  197. 
German  Attitude,  237. 
Russian  Attitude  and  Views,  69,  70,  — 

87,  161,  228,  261,  367,  191. 
Serbian  Attitude,  90. 
Serbian  Reply,  164,  169,  175,  195,  — 
156,  157,  158. 
Austrian  Official  Commentaries. 
Austrian  Views,  198,  221,  251. 
British  Views,  229,  231,  238. 
German  Views,  192,  194,  235. 
Non-publication     of     in     German 
Press,  272. 


Serbia  —  Cont. 

Ultimatum,  Serbian  Reply  to  —  Cont. 
Refusal  of  Austria  to  accept,   174, 

231,  236. 
Russian  Views,  235. 
Special    Points  to  be  brought  before 

Great  Britain,  57,  65. 
Time  Limit  — 
Dangers  of,  61. 

Proposal   for    Extension,    152-158, 
170,  171,  181. 
Austrian  Refusal,  140,  141. 
British  Attitude,  290. 
German  Attitude,  163. 
Italian  Attitude,  196. 
Russian     Attitude,      160,      167, 
396. 
Unconditional         Acceptance         de- 
manded, 164. 
War     Declared     by    Austria-Hungary, 
241,  268,  296,-247,  —273,  344, 
359. 
British  Charg6  d'Affaires  Leaves  Bel- 
grade with  Serbian  Government, 
165. 
Government    Leaves    Belgrade,    165, 

174,  176. 
Integrity  to  be  respected,  264. 
Kragujevac  —  Work  of  Sokol  Society 

Dusan  the  Strong,  121. 
Mediation         Proposals,         Attitude 

towards,  53,  54,  58,  78. 
Minister  Leaves  Berlin,  458. 
Minister  Leaves  Vienna,  177. 
Mobilisation  Ordered,  142,  176. 
Prince  Regent  — 

Appeal  to  the  Czar,  292,  —  96. 

The  Czar's  Reply,  237,  315. 
Speech    from    the    Throne    to    the 
Skupschtina  after  Declaration  of 
War,  340. 
Summary  of  Events  by  Minister  at 
Vienna,  500. 
Triple  Entente.     See  also    Names  of    the 
Powers. 
Declaration   not   to   conclude   separate 
Peace  during  War,  531*. 
Turkey, 

Austro-Servian    Relations,    Views    on, 
217. 
Vienna, 

Demonstrations,  8,  9. 
War  between  Great  Powers, 
German  Attitude,  294. 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America. 


APPENDIX 

THE  SEVERAL  OFFICIAL  PUBLICATIONS  OF  COLLECTED 
DIPLOMATIC  DOCUMENTS  IN  PHOTOGRAPHIC  RE- 
PRODUCTION 


K.  U.  K.  MINISTERIUM  DES  AUSSERN. 


DIPLOMATISCHE  ARTENSTUCKE 


ZUR 


YORGESCHICHTE  des  RRIEGES 


1914. 


WIEN  1915. 

AUS  DER  K.  K.  HOF   UND  STAATSDRUCKEREI. 


m 


INHALTSVERZEICHNIS. 


Seitc 

1.  Legationsrat  Ritter  von  Storck,  Belgrad,  29.  Juni  1914.  Freudenkund- 
gebungen  in  Belgrad  bei  der  Nackriclit  von  der  Ermordong  des  *Herm 
Erzherzogs  Thronfolgers 1 

2.  Legationsrat  Ritter  von  Storck,  Belgrad,  30.  Juni  1914.  Die  serbische 
Polizei  hat  keine  Mafinahmen  getroffen,  um  die  Faden  des  Attentates 

in  Serbien  zu  verfolgen 2 

3.  Generalkonsul  Jeblitscbka,  tlskiib,  1.  Juli  1914.  Freudenkundgebungen 

in  tiskiib    und  Pristina   bei  Bekanntwerden  des  Attentates  in  Sarajevo      2 

4.  Graf  Sz^csen,  Paris,  4.  Juli  1914.  Der  Prasident  der  franzosischen 
Republik  spricbt  die  Uberzeugung  aus,  die  serbische  Regierung  werde 
Osterreich-Ungarn  bei  der  gerichtlichen  Untersuchung  und  der  Verfol- 
gung  eventueller  Mitschuldiger  Entgegenkommen  zeigen 3 

5.  Gerent  Herr  Hoflehner,  Nisch,  6.  Juli  1914.  Freudige  Genugtuung  in 
Nisch  liber  das  Sarajevoer  Attentat 4 

6.  Freiherr  von  Giesl,  Belgrad,  21.  Juli  1914.  Die  Politik  Serbiens  verfolgt 
nur  ein  Ziel,  die  Abtrennung  der  von  Siidslawen  bewohnten  Gebiete 
Osterreich-Ungarns  und  dessen  schlieMche  Vemichtung  als  Groiimacht. 
Serbische  Prelikampagne  voU  Liige,  Hali  und  Geringschatzung.  Eine 
weitere  Schadigung  der  Stellung  der  Monarchie  kann  nicht  mehr  zu- 
gelassen  werden 4 

7.  An   FreiheiTn  von    Giesl  in  Belgrad,  Wien,  22.  Juli   1914.    Note    der 

k.  u.  k.  Regierung  an  die  serbische  Regierung 7 

8.  An  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  Berlin,  Rom,  Paris,  London,  St.  Petersburg 
und  Konstantinopel,  Wien,  22.  JuH  1914.  Mitteilung  der  an  die  serbische 
Regierung  gerichteten  Note.  Kommentar  zu  dieser  Note,  in  welchem 
die  serbischen  Machenschaften  und  Umtriebe  gegen  die  Monarchie, 
sowie  die  Gninde  dargelegt  werden,  aus  denen  die  k.  u.  k.  Regierung 
der  provokatorischen  Haltung  Serbiens  gegeniiber  so  yiel  Langmut 
bewahrte 11 


IV 

Seite 

9.  An  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London,  Wien,  23.  Juli  1914.  Die  serblsche 
Regierung  hat  keinerlei  Mafinahmen  zur  Aufdeckung  der  nach  Belgrad 
weisenden  Spuren  des  Sarajevoer  Attentates  ergriifen,  sondern  vieliiiehr 
getrachtet,  diese  Spuren  zu  verwischen.  Die  kurze  Befristung  der  an 
Serbien  gerichteten  Forderungen  war  unerlaOlich,  uni  den  der  k.  u.  k. 
Regierung  aus  langjahrigen  Erfahrungen  woUbekannten  serbischen  Ver- 
scbleppungskiinsten  keine  Handbabe  zu  bieten .      13 

10.  Graf  Mensdorff,  London,  24.  Juli  1914.  Mitteilung  der  an  Serbien  ge- 
richteten Note  an  Sir  E.  Grey,  der  Bedenken  gegen  die  kurze  Be- 
fristung und  Besorgnis  wegen  der  Riickwirkung  auf  den  europaischen 
Frieden  aulierte.  Darlegung  des  Standpunktes  der  k.  u.  k.  Rjegierung; 
Verteidigung  unserer  vitalsten  Interessen;  Volikommener  Milierfolg  der 
Serbien  gegeniiber  bisher  stets  beobachteten  konzilianten  Haltung  .    .     14r 

11.  Graf  Sz6csen,  Paris,  24.  Juli  1914.  Mitteilung  der  an  Serbien  gerich- 
teten Note  und  Darlegung  des  Standpunktes  dejr  k.  u.  k.  Regierung: 
Es  handle  sich  um  eine  Frage,  welche  direkt  zwischen  Osterreich- 
Ungarn  und  Serbien  ausgetragen  werden  muli;  das  Aufhoren  der 
durch  die  serbische  Wiihlarbeit  seit  Jahren  verursaohten  Unruhe  liege 
aber  im  allgemeinen  europaischen  Interesse.  Der  interimistische  fran- 
zosi.sche  Minister  des  Auliern  vermied,  die  Haltung  Serbiens  irgend- 
•wie  zu  beschbnigen  oder  zu  yerteidigen 15 

12.  Graf  Sz6esen,  Paris,  24.  Juli  1914.  Deutscher  Botschafter  ist  beauf- 
tragt,  dem  franzbsisohen  Kabinett  die  Auffassung  seiner  Regierung 
mitzuteilen,  dafi  serbischer  Streitfall  Angelegenheit  sei,  die  nur  Oster- 
reich-Ungarn  und  Serbien  angehe 1$' 

13.  Graf  Sz6csen,  Paris,  24.  Juli  1914.  Deutscher  Botschafter  hat  Auftrag 
ausgefuhrt.  Franzosische  Regierung  teilt  deutsche  Auffassung  und  hofft, 
dafi  die  Kontroverse  eine  direkte  und  friedliche  Losung  finden 
werde <    .    . 1& 

14.  Graf  Szdpary,  St.  Petersburg,  24.  Juli  .1914.  Mitteilung  der  an 
Serbien  gerichteten  Note  und  Erorterung  des  osterreichisch-ungari-^ 
schen  Standpunktes.  Einwendungen  Herrn  Sazonows.  Auf  seine  Dar- 
stellungsweise,  als  ob  Osterreich-Ungarn  den  Krieg  -wolle,  wurde 
erwidert,  die  Monarchie  sei  die  friedliebendste  Macht  der  Welt,  dock 
miisse  der  Bedrohung  unserer  Dynastie  durch  serbische  Bomben  und 
unseres  Territoriums  durch  die  serbischen  revolutionaren  Umtriebe  ein 
Ende  bereitet  werden 1? 

15.  Russisches  Communiqu6,  24.  Juli  1914.  Rutland  konne  einem  oster- 
reichisch-ungarisch-serbischen  Konflikte  gegeniiber  nicht  indifferent 
bleiben ,     1$ 


V 

Seitd 

16.  Graf  Szapary,  St.  Petersburg,  24.  Juli  1914.  Der  Bemerkung  des 
russischen  Ministers  des  AuBem  gegeniiber,  Streitfall  zwiscben  Cster- 
reicb-Ungarn  und  Serbien  sei  keine  auf  diese  Staaten  bescbrankte 
Angelegenbeit  und  Ruliland  konne  es  nicbt  gleicbgiltig  binnebmen, 
wenn  Osterreicb-Ungarn  die  Absicbt  hatte,  Serbien  „aufziifressen"^ 
antwortete  deutscber  Botscbafter,  Osterreicb-Ungarn  liege  dies  voUig 
feme,  eine  Einmiscbung  in  seine  Differenz  riiit  Serbien  konne  es. 
jedocb  nicbt  zugeben    . IS 

17.  An  Gr^af  MensdorfF  in  London,  Wien,  24.  Juli  1914.  Schritt  in  Belgrad 
bat  nicbt  Cbarakter  eines  formellen  Ultimatums,  sondern  einer  befristeten 
Demarcbe • 19 

18.  An  Graf  Szapary  in  St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  24.  Juli  1914.  Es  .wurde 
dem  russiscben  Gescbaftstrager  erklart,  dali  Osterreicb-Ungarn  keiner 
Demiitigung  Serbiens  und  keine  Gebietserwerbung  bezwecke,  sondern. 
nur  die  Erbaltung  des  Bestebenden,  sowie  die  Verurteilung  und  Unter- 
driickung  der  gegen  den  Bestand  der  Monarcbie  gericbteten  grofi- 
serbiscben  Stromungen ,  ■  .    .     20 

19.  An  die  k.  u.  k.  Botscbafter  in  Berlin,  Rom,  Paris,  London,  St.  Peters- 
burg und  Konstantinopel,  Wien,  25.  Juli  1914.  Dossier,  betrefiend 
die  groftserbis'cbe  Propaganda  und  ibre  Zusammenbange  mit  dem 
Sarajevoer  Attentate ..,..., 21 

20.  An  Sektionscbef  Freiberrn  von  Maccbio  in  Wien,  Lambacb,  25.  Juli 
1914.  Dem  vom  russiscben  Gescbaftstrager  in  Wien  gestellten  Ver- 
langen  einer  Fristerstreckun^  fiir  die  an  Serbien  gericbteten  Forde- 
rungen    kann   nicbt  stattgegeben  werden   ............       69 

21.  An. Graf  Szdpary  in  St.  Petersburg,  Bad  Iscbl,  2.5.  Juli  1914.  Mit- 
teilung  und  Begriindung  dieses  ablebnenden  Standpmiktes    .....      69 

22.  Freiberr  von  Giesl,  Belgrad,  25.  Juli  1914.  Administrative  und  mili- 
tariscbe  Vorbereitungen  in  Serbien »..-..      70 

23.  Freiberr  von  Giesl,   Semlin,   25.  Juli    1914.  Allgemeine  Mobilisierung 

in  Serbien  angeordnet 70 

24.  Freiberr  von  Giesl,  Semlin.  25.  Juli  1914.  Abbrucb  der  diploma- 
tiscben  Beziebungen  zu  Serbien  infolge  ungeniigender  Antwort  der 
Beigrader  Regierung  auf  die  osterreicbiscb-ungariscbe  Note      .    .    .    ,      71 ' 

."25.  Note  der  konigHcb  serbiscben  Regierung  vom  12./25.  Juli  1914  .  .  71 
26.  An  Graf  Szapary  in  St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  25.  Juli  1914.  Die  k.  u.  k. 
Regierung  konnte  sicb  durcb  die  Moglicbkeit  eines.  Zusammenstofies 
mit  Ruliland  nicbt  in  ibrer  Stellungnabme  gegen  Serbien  beirren 
lassen,  weil  grundlegende  staatspolitiscbe  Konsiderationen  Osterreicb- 
Ungarn  vor  die  Notwendigkeit  stellten,  der  Situation  ein  Ende  zu 
bereiten,  dafi  ein  russiscber  Freibrief  Serbien   die  dauernde  ungestrafte 

b 


"VI 

•  Seitd 

und  anstrafbare  Bedrohnng  der  MonarcHe  ermogliclie.  Die  k.  n.  k. 
Regiercng  hofft,  dafi  Euiiland  im  Hinblicke  'auf  das  den  Balkanstaaten 
bisher  bewiesene  WoblwoUen  Osterreich-Ungarns  und  auf  die  Erkla- 
rung  der  k.  u.  k.  Regierung,  dafi  sie  keinerlei  territorialen  Gewinn 
anstrebe  und  die  Souveranitat  Serbiens  nicht  antasten  wolle,  niclit 
in  die  Aktion  Osterreicb-Ungams  gegen  Serbien  eingreifen  werde  .    .      74 

27.  An  Graf  Szdpdry  in  St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  25.  Juli  1914.  Die  For- 
derung  der  Beteiligung  von  k.  u.  k.  Funktionaren  bei  der  Unter- 
driickung  der  subversiven  Bewegung  in  Serbien  entsprang  lediglich 
praktiscben  Eiicksichten  und  niclit  der  Absicbt,  die  Souveranitat 
Serbiens  zu  tangieren  .    .    .    .    , »    .    .    .      77 

28.  Graf  Szdpdry,  St.  Petersburg,  26.  Juli  1914.  Deutscher  Botschafter  in 
St.  Petersburg  warnt  russischen  Minister  des  Auliern,  dali  russiscbe 
Mobilisierungsmafinahmen  gegen  Deutschland  unaufhaltsam  den  Krieg 
herbeifiiliren  wiirden.  Deutscber  Militarattach6  erklart  russischem 
Kriegsminister,  Mobilmachung  gegen  Osterreicb-Ungam  wiirde  eine  sehr 
bedrohlicbe  Situation  ber\^orrufen.  Kriegsminister  gibt  sein  Ehrenwort, 
dafi  keinerlei  Mobilmachungsordre  ergangen 77 

29.  An  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London,  Wien,  26.  Juli  1914.  Auftrag,  Sir  E. 
Grey  aufmerksam  zu  machen,  dafi  die  scbon  drei  Stunden  vor  Uber- 
reichung  der  serbiscben  Antwortnote  angeordnete  allgemeine  Mobi- 
Hsierung  der  serbiscben  Armee  beweise,  wie  wenig  Neigung  in  Belgrad 
zu  einer  friedlicben  Austragung  des  Streifalles  bestand  und  wie  unauf- 
ricbtig  der  angeblicb  versobnlicbe  Tenor  der  serbiscben  Erklarung  sei  .       78 

30.  An  die  k.  u.  k.  Botscbafter  in  Berlin,  Rom,  London,  Paris  und  St.  Peters- 
burg, Wien,  26.  Juli  1914.  Angesicbts  der  Ablebnung  der  bsterreicbisch- 
ungariscb.en  Forderungen  seitens  der  serbiscben  Regierung  sielit  sicb 
die  ki  u.  k.  Regierung  in  die  Notwendigkeit  versetzt,  Serbien  zu  einer 
grundsatzlicben  Anderung  seiner  bisberigen  feindseligen  Haltung  zu 
zwingen 78 

31.  Graf  Szdpdry,  St.  Petersburg,  27.  Juli  1914.  Der  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter 
erklart  dem  russischen  Minister  des  Aufiem,  daft  Osterreich-Ungarn 
ein  Vorstofi  am  Balkan  oder  gar  ein  Praventivkrieg  gegen  Ruftland 
vollig  feme  liege.  Das  Ziel  unserer  Aktion  sei  Selbsterhaltung  und 
Notwehr.  Osterreich-Ungarn  babe  keineswegs  die  Absicbt,  russiscbe 
Interressen  zu  bedrohen  oder  gar  mit  Ruftland  Streit  suchen  zu 
wollen.  Erorterung  der  an  Serbien  gestellten  Forderungen  Osterreich- 
Ungarns     79 

32.  An  Graf  Szdpiry  in  St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  27.  Juli  1914.  K.  u.  k. 
Regierung   erklart,    daft  die  Monarchic,    solange    der   Krieg  zwischen 


VII 

Seite 
Gsterreicli-Ungarn  und  Serbien  lokalisiert  bleibe,   keinerlei  territoriale  , 
Eroberungen  beabsicbtige 80 

33.  Graf  Szogy^ny,  Berlin,  27.  Juli  1914.  „Militarische  Vorsorgen"  in 
Ruliland 80 

34.  An  die  k.  u.  k.  Botscbafter  in  Berlin,  Rom,  London,  Paris  und 
St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  27.  Juli  1914.  Mitteilung  der  Note  der  konig- 
licb  serbiscben  Regierung  vom  12./25.  Juli  1914  und  des  Kom- 
mentares  der  k.  u.  k.  Regierung  zu  dieser  Note  .    1 80 

35.  Graf  Szogy^ny,  Berlin,  28.  Juli  1914.  Der  engliscbe  Vorscblag,  den 
osterreicbisch-ungariscb-serbiscben  Streitfall  einer  in  London  abzu- 
baltenden  Konferenz  zur  Regelung  zu  iiberlassen,  wurde  ^ron  Deutscb- 
land  abgelebnt,  da  es  seinen .  Bundesgenossen  in  der  Auseinander- 
setzung  mit  Serbien  nicbt  vor  ein  europaiscbes  Gericbt  zieben  lassen 
konne 90 

36.  Freiberr  von  Miiller,  Tokio,  28.  Juli,  1914.  Erklarung  der  offiziosen 
japaniscben  „ Times",  dali  die  japaniscbe  Regierung  im  Kriegsfalle 
strengste  Neutralitat  bewahren  werde 90 

37.  Note    an    das    koniglich    serbiscbe    Ministerium    des    Auliern,    Wien, 

28.  Juli   1914.  Kriegserklarung  an   Serbien 90 

38.  An  Graf  Szogy6ny  in  Berlin,  Wien,  28.  JuH  1914.  Es  ist  Sir  E.  Grey 
dargelegt  worden,  dali  Osterreicb-Ungarn  weder  territoriale  Erobe- 
rungen nocb  die  Vernicbtung  der  serbiscben  Unabbangigkeit  beab- 
sicbtige,    sondern  Genugtuung    fiir    die  Vergangenbeit    und  Garantien 

•fiir  die  Zukunft  verlange.  Der  engliscbe  Konferenzvorscblag  erscbeint, 
insoweit  er  sicb  auf  unseren  Konflikt  mit  Serbien  beziebt,  angesicbts 
des  eingetretenen  Kriegszustandes  durcb  die  Ereignisse  uberbolt. 
Konzentrierung  der  engliscben  Flotte 91 

39.  An  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London,  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914.  Auftrag,  Sir 
E.  Grey  die  groGserbische  Propaganda  und  ibre  Zusammenbange  mit 
dem  Sarajevoer  Morde  auseinanderzusetzen  und  ibm  darzulegen,  dali 
das  Entgegenkommen  der  serbiscben  Antwortnote  nur  ein  scbein- 
bares  war,  bestimmt,  Europa  zu  tauscben,  so  dali  keinerlei  Garantien 

fiir  die  Zukunft  geboten  waren 92 

40.  An  Graf  Szdpdry  in  St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914.  Wunscb  der 
russiscben  Regierung,  mit  dem  Wiener  Kabinette  bebufs  Abanderung 
einzelner  seitens  Osterreicb-Ungarns  an  Serbien  gerichteten  Forde- 
rungen  zu  verbandeln.  Dieser  Wunscb  muiite  abgelebnt  werden,  da 
die  gestellten  Forderungen  unerlalilicb  sind,  um  die  gegen  den  Be- 
stand  der  Monarcbie  gericbtete  serbiscbe  Bewegung  zum  Stillstand  zu 
bringen.    Serbien    babe    bereits    durcb    Anordnung    der    allgemeinen 


vm 

Seite 
Mobilisierung    einen    feindseligen  Akt    begangen.   Trotzdem   habe  die 
k;  u.  k.  Kegierung  noch  drei  Tage    gewartet.    Nun    babe  Serbien  die 
'  Feindseligkeiten  an  der  ungarischen  Grenze  eroffnet.    Eine    friedlicbe 
Sanierung  des  Yerhaltnisses  zu  Serbien  sei,  nunmebr  unmoglicb      .    .      93 

41.  An  Graf  Mensdorfif  in  London,  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914.  Der  engliscbe 
Botschafter  bat  den  Konferenzvorscblag  Sir  E.  Greys  dem  k.  u.  k. 
Minister  des  AuBem  auseinandergesetzt  und  Englands  Vermittlung  im 
Konflikte  zwiscben  Osterreicb-Ungarn  und  Serbien  angeboten.  Es 
wurde  ibm  erwidert,  dali  die  Verbinderung  der  Feindseligkeiten  infolge 
Kriegsausbrucbes  nicbt  mebr  moglicb  sei.  Ein  Transigieren  auf  Grund 
der  serbiscben  Antwortnote  sei  angesicbts  der  woblbekannten  serbiscben 
Winkelzuge  nicbt  moglicb.  Der  Friede  wiirde  nicbt  dadurcb  gerettet 
werden,  dali  sicb  Groiimacbte  binter  Serbien  stellen  und  fiir  dessen 
Straffreibeit  eintreten.  Serbien  wiirde  crmutigt  und  der  Friede  bald 
wieder  in  Frage  gestellt  werden 94^ 

42.  An  Graf  Szogy^ny  in  Berlin,  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914,  Ersucben  an  die 
deutscbe  Kegierung,  das  russiscbe  Kabinett  darauf  aufmerksam  zu 
macbenj  daC  die  Mobilisierung  der  Militarb^zirke  Kiew,  Odessa, 
Moskau  und  Kasan  Buier  Bedrobung  Osterreicb-Ungams  gleicbkame 
und  von  der  Monarcbie  und  Deutscbland  mit  den  weitestgebenden 
militariscben  Gegenmaliregeln  beantwortet  werden  miiiite 96 

43.  An  Graf  Szogy^ny  in  Berlin,  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914.  Deutscbe  Regierung 
bat  Anregung  Sir  E.  Greys,  dali  das  Wiener  Kabinett  die  Ant- 
wortnote der  serbiscben  Regierung  als  gentigend  betracbte  oder  als 
Grundlage    fur   Besprecbungen    unter   den  Kabinetteii    annebme,    der 

k.  u.  k.  Regierung  zur  Ervvagung  iibermittelt 96 

.44.  An  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  St.  Petersburg,  London,  Paris  und  Rom, 
Wien,  29.  Juli  1914.  Im  Hinblicke  auf  die  oben  erwabnte  Anregung 
Sir  E.  Greys  werden  die  Griinde  wiederbolt,  wesbalb  die  ser- 
biscbe  Antwortnote  ungeniigend  und  binterbaltig  ist.  Die  Annabme, 
als  ob  die  Aktion  Osterreicb-Ungams  gegen  Serbien  Rutland  und 
dessen  Einfluii  am  Balkan  treffen  wolle,  batte  zur  Yoraussetzung,  daG 
die  gegen  die  Monarcbie  gericbtete  Propaganda  nicbt  allein  serbiscben, 
sondern  aucb  russischen  Ursprunges  sei.  Im  Zeitpunkte  des  in  Wien 
gemacbten  Scbrittes  der  deutscben  Regierung  war  Angelegenbeit  der 
serbiscben  Antwortnote  durcb  ELriegsausbrucb  scbon  iiberbolt.  Einfluii-  • 
nabme  der  engliscben  Regierung  auf  Ruliland  im  Sinne  der  Erbaltung 
des  Friedens  zwiscben  den  Grolimacbten  wiirde  dankbar  begriiiit 
werden 97 

45.  Graf  Sz^csen,  Paris,  29.  Juli  1914.  Deutscber  Botschafter  in  Paris 
wurde    beauftragt,    dortige   Regierung    aufmerksam    zu    macben,    dali 


IX 

Seite 
franzosische  militarische  "Vorbereitungen  Deutschland  zu  gleiclien  Mafi- 
nalimen  zwingen  wiirden,  wodurcli  beide  Staaten  trotz  ihrer  Friedens- 
liebe  zu  gefahrlicher  Mobilisierung  gedrangt  we.rden  kbnnten.  Deutsch- 
land zahle  auf  die  Unterstiitzung  Frankreicbs  zur  Lokalisierung  des 
Konfliktes  zwiscben  Osterreich-Ungarn  und  Serbien 98 

46.  Graf  Szogy^ny,  Berlin,  29.  Juli  1914.  Deutsche  Regierung  hat  am 
26.  Juli  in  St  Petersburg  erklaren  lassen,  daii  sich  Deutschland  bei 
einer  Fbrtsetzung  der  milifarischen  Riistungen  Ruftlands  veranlalit 
sehen  konnte,  zu  mobilisieren 99 

47.  Graf  Szdpdry,  St.  Petersburg,  29.  Juli  1914.  Der  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter 
betonte  Herm  Sazonow  gegeniiber,  dafi  daa  Wiener  Kabinett,  welches 
kein  russisches  Interesse  zu  vferletzen,  kein  serbisches  Territorium  zu 
erwerben  und  die  Souveranitat  Serbiens  nicht  anzutasten  wunsche, 
immer  bereit  sei,  mit  St.  Petersburg  iiber  osterreichisch-ungarische  und 
russische  Interessen  Fiihlung  zu  nehmen.  Die  Bedenken,  dafi  die 
gegen  Serbien  mobilisierten  siidlichen  Korps  RuMand  bedrohen,  konnten 
nicht  ernst  genommen  werden.  Es  sei  dringend  geboten,  dem  zu 
befiirchtenden  militarischen  lizitieren  ein  rasches  Ende  zu  bereiten. 
Der  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  machte  in  ernsten  Worten  auf  den  Eindruck 
aufmerksam,  den  die  bevorstehende  umfangreiche  russische  Mobili- 
sierung in  Osterreich-Ungarn  hervorrufen  wvirde 99 

48.  An  Graf  Szogy^ny  in  Berlin,  Wien,  29.  Juli  1914.  Anregung  bei 
der  deutschen  Regierung,  dali  die  k.  u.  k.  und  die  deutschen  Bot- 
schafter in  St.  Petersburg  und  Paris  angewiesen  werden,  zu  erklaren,  daO 
die  Fortsetzung  der  russischen  Mobilisierung  Gegenmaliregeln  in 
Deutschland  und  Osterreich-Ungarn  zur  Folge  hatte,  die  zu  ernsten 
Konsequenzen  fiihren  miiliten.  Osterreich-Ungarn  werde  sich  naturlich 

in  seiner  kriegerischen  Aktion  gegen  Serbien  nicht  beirren  lassen  .    *  101 

49.  An  Graf  Szdpdry  in  St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  30.  Juli  1914.  Die  k.  u.k. 
Regierung  ist  zu  einer  freundschaftlichen  Atissprache  mit  dem  St.  Peters- 
burger  Kabinette  iiber  die  die  Beziehungen  Osterreich-Ungarns  zu 
Ruliland  direkt  betreffenden  Fragen  stets  bereit 101 

50.  An  Graf  Szdpdry  in  St.  Petersburg,  Wien,  30.  Juli  1914.  Den  Klagen 
Herrn  Sazonows  gegeniiber,  dali  kein  Gedankenaustausch  zwischen 
Graf  Berchtold  und  dem  russischen  Botschafter  stattgefunden  habe, 
wird  auf  die  jungste  Ausspracbe  hingewiesen,  in  welcher  weitgehendo 
Zusicherungen  beziiglich  der  Respektierung  der  territorialen  und  sou- 
veranen  Rechte  Serbiens  erteilt  wurden.  Es  wird  hervorgehoben,  wie 
sehr  die  russische  Diplomatic  an  dem  unleidlichen  Yerhaltnisse  Oster- 
reich-Ungarns   zu   Serbien    schuld    sei.    Die    Mobilisierung   Ruiilands 


'  Sfito 

gegen  OsteiTeict-Ungam  zwingt  die  Monarcliiei  itre  Mobilisienmg  zq 
erweitem 102 

51.  An  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  London  und  St.  Petersburg,  Wien, 
.31.  Juli  1914.  Russisches  Kabinett  hat  6nglisclie  Regierung  ersucht, 
ihre  Vermittlung  zwiscben  Osterreicb-Ungarn  nnd  Serbien  wieder  axif- 
zunebmen  unter  der  Bedingung  der  vorlaufigen  Einstellung  der  Feind- 
seligkeiten.  Sir  E.  Grey  bat  die  Vermittlung  Frankreichs,  Englands, 
Italiens  und  Deutschlands  angeregt.  Die  k.  u.  k.  Regierung  ist  geme 
bereit,  dem  Vorscblage  Sir  E.  Greys  naberzutreten  unter  der  Voraus- 
setzung,  daii  die  militariscbe  Aktion  gegen  Serbien  vorlaufig 
ihren  Fortgang  nebme  und  daO  Ruliland  die  gegen  Osterreicb-Ungam 
gericbtete  Mobilisierung  zum  StUlstande  bringe 103 

52.  Graf  Szdpdry,  St.  Petersburg,  31.  Juli  1914.  .AUgemeine  Mobilisierung. 
der  russiscben  Armee  und  Flotte    .    . .  :•    ..    .    .  .104 

53.  An  die  k.  u.  k.  Missionen,  Wien,  31.  Juli  1914.  Notwendigkeit  mili- 
tariscber  Malinebmen  in  Galizien  angesicbts  der  russiscben  Mobilisie- 
rung. Diese  sind  rein  defensiven  Cbarakters  . 104 

64.  Graf  Sz^csen,  Paris,  31.  Juli  1914.  Erklarung  der  deutscben  Regie- 
rung  in  Paris,  dali  Deutscbland  gleicbfalls  mobilisieren  werde,  wenn 
die  russiscbe  Mobilisierung  nicbt  binnen  zwolf  Stunden  eingestellt 
wird.  Anfrage,  ob  Frankreicb  im  Falle  deutscb-russiscben  Krieges 
neutral  bleiben  werde 3l05 

55.  Graf  Szdpdry,  St.  Petersburg,  31.  Juli  1914.  Ruliland  gibt  sich  selbst 
mit  der  formellen  Erklarung  nicbt  zufrieden,  dali  Osterreicb-Unganx 
weder  das  serbisebe  Territorium  schmalem  nocb  die  serbiscbe  Souve* 
ranitat  antasten,  nocb  aucb  die  russiscben  Balkan-  oder  sonstigen 
Interessen  verletzen  werde,  und  hat  die  allgemeine  Mobilisierung 
angeordnet .....'.........    10& 

56.  Graf  Szdpdry,  St.  Petersburg,  1.  August  1914.  Der  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter 
bringt  nochmals  den  guten  Willen  des  Wiener  Kabinettes  zum  Aus- 
druck,  mit  RuRland  auf  breitester  Basis  zu  verhandeln.  Herr  Sazonow 
spricht  Ansicht  aus,  daO  ihm  Unterhandlungen  in  St.  Petersburg 
weniger  erfolgversprecbend  erscheinen  als  solche  auf  dem  neutralen 
Londoner  Terrain 106 

67.  Graf  Szogy6ny,  Berlin,  2.  August  1914.  Ruliland  bat  Kriegsmalinahmen 
gegen  Osterreicb-Ungarn  und  Deutscbland  nicbt  eingestellt.  Russiscbe, 
Truppen  haben  die  deutsche  Grenze  iiberschritten.  Deutscbland,  das 
somit  angegriflfen  ist,  betrachtet  sich  als  im  Kriegszustande  mit  Ruliland  107 

68.  Graf  Mensdorff,  London,  4.  August  1914.  Ultimatum  Englands  an 
Deutscbland.    Erklarung    Sir    E.    Greys,    solange    Osterreicb-Ungari^ 


XI 

'  Seife 

nicht  im  Kriegszustande   mit   Frankreich,   sei   keine  Veranlassung   zu 
einem  Konflikte  zwischen  England  und  der  Monarchle     .    .    .    .    .    .   lOt 

.59,  An  Graf  Szdpdry  in  St.'  Petersburg,  Wien,  5.  August  1914.  Kriegs- 
zustand  zwischen  Osterreich-Ungarn  und  RuBlatid  infolge  der  drohen- 
den  Haltung  Rufilands  im  osterreicliiscli-ungariscli-serbisclien  Konflikte 
und  der  Eroffnung  der  Feindseligkeiten  gegen  Deutschland      ,    .    .    .   10& 

6^0.  An  Graf  Mensdorff  -in  London,  Wien,  6.  August  1914.  Osterreich- 
Ungam  vsdrd  keinesfalls  ohne  vorliergehende  tormelle  Kriegserklarung 
die  Feindseligkeiten  gegen  England  eroflFnen.  Erwartet  analoges  Ver- 
lialten  Englands 108 

61.  Graf  Sz6csen,  Paris,  8.  August  1914.  Anfrage  der  franzosischen 
Regierung,  ob  die  Nacbriclit  ricbtig  sei,  dali  das  Innsbrucker  Armee- 
korps  an  die  franzosische  Grenze  verscboben  worden  sei     .    .    .    .    .   109 

62.  An  Graf  Sz6csen  in  Paris,  Wien,  9.  August  1914.  l^acbricht  von  der 
Teilnahme  eines  osterreicbiscb-ungariscben  Armeekorpers  am  deutscb- 
franzosiscben  Kriege  ist  vollsfandig  erfunden 109 

63.  Graf  Sz6csen,  Paris,  10.  August  1914.  Franzosiscbe  Regierung,  welcbe 
Nacbricbt  erbielt,  daO  ein  osterreicbiscb-ungariscbes  Armeekorps  nacb 
Deutscbland  gebracbt  worden  sei,  erblickt  bierin  eine  militariscbe 
"Hilfeleistung  an  Deutscbland  und  bat  daber  den  franzbsiscben  Bot- 
scbafter  in  Wien  beauftragt,  seine  Passe  zu  verlangen 109^ 

64.  An  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London,  Wien,  11.  August  1914.  Auftrag, 
engliscber  Regierung  mitzuteilen,  daft  die  Nacbricbt  der  Entsendung 
eines  osterreicbiscb-ungariscben  Armeekorps  nacb  Deutscbland  vollig 
unbegriindet  sei 110 

65.  Graf  Mensdorff,  London,  12.'  August  1914.  Kriegserklarung  Frank- 
reicbs  und  Englands  an  Osterreicb-Ungam Ill 

66.  Note  des  japaniscben  Botscbaffcers  in  Wien  an  Graf  Bercbtold,  Wien, 
20.  August  1914.  Mitteilung  des  am  .15.  August  seitens  Japans  an 
Deutscbland  gericbteten  Ultimatums 112 

.67.  An  Graf  Clary  in  Brussel,  Wien,  22.  August  1914.  Auftrag,  der 
belgiscben  Regierung  mitzuteilen,  daft  Osterreicb-Ungam  angesicbts 
der  militariscben  Kooperation  Belgiens  mit  Frankreicb  und  England 
gegen  Deutscbland  und  der  inbumanen  Bebandlung  der  oster- 
reicbiscben  und  ungariscben  Staatsangeborigen  in  Belgien  gezwungen 
ist,  die  diplomatiscben  Beziehungen  zu  dem  Konigreicbe  abzubrecben 
und  daft  nunmebr  der  Kriegs;z;ustand  eingetreten  ist 114 


xn 

Seite 
6S.  Prinz   Hohenlohe,   Berlin,  23.  August  1914.    Deutsche  Regierung  Tafit 
japanisches  Ultimatum  unbeantwortet  mid  stellt  japardscliem  Gesoliafts- 
trager  in  Berlin  seine  Passe  zu 114 

69.  An  Freiherrn  von  Miiller  in  Tokio,  Wien,  24.  August  1914.  Angesichts 
des  Vorgetens  Japans  gegen  das  Deutsche  Reich  erhielt  der  Kom- 
mandant  S.  M.  S.  „ Elisabeth"  den  Auftrag,  in  Tsingtau  mitzu- 
kampfen,  nnd  wird  der  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  von  Tokio  abberufen  .    .115 


Legationsrat  Ritter  von  Storck  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Belgrad,  29.  Juni  1914, 

Wir  alle  stehen  noch  immer  derart  unter  dem  erschiitternden  Eindruck  der 
gestrigen  Katastrophe,  daO  es  mir  schwer  fallt,  mit  der  notigen  Fassung,  Sacli- 
lictkeit  und  Ruhe  das  blutige  Drama  in  Sarajevo  von  hier  aus  entsprechend  zu 
beurteilen.  Ich  bitte  daher,  mich  vorlaufig  auf  die  Registrierung  einiger  Tat- 
sachen  beschranken  zu  diirfen. 

Gestem  —  den  15./28.  —  wurde  der  Jahrestag  der  Schlacht  am  Amsel- 
felde  festlicber  als  sonst  begangen  und  der  serbiscbe  Patriot  Milos  Obilid  ge- 
feiert,  der  1389  mit  zwei  Gefahrten  den  siegreicben  Murad  meuchlings  er- 
stocben  bat. 

Wo  Serben  leben,  gilt.  Obili<i  als  der  Nationalberos.  An  die  Stelle  der 
Tiirken  sind  aber  —  dank  der  unter  der  Agyde  der  koniglicben  Regierung  ge- 
zucbteten  Propaganda  und  der  seit  Jabren  betriebenen  Prefibetze  —  nunmebr 
wir  als  die  Erbfeinde  getreten. 

Den  drei  jugendlicben  Sarajevoer  Attentatem  Princip,  Cabrinovi<S  und  dem 
dritten  unbekannten  Bombenwerfer  scbeint  daber  eine  Wiederbolung  des  Dramas 
auf  dem  Kossovopolje  vorgescbwebt  zu  baben.  Sie  haben  nocb  eineunscbuldige 
Frau  miterschossen  und  mogen  glauben,  damit  ibr  Vorbild  nocb  ubertroffen  zu 
baben. 

Jabrelang  ist  in  Serbien  Hali  gegen  die  Monarcbie  gesat  worden.  Die 
Saat  ist  aufgegangen  und  Mord  ward  geerntet. 

Die  serbiscbe  Regierung  bat  auf  die  zirka  5  Uhr  nacbmittags  bekaniit- 
gewordene  Nacbricbt  bin  die  Obiii<5-Feier  um  10  Ubr  abends  offiziell  abstoppen 
lassen;  inoffiziell  und  in  der  Dunkelbeit  bat  sie  aber  nocb  geraume  Zeit  weiter 
gedauert. 

Die  Leute  soUen  sicb  vor  Freude  in  die  Arme  gefaUen  sein  (Augenzeugen) 
nnd  man  borte  Bemerkungen  wie:  „recbt  ist  ibnen  gescbeben,  wir  baben  das 
scbon  lange  erwartet,"  oder  „das  ist  die  Racbe  fiir  die  Annexion." 


2. 

Legationsrat  Ritter  von  Storck  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Belgrad,  30.  Juni  1914. 

Ich  riclitete  heute  an  den  Generalsekretar  des  Auswartigen  Ajntes,  Herrn  Gruid, 
die  naheliegende  Frage,  welche  MaOregeln  die  konigliclie  Polizei  ergrifFen  habe, 
respektive  za  ergreifen  gedenke,  um  die  Faden  des  Attentats,  welcbe  notorisch 
nach  Serbien  hinuberspielen,  zu  verfolgen. 

Seine  Erwiderung  lautete,  dali  sich  die  serbische  Polizei  bisher  mit  dem 
Gegenstand  iiberhaupt  nicht  befalit  hatte. 


Generaikonsui  Jehlitschka  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

UskUb  1.  Juli  1914. 

Am  15./28.  Juni  wurde  in  Pristina  der  Vidov-Dan  (Frohnleicbnamstag), 
an  welchem  sicb  diesmal  die  Scblacbt  auf  dem  Amselfelde  (1389)  zum 
525.  Male  jahrte,  zum  ersten  Male  offiziell  als  nBefreiungsfest"  der  serbischen 
Nation  gefeiert. 

Seit  vier  Monaten  hatte  ein  eigenes  Festkomitee  daran  gearbeitet,  dieses 
Fest  zu  einem  moglichst  feierlichen  und  zu  einer  groliartigen  nationalserbischenj 
Demonstration  zu  gestalten. 

Die  beziigliche  Propaganda  setzte  gleicbzeitig  in  Kroatien,  Dalmatien  und| 
Bosnien,  hauptsachlich  aber  in  Ungam  ein,  den  Teilnebmern  wurde  freie  Fabrt 
auf  den  serbischen  Staatsbahnen,  billige  Unterkunft  und  Verpflegung,  Unter- 
stiitzung  seitens  der  Behorden  etc.  zugesagt. 

Die  Agitation  war  eine  energische  und  zielbewuftte. 

Zur  Festfeier  in  Pristina  wurden  die  Gaste  mit  Extraziigen  gebracht. 

Die  verschiedenen  Festreden  schwelgten  in  den  historischen  Reminiszenzen, 
welche  sich  an  den  Schauplatz  des  Festes  Imiipften,  um  schlielilich  mehr  oder 
minder  das  bekannte  Thema  von  der  Yereinigung  aller  Serben  und  der  „Be- 
freiung  der  unterjochten  Briider"  jenseits  der  Donau  und  der  Save,  ferner  in 
Bosnien  und  Dalmatien  zu  variieren. 


Als  sict  in  den  Abendstunden  die  Nachriclit  von  der  entsetzlichen  Schand- 
tat,  deren  Schauplatz  Sarajevo  gewesen  war,  verbreitete,  bema,cbtigte  sicb  der 
fanatisierten  Menge  eine  Stimmimg,  welcbe  icb  nacli  den  zahbreichen  Beifalls- 
aulieru'ngen,  welcbe  mir  von  meinen  absolut  verlafilicben  Gewabrsmannem  ge- 
meldet  werden,  nicbt  anders  als  unmenscblicb  bezeicbnen  kanp. 

Angesicbts  dieser  Haltung  der  Bevblkerung,  welcbe  in  gleicber  Weise  aucb 
in  tiskiib  zu  Tage  trat,  fallen  alle  Versucbe  der  serbiscben  Presse,  die  moraliscbe 
Verantwortung  fiir  die  Tat,  welcbe  von  einer  reprasentativen  Versammlung  mit 
solcb  unverboblener  Genugtuung  aufgenommen  wird,  von  Serbien  abzuscbiitteln, 
in  ein  erbarmlicbes  Nicbts  zusammen. 


Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Puris,  4.  Juli  1914. 

Icb  babe  beute  Herrn  Poincar6  den  Dank  der  k.  u.  k.  Regierung  fiir  sein 
Beileid  ubermittelt. 

Auf  die  serbenfeindlicben  Demonstrationen  bei  uns  anspielend,  erwabnte 
er,  dafi  nacb  der  Ermordung  des  Priisidenten  Carnot  in  ganz  Frankreicb  alle 
Italiener   den    argsten  Verfolgungen    seitens  der  Bevolkerung   ausgesetzt  waren. 

Icb  macbte  ibn  darauf  aufmerksam,  dali  die  daraalige  Bluttat  mit  keinerlei 
antifranzbsiscber  Agitation  in  Italien  im  Zusammenbange  stand,  wabrend  man 
jetzt  zugeben  muli,  dali  in  Serbien  seit  Jabren  mit  alien  erlaubten  und 
unerlaubten  Mitteln  gegen  die  Monarcbie  gebetzt  wird. 

Zum  Scblusse  spracb  Herr  Poincar6  die  Uberzeugung  aus,  die  serbiscbe 
Eegierang  werde  uns  bei  der  gericbtlicben  Untersucbung  und  der  Verfolgung 
eventueller  Mitscbuldiger  das  grolite  Entgegenkommen  zeigen.  Eiiier  solcben 
Pflicbt  konne  sicb  kein  Staat  entzieben. 


5. 
Gerent  Herr  Hoflehner  an  Graf  Berchtofd. 

J^isch,  6.  Jult  WM. 

Die  Nachricht  vom  entsetzliclien,  nar  zu  wotlgelungenen  Attentate  in 
Sarajevo  rief  tier  Sensation  im  volisten  Sinne  des  Wortes  hervor.  Von  Bestiirzung 
oder  aber  Entriistung  war  so  gut  wie  nichts  zu  bemerken,  in  weitaus  vor- 
herrscbendem  Malie  kamen  nur  Empfindungen  d^r  Genugtuung,  ja  der  Freude, 
und  dies  vielfacb  ganz  unverbiillt,  obne  jede  Zuriickbaltung,  nicbt  selten  in  ganz 
rober  Form  zum  Ausdrucke.  Dies  gilt  hauptsacblicb  fiir  die  sogenannten  fubren- 
den  Kreise,  die  Intelligenz,  wie  Berufspolitiker,  Lebrpersonen,  Beamte,  Offiziere 
und  die  Studentenscbaft.  Etwas  zuriickbaltender  zeigte  sicb  nocb  die  Kauf- 
mannscbaft. 

AUe  Erklarungen,  die  seitens  serbiscber  amtlicber  Stellen  oder  einzelner 
boberer  Personlicbkeiten  abgegeben  wurden  und  die  Entriistung  iiber  das 
Attentat  und  dessen  \erurteilung  zum  Ausdruck  bringen  sollfen,  miissen  als 
bitterste  Ironie  auf  den  wirken,  der  Gelegenbeit  batte,  in  d^n  jiingst  ver- 
flossenen  Tagen  in  nacbster  Nabe  Einblicke  in  das  Gefuhlsleben  der  serbiscben 
intelligenten  Bevolkerung  zu  gewinnen. 

Der  Gefertigte  batte  am  Tage  des  Attentates  gegen  9  Ubr  abends  obne: 
Abnung  nocb  vom  Gescbebenen  ein  biesiges  Gartenkaffee  besucbt  und  wurde 
bier  zuerst  von  einem  Bekannten  iiber  das  ganz  bestimmt  aufgetretene  Geriicbt 
in  Kenntnis  gesetzt.  Es-  war  eine  Pein  sondergleicben  zu  beobacbten  und  zu 
boren,  wie  eine  formlicb  froblicbe  Stiramung  die  zablreicben  Gaste  des  Lokales 
erfaftt  batte,  mit  welcbei^  ersicbtlicben  Genugtuung  man  iiber  die  Tat  debattierte 
und  wie  Ausrufe  der  Freude,  des  Hobnes  und  Spottes  aufflattenen  —  selbst  den 
an  Ausbrucbe  des  bier  berrscbenden  politiscben  Fanatismus  seit  lajigem 
Gewobnten  muiiten  diese  Wabrnebmungen  aufs  aulierste  deprimiereni 


Freiherr  von  GiesI  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Belgrad,  21.  Juli  1914, 

Icb  bin  nunmebr  —  nacb  dem  ungliickseligen  Verbrecben  vom  28.  Juni  — 
wieder  seit  einiger  Zeit  auf  meinem  Posten  und  kann  mir  erlauben^  tiber  di» 
bier  berrscbende  Stimmung  ein  Urteil  abzugeben. 


Seit  der  Annexionskrise,  waren  die  Beziehungen  zwischen  der  Monarchie 
und  Serbien  auf  Seite  des  letzteren  durch  nationalen  Chauvinismus,  Feindselig- 
keit  und  eine  wirksame  Propaganda  der  groliserbisclien  Aspirationen  in  unseren 
von  Serben  bewohnten  Landem  vergiftet,  seit  den  letzten  beiden  Balkankriegen 
hat  der  Erfolg  Serbiens  diesen  Chauvinismus  zum  Paroxismus  gesteigert,  dessen 
Ausbriiche  stellenweise  den  Stempel  des  Wahnsinns  tragen. 

Es  sei  mir  erspart,  hiefiir  Beweise  und  Beispiele  erbringen  zu  miissen, 
sie  sind  uberall  and  immer  in  den  Kreisen  der  politischen  Gesellschaft  wie 
unter  dem  niederen  Volke,  in  alien  Parteien  billig  zu  haben!  Ich  stelle  es  als. 
bekanntes  Axiom  hin,  daft  die  Politik  Serbiens  auf  die  Abtrennung  der  von. 
Siidslawen  bewohnten  Gebiete  und  in  weiterer  Folge  auf  die  Vernichtung  der 
Monarchie  als  Groiimacht  aufgebaut  ist  und  nur  dieses  eine  Ziel  kennt. 

Niemand,  der  auch  nur  acht  Tage  in  dem  hiesigen  politischen  Milieu  zu 
ieben  und  zu  wirken  bemiiiiigt  ist,  wdrd  sich  dieser  Wahi'heit  verschlielien. 

Infolge  der  jiingsten  Ereignisse,  welche  die  hiesigen  politischen  Stimmun^en 
beeinflussen,  und  dazu  rechne  ich  das  Attentat  in  Sarajevo,  den  Tod  Hartwigs 
und  die  Wahlkampagne,  -  hat  sich  der  Hali  gegen    die  Monarchie   noch  vertieft. 

Das  Attentat  in  Sarajevo  hat  den  Serben  den  bevorstehenden  Zerfall  der 
habsburgischen  Staaten  —  auf  welchen  man  schon  friiher  seine  Hoffnungen 
setzte  —  als  in  kiirzester  Zeit  zu  erwarten,  den  Abfall  der  von  Siidslawen 
bewohnten  Gebiete  der  Monarchie,  die  Revolution  in  Bosnien-Herzegowina  iind 
die  Unverlalilichkeit  der  slawischen  Regimentcr  —  als  feststehende  Tatsachen 
vorgegaukelt  und  bfachte  System  und  scheinbare  Berechtigung  in  ihren  natioriali- 
stischen  Wahnsinn. 

Das  so  verhalite  Osterreich-Ungarn  erscheint  den  Serben  nunmehr  ohn- 
machtig  und  kaum  mehr  wurdig,  einen  Krieg  mit  ihm  zu  fiihren  —  zum 
Hasse  gesellt  sich  die  Verachtung  —  es  fallt  ohne  Miihe  als  zermiirbter  Korper 
in  den  SchoO  des  in  naher  Zukunft  zu  verwirklichenden  groliserbischen  Reiches. 

Blatter,  welche  nicht  zu  den  allerextremsten  gehoren,  besprechen  in  tag- 
lichen  Artikeln  die  Ohnmacht  und  den  Zerfall  der  .Nachbarmonarchie  und. 
beschimpfen  ohne  Scheu  und  Furcht  vor  Ahndung  ihre  Organe.  Sie  machen 
selbst  vor  der  erhabenen  Person  unseres  Herrschers  nicht  Halt.  Sogar  das 
Regierungsorgan  weist  auf  die  Zustande  in  Osterreich-Ungarn  als  auf  die 
einzigen  Ursachen  des  fluchwurdigen  Verbrechens  hin.  Die  Furcht  vor  Verant- 
wortung  besteht  nicht  mehr.  Das  serbische  Volk  wird  seit  Jahrzehnten  durch 
die  Presse  erzogen  und  die  jeweilige  Politik  hangt  von  der  Parteipresse  ab; 
eine  Frucht  dieser  Erziehung  ist  die  groBserbische  Propaganda  und  ihre  abscheu- 
liche  Ausgeburt,  das  Attentat  vom  28.  Juni. 

Ich  tibergehe  die  an  "Wahnwitz  streifenden,  von  der  t„ Times"  als  „tob- 
suchtig"    bezeichneten    Anklagen    und    Verdachtigungen    anlalilich    des:   Todes 


6 

Hart  wigs,  iiberhaupt  die  lugenhafte  Prefikampagne,  welche  aber  die  Serben  in 
der  Uberzeugung  bestarken  diirfte,  dali  die  Regierung  und  die  Vertreter  Oster- 
reich-Ungarns  vogelfrei  sind,  und  Bezeichnungen  wie  Morder,  Lump,  infamer 
Osteneicher  etc.  fiir  uns  als  schmiickende  Beiworter  gelten  miissen. 

Der  Tod  Hartwigs  hat  in  der  Erkenntnis  der  Schwere  dieses  Yerlusftes  in 
der  serbischen  politischen  Welt  einen  fanatischen  Kultus  des  Verstorbenen  aus- 
gelost  und  man  lieli  sich  dabei  nicht  allein  von  der  Dankbarkeit  fiir  die  Ver- 
gangenhe'it,  sondern  auch  von  der  Sorge  um  die  Zukunft  leiten  und  liberbot 
sich  in  sklavischer  Unterwurfigkeit  vor  Rufiland,  um  dessen  Wohlwollen  fiir 
komraende  Zeiten  zu  sichern. 

Als  dritter  Faktor  vereinigt  die  Wahlkampagne  alle  Parteien  auf  der  Platt- 
form  der  Feindseligkeiten  gegen  Osterreich-Ungarn.  Keine  der  auf  die  Regie- 
rungsgewalt  aspirierenden  Parteien  will  in  den  Verdacht  kommen,  eines 
schwachlichen.  Nachgebens  gegeniiber  der  Monarchie  fiir  fahig  gehalten  zu 
werden.  So  wird  die  Wahlkampagne  unter  dem  Schlagworte  der  Bekampfung 
Osteixeich-Ungarns  gefiihrt. 

Man  halt  die  Monarchie  aus  inneren  und  Sufieren  Griinden  fiir  ohnmachtig, 
zu  jeder  energischen  Aktion  unfahig  und  glaubt,  dali  die  ernsten  Worte,  die 
schon  an  maiigebenden  Stellen  bei  uns  gesprochen  worden  sind,  nur 
Bluff  seien. 

Die  Urlaube  des  k.  u.  k.  Kxiegsministers  und  Chefs  des  Generalstabes  haben 
in  der  Uberzeugung  bestarkt,  daO  die  Schwache  Osterreich-Ungams  nunmehr 
evident  ist. 

Ich  habe  die  Geduld  Euer  Exzellenz  etwas  i'anger  in  Anspruch  zu  nehmen 
.mir  erlaubt,  nicht  weil  ich  mit  Vorstehendem  etwas  Neues  zu  bringen  glaubte, 
sondern  weil  ich  diese  Schilderung  als  Ausgang  zu  der  sich  aufdrangenden 
Konklusion  betrachte,  daO  eine  Abrechnung  mit  Serbien,  ein  Krieg  um  die 
Grolimachtstellung  der  Monarchie,  ja  um  ihre  Existenz  als  solche,  auf  die  Dauer 
nicht  zu  umgehen  ist. 

Versaumen  wir  es,  Klarheit  in  unser  Verhaltnis  zu  Serbien  zu  bringen, 
so  werden  wir  mitschuldig  an  den  Schwierigkeiten  und  der  Ungunst  der  Ver- 
haltnisse  bei  einem  kiinftigen  Kampfe,  dejr  doch,  ob  friiher  oder  spater,  aus- 
getragen  werden  muli. 

Fiir  den  lokalen  Beobachter  und  den  Vertreter  der  osterreichisch-ungarischen 
Interessen  in  Serbien  stellt  sich  die  Frage  so,  daii  wir  eine  weitere  Schddigung 
unseres  Prestiges  nicht  mehr  ertragen  konnen. 

Sollten  wir  daher  entschlossen  sein,  weitgehende  Forderungen,  verbunden 
mit  wirksamer  Kontrolle  —  denn  nur  eine  solche  konnte  den  Augiasstall  der 
groliserbischen  Wiihlarbeit  reinigen  —  zu  stellen,  dann  muliten  alle  moglichen 


Konsequenzen  iiberblickt  werden  und  es  muji  von  Anfang   an   der   starke    und 
feste  Wille  bestehen,  durchzubalten. 

Halbe  Mittel,  ein  Stellen  von  Forderungen,  langes  Parlamentieren  und 
scblieGlich  ein  faules  Kompromili  ware  der  harteste  Schlag,  der  Osterreioh- 
Ungarns  Ansehen  in  Serbien  und  seine  Machtstellung  in  Europa  treffen  konnte. 


7. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  Freiherrn  von  GiesI  in  Belgrad. 

Wien,  am  22.  Juli  1914, 

Euer  Hocbwohlgeboren  woUen  die  nachfolgende  •  Note  am  Donnerstag,  den 
23.  Juli  nachmittags,  der  koniglicben  Regierung  iiberreichen: 

„Le  31  mars  1909  le  Ministre  de  Serbie  k  Vienne  a  fait  d'ordre  de  son 
Gouvernement  au  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  la  declaration  suivante: 

„„La  Serbie  reconnait  qu'elle  n'a  pas  6t6  atteinte  dans  ses  droits  par  le 
fait  accompli  cr66  en  Bosnie-Herc6govine  et  qu'elle  se  conformera  par  conse- 
quent k  telle  decision  que  les  Puissances  prendront  par  rapport  k  I'article  XXV 
du  Traite»  de  Berlin.  Se  rendant  aux  conseils  des  Grandes  Puissances,  la  Serbie 
s'engage  d6s  k  present  h.  abandonner  I'attitude  de  protestation  et  d'opposition 
qu'elle  a  observe e  a  regard  de  1' annexion  depuis  I'automne  dernier,  et  elle 
s'engage,  en  outre,  a  changer  le  cours  de  sa  politique  actuelle  envers  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  pour  vivre  desormais  avec  cette  derni^re  sur  le  pied  d'un  bon  voisinage."  " 

Or,  I'histoire  des  derni^res  annees,  6t  notamment  les  evenements  douloureux 
du  28  juin,  ont  demontre  I'existence  en  Serbie  d'un  mouvement  subversif 
dont  le  but  est  de  detacher  de  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise  certaines  parties 
de  ses  territoiies.  Ce  mouvement  qui  a  pris  jour  spus  les  yeux  du  Gouverne'- 
ment  Serbe  est  arrive  h.  se  manifester  au  delk  du  territoire  du  Royaume  par 
des  actes  de  terrorisme,  par  une  serie  d'attentats  et  par  des  meurtres. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  Serbe,  loin  de  satisfaire  aux  engagements  formels 
contenus  dans  la  declaration  "  du  31  mars  1909,  n'a  rien  fait  pouc  supprimer 
ce  mouvement:  il  a  toiere  I'activite  criminelle  des.  differentes  societes  et  affilia- 
tions dirigees  contre  la  Monarchie,  le  langage  effrene  de  la  presse,  la  glorifica- 
tion des  auteurs  d'attentats,  la  participation  d'officiers  et  de  fonctionnaires  dans 
les  agissements  subversifs,  une  propagande  malsaine  dans  I'instruction  publique, 
toiere  enfin  toutes  les  manifestations  qui  pouvaient  induire  la  population  serbe 
•k  la  haine  de  la  Monarchie  et  au  mepris  de  ses  institutions. 


Cette  tol6rance  coupable  du  Gouvernement  Royal  de  Serbie  n'avait  pas 
cess6  au  moment  ou  les  6v6nements  du  28  juin  dernier  en  ont  d6montr6  au 
monde  entier  les  consequences  funestes: 

II  r^sulte  des  depositions  et  aveux  d'es  auteurs  criminels  de  I'attentat  du 
28  juin  que  le  meurtre  de  Sarajevo  a  6t6  tram6  a  Belgrade,  que  les  armes 
et  explosifs  dont  les  meurtriers  se  trouvaient  etre  munis,  leur  ont  6t6  donn6s 
par  des  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  serbes  faisant  partie  de  la  „Narodna  Odbrana" 
et  enfin  qne  le  passage  en  Bosnie  des  criminels  et  de  leurs  armes  a  6t6  orga- 
nist et  effectue  par  des  chefs  du  service-frontifere  serbe. 

Les  r^sultats  mentionnes  de  I'instrQCtion  ne  permettent  pas  au  Gouverne- 
ment I.  et  R.  de  poursuivre  plus  longtemps  Tattitude  de  longanimity  expectative 
qu'il  avait  observ6e  pendant  des  annees  vis-a-vis  des  agissements  concentres 
a  Belgrade  et  propag^s  de  Ik  sur  les  territoires  de  la  Monarcbie;  ces  r^sultats 
lui  imposent  au  contraire  le  devoir  de  mettre  fin  h,  des  menses  qui  forment 
une  menace  perp6tuelle  pour  la  tranquillite  de  la  Monarchic. 

C'est  pour  atteindre  ce  but  que  le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  se  voit  oblige 
de  demander  au  Gouvernement  Serbe  I'enonciation  officieUe  qu'il  condamne 
la  propagande  dirigee  contre  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise,  c'est-k-dire  I'ensemble 
des  tendances  qui  aspirent  en  dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchic  des 
territoires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  qu'il  s'engage  a  supprimer,  par  tous  les  moyens, 
cette  propagande  criminelle  et  terroriste. 

Afin  de  donner  un  caract^re  solennel  a  cet  engagement,  le  Gouvernement 
Royal  de  Serbie  fera  publier  k  la  premiere  page  du  Journal  officiel  en  date 
du  26/13  juillet  I'enonciation  suivante: 

„„Le  Gouvernement  Royal  de  Serbie  condamne  la  propagande  dirigee 
contre  I'Autriche-Hongrie,  c'est-k-dire  I'ensemble  des  tendances  qui  aspirent  en 
dernier  lieu  k  detacher  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise  des  territoires  qui  en 
font  partie,  et  il  deplore  sinc^rement  les  consequences  funestes  de  ses  agisse- 
ments criminels. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  regrette  que  des  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  serbes 
aient  participe  k  la  propagande  susmentionnee  et  compromis  par  la  les  relations 
de  bon  voisinage  auquel  le  Gouvernement  Royal  s'etait  solennellement  engage 
par  sa  declaration  du  31  mars  1909. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  qui  desapprouve  et  repudie  toute  idee  ou  tenta- 
tive d'immixtion  dans  les  destinees  des  habitants  de  quelque  partie  de  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  consid^re  de  son  devoir  d'avertir  formellement  les  officiers, 
les  fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  population  du  Royaume  que  dorenavant  il  pro- 
cedera  avec  la  demifere  rigueur  contre  les  personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables 
de  pareils  agissements,  agissements  qu'il  mettra  tous  ses  efforts  h,  prevenir  et 
k  reprimer."" 


Cette  6nonciation  sera  port6e  simultan6ment  k  la  connaissance  de  I'Arm^e 
Koyale  par  un  ordre  du  jour  de  Sa  Majest6  le  Roi  et  sera  publico  dans  le  bulletin 
official  de  I'Arm^e. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  Serbe  s'engage  en  outre* 

1°  a  supprimer  toute  publication  qui  excite  h  ,la  haine  et  au  m6pris 
de.la  Monarchic  et  dont  la  tendance  gen^rale  est  dirigee  centre  son  int6grit6 
territoriale, 

2°  k  dissoudre  imm^diatement  la  soci6t6  dite  „Narodna  Odbrana'',  k  con- 
fisquer  tons  ses  moyens  de  propagande,  et  h  proc^der  de  la  meme  mani^re 
centre  les  autres  societes  et  affiliations  en  Serbie  qui  s'adonnent  a  la  pro- 
pagande centre  la  Monarchic  austro-hengroise;  le  Gouvernement  Royal  prendra 
les  mesures  n^cessaires  pour  que  les  soci^t^s  dissoutes  ne  puissent  pas  continuer 
leur  actiYit6  sous  un  autre  nom  et  sous  une  autre  forme, 

3°  a  ^Kminer  sans  d^lai  de  I'instraction  publique  en  Serbie,  tant  en  ce 
qui  concerne  le  corps  enseignant  que  les  moyens  d'instruction,  tout  ce  <jui  sert 
cu  pourrait  servir  a  fementer  la  propagande  centre  I'Autriche-Hengrie, 

4°  h  eloigner  du  service  militaire  et   de   I'administratien.  en  g6n6ral   tous 

les  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  ceupables  de  la  propagande    centre  la  Menarchie 

austro-hengroise  et  dont  le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  se  reserve   de  communiquer 
les  nems  et  les  faits  au  Gouvernement  Royal, 

5°  a  accepter  la  collaboration  en  Serbie  des  erganes  du  Gouvernement  I. 
et  R.  dans  la  suppression  du  mouvement  subversif  dirig6  centre  I'int^grit^ 
territoriale  de  la  Monarchic, 

6°  a  ouvrir  une  enquete  judiciaire  centre  les  partisans  du  complot 
du  28  juin  se  treuvant  sur  territoire  serbe; 

des    erganes,    d616gu6s    par   le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.,  prendront  part  aux 

recherches  y  relatives, 

7°  a  proc6der  d'urgence  h  I'arrestation  du  commandant  Veja  Tankosid  et 
du  nomm6  Milan  Ciganovid,  employ6  de  I'Etat  Serbe,  compromis  par  les 
r^sultafes  de  ['instruction  de  Sarajevo, 

8°  k  empecher,  par  des  mesures  efficaces,  le  concours  des  Autorit^s  Serbes 
dans  le  trafic  illicite  d'armes  et  d'explesifs  k  travers  la  fronti^re; 

k  licencier  et  punir  sdv^rement  les  fonctionnaires  du  service-frontifere  de 
Sabac  et  de  Loznica  ceupables  d'aveir  aid6  les  auteurs  du  crime  de  Sarajevo  en 
leur  facilitant  le  passage  de  la  fronti^re, 

9^  ^  denner  au  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.,  des  explications  sax  les  propos 
injustifiables  de  hauts  fonctionnaires  serbes  tant  en  Serbie  qu'^  I'^tranger  qui, 
;malgr^  leur  position  officielle,   n'ont  pas  h^sit^  apr^s  I'attentat  du  28  juin   de 


10 

s'exprlmer  dans  des  interviews  d'une  mani^re  hostile  envers  la  Monarchie 
austro-hongroise  enfin 

10°  d'avertir,  sans  retard,  le  Gouvememjent  I.  et  R.  de  I'ex^cution  des 
mesures  comprises  dans  les  points  pr^c^dents. 

Le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  attend  la  r6ponse  du  Gouyernement  Royal  au 
plus  tard  jusqu'au  samedi  25  de  ce  mois  ^  6  h  du  soir. 

Un  m^moire  concernant  les  r^sultats  de  Imstruction  de  Sarajevo  h.  I'^gard 
des  fonctionnaires  mentionn6s  aux  points  7  et  8  est  annex6  k,  cette  Note." 


L'instruction  criminelle  ouverto  par  le  tribunal  de  Sarajevo  coritre  Gavrilo 
Princip  et  consorts  du  chef  d'assassinat  et  de  complicity  y  relative,  crime  commis 
par  eux  le  28  juin  dr.,  a  jusqu'ici.  abouti  aux  constatations  suivantes: 

1°  Le  complot  ayant  pour  but  d'assassiner,  lors  de  son  s6jour  k  Sarajevo, 
Tai-chiduc  JFran9ois  Ferdinand  fut  form6  k  Belgrade  par  Gavrilo  Princip,  Nedeljko 
Cabrinovid,  le  nomm^  Milan  Ciganovid  et  Trifko  Grabez  avec  le  concours  du 
commandant  Voja  Tankosid. 

2°  Les  6  bombes  et  les  4  pistolets  Browning  avec  munitions,  moyennant 
lesquels  les  malfaiteurs  ont  commis  I'attentat,  furent  livr^s  ii  Belgrade  k  Pnncip, 
Cabrinovid  et  Grabez  par  le  nomme  Milan  Ciganovid  et  le  commandant  Voja 
Tankosid. 

3°  Les  bombes  sont  des  grenades  k  la  main  provenant  du  ddpot  d'armes 
de  I'arm^e  serbe  a  Kragujevac. 

4°  Pour  assurer  la  r^ussite  de  I'attentat,  Ciganovid  enseigna  a  Princip, 
Gabrinovic  et  Grabez  la  maniSre  de  se  servir  des  grenades  et  donna,  dans 
tine  foret  pr^s  du  champ  de  tir  k  Topschider,  des  le9ons  de  tir  avec  pistolets 
JBrowning  a  Princip  et  Grabez. 

5°  Pour  rendre  possible  k  Princip,  Cabrinovid  et  Grabez  de  passer  la 
fronti^re  de  Bosnie-Hercdgovine  et  d'y  introduire  clandestinement  leur  contre- 
bande  d'armes,  un  syst^me  de  transport  secret  fut  organisd  par  Ciganovid. 

D'apr^s  cette  organisation  lintroduction  en  Bosnie-Hercdgovine  des  rriai- 
faiteurs  et  de  leurs  armcs  fut  opdrde  par  les  Capitaines-fronti^re  de  Sabac 
(Rade  Popovid)  et  de  Loznica  ainsi  que  par  le  douanier  Rudivoj  Orbid  de 
Loznica  avec  le  concours  de  divers  particuliers* 


11 

Gelegentlich  der  Ubergabe  der  vorstehenden  Note  woUen  Euer  Hoch- 
wohlgeboren  miindlich  hinzufiigen,  daJi  Sie  beauftragt  seien  —  falls  Thnen  nicht 
inzwischen  eine  vorbebaltlose  zustimmende  Antwort  der  koniglichen  Regierung 
zugekommen  sein  sollte  —  nach  Ablauf  der  in  der  Note  vorgesebenen,  vom, 
Tage  and  von  der  Stunde  Ihrer  Mitteilung  an  zu  recbnenden  48stundigeix 
Frist,  mit  dem  Personale  der  k.  u.  k.  Gesandtschaft  Belgrad  zu  verlassen. 


8. 

CIraf  Berchtold  an  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  Berlin,  Rom,  Paris,  London, 
St  Petersburg  und  Konstantinopef. 

Wien,  22.  Juli  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  I,  et  R.  s'est  va  oblige  d'adresser  jeudi  le  23  de  ce  mois,  par 
I'entremise  du  Ministre  I.  et  R.  a  Belgrade,  la  Note  suivante  au  Gouvernement  Royal 
de  Serbie.  (Siehe  Weisung  an  den  k.  u.  k.  Gesandten  in  Belgrad' vom  22.  Juli  1914.) 

J'ai  I'honneur  d'inviter  Votre  Excellence  de  vouloir  porter  le  contehu  de  cette 
Note  a  la  connaissance  du  Gouvernement  aupr^s  duquel  Vous  etes  accr6dit6,,  en 
accompagnant  cette  communication  du  commentaire  que  voici: 

Le  31  mars  1909  le  Gouvernement  Royal  Serbe  a  adress6  k  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  la  declaration  dont  le  texte  est  reproduit  ci-dessus. 

Le  lendemain  meme  de  cette  declaration  la  Serbie  s'est  engag6e  dans  une 
politique  tendant  k  inspirer  des  id^es  subversives  aux  ressortissants  serbes  de 
la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise  et  k  preparer  ainsi  la  separation  des  territoires 
austro-hongrois,  limitrophes  h,  la  Serbie. 

La  Serbie  devint  le  foyer  dune  agitation  crimin'elle: 

Des  societes  et  affiliations  ne  tard^rent  pas  k  se  former  qui,  soit  ouverte- 
me.nt,  soit  clandestinement,  etaient  destinies  a  cr^er  des  d^sordres  sur  le  terri- 
toire  austro-hongrois.  Ces  societds  et  affiliations  comptent  parmi  leurs  membres 
des  gen^raux  et  des  diplomates,  des  fonctionnaires  d'Etat  et  des  juges,  bref  les 
sommites  du  monde  officiel  et  inofficiel  du  Royaume. 

Le  journalisme  serbe  est  presque  enti^rement  au  service  de  cette  propa- 
gande,  dirig^e  centre  rAutriche-Hongrie,  et  pas  un  jour  ne  passe  sans  que  les 
organes  de  la  presse  serbe  n'excitent  leurs  lecteurs  k  la  haine  et  au  m^pris  de 
la  Monarchie  voisine  ou  a  des  attentats  dirig^s  plus  ou  moins  ouvertement 
cohtre  sa  surety  et  son  integrite. 


12 

Un  grand  nombre  d'agents  est  appel6  a  soutenir  par  tous  Ics  moyeiis  I'agitation 
centre  rAutricUe-Hongiie  et  h  corrompre  dans  les  provinces  limitrophes  la 
jeunesse  de  ces  pays. 

L'esprit  conspirateur  des  politiciens  serbes,  e^sprit  dont  les  annales.du  Royaume 
portent  les  sanglantes  empreintes,.a  subi  une  recrudescence  depiiis  la  derniere  crise 
balcanique;  des  individus  jiyant  fait  partie  des  bandes  jusque  la  occupies  en  Mace- 
doine,  sont  venus  se  mettre  h,  la  disposition  de  la  propagande  terroriste  contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En  presence  de  ces  agissements  auxquels  I'Autriche-Hongrie  est  expos^e 
depuis  des  ann^es,  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Serbie  n'a  pas  cru  devoir  prendre 
la  moindre  mesure.  C'est  ainsi  que  le  Gouvernement  Serbe  a  manqu(5  au  devoir 
que  lui  imposait  la  declaration  solennelle  du  31  mars  1909,  ct  c'est  ainsi  qu'il 
s'est  mis  en  contradiction  avec  la  volenti  de  I'Europe  et  avec  Tengagement 
qu'il  avait  pris  vis-a-vis  de  rAutriche-Hongrie. 

La  longanimite  du  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  a  I'^gard  de  I'attitude  provocatrice 
de  la  Serbie  ^tait  inspir6e  du  d6sint6ressement  territorial  de  la  Monaichie  austro- 
hongroise  et  de  I'espoir  que  le  Gouvernement  Serbfe  finirait  tout  de  meme  par 
appr^cier  h  sa  juste  valeur  I'amiti^  de  rAutriche-Hongrie.  En  observant  une  attitude 
bienveillante  pour  les  int^rets  politiques  de  la  Serbie,  le  Gouvernement  1.  et  R. 
esperait  que  le  Royaume  se  d^ciderait  finalement  a  suivre  de  son  c6t4  une 
ligne  de  conduite  analogue.  L'Autriche-Hongrie  s'attendait  surtout  h  une  pareille 
6volution  dans  les  id^es  politiques  en  Serbie,  lorsque,  apr6s  les  ^v^nements  de 
I'ann^e  1912,  le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  rendit  possible  par  une  attitude  d(Ssint6ress6e 
et  sans  ranoune  I'agrandissement  si  considerable  de  la  Serbie. 

Oette  bienveillance  manifest^e  par  I'Autriche-Hongrie  h  I'dgard  de  I'Etat  voisin 
n'a  cependant  aucunement  modifie  les  pioc^dds  du  Royaume  qui  a  continue  a  tol^rer 
sur  son  tenitoire  une  propagande  dont  les  funestes  consequences  se  sont  manifestecs 
au  monde  entier  le  28  juin  dr.,  jour,  ofi  I'heritier  presomptif  de  la  Monarchic  et  son 
illustre  epouse  devinrent  les  victimes  d'un  complot  trame  a  Belgrade. 

En  presence  de  cet  etat  de  choses  le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  a  du  se  decider  a 
entreprendre  de  nouvelles  et  pressantes  demarches  a  Belgrade  afin  d'amener  le 
Gouvernement  Serbe  a  arreter  le  mouvement  incendiaire  mena9ant  la  surete  et 
I'integrlte  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise. 

Le  Gouvernement  L  et  R.  est  persuade  qu'en  entreprenant  cette-tiemarche,  il 
se  trouve  on  plein  accord  avec.  les  sentiments  de  toutes  les  nations  civilisees  qui  ne 
sauraieat  admettre  que  le  regicide  devint  une  arme  dont  on  puisse  se  servir  impune- 
ment  dans  la  lutte  politique,  et  que  la  paix  europeenne  fut  continuellemcnt  ti'oublee 
par  les  agi.ssements  partant  de  Belgrade. 

C'est  h  I'appui  de  ce  qui  precede  que  le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  tient  b.  la 
disposition  du  Gouvernement .    un  dossier 


13 

^lucidant  les  menses  serbes  et  les  rapports  existant  entrc  ses  menses  et  le  meurtre 
du  28  juin. 

Une  communication  identique  est  adress<$e  aux  Repr^sentants  Imp6riaux  ot 
Royaux  aupr^s  des  autres  Puissances  Signataires. 

Vous  etes  autoris^  de  laisser  une  copie  de  cette  d^peche  entre  les  mains  de 
Monsieur  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrang^res. 


9. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  23.  JmU  1914. 

Da  unter  den  Ententemachten  England  am  ehesten  flir  eine  objektive  Be- 
urteilung  unseres  heutigen  Sehrittes  in  Belgrad  zu  gewinnen  sein  diirfte,  ersuche 
ich  Euer  Exzellenz  bei  der  Konversation.  die  Sie  am  24.  1.  M.  gelegentlich  der 
Uberreichung  der  Zirkularnote  im  Foreign  Office  haben  werden,  unter  anderem 
auch  darauf  binzuweisen,  dali  es  Serbien  in  der  Hand  gehabt  hatte,  den  ernsten 
Scbritten,  die  es  unsererseits  erwarten  mufite,  die  Spitze  abzubrechen,  wenn  es 
seinerseits  spontan  das  Notwendige  vorgekebrt  batte,  um  auf  serbiscbem  Boden 
eine  Untersucbung  gegen  die  serbiscben  Teilnebmer  am  Attentat  vom  28.  Juni  1.  J. 
einzuleiten  und  die  Verbindungen  aufzudecken,  die  binsicbtlicb  des  Attentates 
erwiesenermaften  von  Belgrad  nacb  Sarajevo  fiibren. 

Die  serbiscbe  Regierung  bat  bis  beute,  obwobl  eine  Anzabl  notorisch 
bekannter  Indizien  nacb  Belgrad  weisen,  in  diesem  Belange  nicbt  nur  nichts 
unternommen,  sie  bat  vielmebr  die  vorbandenen  Spuren  zu  verwiscben  getracbtet. 

So  ist  einem  telegrapbiscben  Bericbt  unserer  Gesandtscbaft  in  Belgrad  zu 
entnebmen,  daft  der  durcb  die  iibereinstimmenden  Aussagen  der  Attentater 
kompromittierte  serbiscbe  Staatsbeamte  Ciganovid  am  Tage  des  Attentates  nocb 
in  Belgrad  weilte,  drei  Tage  darauf  aber,  als  sein  Name  in  den  Zeitungen 
genannt  wurde,  die  Stadt  bereits  verlassen  batte.  Bekanntlich  erklarte  aucb  scbon 
der  serbiscbe  Preficbef,  daO  Ciganovid  in  Belgrad  vollig  unbekannt  sei. 

Was  die  kurze  Befristung  unserer  Forderungen  anbelangt,  so  ist  dieselbe 
auf  unsere  langjabrigen  Erfabrungen  serbiscber  Verscbleppungskiinste  zuriick- 
zufiibren. 

Wir  konnen  die  Forderungen,  deren  Erfiillung  wir  von  Serbien  verlangen 
und  die  eigentlicb  im  Yerkebr  zwiscben  Staaten,  die  in  Friede  und  Freundscbaft 
Jeben  sollen,  nur  Selbstverstandlicbes  entbalten,  nicbt  ziim  Gegenstand  von  Ver- 
handlungen  und  Kompromissen  macben  und  konnen  mit  Riicksicht  auf  unsere  volks- 


14 


wirtscliaftliclien  Interessen  nicht  riskieren,  eine  politische  Methode,  wonacli 
Serbien  die  entstandene  Krise  nach  seinem  Belieben  zu  verlangern  in  der  Hand 
hatte,  zu  akzeptderen. 


10. 
Graf  Mensdorff  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  London ,  24.  Juli  1914. 

Zirkulamote  Sir  E.  Grey  eben  iibergeben,  der  sie  anfmerksam  durcli- 
gelesen.  Bei  Punkt  5  fragte  er,  wie  da«  zu  verstehen  sei,  Einsetzung  Organe 
unsei-er  Regierung  in  Serbien  ware  gleichbedeutend  mit  Aufhoren  staatlicber 
Upabhangigkeit  Serbiens.  Icb  «rwiderte,  Kollaboration  von  z.  B.  Polizeiorganen 
tangiere  keineswegs  Staatssouveranitat. 

Er  bedauerte  Befnstung,  weil  dadurcb  die  Moglichkeit  benommen  wiirde, 
die  erste  Erregung  zu  berubigen  und  auf  Belgrad  einzuwirken,  uns  eine  befriedi- 
gende  Antwort  zu  geben.  Ein  Ultimatum  konne  man  immer  noch  stellen,  wenn 
Antwort  nicht  annehmbar. 

Icb  fiihrte  lange  unseren  Standpunkt  aus  (Notwendigkeit  Abwebr  von  un- 
ausgesetzten  subversiven  Untemebmungen,  welche  Gebiet  der  Monarchie  bedroben, 
Verteidigung  unserer  vitalsten  Interessen,  voUkommenster  Mi^erfolg  der  vielfach 
bewiesenen  bisberigen  konzilianten  Haltung  gegeniiber  Serbien,  das  jetzt  iiber 
drei  Wocben  Zeit  hatte,  aus  eigenem  Antrieb  Untersuchung  gegen  Teilnahme 
Attentat  einzuleiten  etc.). 

Der  Herr  Staatssekretar  wiederholte  seine  Bedenken  gegen  kurze  Befristung, 
anei-kannte  aber,  daO  das,  was  iiber  Mitschuld  an  Verbrechen  von  Sarajevo 
gesagt  wird,  sowie  manche  unserer  Verlangen  berechtigt  seien. 

Er  wiirde  ganz  bereit  sein,  die  Angelegenheit  als  cine  solche  zu  betrachten, 
die  nur  Osterreich-Ungam  und  Serbien  beriihre.  Er  ist  aber  sehr  ^apprehensiv", 
daC  mebrere  Grofimachte  in  einen  Krieg  verwickelt  werden  konnten.  Von  Rut- 
land, Deutschland,  Frankreich  sprechend  bemerkte  er,  die  Bestimmungen  des 
franzosisch-russischen  Biindnisses  diirften  ungefahr  so  lauten,  wie  die  des  Drei- 
bundes. 

Ich  legte  ihm  ausfiihrlich  unseren  Standpunkt  dar  und  wiederholte  ent- 
scbieden,  dali  in  diesem  Falle  wir  fest  bleiben  miiOten,  um  uns  doch  einiger- 
malien  Garantien  zu  schaffen,  nachdem  bisherige  serbiscbe  ErkJarungen  niemals 


15 

eingehalten  wurden.  Ich  begreife,  daO  er  zunachst  nur  die  Frage  der  Ruck- 
wirkung  auf  europaischen  Frieden  erwage,  er  miisse  aber  auch,  um  unseren 
Standpunkt  zu  wiirdigen,  sich  in  unsere  Lage  versetzen. 

Er  wollte  nicbt  in  eine  nahere  Diskussion  iiber  dieses  Thema  eingeben, 
miisse  aucb  nocb  Note  genauer  studieren.  Er  zitiere  zunachst  den  deutscben  und 
den  franzosiscben  Botscbafter,  da  er  mit  den  Alliierten  Osterreicb-Ungams  und 
Ru Glands,  die  aber  selbst  keine  direkten  Interessen  in  Serbien  baben,  vor  allem 
in  Gedankenaustauscb  treten  miisse. 


11. 

Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Paris,  24.  Juli  1914. 

Soeben  dem  mit  der  Vertretung  des  abwesenden  Ministers  des  Aussern 
betrauten  Herrn  Justizminister  Weisung  vom  22.  1.  M.  vorgelesen  und  Kopio 
binterlassen.  Herr  Bienvenu  Martin,  der  durcb  beutige  Morgenblatter  vom  Inbalt 
unserer  Demarcbe  in  Belgrad  beilaufig  informiert  ^ar^  scbien  durcb  meine 
Mitteilung  ziemlicb  impressioniert.  Obne  sicbin  eine  nabere  Erbrterung  des 
Textes  einzulassen,  gab  er  bcreitwillig  zu,  dali  die  Ereignisse  der  letzten  Zeit 
und  die  Haltung  der  serbiscben  Regierung  ein  energiscbes  Einschreiten  unserer- 
seits  ganz  begreifiicb  erscbeinen  lassen. 

Punkt  5  der  in  Belgrad  iiberreicbten  Note  scbien  dem  Herrn  Minister 
besonders  aufzufallen,  denn  er  lieft  sicb  denselben  zweimal  vorlesen. 

Der  Herr  Minister  dankte  mir  fiir  meihe  Mitteilung,  die,  wie  er  sagte,  ein- 
gebend  gepiuft  werden  wiirde.  Icb  nabm  die  Gelegenbeit  wabr,  um  zu  betonen,  dafi 
es  sicb  um  eine  Frage  handle,  die  direkt  zwischen  Serbien  und  uns  ausgetragen 
werden  mufi,  dali  es  aber  im  allgemelnen  europaischen  Interesse  liege,  wenn 
die  Unrube,  die  seit  Jahren  durcb  die  serbische  Wiihlarbeit  gegen  uns  auf- 
rechterbalten  werde,  endlich  einem  klaren  Zustand  Platz  mache. 

Alle  Freunde  des  Friedens  und  der  Ordnung,  und  zu  diesen  zahle  icb 
Frankreich  in  erster  Linie,  sollten  daher  Serbien  ernstlich  raten,  seine  Haltung 
griindlich  zu  andern  und  unseren  berecbtigten  Forderungen  Rechnung  zu 
tragen. 

Der  Herr  Minister  gab  zu,  dali  Serbien  die  Pflicht  babe,  gegen  etwaige 
Komplizen  der  Mbrder  von  Sarajevo  energisch   vorzugehen,    welcher  Pflicht  es 


16 

sich  wohl  nicht  entzieKen  werde.  Unter  nachdrucklicher  Betonung  der  Sympathie 
Frankreichs  fiir  Osterreich-Ungarn  und  der  zwischen  unseren  beiden  Landern 
bestehenden  guten  Beziehungen,  sprach  er  Hoffnung  aus,  daO  die  Streitfrag-e 
friedlich,  in  einer  xmseren  Wiinschen  entsprechenden  Weise  ausgetragen 
werden  wird. 

Der  Herr  Minister   vermied  jeden  Versuch,  die  Haltung  Serbiens  irgendwie , 
zu  beschonigcn  oder  zu  verteidigen. 


12. 
Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Paris,  .24,  Juli  1914. 

Baron  Schoen  wird  auftraggemali  heute  hier  mitteilen,  daO  unsere  Kontro- 
verse  mit  Serbien  nach  Ansicht  Berliner  Kabinettes  eine  Angelegenheit  sei,  die 
nur  Osterreich-Ungarn  und  Serbien  angehe. 

Ankniipfend  hieran  wird  er  zu  verstehen  geben,  dali,  falls  dritte  Staaten 
sich  einmischen  wollten,  Deutschland,  getreu  seinen  Allianzverpflichtungen,  auf 
unserer  Seite  sein  wird. 


13. 

Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berphtold, 

Telegramm.  Paris,  24.  Juli  1914, 

Baron  Schoen.  hat  die  ihm  aufgetragene  Demarche  soeben  ausgefuhrt. 

Herr  Bienvenu  Martin  hat  ihm  gesagt,  er  konne  sich  noch  nicht  definitiv 
auGem,  soviel  konne  er  aber  schon  jetzt  sagen,  da(i  die  franzosische  Regierung 
auch  der  Ansicht  sei,  unsere  Kontr.overse  mit  Serbien  ginge  nnr  Belgrad  und 
Wien  an  und  dali  man  hier  hoffe,  dafi  die  Frage  eine  direkte  und  friedliche 
Lbsung  finden  werde. 

Dem  hiesigen  serbischen  Gesandten  wurde  bereits  der  Rat  gegeben,  seine 
Regierung  moge  in  alien  Punkten  soweit  als  nur  moglich  nachgeben,  freilich 
mit  der  Einschrankung;  „insofeme  ihre  Souveranitatsrechte  nicht  tangiert 
werden". 

Baron  Schoen  betonte  die  europaische  Notwendigkeit,  dafi  der  Herd  ewiger 
Beunruhigung  in  Belgrad  endjich  aus  der  Welt  geschaflft  werden  miisse. 


17 

14. 

Graf  Szdp^ry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Sl  Petersburg,  24.  Juli  1914: 

Der  Herr  Minister  des  AuBern  empfing  mich,  indem  er  mir  sagte,  er  wisse,  was 
mich  zu  ihm  fiihre  und  erklare  mir  gleich,  dali  er  zu  meiner  Demarcke  keino 
Stellung  nehmen  \Nrurde.  Ich  begann  mit  der  Verlesung  meipes  Auftrages.  Der 
Minister  unterbracli  mich  das  erste  Mai  bei  der  Erwahnung  der  Serie  von 
Attentaten  und  fragte  auf  mcine  Auf kl'arungeri,  •  ob  denn  erwiesen  sei,  daO  diese 
alle  in  Belgrad  ihren  Ursprung  h'atten?  Icb  betonte,  daft  sie  Ausflufi  der  serbi- 
scben  Aufwiegelung  seien.  Im  weiteren  Yerlauf  der  Verlesung  aufierte  er,  er 
wisse,  worum  es.sich  handle:  Wir  wollten  Serbien  den  Krieg  macben  und  dies 
fioUe  der  Vorwand  sein.  Ich  replizierte,  daft  unsere  Haltung  in  den  letzten 
Jahren  e.in  hinreichender  Beweis  sei,  daft  wir  Serbien  gegeniiber  Vorwande 
weder  suchen  noch  brauchen.  Die  geforderten  solennen  Enunziationen  riefen 
nicht  den  Widerspruch  des-  Herrn  Ministers  hervor;  er  versuchte  nur  immer  wieder 
zu  behailpten,  daft  Pasid  sich  bereits  in  dem  Sinne  •  ausgesprochen  habe,  was 
ich  richtig  stellte.  „!!  dira  cela  25  fois  si  vous  voulez",  sagte  er.  Ich  sagte 
ihm,  niemand  wende  sich  bei  uns  gegen  Serbiens  Integritat  oder  Dynastie.  Am 
lebhaftesten  erklarte  sich  Herr  Sazonow  gegen  die  Auflosung  der  „Narodna 
Odbrana",  die  Serbien  niemals  vornehmen  werde.  Weiteren  Widerspruch  von 
Seite  des  Herrn  Ministers  loste  die  Befeiligung  von  k.  u.  k.  Funktionaren  an-  der 
Unterdriickung  der  subversiven  Bewegung  aus.  Serbien  werde  also  daheim  nicht 
mehr  der  Herr  sein!  „Sie  werden  dann  immer  wieder  intervenieren  wollen  und 
welches  Leben  werden  Sie  da  Europa  bereiten!"  Ich  erwiderte,  es  werde,  wenn 
Serbien  guten  ^Villen  hat,  ein  ruhigeres  sein,  als  bisher. 

Den  an  die  Mitteilung  der  Note  angefiigten  Kommentar  horte  der  Herr  Minister 
ziemlich  ruhig  an;  bej  dem  Passus,  daft  wir  uns  in  unseren  Gefiihlen  mit  jenen 
aller  zivilisierten  Nationen  eins  wissen,  meinte  er,  dies  sei  ein  Irrtum.  Mit  allem 
mir  zu  Gebote  stehenden  Nachdruck  verwies  ich  -darauf,  wie  traurig  es  ware, 
wenn  wir  in  dieser  Frage,  bei  der  alles  im  Spiele  sei,  was  wir  Heiligstes  batten 
und,  was  immer  der  Herr  Minister  sagen  wolle,  auch  in  Ruftland  heilig  sei, 
kein  Verstandnis  in  Ruftland  fanden.  Der  Herr  Minister  suchte  die  monarchische 
Seite  der  Angelegenheit  zu  verkleinern. 

Das  zur  Verfiigung  der  Regierungen  gehaltene  Dossier  b'etreffend,  meinte 
Herr  Sazonow,  wozu  wir  uns  diese  Miihe  gegeben  hatten,  wo  wir  doch  bereits 
ein  Ultimatum  erlassen  hatten.  Dies  beweise  am  besten,  daft  wir  eine  unparteiische 
Priifung  des  Falles  gar  nicht  anstreben,  Ich  sagte  ihm,  daft  fiir  unser  Vorgehen 
in  dieser  zwischen  Osterreich-Ungarn  und  Serbien  spielenden  Angelegenheit  die 
durch    unsere    eigene    Untersuchung   erzielten   Resultate   geniigen   und   wir  nur- 

2 


18 

bereit  seien,  den  Machten  weltere  Aufschlusse,  falls  dieselben  sie  interessieren, 
zu  geben,  well  wir  nichts  zu  verheimliclien  batten. 

HeiT  Sazonow  meinte,  jetzt  nacb  dem  Ultimatum  sei  er  eigentlicb  gar 
nicbt  neugierig.  Er  stellte  die  Sacbe  so  dar,  als  ob  es  uns  darauf  ankomme, 
unbedingt  mit  Serbien  Krieg  zu  fiibren.  Ich  erwiderte,  wir  seien  die  fried- 
liebendste  Maebt  der  Welt,  was  wir  wollten,  sei  nup  Sicberung  unseres 
Territoriums  vor  fremden  revolutionaren  Umtrieben  und  unserer  Dynastie  vor- 
Bomben. 

Im  Verlaufe  der  weiteren  Erorterungen  lieli  Herr  Sazonow  nocbmals 
Bemerkung  fallen,  daii  wir  jedenfalls  eine  emste  Situation  gescbaffen  batten. 

Trotz  der  relativen  Rube  des  Herm  Ministers  war  seine  Stellungnabme  eine 
durcbaus  ablebnende  und  gegneriscbe. 


15. 
Communique  des  russischen  Amtsblattes. 

St.  Petersburg,  24.  Juli  1914. 

Die  St.  Petersburger  Telegrapbenagentur  meldet: 
Das  amtlicbe  Organ  veroffentlicbt  folgendes  Communique : 
Die  kaiserlicbe  Regierung,  lebbaft  besorgt  durcb  die  liberrascbenden  Ereigr 
nisse  und  durcb  das  an  Serbien  durcb  Osterreicb-Ungarn  gericbtete  Ultimatum, 
verfolgt  mit  Aufmerksamkeit  -die  Entwicklung  des  osterreicbiscb-ungariscb-serbi- 
scben  Konfliktes,  in  welcbem  Rufiland  nicbt  indifferent  bleiben  kann. 


16. 
Graf  Sz^p^ry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  St.  Petersburg,  24.  Juli  1914. 

Nacb  funfstiindigem  Ministerrate  bat  Herr  Sazonow  abends  den  deutscben 
Botscbafter  empfangen  und  mit  ibm  eine  lange  Unterredung  gebabt. 

Der  Herr  Minister  vertrat  biebei  die  wabrscbeinHcb  als  Resultat  des  Ministerrates 
zu  betracbtende  Ansicbt,  der  osterreicbiscb-ungariscb-serbiscbe  Streit  sei  keine 
auf   diese  Staaten  bescbrankte  Angelegenbeit,  sondern  eine   europaiscbe,  da  der 


19 

im  Jahre  1909  durcli  eine  serbische  Deklaration  erfolgte  Ausgleicli  unter  den 
Auspizien  ganz  Europas  vollzogen  worden  sei. 

Der  Herr  Minister  hob  hervor,  dali  ihn  besonders  der  Umstand  uiiangenehm 
beriihrt  babe,  dali  Osterreich-Ungarn  die  Priifung  eines  Dossiers  angeboten  babe, 
wabrend  bereits^ein  Ultimatum  ergangen  sei.  Ruiiland  wurde  eine  internationale 
Priifung  des  von  uns  zur  Verfugung  gestellten  Dossiers  verlangen.  Mein  deutscber 
Kollege  macbte  Herrn  Sazonow  sofort  darauf  aufmerksam,  dali  Osterreicb- 
Ungarn  eine  Einmiscbung  in  seine  Differenz  mit  Serbien  nicbt  akzeptieren 
werde  und  dali  aucb  Deutscbland  seinerseits  eine  Zumutung  nicbt  annebmen 
konne,  welche  der  Wiirde  des  Bundesgenossen  als  Groliraacbt  zuwiderlaufe. 

Im  weiteren  Verlaufe  des  Gespracbes  erklarte  der  Herr  Minister,  dafi  dasjenige, 
was  Ruliland  nicbt  gleicbgiiltig  binnebmen  kbnne,  die  eventuelle  Absicbt  Osterreicb- 
Ungarns  ware  „de  d^vorer  la  Serbie".  Graf  Pourtales  erwiderte,  dali  er  eine  solcbe 
Intention  bei  Osterreicb-Ungarn  nicbt  annebme,  da  dies  dem  eigensten  Interesse 
der  Monarch ie  zuwiderlaufen  wiirde.  Osterreicb-Ungarn  sei  wobl  nur  daran 
gelegen  „d'infliger  a  la  Serbie  le  cbatiment  justement  m6rit6".  Herr  Sazonow 
babe  seine  Zweifel  daran  ausgedriickt,  ob  Osterreicb-Ungarn,  selbst  wenn  bier- 
iiber  Erklarungen  vorliegen  wiirden,  sicb  bieran  geniigen  lassen  wiirde. 

Die  Unterredung  scbloli  mit  einem  Appell  Herrn  Sazonows,  Deutscbland 
moge  rait  Ruliland  an  der  Erbaltung  des  Friedens  zusammenarbeiten.  Der 
deutsche  Botschafter  versicberte  dem  russiscben  Minister,  dali  Deutscbland 
gewifi  nicbt  den  Wunscb  babe,  einen  Krieg  zu  entfesseln,  daft  es  aber  selbsfc^ 
verstandlich  die  Interessen  seines  Bundesgenossen  voll  vertrete. 


17. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  24.  Juli  1914, 

Zu  Euer  Exzellenz  gestrigem  Telegramm. 

Ersucbe,  Sir  E.  Grey  sofort  aufzuklaren,  dali  unsere  gestrige  Demarche  in 
Belgi'ad  nicbt  als  formelles  Ultimatum  zu  betracbten  sei,  sondern.  dali  es  sicb 
um  eine  befristete  Demarche  handle,  die,  wie  Euer  Exzellenz  Sir  E.  Grey  streng 
vertraulich  mitteilen  woUen,  —  wenn  die  Frist  frucbtlos  ablauft  —  einstweilen 
nur  von  dem  Abbruche  der  diplomatiscben  Beziebungen  und  von  dem  Beginne 


20 

notwendiger  militarischer  Vorbereitungen   gefolgt  sein  wird,    da   wir   unbedlngt 
entschlossen  sind,  unsere  berecbtigten  Forderungen  durcbzusetzen. 

Euer  Exzellenz  sind  ermacbtigt  beizufugen,  dali  wir  allerdings,  wenn 
Serbien  nach.  Ablauf  des  Terraines  nur  unter  dem  Drucke  unserer  militariscberi 
Vorbereitungen  nacbgeben  wiirde,  es  zum  Ersatze  der  uns  erwacbsenen  Kosten 
verbdlten  miiliten;  bekanntlicb  muiiten  wir  zweimal  (1908  nn^  1912)  Serbiens 
wegen  mobilisieren. 


18. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Szdpary  in  St.  Petersburg. 


Wten,  24.  Juli  1914. 


Ich  babe  den  russiscben  Gescbaftstrager  am  24.  Juli  vormittags  empfangen 
und  ibn  versicbert,  dafi  ich  spezielles  Gewicbt  darauf  lege,  ihn  sobald  als 
moglicb  von  unserem  Scbritte  in  Belgrad  in  Kenntnis  zu  setzen  und  ihm 
diesbeziiglicb  unseren  Standpunkt  darzulegen. 

Indem  Fiirst  KudascbefF  fiir  diese  Aufmerksamkeit  dankte,  verbeblte  er 
mir  nicbt  seine  Beunrubigung  iiber  unser  kategoriscbes  Vorgehen  gegen  Serbien, 
wobei  er  bemerkte,  dafi  man  in  St.  Petersljurg  immer  praokkupiert  gewesen  sei, 
ob  nicbt  unsere  Demarche  die  Form  einer  Demiitigung  fiir  Serbien  annehmen 
werde,  was  nicbt  obne  Reperkussion  in  Rutland  bleiben  konnte. 

Ich  lieli  es  mir  angelegen  sein,  den  russiscben  Gescbaftstrager  in  dieser 
Ricbtung  zu  berubigen.  Unser  Ziel  bestebe  darin,  die  unbaltbare  Situation 
Serbiens  zur  Monarchic  zu  klaren  und  zu  diesem  Zwecke  die  dortige 
Regierung  zu  veranlassen,  einerseits  die  gegen  den  derzeitigen  Bestand  der 
Monarchic  gerichteten  Stromungen  offentlicb  zu  desavouieren  und  durcb  admi- 
nistrative MaOnabmen  zu  unterdriicken,  andererseits  uns  die  Moglichkeit  zu 
bieten,  uns  von  der  gewissenhaften  Durchfiihrung  dieser  MaOnahmen  Recben- 
schaft  zu  geben.  Ich  fiibrte  des  langeren  aus,  welcbe  Gefabr  ein  weiteres 
Gewabrenlassen  der  groiiserbiscben  Propaganda  nicbt  nur  fiir  die  Integritat 
der  Monarchic,  sondern  auch  fiir  das  Glcicbgewicht  und  den  Frieden  in  Europa 
nach  sich  zieben  wiirde  und  wie  sebr  alle  Dynastien,  nicbt  zuletzt  die  russische, 
durcb  die  Einbiirgerung  der  Auffassung  bedroht  erscheinen,  dafi  cine  Bewegung 
ungestraft  bleiben  konne,  die  sich  des  Mordcs  als  eines  uation^ilistiscben  Kampf- 
mittels  bedient 


21 

ScWIelilicli  verwies  ich  darauf,  da(i  wir  keine  Gebietserwerbung,  sondem 
bloft  die  Erhaltung  des  Bestehenden  bezweckten,  ein  Standpunkt,  der  bei  der 
russiscben  Regierung  Verstandnis  finden  miisse. 

Fiirst  KudascbefF  bemerkte  darauf,  dali  er  den  Standpunkt  seiner  Regierung 
nicbt  kenne  und  aucb  nicbt  wisse,  wie  sicb  Serbien  zu  den  einzelnen  Forde- 
ningen  stellen  werde. 

Zum  ScbluSse  unserer  Unterredung  betonte  der  Herr  Gescbaftstrager,  daD  er 
nicbt  ermangeln  werde,  seiner  Regierung  die  Auskiinfte  zur  Kenntnis  zu 
bringen,  die  ich  ibm  iiber  unseren  Scbritt  gegeben,  namentlicb  aucb  in  der 
Ricbtung,  dafi  unsererseits  keine  Demiitigung  Serbiens  beabsicbtigt  sei. 


19. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  Berlin,  Rom,  Paris,  London, 
St.  Petersburg  und  Konstantinopel. 

Wien,  25.  Juli  1914. 

Im  Anbuge  erbalten  Euer  Exzellenz  das  in  der  Zirkularnote  an  die  Macbte 
angekiiiidigte  Dossier,  das  die  groliserbiscbe  Propaganda  und  ihre  Zusammen- 
bange  mit  dem  Sarajevoer  Attentate  zum  Gegenstande  hat. 

Euer  Exzellenz  woUen  dieses  Dossier  zur  Kenntnis  der  dortigen  Regierung 
bringen. 

Memolre. 

Die  von  Serbien  ausgegangene  Bewegung,  die  sicb  zum  Ziele  gesetzt  bat, 
die  siidslawischen  Telle  Osterreich-Ungarns  von  der  Monarchic  loszureilien,  um 
sie  mit  Serbien  zu  einer  staatlichen    Einheit  zu  verbinden,    reicht   weit  zuriick. 

In  ihren  Endzielen  stets  gleich  bleibend  und  nur  in  ihren  Mitteln  und  an 
Intensitat  wecbselnd,  hat  diese  Propaganda  ^uf  serbiscbem  Boden  zur  Zeit  der 
Annexionskrise  einen  ihrer  Hohepunkte  erreicbt.  Den  schiitzenden.  Mantel  der 
Heimlichkeiten  abstreifend,  war  sie  damals  mit  dem  Einbekenntnisso  ihrer 
Tendenzen  ofFen  hervorgetreten  und  hatte  versucht,  unter  der  Patronanz  der 
serbischen  Regierung  mit  alien  ihr  zur  Verfiigung  stehenden  Mitteln  zur  Ver- 
wirklichung  ihrer  Absichten  zu  gelangen. 

Wahrend  die  gesamte  serbische  Presse  in  gebassigen,  die  Tatsachen  ent- 
stellenden  Ausf alien  zum  Kampfe  gegen  die  Monarchie  aufrief,  bildeten  sicb  — 
von  anderen  Propagandamittein  abgesehen  —  Assoziationen,  die  diesen  Kampf 
vorbereiteten. 


22 

An  Bedeutimg  ragte  unter  diesen  die  Narodna  odbrana  hervor.  Aus  einem 
damals  bestandenen  revolutionaren  Komitee  hervorgegangen,  war  diese  als 
Privatverein  konstituierte,  jedoch  vom  Belgrader  Auswartigen  Amte  voUig  ab- 
hangige  Organisation  von  scrbischen  Militar-  und  Zivilfunktionaren  ins  Leben 
gerufen  worden.  Als  ihre  Griinder  fungierten  unter  anderen:  General  Bozo 
Jankovid, ,  die  ehemaligen  Minister  Ljuba  Jovanovid,  Ljuba  Davidovid  und  Velislav 
Vulovid,  der  Direktor  der  Staatsdruckerei  Zivojin  DaCid  und  die  damaligen 
Hauptlcute,  jetzt  Majore  Voja  Tankosid  und  Milan  PribiCevid.  Dieser  Verein 
hatte  sich  die  Bildung  und  Ausriistung  von  Freischaren  fiir  den  bevorstehenden 
Krieg  gegen  die  osterreicbisch-ungarisclie  Monarchie  zum  Ziele  gesetzt.  (Siehe 
Beilage  2.) 

Ein  anschauliches  Bild  der  damaligen  Tatigkeit  der  Narodna  odbrana  liefert 
unter  anderem  die  Aussagc  des  vom  Kreisgericbte  in  Sarajevo  als  Zeugen  ver- 
nommenen  bosnisch-berzegowinischen  Landesangeliorigen  Trifko  Krstanovi<5,  der 
sich  zu  jener  Zeit  in  Belgrad  befand  und  der,  nebst  anderen  Angehorigen  der 
jMonarchie,  von  der  Narodna  odbrana  als  Komitatschi  angeworben  war.  Mit  etwa 
1140  anderen  Bandenmitgliedem  war  Krstanovid  anfangs  1909  nach  einer  fiir 
die  AusbilduDg  von  Banden  in  Cuprija , (Bezirk  Jagodina)  eriichteten  und  von 
den  Hauptleuten  Voja  Tankosid  und  Dusan  Putnik  geleiteten  Scbule  gebracht 
worden.  Als  Lehrer  fungierten,  dort  ausschlieiilicli  serbische  Offiziere. .  General 
Bozo  Jankovid  und  Hauptmann  Milan  Pribidevid  inspizierten  diesen  dreimonat- 
lichen  Bandenkurs  in  regelmaiiigen  Zeitabschnitten. 

Dort  erbielten  die  angebenden  Komitatscbis  Unterricbt  im  Schieften  und 
Werfen  von  Bomben,  im  ^Minenlegen,  Sprengen  von  Eisenbahnen,  Tunnels  und 
Briicken  sowie  im  Zerstoren  von  Telegraphenleitungen.  Ihre  Aufgabe  war  es, 
nach  den  Auftragen  ihrer  Befehlshaber  die  neuerworbenen  Kenntnisse  in 
Bosnien  und  der  Herzegowina  in  die  Tat  umzusetzen. 

Durch  diese  ganz  offentlich  betriebene  und  von  der  serbischen  Regierung 
gefbrderte  Aktion  der  Narodna  odbrana  wurde  damals  der  Bandenlmeg  gegen 
Osterreich-Ungarn  vorbereitet.  Angehorige  der  Monarchie  wurden  hiebei  zum 
VeiTate  an  ihrem  Vaterlande  verleitet  und  systematisch  dazu  erzogen,  als 
serbische  Emissare  heimtiickische  Angriffe  gegen  die  Verteidigungsinittel  ihrer 
Heimat  zu  richten. 

Diese  Periode  der  aggressiven  Aspirationen  fand  ihren  Abschluli  mit  der 
von  der  serbischen  Eegienmg  am  31.  Marz  1909  abgegebenen  Erklarung,  in 
welcher  sich  diese  mit  der  durch  die  Annexion  Bosniens  una  der  Herzego- 
wina geschaflfenen  volker-  und  staatsrechtlichcn  Neuordnung  abfinden  zu  wollen 
erklarte  und  feierlich  versprach,  mit  der  osterreichisch-ungarischen  Monarchie 
in  Hinkunft  in  freundschaftlichen  Beziehungen  leben  zu  wollen. 

Mit  dieser  Erklarung  schien  auch  das  Ende  der  eine  stete  Quelle  der 
Unruhc  bildenden  Bewegung  gegen  Osterreich-Ungani  gekommen  und  der  Weg 


23 

zu  einer  wirkllch  freundschaftlichen  Annaherung  Serbiens  an  die  Monarchie 
betreten.  Der  Forderung  durch  die  serbiscbe  Eegierung  beraubt  und  von  ibr 
pflichtgemali  bekampft,  batte  die  monarcbiefeindlicbe  Propaganda  nur  mebr  ein 
scbattenbaftes,  dem  baldigen  Untergange  geweibtes  Dasein  fristen  konnen.  Da- 
gegen  batten  die  zwiscben  den  siidslawiscben  Teilen  der  Monarcbie  und  Serbien 
auf  spracblicbem,  etbniscbem  und  kulturellem  Gebiete  bestebenden  Beriibrungs- 
punkte  zur  Verricbtung  gemeinsamer,  vom  Geiste  gegenseitiger  Freundscbaffc 
und  pai-alleler  Interessen  getragener  Kulturarbeit  fiibren  miissen. 

Piesc  Envartungen  baben  sicb  jedocb  nicbt  erfiillt. 

Die  monarcbiefeindlicben  Aspii'ationen  sind  geblieben  und  unter  den  Augen 
der  serbiscben  Regierung,  die  nicbts  getan  bat,  um  diese  Bewegung  zu  unter- 
driicken,  bat  die  gegen  Osterreicb-Ungarn  gericbtete  Propaganda  nur  nocb  an 
Breitc  und  Tiefe  gewonnen.  Der  Hali  gegen  die  Monarcbie  wurde  wacberbalteti 
und  durcb  stets  neue  Anfacbung  zu  einem  unversobnlicben  gestaltet.  Mit  den 
alten,  der  geanderten  Situation  angepaOten  und  durcb  neue  Metboden  erganzten 
.Mittcbi  wuide  das  Yolk  Serbiens  „zum  unvermeidlicben  Vernicbtungskampfe" 
gegen  Osten-eicb-Ungarn  aufgerufen.  Systematiscb  wurden  gebeimnisvolle  Faden 
nacb  den  siidslawiscben  G.ebieten  der  Monarcbie  gesponnen  und  deren  Burger 
,zum  Verrate  am  Vaterlande  geworben. 

Vor  allem  bat  die  serbiscbe  Presse  seitber  nicbt  aufgebiirt,  in  diesem  Geiste  zu 
"wirken. 

Nicbt  weniger  als  81  in  Serbien  erscbeinenden  Zeitscbriften  muftte  bis  beute 
wegen  ibres  die  inlandiscben  Strafgesetze  verletzenden  Inbaltes  das  Postdebit 
entzogen  werden. 

Kaum  eine  der  Strafoormen,  welcbe  die  erbabene  Person  des  Monarcben,  die 
Mitglieder  Allerbocbstseines  Hauses  und  die  Integritat  des  Staates  scbutzen,  ist 
seitens  der  serbiscben  Blatter  unverletzt  geblieben.  Einige  wenige  aus  der  iibfer- 
reicben  Fiille  dieses  Materials  entnommene,  aus  verscbiedenen'  Zeitpunkten 
stammende  Proben  dieser  Prefistimmen  sind  in  der  Beilage  1  zusammengestellt. 

Obne  in  eine  detaillierte  Besprecbung  dieser  x4.ufierungen  der  offentlicben 
Meinung  Serbiens  einzugeben,  muli  immerbin  bemerkt  werden,  daft  sie  die  An- 
nexion Bosniens  und  der  Herzegowina  trotz  der  serbiscberseits  erfolgten  An- 
erkennung  dieses  Aktes  nacb  wie  vor  als  einen  an  Serbien  veriibten  Raub,  der 
einer  Remedur  bedarf,  binstellen,  ein  Gedanke,  der  nicbt  bloii  in  den  Blattern 
scbarfster  Ricbtung  in  alien  Variationen  ibrer  unflatigen  Spracbe  immer  wieder- 
kcbrt,  sondern  der  aucb  in  der  dem  Belgrader  Auswartigen  Amte  so  nabe- 
stebenden  „Samouprava"  in  kaum  verbiillter  Form  ausgesprocben  wird  (lit.  b 
der  Beilage  1). 

Ebenso  kann  nicbt  unterlassen  werden,  das  Augenmerk  darauf  zu  lenken, 
wie  das    am    15.  Juni  1910    in   Sarajevo   von  Bogdan  Zeraji<5  veriibte '  Attentat 


24 

gegeD  den  Landes-Chef  von  Bosnien  und  der  Herzegowina,  Feldzengmelster 
von  Varesanin,  publizistiscli  vervvertet  wurde. 

Wie  bekannt,  hatte  sicli  Zerajid  unmittelbar  nacli  der  Tat  entleibt  und  vor 
deren  Veriibung  seine  gesamten  Papiere  verbrannt.  Unter  diesen  Umstanden 
vermochten  die  Motive  seines  Anschlages  nicht  voUkommen  klargestellt  zu 
werden.  Immerbin  konnte  man  aber  aus  einem  bei  ihm  gefundenen  Abzeichen 
scbliefien,  dali  er  ICrapotkinschen  Ideen  huldigte.  Aucb  die  gefiihrten  Erhebun- 
gen  deuteten  darauf  hin,  daft  man  es  mit  einem  auf  anarcbistischen  Grund- 
lagen  beruhenden  Verbrecben  zu  tun  batte. 

Dies  binderte  jedocb  die  Presse  Serbiens  nicbt,  den  Attentater  als  serbiscben 
Nationalhelden  zu  feiem  und  seine  Tat  zu  /verberrlicben.  Ja,  die  j,Politika" 
verwabrte  sicb  fdrmlicb  dagegen,  dafi  Zerajid  Anarchist  gewesen  sei  und  rekla- 
mierte  ihn  als  „beldenmutigen  Serben,  dessen  Name  jeder  Serbe  mit  Acbtung 
und  Scbmerz  nennen  \\drd". 

Pas  Datum  des  18.  August*)  desselben  Jabres  bielt  die  ^Politika"  fur 
eine  passende  Gelegenbeit,  sicb  mit  dem  Anscblage  des  Zerajid,  „dessen  Name 
im  Volke  wie  etwas  „„Heiliges""  genannt  werde",  neuerlicb  zu  befassen  und 
das  Attentat  in  einem  Gedicbte  zu  feiem  (lit.  a  der  Beilage  ]). 

So  wurde  dieses  Verbrecben,  das  mit  den  Aspirationen  auf  Territorien 
der  Monarcbie  nicbts  zu  tun  batte,  fiir  die  Forderung  dieser  Ideen  ausgebeutet 
und  durcb  die  Gloiifizierung  des  Zcrajid  der  Mord  ganz  ausdriicklicb  als  ein 
riibmlicbes  und  nachabmenswertes  Mittel  im  Kampfe  fiir  die  Verwirklicbung 
dieser  Gedanken  anerkannt.  Diese  Sanktionierung  des  Mordes  als  einer  voU- 
kommen zulassigen  Methode  im  Kampfe  gegen  die  Monarcbie  kcbrt  spater  in 
den  Blattem  bei  Besprccbung  des  von  Jukid  veriibten  Attentates  gegen  den 
koniglicben  Kommissar  von  Cuvaj  wieder  (lit.  c  der  Beilage  p. 

Diese  nicbt  nur  in  Serbien  verbreiteten,  sondern  —  wje  spater  gezeigt 
weMen  wird  —  auf  woblorganisierten  Scbleicbwegen  in  die  Monarcbie  ein- 
gescbmuggelten  Zeitungcn  waren  es,.  die  bei  den  breiten  Massen  jene  Stimmun- 
gen  erzeugten  und  wacberbielten,  welcbe  einen  frucbtbaren  Nabrboden  fiir  die 
Macbenscbaften  der  monarcbiefeindlicben  Assoziationen  boten. 

Zum  Zentralpunkte  dieser  von  Vereinen  bctriebenen  Agitation  wurde  die 
Narodna  odbrana.  Dieselben  Personen,  die  zur  Zeit  der  Annexion  an  der  Spitzc 
des  Vereines  gestanden  waren,  bildeten  aucb  jetzt  seine  Leitung;  wieder  findet 
man  bier,  wie  seinerzeit,  als  die  energiscbesten  und  tatigsten  Organisatoren  die 
beftigsten  Gegner  der  Monarcbie;  den  General  Bozo  Jankovid,  den  Direktor 
der  Staatsdruckerei  Zivojin  Dadid  so  wie  die  Majore  Milan  Pribidevid  und  Voja 
Tankosid.  Organisatoriscb  auf  eine  in  die  Breite  und  Tiefe  gebende  Basis  gestellt 
iund  bierarcbisch  straff  gegliedert  (siebe  Beilage  2  unter  „ Organisation"),  besali 


*;  GeburtstAg  Seiner  k.  und  k.  Apostolischeii  M^jestat. 


25 

clle  Narodna  odbraria  bald  zirka  400  Ausschiisse,  die  eine  lebkafte  Agitation 
entfalteten. 

Hiezu  kam,  dafi  die  Narodna  odbrana  zu  dem  Scbiitzenbunde  (mit  762  Ver- 
elnen),  dem  Sokolbunde  „Dusan  Silni"  (mit  2500  Mitgliedem),  dem  olympisclien 
Klubj  dem  Beitervereine  „Knez  Mihajlo",  dem  Jiigerbunde  und  der  Kulturliga 
in  engste  Verbindung  trat  und  zablreiche  andere  Vereine  in  ibre  Dienste  stellte, 
die  alle,  von  der  Narodna  odbrana  gefiibrt  und  unterstiitzt,  in  deren  Sinn 
wirken.  In  steter  gegenseitiger  Durcbdringung  gelangten  diese  Vereine  zu  einer 
fonnlicben  Amalgamierung,  so  dali  sic  beute  eigentlicb  alle  -nur  Glieder  des 
einen  Korpei's  der  Narodna  odbrana  sind. 

So  spannte  die  Narodna  odbrana  iiber  ganz  Serbien  ein  engmaschiges 
Netz  der  Agitation,  mit  welcbem  sie  alle  fur  ibre  Ideen  Empfanglicbeji  an  sicb  zog. 

Welcbes  aber  der  Geist  ist,  in  dem  die  Narodna  odbrana  wirkt,  das  gebt  mit 
geniigender  Klarbeit  scbon  aus  ibren  ofliziellen  Vereinspublikationen  bervor. 

In  ibren  Statuten  im  Kleide  eines  Kulturvereines  auftretend,  dem  nur  die 
geistige  und  korperlicbe  Entwicklung  der  Bevolkerung  Serbiens  sowie  deren 
materielle  Kraftigung  am  Herzen  liegt,  entbiillt  die  Narodna  odbrana  in  ibrem 
Vereinsorgane  (siebe  Beilage  2)  den  wahren  und  einzigen  Grund  ibres  Daseins,  ibr 
sogenanntes  „reorganisiertes  Programm",  namlich: 

In  „fanatiscber  und  unermiidlicber  Arbeit"  dem  serbiscben  Volke  unter  dem 
Vorwande,  dali  ibm  die  Monarcbie  „ seine  Freiheit  und  Spraebe  nebmen,  ja 
Serbien  zerscbmettern"  wolle,  die  „beilige  Wabrbeit"  zu  predigen,.  daO  es  eine 
unerlalilicbe  Notwendigkeit  ist,  gegen  Osterreicb-Ungarn,  diesen  seinen  „ersten 
und  groBten  Feind",  den  „Ausrottungskampf  mit  Gewebr  und  Kanone"  zu 
fiibren  und  das  Volk  „mit  alien  Mitteln"  auf  diesen  Kampf  vorzubereiten,  der  zu 
fiibren  ist,  „zur  Befreiung  der  unterworfenen  Gebiete",  in  denen  „7  Millionen 
unterjocbter  Briider  scbmacbten". 

Ausscblielilicb  im  Dienste  dieser  Idee  steben  die  „Kultiirbestrebungen"  der 
Narodna  odbrana,  als  blolie  Mittel  zur  Organisierung  und  Erziebung  des  Volkes 
fiir  den  ersebnten.  Vernicbtungskampf  gegen  die  Monarcbie. 

In  eben  diesem  Geiste  wirken  aber  alle  der  Narodna  odbrana  affilierten 
Vereine,  wofiir  der  Sokolverein  in  Elragujevac  als  Beispiel  dienen  moge  (siebe 
Beilage  3). 

Wie  bei  der  Narodna  odbrana,  so  steben  aucb  bier  Offiziere,  Professoren 
ujid  Staatsbeamte  an  der  Spitze. 

Die  Anspracbe,  mit  welcber  der  Vereinsprasident  Major  KovaCevid  die- 
Jabresversammlung  im  Jabre  1914  erofFhete,  verzicbtet  vollkommen  darauf,  das 
Turnen,  das  docb  der  eigentlicbe  Zweck  eines  Sokolv,ereines  ist,  zu  erwabnen 
und  befaflt  sicb  ausscblielilicb  mit  der  „Yorbereitung  zum  Kampfe"  gegen  den 
,;5gefabrlichen,  berzlosen,  lustemen,  lastigen  und  gefraliigen  Feind  im  Norden*. 


26 

der  „Millionen  serbisclier  Briidei*  Freiheit  lind  Recllt  nimmt  und  sie  in  Sklaverei 
und  Ketten  halt". 

In  dem  Verwaltungsbericlite  dieses  Vereines  treten  die  sachliclien  Aus- 
fulirimgen  ganz  in  den  Hintergrand  und  gebep  nur  die  Stichworte  fiir  das 
Bekenntnis  des  wahren  „Zieles  der  Handlungen  der  Verwaltung"  ab,  namlicli: 
die  Vorbereitung  der  nationalon  Entwicklung  und  der  StUrkung  der  „unter- 
driickten  Nation"  zu  dem  Ende,  damit  sie  ihr  „nocb  niclit  erfiilltes  Programm, 
ihre  noch  nicht  erfiillte  Arbeit"  zu  Ende  fiihren  und  jene  r-o^'oGe  Tat"  voU- 
bringen  konne,  „die  sich  in  nachster  Zeit  abspielen  wird":  „die  Befreiung  der 
jenseits  der  Drina  wohnenden  Briider,  welche-  die  Leiden  des  Gekreuzigten 
erdulden". 

Ja  sogar  der  Kassier  beniitzt  seinen  Kassenbericbt  zu  dem  Mabnrufe,  man 
miisso  „Falken  erzieben",  die  imstande  sind,  den  „nocli  niclit  befreiten  Briidern 
die  Freiheit  zu  bringen". 

Ebenso  wie  bei  der  Narodna  odbrana  die  Kulturbestrebungen,  ist  also  bei 
den  Sokols  die  turnerische  Betatigung  nicht  Selbstzweck,  sondern  ein  bloftes 
Mittel  im  Dienste  ebenderselben  Propaganda,  die  mit  denselben  Gedanken,  ja 
fast  mit  den  gleichen  Worten  betrieben  wird. 

Wenn  nun  die  Narodna  odbrana  das  „Yolk"  zum  Vernichtungskampfe 
gegen  die  Monarchie  aufruft,  wendct  sie  sich  nicht  nur  an  das  Volk  in  Serblen, 
sondern  an  alle  siidslawischen  Volkerschaften.  Gelten  doch  der  Narodna  odbrana 
die  siidslawischen  Gebiete  der  Monarchie  als  „unsere  unterworfenen  serbischen 
Gebiete".  (Siehe  auch  Beilage  4).  So  sollen  also  auch  die  siidslawischen  Ange- 
horigen  der  Monarchie  an  dieser  „nationalen  Arbeit"  teilnehmen;  so  soil  auch 
jenseits  der  serbischen  Grenze  diese  „gesunde,  notwendige  Arbeit"  verrichtet 
werden.  Und  auch  auf  dem  Boden.der  Monarchie  sucht  die  Narodna  odbrana 
jene  „nelden  fiir  diesen  heiligen  Kampf",  denen  Obilid,  der  Morder  Murads, 
als  nachstrebenswertes  Beispiel  nationaler  Opferwilligkeit  voranleuchten  soil. 

Um  aber  die  „Briider  aulierhalb  Serbiens"  zur  Teilnahme  an  der  ^Arbeit 
privater  Initiative"  anzuspornen,  unterhalt  die  Naiodna  odbrana  eine  lebhafte 
Verbindung  mit  den  „Briidern  jenseits  der  Grenze".  Wie  diese  Verbindung 
geartet  jst,  wird  In  dem  Vereinsorgane  nicht  gesagt,  Avohl  deshalb,  weil  dies  zu 
jenem'  Teile  der'  „Gesamtarbeit"  g^hort,  der  „aus  mehrfachen  Grunden  weder 
wiedergegeben  werden  darf  noch  kann". 

Wie  umfangreich  dieser  Zweig  ihrer  Tatigkeit  ist,  lafit  sich  aus  dem 
Umstande  erkennen,  dali  sowohl  der  Zentralausschuii  der  Narodna  odbrana  als 
auch  einzelne  ihrer  KreisausschUsse  eigene  Sektionen  fur  ^auswartige  Angelegen- 
heiten"  besitzen. 

Diese  „auswartige"  Tatigkeit  der  Narodna  odbrana  und  ihrer  Affilierten 
ist  eine  aulierst  vielseitigc. 


27 

Das,  well  behordlich  kontrollierbar,  reladv  ungefahrlichste  Mittel  dleser 
Agitation  sind  die  Vortragsreisen,  welche  hervorragende  Vereinsmitglieder  der 
Narodna  odbrana  nach  den  siidostlichen  Teilen  der  Monarchie  unternelimen, 
wo  sie  in  verschiedenen  Vcreinen  iiber  nationale  und  kulturelle  Fragen  sprecben. 
Diese  Anlasse  bieten  den  Vortragenden  die  von  ihnen  gesuchte  und  wohl  den 
vornehmlicbsten  Zweck  dieser  Reissn  bildende  Gelegenheit,  in  halben,  dem 
Kenner  verstandlicben  Worten  und  Wendungen  im  Sinne  der  wahren  Tendenzen 
dieser  Verelne  zu  wirken. 

Unter  diesen  Emissaren  nimmt  nebst  anderen  aucb  der  schon  mebrmals 
erwahnte  Direktor  der  serbiscben  Staatsdrackerei  Zivojin  Da6i6  eine  bervorragende 
Stellung  ein,  jener  Zivojin  Daci(^,  der  am  8.  August  1909  einen  „Aufruf"  an 
das  serbiscbe  Volk  erliefi,,  in  welcbem  er  Osterreicb-Ungarn  als  den  Feind 
Serbiens  bezeicbnete  und  ziir  Vorbereitung  auf  den  Kampf  mit  der  Monarcbie 
ermabnte.  Wiederbolt  unternahm  Dac$i(5  Agitatlonsreisen  nacb  den  siidostlicben 
Teilen  der  osterreicbiscb-ungarischen  Monarcbie.  Bei  einem  solcben  Vortrage  in 
Karlovci  (1912)  legte  er  seine  sonst  beobacbtete  Vorsicbt  ab  und  trat  geradezu 
fiir  die  „Vereiniguhg  aller  Serben  gegen  den  gemeinsamen' Feind '^  ein,  als  den 
er  in  nicbt  milizuverstebenden  Andeutungen  Osterreicb-Ungarn  binstellte. 

Bedenklicber  sind  die  Beziebungen,  welcbe  die  im  Geiste  der  Narodna 
odbrana  wirkenden  serbiscben  Korporationen  unter  dem  Deckmantel  der  Tnter- 
essen-  und  Kulturgemeinscbaft  mit  Verelnen  in  der  Monarcbie  angekniipft 
baben,  denn  die  gegenseitigen  deputativen  oder  korporativen  Besucbe  dieser 
Verelne,  die  sicb  einer  genaueren  bebordlicben  Kontrolle  entzieben,  werden 
serbiscberseits  zu  allerlei  monarcbiefeindlicben  Macbenscbaften  beniitzt. 

So  bat  sicb  beispielsweise  ein  zu  der  bekannten  Feier  des  Sarajevoer 
Prosvjetavereines  im  September  1912  entsendeter  Delegierter  der  Narodna 
odbrana  nicbt  gescbeut  (siebe  Beilage  6)  bei  diesem  Anlasse  im  gebeimen 
bosniscbe  MItglieder  fiir  seinen  Verein  anzuwerben.  Die  Entsendung  eines  Ver- 
treters  des  Kragujevacer  Sokolvereines  zu  dieser  Feier  sollte  den  ^Briidern  in 
Bosnien"  sagen:  „Wir  baben  Euer  nicbt  vergessen;  die  Fliigel  des  Falken  der 
Sumadija  sind  nocb  macbtig",  ein  Gedanke,  der  im  intlmen  Verkehre  wobi 
einen  ganz  anderen,  den  friiber  dargelegten  Tendenze,n  dieses  Vereines  adaquateren 
Ausdruck  gefunden  baben  wird.  (Siebe  Beilage  3.)  Was  die  Vorgange  anbelangt, 
die  sicb  bei  den  in  Serbien  abgebaltenen  Zusammenkunften  dieser  Art  abspielen, 
so  entzieben  sicb  diese  allerdings  einer  auf  vollkommen  sicberer  Basis  stebend en 
Kenntnis  der  k.  und  k.  Beborden,  denen  ja  fur  diese  Falle  nur  scbwer  kontrollier- 
bare  konfidentielle  Mitteilungen  zur  Verfugung  steben.  In  diesem  Zusammenbange 
ware  des  Besucbes  von  Agramer  Studenten  in  Serbien  im  April  1912  zii  gedenken, 
der  auf  serbiscber  Seite  durcb  die  Veranstaltung  eines  offiziellen.  militarischen 
Empfanges,  ja  sogar  einer  Truppenparade  zu  Ebren  dieser  Studenten  zu  einer  derart 
jsuggestiven   Demonstration    gestaltet   wurde,    dali    der   Verwaltungsberjcht    des 


28 

Kragujevacer  Sokolvereines  sagen  darf,  dieses  „Ereignis  bedeutet  den  Anfang  nnd 
Keim  einer  groiien- Tat,  die  sich  in  der  nacbsten  Zukunft  abspielen  wird",  „ein 
Keim,  der  reifen  wird,  wenn  die  Volksseele  nocb  mebr  aufwallt",  „bis  es  keine 
Schranken  gibt,  die  sie  nicbt  niederreifien  konnte". 

Erst  vor  kurzem  ist  cs  zur  Kenntnis  der  Beborden  der  Monarcbie  gelangt,  dali 
die  Sokolvereine  Serbiens  einige  analoge  Korporationen  in  der  Monarcbie  dazu 
bestimmt  baben,  sicb  mit  ibnen  in  einem  bisber  gebeim  gebaltenen  Verbande  zu 
vereinigen,  dessen  Cbarakter  bisber  nocb  nicbt  ganz  klargestellt  ist,  da  die 
Erbebungen  dariiber  derzeit  nocb  fortdauern.  Immerbin  lassen  die  scbon  jetzt 
erzielten  Ergebnisse  der  Nacbforscbungen  vermuten,  dali  man  bier  einem  der  Wege 
auf  die  Spur  gekommen  ist,  auf  dem  die  subversiven  Tendenzen  der  serbiscben 
Sokols  und  ibrer  Freunde  einzelnen  verfiibrten  und  irregeleiteten  Personengruppen 
in  der  Monarcbie  eingeimpft  werden. 

Diese  auf  breitere  Scbicbten  gemiinzte,  mebr  vorbereitende  Propaganda  tritt 
aber  an  Bedeutung  gegeniiber  jener  „auswartigen  Arbeit"  in  den  Hintergrund,  die 
von  der  Narodna  odbrana  und  ibren  Freunden  in  der  Agitation  von  Mann  zu  Mann 
geleistet  wird.  Hier  ist  jenes  Gebiet,  auf  dem  ibre  traurigsten  Erfolge  liegen. 

Durcb  ibre  gebeimen  Vertrauensmanner  und  Emissare  tragt  sie  das  Gift  der 
Aufwieglung  in  die  Kreise  der  Erwacbsenen  ebenso  wie  der  urteilslosen  Jugend. 

So  baben  beispielsweise,  von  Milan  Pribii^evid  verleitet,  die  ebemaligen 
Honvedofiiziere  V.  B.,  D,  K.,  V.  N.  imd  der  kroatiscb-slawoniscbe'Gendarmerie- 
leutnant  V.  K.  den  Heeresdienst  in  der  Monarcbie  unter  bedenklicben  Umsfanden 
vei;lassen  und  sicb  nach  Serbien  gewendet,  wo  sie  inzwiscben  allerdings  mancbe 
ibrer  Hoffnungen  getauscbt  seben  und  wenigstens  zum  Teile  daran  denken,  in 
die  von  ibnen  veiratene  Heimat  zuriickzukebren. 

Die  von  Serbien  aus  in  die  mittleren  Scbulen  Kroatiens  und  Bosniens 
getragene  Agitation  ist  leider  so  bekannt,  daft  sie  einer  Exemplifizierung  nicbt 
bedarf.  Weniger  bekannt  aber  ist  es,  daft  die  wegen  scbwerer  disziplinarer 
Vergeben  aus  kroatiscben  und  bosniscben  Scbulen  Ausgeschlossenen  in  Serbien 
mit  offenen  Armen  aufgenommen,  oft  sogar  von  Staats  wegen  unterstiitzt  und  zu 
Feinden  der  Monarcbie  erzogen  werden.  Die  serbiscben  Scbulen  mit  ibren 
monarcbiefeindlicben  Lebrbehelfen  und  ibrer  groften  Zabl  von  Professoren  und 
Lebrera,  die  in  den  Reihen  der  Narodna  odbrana  steben,  sind  allerdings  geeignete 
Anstalten  zur  Erziebung  derartiger  Adepten.  Ein  besonders  beacbtenswerter 
Fall  dieser  Art  mag  bier  als  Beispiel  Erwabnung  finden.  Im  Marz  1914  waren 
mebrere  Scbiiler  der  Lebrerpraparandie  in  Pakrac  (l^roatien)  wegen  eines  Streikes 
relegiert  worden.  Dieselben  wandten  sicb  nacb  Serbien,  wo  sie  zum  Teile  sofort  als 
Lebrer  Anstellungen  erbielten,  zum  Teile  in  einer  Lebrerbildungsanstalt  unter- 
gebracht  wurden.  Mit  monarcbiefeindlicben  Kreisen  in  Verbindung  stebend,  bat 
einer  dieser  Relegierten  offentlicb  erklart,  er  und  seine  Leute  wurden  zur  Zeit 
der  Anwesenbeit  des  Herm  Erzberzog-Tbronfolgers  in  Bosnien  den  Beweis  liefern, 


29 

dafl  Bosnien  serblsctes  Land  sei.  Recht  merkwiirdig  mutet  es  an,  daO  der 
koniglich  serbische  Kreisprafekt  in  Krajnsi,,  wie  hier  erganzend  bemerkt  sei, 
dreien  aus  dem  Kreise  dieser  so  arg  kompromittierten  Studenten  gerade  zur  Zeit 
der  Anwesenbeit  des  Herrn  Eizberzogs  Franz  Ferdinand  in  Bosnien  serbiscbe 
Passe  ausstellte,  in  denen  er  sie  falscblicb  als  serbiscbe  Staatsangeborige 
bezeicbnete,  obwobl  er  deren  kroatiscbe  Heimatsberecbtigung  kennen.  mulite.  Mit 
diesen  Passen  ausgeriistet,  vermocbten  die  drei  Praparandisten  unbemerkt  naob 
der  Monarcbie  zu  gelangen,   wobei  sie  jedocb  erkannt  und  angebalt^n  warden. 

Mit  all  dem  ware  aber  die  „auswartige"  Tatigkeit  der  Narodna  odbrana 
nocb  lange  nicbt  erscbopfend  cbarakterisiert. 

Scbon  seit  langerer  Zeit  war  die  k.  und  k.  Regierung  durcb  konfidentielle 
Meldungen  dariiber  unterricbtet,  daii  die  Narodna  odbrana  den  von  ibr 
gewunscbten  Krieg  gegen  die  Monarcbie  aucb  militariscb  insoferne  vorbereite, 
als  sie  in  der  Monarcbie  Emissare  balte,  die  nacb  gewobnter  Bandenart  im 
Falle  des  Ausbrucbes  von  Feindseligkeiten  die  Zerstorung  von  Transport-Mitteln 
und  -Einricbtungen  bewirken  und  B-evolten  sowie  Paniken  bervorrufen  soUten. 
(Siebe  Beilage  7.) 

Das  im  Jabre  1913  beim  Kreisgericbte  in  Sarajevo  gegen  Jovo  Jagli6i(5 
und  Genossen  eingeleitete  Strafverfabren  wegen  Verbrecbens  der  Ausspabung 
(Beilage  6)  bat  die  Besfatigung  dieser  vertraulicben  Mitteilungen  gebracbt.  .  So 
wie  zur  Zeit  ihrer  Griindung  stebt  aucb  beute  nocb  die  Vorbereitung  des 
Bandenkrieges  auf  dem  Programme  der  Narodna  odbrana,  wozu  nocb  erganzend 
die  Entwicklung  einer  Spionagetatigkeit  trat. 

So  ist  das  beutige  sogenannte  „reorganisierte  Programm"  .der  Narodna 
odbrana  in  Wahrbeit  ein  erweitertes  Programm:  Den  „Ausrottungskampf"  gegen 
die  Monarcbie  vorzubereiten;  ja  berbeizufiibren  und  dann  wieder  „die  alte  rote 
Fabne  der  Narodna  odbrana"  zu  entfalten. 

Aus  dieser  Atmospbare  des  offen  und  ^ebeim  gescbiirten  Hasses  gegen  die 
Monarcbie,  verbunden  mit  einer  sicb  jenseits  aller  Verantwortlicbkeit  diinkenden 
Agitation,  die  im  Kampfe  gegen  Osterreich-Ungam  alle  Mittel  fiir  zulassig  eracbtet 
und  hiebei  ganz  ungescbeut  den  gemeinen  Mord  als  deren  wirksamstes  empfjeblt, 
muiiten  scblielilicb,  aucb  ohne  weiteres  Zutun  der  monarcbiefeindlicben  Kreise 
Serbians,  Akte  des  Terrorismus  entsteben. 

Am  8.  Juni  1912  gab  Lukas  Jukid  gegen  den  koniglicben  Kommissar  in 
Agram,  von  Cuvaj,  einen  ScbuO  ab,  durcb  den  der  im  Wagen  sitzejide  Banalrat 
von  Hervoid  totlicb  verletzt  wurde.  Auf  der  Flucbt  erscbofi  Jukid  einen  ibn 
verfolgenden  Polizeimann  und  verletzte  zwei  weitere^ 

Wie  aus  der  offentlicb  durcbgefiibrten  Hauptverbandlung  bekannt  ist^  finden 
sicb  in  den  Ideen  des  Jukid  die  grundlegenden  Gedanken  der  von  der  Narodna 
odbrana  propagierten  Plane  wieder.  Wenn  sicb  Jukid  aucb  scbon  seit  einiger 
Zeit  mit  Attentatspl'anen  trug,   so  kamen   diese  docb  erst  zur  Reife,   als  er  am 


30 

18.  April  1912  den  Ausflug  der  Agramer  Studenten  nach  Belgrad  mitgemacht 
liatte.  Bei  den  zu  Ehren  der  Besucher  veranstalteten  rauschenden  Festlichkeiten 
war  Jukid  zu  verschiedenen  Personen  in  Beziehung  getreten,  die  dem  Kreise 
der  Narodna  odbrana  angehorten  und  mit  dferien  er  politische  Gesprache  fiih^rte. 
Wenige  Tage  spater  war  Jukic  wieder  in  Belgrad  und  hier  erhielt  er  von  einem 
serbisclien  Major  eine  Bombe  und  von  einem  Genossen  die  Browningpistole, 
mit  der  er  das  Attentat  vollfiilirte. 

Die  in  Agram  aufgefundene  Bombe  war  nacb  dem  Gutachten  der  Sacb- 
verstandigen  in  einem  Arsenale  zu  militariscben  Zwecken  erzeugt'  worden. 

Nocb  war  der  Anscblag  des  Jukid  nicbt  vergessen,  als  am  18.  August  1913 
der  aus  Amerika  zugereiste  Stepban  Dojdid  in  Agram  ein  Attentat  gegen  den 
koniglichen  Kommissar  Baron  Skerlecz  veriibte  —  eine  Tat,  die  der  von  Serbien 
aus  organisierten  Verbetzung  der  in  Amerika  lebenden  Siidslaven  entsprang  — 
gleicbfalls  ein  Werk  der  „auswartigeii"  Propaganda  der  Narodna  odbrana  und 
ibrer  Gesinnungsgenossen. 

Die  von  dem  Serben  T.  Dimitrijevid  verfaOte,  in  Cbicago  gedruckte 
Broscbiire  „Natrag  u  staro  ognjiste  vase"  mit  ibren  maQlosen  Ausfalleri  gegen 
Seine  k.  und  k.  Apostoliscbe  Majestat  und  ibrer  Aufforderung  an  die  Serben 
der  Monarcbie,  im  Hinblicke  auf  ibre  baldige  „Befreiung"  nacb  Serbien  beim- 
zuwandern,  zeigt  den  Parallelismus  dieser  in  Amerika  mit  voller  Freibeit  der 
Bewegung  betriebenen,  von  Serbien  aus  geleiteten  Propaganda  und  jener,  die 
von  Serbien  aus  in  die  Gebiete  der  Monarcbie  getragen  wird. 

Und  wieder  kaum  nach  Jabresfrist  war  Agram  der  Scbauplatz  eines,  diesmal 
miiigluckten  Attentates. 

Am  20.  Mai  1.  J.  versucbte  Jakob  Scbafer  im  Agramer  Tbeater  einen 
Anscblag  auf  den  Banus  Freiberrn  von  Skerlecz,  woran  er  im  letzten  Augen- 
blicke  durcb  einen  Polizeibeamten  gebindert  wurde.  Die  Untersucbung  ergab 
den  Bestand  eines  Komplottes,  dessen  Seele  Eudolf  Hercigonja  war.  Aus  den 
Aussagen  He'rcigonjas  und  seiner  fiinf  Mitangeklagten  ergab  sicb,  daO  aucb 
dieses  Attentat  seinen  Ausgang  von  Serbien  nabm. 

An  einem  gescbeiterten  Versucbe  zur  Befreiung  des  Jukid  beteiligt,  war 
Hercigonja  nacb  Serbien  gefliicbtet  (Oktober  1912),  wo  er  gemeinsam  mit 
seinem  Komplizen  Marojan  Jaksid  mit  Komitatscbis  und  Mitgliedern  der  Narodna 
odbrana  verkebrte.  Wie  scbon  so  oft  bei  den  durcb  viel  zu  friibe  Bescbaftigung 
mit  Fragen  der  Politik  iiberbitzten  jugendlicben  Gemiitern,  war  das  Ergebnis 
dieses  korrumpierenden  Verkebres  aucb  diesmal  ein  unbeilvclles.  Hercigonja 
kebrte  mit  dem  in  Belgrad  verkiindeten  Dogma  zuriick,  dali  die  siidslawiscben 
Lander  Osterreicb-Ungarns  von  der  Monarcbie  abgetrennt  und  mit  dem  Konig- 
reicbe  vereinigt  warden  miiliten.  Dazu  batte  er  in  dem  Kreise,  in  dem  er  dort 
-verkebrte,   die   Lebre   eingesogen,   daO   dieses  Ziel   durcb   die  Ausfubrung  von 


31 

Attentaten  auf  hochstehende  Personlichkeiten  und  fiibrende  Politiker  der  Mon- 
archie  anzustreben  sei,  da  es  nur  durch  diese  Mittel  verwiiklicht  werden  konne. 

In  diesem  Sinne  wirkte  dann  Hercigonja  in  Agram  auf  seine  Freunde  ein, 
deren  einige  er  fiir  seine  Ideen  gewann.  Im  Voidergrunde  seiner  Plane  stand 
die  Veriibung  eines  Anschlages  auf  den  Tkronfolger  Erzherzog  Franz  Ferdinand. 

Wenige  Monate  vorher  waren  gegen  Luka  Aljinovic  Erhebungen  wegen 
hocbverraterischer  Propaganda  gefiihrt  worden.  Im  Zuge  dieses  Veifabrens 
hatten  drei  Zeugen  ausgesagt,  Aljinovid  babe  vor  ibnen  erklart,  er  hatte  im 
Jabre  1913  in  Belgrad  zu  Prdpagandazwecken,  speziell  aber  zur  Ausfiibrung 
eines  Attentates  auf  den  Herrn  Erzberzog  Franz  Ferdinand  von  der  Narodna 
odbrana  100  Dinar  und  die  gleicbe  Summe  von  einer  gebeimen  Studenten- 
vereinigung  bekommen. 

Man  siebt,  wie  sicb  die  verbrecberiscbe  Agitation  der  Narodna  odbrana 
und  der  ibr  Gleicbgesinnten  in  letzter  Zeit  auf  die  Person  des  Herrn  Erz- 
berzog-Tbronfolgers  konzentrierte. 

Aus  alien  diesen  Feststellungen  gelangt  man  zu  dem  Scblusse,  dafi  die 
Narodna  odbrana  mit  den  um  sie  gruppierten  monarcbiefeindlicben  KJreisen 
Serbiens  seit  kurzem  den  Zeitpunkt  fiir  gekommen  eracbtete,  die  von  ihr  ver- 
bi:eiteten  Lebren  durcb  Taten  verwirklicben  zu  lassen. 

Beacbtenswert  ist  aber,  dali  sie  sicb  biebei  damit  begniigte,  fiir  diese  Taten 
die  Anreg-ungen  zu  geben  und  dort,  wo  diese  Anregungen  auf  frucbtbaren 
Boden  gefallen  waren,  die  materiellen  Hilfsmittel  zu  deren  Verwirklicbung  bei- 
zustellen,  daii  sie  aber  die  einzige  gefabrlicbe  Rolle  bei  dieser  Prdpaganda  der 
Tat  ausschlielilicb  der  von  ibr  verbetzten  und  verfiibrten  Jugend  der  Monarcbie 
zuscbob,  die  ganz  allein  die  Lasten  dieses  traurigen  ^Heldentums"  zu  tragen  bat. 

AUe  Ziige  dieser  Macbe  finden  sich  in  der  Entstebungsgescbicbte  des  tief- 
betriibenden  Attentates  vom  28.  Juni  wieder.  (Beilage  8.) 

Princip  und  Grabez  tragen  den  Typus  der  scbon  in  der  Scbule  von  den 
Gedanken  der  Narodna  odbrana  vergifleten  Jugend. 

In  Belgrad,  im  Kreise  einer  von  diesen  Idcen  erfiillten  Studentenscbar 
verkebrend,  trug  sicb  Princip  mit  Attentatsplanen  gegen  den  Herrn  Erzberzog- 
Tbronfolger  Franz  Ferdinand,  gegen  den  sicb  damals  aus  Anlafi  seiner  Keise  nacli 
den  annektierten  Landem  der  Hali  der  rnonarcbiefeindlicben  Elemente  Serbiens 
besonders  akzentuiert  batte. 

Ibm  gesellte  sicb  der  im  selben  Kreise  verkebrende  Cabrinovid  bei,  dessen 
wechselnde,  radikal-revolutionaren  Ansicbten  nacb  seinem  eigenen  Gestandnisse 
unter  dem  Einflusse  seiner  Belgrader  Umgebung  und  der  Lektiire  der  serbiscben 
Blatter  in  die  gleicbe  monarcbiefeindlicbe  und  zur  Propaganda  der  Tat  neigende 
Eichtung  gedrangt  wurden. 

Dank  seiner  bereits  vorhandenen  Dispositionen  erlag  Grabez  diesem  Milieu, 
in  das  er  erst  spater  tirat,  sebr  rasch. 


32 

Soweit  aber  dieses  Kojuplott  auch  gediehen  und  so  fest  der  Entschlufi  der 
Verschworer  auch  gewesen  sein  mag,  zur  Ausfiihrung  des  Attentates  zu 
schreiten,  so  ware  es  doch  nie  zu  dessen  Veriibung  gekommen,  wenn  sicb  nicht, 
gleichwie  im  Falle  Jukid,  Leute  gefunden  batten,  die  den  Komplizen  die  Mittel 
zur  Veriibung  des  Anscblages  zur  Verfiigung  gestellt  batten.  Denn  es  feblte 
ibnen,  wie  Princip  und  Cabrinovid  ausdriicklicb  bestatigen,  an  den  notigen 
Waffen,  ebenso  aber  aucb  an  Geld  zu  deren  Anscbaffung. 

Interessant  ist  es  nun  zu  seben,  wo  sicb  die  Komplizen  ibre  Werkzeuge 
zu  verscbaffen  sucbten.  Milan  PribiCevid  und  Zivojin  Dadid,  diese  beiden  fiibren- 
den  Manner  der  Narodna-  odbrana,  waren  die  ersten,  an  die  sie  als  sicbere 
Heifer  in  ibrer  Not  dacbten,  ofienbar  desbalb,  weil  es  im  Kreise  der  Attentats - 
lustigen  bereits  zur  Tradition  geworden  ist,  die  Mordwerkzeuge  von  diesen 
Reprasentanten  der  Narodna  odbrana  zu  bezieben.  Ber  zufallige  Umstand,  dali 
diese  beiden  Manner  zur  kritiscben  Zeit  nicbt  in  Belgrad  weilten,  vereitelte 
allerdings  dieseri  Plan,  docb  waren  Princip  und  Cabrinovid  desbalb  nicbt.  ver- 
legen,  eine  andere  Unterstiitzungsstelle  zu  finden,  jenen  Milan  Ciganovid,  einen 
■gewesenen  Komitatscbi,  jetzt  Beamten  der  serbiscben  Eisenbabndirektion  in 
Belgrad,  gleicbfalls  ein  aktives  Mitglied  der  Narodna  odbrana,  welcber  in  deren 
Gescbichte  zuerst  im  Jabre  1909  als  Z ogling  der  Bandenscbule  in  Cuprija 
(Beilage  6)  auftaucbt.  In  ibrer  Erwartung  batten  sicb  denn  aucb  Princip  und 
Cabrinovid  nicbt  getauscbt,  denn  bei  Ciganovid  fanden  sie  sofort  die  erbetene 
Unterstiitzung. 

Dieser  und  durcb  dessen  Vermittlung  sein  Freund,  der  scbon  mebrmals 
genannte  koniglicb  serbische  Major  Voja  Tankosid,  ebenfalls  einer  der  Fiibrer 
der  Narodna  odbrana,  der  im  Jabre  1908  Leiter  der  Bandenscbule  in  Cuprija 
gewesen  war  (Beilage  5),  traten  nun  als  geistige  Leiter  und  entscbeidende 
Forderer  an  die  Spitze  des  Komplotts,  das  sie  mit  einer  abstoiienden,  fiir  die 
moralischen  Qualitaten  der  ganzen  monarcbiefeindlicben  Bewegung  bezeicbnen- 
den  Selbstverstandlicbkeit  billigten.  Nur  ein  leises  Bedenken  katten  sie  zuerst 
—  ob  die  drei  Verscbworer  aucb  fest  entscblossen  waren,  die  Tat  zu  wagen  — 
ein  Bedenken,  das  unter  ibrer  suggestiven  Mitbilfe  allerdings  bald  scbwand. 
Dann  aber  waren  sie  zu  jeder  Hilfe  bereit.  Tankosid  stellte  4  Brownings  mit 
Munition  und  .Reisegeld  zur  Verfiigung;  6  Handgranaten  aus  serbiscben  Armee- 
bestanden  bildeten.  die  VervoUsfandigung  der  Ausriistung,  eine  Bewaffnung,  die 
nach  ibrer  Zusammenstellung  und  Herkunft  Keminiszenzen  an  den  Fall  Jukitf 
wacbruft.  tJm  den  Erfolg  der  Aktion  besorgt,  verfiigte  Tankosid  die  Unter- 
weisung  der  Verscbworer  im  Scbiefien,  eine  Aufgabe,  der  sicb  Ciganovid  mit 
dcm  bekannten  Erfolge  unterzog.  Eine  spezielle,  nicbt  erbetene  Fiirsorgc  ent- 
wickelten  aber  Tankosid  und  Ciganovid  zur  Gebeimbaltung  des  Komplottes:  sie 
stellten  Zyankali  rhit  der  Weisung  bei,  dali  sicb  die  Tater  nacb  voUbracbtem 
Anscblage    damit  eiitleiben,   ein  Akt   der  Fiirsorge,   der  in    erster  Lini©    ihnen 


zagato  kommea  mti6te,  da  die  Walu-ung  des  Geheimnlsses  sie  atich  nocli  den 
geringen  Gefaliren  entriickte,  die  -sie  bei  dieser  Unternehmung-  auf  sich  nehmea 
mufiten.  Der  sichere  Tod  fur  die  Opfer  ihrer  VerfiiKrung,  die  voile  Sicherlieit 
fur  sieh)  das  ist  die  berdts  bekannte  Devise  der  Narodna  odbrana. 

Um  die  Ausfiihrung  des  Attentatsplanes  zu  ermogliclien,  mufiten  die 
Bomben  und  Waffen  xinbemerkt  nach  Bosnien  eingeschmuggelt  werden.  Auch 
bier  tritt  Ciganovid  belfend  auf,  er  schreibt  de.n  Verscbworern  eine  genaue 
Reiseroute  vor  und  sIcHert  ibuen  fiir  ihr  Einschleichen  nach  Bosnien  die  Unter- 
stutzung  der  serbiscben  Grenzbeborden.  Die  Art,  vvie  dieser  selbst  von  Prinzip 
als  „mysterios"  bezeicbnete  Transport  organisiert  war  und  durcbgefiibrt .  wurde, 
lalit  keinen  Zweifel  dariiber  offen,  dafi  dies  ein  wobl  vorbereiteter  und  fiir  die 
gebeimnisvollen  Zwecke  der  Narodna  odbrana  scbon  oft  begangener  Scbleicb- 
weg  war.  Mit  einer  Selbstverstandlichkeit  und  Sicherheit,  die  nur  der  Gewobnr 
beit  entspringen  konnen,  stellten  die  Grenzbauptleute  in  Sabac  und  Loznica 
ihren  Verwaltungsapparat  fiir  diesen  Zweck  zur  Verfugung.  Ohne  Storungen 
vollzog  sicb  dieser  gebeimnisvolle  Transport  mit  seinem  komplizieiten  System 
von  stets  wecbselnden  Fiibrern,  die  wie  durcb-  Zauberkraft  herbeigerufen,  immer 
zur  Stelle  waren,  wenn  man  sie  braucbte.  Ohne  nach  dem  Zwecke  dieser" 
merkwiirdigen  Reise  einiger  unreifer  Studenten  zu  fragen,  liefien  die  serbiscben 
Beborden,  auf  die  Weisung  des  ebemaligen  Komitatschis  und  untergeordneten 
[Babnbeamten  Ciganovid  bin,  diesen  glatt  funktionierenden  Apparat  spielen.  Sie 
Ibrauchten  iibrigens  nicbt  zu  fragen,  denn  nach  den  erhaltenen  Weisungen  war 
lihnen  wohl  klar,  dafi  bier  wieder  eine  „ Mission"  der  Narodna  odbrana  zu 
terfiillen  war.  Der  Anblick  des  Arsenals  von  Bomben  und  Revolvern  entlockte 
idenn  auch  dem  Finanzwachmanne  Grbid  nur  ein  wohlwollend  zustimmendes 
iLacheln,  wohl  ein  ausreichender  Beweis  dafiir,  wie  sebr  man  auf  dieser  „Strafie" 
an  den  Anblick  derartiger  Konterbande  gewohnt  war. 

Schwere  Schuld  hat  die  koniglicb  serbische  Regierung  auf  sich  geladen, 
5ils  sie  all  dies  geschehen  liefJ. 

Zur  Pflege  freundnachbarlicher  Beziehungen  zu  Osterreich-TJngarn  ver-^ 
■pflichtet,  hat  sie  ihrer  Presse  gestattet,  den  Hafi.  gegen  die  Monarchie  zu  ver- 
breiten;  hat  sie  es  zugelassen,  dafi  auf  ihrem  Boden  etablierte  Vereinigungen 
unter  Fiihrung  hober  Offiziere,  Staatsbeamter,  Lebrer  und  Richter  offentlich 
«ine  Kampagne  gegen  die  Monarchie  fiihren,  die  auf  die  Revolutionierung 
ihrer  Burger  abzielt;  hat  sie  es  m'cht  verhindert,  dafi  an  der  Leitung  ihrer 
Militar-  und  Zivilverwaltung  beteiligte,  aller  moralischen  Hemmungen  bare 
Manner  das  offen tliphe  Gewissen  derart  vergiften,  dafi  ihm-  in  diesem  Kampf* 
der  gemeine  Meuchelmord  als  die  beste  Waffe  scheint. 


u 

Beilag'e  1. 


Serbische  PreBstimmen. 

a)  Die  „PolItika"  brachte  am  18.  August  1910  anlafillch  des  80.  GeBurts- 
tages  Seiner  k.  und  k.  Apostolischen  Majestat  ein  groGes  Bild  des  Bogdaii 
Zerajic^,  der  zwei  Monate  vorher  gegen,  den  Landeschef  von  Bosnien, 
Freiherrn  von  Varesanin,  ein  Attentat  verubt  hatte.  Tn  dem  dazu  gehorigen 
Artikel  hieli  es:  „Vor  zwei  Monaten,  am  2.  Juni  (a.  St.),  gerade  am  Tage 
der  Eroffnung  des  bosniscH-herzegowiniselien  Landtages,  versuchte  ein  junger 
Serbe,  der  Student  Bogdan  Zerajid,  in  Sarajevo  den  Landes-Chef  von  Bosnien 
und  del'  Herzegowina,  den  General  Marian  Varesanin  zu  toten.  Fiinf 
Schiisse  feuerte  Zerajid  auf  diesen  Renegaten,  der  sicb  seine  Karriere  im 
beriilimten  Yolksaufstande  in  Rakovica  durcb  Vergieliung  des  Blutes  -seiner 
leiblicben  Briider  gesicbert  hatte,  durch  einen  merkwurdigen  Zufall  gelang 
es  nicbt,  ibn  zu  toten.  Dann  jagte  sicb  der  tapfere  und  selbstbewuiite- 
Zerajid  die  seebste  und  letzte  Kugel  in  den  Kopf  und  stiirzte  sofort  tot 
zusammen.  In  Wien  verstanden  sie  sebr  gut,  daft  Zerajid  das  Attentat  nicbt 
desbalb  veriibte,  weil  er  russisebe  und  revolutionare  Scbriften  gelesen,  sondern 
dali  er  dies  als  edler  Spi'osse  eines  Volkes  getan  batte,  das  auf  diese  blutlge 
Weise  gegen  die  Freindberrscbaft  protestieren  wollte.  Desbalb  tracbteten 
sie,  diese  ganze  Sacbe  moglicbst  scbnell  zu  vertuscben  und  —  was  gegen 
ibre  Gewobnbeit  ist  —  eine  Affaire  zu  vermeiden,  welcbe  die  osterreicbiscbe 
Regierung  in  Bosnien  und  der  Herzegowina  nocb  mebr  kompromittiert 
batte.  In  Wien  wunscbte  man,  dafi  jedes  Andenken  an  Zerajid  ausgeloscbt 
und  seinem  Attentate  jede  Bedeutung  abgesprocben  werde.  Aber  gerade 
,  diese  Furcbt  vor  dem  toten  Zerajid  und  das  Verbot,  dali  sein  Name  in 
ganz  Bosnien  und  der  Herzegowina  erwabnt  werde,  bewirkten,  daO  sein 
Name  im  Volke  wie  etwas  Heiliges  genannt  wird,  beute,  am  18.  August, 
vielleicbt  mebr  als  jemals. 

Am  beutigen  Tage    ziinden    aucb    wir   eine  Kerze    auf  seinem  Grabe 
an  und  rufen:  „Ebre  dem  Zerajid!" 

Hieran  scbloli  sicb  ein  Gedicht,  dessen  Inbalt   in  Ubersetzung  lautet: 

„  Bosnien  lebt,  nocb  ist  es  nicbt  tot, 

Umsonst  babt  Ihr  seinen  Leib  begraben; 

Nocb  spriibt  es  Feuer,  das  gefesselte  Opfer, 

Nocb  ist's  nicbt  Zeit,  das  Grabbed  zu  singen. 


35 

Mit  Satanshand  scharrtet  auf  Hir  die  Grube, 
Aber  der  lebende  Tote  will  nicht  in  die  Gruft; 
Kaiser,  hortest  Du?  im  Blitzen  des  Revolvers 
Sausen  die  bleiernen  Kugeln  gegen  Deinen  Thron! 
Das  sind  nicht  Sklaven,  das  ist  berrlicbe  Freiheit, 
Die  aus  der  kiilmen  Hand  des  Unterjocbten  leucbtetl 
Was  zittert  so  dieses  schrecklicbe  Golgatba? 
Petrus  zog  das  Scbwert,  Cbrlstus  zu  scbirmen. 
Seine  Hand  sank,  aber  aus  dem  Blute 
Werden  tausende  tapfere  Hande  sicb  erbeben; 
Dieser  Scbuli  war  nur  der  erste  Bote 
Der  glorreicben  Ostern  nacb  Golgatbas  Peinen." 

b)  Am  8.  Oktober  1910  bracbten  anlafilicb  des  Jabrestages  der  Annexion 
Bosniens  und  der  Herzegowina  „Politika"  und  „Mali  Journal",  von  denen 
letzteres  mit  scbwarzem  Rande  er.scbien,  Artikel,  in  denen  sie  sicb  in 
beftigen  Angriffen  gegen  Osterreicb-XJngarn  ergingen.  Europa  iniisse  sicb 
iiberzeugen,  dafi  das  serbiscbe  Volk  nocb  immer  an  die  Revancbe  denke. 
Der  Tag  der  Revancbe  miisse  kommen,  dafiir  biirgten  die  fieberbaften 
Anstrengungen  Serbiens  zwecks  Organisierung  seiner  Webrmacbt,  sowie 
die  Stimmung  und  der  Hafi  des  serbiscben  Volkes  gegen  die  Nacbbar- 
monarcbie. 

Aus  dem  gleicben  Anlafi  scbrieb  die  „Samouprava"  am  9.  Oktober 
1910:  „  Scbimpfworte  und  Exzesse  sind  kein  Mittel,  um  den  wabren  Patrio- 
tismus  zum  Ausdruck  zu  bringen.  Nur  stille  und  wiirdige  Arbeit  fiibrt 
zum  Ziele!" 

c)  Am  18.  April  1911  bieft  es  in  der  jjPolitika":  „Auiier  einigen  Zynikern 
wiirde  es  niemand  in  Serbien  geme  seben,  wenn  Konig  Peter  nacb 
Wien  oder  Budapest  reisen  sollte.  Durcb  die  Annexion  Bosniens  und  der 
Herzegowina  ist  ein  fiir  allemal  die  Moglicbkeit  einer  Freundscbaft  zwiscben 
Serbien  .und  Osterreicb-Ungarn  zerstort   worden.    Das   fublt  jeder  Serbe." 

d)  Die  „Beogradske  Novine"  scbreiben  am  18.  April  1911:  „Aucb  die 
meisten  Regierungsmanner  milibilligen  die  geplante  Reise  des  Konigs  Peter 
zu  Kaiser  Franz  Josepb.  Der  Sturm  der  Entriistung,  der  sicb  wegen  des 
Planes  dieser  Reise  des  Konigs  dcs  ganzen  Serbentums  bemacbtigt  bat,  ist 
vollkommen  begreiflicb. " 

e)  Das  „Mali  Journal"  vom  19.  April  1911  sagt:  „Ein  Besucb  des  Konigs 
Peter  beim  HerrscKer  von.  Osterreicb-Ungarn  ware  eine  Beleidigung  des 
ganzen  Serbentums.  Durcb  diesen  Besucb  wiirde  Serbien  das  Recbt  auf 
die  PiemontroUe  verlieren.  Die  Interessen  Serbiens  konnen  sicb  niemals 
mit  den  Interessen  Osterreicbs  decken." 


3G 

/;  Am   23.  April    1911    fuhren    „PoIitika«,    „Mali   Journal",    „Tribuna«, 

„BeogTa(iske  Novine''  und  „Vecernje  Novosti"  zu  dem  Plane  eines  Besuches 
Konig  Peters  am  Wiener  Hofe  aus:  Zwischen  Serbien  und  Osterreich- 
Ungarn  konne  niemals  Freundschaft  existieren.  Der  ^eplante  Besuch  des 
Konigs  Peter  sei  daher  fiir  Serbien  eine  „scliandliclie  Kapitulation",  eine 
„Demutigung  Serbiens",  eine  „felerliche  Sanktionierung  aller  Yerbrecben 
und  Missetaten,  die  Osterreicb-Ungarn  an  Serbien  und  dem  serbischen 
Volke  begangen  babe". 

g)  Am  18.  April  1912  scbreibt  „Trgovinski  Glasnik'^   in  einem  mit  „I)er 

Zerfall  in  Osterreicb"  iiberscbriebenen  Aj-tikel:  „In  Osterreicb-Ungarn 
herrscbt  ein  Zerfall  nacb  alien  Seiten.  Was  jenseits  der  Donau  und  Save 
gescbieht,  das  ist  nicbt  mebr  eine  deutsebe,  magyariscbe,  bobmiscbe  oder 
kroatiscbe  Krise,  das  ist  eine  allgemeine  osterreicbische  Krise,  eine  Krise 
der  Dynastie  selbst.  Wir  Serben  konnen  mit  Zufriedenbeit  einer  solcben 
Entwicklung  der  Dinge  in  Osterreicb  zuseben." 

li)  In    einem    „Die    Grenzen    Albaniens"     betitelten    Artikel    greift    der 

„ Balkan"  Osterreicb-Ungarn  mit  folgenden  Ausfiibrungen  an:  Wenn  Europa 
zu  scbwach  sei,  um  Osterreicb  Halt  zu  gebieten,  wiirden  Montenegro  und 
Serbien  dies  tun,  indem  sie  Osterreicb  zurufen:  „Halt,  weiter  gebt  es  nicbt! 
Ein  Krieg  zwiscben  Osterreicb-Ungarn  und  Serbien  ist  unausbleiblicb.  Wir 
baben  das  tiirkiscbe  Reicb  zerstiickelt,  wir  werden  aucb  Osterreicb  zer- 
stiickeln.  Einen  Krieg  baben  -wir  beendet,  jetzt  steben  wir  vor  einem 
zweiten." 

i)  „Ve5emje  Novosti"  vom  22.  April  1913  .ricbten  einen  Aufruf  an  das 

serbiscbe  reisende  Publikum  und  an  die  serbiscben  Kaufleute,  sie  mogen 
die  Donau-Dampfschiffabrts-Gesellscbaft  boykottieren.  Niemand  solle  mit 
den  ScbiflFen  dieser  osterreicbischen  Gesellscbaft  fabren  oder  Waren  trans- 
portieren  lassen,  Alle,  die  dies  taten,  wiirden  von  einem  Ausscbusse  mit 
Geldbulien  bestraft.  Die  Gelder  wiirden  der  Komitatschikasse  zuflieGen, 
welcbe  fiir  die  Verwendung  im  kommenden  Kriege  mit  Osterreicb 
bestimmt  sei." 

1c)  Die  „Tribuna"    vom    26.  Mai  1913    scbreibt    aus  Anlali    der   Besitz- 

ergreifung  Ada  Kalebs  durcb  Osteireicb-Ungarn :  „Das  scbwarz-gelbe 
verbrecberiscbe  Osterreicb  bat  wieder  einen  rauberiscben  Trick  durcb- 
gefiibrt.  Es  ist  ein  Dieb,  der,  wenn  er  nicbt  einen  ganzen  Sack  Geld 
steblen  kann,  sicb  aucb  mit  einem  Dinar  begniigt." 

I)  Am    10.    Juni  1913,    anlalilicb    der   Wiederkebr    des   Jabrestages    des 

Attentates  auf  den  koniglicben  Kommissar  in  Agram  durcb  den  Stadenten 
Luka  Jukid  bracbten  die  serbiscben  Blatter  Gedenkartikel.  In  einem  Artikel 
der  ^Pravda"  beifit  es:  »Es  mufi  aus  tiefster  Seele  webe  tun,  daft  niclit 
jeder  so  gebandelt  bat,  wie  unser  Jukid.    Wir  baben   keinen  Jykid    mebr, 


37 

aber  wir  h^iben  den  Hiafi,  -wir  habeii  deu  Zorn,  wir  Baben  beute  zebn 
Millionen  Jukid.  Wir  sind  £est  uberzeugt^  dafi  Jukid  bald  durcb  sein  Arrest- 
fenster  den  letzten  Kanonenschuii  der  Freilieit  vemebmen  wird." 

m)  „Mali  Journal"   vom  7.  Oktober  1913  bringt  an  leitender  Stelle  einen 

Ar^ikel,  in  welcKem  Osterreich-Ungarn  die  Existenzberecbtigung  abgesprocben 
wird  und  die  slawiscben  Nationalitaten  aufgefordert  werden,  den  Angriffs- 
kampf,  den  Serbien  zu  unternehmen  gedenke,  zii  unterstutzen. 

n)  Der  „Piemont"   vom  8.  Oktober  1913  schreibt  zu  dem  Gedacbtnistage 

der  Annexion:  ^Heute  sind  es  fiinf  Jahre,  dali  mittels  eines  kaiserlichen 
Dekretes  die  Souveranitat  des  Habsburger  Szepters  liber  Bosnien  und  die 
Herzegowina  ausgebreitet  wurde.  Den  Schmerz,  der  an  diesem  Tage  dem 
serbiscben  Volke  zugefiigt  wurde,  wird  das  serbiscbe  Volk  noch  durch.  Jabr- 
zebnte  fiiblen.  Bescbamt  und  vernichtet  stohnte  das  serbiscbe  Volk  ver- 
zweifelt.  Das  Volk  legt  das  Geliibde  ab,  Racbe  zu  uben,  um  dureb  einen 
keroiscben  Scbritt  zur  Freibeit  zu  gelangen.  Dieser  Tag  bat  die  bereits 
eingescblafene  Energie  geweckt  und  der  wiederbelebte.  Held  wird  eines 
Tages  die  Freibeit  sucben.  Heute,  wo  serbiscbe  Graber  die  alten  serbiscben 
Lander  zieren,  wo  die  serbiscbe  Kavallerie  die  Scblacbtfelder  von  Mazedonien 
und  Altserbien  betreten  bat,  wendet  sicb  das  serbiscbe  Volk,  nacbdem  es 
seine  Aufgabe  im  Siiden  beendet  bat,  der  entgegengesetzten  Seite  zu,  von 
wo  das  Stobnen  und  Weinen  des  serbiscben  Bruders  gebort  wird,  wo  der 
Galgen  baust.  Serbiscbe  Soldaten,  die  beute  in  Dusans  Reicbe  mit  jenen 
Albanesen  kampfen,  die  gegen  uns  der  Staat  aufwiegelte,  welcber  uns 
Bosnien  und  Herzegowina  nabm,  legten  beute  das  Geliibde  ab,  dali  sie 
gegen  die  „zweite  Tiirkei"  ebenso  vorgeben  werden,  wie  sie  mit  Gottes 
Hilfe  gegen  die  Balkan-Tiirkei  vorgegangen  sind.  Sie  legen  dieses  Geliibde 
ab  und  boffen,  dali  der  Tag  der  Racbe  nabt.  Eine  Tiirkei  verscbwand.  Der 
gute  serbiscbe  Gott  wird  geben,  daO  aucb  die  „zweite  Tiirkei"  verscbwindet." 

t  c)  Das  „ Mali  Journal"  vom  4.  November  1913  scbreibt:  „Jedes  Streben 

nacb  einer  Annaberung  an  Osterreicb-Ungarn  kommt  einem  Verrate  an 
dem  serbiscben  Volke  gleicb.  Serbien  muli  sicb  mit  den  Tatsacben  abfinden 
und  immer  vor  Augen  balten,  dali  es  in  Osterreicb-Ungarn  seinen  gefabr- 
lichsten  Feind  hat,  den  energisch  zu  bekampfen  die  heiligste  Pflicbt  jeder 
serbiscben  Regierung  sein  muli." 

J))  Am  14.  Janner  1914    beiiit   es   in  der  „Pravda":    „Unsere  Neujabrs- 

wiinscbe  gelten  in  erster  Linie  unseren  nocb  nicbt  befreiten,  unter  fremder 
Knecbtschaft  seufzenden  -Briidern.  Die  Serben  mogen  ausbalten;  nacb 
Kossovo  kam  Kumanovo  und  unser  Siegeszug  ist  nocb  nicbt  beendet." 

g)  „Novosti"  vom  18.  Janner  1914  bracbten    ein  Bild  der  Wasserweibe 

in  Bosnien  mit  folgendem  Text:  „Auch  in  Orten,  die  unter  fremdem  Jocbe 


38 

seufzen,  bewahren  die  Serben  ihre  Sitten,   bis  sie  der  Tag  der  Freiheit  in 

teller  Begeisterung  finden  wird." 
■t)  Die  „Zastava"  gestebt    im   Janner  1914:    „Serbien    eifert.  die   qster^ 

reicbiscb-xmgariscben  Serben  zur  Revolution  an." 
s)  Das  „Mali  Journal"  vom  9.  Marz  1914  scbreibt:    „Serbien   kann  das 

Sabelrasseln  Franz  Ferdinands  anlaiilicb    der  Skufariaffaire  nie  vergessen." 
t}  Am  4.  April  1914  scbreibt  die  „Zastava":  .„Die  osterreicbiscben  Staats- 

manner,    die  nur  eine  Politik  des  Hasses,    eine  Biireaukratenpolitik  fiibren, 

nicbt   aber   eine  weit  ausblickende  Politik,   bereiten   selbst   den  Untergang 

ibres  Staates  vor." 
\u)  Die  „Pravda"    vom  8.  April  1914   sagt:    ^Osten-eieb  bat  bente  sein^ 

Existenzberecbtigung  verloren." 
v)  In  den  Osternummern  (April  1914)  geben  alle  serbiscben  Blatter  der 

Hofifnung  Ausdruck,    dali  aucb  die  nicbtbefreiten,  unterjocbten,   gedriickten 

Briider  bald  eine  frobe  Auferstebung  feiern  werden. 
^o)  In  der  „Tribuna"  yom  23.  April  1914  beifit  es:  „Die  Pazifisten  baben 

ein   neues  Scblagwort   erfunden,    das  vom  „Patriotismus  Europas".    Dieses 

Programm  kann  aber  nur  dann  verwirklicbt  -v^erden,  wenn  Osterreicb  auf- 

geteilt  vyird." 
x)  Das  „Mali  Journal"    vom   12.  Mai    1914   scbreibt:    „Was   im   Privat- 

leben  Verbrecben   beilit,    nennt  man  in  Osterreicb  Politik.   Die  Gescbicbte 

kennt  ein  Ungebeuer  iind  dieses  Ungebeuer  beilit  Osterreicb." 


39 
Bellagro  2. 


Auszug  aus  dem  vom  Zentralausschusse  des  Vereines  „Narodna  odbrana"  heraus- 

gegebenen  Vereinsorgane  gleichen   Namens.    (Narodna  odbrana,  izdanje  stredi§nog 

odbora  narodne  odbrane.  Beograd,  1911.  Nova  stamparija  ,,Davidovic'S  Decanska 

ulica  br.  14,  Ljub.  Davidovica.) 

In  einer  kurzen  Einleitung  wird  zunachst  bemerkt,  daG  diese  Broschiire 
^keine  vollkommene,  erschopfende  Wiedergabe  der  Gesamtarbeit  der  Narodna 
odbrana  bilde,  da  sie  dies  aus  mehrfachen  Griinden  weder  sein  darf  noch"  sein 
kann". 

Diese  Scbrift  ist  in  drei  Abschnitte  geteilt,  deren  erster  aus  XIV  Kapiteln 
besteb.t  und  programmatiscber  Natur  ist,  wahrend  der  zweit'e  Abschnitt  einen 
Bericht  iiber  die  Vereinstatigkeit  enthalt  und  im  dritten  Beispiele  fur  die 
Organisation  ahnlicber  auslandischer  Vereine  angefiihrt  werden. 

Im  I.  Kapitel  „Entstebung  und  Tatigkeit  der  ersten  Narodna  odbrana" 
wird  bemerkt,  daO  dieser  Verein  anlalilich  der  in  Serbien  durch  die  Annexion 
Bosniens  und  der  Herzegowina  entstandenen  Volksbewegung  mit  folgenden 
Zielen  gegriindet  wurde: 

1.  Hebung,  Ermutigung  und  Starkung  des  NationalgefUHs. 

2.  Einscbreibung  und  Sammlung  von-  Freiwilligen. 

3.  Formierung  von  Freiwilligeneinheiten  und  deren  Vorbereitung  zur 
bewaffneten  Aktion. 

4.  Sammlung  von  freiwilligen  Beitragen,  Geld  und  anderen  Erfordefnissen 
zur  Verwirklicbung  ihrer  Aufgabe. 

5.  Organisierung,  Ausrustung  und  Einexerzierung  einer  besonderen  auf- 
standlscben  Truppe  (Komitefe)^  bestimmt  zu  besonderer:  und  selbstandiger  Krieg- 
fiibrung. 

6.  Entwicklung  einer  Aktion  in  alien  anderen  Ricbtungen  der  Verteidigung 
des  serbischen  Volkes. 

Ankniipfend  hieran  wird  bemerkt,  dafi  durch  die  Anerkennung  der  Annexion 
seitens  der  GroGmacbte  dieser  ganzen  Arbeit  des  Vereines  ein  Ende  bereitet 
worden  ist,  worauf  unter  Beibebaltung  der  bestebenden  Vereinsverfassung 
zu  einer  Reorganisation  des  Programmes  und  zu  neuer  Arbeit  gescbritten 
worden  sei,  damit  bei  Wiederholung  eines  abnlichen  Anlasses  „die  alte  tote 
Kriegsfabne  der  Narodna  odbrana  wieder  entfaltet  werden  konne". 


40 

Im  II.  Kapitel  „Die  neue  heutige  Narodna  odbrana"  vvird*  zunachst  aus- 
gefiilirt:  „Man  liat  zur  Zeit  der  Annexion  die  Erfahrung  gemachty  dafi  Serbien 
fur  den  Kampf,  den  ihm  die  Verhaltnisse  auferlegen,  nicht  vorbereitet  ist  und 
dafi  dieser  Kampf,  den  Serbien  aufzunebmen  hat,  viel  ernster  und  schwieriger 
ist,  als  man  dacbte;  die  Annexion  war  nur  einer  der  Scblage,  den  die  Feinde 
Serbiens  gegen  dieses  Land  gefiihrt  batten,  ein  Schlag,  dem  bereits  viele 
andere  Scblage  vorangegangen  sind,  und  dem  noch  andere  folgen  werden. 
Damit  ein  neuer  Uberfall  Serbien  nicbt  ebenso  unvorbereitet  trifft,  ist  es  not- 
wendig,  sicb  vorzubereiten'  zu  arbeiten."  AJs  Ziel  dieser  in  den  breitesten 
Scbicbten  des  Volkes  zu  leistenden  „  Arbeit"  wird  die  „Vorbereitung  des 
Yolkes  zum  Kampfe  in  alien  Richtungen  der  nationalen  Arbeit,  entsprecbend 
den  heutigen  Zeiterfordernissen "  bezeichnet  und  werden  als  Mittel  biezu 
„Starkung  des  nationalen  Bewufitseins,  korperliche  tjbungen,  das  wirtschaftlicbe 
nnd  gesundheitlicbe  Wohlergehen,  Hebung  der  Kultur  etc."  hervorgehoben, 
„insoweit  auf  diesem  Gebiete  neben  dem  Staate  der  einzelne  und  die  Gesellschaft 
wirken  kann  und  mufi". 

Das  Kapitel  HI  „Die  drei  Hauptaufgaben**  begiont  mit  dem  Hinweise 
darauf,  dafi  die  Annexion  gelehrt  habe,  das  Nationalbewufitsein  iin  Serbien  sei 
nicht  so  stark,  als  es  in  einem  Lande  sein  sollte,  welches  als  ein  kleiner  TeiL 
von  3  Millionen  die  Hoffnung  und  Stiitze  fiir  7  Millionen  des  unterjochten. 
serbischen  Volkes  bilde.  Die  erste  Aufgabe  des  Vereines  bestehe  daher  in  der 
Starkung  des  nationalen  Bewufitseins.  Die  zweite  Aufgabe  sei  die  Pflege  korper- 
licher  tJbungen,  die  dritte  die  Erzielung  einer  richtigen  Wertung  dieser  sport- 
lichen  Betatigung. 

In  dem  IV. .  „Vom  Schiefiwesen"  hand'elnden  Kapitel  wird  der  Wert  einer 
guten  Ausbildung  im  Schiefien  speziell  fiir  die  serbischen  Verhaltnisse  hervor- 
gehoben, da  dort  die  militarische  Ausbildung  nur  6  Monate  dauere.  Diese  Aus- 
fiihrungen  konkludieren  in  dem  Satze: 

„Einem  neuen  Schlage,  wie  die  Annexion  einer  war,  mufi  ein  neues 
Serbien  entgegentreten,  worin  jeder  Serbe  vom  Kinde  bis  zum  Greise  ein 
Schiitze  ist." 

Kapitel  V,  welches  das  „Verhaltnis  der  Narodna  odbrana  zur  Sokolschaff" 
behandelt,  beginnt  mit  einem  allgemeinen  kulturpolitischen  Exkurs  iiber  die 
Bedingungen  der  Kxafte  der  Staaten.  Hiebei  wird  _auf  den  Niedergang  der 
Tiirkei  verwiesen  und  ankniipfend  hieran  gesagt: 

„Die  alten  TUrken  vom  Stiden  her  verschwinden  nach  und  nach  und  nur 
noch  ein  Teil  unseres  Volkes  leidet  unter  ihrer  Herrschaft.  Aber  neue  Tiirken 
kommen  vom  Norden,  furchtbarer  und  gefahrlicher  als  die  alten.  Kulturell  und 
wirtschaftlich  starker,  gehen  die  pbrdlichen  Feinde  auf  uns  los.  Sie  woUen  uns 
unsere  Freiheit,  unsere  Sprache  bebraeii,  wis   ^.erschmettera.   Die  Vgrzeichen 


41 

des  Kampfes,  der  da  kommt,  siiid  fiihlbar.  Das   serbische  Volk   steht  vor    dec 
Frage,  sein  oder.  nicht  sein" 

„Was  woUen  wir  mit  den  Vortragen",  lautet  die  tjberschrift  des  VIL  Kapitels^ 
dessen  wesentlichster  Inlialt  sich  in  dem  Satgie  erschopft: 

„Die  Narodna  odbrana  veranstaltete  Vortrage,  welcbe  mebr  oder  wenigei* 
Agitationsvortrage  waren.  Es  wurde  das  Programm  unserer  neuen  Arbeit  enfr- 
wickelt.  Bei  jedem  Vortrage  wurde  von  der  Annexion  gesprochen,  von  der 
Arbeit  der  alten  Narodna  odbrana  und  den  Aufgaben  der  neuen.  Die  Vortrage 
werden  nie  aufhoren  Agitationsvortrage  zu  sein,  sie  werden  sicli  jedoch  immer 
mebr  nach  den  einzelnen  Fachern  entwickeln  und  sich  mit  alien  Fragen  unseres 
gesellschaftlichen  und  natipnalen  Lebens  befassen." 

In  den  Kapiteln  VIII  „Tatigkeit  der  Frau  in  der  Narodna  odbrana",  DC 
„Detail-  und  Kleinarbeit"  und  X  ^Renaissance  dex  Gesellschaft"  wird  unter 
Hinweis  auf  die  Aufgaben  der  Narodna  odbrana  die  Vorbereitung  und  Ver- 
tiefung  der  Vereinsarbeit  und  die  Notwendigkeit  einer  E-egenerierung  der 
Individuen,  des  Voltes  und  des  Staates  behandelt. 

Das  Kapitel  XI  „Neue  Obilide  und  Singjelide"  *)  sagt  einleitend: 
„Es  ist  ein  Irrtum  zu  behaupten,  Kossovo  sei  gewesen  und  yoruber.  Wir 
befinden  uns  mitten  im  Kossovo.  Unser  beutiges  Kossovo  ist  die  Finstemis  und 
Unkenntnis,  in  welcher  unser  Volk  lebt.  Die  anderen  Griinde  des  neuen  Kossovo 
leben  an  den  Grenzen  im  Norden  und  Westen:  Die  Deutschen,  Osterreicher 
imd  Schwabas  mit  ihrem  Vordringen  gegen  unseren  serbiscben  und  slawischen. 
Siiden."  Ankniipfend  bieran  v^rird  unter  Hinweis  auf  die  Heldentaten  des  Obilid 
und  Singjeli(5  auf  die  Notwendigkeit  der  Aufopferung  im  Dienste  der  Nation 
bingewiesen  und  gesagt:  „Die  nationale  Arbeit  ist  mit  Opfern  verbunden, 
namentlich  in  der  Tiirkei  und  in  Osterreich,  wo  solcbe  Arbeiter  von  den 
fBeborden  verfolgt,  in  den  Kerker  und  an  den  Galgen  gebracbt  werden.  Auch. 
fiir  diesen  Kampf  gegen  die  Finstemis  und  Unwissenheit  sind  solche  Helden 
notig.  Die  „ Narodna  odbrana"  zweifelt  nicht,  dali  im  Kampfe  mit  Gewehr  und 
Kanone  gegen  die  Schwabas  und  unsere  sonstigen  Feinde,  dem  wir  entgegen- 
gehen,  unser  Volk  eine  Reihe  von  Helden  steUen  wird.  Doch  ist  die  Narodna 
odbrana  damit  nicht  zufrieden,  denn  sie  betrachtet  auch  die  heutigen  sogenannj; 
friedlichen  Verhaltnisse  als  Krieg  und  fordert  gieichfalls  Helden  fiir  diesen 
heutigen  Kampf,  den  wir  in  Serbien  und  jenseits  der  Grenze  fiihren.^ 


*)  Milos  Obilic  (auch  Kobilic)  schHch  sich  —  nach  der  serbischen  Tradition  —  nach  der  Schlacht 
aiif  dem  Amselfelde  in  das  tiirkischo  Lager  und  ermoidete  dort  Sultan  Murad  (voo  KalJay,  „Geschichte  der 
SerDen",  I.  Bd.).  Stephan  Singjelic,  Knez  von  Kesara.  spielte  wiihrend  des  serbischen  Aufstandes 
(1807—1810)  eine  Rolle.  1809  verteidigte  Singjelid  die  Redouts  von  Tschagar  gegen  die  TQrken  und  soil 
sich,  da  er  der  Ubermacht  nicht  gewachson  war,  mit  einem  Teile  der  Seinen  und  mit  zahlreichen  TUrken 
in  die  Luft  gesprengt  haben.  (von  Kallay,  „Die  Geschichte  des  fierbiacben  Aufstandes. " 


42 

tjber  die  „Verbmdung  mit  den  Briidern  und  Freunden"  handelt  das 
Xn.  Kapitel,  dessen  wesentliclister  Inhalt  sich  in  folgenden  Satzen  zusammen- 
drangt: 

^Zu  den  Hauptaufgaben  der  Narodna  odbraAa  gebort  die  Aufrecbterhaltung 
der  Verbindung  mit  unseren  nahen  und  ferneren  Briidern  jenseits  der  Grenze 
und  unseren  ubrigen  Freunden  in  der  Welt.  Mit  dem  Worte  „Volk"  meint  die 
Narodna  odbrana  unser  ganzes  Volk,  nicbt  nur  jenes  in  Serbien.  Sie  bofft,  daft 
die  von  ihr  in  Serbien  geleistete  Arbeit  den  Briidern  aufierhalb  Serbiens  ein 
Anspom  zu  lebhafterer  Teilnahme  an  der  Arbeit  privater  Initiative  werde, 
damit  der  beutige  neue  Aufschwung  fiir  die  Schaffung  einer  kraftigen  serbiscben 
Narodna  odbrana  in  alien  serbischen  Gebieten  unter  eineln  vor  sich  gebe." 

„Zwei  wichtige  Aufgaben"    benennt   sich   Kapitel  XIII,  welclies    ausfiilirt: 

„Indem  v^ir  auf  dem  Standpunkte  stehen,  dali  durcb  die  Annexion  Bosniens 
und  der  Herzegovina  das  Vordringen  gegen  unsere  Lander  vom  Norden  her 
vollkommen  zutage  getreten  ist,  erachtet  die  Narodna  odbrana  und  nennt  dem 
Volke  Osterreich  als  unseren  ersten  und  grofiten  Feind."  Diese  Arbeit  (namlich 
Osterreicb  dem  serbiscben  Volke  als  dessen  groBteri  Feind  zu  bezeichnen) 
betracbtet  der  Verein  nach  den  folgenden  Ausfiibrungen  als  eine  gesunde, 
notwendige  Aufgabe,  als  seine  Grundpflicbt  Dann  fahrt  die  Broscbiire  fort: 

„Wie  einst  die  Turken  vom  Siiden  auf  uns  losgegangen  sind,  so  gebt 
teute  Osterreich  vom  Norden  her  auf  uns  los.  Wenn  die  Narodna  odbrana  die 
Notwendigkeit  des  Kampfes  mit  Osterreich  predigt,  so  predigt  sie  eine  heilige 
Wahrheit  unserer  nationalen  Lage." 

Der  durch  diese  Propaganda  entstehende  Hafi  gegen  Osterreich  sei  aller- 
dings  nicht  das  Ziel,  sondem  die  natiirliche  Konsequenz  der  Arbeit,  deren 
Zweck  die  Selbsterhaltung  und  Freiheit  sei.  Wenn  hiebei  der  Hali  gegen  Oster- 
reich aufkeime,  so  sei  es  Osterreich,  welches  ihn  durch  sein  Vorgehen  sae, 
welches  Vorgehen  den  „Kampf  gegen  Osterreich  bis  zu  dessen  Ausrottung 
auferlegt". 

Nach  einem  Lobe  der  modernen  Auffassung  der  nationalen  Idee  wird 
bemerkt,  dafi  bei  Besprechung  der  „Befreiung  und  Vereinigung"  zu  viel  mit 
Phrasen  gearbeitet  werde.  Dem  Volke  miisse  gesagt  werden: 

„Die  Befreiung  unserer  unterworfenen  serbischen  Gebiete  und  deren  Ver- 
einigung  mit  Serbien  ist  fiir  unseren  Herm,  unseren  Kaufraann,  unseren  Bauer 
notwendig  wegen  der  fundamentalsten  Bediirfnisse  der  Kultur,  des  Handels, 
wegen  des  Brotes  und  des  Raumes.  In  dieser  Erkenntnis  wird  das  Volk  mit 
grolierer  OpfervnUigkeit  bei  der  nationalen  Arbeit  zugreifen.  Unserem  Volke 
mufi  gesagt  werden,  daii  die  Freiheit  Bosniens  fiir  dasselbe  notwendig  ist,  nicht 
HUT  aus  Mitleid  mit  den  dortselbst  leidenden  Briidern,  sondem  wegen  des  Handels 
und  der  Verbindung  mit  dem  Meere. 


43 

Die  „beiden  Aufgaben"  der  Narodna  odbrana  werden  dann  nochmals  in 
folgendem  Schlulisatze  zusammengefalit :  „Neben  der  Aufgabe,  dem  Volke  die 
ihm  seitens  Osterreicbs  drobende  Gefahr  zu  erklaren,  hat  die  Narodna  odbrana 
noch  die  wicbtige  Aufgabe,  unter  vollstandiger  Wabrnng  der  beiligen  nationalen 
Erinnenmgen  dieses  neue,  gesunde  und  in  seineii  Folgen  macbtige  Erfassen 
des  Nationalismus  mid  der  Arbeit  zum  Zwecke  der  Befreiung  und  Vereinigung 
in  das  Yolk  zu  tragen." 

Das  XIV.,  Scblulikapitel,  beginnt  mit  einem  Appell  an  die  Regierung  und 
das  Volk  Serbiens,  sicb  mit  alien  Mitteln  fur  den  Kampf  vorzubereiten,  „den 
die  Annexion  vorangezeigt  bat". 

In  folgendem  Satze  wird  hierauf  die  Tatigkeit  der  Narodna  odbrana  noch- 
mals rekapituliert: 

„Indem  die  Narodna  odbrana  zeitgemafi,  den  veranderten  Verhaltnissen 
entsprechend  wirkt,  dabei  alle  zur  Zeit  dei'  Annexion  gekniipften  Verbindungen 
aufrechterhalt,  ist  sie  heute  dieselbe,  die  sie  zur  Zeit  der  Annexion  war.  Sie 
ist  auch  heute  odbrana  (Wehr),  sie  ist  auch  heute  Narodna  (des  Volkes).  Sie 
versammelt  auch  heute  um  ihre  Fahne  die  Staatsbiirger  Serbiens,  wie  sie  sie 
zur  Annexionszeit  versammelt  hat.  Damals  rief  man  nach  dem  Kriege,  heute^ 
ruft  man  nach  der  Arbeit,  damals  wurden  Meetings,  "Demonstrationen,  frei- 
willige  Komitees,  Gewehre  iind  Bomben  verlangt,  heute  wird  die  stille,  fana- 
tische,  unermiidliche  Arbeit  und  wieder  Arbeit  in  der  Richtung  der  Aufgaben 
und  Pflichten  verlangt,  welche  wir  vorgefiihrt  haben,  als  vorlaufige  Vorbereitung 
fiir  den  Kampf  mit  Gewehr  und  Kanone,  welcher  kommen  wird." 


t5l)ei:  die  Organisation  der  Narodna  odbrana  enthalt  diese  Broschiire  und 
der  Jahresbericht  dieses  "Vereines  folgende  Paten: 

Ein  Zentralausschuli  mit  dem  Sitze  in  Belgrad,  leitet  alle  Agenden  der 
Narodna  odbrana,  Diesem  sind  alle  anderen  Ausschusse  der  Narodna  odbrana 
untergeordnet.  Der  Zentralausschuli  teilt  sich  in  vier  Sektionen:  ftir  kulturelle 
Arbeit,  fiir  korperliche  Fortbjldung,  fiir  die  finanzielle  Gebarung  und  fiir  aus- 
wartige  Angelegenheiten. 

Kreisausschiisse  mit  dem  Sitze  an  den  Orten  der  politischen  Kreisbehorden 
leiten  die  Vereinsangelegenheiten  in  den  betreffenden  Kreisen.  Jeder  Kreis- 
ausschuii  teilt  sich  in  je  eine  Sektion  fiir  kulturelle  Arbeit  (Vorstand  ist  der 
im  Orte  befindliche  Obmann  einer  Filiale  der  „Kulturliga"),  fiir  korperliche 
Fortbildung  (Vorstand  ist  ein  im  Orte  befindliches  Mitglied  des  Schiitzen-, 
Sokol-,  Jager-,  Reitervereines)  und  fiir  finanzielle  Gebarung;  bei  einzelnen 
Kj-eisausschiissen  besteht  auch  eine  Sektion  fiir  auswartige  Angelegenheiten. 

Bezirksausschiisse  mit  dem  Sitze  an  den  Orten  der  politischen  Bezirks- 
behorden  leiten  die  Vereinsangelegenheiten  in  den  betreffenden  Bezirken, 


44 

Ortsausscliusse  sind  die  leitenden  Organe  in  den  einzelnen  Orten. 

Vertrauensmanner  befinden  sich  in  jenen  Orten  im  Innern  des  Landes,  wo 
die  Notwendigkeit,  einen-  Ausschufi  zu  bilden,  niclit.  bestebt. 

Vereine,  „welche  mit  der  Arbeit  der  Organisation  der  Naro:dna  odbrana  in 
engster  Verbindung  steben"  und  von  dieser  in  jeder  Hinsicht  unterstUtzt  werden, 
sind:  der  Schiitzenbund  mit  762  Vereinen,  der  Sokolbund  „Dusan  Silni"  mit 
2500  Mitgliedern,  der  olympische  Klub,  der  Keiterverein  „Knez.  Mibajlo",  der 
Jagerbund  und  die  Kulturliga. 

AUe  diese  Vereine  sind  ahnlicli  organisiert  wie  die  Narodna  odbrana,  beniitzen 
auch  deren  Lokalifaten,  bezw.  Yerelnshauser,  deren  Bibliotheken  etc.;  angesehene 
Mitglieder  dieser  Vereine  sind  Sektionsvorstande  in  den  Ausscbiissen  der  Narodna 
odbrana. 


45^ 

Beilag'c  8. 


Auszug  aus  xlem  „Bericht  Uber  die  T^tigkeit  des  Sokolvereines  Du§an  Silni  in 
Kragujevac  in  den  Jahren  1912  und  1913"   (Kragujevac,  Druckerei    „Buducnost'' 

Tih.  Lekic  1914). 

An  der  Spitze  dieses  Berichtes  ist  die  AnspracHe  abgedruckt,  mit  welclier 
der  Prasident  des  Vereines,  der  koniglicli  serbiscKe  Major  KovaCevid,  die  Jahres- 
versammlung  im  Janner  1914  begriifite. 

^Es  ist  Euch  bekannt",  begann  der  Prasident,  „dali  das  Sokolwesen,  im 
Kampfe  gegen  den  Germanismus  entstanden,  eine  rein  slawische  Institution  ist, 
welcbe  das  Ziel  verfolgt,  alle  slawischen  Briider  zu  vereinigen,  zu  begeistem 
und  durcb  Kultur  und  Gewalt  fiir  den  Kampf  gegen  den  Feind  des  Slawen- 
tuins  vorzubereiten. 

Wir  Serben  als  ein  Teil  der  groiien  Slawengemeinschaft  haben  die  Sokol- 
idee  aufgenommen  und  der  gemeinschaftlichen  Arbeit  fiir  unser  und  unserer 
Briider  Woblergeben  und  Gliick  zugestimmt. 

Auch  wir  Serben  wollen  im  Geiste  des  Sokols  leben  und  arbeiten,  denn 
"wir  wiinschen  die  Miiden  und  Matten  zu  beleben,  die  Scliwachen  und  Ver- 
kiimmerten  zu  starken,  die  Gefangenen  und  Gefesselten  zu  befreien.  Wir  haben 
dies  auch  jetzt  und  in  den  friiheren  Kriegen  getan.  Wir  haben  einen  Teil 
unserer  Briider  von  dem  tJbermute  des  Feindes  im  Siiden  befreit.  Wir  haben 
ihnen  die  Fesseln  aufgerissen,  sie  der  Qualen  entledigt  und  ihnen  die  Freiheit 
gegeben,  damit  sie  in  ihr  das  Gliick,    die  Gleichheit  und  Briiderschaft  fiihlen." 

Nach  einigen  Worten  der  Lobpreisung  dieser  „edlen  Arbeif*,  welche 
„ einen  Teil  der  grofien  Sokolidee  verwirklichte",  fuhr  Major  KovaCevid  fort: 

„Aber  meine  Briider  und  Schwestem,  unser  Feind  im  Norden  ist  gefahr- 
licher  und  herzloser,  weil  er  kulturell  und  okonomisch  starker  ist. 

Dieser  Feind  ist  in  seinen  Geliisten  unersattlich ;  er  halt  Millionen  unserer 
Briider  in  Sklaverei  und  Ketten.  Er  nahm  ihnen  die  Freiheit  und  das  Recht 
und  unterwarf  sie  alle  seinen  Diensten.  Die  Briider  murren,  rufen  und  bitten 
urn  je  raschere  Hilfe. 

Wir  diirfen  sie  nicht  auf  Gnade  und  Ungnade  diesem  fiirchterlichen  und 
gefrafiigen  Feinde  iiberlassen.  Wir  miissen  ihnen  je  eher  zu  Hilfe  eilen,  weil 
dies  zu  tun  unsere,  Pflicht  ist.  Kbnnten  wir  denn  schliefilich  glUcklich  sein, 
wenn  so  viele  Briider  in  Sklaverei  leben,  leiden  und  murren? 

Briider  und  Schwestern! 

Der  Feind  ist  gefahrlich,  liistern  und  lastig.  Seien  wir  immfer  auf  der  Hut! 


46 

Arbeiten  wir  mit  noch  grbfierer  Lust  und  Aufopferung.  Seien  -wir  genan 
in  der  heiligen  Sokolpflicht,  treu  und  ausharrend. 

Bereiten  wir  uns  zum  Kampfe  und  fiir  die  gerechte  Sokolidee  vor. 

Vereinigen  und  gesellen  wir  uns  zu  unzaUbaren  Sokolschwarmen  und 
denken  wir  immer  an  jene  Wabrlieit,  welcbe  die  serbiscben  Sokolasen  auf 
ibrer  Fabne  gescbrieben  babdn:  Dafi  nur  ein  gesundes,  kraftiges,  national- 
bewuiites  und  gut  organisiertes  Volk  geeignet  ist,  sicb  zu  verteidigen,  zu 
kampfen  und  zu  siegen". 

An  diese  Anspracbe  des  Prasidenten  scblieOt  sicb  der  Bericbt  des  Ver- 
waltungsausscbusses  an.  Nacb  einer  Scbilderung  der  Erfolge  der  letzten  Kriege, 
welcbe  den  Verein  wabrend  zweier  Jabre  an  einer  Betatigung  binderten,  beilit 
es  dort:  „Es  kam  der  Tag,  an  dem  wir  zu  unserer  Arbeit  zuriickkebren,  weil 
unser  Programm  nocb  nicbt  erfullt,  well  unsere  Aufgabe  nocb  nicbt  beendet 
ist.  Nocb  ein  grolier  Teil  unseres  Volkes  erduldet  die  Leiden  des  gekreuzigten 
Cbristus;  wir  baben  nocb'  unsere  Briider  jenseits  der  Drina  zu  besucben;  wir 
baben  nocb  die  Stadt  Sarajevo  und  das  Vermacbtnis  des  beiligen  Sava*)  auf- 
zusucben.;  wir  baben  das  Heimatland  des  Mairina  Novak,  des  Deli  Radivoj  und 
des  alten  Vujadin  zu  besicbtigen;  wir  baben  das  Gebirge  Romanija  zu  iiber- 
scbreiten  und  zu  seben,  warum  sicb  Travnik  in  Nebel  gebiillt  bat,  es  muli 
einmal  jenes  Lied  aufboren :  Aoj,  Bosnien,  Du  Waisenkind  vor  Gott,  bast  Du 
nirgends  Leute  Deines  Stammes  ..." 

Nacb  einer  Besprecbung  diverser  Untemebmungen  des  Vereines  wird 
betont,  dali  der  Verein  zu  den  „Brudervereinen  jenseits  der  Save  und  Drina" 
Beziebungen  unterbielt  und  speziell  die  Entsendung  von  Delegierten  zu  der  in 
Sarajevo  abgebaltenen  Jubelfeier  der  Prosvjeta  betont.  Hiezu  bemerkt  der 
Bericbt:  „Durcb  Absendung  der  Eeprasentanten  zu  den  Briidem  nacb  Bosnien 
beabsicbtigte  der  Ausscbuii,  denselben  biemit  zu  sagen:  „Wir  baben  Euer  nicbt 
vergessen,  die  Fliigel  des  Falken  der  Sumadija  sind  nocb  macbtig." 

Nacb  eingebender  Scbilderung  eines  Besucbes  der  Agramer  Studenten  in 
Serbien**)  und  der  Fabnenweibe  des  „Verbandes  der  niicbtemen  Jugend" 
scblielit  der  Verwaltungsbericbt  mit  folgenden  Satzen: 

„ Diese  Erscbeinungen  —  die  Ankunft  der  Briider  Kroaten  in  der  Sumadija 
und  die  Zusammenkunft  der  „ niicbtemen  Jugend"  aus  alien  Gegenden  des 
Serbentums  weifi  die  Verwaltung  ricbtig  zu  wiirdigen  und  man  wird  nicbt 
iibertreiben,  wenn  man  sagt,  daG  diese  Ereignisse^  den  Anfang-oind  Keim  einer 
grolien  Tat  bedeuten,  die  sicb  in  der  nacbsten  Zukunft  abspielen  wird. 


*)  Der  hlg.  Sava  ist  Schutzpatron  der  Serben  (gestorbeu  123&).    Ducatus  sancti  Save  heilit  Herzego- 
wina.  Vermachtnis  des  hi.  Sava  ist  also  mit  Herzegowina  gleichbedeatend. 

**)  Dieser  Besuch  der  Agramer  Studenten  (April  1912)  in  Belgrad,  Nig,  Semendria  a.  8.  w.  wnrde  in 
Serbien  zu  einer  grofien,  monarchiefeindUchen  Demonstration  beniitzt.  Den  Ausfliiglem  wurden  militariscHe 
Ehren  erwiesen,  es  fanden  in  der  Militarakademie  und  im  Offizierskasino  D^jeneors  nnd  Biille  statt.  In  Nid 
wurde  zn  Ehren  der  Besucher  sogar  einb  mUitarische  Parade  abgehalten. 


.     .  47 

Sle  sind  der  Ausdruck  eines  grofien,  bislier  nocli  stillen  Erwacliens  des 
nationalen  Bewufttseins  und  der  Starke  einer  unterdriickten  Nation,  welclier 
man  nicht  erlaiibt,  dali  sie  sich  emporhebt  und  einigt.  Noch  eine  Zeitlang  und 
dieser  Keim  wird  reifen  und  wenn  die  Volksseele  noch  mehr  aufwallt^  wird  es 
keine  Schranken  geben,  die  sie  nicht  zerreiflen  kann,  keine  Hindernisse,  die  sie 
auf  ihrem  Wege  nicht  wird  niedeiTeiiien  konnen.  Die  Arbeit  an  der  Kraftigung 
dieser  Macht,  die  Mithilfe  und  BeSchleunigung  des  Laufes  dieser  nationalen 
Entwicklung,  die  Vorbereitung  und  die  Unterstiitzung  dieser  Idee  war  der  Ver- 
waltung  stets  das  Ziel  ihrer  Handlungen." 

I>er  Bericht  des  Kassiers  fiihrt  vorerst  alle  jene  an,  die  dem  Verein  ihre 
Unterstiitzung  liehen.  Nebst  einer  Reihe  von  Mitgliedern  des  Kragujevacer 
Kreisausschusses  werden  hiebei  dankend  erwahnt: 

Der  Kreisausschuli  der  „Narodna  odbrana"  in  Kragujevac,  insbesonders 
dessen  Eittersektion,.  die  dem  -Sokolvereine  ofters  mit  reichlichen  Uhterstutzungen 
zu  Hilfe  kam;  der  Diiektor  des  Gymnasiums  in  Kragujevac,  der  den  Sokolen 
„  Stan  dig  seine  vaterliche  Ailfmerksamkeit  zeigte" ;  der  Divisionskommandant 
der  Sumadija,  der  den  Verein  reichlich  unterstiitzte ;  der  Prasident  deS  Kreis- 
gerichtes  in  Kragujevac,  der  Kreisvorstand  und  der  Gemeindevorstand  in 
Kragujevac. 

Nachdem  der  Kassier  der  im  Kriege  gefallenen  Vereinsmitglieder  gedacht 
hat,  schliefit  er  seinen  Bericht  mit  folgenden  Worten: 

„Nach  dem  so  glanzenden  Siege  iiber  einen  Teil  unseres  Feindes  hofft 
die  Vereinsleitung,  daii  Ihr  alle  von  nun  ab  noch  mehr,  fester  und  lieber  Euch 
der  Tatlgkeit  des  Sokoltums  widmen  werdet,  damit  Ihr  in  unserem  Falkenhorst 
Falken  erzieht,  die  im  gegebenen  Zeitpunkte  eines  Tages  in  der  Lage  sein 
werden,  hoch  aufzufliegen  und  auf  ihren  machtigen  Schwingen  auch  alien 
unseren  noch  nicht  befreiten  Briidern  Briiderschaft,  Liebe  und  Freiheit  zu 
biingen." 

Der  Jahresbericht  ist  unterfertigt  von  dem  Majore  M.  J.  KovaCevid  als 
Prases,  dem  Gerichtssekretar  D.  V.  Brzakovid  als  Sekretar  und  von  10  Vor- 
standsmitgliedern,  unter  denen  sich  zwei  Professoren  (Emil  Lukid  und  Milan 
Jankovid)    sowie-  ein  weiterer  Offizier    (Infanterie major  Michael  Vasid)  befinden. 

Aus  diesem  Jahresberichte  und  aus  einer  von  dem  Kragujevacer  Sokol- 
vereine dem  „Srpski  Soko"  in  Tuzla  zur  Ausfiillung  zugesendeten,  gleichfalls 
vom  Major  Kovadevid  und  Gerichtssekretar  Brzakovid  gezeichneten  Tabelle  geht 
hervor,  daO  die  Sokolvereine  in  Serbien  mit  einzelnen  derartigen  Vereinen  in 
der  Monarchie  in  einem  bisher  nicht  bekannt  gewesenen  engeren  Verbande 
stehen. 


48 
Beilago  4. 


Das  serbische  Amtsblatt  im  Dieniste  der  Narodna  odbrana. 

Dem  serbischen  Amtsblatte'  „Srpski  no  vine"  vom  28.  Jqni  1914  (n.  St.) 
lag  als  Beilage  ein  Aufruf  der  , Narodna  Odbrana"  bei,  der  alien  Abonnenten 
des  Blattes  zugestellt  wurde. 

In  diesem  Aufrufe  finden  sich  die  tblgenden  Stellen: 

„Bruder  und  Schwestern!  Nur  ein  Teil  des  .Kossovo  wurde  geracht,  nur 
ein  Teil  des  St.  Veittages  (Vidovdan)  gesiihnt.  Ebenso  weit  und  breit,  wie  die 
Gebiete  sind.  in  denen  unsere  Volkssprache  gehort  wird  —  die  serbiscbe, 
kroatische  und  sloweniscbe  —  von  Kikinda  bis  Monastir,  von  Triest  bis  Carevo- 
Solo,  ebenso  weit  und  breit  ist  die  Bedeutung  des  St.  Veittages  und  des 
Kossovo.  So  viel  nationale  Seelen  auf  diesem  Territorium  weinen,  so  viel  Ketten 
unserer  Briider  knirscben,  so  viel  Arbeit  ist  noch  zu  leisten,  so  viel  baben  wir  noch 
zu  opfern.  Der  St.  Veittag  konnte  friiher  fur  uns  einen  Tag  der  Trauer  be- 
deuten,  aber  beute,  wo  wir  schon  tief  in  die  neue  .Geschiclite  des  Volkes 
gescbritten  sind,  wo  binter  uns  groGe  und  glorreiche  nationale  Geschehnisse 
steben  und  uns  nocb  groliere  und  glorreicbere  erwarten,  heute,  wo  wir  in  der 
Mitte  des  Scbaffens  des  groGen  nationalen  Staates  steben,  beute  raufi  fiir  uns 
der  St.  Veittag  ein  Tag  grolier  Freude  und  Stolzes  wegen  des  Geschehenen  sein, 
da  es  aus  ihm  entsprossen  ist  und  nocb  mebr  wegen  dessen,  was  kommen 
wird.  Serben  und  Serbinnen!  Millionen  unserer  Briider.  Slowenen,  Kroaten  und 
Serben  auOerhalb  unserer  Grenzen  schauen  heute  auf  uns,  die  Kinder  des 
Konigreiches,  und  ihre  Brust  wolbt  die  Freude  und  die  Hofinung,  indem  sie 
unsere  heutige  majestatische  Manifestation  fiir  die  nationale  Sacbe  betrachten. 
Dem  Mutlgen  hilft  Gott!  Vorwarts  alle!  Es  ruft  uns  derjei\ige  Teil  unserer 
geheiligten  Aufgabe,  der  nocb  unverwirklicht  geblieben  ist.  Am  St.  Veittage  1914 
in  Belgrad. 


49 

Beilago  5* 


Zeugenaussage  des  Trifko  Krstanovic  Uber  die  Narodna  odbrana. 

Der  Backergehilfe  Trifko  ICrstanovid  m  Zavldovici  wurde  von  einep 
Gendarmeriepatroiiille  in  der  Nacht  vom  6.  zum  7.  Juli  1914  verhaftet,  weil 
durch  eine,  kurz  nach  Veriibung  des  Attentates  gegen  den  Herrn  Erzlierzog 
Franz  Ferdinand  von  ihm  gemachte  x\.uiierung,  dieses  Attentat  sei  zu  erwarten 
gewesen,  der  Verdaclit  entstanden  war,  dali  er  von  dem  Komplotte  Kenntnis 
gehabt  habe. 

Er  wurde  deshalb  dem  Kreisgericlite  in  Sarajevo  eingeliefert.  Bei  der 
Abhorung  des  Verhafteten  ergab  sicb,  daO  seine  Aufierung  den  gegen  ihn  reg& 
gewordenen  Verdaclit  nicbt  rechtfertigte,  da  sie,  lediglich  auf  seinen  friilieren 
Kenntnissen  von  der  Tatigkeit  der  Narodna  odbrana  berahend,  blofi  der  Aus- 
druck  seiner  Uberzeugung  gewesen  war,  daft  bei  der  in  Serbien  gegen  die 
osterr.-ungar,  Monarchic  und  speziell  gegen  den  Plerrn  Erzherzog  Franz  F-erdinand 
entfalteten  Agitation  eine  derartige  Tat  erwartet  werden  mulite.  Das  gegen 
Kjrstanovid  eingeleitete  Verfabren  wurde"  desbalb  mangels  jedes  Tatbestandea 
eingestellt  und  der  Genannte  mit  Eiicksicbt  auf  seine  fiir  die  Untersuchung 
wichtigen  Kenntnisse  uber  die  Tatigkeit  der  Narodna  odbrana  als  Zeuge  ein- 
vernommen. 

Ein  die  hier  interessierenden  Umstande  betrefifender  Auszug  aus  diesem 
am  19.  Juli   1914  aufgenommenen  ZeugenprotokoUe  folgt  hiemit: 

„Im  Herbste  des  Jahres  1908  iiberscbritt  icb  auf  der  Mokra  Gora  bei 
ViSegrad  die  Grenze  nach  Serbien,  um  mir  Besch'aftigung  zu  suchen.  Zuerst 
kam  ich  nacb  Bajina  Basta  im  Bezirke  Uzice  und  da  ich  dort  keinerlei  Be- 
sch'aftigung fand,  ging  ich  nach  Belgrad,  wo  ich  gerade  zu  der  Zeit  der  Ver- 
kiindigung  der  Annexion  Bosniens  und  der  Herzegowina  emlangte.  Da  ich  sah, 
daO  wegen  der  Annexion  in  der  iBevolkerung  eine  grolie  Bewegung  und 
Erregung  entstanden  war  und  daft  ich  keinerlei  Beschaftigung  werde  finden 
konnen,  ging  ich  in  das  k.  n.  k.  K^nsulat  und  ersuchte,  mich  nach  Hause 
abzufertigen.  Dort  sagte  man  mir,  daft  ich  nachmittags  kommen  moge  und  daft 
man  mich  dann  in  die  Heimat  abfertigen  werde.  Als  ich  jedoch  aus  dem 
Konsulate  hinausging,  erwischte  mich  auf  der  Strafte  ein  Gendarm  und  fragte 
mich,  woher  ich  sei;  in  der  Meinung,  ich  sei  ein  Spion,  fiihrte  er  mich  in 
eine  Karaula.  Hier  verhorte  man  mich  und  als  ich  ihnen  sagte,  daft  ich  gerne 
nach  Hause  mochte,  begann  mich  ein  Unteroffizier  zu  schmahen,  wieso  ich 
jetzt  aus  Serbien  wolle,    da  sie  gera,de  jetzt  mehr  Leute  brauch'en,    weil  es  zu 


50 

eincm  Kriege  mit  Osterreich  kommen  konnte.  Als  ich  ihm  sagte,  daft  ich  nichts 
zum  Leben  babe,  antwortete  er  mir,  dafi  icb  voUe  Versorgung  finden  werde, 
vvenn  icb  micb  in  das  Komitee  einscbreibe.  Icb  war  in  jener  Not  damit  ein- 
verstanden  und  ein  Gendarm  fiibrte  micb  ^in  das  Gasthaus  „Zelenom  Vijencu" 
(„zum  gi-iinen  Kranz")  und  stellte  micb  dort  dcm  Voja  Tankosid,  dem  Fiihrer 
des  Komitees  und  Kapifan  im  regularen  Heere  vor.  Hier  beim  ^griinen  Kranze" 
wurdc  icb  in  Kost  und  Wobnung  genommen  und  wie  icb  sab,  waren  bier  aucb 
andcre  vom  Komitee  wobnbaft.  Voja  Tankosid  sagtc  mir,  daft  es  der  Zweck 
des  Komitees  sei,  sicb  zu  unterricbten  im  Bombenwerfen,  in  der  Zerstorung 
von  Briicken,  Tunnels,  Telegij-apben  und  Eisenbabnen,  und  zwar  desbalb,  weil 
es  Iciclit  zu  einem  Kriege  zwiscben  Serbien  und  Osterreicb  kommen  konnte. 
Hierauf  fiibrte  micb  ein  Mann  in  ein  aiariscbes  kleineres  Plans  ncben  dem 
Fiiianzministcrium,  wo  die  Kanzleien  des  Komitees  sicb  befanden  und  bier  in 
der  Kanzlei  traf  icb  Milan  Pribii^evir,  welcber  micb  in  das  Komitee  einscbrieb. 
Bei  dieser  Einscbreibung  fragte  micb  Milan  Pnbi(?evid,  ob  mir  Voja  Tankosid 
gesagt  babe,  welcbe  Pflicbten  icb  als  Komita  babo,  worauf  icb  antwortete:  „ja". 
Er  sagte  mir,  daft  die  Eingescbriebenen  tiicbtig,  stark  und  opferwillig  sein 
miifiten.  Damals  waren  wir  etwa  70  eingescbrieben.  In  Belgrad  baben  w'ir 
nicbts  gemacbt.  Nacb  etwa  iVt  Monaten  teilte  uns  unser  FUbrer  Tankosid  mit, 
daft  die  Groftmacbte  unser  Komitee  verboten  baben  und  daft  wir  uns  aus  Belgrad 
entfernen  und  irgendwo  in  einem  verlorenen  Orte  vcrstecken  miissen,  wobin 
Fremde  nicbt  konmien.  Auf  diese  Weise  sandten  sie  uns  in  die  Stadt  Cuprija. 
Hier  iibten  uns  ein  die  Oftiziere  Voja  Tankosic,  Dusan  Putnik,  Zivko  Gvozdid 
und  Mitar  Djinovid,  der  in  die  montenegriniscbe  Bombenaffaire  verwickelt  war 
und  in  Montenegro  erscbossen  wurde.  Es  war  uns  verboten,  mit  den  ubrigen 
Leuten  zu  verkebren,  damit  man  nicbts  von  unserem  Zwecke  erfabre  und  aucb 
nichts  davon,  wie  viele  wir  waren.  Wir  iibten  uns  in  dem  Werfen  von  Bomben, 
in  dem  Enicbten  von  Minen  und  in  der  Zerstorung  von  Telegrapben,  Eisen- 
babnen, Tunnels  und  Briicken.  AUe  14  Tage  kamen  zu  uns  Milan  Pribicevid, 
General  Bozo  Jankovi«;,  der  Apotbeker  .Skaric,  der  Abgeordnete  Zivko  Rafajlo- 
vid,  ein  gewisser  Glisid  Milutin,  Beamtcr  im  Finanzministerium,  und  diese 
sahen  zu,  wie  wir  iibten  und  beglicben  jedesmal  fiir  uns  die  Kosten  der  Ver- 
pflcgung.  Unsere  Lebrer  sagten  uns,  daft  wir  Komitees,  sobald  der  Krieg  ver- 
kiindigt  sei,  voraus  gcben  werden,  binter  uns  die  Freiwilligen  und  dann  das 
regulare  Heer.  In  Cuprija  waren  wir  etwa  140  Mann.  Wir  bekamen  aufier  der 
Kost,  Wobnung  und  Kleidung  je  25  Para  faglicb  fiir  Tabak.  Die  Scbule 
dauerte  beilaufig  3  Monate,  d.  h.  bis  Marz  1909.  Dann  sagten  uns  die  Mit- 
glieder  des  Ausscbusses,  daft  wir  entlassen  waren,  daft  jeder  geben  konne, 
wobin  er  wolle,  denn  die  Annexion  Bosniens  und  der  Herzegowina  sei  von 
den  Groftmacbten  anerkannt  und  unser  Komitee  babe  keinen  Zweck  mebr. 
Bei  der  Auflosung  des  Komitees  sagte  mir  General  Bozo  Jankovid,  daft  icb  in 


51 

den  Dienst  des  Bozo  Milanovid  in  Sabac  trete  und  50  Dinar  monatlich  Lohn 
erhalte.  Er  sagte  mir  nicht,  welcher  Dienst  das  sein  werde.  Icb  nahm  an,  weil 
ich  mich  als  Komitee  gegeniiber  dem  General  Jankovid  zu  folgen  verpflichtet 
fiihlte  und  auch  da  ich  nichts  zum  Leben  hatte  und  mir  ein  Bret  suchen 
mulite.  So  kam^  ich  im  Marz  1909  nach  Sabac  und  meldete  mich  bei  Bozo 
Milanovid,  Kaufmaiin  in  Sabac.  General  Jankovid  hatte  mir  gesagt,  dafi  Bozo 
MiJanovid  der  Vorstand  der  Narodna  odbrana  in  Sabac  sei  und  daft  ich  bei 
ihm  in  dicser  Narodna  odbrana  dienen  werde.  Als  ich  dem  Bozo  Milanovid  das 
Schreiben  des  Generals  gab  und  er  es  gelesen  hatte,  sagte  er  mir,  daft  ich 
ihm  treu  dienen  und  seine  Auftriige  ausfuhren  miisse.  Der  hauptsachlichste 
Dienst  uerde  fiir  mich  sein  Briefe  auszutragen,  wohin  sie  eben  lauten.  Falls 
ich  einen  Brief  nicht  dorthin  tragen  werde,  wohin  er  gerichtet  sei  und  falls 
irgend  jemand  anderer  zu  diesem  Briefe  kame,  so  sei  das  mit  meinem  Leben 
verbunden.  Gleich  nachsten  Tages  gab  mir  Bozo  Miranovid  einen  geschlossenen 
Brief,  den  ich  ^u  Cedo  Lukid,  Finanzwachtmeister  in  Serbisch-Raca,  tragen 
soUte.  Am  Wege  nach  Raca',  im  Orte.  Bogatid,  stelite  mich  der  Bezirkskapetan, 
nahm  mir  den  Brief  ab,  offnete  und  las  ihn.  In  dem  Brief  stand,  daft  Lukid 
sofort  drei  Boote  kaufen  solle,  dam  it  sie  fertig  waren,  falls  sie  gebraucht 
wiirden.  Dem  Briefe  waren  100  Dinar  beigeschlo§sen.  Bei  dieser  Gelegenheit 
sagte  mir  der  Kapetan,  daft  vom  Ministerium  der  strenge  Auftrag  gekommen 
sei,  daft  die  Komitatschi  auf  eigene  Faust  nichts  tun  diirfen,  damit  nicht  eine 
internationale  diplomatische  Intervention  provoziert  werde.  Ich  kehrte  nach 
•Sabac  zuriick  und  meldete  dem  Bozo  Milanovid,  was  mir  geschehen  war.  Bozo 
Milanovid  wendete  sich  an  den  Kreisprafekten  und  dieser  ordnete  an,  daft  mir 
der  Revolver,  den  mir  der  Kapetan  in  Bogatid  abgenommen  hatte,  zuriick- 
gestellt  werde.  Auch  ordnete  er  an,  daft  der  Kapetan  den  Brief  an  Cedo  Lukid, 
an  welchen  er  lautcte,  zu  expedieren  habe.  Deraitige  Briefe  habe  ich  vom 
Marz  1909  bis  zum  Oktober  1910  ausgetragen,  und  zwar  habe  ich  wahrend 
dieser  Zeit  nach  Serbisch-Raca  43  Briefe,  nach  Loznica  55  Briefe,  nach 
Zvornik  5,  nach  Ljubivija  2  Briefe  getragen  und  nach  Koviljada  wcift  ich  nicht 
wie  viele.  Ich  habe  mir  deswegen  gemerkt,  vvie  oft  ich  in  jedem  Orte  war, 
weil  diese  Orte  von  Sabac  sehr  weit  entfernt  sind.  Die  Briefe  habe  ich  an  die 
Leiter  der  Zollamter  in  den  betreffendcn  Oiten  getragen  und  von  diesen  habe 
ich  wieder  Briefe  als  Antwort  erhalten  und  zu  Bozo  Milanovid  getragen.  Ich 
erinnere  mich,  daft  ich  auch  einigemale  Briefe  nach  Sepadka  Ada  getragen 
habe.  Mein  Gehilfe  im  Austragen  von  Briefen  war  ein  gewisser  Vaso  Erid, 
gebiirtig  aus  Srebrenica.  Nach  Belgrad  habe  ich  Briefe  von  Bozo  Milanovid 
jede  Woche  getragen  und  an  Milan  Pribicevid  und  Bozo  Jankovid  zugestellt. 
Von  dem  Inhalte  dieser  Briefe  habe  ich  nichts  gewuftt  und  hat  mir  auch 
niemand  hieriiber  etwas  gesagt.  Soviel  ich  sehen  konnte,  waren  die  Briefe, 
welche  Bozo  Milanovid  absandte,    nicht    chiffriert,    wahrend   die  Briefe,    welche 


52 

die  Zollamtsleiter  sendeten,  mit  besondeien  Zeichen  geschrieben  waren,  was 
ich  beobachtet  habe,  als  sie  Bozo  Milanovid  offnete.  Einmal  brachte  ich  dem 
Bozo  Milanovid  ein  solches  chiffriertcs  Scbreiben,  ich  glaube  aus  Zvornik,  und 
dieser  sendete  mich  mit  dem  Sclireil^en  zu  Mika  Atanasijevid,  Professor  in 
Sabac,  darait  er  es  dechiffriere.  Dieser  vollfiihrte  das,  wie  cr  das  gewohnlicli 
tat;  aber  vielleicht  vergaO  er  den  Brief  zu  schlielien,  so  daft  ich  ihn  lesen 
konnte.  In  dem-  Briefe  stand,  dafi  von  sicherer  Seite  gemeldet  werde,  daft  Geld 
mit  dem  Bildnisse  des  Thronfolgers  zu  pragen  sei  und  daft  dies  ein  Zeichen  sei, 
dafi  Kaiser  Franz  Joseph  abdizieren  werde.  Etwa  nach  8  Monaten  meiner  Dienst- 
leistung  bei  Bozo  Milanovid  gab  mir  Bozo  seine  Visitkarte,  auf  welcher  ein 
Totenkopf  aufgezeichnet  war  und  auf  der  aufgeschrieben  stand,  daO  ich  zum 
Vertrauten  (povjerenik)  der  Narodna  odbrana  ernannt  sei.  Bei  dieser  Gelegen- 
heit  sagte  er  mir,  dali  es  sich  um  Spionage  handle 

"Von  dem  Offizier  Dusan  Opterkid,  dem,  Mitgliede  der  Narodna  odbrana, 
erfuhr  ich  einmal,  dali  die  Narodna  odbrana  in  Bosnien  und  Herzegowina  23  Mit- 
glieder  habe.  Sonst  ist  mir  aber  nicht  bekannt,  ob  und  welche  Organisation  die 
Narodna  odbrana  in  Bosnien  hat.  Hin  und  wieder  gab  mir  Milan  Pribi(!evid 
einen  Revolver  oder  aber  Geld  zum  Ankauf  eines  Revolvers,  damit  ich  ihn  den 
Finanzem  an  der  Grenze  gebe,  welche  als  Komitatschis  dienten,  da  sie  keinen 
Revolver  batten  und  auch  kein  Geld,  um  sich  einen  solchen  selbst  zu  kaufen. 
Wie  mir  scheint,  gab  ihnen  Milan  Pribic'^evid  diese  zur  Ehrung,  weil  sie  cben 
Komitatschis  waren.  Eine  andere  Beschaftigung  mit  Waffen  hatte  ich  nicht. 

Einmal  bekam  ich  zur  Zeit  meiner  Dienstleistung  von  Bozo  Milanovic  derr 
Auftrag,  mit  einem  Manne  zu  einem  Bauern  in  Lijesnica  an  der  Drina  zu 
gehen  und  dieser  Bauer  werde  una  informieren  und  alles,  was  notwendig  wird, 
zeigen,  damit  wir  zwei  den  Ljubo  StanariCi('*,  serbischen  Reserveoffizier,  der 
nach  Bijeljina  gefliichtet  war,  toten.  Der  AusschuO  dor  Narodna  odbrana  hatte 
namlich  erfahren,  daft  Ljubo  Stanari^ii^  fiir  •  den  serbischen  Staat  gefahrlich  sei 
und  hatte  beschlossen,  daii  er  getotet  werden  solle. 

Von  Bozo  Milanovid  erhielten  ich  und  jener  Mann  den  Auftrag,  an  einem 
bestimmten  Orte  iiber  die  Drina  zu  gehen  und  Ljubo  Stanaricid,  der  gerade 
am  Ufer  der  Drina  auf  der  bosnischen  Seite  im  Bijeljiner  Bezirke  wohnhaft  ist, 
zu  toten.  Ich  und  jener  Mann  waren  in  die  Drina  gestiegen,  aber  weil  das 
Wasser  tief  war  und  wir  auch  sahen,  daO  Ljubo  mit  dem  Gewehr  auf  der 
Schulter  um  sein  Haus  herumgehe,  kehrten  wir '  zum  Hause  jenes  Bauern 
zuriick.  Weil  ich  sah,  dali  wir  ihn  mit  dem  Messer  nicht  toten  konnen,  sendete 
ich  jenen  Mann  nach  Sabac,  damit  er  Bozo  Milanovid  melde,  dafi  es  nicht 
moglich  sei,  den  Stanaridid  auf  diese  Weise,  wie  er  ^wolie,  namlich  mit  dem 
Messer,  zu  toten.  Daraufhin  erhielt  ich  vom  Bozo  Milanovid  den  Auftrag,  dafi 
wir  ihn  auf  jeden  Fall  toten.  Dann  haben  wir  uns  entschlossen,  ihn  mit  dem 
Gewehre  zu  erschielien.  Dieser  Mann,  der  mit  mir  war,    hatte    nach,  dem  Au/- 


53 

trage  des  Bozo  auf  Stanari^id  zu  schieften  und  ilin  zu  toten  und  ich  hatte  zu 
kontrollieren,  ob  dieser  Auftrag  ausgefiihrt  werde.  Inzwischen  jedoch  kam  ein 
berittener  Gendarm  und  brachte  vom  Kreispr'afekten  in  Sabac  den  Auftrag,  daO 
wir  zuriickkehren  und  von  der  urspriinglichen  Absicht  abstehen  sollen.  Und  so 
kehiten  wir  nach  Sabac  zuriick. 

Im  Oktober  1910  verlangte  icb  vom  Bozo  Milanovid,  daft  er  mir  den 
Lohn  erhohe  und  als  er  mir  das  nicht  tun  woUte,  bedankte  ich  raich  fiir  den 
Dienst.  Aus  Sabac  ging  ich  nach  Belgrad,  wo  ich  mit  dem  General  Jankovid 
zusammentraf,  der  mich  verhaften  lieft,  deshalb,  weil  ich  den  Gehorsam  auf- 
gesagt  habe.  Sie  zogen  mich  durch  verschiedene  Gefangnisse,  etwa  durch  zwei 
Monato  und  alles  deswegen,  weil  ich  ihnen  den  Gehorsam  aufgesagt  hatte  und 
sie  sich  fiirchteten,  daft  ich  ihre  Geheimnisse  venate.  Zum  Schlusse  entschieden 
sich  die  Behorden,  mich  nach  Bosnien  zu  expediereu.  In  Sabac  sagte  mir  ein 
Gefangener,  daft  es  sich  um  mein  Leben  handelt.  Die  Gendarmen  begleitetcn  mich 
bis  Zvornik,  wo  sie  mich  den  bosnischen  Gendarmen  ubergaben.  So  Icam  ich 
im  Dezember  1910  nach  Bosnien. 

Von  irgend  einer  Schwarzen  Hand  weiB  ich  nichts  Bestimmtes  mit  Aus- 
nahme  dessen,  was  ich  von  dieser  Hand  in  serbischen  Zeitungen  gelesen 
habe.  Heute  erinncre  ich  mich  nicht  daran,  was  von  dieser  Schwarzen  Hand 
in  Zeitungen  geschrieben  war.  Ebenso  weili  ich  nichts  von  der  Schwarzen  Liste. 
In  Serbien  herrschte  nach  dei-  Annexion  ein  allgemeiner  Unwille  und  Hali 
gegen  die  Person  des  osterreichischen  Thronfolgers,  denn  er  war  allgemein  als 
ein  Blutfeind  der  Serben  angesehen. 

Im  iibrigen  berief  sicb  Krstanovid  auf  seine  friiheren  Angaben,  von  denen 
bloft  die  folgenden  zur  Erganzung  der  vorstehenden  Aussage  von  Interesse  sind. 

Das  Komitee,  in  das  Krstanovid  durch  Milan  Pribidevid  aufgenommen 
wurde,  gelangte  von  der  Norodna  odbrana  zur  Aufstellung.  In  der  Schule  in 
Cuprija  befanden  sich  20 — 22  Angehorige  aus  der  Monarchie.  Unter  den 
Schiilem  war  auch  Milan  Ciganovid. 

In  der  Schule  zu  Cuprija  wurde  gelehrt,  daft  die  Komitees  bereit  sein 
miissen,  auf  Befehl  der  Norodna  odbrana  nach  Bosnien  zu  gehen  und  dort 
nach  'den  von  ihren  Vorgesetzten  erhaltenen  Auftragen  zu  handeln. 


54 

BeHago.  G. 


Auszug  aus  den  Akten  des  Kreisgerichtes  in  Sarajevo  Uber  das  Strafverrahren 
gegen  Jovo  Jagiicic  und  Genossen  wegen  Verbrechens  der  Ausspahung. 

Im  Jahre  1913  wurde  eine  von  Jovo  Jagli6id  und  mehreren  Komplizen 
in  Bosnien  zugunsten  Serbiens  betriebene  Ausspahungsaktion  aufgedeckt.  Das 
hierauf  in  Sarajevo  eingeleltete  Strafverfahren  lieferte  unter  anderem  auch 
folgendes,  einen  Einblick  in  die  Methoden  der  grofiserbischen  Propaganda  und 
speziell  der  Narodna  odbrana  bietendes  Materiale. 

Jovo  JagliCi(?  gab  an,  dafi  er  im  Monate  August  oder  September  1912 
zum  ersten  Male  dem  gewesenen  Viehrevisor  in  Foua,  Petar  Klarid  genannt 
Pesut,  begegnete,  welcher  im  Herbst  1912  nach  Montenegro  gefluehtet  und 
dann  Komitatschi  geworden  war. 

Bei  der  ersten  Zusammenkunft  fragte  Klarid  den  Jaglieid,  ob  er  den  Rade 
Milosevid  aus  Kalinovik  kenne  und  meinte  auf  die  Antvvort  des  letzteren,  dali 
Milosevic  im  Spital  scbwer  krank  liege:  „Sehade,  wenn  er  stirbt,  wir  haben 
Merkwiirdiges  gesprochen,  hat  er  Dir  nichts  davon  erwahnt?"  Auf  die  ver- 
neinende  Antwort  erwiderte  Klarid:  ,.Ich  hatte  Dir  etwas  Wichtiges  mitzuteilen, 
wir  sind  Serben  und  miissen  etwas  Wichtiges  fiir  Serbien  tun,  komme  zu  mir 
in  meine  Kanzlei".  Dort  entspann  sich  nun  zwischen  ihnen  folgendes  Gesprach: 

„Jovan,  ich  will  Dir  etwas  erzahlen,  ich  kenne  Dich  noeh  nicht,  ob  Du 
mich  verraten  wirst?  Ich  sage  es  Dir  trotzdem  und  wenn  Du  das  Herz  hast 
verrate  mich!" 

Auf  die  Frage  des  Jaglidid,  um  was  es  sich  denn  handle,  antwortete  Klarid: 
„Bruder,  in  Serbien  existiert  ein  Verein  „Narodna  odbrana".  In  diesen  Verein 
sollen  ^^ele  Leute  eintreten;  es  sind  auch  schon  viele  in  Bosnien  und  der 
Herzegowina  sowie  in  der  ganzen  Monarchic  angeworben;  es  gibt  Leute  dabei 
von  Intelligenz  und  Wohlhabende,  das  sind  grofie  Kopfe,  und  wenn  es  die 
konnen,  waipum  sollen  es  nicht  auch  wir  tun,  damit  wir  auch  etwas  dazu  bei- 
tragen". 

Auf  die  Frage,  welche  Ziele  dieser  Verein  verfolgt,  antwortete  Klarid: 

„Der  Verein  verfolgt  den  Zweck:  z.  B.  Du  bist  in  Kalinovik,  Du  meldest 
mir,  was  es  dort.  Neues  gibt,  wie  viel  Militar,  Kanonen,  Munition,  verschiedene 
Gewehre,  wer  kommt,  wer  geht  u.  dgl.  Wir  haben  eine  geheime  Schrift  „Chiffre" 
und  korrespondieren  mit  derselben.  Wenn  Du  treu  bist,  erhaltst  Du   sie  auch." 


55 

Jaglicid  hatte  Furcbt,  da(i  Klarid  ihri  nur  ausforsche,  um  ihn  dann  zu' 
verraten  und  ersuchte  ihn  daher,  er  solle  .ihm  einige  Namen  von  Mitgliedern 
nennen,  worauf  Klarid  eine  Zeitlang  nachdaclite  und  dem  JagliCid  dann  einen 
Namen  nannte,  der  diesem  Vertrauen  einflolite. 

Hierauf  sagte  ihm  IClarid:  ^SoU  ich  Dir  den  „^Chiffre''"  geben?"  Jaglicid 
war  damit  einverstanden.  Klarid,  welcher  den  Chiffre  auswendig  kannte,  schrieb 
ihn  auf  einen  Zettel  auf  und  vibergab  ihn  dem  Jaglicid. 

Bei  einer  anderen  Gelegenheit  erzahlte  Klarid  von  seinem  Aufenthalt  in 
Banja-Koviljaca  (bei  Loznica),  wo  er  durch  den  serbischen  Hauptmann 
Todorovid*)  Unterricht  im  Bombenwerfen  erhalten  hat  und  sagte  auf  die  Frage 
des  Beschuldigten,  warum  er  dies  gelernt  habe:  „Wenn  eS  zu  etwas  kommt, 
wie  ich  Dir  bereits  gesagt  habe,  ist  es  notwendig,  dali  ich  mit  Bomben  umzu- 
gehen  verstehe,  daft  ich  Dich  einiibe  und  Du  dann  die  anderen,  damit  Pulver- 
magazine  und  sonstige  wichtige  Objekte  in  die  Luft  gesprengt  werden,  weil 
wir  in  diesem  Falle  Bomben  aus  Serbien  erhalten  werden" 

Hierauf  beschrieb  Klarid  das  Aussehen  der  Bomben  und  sagte,  dafi  er 
bereits  Leute  angeworben  habe,  welche  im  Falle  eines  Krieges  die  Telegraphen- 
und  Telephondiahte  durchschnelden  werden. 

Bei  diesen  Zusammenkiinften  erfuhr  Jaglicid  von  Klarid  auch,  daB  es  zu 
den  Aufgaben  der  Mitglieder  der  Narodna  odbrana  gehort,  osterreichisch-unga- 
rische  Soldaten  zur  Fahnenflucht  zu  verleiten,  Freiwlllige  (Komitatschis)  anzu- 
werben,  Banden  zu  organisieren,  Objekte  und  Depots  zu  sprengen  u.  s.  w. 
Auch  teilte  ihm  Klarid  mit,  dali  selbst  die  chififrierte  Korrespondenz  zwischen 
den  serbischen  und  bosnischen  Mitgliedern  nicht  der  Post  anvertraut,  sondern 
durch  sichere  Boten  iiber  die  Grenze  befordert  wird. 

Klarid  hat  dem  Jaglicid  weiters  erzahlt,  daft  gelegentlich  der  Prosvjetafeier 
(im  September  1912)  mit  der  zu  dieser  enlsendeter)  Deputation  aus  Serbien 
auch  ein  serbischer  Major  in  Sarajevo  im  Hotel  „Europe"  gewohnt  hat**} 
welchem  Klarid  Mitglieder  der  Narodna  odbrana  zufiihrte,    die    dieser  beeidete. 

Von  einem  Spione  erfuhr  Jaglidid,  daft  Bomben  nach  Sarajevo  kommen 
werden  odei  schon  gekommen  sind,  daft  diese  das  Aussehen  von  Seifenstiicken 
haben***j  und  daft  man  auch  diesem  Spione  2 — 3  Stiicke  senden  oder  daft 
er  sich  solche  abholen   werde. 


*)  Hauptmann  Kosta  Todorovic  war  damals  latsjiclilich  Grcnzkommissiir  und  Leiter   des    serbischen 
Kundscliaftsdienstcs  fiir  die  Grcnzstrecke  Raca— Ljuboija. 

**)  Zu  der  Prosvjetafeier  war  der  scrbisclie  Major  Mika  Jankovic  als  serbiselier  Delegierier  ersciiicnen. 
***)  Die  bei  dem   Sarajevoer  Attentate    gegen  Er/lierzog   Franz  Ferdinand   verwendeten    und    die  im 
Jahre  1913  in  der  Save  bei  Brcko  gefundenen,  aus  dem  konigl.  serbischen  Arsenale  in  Kragujevac  stammen- 
tlen  Bomben  ktinnen  tatsachlich  mit  Seifenstiicken  verglichen  werden. 


56 
Beilage  7. 


Aus  konfidentielien  Meldungen  iiber  die  „Narodna  odbrana". 

Die  Leitung  der  Narodna  odbrana  besteht  aus  Vertretem  aller  Partei- 
richtungen,  um  auch  die  Fortschrittler  und  die  Gegner  der  Versehworer  zu 
gewinnen.  Ihr  eigentlicher  Spiritus  rector  ist  der  jetzige  Major  Pribi6evi(5.  Die 
Sekretarstelle  ist  immer  mit  einem  beurlaubten  Offizier  besetzt. 

Aufgabe  der  Narodna  odbrana  ist  es,  in  den  siidslawischen  Teilen  Oster- 
reich-Ungarns  eine  wirksame  Propaganda  in  Miiitar-  und  Zivilkreisen  zu  ent- 
wickeln,  um  so  eine  Revolution  vorzubereiten,  evenluelle  Mobilisierungen  zu 
storen,  Paniken  und  Revolten  hervorzurufen  u.  s.  w. 

Die  Organisation  besitzt  in  der  Monarchie  mehrere  Vertrauensmiinner  und 
Emissare,  die  eine  stille  Propaganda  von  Mann  zu  Mann  betreiben.  Einzelne 
haben  spezielle  Missionen,  am  bei  wichtigen  Briicken,  Knotenpunkten  etc.  einige 
Leute  —  womoglich  Eisenbahnbeamte  —  anzuwerben,  welche  die  Aufgabe 
haben,  im  geeigneten  Momente  etwa  erhaltene  Weisungen  durchzufuhren  oder 
durchfiihren  zu  lassen. 

Der  Verkehr  zwischen  den  Mitgliedern  der  Narodna  odbrana  wird  moglichst 
durch  personliche  Fuhlungnahme  bewerkstelligt. 

Als  Mitglieder  werden  hauptsachlich  junge  Leute,  Arbeiter,  Eisenbahner 
geworben. 


57 

Bcilairc  8. 


Auszug  aus  den  Akten  des  bosnisch-herzegowinischen  Kreisgerichtes  in  Sarajevo 
Uber  die  dort  anhangige  Untersuchung  gegen  Gavrilo  Princip  und  Genossen  wegen 
des  am  28.  Juni  1914  an  Seiner  k.  und  k.  Hoheit  dem  Herrn  Erzherzoge  Franz 
Ferdinand  von  Osterreich-Este  und  Ihrer  Hoheit  der  Frau  Herzogin  Sophie  von 
Hohenberg  verUbten  Yerbreohens  des  IMeucheimordes. 

I.  Die  Tat  and  die  T'aterscliaft. 

Gavrilo  Princip,  Nedeljko  Cabrinovid,  Trifko  Grabez,  Vaso  Cubrilovid  und 
Cetres  Popovid  sind  gestandig,  in  Gemeinscbaft  mit  dem  fliichtigen  Mebemed 
Mehmedbasid  ein  Komplott  zur  Ermordung  des  Herrn  Erzberzogs  Franz.  Ferdinand 
gebildet  und  mit  Bomben,  teilweise  aucb  mit  Browningpistolen  ausgeriistet, 
Hochstdemselben  am  28.  Juni  1914  auf  Seiner  Rundfabii;  durcb  Sarajevo  zwecks 
Veriibung  des  geplanten  Attentates  aufgelauert  zu  baben. 

Nedeljko  Cabrinovid  ist  gestandig,  als  erster  unter  den  Verscbworern  gegen 
den  Wagen  des  Herrn  Erzberzogs  eine  Bombe  gescbleudert  zu  haben,  die  ibr 
Ziel  verfeblte  und  die  beim  Explodieren  lediglicb  Insassen  des  dem  erzberzog- 
licben  Automobile  folgenden  Wagons  verletzte. 

Gavrilo  Princip  ist  gestandig,  aus  einer  Browningpistole  zwei  Scbiisse  gegen 
das  erzherzoglicbe  Automobil  abgegeben  zu  baben,  durch  welcbe  der  Herr  Erz- 
herzog  Franz  Ferdinand  und  die  Frau  Herzogin  Sopbie  von  Hobenberg  totlicb 
Terletzt  wurden. 

Beide  Tater  geben  die  Mordabsicbt  bei  Veriibung  der  Tat  zu. 

Diese  Gestandnisse  haben  durcb  die  gepflogenen  Erbebungen  ibre  voile 
Bestatigung  gefunden  und  ist  festgestellt,  dali  weiland  Herr  Erzberzog  Franz 
Ferdinand  und  weiland  Frau  Herzogin  Sopbie  von  Hobenberg  an  den  Folgen 
der  von  Gavrilo  Princip  auf  sie  abgegebenen  Eevolverscbiisse  gestorben  sind. 

n.  Entstebung  des  Komplotts. 

Die  Bescbuldigten  baben,  im  wesentlicben  tibereinstimmend,  vor  dem  Unter- 
sucbungsricbter  nacbstpbende  Angaben  gemacbt: 

Im  April  1914  fafite  Princip  wabrend  seines  Aufentbaltes  in  Belgrad,  wd 
er  in  dortigen  Kaffeebausern  mit  vielen  serbiscben  Studenten  verkebrte,  den  Plan 
zm-  Ausfubrung  eines  Attentates  auf  weiland  Herrn  Erzberzog  Franz  Ferdiniand. 


58 

Diese  Absicht  hat  er  mit  dem  ihm  bekannten,  damals  gleichfalls  in  Belgrad 
anwesenden  Cabrinovid  besprocben,  der  sich  damals  schon  mit  dem  gleichen 
Gedanken  trug  und  der  zur  Teilnahme  an  dem  Attentate  sofort  bereit  war.  tJber 
dieVeriibung  eines  Anschlages  auf  den  Herm  Erzberzog  wurde  in  dem  Kreise,  in 
dem  Princip  mid  Cab^ino^d<5  verkebrten,  oft  gesprocben,  da  der  Herr  Erzberzog 
als  gefabrlicber  Feind  des  serbischen  Yolkes  gait. 

Die  zur  Ausfiibrang  der  Tat  notigen  Bomben  und  Waffen  wollten  sich 
Princip  und  Cabrinovid,  da  sie  selbst  die  Mittel  zu  deren  Ankauf  nicbt  besalien, 
zuerst  von  dem  serbischen  Major  Milan  Pribice\i(5  oder  von  der  Narodua  odbrana 
beschaffen.  Da  aber  Major  Pribi(5evi(5  und  das  mafigebende  Mitglied  des  genannten 
Vereines,  Zivojin  Dadid,  zu  jener  Zeit  verreist  waren,  beschlossen  sie  zu  trachten, 
die  Waffen  von  dem  ihnen  bekannten  ehemaligen  Komitatschi  und  derzeitigen 
Staatsbahnbeamten  Milan  Ciganovid  zu  erhalten. 

Nun  trat  Princip  durch  Vermittlung  eines  intimen  Bekannten  des  Ciganovid 
mit  diesem  in  Verbindung.  Ciganovid  suchte  hierauf  den  Princip  auf,  sprach  mit 
ihm  iiber  das  geplante  Attentat,  das  er  vollkommen  billigte  und  erklarte  zunachst, 
daii  er  es  sich  noch  iiberlegen  woUe,  ob  er  die  Waffen  hiezu  beistellen  solle. 
Auch  Cabrinovid  sprach  mit  Ciganovid  wegen  der  Waffen. 

Zu  Ostern  zog  Princip  den  gleichfalls  iil  Belgrad  anwesenden  Trifko  Grabez 
ins  Vertrauen,  der  sich  nach  seinem  Gestandnisse  gleichfalls  zur  Mitwirkung  an 
dem  Attentate  bereit  erklarte. 

In  der  folgenden  Zeit  hatte  Princip  wiederholt  Gesprache  mil  Ciganovid 
liber  die  Ausfiihrung  des  Attentates. 

Inzwischen  hatte  sich  Ciganovid  wegen  des  geplanten  Attentates  auch  mit 
dem  ihm  eng  befreundeten  serbischen  Major  Voja  Tankosid  ins  Einvernehmen 
gesetzt,  der  dann  fiir  diese  Zwecke  die  Browningpistolen  zur  Verfugung  stellte. 

Grabez  gesteht  in  Cbereinstimmung  mit  den  Angaben  des  Princip  und 
Cabrinovid  zu,  am  24.  Mai  in  Begleitung  des  Ciganovid  den  Major  Tankosid 
fiber  dessen  Wunsch  in  seiner  Wohnung  besucht  zu  haben.  Nach  der  Vorstellung 
babe  Tankosid  dem  Grabez  gesagt:  „Bist  Du  dieser,  bist  Du  entschlossen?" 
worauf  Grabez  erwiderte:  „Ich  bin  es".  Als  Tankosid  dann  fragte:  „Versteht 
Ihr  aus  dem  Revolver  zu  schiefien?"  und  Grabez  hierauf  verneinend  antwortete, 
sagte  Tankosid  zu  Ciganovid:  „Ich  werde  Dir  einen  Revolver  geben^  gebe  und 
unterrichte  sie  im  Schiefien". 

Hierauf  fuhrte  Ciganovid  den  Princip  und  den  Grabez  zur  Militarschieli- 
statte  in  Topdider  und  erteilte  ihnen  in  einem  bei  der  Schielistatte  liegendera 
Walde  Unterricht  im  Schieiien  mit  Browningpistolen  auf  Ziele.  Hiebei  erwies 
sich  Princip  als  der  bessere  Schiitze.  Ciganovid  hat  den  Princip,  Grabez  und 
Cabrinovid  auch  mit  dem  Gebrauche  der  ihnen  spater  ubergebenen  Bomben 
vertraut  gemacht. 


59 

Am  27.  Mai  1914  iibergab  Ciganovic?,  dem  Princip,  Cabrinovid  and  GrabeX 
nach  deren  iibereinstimmenden  Gestandnissen  6  Bomben,  4  Browningrevolver 
und  geniigende  Mengen  Munition,  sowie  eine  Glastubc  mit  Zyankali,  damit  sie 
sich  zwecks  Wabrung  des  Geheimnisses  nach  veriibter  Tat  vergiften.  Uberdies 
gab  ihnen  Ciganovid  Geld. 

Scbon  zu  Ostern  hatte  Princip  den  Danilo  T\i6  von  seinem  Attentatsplane 
unterrichtet.  Bei  der  Riickkehr  nacb  Sarajevo  ersuclite  er  nun  diesen,  einige 
weitere  Personen  zu  werben,  die  sich  an  dem  Attentate  beteiligen,  damit  es 
sicher  gelinge.  Hierauf  hat  Hid  nach  seinem  Gestandnisse  den  Jaso  Cubrilovid, 
Cetro  Popovid  und  Mehemed  Mehmedbasid  hiezu  geworben. 


ni.  Herkunft  der  Bomben. 

Bei  Veriibung  des  Attentates  war  nur  eine  der  Bomben  zur  Verwendung 
gelangt.  Die  iibrigen  fiinf  Bomben  wurden  spater  von  der  Polizei  in  Sarajevo 
zustande  gebracht. 

Diese  Bomben  sind  nach  dem  Gutachten  der  gerichthchen  Sachverstandigen 
serbische  Handgranaten,  die  fabriksmafiig  erzeugt  wurden  und  fur  militiirische 
Zwecke  bestimmt  waren.  Sie  sind  identisch  mit  den  21  Bomben,  die  im  Jahre 
1913  in  der  Save  bei  Brdko  gefunden  wurden  und  die  sich  zum  Teile  noch  in 
der  Originaipackung  befanden,  aus.der  sich  mit  Sicherheit  ergab,  dali  sie  aus 
dem  serbischen  Waffenlager  in  Kragujevac  stammten. 

Damit  ist  festgestellt,  daii  auch  die  bei  dem  Attentate  gegen  den  Herrn 
Erzherzog  Franz  Ferdinand  verwendeten  Granaten  aus  den  Vorraten  des 
Kragujevacer  Armeedepots  stammen. 

Grabez  nennt  die  ihm  und  seinen  Komplizen  libergebenen  Granaten  ganz 
spontan  „ Kragujevacer  Bomben" 


IV.  Transport  der  drei  Attentater  und  der  Waffen  von  Serbien 

nach  Bosnien. 

Prinzip  gibt  hieriiber  folgendes  an: 

Ciganovid  sagte  dem  Cabrinovid,  Grabez  und  Princip,  sie  sollten  ihren  Weg 
tiber  Sabac  und  Loznica  nach  Tuzla  nehmen  und  sich  dort  an  Misko  Jovanovid 
wenden,  der  die  Waifen  iibernehmen  werde.  Zunachst  sollten  sie  nach  Sabac 
gehen  und  sich  dort  beim  Grenzhauptmanne  Major  Rade  Popovid  melden,  fiir 
den  er  ihnen  einen  Zettel  mitgab,  den  Princip  ubernahm.  Am  28.  Mai  verlieCen 
die  drei  Komplizen  mit  den  Waffen  Belgrad.  In  Sabac  tibergab  Prinzip  den 
Zettel,  den  er  von  Ciganovid  erhalten  hatte  dem  Major  Popovid,  der  hierauf  alle 
drei  auf  das  Kommando  fiihrte  und  ihnen  einen  Passierschein  ausstellte,  in 
welchem  bestatigt  wurde,  dali  einer  von  ihnen  Finanzwachmann  und  die  beiden 


60 

anderen  dessen  Kameraden  seien.  Der  Passiersclieiii  entliielt  auch  den  Namen 
dieses  angebliclien  Finanzwaclimannes,  doch  habe  er  den  Namen  vergessen. 
Gleichzeitig  iibergab  ilmen  Major  Popovid  ein  geschlossenes  Scbreiben  fiir  den 
Grenzbauptmann  in  Loznica,   der  Pravanovid,   Prdanovid   oder  Predojevid   hieli. 

»  Pfincip,  Cabrinovid   und   Grabez  iibernacbteten   in    §abac   und    reisten   am 

nacbsten  Morgen  mit  der  Babn  nacb  Loznica,  und  zwar  auf  Grand  des  ibnen 
vom  Major  Popovid  ausgefertigten  Passierscheines  mit  balber  Fabrkarte.  Mittags 
kamen  sie  in  Loznica  an  mid  iibergaben  dem  dortigen  Grenzhauptmanne  den 
Brief  des  Majors  Popovid,  in  dem  es  bieli:  ^Scbau,  daft  Du  diese  Leute  empfangst 
und  sie  durcbfiibrst,  wo  Du  vv^ilit."  Der  Grenzbauptmann,  sagte,  er  werde  seine 
Finanzwacbleute  von  der  Grenze  rufen  und  die  drei  dem  sicbersten  Manne  an- 
vertrauen.  Darauf  telepbonierte  er  und  bestellte  die  drei  Komplizen  fur  den 
nacbsten  Morgen,  7  Ubr,  in  seine  Kanzlei. 

Am  anderen  Morgen  vereinbarten  die  drei  Verscbworer,  dafi  Cabrinovid  mit 
<iem  Passe  des  Grabez  offen  den  Weg  nacb  Zvomik  nebme,  Princip  und  Grabez 
aber  die  Grenze  beimlicb  iiberscbreiten.  Dieser  Plan  wurde,  mit  dem  Grenz- 
bauptmanne  besprocben  und  biebei  beschlossen,  daO  ein  Finanzwacbmann  aus 
LjeSnica,  namens  Grbid,  den  Princip  und  Grabez  in  seine  Karaula  mitnebmen 
und  liber  die  Grenze  bringen  solle.  Cabrinovid  ging  dann  zu  Fuli  nacb  Banja 
Koviljada  in  der  Ricbtung  gegen  Zvomik.  Princip  und  Grabez  fubren  mit  dem 
Finanzwacbmanne  Grbid  nacb  Ljesnica,  wo  sie  die  Bomben  imd  den  Revolver  in 
einem  Hotelzimmer  ablegten.  Hiebei  sab  der  Finanzwacbmann  Grbid  diese 
Objekte.   Princip  selbst  bezeicbnete  diese  Reise  als  mysti;^cb. 

Grabez  sagte  im  wesentlicben  konform  mit  Princip  aus  und  ftigte  erganzend 
bei,  Grbid  babe  gelacbt,  als  er  die  Bombe  und  die  Revolver  sab  und  lediglicb 
gefragt,  wobin  in  Bosnien  sie  mit  diesen  Bomben  gingen.  Der  Finanzwacbmann 
babe  sicb  jedenfalls  gedacbt,  dali  Grabez  und  Princip  eine  Mission  batten. 

Grbid  und  ein  zweiter  Finanzwacbmann  baben  den  Princip  und  Grabez  auf 
einem  ICabne  zu  einer  Insel  in  der  Drina  gebracbt.  Dort  wies  sie  Grbid  an,  auf 
einen  Bauer  zu  warten,  der  sie  abbolen  werde.  Sie  iibernacbteten  auf  der  Insel 
in  einem  Bauernbauscben,  wobin  Grbid  sie  gewiesen  batte.  Am  nacbsten  Tage 
kam  ein  Bauer,  der  sie  wabrend  der  Nacbt  zuerst  durcb  einen  Sumpf  und  dann 
iiber  das  Gebirge  bis  in  die  Nabe  von  Priboj  bracbte,  wo  er  sie  wieder  dem 
dortigen  Lebrer  Cubrilovid,  der  bereits  auf  sie  gewartet  zn- baben-  scbien,  zur 
Weiterbefbrderung  iibergab. 

Dieser  bracbte  sie  dann  weiter  nacb  Tuzla  zu  MiSkq  Jovanovid. 

Cabrinovid  sagte  iiber  die  Yorgange  der  Reise  bis  zu  dem  Momente,  in 
dem  er  sicb  von  Princip  und  GrabeX  trennte,  im  wesentlicben  iibereinstimmend 
mit  diesen  aus  und  ftigte  nur  erganzend  bei,  daii  Major  Popovid  ibnen  erzablt 
habe,  er  sei  erst  am  Tage  vor  ibrer  Ankunft  in  Sabac  aus  Belgiad  gekommen. 


61 

In  Loznica  beschlossen  Cabiinovic,  Princip  und  GrabeX  sich  zu  trennen, 
da  es  zu  gefahiilch  ware,  wenn  sie  zu  dritt  gingen.  -Der  Grenzhauptmann  in 
Loznica,  dem  sie  hievon  Mitteilung  macbten,  lobte  ibren  Plan  und  gab  dena 
6abrinovi(5  einen  Brief  fiir  den  Lebrer  M.  Jaklojevid  in  Mali-Zvornik  mit. 
Cabrinovid  iibergab  bierauf  die  von  ihm  getragenen  Bomben,  Browning  und 
Munition  dem  Princip  und  Grabez  und  ging  in  Begleitung  eines  ibm  beigege-j 
benen  Finanzwacbmannes  nacb  Mali-Zvornik. 

Dort  fand  er  den  Lehrer  Jaklojevid,  dem  er  den  Brief  des  Grenzhaupt-i 
mannes  von  Loznica  iibergab.  Dieser  avisierte  bierauf  den  serbiscben  Grcnzposten., 
Als  Cabrinovid  spater  mit  dem  Lebrer  zu  diesem  Grenzposten  kam,  wartete 
dort  bereits  ein  Mann  auf  sie,  der  sie  mit  einem  Kabne  iiber  die  Diina  nacb 
Grofi-Zvornik  in  Bosnien  bracbte. 

Von  dort  begab  sicb  dann  Cabrinovid  nacb  Tuzla  zu  Misko  Jovanovid. 


Nachtrag. 

Knapp  vor  Abschluli  dieses  Memoires  wird  vom  ICreisgerichte  in  Sarajevo' 
ein  ZeugenprotokoU  vorgelegt,  aus  dem  sicb  ergibt,  dall  ein  Angeboriger  der 
Monarcbie  einige  Tage  vor  dem  28.  Juni  d.  J.  dem  k.  Und  k.  [Consulate  in 
Belgrad  die  Meldung  crstatten  woUte,  dali  er  vermute,  es  bestebe  der  Plan  auf  Erz- 
berzog  Franz  Ferdinand  wahrend  seiner  Anwesenheit  in  Bosnien  ein  Attentat  zu 
veriiben.  Dieser  Mann  soil  nun  durcb  Belgrader  Polizeiorgane,  die  ibn  unmittelbar. 
vor  dem  Betreten  des  k.  und  k.  Konsulates  aus  nicbtigen  Griinden  verbafteten, 
an  der  Erstattimg'  dieser  Meldung  verhindert  worden  sein.  Aus  den  in  dem  frag- 
lichen  ZeugenprotokoUe  entbaltenen  Angaben  wiirde  folgen,  daO  die  betreffenden 
Polizeiorgane  von  dem  geplanten  Attentate  Kenntnis  gebabt  und  diesen  Mann 
nur  verbaftet  batten,  um  ibn  an  der  Erstattung  der  Anzeige  zu  bindern. 

Da  diese  Angaben  nocb  nicbt  nacbgepriift  sind,  kann  iiber  deren  Sticbbaltig- 
keit  im  gegenwartigen  Zeitpunkte  nocb  kein  Urteil  abgegeben  werden.  Mit  Rtick- 
sicbt  auf  die  bieriiber  scbwebenden  Erbebungen  entzieben  sicb  die  naberen 
Details  der  Zeugenaussage  derzeit  einer  genaueren  Wiedergabe. 


62^ 

Beilage  9. 


Die  serbische  Presse  Qber  das  Attentat. 

a)  Das  Belgrader  Blatt  „Balkan"  schreibt  am  29.  Juni  liber  die  beiden  Atten- 
tater: 

Nedeljko  Cabrinovid,  von  Benif  Typograph,  war  von  anarchistischen 
Ideen  erfiillt  und  als  unrubiger  Geist  bekannt.  Er  weilte  bis  vor  20  Tagen 
in  Belgrad,  wobin  er  nacb  dem  Kriege  kam  und  in  der  Staatsdruckerei 
bescbaftigt  war.  Vor  seiner  Abreise  erklarte  er,  dali  er  sicb  nach  Triest 
begebe,  wo  er  in  einer  neuen  Druckerei  Arbeit  bekommen  werde.  Gavrilo 
Princip  weilte  gleichfalls  bis  vor  kurzem  in  Belgrad.  .Wahrend  des  Krieges 
hat  er  sich  als  Freiwilliger  gemeldet,  wurde  jedoch  nicht  angenommen,  wes- 
balb  er  Belgrad  verlieli.  Er  kebrte  aber  zu  Weihnacbten  des  vorlgen  Jahres 
wieder  nach  Belgrad  zuriick,  besuchte  eine  Zeitlang  das  Gymnasium  und 
verlieli  Belgrad  fast  zu  gleicher  Zeit  wie  Cabrinovid,  jedoch  auf  einem 
anderen  Wege  als  dieser.  Princip  war  sehweigsam,  nervos,  lernte  gut,  ver- 
kehrte  mit  einigen  gleichfalls  aus  Bosnien  und  der  Herzegowina  stammen- 
den  Mittelschiilern  und  in  der  letzten  Zeit  auch  mit  Cabrinovid.  Er  neigte 
sozialistischen  Ideen  zu,  obwohl  er  urspriinglich  der  fortschrittlichen  Jugend 
angehort  hat.  Princip  ist  ebenso  wie  Cabrinovid  in  Sarajevo  aufgewachsen; 
beide  verband  seit  ihrer  Kindheit  eine  unzertrennliche  Freundschaft. 

b)  Der  „ Pigment"  vom  1.  Juli  verweist  darauf,  dali  nach  dem  lauten  Proteste 
des  Attentaters  Zerajid  der  Protest  Princips  gefolgt  sei.  Das  Werk  des  letz- 
teren  finde  gleichfalls  seine  Aufklarung  im  bosnischen  Regierungssystem. 
Der  Umstand,  daft  Princip  den  Racheakt  am  heiligen  Nationaltag  Vidovdan 
veriibte,  welcher  fur  die  Vomahme  der  Manover  gewahlt  worden  war,  lasse 
die  Verzweiflungstat  des  jungen  Martyrers  verstandlicher  .und  naturlichor 
erscheinen. 

(Das  Blatt  wurde  wegen  dieses  Artikels  von  der  Polizei  konfisziert, 
die  Konfiskation  jedoch  tags  darauf  von  der  ersten  Instanz  des  Belgrader 
Gerichtes  annuUiert.) 
\c)  Der  jungradikale  „Odjek"  vom  3.  Juli  sagt:  man  babe  den  Herrn  Erzherzog 
Franz  Ferdinand  am  Tage  des  nationalen  Enthusiasmus  nach  Sarajevo  gesendet, 
um   eine   brutale   Manifestation   der  Gewalt   und  Unterwerfung   zu   feiern. 


63 

Dieser  brutale  Akt  mufite  bratale  Gefuhle  des  Widerstandes,  des  Hasse* 
and  der  Rache  herausfordern. 
\d)  Das  nationalistlsche  Partciorgan  ^Srpska  Zastava"  vom  3.  Juli  sagt  in  einem 
Artikel,  betitelt  „Verdachtigungen  und  Drohungen:  „Das  Attentat  stellt  sioh 
immer  rnehr  als  ein  Erzeugnis  der  ungesunden  Verhaltnisse  in  der  Monarchie 
dar.  Andererseits  ruft  die  wilde  Verfolgung  des  serbischen  Volkes  in  Bosnien 
und  der  Herzegowina  den  Abscbeu  der  ganzen  zivilisierten  Welt  hervor." 

e)  Das  fortschrittliche  Blatt  ^Pravda"  vom  3.  Juli  schreibt:  ^Die  "Wiener  Politik 
ist  zynisch.  Sie  beutet  den  Tod  des  ungliicklichen  Paares  fiir  ihre  abscheu- 
licben  Ziele  gegen  das  serbische  •  Volk  aus." 

f)  Die  „Agence  des  Balkans"  vom  3,  Juli  meldet:  „Die  in  Bosnien  und  der 
Herzegowina  gegen  die  Serben  veriibten  Verbrechen  sind  unter  den  Auspizien 
und  auf  direkte  Anstiftung  der  osterreichisch-ungarischen  Zivil-  und  Militar- 
behorden  begangen  worden." 

ig)  Die  ^Pravda"  vom  4.  Juli  sagt:  „Alle  bisher  in  Osterreich  begangenen 
Morde  und  Attentate  haben  stets  eine  und  dieselbe  Quelle  gehabt.  Die 
unterdriickten  Volker  der  Monarchie  mufiten  zu  dieser  Art  des  Protestes  greifen, 
weil  ihnen  kein  anderer  Weg  moglicb  war.  In  einem  Chaos  der  Schreckens- 
herrschaft  ist  es  natiirlich  und  voUkommen  begreiflich,  dafi  sich  die  Ara 
der  Attentate  eingebiirgert  hat. 

k)  Der  „ Balkan"  vom  5.  Juli  bemerkt,  dali  Osterreich-Ungarn  „wegen  Ver- 
folgung Unschuldiger  unter  internationale  KontroUe  gestellt  werden  miifite"; 
denn  Osterreich-Ungarn  sei  weniger  konsolidiert  als  die  Tiirkei. 

i)  Das  „Mali  Journal"  vom  7.  Juli  schreibt:  „Ein  Sproiiling  des  Mittelalters 
wurde  dieser  Tage  in  Sarajevo  ermordet.  Ermordet  hat  ihn  ein  Knabe,  der 
das  Leid  um  sein  geknechtetes  engeres  Vaterland  bis  zum  Paroxismus 
fiihlte,    das   Leid,    das    ihm    die  Rauber   der  Lander   seiner  Vater    angetan 

.  haben.  Was  hat  daraufhin  das  offizielle  Osterreich-Ungarn  getan?  Es  hat 
mit  allgemeinen  Massakiierungen,  Pliinderungen  und  Zerstorungen  des  ser- 
bischen Lebens  und  Eigentums  geantwortet.  Durch  solches  Heldentum 
zeichnen  sich  nur  die  Nichtsnutzigen  aus.  Die  Feigen  sind  immer  grolie 
Helden,  wenn  sie  sicher  sind,  dali  ihnen  nichts  gescbehen  wird.  Man  ver- 
gleiche  nur  Princip  und  Cabrinovid  mit  diesen  Helden  und  man  wird 
gleich  den  grofien  Unterscbied  merken.  Zivilisation  und  Gerechtigkeit  sind 
in  Osterreich-Ungarn  eine  grofie  Liige." 

j)  Die  „Tribuna"  vom  7.  Juli  sagt:  „Wir  sind  der  Ansicht,  daD  die  Mordtat 
von  Sarajevo  bestellt  wurde,  um  die  Ausrottung  der  Serben  mit  einem 
Schlag  durcbzufiihren." 

%)  Der  „ Pigment"  vom  8.  Juli  meldet  aus  Bajina  Baschka,  dafi  die  osterrei- 
chischen  Behorden  in  Bosnien  ein  Christenmassaker  vorbereitan. 


64 

I)  Der  „Balkan"  vom  8.  veroffentlicht  einen  Berlcht  aus  Bosnien  unter  dem 
Titel  „Bartholomausnacht  in  Sarajevo"  und  tritt  fiir  einen  allgemeinen 
Boykott  gegen  alle  in  Serbien  lebenden  Osterreicher  ein. 

m)  Das  „Mali  Journal"  vom  8.  fordert  zum  Boykott  gegen  die  Donau-Dampf- 
schiffahrts-Gesellscliaft  auf. 

nj  Unter  dem  I'itel  „Niclits  aus  Osterreich-Ungam!"  schreibt  die  „Tribuna" 
vom  8.,  es  sei  am  besten,  aus  Osterreich-Ungarn  nichts  zu  beziehen,  auck 
die  osterreicbischen  und  ungarischen  Bader  nicht  zu  besucben  und  kein« 
Arzte  aus  Osterreicli-Ungarn  zu  berufen.  Die  Privatinitiative  konne  in  der 
angedeuteten  Ricbtung  viel  ausricbten.  Der  Staat  und  die  Beborden  baben  sicb 
darein  nicbt  einzumiscben.  Es  sei  geniigend,  an  die  Burger  zu  appellieren. 

o)  Die  „Stampa"  vom  8.  bebauptet,  dafi  die  Sarajevoer  Polizei  die  verbafteten 
Attentater  der  unmenscblichsten  und  scbamlosesten  Tortur  aussetze,  um  von 
ibnen  unwabre  Gestandnisse  zu  erpressen,  auf  Grund  welcber  dann  Anklagen 
gegen  das  serbiscbe  Volk  erboben  werden  sollen. 

p)  Die  ^Agence  des  Balkans"  vom  9.  meldet  aus  Belgrad:  „ Absolut  sicbere 
Privatmeldungen  kiindigen  an,  daO  in  Bosnien  und  der  Herzegowina  ein 
allgemeines  Massaker  der  Serben  unmittelbar  bevorstebe." 

iq)  Ankniipfend  an  die  Aufierung  des  Premierministers  Asquitb  bei  der  Mit- 
teilung  der  Nacbriebt  vom  Tode  des  Herrn  Erzberzogs  Franz  Ferdinand,  daft 
er  fiir  das  Scbicksal  der  Menscbbeit  besorgt  sei,  vcroffentlicbt  der  „Balkan" 
am  9.  Juli  einen  bistoriscben  tJberblick  iiber  die  Ereignisse  der  letzten 
40  Jabre,  aus  dem  er  ableitet,  daG  das  serbiscbe  VoDc  in  diesem  Zeitraume 
den  furcbtbarcn  Qualen  der  jesuitiscben  Politik  Osterreicb-Ungarns  ausgesetzt 
war.  Scbliolilicb  mulite  Herr  Erzberzog  Franz  Ferdinand,  wie  alle  Sobiie 
Loyolas,  welcbe  nur  im  Blutc  der  Menscben  arbeiten  und "  dem  Prinzipe, 
„der  Zweck  beiligt  die  Mittel",  buldigen,  vom  Scbicksal  ereilt  und  ein 
Opfer  des  Jesuitismus  werden,  wie  es  aucb  das  ganze  Osterreicb-Ungarn 
werden  wird.  Durcb  den  Untergang  Osterreicb-Ungarns  aber  soil  der  Menscb- 
beit Rube  und  Frieden  gegeben  werden.  Wenn  man  alle  diese  Wabrbeiten 
resumiert,  dann  kommt  man  zum  Scblusse,  dali  Asqiiitb  ruhigen  Gemiits 
die  Todesnacbricbt  batte  mit  den  Worten  begleiten  konnen:  ,Icb  bin  fiir 
das  Scbicksal  der  Menscbbeit  nicbt  mebr  besorgt". 

r)  Die  „Politika"  vom  9.  Juli  fiibrt  im  Leitartikel  unter  der  Uberscbrift 
^Unverschamte  Liigen"  aus:  „Die  Art  und  Weise,  wie  die  Untersucbung 
iiber  das  Sarajevoer  Attentat  gefubrt  wird,  lafit  offen  erkennen,  welcbe 
2iele  Osterreicb  dabei  verfolgt.  Da  die  Attentater  ungeacbtet  aller  Torturen, 
denen  sie  ausgesetzt  sind,  nicbt  das  sagen  wollen,  was  man  von  ibnen 
verlangt,  wurden  andere  Individuen  ausfindig  gemacbt,  die  sicb  bereit 
erklarten,   unter   gewissen   Bedingungen    eine    gewisse   Mitscbuld    an    dem 


65 

Attentate  einzugestehen,  zugleich  aber  alle  jene  zu  beschuldigen,  die 
Osterreich  unangenehm  sind.  Diese  Methode  ist  vorlaufig  gelungen,  denn 
die  gedungenen  Individuen  erzahlen  alles,  was  man  von  ihnen  will  und 
die  osterreichische  Polizei  sorgt  dafiir,  dafi.  diese  Ltigen  sofort  nach  alien 
Windrichtungen  verbreitet  werden.  Osterreich  hat  ja  kein  Schamgefiihl 
und  es  glaubt,  dali  sich  jemand  finden  werde,  der  solchen  Liigen  Glauben 
schenkt." 
$)^  Die  „Stampa"  vom  9.  sagt,  es  sei  noch  nicht  alles,  was  sich  in  Bosnien 
und  der  Herzegowina  ereignet  hat,  aufgedeckt  und  in  die  Offentlichkeit 
gedrungen!  Das  werde  strengstens  verheimlicht.  Die  Wahrheit  werde  aber 
dennoch  friiher  oder  spater  an  die  Oberflache  kommen.  Das  blutdiirstige 
Osterreich  will  sich  eben  an  serbischem  Blute  satt  trinken  und  tut  es  auch. 
Es  verlautet,  dali  es  heute  ungefahr  10.000  Verwundete  und  Tote  in 
Bosnien  gebe. 
t)  Die  „Politika"  vom  10.  Juli  richtet  malilose  Beleidigungen  gegen  Mitglieder 
des  Allerhochsten  Kaiserhauses. 

u)  Das  Handelsblatt  „Trgovinski  Glasnik"  vom  10.  Juli  spricht  von  der  Ver- 
derbtheit  und  Skrupellosigkeit  der  osterreichisch-ungarischen  Politik,  die 
es  jesuitisch,  riicksichtslos  und  unehrenhaft  nennt.  Sie  sei  dem  serbischen 
Volke  in  Osterreich- Ungarn  eine  Mahnung,  daG  es  nicht  in  einem  Kultur- 
staate  lebe,  welcher  Leben  und  Eigentum  garantiere,  sondern  daii  es  stets 
bereit  und  bewaffnet  sein  miisse,  sich  vor  der  Rauberei  der  Behorden 
und  der  Regierung  zu  verteidigen.  Nach  den  letzten  Ereignissen  diirfe 
das  serbische  Volk  nicht  mehr  wie  ein  Lamm  warten,  welches  jeden  Tag 
abgeschlachtet  werden  konnte,  sondern  wie  ein  Lowe,  der  bereit  ist  zur 
blutigen  Abwehr. 

^v)  In  der  ^Stampa"  vom  10.  Juli  heilit  es:  Nichts  sei  ewig  und  auch 
Osterreich-Ungarn  werde  nicht  ewig  in  Bosnien  und  der  HerzegDwina 
bleiben.  Die  Zeit  sei  nicht  fern,  wo  die  Serben,  welche  die  Macht  der 
Tiirken  brachen  und  die  Bulgaren  straften,  um  die  Ivan  Planina  am 
Trebevic  kreisen  werden. 

id)  Die  „Pravda"  vom  10.  Juli  fordert  unter  dem  Titel  „Boykott  gegen  die 
Nichtsnutzigen"  zum  Boykott  der  osterreichischen  Firmen  in  Belgrad  sowie 
der  osterreichischen  Waren  auf  und  sagt,  es  sei  Pflicht  der  „Narodna 
odbrana",  die  strengste  Durchfuhrung  des  Boykotts  zu  iiberwachen. 

xj  Der  nZvono"  vom  16.  Juli  erklart  Princip  als  Sohn  der  Grafin  Lonyay, 
dem  die  Aufgabe  zuteil  wurde,  den  Tod  des  Kronprinzen  Rudolf  an 
dessen  Morder,  Herrn  Erzherzog  Franz  Ferdinand,  zu  rachen. 

y)  Das  „Mali  Journal"  vom  19.  Juli  veroffentlicht  einen  Bericht,  worin  es  heiiit: 
Princip   sei   von    einem    osterreichisch-ungarischen   Agenten    zum    Attentat 


66 

angestiftet  worden.    In  Wien  sage   man,    der  walire  Schuldige   sei  nur  ia 
der  osterreicHscli-ungafisclieii  Gesandtschaft  in  Belgrad  zu  finden. 

t)  Das  fiilirende  jungradikale  Blatt  j,Odjek"  vom  20.  Juli  schreibt:  „Osterreicli~ 
Ungam  gibt  durcli  hundert  Beweise  kund,  dafi  es  den  Titel  des  kranken 
Mannes  in  Europa  erwerben  will.  Wahrend  in  Serbien  nicbt  ein  einziger 
osterreicbisclier  Burger  belastigt  worden  ist,  warden  in  Bosnien  und  der 
Herzegowina  Dorfer  und  Stadte  gepliindert.  Diese  Tatsacbe  ist  ein  neuer 
Beweis  dafur,  um  wie  viel  Serbien  kultxireU  und  moraliscb  holier  stebt 
als  Osterreich-Ungam." 


67_ 

Beilage  10. 


Der  Ortsausschufi  der  Narodna  odbrana  in  Nisch  Qber  das  Attentat  gegen  den  Herrn 
Erzherzog  Franz  Ferdinand. 

Dera  k.  und  k.  Ministerium  des  Aufiem  ist  von  eiiiem  verlafiliclieii 
Konfidenten,  dessen  Name  gegebenenfalls  bekanntgegeben  wird,  eine  vertrauliche* 
Mitteilung  zugekommen,  wonacb  der  Ortsausscliuli  der  Narodna  odbrana  in 
Niscb  kijrzlich  eine  Sitzung  abbielt,  in  welcber  der  Vorsitzende  dieses  Aus- 
schusses,  der  Direktor  der  Niscber  Strafanstalt  Jasa  Nenadovid,  auf  das  gegen 
den  Herrn  Erzberzog  Franz  Ferdinand  verubte  Attentat  za  sprechen  kam 
nnd  biebei  folgendes  ausfiihrte. 

Serbien  muiite  sich  diesraal  unbedingt  eines  Mittels  wie  das  Attentat  gegen  den 
Erzberzog  Franz  Ferdinand  bedienen,  weil  eben  dieser  wegen  seines  aggresiven 
"und^  exzentriscben  Cbarakters  eine  eminente  und  fatale  Gefabr  fiir  Serbien  und 
moglicberweise  aucb  fiir  weitere  slawiscbe  Kreise  bedeutete.  Er  batte,  ware  ef 
am  Leben  geblieben,  in  Kiirze  Serbien  zum  Kriege  berausgefordert  oder  es 
angegriffen,  in  welchem^Falle  Serbien,  das  ja  jetzt  materiell  so  gescbwacbt  und 
mit  seiner  Armeereorganisation  nocb  niebt  fertig  ist,  unbedingt  verloren  gewesen 
ware.  Nun  aber  ist  durcb  den  Sarajevoer  Mord  Serbien  gerettet  und  damit 
einer  jener  aus  dem  Wege  geraumt,  die  Serbien  gefabrlicb  sind.  Serbien  wird 
jetzt  einige  Jabre  lang  Euhe  baben,  da  der  neue  Tbronfolger  es  sicb  "wobl 
iiberlegen  wird,  in  den  Spuren  seines  Vorgangers  zu  wandeln, 

Wenn  er  aucb  wulite,  so  fiibrte  der  Redner  weiter  aus,  daO  die  Ermordung 
des  Erzberzogs  Franz  Ferdinand  fiir  Osterreicb-Ungarn  ein  scbwerer  Scblag  und 
grolier  Scbmerz  sein  wird  und  daO  darauf  Torturen  fiir  unser  dort  lebendes  Volk 
folgen  werden,  so  batte  er  docb  nicbt  gedacbt,  dali  seine  Voraussetzungen  in 
solcbem  Malie  eintreffen  und  dafi  die  Kroaten  sicb  derart  benebmen  werden. 
Hatten  ibm  docb  seine  Freunde  in  Bosnien  und  der  Herzegowina  aucb  ver- 
sicbert,  daB  die  osterreicbiscb-ungariscben  Beborden  feige  sind  und  in  ihrem 
Auftreten  nicbt  iibertreiben  diirfen;  leider  aber  batten  sicb  diese  Freunde  und 
durcb  sie  aucb  wir  getauscbt.  Wenn  es  so  weiter  andauert,  so  miissen  Revolver 
und  Bomben  erst  recbt  ibre  wabre  RoUe  spielen.  Was  immer  aucb  der 
serbiscbe  Gott  gibt,  auf  diese  Art  darf  man,es  nicbt  weiter  geben  lassen. 

Die  Ausfubrungen  des  Redners  fanden  bei  seinen  Zuborem  vollste 
Zustimmung. 


68_ 

Beilage  11. 


NachtrMge  nach  SchluB  des  Druckes. 

1.  Zn  Beilage  8. 

Der  Lehrer  Cubrilovid,  welcher  bei  Priboj  die  Fiihrung  des  Princip  und 
Grabez  iibemalim,  hat  ein  voiles  Gestandnis  abgelegt,  aus  dem  sicb  folgende 
wicbtige  Daten  ergeben. 

Im  Jabre  1911  wurde  Cubrilovid  aus  Anlali  eines  Sokolausfluges  nach 
Sabac  durch  Bozo  Fovid,  einem  Vorstandsmitgliede  der  Narodna  odbrana,  in 
die  Ziele  dieses  Vereines  eingeweibt  und  dann  zum  Kommissar  der  Narodna 
odbrana  in  Zvornik  (Bosnien)  bestellt.  tjber  seine  Einladung  wurde  spater 
Misko  Jovanovid  zum  Kommissar  der  Narodna  odbrana  fiir  Tuzla  ernannt. 

Als  Mittelsmann  beim  Verkehre  mit  der  Narodna  odbrana  fungierte  ein 
Bauer,  eben  derselbe  Bauer,  der  den  iPrincip  imd  Grabez.  mit  der  Mitteilung 
zu.  Cubrilovid  brachte,  er  fiihre  zwei  serbische  Studenten  mit  WaiFen  zu  ihm. 
Als  er  dies  erfuhr,  babe  er  gewulit,  dali  dies  eine  ^Botschaft"  der  Narodna 
odbrana  sei.  Princip  und  Grabez  haben  ihm  gesagt,  daft  sie  Bomben  und  Revolver 
bei  sich  haben,  um  ein  Attentat  gegen  den  Herrn  Erzherzog  Franz  Ferdinand 
auszufiihren. 

2.  Monarchiefeindliche  Bilder  im  Belgrader  Kriegsministerium. 

Vor.  dem  Empfangssaale  des  koniglich  serbischen  Kriegsministeriums  be-* 
finden  sich  an  der  Wand  vier  allegonsche  Bilder,  von  denen  drei  Darstellungen 
von  serbischen  Kriegserfolgen  sind,  wahrend  das  vierte  die  Verwirklichung  der 
monarchiefeindlichen  Tendenzen  Serbiens  versinnbildlicht. 

tJber  einer  Landschaft,  teils  Gebirge  (Bosnien),  teils  Ebene  (Siidungarn) 
geht  die  „zora",  die  Morgenrote  der  serbischen  Hoffnungen  auf.  Im  Vorder- 
grunde  steht  eine  bewaffnete  Frauengestalt,  auf  deren  Schild  die  Namen  aller. 
„noch  zu  befreienden  Provmzen":  Bosnien,  Herzegowina,  Vojvodina,  Syrmien,. 
Dalmatien  etc.  stehen. 


m 


20. 
Graf  fierchtold  an  Sektionsohef  Freiherrn  von  Macchio  in  Wien. 

Telegramm.  Lamhachy  25.  Juli  1914. 

Eussischer  Geschaftstrager  telegraphiert  mir,  er  sei  von  seiner  Regierung 
dringend  beauftragt,  eine  Fristerstreckung  fiir  das  Ultimatum  an  Serbien  zu 
verlangen.  Ich  ersucKe  Euer  Exzellenz,  ihm  in .  meinem  Namen  zu  antworten, 
daB  ^ir  eine  Verlangerung  der  Frist  nicht  zugeben  konnen.  Euer  Exzellenz 
wollen  hinzufiigen,  daii  Serbien  ancli  nach  dem  Abbruche  der  diplomatiscben 
Beziebungen  durcb  uneing;escLLrankte  Annabme  unserer  Forderungen  eine  fried- 
liche  Losung  herbeifuhren  kann,  docb  wiirden  wir  in  diesem  Falle  genptigt 
■sein,  den  Biickersatz  aller  unserer  durch  militarische  Maiinaiimeu  verursacbten 
[Kosten  und  Scbaden  von  Serbien  zu  verlangen. 


21. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Sz^pdry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Bad  Ischl,  25.  Juli  1914. 

Zu  Euer  Exzellenz  Information  und  Regelung  Ibrer  Spracbe: 

Der  russiscbe  Gescbaftstrager  bat  beute  vormittag  beim  Herrn  Ersten 
Sektionscbef  vorgesprocben,  um  im  Namen  seiner  Regierung  den  Wunscb  aus-. 
zudriicken,  daii  die  in  unserer  Note  an  Serbien  angegebene  Frist  verlangert 
werden  moge. 

Dieses  Ersucben  wurde  darait  begriindet,  daJi  die  'Macbte  von  unserem 
Scbritt  iiberrascbt  worden  seien  und  daO  die  russiscbe  Regierung  es  als  eine 
natiirlicbe  Rucksicbt  des  Wiener  Kabinettes  gegen  die  anderen  Kabinette 
betracbten  wiirde,  wenn  den  letzteren  GelegenKeit  gegeben  wiirde,  die  Grund- 
lagen  unserer  Mitteilung  an  die  Macbte  zu  prtifen  und  das  von  uns  in  Aussicbt* 
gestellte  Dossier  zu  studieren. 

Der  Herr  Erste  Sektionscbef  antwortete  dem  Herrn  Gescbaftstrager,  dafi  er  seine 
Ausfiihrungen  sofort  zu  meiner  Kenntnis  bringen  werde;  er  konne  ibm  aber 
scbon  jetzt  sagen,  daii  keine  Aussicbt  bestebe,  daii  eine  Verlangerung  der 
angegebenen  Frist  von  unserer  Seite  gewabrt  wiirde.  Was  die  Griinde 
anbelange,  die  die  russiscbe  Regierung  zur  Erbartung  des  von  ibr  vorgebracbten 
Wunscbes     angefiibrt     babe,     so     scbienen     dieselben     auf     einer    irrtumlicben 


70 

Voraussetzung  za  berulien.  Unsere  l^ote  an  die  Machte  tatte  keineswegs 
den  Zweck  verfolgt,  dieselben  einzuladen,  ihre  gegensfandliche  Auffassung 
bekannt  zu  geben,  sondern  nur  den  Charakter  einer  Information  gehabt,  die 
wir  als  eine  Pfliclit  internationaler  Hofliclikeit  angesehen  batten.  Im  iibrigen 
betrachteten  wir  unsere  Aktion  als  eine  nur  uns  und  Serbien  beriihrende  Ange- 
legenbeit,  zu  der  wir  trotz  unserer  seit  Jabren  bekundeten  Geduld  und  Lang- 
mut  durch  die  Entwicklung  der  Verhaltnisse  zur  Verteidigung  unserer  vitalsten 
ilpteressen  sebr  gegen  unseren  Wunsch  gezwungen  worden  sind. 


22. 

Freiherr  von  GiesI  an  Graf  Berchtoid. 

iTelegramm.  Belgrad,  25.  Juli  1914. 

Ministerrat  gestem  abends  und  beute  frut  zusammengetreten,  nach  mehr- 
fachen  Versionen  soil  mir  Antwort  auf  unsere  Note  noct  vor  Ablauf  der  Frist 
tibergeben  werden.  Wie  ich  bore,  wird  Hofzug  zusammengestellt;  Geld  der 
Nationalbank  und  der  Eisenbabn  sowie  die  Akten  des  Ministeriums  des  Auliern 
werden  in  das  Innere  des  Landes  gebracht.  Einige  meiner  Kollegen  sind  der 
AnffaSsung,  daii  sie  der  Regierung  folgen  miissen,  speziell  auf  der  russiscben 
Gesandtscbaft  wird  gepackt. 

Gamison  bat  in  Feldausriistung  Stadt  verlassen.^  Munitionsdepots  der  Festung 
-wurden  evakuiert.  Am  Babnbof  starker  militariscber  Verkebr.  Die  Sanitats- 
kolonnen  baben  Belgrad  in  der  Ricbtung  nacb  Siiden  verlassen.  In  Befolgung 
der  mir  inzwiscben  zugekommenen  Weisungen  werden  wir  im  Falle  Abbrucbes 
mit  dem  Zuge  6  Ubr  30  von  Belgrad  abreisen. 


23. 
Freiherr  von  GiesI  an  Graf  Berchtoid. 

Telegramm.  Semlin,  25.  Juli  1914. 

Um   3    Ubr   nacbmittags   wurde  in   Serbien   die   aUgemeine  Mobilisierung 
angeordnet. 


71 

24. 

Freiherr  von  CilesI  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Semlin,  25.  Juli  1914^ 

Ich  habe  infolge  raigeniigender  Antwort  der  kbniglich  serbischen  Regierung| 

auf  unsere  am  23.  1.  M.  gestellten  Fordemngen  die  diplomatiscben  Beziebimgeiii 

mit  Serbien  fiir  abgebrocben  erklart  und  mil  Personal  der  Gesandtscbaft  Belgrad^ 

verlassen. 

Die  Antwortuote  wnrde  mir  2  Minuten  vor  6  Uhr  abends  iibergeben. 


25. 
Note  der  kSniglich  serbischen  Regierung  vom  12./25.  Juli  1914, 

Le  Gouvemement  Royal  serbe  a  recu  la  communication  du  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal  du  10  de  ce  mois  et  i]  est  persuade  que  sa  r^ponse  61oignera 
tout  malentendu  qui  menace  de  gater  les  bons  rapports  de  voisinage  entre  la 
Monarcbie  austro-bongroise  et  le  Royaume  de  Serbie. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  est  conscient  que  les  protestations  qui  ont  apparu 
tant  k  la  tribune  de  la  Skoupcbtina  Nationale  que  dans  les  declarations  et  les' 
actes  des  repr6sentants  responsables  de  I'.Etat,  protestations  qui  furent  couples 
court  par  la  declaration  du  Gouvemement  serbe  faite  le  18  mars  1909,  ne  se 
sont  plus  renouvel^es  vis-k-vis  la  grande  Monarcbie  voisine,  en  aucune  occasion, 
et  que  depuis  ce  temps,  aufcant  de  la  part  des  Gouvernements  Royaux  qui.  se 
sont  succ6des,  que  de  la  part  de  leurs  organes  aucune  tentative  n'a  6t6  faite, 
dans  le  but  de  cbanger  I'^tat  de  cbose  politique  et  juridique  cr66  en  Bosnie- 
Herc6govine.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  constate  que  sous  ce  rapport  le  Gou- 
vernement Imperial  et  Royal  n'a  fait  aucune  representation  sauf  en  ce  qui 
concerne  un  livre  scolaire,  et  au  sujet  de  laquelle  le  Gouvemement  L  et  R.  a 
;Te9u  une  explication  enti^rement  satisfaisante.  La  Serbie  a  de  nombreuses  fois 
donn6  des  preuves  de  sa  politique  pacifiste  et  moder^e  pendant  la  dur^e  de  la 
crise  balcanique  et  c'est  gri,ce  a  la  Serbie  et  au  sacrifice  qu'elle  a  fait  dans 
I'interet  exclusif  de  la  paix  europeenne  que  cette  paix  a  ete  pr^serv^e. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  ne  peut  pas  ^tre  rendu  responsable  pour  des 
manifestations  d'un  caract^re  priv^  telle  que  les  articles  des  journaux  et  le 
travail  paisible  des  societ^s,  manifestations  qui  se  produisent  dans  presque  tous 
les  pays  comme  une  cbose  ordinaire  et  qui  ecbappent  enr^gle  gen6rale  au 
controle  officiel.  D'autant  moins  que  le  Gouvernement  Royal,  lors  de  la  solution 
de    toute   une   s^rie   de   questions   qui   se   sont  presentees   entre   la   Serbie   et 


I 


12 

rAutriche-Hongrie  a  montr6  une  grande  provenance  et  a  r6nssi  de  cette  faQon 
k  en  rOgler  le  plus  grand  nombre  au  profit  du  progr^s  des  deux  pays  voisins. 

C'est  pourquoi  le  Gouvernement  Royal  a  6t6  pOniblement  surpris  par  les 
affirmations  d'apr^s  lesquelles  des  personnes  du  Royaume  de  Serbie  auraient 
particip6  a  la  preparation  de  I'attentat  commis  h  Saraievo.  U  s'attendait  a  ce 
qu'il  soit  invito  k  collaborer  a  la  recberclie  de  tout  ce  qui  se  rapporte  h.  ce 
crime  et  il  etait  pret,  pour  prouver  par  des  actes  son  enti^re  correction,  a  agir 
centre  toutes  les  personnes  a  I'Ogard  desquelles  des  communications  lui  seraient  faites. 

Se  rendant  done  au  dOsir  du  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.,  le  Gouvernement 
Royal  est  disposO  a  remettre  au  tribunal  tout  sujet  serbe,  sans  6gard  h  aa 
situation  et  a  son  rang  pour  la  complicity  duqu^l  dans  le  crime  de  Saraievo 
des  preuves  lui  seraient  fournies  et  spOcialement  il  s'engage  h  faire  publier  a  la 
premiere  page  du  Journal  Officiel  en  date  du  13/26  juillet  I'Ononciation  suivante; 

„Le  Gouvernement  Royal  de  Serbie  condamne  toute  propagande  qui  serait 
dirigOe  contre  I'Autriclie-Hongrie  c'est  k  dire  I'ensemble  des  tendances  qui 
aspirent  en  dernier  lieu  a  dOtacber  de  la  Monarcbie  austro-bongroise  des  terri- 
toires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  il  deplore  sinc^rement  les  consequences  funestes 
de  ces  agissement  criminels." 

„Le  Gouvernement  Royal  regrette  que  certains  officiers  et  fonctionnaires 
serbes  aient  particip6,  d'aprOs  la  communication  du  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.,  h  la 
propagande  susmentionnOe  et  compromis  par  \h  les  relations  de  bon  voisinage 
auxquelles  le  Gouvernement  Royal  s'Otait  solennellement  engagO  par  sa  decla- 
ration du  31  mars  1909." 

„Le  Gouvernement,  qui  dOsapprouve  et  rOpudie  toute  idOe  ou  tentative 
d'une  immixtion  dans  les  destinies  des  habitants  de  quelque  partie  de  I'Autricbe-, 
Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  considfere  de  son  devoir  d'avertir  formeUement  les  officiers, 
les  fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  population  du  Royaume  que  dorOnavant  il  procOdera 
avec  la  derni^re  rigueur  contre  les  personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables  d& 
pareils  agissements,  agissements  qu'il  mettra  tons  ses  efforts  k  prOvenir  et  k 
rOprimer." 

Cette  Ononciation  sera  port6e  a  la  connaissance  de  I'Annee  Royale  par  un 
ordre  dn  jour  au  nom  de  Sa  MajestO  le  Roi,  par  son  Altesse  Royale  le  Prince' 
Heritier  Alexandre  et  sera  publiOe  dans  le  procbain  bulletin  officiel  de  rArmOe. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  s'engage  en  outre: 

1"  d'introduire  k  sa  premiere  convocation  rOguli^re  de  la' Skoupcbtina,  une 
disposition  dans  la  loi  de  la  Presse  par  laquelle  sera  punie  de  la  maniere  la 
plus  sOv^re  la  provocation  k  la  haine  et  au  mOpris  de  la  Monarcbie  austro- 
bongroise  ainsi  que  contre  toute  publication  dont  la  tendance  gOnOrale  serait 
dirigOe  contre  I'integrite  territoriale  de  I'Autricbe-Hongrie.  II  se  cbarge  lors  de 
la  revision  de  la  Constitution  qui  est  procbaine,  k  faire  introduire  dans 
I'article  XXII  de  la  Constitution  un  amen  dement   de  telle  sorte  que  les   public 


73 

cations    ci-dessus   puissent    6tre    confisqu6es,   ce    qui    actaellement    aux   termes 
cat^goriques  de  Tarticle  XE  de  la  Constitution  est  impossible. 

20  Le  Gouvernement  ne  poss^de  aucune  preuve  —  et  la  note  du  Gouver- 
nement  I.  et  R  ne  lui  en  fournit  non  plus  aucune  —  que  la  soci6t6  „Narddna- 
Odbrana"  et  autres  soci^t^s  similaires  aient  commis  jusqu'5,  ce  jour  quelque' 
acte  criihinel  de  ce  genre  par  le  fait  d'un  de  leurs  membres.  N^anmoins  le 
Gouvernement  Royal  acceptera  la  demande  du  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  et  dissoudra 
la  soci6t6  „Narodna  Odbrana"  et  toute  autre  soci6t6  qui  agirait  contre  I'Autriche-; 
Hongrie. 

3*  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe  s'engage  k  6liminer  sans  d^lai  de 
rinstruction  publique  en  Serbie  tout  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourrait  servir  h.  fermenter 
la  propagande  contre  I'Autriclie-Hongrie,  quand  le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R.  lui 
fournira  des  faits.et  des  preuves,  de  cette  propagande. 

40  Le  Gouvernement  Royial  accepte  de  meme  h  eloigner  du  service  mili- 
taire  et  de  I'administration  les  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  pour  lesquels  I'enquete 
judiciaire  aura  prouv6  qu'ils  sont  coupables,  d'actes  dirig^s  contre  I'int^grit^  du 
territoire  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise  et  il  attend  que  le  Gouvernement 
I.  et  R.  lui  communique  ultdrieurement  les  noms  et  les  faits  de  ces  officiers  et' 
fonctionnaires  aux  fins  de  la  procedure  qui  doit  s'ensuivre. 

5"  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  doit  avouer  qu'il  ne  se  rend  pas  clairement 
compte  du  sens  et  de  la  port6e  de  la  demande  du  Gouvernement  L  et  R.  que 
la  Serbie  s'engage  h  accepter  sur  son  territoire  la  collaboration  des  organes  du 
Gouvernement  I.  et  R.,  mais  il  declare  qu'il  admettra  la  collaboration  qui 
repondrait  aux  principes  du  droit  international  et  a  la  procedure  criminelle,' 
ainsi  qu'aux  bons  rapports  de  voisinage. 

6"  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  —  cela  va  de  soi  —  consid^re  de  son  devoir 
d'ouvrir  une  enquete  contre  qui  sont  ou  qui  ^ventuellement  auraient  6t6  mel6s 
au  complot  du  15/28  juin  et  qui  se  trouveraient  sur  le  territoire  du  Royaume. 
<^uant  a  la  participation  de  cette  enquete  des  organes  des  autorit^s  austro- 
hongroises,  qui  seraient  d^l6gu6s  h  cet  effet  par  le  Gouvernement  L  et  R.  lei 
Gouvernement  Royal  ne  pent  pas  I'accepter,  car  ce  serait  une  violation  de  la 
Gonstitution  et  de  la  loi  sur  la  procedure  criminelle.  Cependant  dans  des  cas 
concrets  des  communications  sur  les  r^sultats  de  I'instruction  en  question 
pourraient  etre  donn^es  aux  organes  austro-hongrois. 

7 "  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  a  fait  proc6der  dhs  le  soir  meme  de  la  remise 
de  la  note  k  I'arrestation  du  Comandant  Voislav  Tankositch. 

Quant  a  Milan  Ziganovitcb  qui  est  sujet  de  la  Monarcbie  austro-bongrpise 
et  qui  jusqu'au  15  juin  6tait  employ^  (comme  aspirant)  h.  la  direction  des 
cbemins  de  fer,  il  n'a  pas  pu  encore  etre  d6couvert  et  un  mandat  d'amener  a  6t6 
lanc6  contre  lui.  Le  Gouvernement  L  et  R.  est  pri^  de  vouloir  bien  dans  la  forme 


74 

accoutum6e  faire  connattre  le  plus  tot  possible  les  pr6somptions  de  culpability  ainsi 
que  les  preuves  6ventuelles  de  leur  culpability  qui  ont  6t6  recueillies  jusqu'5,  ce  jour 
pai-  rinstruction  a  SaraieVo  aux  fins  d'enquete  ult^rieure. 

80  Le .  Gouvemement  serbe  renforcera  et  6tendra  les  mesures  prises  pour 
empecher  le  trafic  illicite  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  k  travers  la  fronti^re. 

II  va  de  soi  qu'il  ordonnera  de  suite  une  enquete  et  punira  s^verement 
les  fonctionnaires  des  fronti^res  sur  la  ligne  Sabad — Loznica,  qui  ont  manqu6 
leurs  devoirs  et  laiss6  passer  les  auteurs  du  crime  de  SaraYevo. 

90  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  donnera  volontiers  des  explications  sur  les  propos 
que  ses  fonctionnaires  tant  en  Serbie  qu'a  r6tranger  ont  tenus  apres  I'attentat  dans 
des  interviews  et  qui,  d'apres  I'affirmation  du  Gouvemement  L  et  E,.,  ont  6t6 
hostiles  envers  la  Monarcbie  d^s  que  le  Gouvemement  l/et  R.  lui  aura  indiqu6 
les  passages  en  question  de  ces  propos  et  des  qu'il  aura  d^montr^  que  les  propos 
employ6s  ont  en  effet  dte  tenus  par  lesdits  fonctionnaires,  au  sujet  de  quoi  le 
Gouvemement  Royal  lui-meme  aura  soin  de  recueillir  des  preuves  et  con- 
■victions. 

lOo  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  informera  le  Gouvemiement  I.  et  R.  de  I'exdcu- 
tion  des  mesures  comprises  dans  les  points  pr6c6dents,  en  tant  que  oela  n'a  pas 
6t6  d6ja  fait  par  la  presente  note,  aussitot  que  chaque  mesure  aura  6t6  ordonn6e 
et  ex6cut6e. 

Bans  le  cas  ou  le  Gouvemement  L  et  R.  ne  serait  pas  satisfait  de  cette 
r^ponse,  le  Gouvemement  Royal  serbe,  consid6rant  qu'il  est  de  I'int^ret 
commun  de  ne  pas  precipiter  la  solution  de  cette  question,  est  pret  comme 
toujours  d'accepter  une  entente  pacifique,  soit  en  remettant  cette  question  k  la 
decision  du  Tribunal  International  de  la  Haye  soit  aux  Grandes  Puissances  qui 
ont  pris  part  h  I'^laboration  de  la  declaration  que  le  Gouvemement  serbe  a  faite 
le  18/31  mars  1909. 


26. 
Graf  Berclitold  an  Graf  Sz^p^ry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Wien,  25.  Juli  1914. 

In  dem  Augenblicke,  wo  wir  uns  zu  einem  ernsten  Vorgehen  gegen 
Serbien  entschlossen  haben,  sind  wir  uns  naturlich  auch  der  Moglichkeit  eines 
sich  aus  der  serbiscben  Differenz  entwickelnden  Zusammenstolies  mit  RuOland 
bewuGt  gewesen.  Wir  konnten  uns  aber  durch  diese  Eventualitat  nicbt  in  unserer 
SteUungnahme  gegeniiber  Serbien  beirren  lassen,  weil  grundlegende  staats- 
politische  Konsiderationen  uns  vor  die  Notwendigkeit  stellten,  der  Situation  ein 
Ende  zu  machen,  daft  ein  russiscber  Freibrief  Serbien  die  dauernde,  ungestrafte 
uijid  unstrafbare  Bedrohung  der  Monarchie  ermogliche. 


75 

Fiir  den  Fall,  als  Rufiland  den  Moment  fiir  die  grolie  Abrechnung  mit  den 
europaischen  Zentralmachten  bereits  fiir  gekommen  erachten  sollte  und  daber 
von  vorneberein  zum  Krieg  entscblossen  ware,  erscbeint  allerdings  nacbstebende 
Instraierung  Euer  Exzellenz  iiberfliissig. 

Es  ware  aber  immerbin  denkbar,  dafi  Ruliland,  nacb  der  eventuellen  Ab- 
lebnung  unserer  Fordeningen  durcb  Serbien  und  angesicbts  der  sicb  fiir  uns 
ergebenden  Notwendigkeit*  eines  bewaffneten  Vorgebens,  mit  sicb  selbst  zu  Rate 
ginge  und  daft  es  sogar  gewillt  sein  konnte,  sicb  von  den  kriegslustigen 
Elementen  nicbt  mitreilien  zu  lassen. 

Dieser  Situation  sind  die  nacbfolgenden  Darlegungen  angepafit,  die  Euer 
Exzellenz  im  gegebenen  Moment  und  in  der  Ibnen  geeignet  erscbeinendeu 
Weise  und  nacb  der  von  Ibnen  zu  ermessenden  Opportunitat  bei  Herrn  Sazonow- 
und  dem  Herrn  Ministerprasidenten  verwerten  woUen: 

Icb  setze  im  allgemeine'n  voraus,  daO  Euer  Exzellenz  unter  den  gegen- 
wartigen  Verbaltnissen  ein  enges  Einvernebmen  mit  Ibrem  deutscben  Kollegen 
hergestellt  baben,  der  seitens  seiner  Regierung  gewiii  beauftragt  worden  sein 
diirfte,  der  russiscben  Regierung  keinen  Zweifel  dariiber  zu  lassen,  daO  Oster- 
reicb-Ungarn  im  Falle  eines  Konfliktes  mit  Rufiland  nicbt  allein  steben  wiirde. 

Dariiber  gebe  icb  micb  keiner  EQusion  bin,  daJi  es  nicbt  leicbt  sein  wird, 
fiir  unseren  unvermeidlicb  gewordenen  Scbritt  in  Belgrad  bei  Herrn  Sazonow 
Versfandnis  zu  finden. 

Es  gibt  aber  ein  Moment,  das  seiifen  Eindruck  auf  den  russiscben  Minister 
des  Auliem  nicbt  verfeblen  kann  und  das  ist  die  Betonung  des  Umstandes,  dafi 
die  osterreicRiscb-ungariscbe  Monarcbie,  dem  von  ibr  seit  Jabrzenten  fest- 
gebaltenen  Grundsatze  entsprecbend,  aucb  in  der  gegenwartigen  Ej-ise  und  bei 
der  bewaffneten  Austragung  des  Gegensatzes  zu  Serbien  keinerlei  eigenniitzige 
Motive  verfolgt. 

Die  Monarcbie  ist  territorial  saturiert  und  tragt  nacb  serbiscbem  Besitz 
kein  Verlangen.  Wenn  der  Kampf  mit  Serbien  uns  aufgezwungen  wird,  so 
wird  dies  fiir  uns  kein  Kampf  um  territorialen  Gewinn,  sondern  lediglicb  ein. 
Mittel  der  Selbstverteidung  und  Selbsterbaltung  sein. 

Der  Inbalt  des  Zirkularerlasses,  der  an  sicb  scbon  beredt  genug  ist,  -mid 
in  das  recbte  Licbt  geriickt  durcb  das  Dossier  iiber  die  serbiscbe  Propaganda 
gegen  die  Monarcbie  und  die  Zusamraenbange,  die  zwiscben  dieser  Propaganda* 
und  dem  Attentat  vom  28.  Juni  besteben. 

Auf  dieses  Dossier  wollen  Euer  Exzellenz  die  Aufmerksamkeit  des  Herrn 
russiscben  Ministers  ganz  spcziell  lenken  und  dartun,  es  sei  eine  in  der  Ge- 
scbicbte  singulare  Erscbeinung,  daii  eine  Grollmacbt  die  aufriibreriscben 
Umtriebe  eines  angrpnzenden  kleinen  Staates  durcb  so  lange  Zeit  mit  so  beispielr 
loser  Lan'gmut  geduldet  batte  wie  Osterreicb-Ungarn  jene  Serbiens. , 


76 

Wir  wollten  keine  Politik  gegen  das  Aufstreben  der  christlichen  Balkan- 
staaten  machen  und  haben  daher  —  trotzdem  uns  der  geringe  Wert  serbischer 
Versprechungen  bekannt  war  —  nach  der  Annexionskrise  vom  Jabre  1908  zu- 
gelassen,  daft  sich  Serbien  beinabe  um  das  Doppelte  vergrofiere. 

Seitdem  hat  die  subversive  Bewegung,  die  in  Serbien  gegen  die  Monarchie 
genahrt  wird,  so  exzessive  Formen  angenommen,  dali  die  Lebensinteressen 
Osterreich-Ungarns  und  selbst  unsere  Dynastie  durch  die  serbische  Wiihlarbeit 
bedroht  erscheinen, 

Wir  miissen  annehmen,  dafi  das  konservative,  kaisertreue  Rutland  ein 
energisches  Vorgehen  unsererseits  gegen  diese  Bedrohung  aller  staatlichen  Ord- 
nung  begreiflicb  nnd  sogar  notwendig  finden  wird. 

Wenn  Euer  Exzellenz  in  Ihrem  Gespracb  mit  Herrn  Sazonow  an  diesem 
Punkte  angelangt  sein  werden",  wird  der  Moment  gekommen  sein,  an  die  Auf- 
stellung  unserer  Beweggriinde  und  Absichten  den  Hinweis  zu  kniipfen,  dafi  wir 
zwar  - —  ^vie  Euer  Exzellenz  bereits  in  der  Lage  gewesen  waren  darzulegen  — 
keinen  territorialen  Gewinn  anstreben  und  auch  die  Souveranitat  des  Konig- 
reiches  nicbt  anzutasten  gedachten,  dafi  wir  aber  andererseits  zur  Durchsetzung 
unserer  Forderungen  bis  zum  AuCersten  gehen  wiirden. 

Dafi  wir  bisher,  soweit  es  an  uns  lag,  bestrebt  waren,  den  Frieden  zu  er- 
halten,  den  auch  wir  als  das  kostbarstc  Gut  der  Volker  betrachten,  zeige  der 
Verlauf  der  letzten  40  Jahre  und  die  geschichtliche  Tatsache,  dafi  unser  Aller- 
gnadigster  Herr  Sich  den  glorreichen  Namen  eines  Hiiters  des  Friedens  er- 
worben  hat. 

Wir  wiirden  eine  Storung  des  euiopaischen  Friedens  schon  deshalb  auf 
das  lebhafteste  bedauern,  weil  wir  stets  der  Ansicht  waren,  dafi  das  Erstaiken 
der  Balkanstaaten  zur  staatlichen  und  politischen  Selbsfandigkeit  unseren  Bezie- 
hungen  zu  Rufiland  zum  Vorteil  gereichen  wiirde,  auch  alle  Moglichkeit  eines 
Gegensatzes  zwischen  uns  und  I^ufiland  beseitigen  wiirde  und  well  wir'immer 
bereit  waren,  die  grofien  politischen  Interessen  Rufilands  bei  unserer  eigenen 
politischen  Orientierung  zu  beriicksichtigen. 

Eine  weitere  Duldung  der  serbischen  Umtriebe  wiirde  unsere  staatliche  Exi- 
stenz  untergraben  und  unseren  Bestand  als  Grofimacht,  daher  auch  das  europaische 
Gleichgewicht,  in  Frage  stellen.  Wir  sind  aber  Uberzeugt,  dafi  es  Rulilands 
eigenstes,  von  seinen  friedlichen  Staatsleitern  wohlverstandenes  Interesse  ist,  dafi 
das  gegenwartige  europaische,  fiir  den  Weltfrieden  so  nutzliche  Gleichgewicht 
erhalten  bleibe.  Unsere  Aktion  gegen  Serbien,  in  welcher  .Form  immer  sie 
erfolgt,  ist  eine  durchaus  konservative  und  ihr  Zweck  die  notwendige  Erhaltung 
unserer  europaischen  Stellung. 


77 

27. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Szdp^ry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegram  m.  Wien,  25.  JuU  1914, 

Da  Punkt  5  iinserer  Forderungen,  namlich  die  Beteiligung  von  k.  u.  k. 
Funktionaren  bei  der  Unterdriickung  der  subversiven  Bewegung  in  Serbien, 
besonderen  Widersprucb  Herrn  Sazonows  hervorgerufen,  wollen  Euer  Exzellenz 
sich  iiber  diesen  Punkt  streng  vertraulich  dabin  auliern,  daft  dessen  Einscbaltung 
lediglich  praktischen  Riicksicbten  entsprang  und  keineswegs  der  Absicbt,  die 
Souveranitat  Serbiens  zu  tangieren.  Wir  denken  bei  Punkt  5  „ collaboration" 
an  die  Errichtung  eines  gebeimen  „ bureau  de  surety"  in  Belgrad,  welches  nach 
Art  der  analogen  russiscben  Einrichtungen  in  Paris  funktionieren  und  mit  der. 
.serbischen  Polizei  und  Verwaltungsbeborde  kooperieren  wiirde. 


28. 
Graf  Sz^p^ry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  St.  Petersburg,  26.  Jnli  1914. 

Aus  AnlaO  von  Geriichten  iiber  russische  Mobilisierungsmafinahmen  hat  Graf 
Pourtal^s  den  russiscben  Minister  in  der  ernstesten  Weise  darauf  aufmerksam 
gemacht,  dali  heutzutage  Mobilisierungsmafinahmen  als  diplomatisches  Druck- 
mittel  hochst  gefahL-licb  seien.  Denn  in  diesem  Falle  gelange  die  rein  militarische 
Erwagung  der  Generalstabe  zum  Wort  und  wenn  in  Deutschland  einmal  auf 
den  Knopf  gedriickt  werde,  sei  die  Sache  unaufhaltsam.  Herr  Sazonow  ver- 
sicherte  dem  deutschen  Botschafter  unter  Ehrenwort,  dafi  die  beziiglichen 
Geriichte  unrichtig  seien,  dali  bisber  kein  Pferd  und  kein  Reservist  eingezogen 
sei  und  daft  es  sich  lediglich  um  vorbereitende  Maftnahmen  in  den  Militar- 
bezirken   Kiew  und  Odessa,  vielleicbt  Kasan  und  Moskau  handle. 

Unmittelbar  nachber  erhielt  der  kaiserlich  deutsche  Militarattach6  per  Kurier 
spat  abend  eine  Einladung  zu  Kriegsminister  Suchomlinow,  welcher  sich  darauf 
berief,  daft  Graf  Pourtales  dem  Minister  dcs  Auftern  iiber  die  russiscben 
Riistungen  gesprochen  babe  und  da  der  Botschafter  einzelne  militarische  Details 
miftverstanden  haben  konnte,  nehme  er  Gelegenheit,  ihn  ausfiihrlicher  zu 
informieren.  In  folgendem  mir  zur  Verfiigung  gestellten  Telegramm  des  Grafen 
Pourtales  nach  Berlin  sind  die  diesfalligen  Mitteilungen  des  Majors  von  Eggeling 
ztisammengefaftt : 

Milifarattach^  meldet  iiber  Gespracb  mit  russischem  Kriegsminister:  Herr 
Sazonow  hat  ihn  gebeten,  mich  iiber  militarische  Lage  aufzuklaren.  Der  Herr 
Kriegsminister  gab  mir  sein  Ehrenwort,  daft  noch  keinerlei  Mobilmachungsordre 
ergangen  sei.  Vorlaufig  wurden  lediglich  vorbereitende  Maftnahmen  getroffen, 
kein  Pferd  ausgehoben,    kein  Reservist  eingezogen.    Wenn  Osterreich   serbische 


78 

Grenze  ubcrsclu'eitc,  werden  aaf  Osterreich  gerichtete  Militarbe/irke  Kiew, 
Odessa,  Moskau,  Kasan  mobilisiert.  Unter  keinen  Umstanden  an  deutscher  Front, 
Warschau,  Wilna,  St.  Petersburg.  Man  wiinscht  dringend  Frieden  mit  Deutschland. 
Anf  meine  Frage,  zu  welchem  Zweck  die  Mobilisierung  gegen  Osterreich,  Acbsel- 
zucken  und  Hinweis  auf  Diplomaten.  Sprach  dem  Herrn  Minister  aus,  daO  man 
bei  uns  Wiirdigung  fur  freundschaftliche  Absicht  zeigen,  aber  auch  Mobil- 
machung  gegen  Osten-eich  allein  als  sehr  bedrohlicb  ansehen  werde.  Herr 
Minister  betonte  nachdriicklichst  und  wiederholt  dringendes  Bediirfnis  und 
Wunscb  auf  Frieden. 


29. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  26.  Juli  1914. 

Herr  von  Tschirschky  teilte  mir  auftraggemaii  heute  mit,  laut  eines  in 
London  am  25.  d.  M.,  3  Uhr  nachmittags,  aufgegebenen  Telegrammes  des 
Fiirsten  Lichnowsky  habe  Sir  E.  Grey  diesem  die  Skizze  einer  Antwortnote 
Serbiens  iibersendet  und  in  dem  begleitenden  Privatschreiben  bemerkt,  daft  er 
hoffe,  das  Berliner  Kabinett  wiirde  sich  angesichts  des  versohnlichen  Tenors 
dieser  Antwort  in  Wien   fiir  deren  Annahme  verwenden. 

Ich  halte  es  fiir  angezeigt,  daft  Euer  E.Kzellenz  dem  Herrn  Staatssekretar  gegen- 
iiber  auf  die  Sache  zurlickkommen  und  ihn  darauf  aufmerksam  machen,  daii  fast 
zur  selben  Zeit,  als  er  dieses  Schreiben  an  Fiirst  Lichnowsky  richtete,  namlich 
gestern  um  3  Uhr  nachmittags,  Serbien  bereits  die  allgemeine  Mobilisierung 
seiner  Arme  angeordnet  hat,  was  beweist,  daft  in  Belgrad  zu  einer  friedlichen 
Austragxmg  der  Sache  keine  Neigung  bestand.  Die  tjberreichung  der,  wie  es 
scheint,  schon  vorher  nach  London  telegraphierten  Antwort  an  den  k.  und  k. 
Gesandten  in  Belgrad  fand  mit  einem  unseren  Forderungen  nicht  entsprechenden 
Inhalte  erst  um  6   Uhr  nach  erfolgter  Ausschreibung  der  Mobilisierung  statt. 


30. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  Berlin^  Rom,  London,  Paris  und 

St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  26.  Juli  1914. 

Wir  haben,  nachdem  Serbien  die  von  uns  aufgesteUten  Forderungen  ab- 
gelehnt  hat,  die  diplomatischen  Beziehungen  zu  diesem  Lande  abgebrochfsn. 

Ich  ersuche  Euer  Exzellenz  nunmehr,  sich  sofort  zum  Herrn  Minister  des 
Auftern  oder  dessen  Stellvertreter  zu  begeben  und  sich  ihm  gegeniiber  beilaufig 
in  folgender  Weise  auszusprechen : 


^9 

Die  koniglich  serbische  Regierung  hat  es  abgelehnt,  die  Forderungen,  welche 
wir  zur  dauernden  Sicherung  unserer  von  ihr  bedrohten  vitalsten  Interessen  an 
sie  stellen  muliten,  zu  erfiillen,  womit  sie  bekundet  hat,  dali  sie  ihre  sub- 
versiyen,  auf  die  stete  Beanruhigung  einiger  unserer  Grenzgebiete  und  ihre 
schliefiliche  Lostrennung  aus  dem  Gefiige  der  Monarchie  gerichteten  Bestre- 
bungen  aufzugeben,  nicht  willens  sei. 

Zu  unserem  Bedauern  und  sehr  gegen  unseren  Willen  sind  wir  dadurch 
in  die  Notwendigkeit  versetzt  worden,  Serbien  durch  die  scharfsten  Mittel  zu 
einer  grundsatzlichen  Anderung  seiner  .  bisherigen  feindseligen  Haltung  zu 
zwingen. 


31. 
Graf  Sz^p^ry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  St  Petersburg,  27.  Juli  1914. 

Soeben  lange  Unterredung  mit  Herrn  Sazonow  gehabt,  Sagte  dem  Herrn 
Minister,  ich  hatte  den  Eindruck,  daft  man  iiber  den  Charakter  unserer  Aktion 
in  Rufiland  in  Irrtiimern  befangen  sei.  Man  imputiere  uns,  hiemit  einen  Vorstoii 
auf  den  Balkan  unternehmen  und  den  Marsch  nach  Salonich  oder  gar  nach 
Konstantinopel  antreten  zu  wollen.  Andere  wieder  gingen  so  weit,  unsere  Aktion 
nur  als  den  Auftakt  eines  Praventivkrieges  gegen  Ruliland  zu  bezeichnen.  All 
dies  sei  irrig,  zum  Telle  geradezu  unverniinftig.  Das  Ziel  unserer  Aktion  sei 
Selbsterhaltung  und  Notwehr  gegeniiber  einer  feindseligen,  unsere  Integritat 
bedrohenden  Propaganda  des  Wortes,  der  Schrift  und  der  Tat.  Niemandem  in 
Osterreich-Ungarn  falle  es  ein,  russische  Interessen  bedrohen  oder  gar  Handel 
mit  Ruliland  suchen  zu  wollen.  Das  Ziel  jedoch,  das  wir  uns  vorgesetzt,  seien 
wir  unbedingt  entschlossen  zu  erreichen  und  der  Weg,  den  wir  gewahlt  hatten, 
schien  uns  der  zweckdienlichste.  Da  es  sich  aber  um  eine  Aktion  der  Notwehr 
handle,  konne  ich  ihm  nicht  verhehlen,  daO  man  sich  bei  einer  solchen  durch 
gar  keine  wie  immer  gearteten  Konsequenzen  beirren  lassen  konne. 

Herr  Sazonow  stimmte  mir  bei.  Unser  Ziel,  wie  ich  es  ihm  geschildert 
habe,  sei  ein  voUkomraen  legitimes,  aber  er  meine,  der  Weg,  den  wir  zu  dessen 
Erreichung  verfolgen,  sei  nicht  der  sicherste.  Die  Note,  die  wir  iiberreicht  hatten, 
sei  in  der  Form  nicht  glucklich.  Er  habe  sie  seitdem  studiert  und  wenn  ich 
Zeit  hatte,  mochte  er  sie  nochmals  mit  mir  durchschauen.  Ich  bemerkte,  dali 
ich  zu  •  seiner  Disposition  sei,  aber  weder  autorisiert  sei,  den  Notentext  mit  ihm 
zu  diskutieren,  noch  denselben  zu  in'terpretieren.  Seine  Bemerkungen  seien  aber 
natiirlich  von  Interesse.  Der  Herr  Minister  nahm  sodann  alle  Punkte  der  Note 
durch  und  fand  heute  von  den  zehn  Punkten  sieben  ohne  allzu  grolie  Schwierig- 
keiten  annehmbar,  nur  die  zwei  Punkte,  betreffend  die  Mitwirkung  von  k.  u.  k. 


80- 

Funktionaren  in  Serbien  und  den  Punkt,  betreffend  die  Entlassiing  von  unsersoits 
zu  bezeicbnenden  Offizieren  und  Bcamten,  fand  er  in  diesei-  Form  unannehmbar. 
Beziiarlicb  der  beiden  ersten  Punkte  war  icb  in  der  Lagre  eine  authentische 
Interpretation  im  Sinne  Euer  Exzellenz  Telegjammes  vom  25.  d.  M.  zu  geben, 
beziiglicb  des  dritten  meintc  ich,  daft  er  eine  notwendige  Forderang  sei. 
Ubrigens  seien  die  Dinge  im  Rollen.  Die  Serben  hatten  schon  gestern  mobili- 
siert  und  was  sicb  seither  noch  ereignet  babe,  sei  rair  unbekannt. 


32. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Szdpdry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  27.  Juli  1914. 

Icb  ermacbtige  Euer  Exzellenz,  Herrn  SazonoW  gegeniiber  sicb  dabin  aus- 
zusprecben,  daJi,  solange  der  Krieg  z^viscben  Ostcrreicb-Ungarn  und  Serbien 
lokalisiert  bleibe,  die  Monarcbie  irgendwelcbe  tewitoriale  Eroberungen  keineswegs 
beabsichtige. 

33. 
Graf  Szogy^ny  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Berlin,  27.  Juli  1914. 

Herr  Sazonow  erklarte  dem  deutscben  Botscbaftor,  er  konne  ibm  „garan- 
tieren,  dafi  russiscberseits  keine  Mobilisierung  vorgenommen  worden  sei;  aller- 
dings  waren  gewisse  notwendigste  militariscbe  Vorsorgen  getroffen." 

Deutscber  Militarattacb6  in  St.  Petersburg  meldet,  dafi  „russiscber  Kriegs- 
minister  ibm  sein  Ebrenwort  gegeben  babe,  dafi  nicbt  ein  Mann,  nocb  ein  Pferd 
mobilisiert  sei;  docb  seien  natiirlicberweise  gewisse  militariscbe  Vorsorgen 
getroffen  worden";  Vorsorgen,  die,  wie  der  deutscbe  Militarattacb6  seiner  Meldung 
als  von  sicb  aus  binzufiigt,   „allerdings  ziembcb  weitgehend  seien." 


34. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  die  k.  u.  k.   Botschafter  in  Berlin,  Rom,   London,  Paris 

und  St.  Petersburg. 

Wien,  27.  Jnli  1914. 

In  der  Anlage  erbalten  Euer  —  den  mit  unseren  Bemerkungen  versebenen 
Text  der  Note,  welcbe  die  koniglicb  serbiscbe  Regierung  unterm  25.  1.  M.  an 
den  k.  u.  k.  Gesandten  in  Belgrad  gericbtet  bat. 


81 


Beilagc. 


Note  der  kbnigl.  serbischen  Regierung  an  die  k.  und  k.  Regierung  vom  12./25.  Juli 

1914. 


Ubersetzung. 

Die  konigl.  serbiscLe  Regierung  hat 
die  Mitteilung  der  k.  und  k.  Regierung 
vom  10.  d.  M.  erhalten  und  ist  iiber- 
zeugt,  daO  ihre  Antwort  jedes  Mifiver- 
standnis  zerstreuen  wird,  welches  die 
frcundnachbarJichen  Beziehungen  zwi- 
schen  der  osterreichisch-ungarischen  Mon- 
archie  und  dcm  Konigreiche  Serbien 
zu  storen  droht. 

Die  konigliche  Regierung  ist  sich 
bewuftt,  daO  der  grofien  Nachbarmon- 
archie  gegeniiber  bei  keinem  Anlasse 
jcne  Proteste  erneuert  wurden,  die. 
seinerzeit  sowohl  in  der  Skupschtina, 
als  auch  in  Erklarungen  und  Hand- 
lungen  der  verantwortlichen  Vertreter 
des  Staates  zum  Ausdrucke  gebracht 
wurden  und  die  dui'ch  die  Erklarung 
der  serbischen  Regierung  vom  18.  Miirz 
1909  ihren  Abschluli  gefunden  haben, 
sowie  weiters,  daft  seit  jener  Zeit  weder 
von  den  verschiedenen  einander  folgen- 
den  Regierungen  des  Konigreiches,  noch 
von  deren  Organen  der  Versuch  unter- 
nommcn  wurde,  den  in  Bosnien  und 
der  Herzegowina  geschaffenen  politischen 
und  rechtlichen  Zustand  zu  andern.  Die 
konigliche  ,  Regierung  stellt  fest,  dali 
die  k.  und  k.  Regierung  in  dieser  Rich- 
tung  keinerlei  Vorstellungen  erhoben 
hat,  abgesehen  von  dem  Falle  eines 
Lchrhuches,      hinsichtlich     dessen     die 


Annierkangen. 


Die  konigl.  serbische  Regierung 
beschrankt  sich  darauf  festzustellen,  dali 
seit  Abgabe  der  Erklarung  vom  18.  Marz 
1909  von  Seite  der  serbischen  Regie- 
rung  und  ihrer  Organe  kein  Versuch 
zur  Anderung  der  Stellung  Bosniens 
und  der  Herzegowina  unternommen 
wurde. 

Damit  verschiebt  sie  in  bewulit  will- 
kurlicher  Weise  die  Grundlagen  unserer 
Demarche,  da  wir  nicht  die  Behauptung 
aufgestellt  haben,  dali  sie  und  ihre  Or- 
gane in  dieser  Richtung  offiziell  irgend 
etwas  untemomnjen  hatten, 

UnserGravamengehtvielmehrdahin, 
dafi  sie  es  trotz  der  in  der  zitierten  Note 
iibemommenen  Verpflichtungen  unter- 
lassen  hat,  die  gegen  die  territoriale 
Integritat  der  Monarchic  gerichtete  Be- 
wegung  zu  unterdriicken. 

Ihre  Verpflichtung  bestand  also 
darin,  die  ganze  Richtung  ihrer  Politik 
zu  andern  und   zur  ostcrreichisch-unga- 


82 


k.  and  k.  Regierung  eine  vollkommen  be- 
friedigende  Aufklarung  erKalten  hat. 
Serbien  bat  wabrend  der  Dauer  der 
Balkankrise  in  zablreicben  Fallen  Be- 
■weise  fiir  seine  pazifistiscbe  und  ge- 
maliigte  Politik  geliefert  und  es  ist  nur 
Serbien  und  den  Opfem,  die  es  aus- 
scblielilicb  im  Interesse  des  europaiscben 
Friedens  gebracbt  bat,  zu  danken,  wenn 
dieser  Friede  erbalten  geblieben  ist. 

Die  koniglicbe  Regierung  kann 
nicbt  fiir  AuGerungen  piivaten  Cbarakters 
verantwortlicb  gemacbt  werden,  wie  es 
Zeitungsai-tikel  und  die  friedlicbe  Arbeit 
von  Gesellscbaften  ist,  Auiierungen,  die 
fast  in  alien  Landern  ganz  gewobnlicbe 
Erscbeinungen  sind  und  die  sicb  im 
allgemeinen  der  staatlicben  KontroUe 
entzieben.  Dies  umsoweniger,  els  die 
koniglicbe  Regierung  bei  der  Losung 
einer  ganzen  Reibe  von  Fragen,  die 
zwiscben  Serbien  und  Osterreicb-Ungam 
aufgetaucbt  waren,  grolies  Entgegen- 
kommen  bewiesen  bat,  wodurcb  es  ibr 
gelungen  ist,  deren  grolieren  Teil  zu- 
gunsten  des  Fortscbrittes  der  bei  den 
Nacbbarlander  zu  losen. 


Die  koniglicbe  Regierung  war  des- 
balb  durcb  die  Bebauptungen,  dali  An- 
geborige  Serbiens  an  der  Vorbereitung 
des  in  Sarajevo  veriibten  Attentates  teil- 
genommen  batten,  scbmerzlicb  iiber- 
rascbt.  Sie  batte  erwartet,  zur  Mit- 
wirkung  bei  den  Nacbforscbungen  iiber 
dieses  Verbrecben  eingeladen  zu  werden 
und  war  bereit,  um  ibre  voile  Korrekt- 
heit  durcb  Taten  zu  beweisen,  gegen 
alle   Personen    vorzugeben,   binsicbtlicb 


riscben  Monarcbie  in  ein  freundnacb-' 
barlicbes  Verbaltnis  zu  treten,  nicbt 
blofi  die  Zugeborigkeit  Bosniens  zur 
Monarcbie  offiziell  nicbt  anzutasten. 


Die  Bebauptung  der  konigl.  serbi- 
scben  Regierung,  dali  die  Aulierangen 
der  Presse  und  die  Tatigkeit  von  Yer- 
einen  privaten  Cbarakter  baben  und  sicb 
der  staatlicben  KontroUe  entzieben,  stebt 
im  vollen  Widersprucbe  zu  den  Einricb- 
tungen  modemer  Staaten,  selbst  der 
freibeitlicbsten  Ricbtung  auf  dem  Ge- 
biete  des  Preli-  und  Vereinsrecbtes,  das 
einen  ofifentlicb  recbtlicben  Cbarakter 
bat  und  Presse  sowie  Vereine  der  ^taat^ 
licben  Aufsicbt  unterstellt.  tJbrigens 
seben  aucb  die  serbiscben  Einricbtungen 
eine  solcbe  Aufsicbt  vor.  Der  gegen  die 
serbiscbe  Regierung  erbobene  Vorwurf 
gebt  eben  dabin,  daO  sie  es  ganzlicb 
unterlassen  bat,  ibre  Presse  und  ibre 
Vereine  zu  beaufsicbtigen,  deren  Wir- 
ken  im  monarcbiefeindlicben  Sinne  sie 
kannte. 


Diese  Bebauptung  ist  unricbtig;  die 
serbiscbe  Regierung  war  iiber  den  gegen 
ganz  bestimmte  Personen  bestebenden 
Verdacbt  genau  unterricbtet  und  nicbt 
nur  in  der  Lage,  sondem  aucb  nacb 
ibren    internen     Gesetzeo     verpflicbtet, 


83 


welpher  ihr  Mittellungen   ztigekommen 
waren. 

Den  Wiinschen  der  k.  and  k.  Re- 

^ierung  entsprechend,  ist  die  konigliclie 
iRegierung  somit  bereit,  dem  Gerichte 
iohne  Riicksicht  auf  Stellung  und  Rang 
jeden  serbischen  Staatsangeborigen  zu 
iibergeben,  ftir  dessen  Teilnabme  an 
dem  Sarajevoer  Verbrecben  ibr  Beweise 
geliefert  werden  sollten;  gie  verpflicbtet 
sicb  insbesondere  auf  der  ersten  Seite 
des  Amtsblattes  vom  13./26.  Juli  fol- 
gende  Enunziation  zu  veroffentlicben: 
„Die  konigl.  serbiscbe  Regierung 
verurteilt  jede  Propaganda,  die  gegen 
Osterreicb-Ungam  gericbtet  sein  sollte, 
d.  b.  die  Gesamtbeit  der  Bestrebungen, 
die  in  letzter  Linie  auf  die  Losreiliung 
einzelner  Gebiete  von  der  osterreicbiscb- 
ungariscben  Monarcbie  abzielen  und 
sie  bedauert  aufricbtig  die  traurigen 
Folgen  dieser  verbrecberiscben  Macben- 
scbaften. 


Die  koniglicbe  Regierung  bedauert, 
dali  laut  der  Mitteilung  der  k.  und  k. 
Regierung  gewisse  serbiscbe  Offiziere 
und  Funktionare  an  der  eben  genannten 
Propaganda  mitgewirkt  und  dafi  diese 
damit  die  freundnacbbarlicben  Bezie- 
bungen  gefabrdet  batten,  zu  deren 
Beobacbtung  sicb  die  koniglicbe  Re- 
gierung    durcb     die     Erklarung     vom 


ganz  spontan  Erbebungen  einzuleiten. 
Sie  bat  in  dieser  Ricbtung  gar  nicbts 
untemommen. , 


Unsere  Forderung  lautete: 

„Die  konigb  serbiscbe  Regierung 
verurteilt  die  gegen  Osterreicb-Ungarn 
gericbtete  Propaganda  ..." 

Die  von  der  konigl.  serbiscben 
Regierung  vorgenommene  Anderung  der 
von  uns  geforderten  Erklarung  will 
sagen,  dali  eine  solcbe  gegen  Osterreicb- 
Ungarn  gericbtete  Propaganda  nicbt  be- 
stebt  oder  dafi  ibr  eine  solcbe  nicbt 
bekannt  ist.  Diese  Formel  ist  unauf- 
ricbtig  und  binterbaltig,  da  sicb  die 
serbiscbe  Regierung  damit  fiir  spater 
die  Ausflucbt  reserviert,  sie  batte  die 
derzeit  bestebende  Propaganda  durcb 
diese  Erklarung  nicbt  desavouiert  und 
nicbt  als  monarcbiefeindlicb  anerkannt, 
woraus  sie  weiter  ableiten  konnte,  dafi 
sie  zur  Unterdriickung  einer  der  jetzigen 
Propaganda  gleicben  nicbt  verpflicbtet  sei. 

Die  von  uns  geforderte  Formulie- 
rung  lautete: 

„Die  koniglicbe  Regierung  bedauert, 
dali  serbiscbe  Offiziere  und  Funktionare 
mitgewirkt  baben " 

Aucb  mit  dieser  Formulierung  und 
dem  weiteren  Beisatze  „laut  der  Mit- 
teilung der  k.  und  k.  Regierung"  ver- 
folgt  die  serbiscbe  Regierung  den  bereits 


84 


31.  Marz  1909  feierlich  verpflichtet 
hatte. 

j,Die  Eegierung *  gleichlaatend 

mit  dem  geforderten  Texte. 

Die  konigliche  Regierung  ver- 
pflichtet  sich  welters: 

1.  Anlaiilich  des  nachsten  ord- 
nungsmafiigen  Zusammentrittes  der 
Skupschtina  in  das  Preligesetz  eine 
Bestimmung  einzuschalten,  wonach  die 
Aufreizung  zum  Hasse  und  zur  Ver- 
achtung  gegen  die  Monarcliie  sowie 
jede  Publikation  strengstens  bestraft 
wiirde,  deren  allgemeine  Tendenz  gegen 
die  territoriale  Integritat  Osterr.eich- 
Ungams  gerichtet  ist. 

Sie  verpflichitet  sicli  anlafilich  der 
demnachst  erfolgenden  Revision  der 
Verfassung  in  den  Artikel  XXII  des 
Ve'rfassungsgesetzes  einen  Zusatz  aufzu- 
nehmeh,  der  die  Konfiskation  derartiger 
PubUkationen  gestattet,-  was  nacb  den 
klaren  Bestimmungen  des  Artikels  XXII 
der  Konstitution   derzeit  unmoglicb  ist. 


oben  angedenteten  Zweck,  sich  fiir  die 
Zukunft  freie  Hand  zu  waliren. 


Wir  batten  gefordert: 

„1.  Jede  Publikation  zu  unter- 
driicken,  die  zum  Hasse  und  zur  Ver- 
achtung  gegen  die  Monarcliie  aufreizt 
und  deren  allgemeine  Tendenz  gegen 
die  territoriale  Integritat  der  Monarchic 
gerichtet  ist." 

Wir  wollten  also  die  Verpflichtung 
Serbiens  herbeifiihren,  dafiir  zu  sorgen, 
dali  derartige  Prefiangriflfe  in  Hinkunft 
unterbleiben;  wir  wiinschten  also  einen 
bestimmten  Erfolg  auf  diesem  Gebiete 
sichergestellt  zu  wissen. 

Statt  dessen  bietet  uns  Serbien  die 
Erlassung  gewisser  Gesetze  an,  welche 
als  Mittel  zu  diesem  Erfolge  dienen 
sollen,  u.  zw.: 

a)  ein  Gesetz,  womit  die  fraglichen 
monarchiefeindlichen  Preliaulierungen 
subjektiv  bestraft  werden  sollen,  was 
uns  ganz  gleichgiiltig  ist,  umsomehr  als 
bekanntermalien  die  subjektive  Ver- 
folgung  von  PreCdelikten  aufierst  selten 
moglich  ist  und  bei  einer  entprechend 
laxen  Behandlung  eines  solchen  Gesetzes 
auch  die  wenigen  Falle  dieser  Art  nicht  zur 
Bestrafung  kommen  wUrden;  also  ein 
Vorschlag,  der  unserer  Forderung  in 
keiner  Weise  entgegenkommt,  da  er 
uns  nicht  die-  geringste  Garantie  fiir 
den  von  uns  gewunschten  Erfolg  bietet; 

h)  ein  Nachtragsgesetz  zu  Art.  XXII 
der  Konstitution,  das  die  Konfiskation 
gestatten  wiirde  —  ein  .  Vorschlag,  der 
uns  gleichfalls  nicht  befriedigen  kann, 
da  der  Bestand  eines  solchen  Gesetzes 


85 


2.  Die  Ilegierung  besltzt  keinerlei 
Beweise  dafur  und  auch  die  Note  der 
k.  und  k.  Regierung  liefert  ihr  keine 
solchen,  daii  der  Verein  „Narodna 
odbrana"  und  andere  ahnliche  Gesell- 
schaften  bis  zum  heutigen  Tage  durch 
eines  ihrer  Mitglieder  irgendwelche  ver- 
brecherischen  Handlungen  dieser  Art 
begangen  batten.  Nicbtsdestoweniger 
wird  die  koniglicbe  Regierung  die  For- 
derung  der  k.  und  k.  Regierung  an- 
nebmen  und  die  Gesellscbaft  Narodna 
odbrana  sowie  jede  Gesellscbaft,  die 
gegen  Osterreicb-Ungarn  wirken  sollte, 
auflosen. 


3.  Die   koniglich   serbische  Regie- 
rung  verpflicbtet  sicb  ohne  Verzug  aus 


in  Serbien  uns  nicbts  niitzt,  sondern  nur 
die  Verpflicbtuug  der  Regierung,  es 
aucb  anzuwenden,  was  uns  aber  nicbt 
versprocben  wird. 

Diese  Vorscblage  sind  also  voll- 
kommen  unbefriedigend  —  dies  umso- 
mebr,  als  sie  aucb  in  der  Ricbtung 
evasiv  sind,  dafi  uns  nicbt  gesagt  wird, 
innerbalb  \velcber  Frist  diese  Gesetze 
erlassen  wurden  und  daft  im  Falle  der 
Ablebnung  der  Gesetzvorlage  durcb  die 
Skupscbtina  —  von  der  eventuellen 
Demission  der  Regierung  abgeseben  — 
alles  beim  alten  bliebe. 

Die  monarcbiefeindlicbe  Propa- 
ganda der  Narodna  odbrana  und  der 
ihr  affilierten  Vereine  erfullt  in  Serbien 
das  ganze  ofFentlicbe  Leben;  es  ist 
daber  eine  ganz  unzulassige  Reserve, 
wenn  die  serbische  Regierung  bebaupte't, 
daii  ihr  dariiber  nicbts  bekannt  ist. 

Ganz  abgesehen  davon  ist  die  von 
uns  aufgestellte  Forderung  nicbt  zur 
Ganze  erfullt,  da  wir  iiberdies  verlangt 
haben: 

Die  Propagandamittel  dieser  Gesell- 
scbaften  zu  konfiszieren; 

die  Neubildung  der  aufgelosten 
Gesellscbaften  unter  anderem  Namen 
und  in  anderer  Gestalt    zu    verbindern. 

In  diesen  beiden  Ricbtungen 
scbweigt  das  Belgrader  Kabinett  voU- 
kommen,  so  dafi  uns  aucb  durcb  die 
gegebene  balbe  Zusage  keine  Garantie 
dafiir  geboten  ist,  daii  dem  Treiben  der 
monarcbiefeindlicben  Assoziationen,  ins- 
besondere  der  Narodna  odbrana,  durcb 
deren  Auflosung  definitiv  ein  Ende  be- 
reitet  ware. 

Aucb  in  diesem  Falle  verlangt  die 
serbische     Regierung     erst.    Nacbw^ise 


86 


dem  offentlichen  Unterrlchte  in  Serbien 
alles  auszuscheiden,  was  die  gegen 
Osterreicli-Ungam  gerichtete  Pro- 
paganda ibrdem  konnte,  falls  ihr  die 
k.  und  k.  Eegierung  tatsacUiche  Nach- 
weise  fiir  diese  Propaganda  liefert. 


4.  Die  konigliche  Keglerung  ist 
audi  bereit,  jene  Offiziere  und  Beamten 
aus  dem  Militar-  und  Zivildienste  zu 
entlassen,  hinsichtlicli  ^velcher  durch 
gericbtliche  Untersuchung  festgestellt 
wird,  daft  sie  sich  Handlungen  gegen 
die  territoriale  Integritat  der  Monarcbie 
liaben  zuscbulden  komraen  lassen;  sie 
erwartet,  da(i  ihr  die  k.  und  k.  Regie- 
rung  zwecks  Einleitang  des  Verfabrens 
die  Namen  dieser  Offiziere  und  Beamten 
und  die  Tutsacben  mitteilt,  welcbe  den- 
selben  zur  Last  gelegt  werden. 


5.  Die  koniglicbc  Regierung  mufi 
bekennen,  dali  sic  sicb  iiber  den  Sinn 
und  die  Tragweito  jenes  Begebrens  der 
k.  und  k.  Regierung  nicbt  voile  Recbcn- 


dafiir,  dafi  im  offentlicben  Unterricbte 
Serbiens  eine  monarcbiefeindliche  Pro- 
paganda geti-ieben  wird,  wabrend  sie 
docb  wissen  mufi,  daii  die  bei  den 
serbiscben  Scbulen  eingefubrten  Lebr- 
biicber  in  dieser  Ricbtung  zu  bean- 
standenden  Stoff  entbalten  und  dali  ein 
grolier  Teil  der  serbiscben  Lehrer  im 
Lager  der  Narodna  odl^rana  und  der 
ibx  affilierten  Vereine  stebt. 

tjbrigens  bat  die  serbiscbe  Regie- 
rung  auch  bier  einen  Teil  unserer 
Forderung  nicbt  so  erfiillt,  wie  wir  es 
verlangt  baben,  indem  sie  in  ibrem  Text 
den  von  uns  gewiinscbten  Beisatz  „so- 
wobl  was  den  Lebrkorper  als  aucb  was 
die  Lebrmittel  anbelangt",  weglieli  — 
ein  Beisatz,  welcber  ganz  klar  zeigt, 
wo  die  monarcbiefeindlicbe  Propaganda 
in-  der  serbiscben  Scbule  zu  sucben  ist. 

Indem  die  koniglicb  serbiscbe  Re- 
gierung die  Zusage  der  Entlassung  der 
fraglicben  Offiziere  und  Beamten  aus 
dem  Militar-  und  Zivildienst  an  den 
Umstand  kniipft,  dali  diese  Personen 
durcb  ein  Gericbtsverfabren  scbuldig 
befunden  werden,  scbrankt  sie  ibre 
Zusage  auf  jene  Fiille  ein,  in  dencn 
diesen  Personen  ein  strafgesetzlicb  zu 
abndendes  Delikt  zur  Last  liegt.  Da 
wir  aber  die  Entfernung  jener  Offiziere 
und  Beamten  verlangen,  die  monarcbie- 
feindlicbe Propaganda  betreibon,  was  ja 
Im  allgemeinen  in  Serbien  kein  ge- 
ricbtlicb  strafbarer  Tatbestand  ist,  er- 
scbeint  unsere  Forderung  aucb  in  diesem 
Punkte  nicht  erfullt. 

Mit  dieser-  Frage  bat  das  ailge- 
meine  Volkerrecbt  ebensowenig  etwas 
zu  tun,  wie  das  Strafprozefirecbt;  es 
bandelt    sicb    um    eine    Angelegenbeit 


87 


schaft  geben  kann,  welches  daliin  geht, 
daO  die  koniglich  serbische  Regierung 
sich  verpflichten  soil,  auf  ihrem  Gebiete 
die  iMitwirkung  von,  Organen  der 
k.  und.k.  Eegierung  zuzulassen,  doch 
erklart  sie,  dafi  sie  jene  Mitwirkung 
anzunehmen  bereit  ware,  welche  den 
Grundsatzen*  des  Volkerrecbtes  und  des 
Strafprozesses  sowie  den  freundnachbar- 
lichen  Beziehungen  entsprecben  wiirde. 
6.  Die  koniglicbe  Eegierung  halt 
es  selbstverstandlich  fiir  ihre  Pflicht 
gegen  alle  jene  Personen  eine  Unter- 
suchung  einzuleiten,  die  an  dem  Kom- 
piotte  vom  15./28.  Juni  beteiligt  waren 
oder  beteiligt  gewesen  sein  sollen  und 
die  sich  auf  ihrem  Gebiete  befinden. 
Was  die  Mifwirkung  von  hiezu  speziell 
delegierten  Organen  der  k.  und  k.  Ee- 
gierung an  dieser  Untersuchung  anbe- 
langt,  so  kann  sie  eine  solche  nicht 
annehmen,  da  dies  eine  Verletzung  der 
Verfassung  und  des  Strafprozeligesetzes 
ware.  Doch  konnten  den  osterreichisch- 
ungarischen  Organen  in  einzelnen  Fallen 
Mitteilung  von  dem  Ergebnisse  der 
Untersuchung  gemacht  werden. 


rein  staatspolizeilicher  Natur,  die  im 
Wege  einer  besonderen  Vereinbarung 
zu  losen  ist.  Die  Eesei-ve  Serbiens  ist 
daher  unverstandlich  und  ware  bei  ihrer 
vagen,  allgemeinen  Form  geeignet,  zu 
unuberbriickbaren  Schwierlgkeiten  bei 
Abschluli  des  zu  treffenden  Abkommens 
zu  fiihren. 


Unser  Verlangen  wai'  ganz  klar 
und  nicht  miiizuverstehen.  Wir  be- 
gehrten: 

1.  Einleitung  einer  gerichtlichen 
Untersuchung  gegen  die  Theilnehmer 
am  Komplotte. 

2.  Die  Mitwirkung  von  k.  und  k. 
Organen  an  den  hierauf  beziiglichen 
Erhebungen  („recherches''  im  Gegen-. 
Satze  zu  „enquete  judiciaire"). 

Es  ist  uns  nicht  beigefallen,  k.  und  k. 
Organe  an  dem  serbisclfen  Gerichts- 
verfahren  teilnehmen  zu  lassen;  sie 
sollten  nur  an  den  polizeilichen  Vor- 
erhebungen  mitwirken,  welche  das 
Materiale  fiir  die  Untersuchung  herbei- 
zuschaffen    und    sicherzustellen    batten. 

Wenn  die  serbische  Eegierung  uns 
hier  mifiversteht,  so  tut  sie  dies  be- 
wufit,  denn  der  Unterschied  zwischen 
„enquete  judiciaire'^  und  den  einfachen 
„recherches"  muli  ihr  gelaufig  sein. 

Da  sie  sich  jeder  KontroUe  des 
einzuleitenden  Verfahrens  zu  entziehen 
wunschtj  das  bei  korrekter  Durch- 
fuhrung  hochst  unerwunschte  Ergebnisse 
fiir  sie  liefern  wiirde  und  da  sie  keine 
Handhabe  besitzt,  in  plausibler  Weisc 
die  Mit^Ndrkung  unserer  Organe  am 
polizeilichen  Verfahren  abzulehnen 
(Analogien  fiir  solche  poUzeiliche  Inter- 


88 


7.  Die  konigliclie  Regierung  Lat 
noch  am  Abend  des  Tages,  an  dem  ikr 
die  Note  zukam,  die  Verhaftung  des 
Majors  Voislav  Tankosid  verfiigt. 

Was  aber  den  Milan  Ciganovid  an- 
belangt,  der  cin  Angehoriger  der  oster- 
reichisch-ungarisclien  Monarcbie  ist  und 
der  bis  zum  15.  Juni  (als  Aspirant)  bei 
der  Eisenbabndirektion  bedienstet  war, 
so  konnte  dieser  bisber  nicht  ausge- 
forscbt  werden,  \veshalb  ein  Steckbrief 
gegen  ibn  erlassen  Avurde. 

Die  k.  und  k.  Regierung  -vvird  ge- 
beten,  zwecks  Durchfiihrung  der  Unter- 
suchung  so  bald  als  moglich  die  be- 
stehenden  Verdacbtsgriinde  und  die  bci 
der  Untersuchung  in  Sarajevo  ge- 
sammelten  Scbuldbeweise  in  der  iiblicben 
Forai  bekanntzuffeben 


8.  Die  serbischo  Regierung  wird 
die  bestehenden  Malinahmen  wegen 
Unterdriickung  des  Scbmuggelns.  von 
AVafFen  und  Explosivstoffen  verscharfen 
und'  erweitem. 

Es  ist  selbstversfandlich,  dafi  sic 
sofort  eine  Untersuchung  einleiten  und 
jene  Beamten  des  Grenzdienstes  in  der 
Linie  Sabac — Loznica  streng  bestrafen 
wird,  die  ihre  Pflicht  verletzt  und  die 
Urheber  des  Verbrecbens  die  Grenze 
haben  iiberschrciten  lassen. 

9.  Die  konigliche  Regierung  ist 
geme     bereit,     Aufklarung     iiber     die 


ventionen  besteben  in  grofier  Menge),  bat' 
sie  sicb  auf  einen  Standpunkt  begeben,  der 
ihrer  Ablebnung  den  Scbein  der  Be- 
recbtigung  geben  und  unserem  Ver- 
langen  den  Stempel  der  UnerfuUbar- 
keit  aufdriicken  soil. 


Diese^  Antwort  ist  hinterbaltig. 

Ciganovic  ging  laut  der  von  uns 
veranlaliten  Nachforschungen  drei  Tage 
nacb  dem  Attentate,  als  bekannt  wurde, 
dafi  Ciganovic  an  dem  Komplotte  be- 
teiligt  sei,  auf  Urlaub  und  begab  sicb 
iiber  Auftrag  der  Polizeiprafektur  in 
Belgrad  nacb  Ribari.  Es  ist  also  zu- 
nacbst  unrichtig,  dafi  Ciganovic  scbon 
am  15./28.  Juni  aus  dem  serbiscben 
Staatsdienste  scbied.  Hiezu  kommt,  dafi 
der  Polizeiprafekt  von  Belgrad,  der  die 
Abreise  des  Ciganovic  selbst  veranlafit 
hat  und  der  wufite,  wo  dieser  sicb  auf- 
halte,  in  einem  Interview  erklarte,  ein 
Mann  namens  Milan  Ciganovic  existiere 
in  Belgrad  nicht. 


Der  koniglich  serbischen  Regierung 
miissen  die  bezuglichen  Interviews  ganz 


89 


Aufiefungen  zu  geben,  welche  ihre 
Beamten  in  Serblen  und  im  Auslande 
nach  dem  Attentate  in  Intendews  ge- 
macht  haben  und  die  nach  der  Be- 
hauptung  der  k.  und  k.  Regierung  der 
Monarchie  feindselig  waren,  sobald  die 
k.  und  k.  Hegierung  die  Stellen  dieser 
Ausfiihrungen  bezeicbnet  und  bewiesen 
haben  wird,  daft  diese  Aufierungen  von 
den  betreffenden  Funktionaren  tatsach- 
lich  gemacht  worden  sind.  Die  k(5nig- 
liche  Regierung'wird  selbst  Sorge  tragen, 
die  notigen  Beweise  und  Uberfiihrungs- 
mittel  hiefiir  zu  sammeln. 

10.  Die  konigliche  Regierung  wird, 
insofern  dies  nicht  schon  in  dieser  Note 
geschehen  ist,  die  k.  und  k.  Regierung 
von  der  Durchfiihning  der  in  den  vor- 
stehenden  Punkten  enthaltenen  MaO- 
nahmen  in  Kenntnis  setzen,  sobald  eine 
dieser  Maliregeln  angeordnet  und  durch- 
gefiihrt  wird. 

Die  konigl.  serbische  Regierung 
glaubt,  dali  es  im  gemeinsamen  Interesse 
liegt,  die  Losung  dieser  Angelegenheit 
nicht  zu  ubersturzen  und  ist  daher,  falls 
sich  die  k.  und  k.  Regierung  durch 
diese  Antwort  nicht  fur  befriedigt  er- 
achten  soUte,  wie  immer  bereit,  eine 
friedliche  Losung  anzunehmen,  sei  es 
durch  Ubertragung  der  Entscheidung 
dieser  Frage  an  das  internationale  Ge- 
richt  im  Haag,  sei  es  durch  Uberlassung 
der  Entscheidung  an  die  Grofimachte, 
welche  an  der  Ausarbeitung  der  von 
der  serbischen  Regierung  am  18./31. 
Marz  1909  abgegebenen  Erklarung  mit- 
gewirkt  haben. 


genau  bekannt  sein,  Wenn  sie  von  der 
k.  und  k.  Regierung  verlangt,  dafi  diese 
ihr  allerlei  Details  iiber  diese  Interviews 
liefere  und  sich  eine  fdrmliche  Unter- 
suchung  hieriiber  vorbehalt,  zeigt  sie, 
dali  sie  auch  diese  Forderung  nicht 
emstlich  erfuUen  will. 


90 

35. 
Graf  Sz5gy§ny  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Berlin,  28.  Juli  1914. 

Der  von  England  gemachte  Vermittlungsvorschlag,  es  soUten  DeutscUand, 
Italien,  England  und  Frankreich  zu  einer  Konferenz  in  London  zusammentreten, 
ist  deutscherseits  mit  der  Begriindung  abgelehnt  worden,  daO  es  fiir  Deutschland 
unmoglich  sei,  seinen  Bundesgenossen  in  seiner  Auseinandersetzung  mit  Serbien 
vor  ein  europaisches  Gericht  zu  ziehen. 


36. 
Freiherr  von  Nluller  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Toldo,  28.  Juli  1914. 

Die  hentige  offiziose  japanische  Times  enthalt  einen  Leitartikel,  der  am 
Schlusse  besagt,  dafi  Japan  mit  den  drei  in  Betracht  kommenden  Grolimachten 
Osterreicb-Ungara,  Deutschland  und  Ruliland  auf  bestem  Fufi  stehe,  wahrend  es 
an  Serbien  in  keiner  Weise  interessiert  sei.  Im  Kriegsfalle  wiirde  die  kaiser- 
liche  Regierung  selbstverstandlicb  strengste  Neutral  itat  bewahren. 


37. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  das  koniglich  serbische  Ministerium  des  AuQern  in  Belgrad. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914. 

Le  Gouvemcment  Royal  de  Serbie  n'ayant  pas  rdpondu  d'une  mani^rc 
satisfaisante  h.  la  Note  qui  lui  avait  €i€  remise  par  le  Ministre  d'Autricbe- 
Hongrie  h.  Belgrade  h.  la  date  du  23  juillet  1914,  le  Gouvernement  I.  et  R. 
se  trouve  dans  la  n^cessit^  de  pourvoir  lui-meme  k  la  sauvegarde  de  ses  droits 
et  int^-rets  et  de  recourir  k  cet  cffet  h.  la  force  des  armes. 

L'Autriche-Hongne  se  consid^re  done  des  ce  moment  en  etat  de  guerre 
avec  la  Serbie. 


91 

38. 
Graf  Berohtold  an  Graf  Szdgy^ny  in  Berlin. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  28'.  JuU  1914. 

Zu  Euer  Exzellenz  Information  and  zur  Mitteilung  an  den  Herrn  Staats- 
sekretar; 

Ich  habe  nachstehendes  Telegramm  des  Grafen  Mensdorff  uiiterm  27.  1.  M. 
erhalten: 

„Icli  hatte  heute  Gelegenteit,  Sir  E.  Grey  ausfiihrlicli  darzulegen,  dafi 
unsere  Aktion  nicht  Aggression  sondern  Selbstverteidigung  und  Selbsterhaltung 
sei  und  wir  keine  territorial  en  Eroberungen  nocb  Vemiclitung  serbischer 
Unabbangigkeit  beabsichtigen.  Wir  wollen  gewisse  Genugtuung  fiir  Vergangen- 
heit  und  Garantien  fiir  die  Zukunft. 

Hiebei  verwertete  ich  einige  Anbaltsp^nkte  aus  dem  Erlasse  Euer  Exzellenz 
an  Graf  Szdpdry. 

Sir  E.  Grey  sagte  mir,  er  sei  sehr  enttauscht  dariiber,  daO  wir  die  serbische 
Antwort  so  behandeln,  als  wenn  sie  ganz  ablebnend  ware. 

Er  hatte  geglaubt,  diese  Antwort  wiirde  eine  Basis  liefem,  auf  welcher  die 
vier  anderen  Regierungen  ein  befriedigendes  Arrangement  ausarbeiten  konnten. 

Das  war  seine  Idee  beim  Yorschlag  einer  Konferenz. 

Die  Konferenz  wiirde  sich  versammein  unter  der  Voraussetzung,  dafi  sowohl 
Osterreich-Ungarn  wie  Ruliland  wahrend  des  Versuches  der  anderen  Machte, 
einea  befriedigenden  Ausweg  zu  finden,  sich  jeder  militarischen  Operation 
enthalten  wiirden. 

(Heutige  Erklarung  Sir  E.  Greys  im  Unterhaus  fiihrte  Konferenzprojekt 
aus.)  Als  er  vom  Enthalt  militarischer  Operationen  unsererseits  gegen  Serbien 
sprach,  machte  ich  die  Bemerkung,  ich  fiirchte,  es  sei  vielleicht  schoTa  zu  spat. 
Der  Herr  Staatssekretar  meinte,  wenn  wir  entschlossen  sind,  unter  alien  Urn- 
standen  mit  Serbien  Krieg  zu  fiihren  und  voraussetzen,  dali  Ruliland  ruhig 
bleiben  wird,  so  nehmen  wir  ein  grolies  Risiko  auf  uns.  Konnen  wir  Ruliland 
dazu  bewegen,  ruhig  zu  bleiben,  habe  er  nichts  mehr  zu  sagen.  Wenn  nicht, 
sind  die  Moglichkeiten  und  Gefahren  unberechenbar. 

Als  Symptom  der  Beunruhigung  sagte  er  mir,  die  grolie  englische  Flotte, 
die  nach  den  Manovern  in  Portsmouth  konzentriert  wurde  und  heute  auseinander 
gehen  sollte,  wiirde  vorlaufig  dort  bleiben.  „„Wir  h'atten  keine  Reserven  ein- 
berufen,  aber  nachdem  sie  versammelt  sind,  konnen  wir  sie  in  diesem  Augen- 
blick  nicht  nach  Hause  schicken."" 

Seine  Idee  von  Konferenz  hat  den  Zweck,  wenn  moglich  KoUision  zwischen 
den  Grolimachten  hintanzuhalten  und  er  diirfte  also  auf  Isolierung  des  Konfliktes 
hinzielen.  Falls  aber  Ruliland  mobilisiert  und  Deutschland  in  Aktion  tritt,  so 
fallt  die  Konferenz  von  selbst  in  Brach." 


92 


Ich  glaube  Euer  Exiellen?:  gegeniiber  nicht  besonders  hervorbeben  zu 
«ollen,  dafi  dev  Greyscbe  Konferenzvorscblag,  insoweit  er  sicb  auf  unseren 
Konflikt  mit  Serbien  beziebt,  angesicbts  des  eiiigetretenen  Kriegszustandes  durcb 
die  Ereignisse  uberbolt  erscbeint. 


39.     \ 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  28.  /uli  1914, 

Wir  legen  das  grolite  Gewicbt  darauf,  dali  Sir  E.  Grey  unser  Vorgeben 
gegen  Serbien  im  allgemeinen  und  speziell  unsere  Ablebnung  der  serbischen 
Antwort  in  unparteiiscber  Weise  wiirdige,  und  ersiicbe  icb  Euer  Exzellenz  daber, 
Gelegenbeit  zu  nebmen,.  dem  Herm  Staatssekretar  das  Ibnen  auf  dem  Post- 
wege  ubermittelte  Dossier  im  Detail  und  unter  Hervorbebung  der  besonders 
markanten  Stellen  auseinanderzusetzen;  in  demselben  Sinne  woUen  Euer  Exzellenz 
die  kritiscben  Bemerkungen  zu  der  serbiscben  Note  (Text  der  Note  mit  unseren 
Bemerkungen  verseben  ist  gestern  an  Euer  Exzellenz  per  Post  abgegangen)  mit 
Sir  E.  Grey  durcbsprecben  und  ibm  klarlegen,  daD  das  serbiscbe  Entgegen- 
kommen  nur  ein  scbeinbares  war,  bestimrat,  Europa  zu  tauscben,  obne  fur  die 
Zukunft  irgendeine  Garantie  zu  bieten. 

Da  die  serbiscbe  Regierung  wuOte,  dafi  uns  nur  eine  vorbebaltlose  An- 
nabme  unserer  Forderungen  befriedigen  konne,  ist  die  serbiscbe  Taktik  klar  zu 
durchscbauen:  Serbien  akzeptierte,  um  Eindruck  auf  die  europaiscbe  Offentlicb- 
keit  zu  maeben,  mit  allerlei  Vorbebalten  eine  Anzabl  unserer  Forderungen,  darauf 
bauend,  daO  es  nicbt  in  die  Lage  kommen  werde,  seine  Zusagen  zu  erfiillen. 
Ein  Hauptgewicbt  bei  der  Konversation  Euer  Exzellenz  mit  Sir  E.  Grey  ware 
auf  den  Umstand  zu  legen,  daft  die  allgemeine  Mobilisierung  der  serbiscben 
Armee  fiir  den  25.  Juli  nacbmittags  3  Ubr  angeordnet  wurde,  wabrend  die 
Antwort  auf  unsere  Note  erst  knapp  vor  Ablauf  der  Frist,  das  beifit  wenige 
Minuten  vor  6  Ubr,  iiberreicbt  wurde.  Wir  batten  vorber  keine  militariscben 
Vorbereitungen  getroffen,  durcb  die  serbiscbe  Mobilisierunff  wurden  wir  aber  zu 
solcben     gezwungen. 


93 

40. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Szipiry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914. 

Zu  Euer  Exzellenz  Orlentlening  und  Regelung  Hirer  Sprache: 

Der  kaiserlich  russische  Botschafter  sprach  heute  bei  mir  vor,  um  mir  sein© 
Riickkehr  aus  Rufiland  von  kurzem  Urlaube  mitzuteilen  und  gleichzeitig  einenji 
telegraphischen  Auftrage  Herrn  Sazonows  nachzukommen.  Letzterer  liatte  ihm 
mitgeteilt,  dali  er  eine  langere,  freundschaftliche  Aussprache  mit  Euer  Exzellenz^ 
gehabt  liatte  (Euer  Exzellenz  Telegramm  vom  27.  d.  M.),  in  deren  Yerlaufe 
Hochdieselben  mit  grolier  Bereitwilligkeit  die  einzelnen  Punkte  der  serbischen 
Antwortnote  durchgesprochen  batten.  Herr  Sazonow  sei  der  Ansicbt,  dali  Serbien 
in  weitgebendem  Maiie  unseren  Wiinscben  entgegengekommen  sei,  dali  aber 
einige  Forderungen  ibm  ganz  unannebmbar  scbienen,  was  er  aucb  Euer  Exzellenz 
nicbt  verbeblt  babe.  Es  ^cbiene  ibm  unter  diesen  Umstanden,  dali  die  serbiscbe 
Antwortnote  geeignet  sei,  den  AusgangspUnkt  zu  einer  Verstandigung  abzugeben, 
wozu  die  russiscbe  Regierung  gerne  die  Hand  bieten  'mocbte.  Herr  Sazonow 
wolle  mir  daber  vorscblagen,  dali  der  Gedankenaustauscb  mit  Euer  Exzellenz 
Fortsetzung  finde  und  Euer  Exzellenz  diesbezuglicb  mit  Insttuktionen  verseben 
werden. 

In  meiner  Entgegnung  betonte  icb,  daO  icb  auf  einen  derartigen  Vorscblag 
nicbt  eingeben  konne.  Eine  Verbandlung  iiber  den  Wortlaut  der  von  uns  als 
unbefriedigend  bezeicbneten  Antwortnote  kbnnte  bei  uns  niemand  versteben  und 
niemand  billigen.  Es  ware  dies  umsoweniger  moglicb,  -als  sicb,  wie  der  Botscbafter 
wisse,  bereits  eine  tiefgebende  allgemeine  Erregung  der  offentlicben  Meinung 
bemacbtigt  batte,  iiberdies  unsererseits  beute  der  Krieg  an  Serbien  erklart 
worden  sei. 

Auf  die  Auselnandersetzungen  des  Botscbafters,  welcbe  bauptsacblicb  darin 
gipfelten,  dali  wir  die  durcbaus  nicbt  abgeleugnete  feindselige  Stimmung  in 
Serbien  durcb  eine  kriegeriscbe  Aktion  nicbt  niederringen,  im  Gegenteile  nur 
steigern  wiirden,  gab  icb  ibm  einige  Streiflicbter  binsicbtlicb  unseres  derzeitigen 
Verbaltnisses  zu  Serbien,  welcbes  es  unvermeidlicb  macbe,  ganz  gegen  unseren 
Willen  und  obne  jede  egoistiscbe  Nebenabsicbt  unserem  unrubigen  Nachbar 
mit  dem  notigen  Nacbdrucke  unsere  emste  Absicbt  zu  zeigen,  nicbt  langer 
eine  von  der  Regierung  geduldete,  gegen  den  Bestand  der  Monarcbie  gericbtete 
Bewegung  zuzulassen.  Die  Haltung  Serbiens  nacb  Empfang  unserer  Note  sei 
ubrigens  nicbt  darnacb  gewesen,  eine  friedlicbe  Beilegung  zu  ermoglichen,  in  dem 
Serbien,  nocb  bevor  es  uns  seine  ungeniigende  Antwort  ubergel)en  lieli,  die  allgememe 
Mobilisierung  angeordnet  und  scbon  dadurcb  uns  gegenu"ber  einen  feindseligen 
Akt    vorgenommen    babe.    Trotzdem    batten    wir    noch    drei    Tag^e    ziigewartet. 


94 

Gestem  seien  nun  serbischerseits  gegen  uns  die  Feindseligkeiten  an  der  tuigarisclien 
Grenze  eroffhet  worden.  Dadurch  sei  uns  die  Mogliclikeit  benommen,  bei  unserer 
Serbien  gegeniiber  bewiesenen  Langmut  weiter  zu  bebarren.  Die  Herbeifiibrung 
einer  griindlicben  aber  friedlichen  Sanierung  unseres  Verbaltnisses  zu  Serbien 
sei  uns  nunmehr  unmoglicb  gemacbt  worden  und  wir  seien  gezwungen,  den 
serbiscben  Provokationen  in  der  Form  entgegenzutreten,  die  unter  den  gegebenen 
Umstanden  der.  Wiirde  der  Monarcbie  allein  entsprecbe. 


41. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  28.  Juli  1914. 

Der  engliscbe  Botschafter,  welcher  beute  bei  mir  vorspracb,  bat  mir  auf- 
traggemafi  den  Standpunkt  Sir  E.  Greys  zu  unserem  Konflikte  mit  Serbien  in 
folgender  Weise  auseinandergesetzt: 

Die  engliscbe  Regierung  babe  mit  lebbaftem  Interesse  den  bisherigen  Ver- 
lauf  der  Krise  verfolgt  und  lege  Wert  darauf,  uns  zu  versicbern,  dafi  sie 
Sympatbien  fiir  unseren  Standpunkt  hege  und  unsere  Griefs  gegen  Serbien 
vollkommen  verstebe. 

Wenn  somit  England  keinen  Grund  babe,  unseren  Streitfall  mit  Serbien 
an  sicb  zum  Gegenstande  besonderer  Praokkupation  zu  macben,  so  konne  der- 
selbe  docb  nicbt  der  Aufmerksamkeit  des  Londoner  Kabinetts  entgehen,  weil 
dieser  Konflikt  weitere  Kreise  zieben  und  dadurcb  den  europaiscben  Frieden 
in  Frage  stellen  konne. 

Nur  aus  diesem  fiir  England  in  Betracbt  kommenden  Grunde  babe  sicb 
Sir  E.  Grey  veranlalit  geseben,  eine  Einladung  an  die  Regierungen  jener 
Staatcn  zu  ricbten,  die  an  diesem  Kondikte  nicbt  naber  interessiert  seien 
(Dcutschland,  Italien  und  Frankreicb),  um  gemeinschaftlicb  mit  ibnen  im  Wege 
fortlaufenden  Gedankenaustauscbes  die  Moglicbkeiten  zu  priifen  und  zu  erortern, 
wie  die  Differenz  mbglicbst  rascb  ausgeglicben  werden  konnte.  Nacb  dem 
Muster  der  Londoner  Konferenz  wabrend  der  letzten  Balkankrise  soUten,  nacb 
Anschauung  des  engliscben  Staatssekretars,  die  Londoner  Botscbafter  der 
genannten  Staaten  sicb  zu  dem  angegebcnen  Zwecke  in  fortlaufendem  Kontakte 
mit  ibm  balten.  Sir  E.  Grey  babe  bereits  von  den  betreflfenden  Regierungen  sebr 
freundscbaftlicb  gebaltene  Antworten  erbalten,  worin  dieselben  dem  angeregten 
Gedanken  zustimmen.  Gegen wartig  ware  es  der  Wunscb  des  Heri'n  Staatssekretars, 
wenn  moglich,    den  Ausbrucb    der  Feindseligkeiten    zwiscben  Osterreicb-Ungarn 


95 

nnd  Serbien  in  elfter  Stunde  zu  verhindern,  wenn  dies  aber  iiicht  tunlicb  ware, 
doch  vorzubeugen,  dali  es  zu  einem  blutigen  ZusammenstoBe  komme,  eventuell 
dadurch,  daii  die  Serben  sich  zuriickziehen  konnten,  ohne  den  Kampf  aufzu- 
nehmen.  Die  von  Serbien  an  uns  eingelangte  Antwort  scheine  die  Moglichkeit 
zu  bieten,  eine  Basis  fiir  eine  Verstandigung  abzugeben.  England  sei  game 
bereit,  hiebei  in  unserem  Sinne  und  nacb  unseren  Wiinschen  seinen  Einfluli 
zur  Geltung  zu  bringen. 

Icb  dankte  dem  Herm  Botscbafter  fiir  die  Mitteilung  Sir  E.  Greys  und 
terwiderte  ibm,  dafi  ich  der  Auffassung  des  Herrn  Staatssekretars  voile  Wiirdi- 
jgung  zu  zollen  wisse.  Sein  Standpunkt  sei  aber  von  dem  meinigen  naturgemafi 
Terscbieden,  da  England  an  dem  Streitfalle  zwischen  uns  und  Serbien  nicbt 
direkt  intc-ressiert  sei  und  der  Herr  Staatssekretar  wobl  kaum  grundlich  orien- 
tiert  sein  konne  iiber  die  schwerwiegende  Bedeutung  der  zu  losenden  Fragen 
fiir  die  Monarcbie.  Wenn  Sir  E.  Grey  von  der  Moglicbkeit  rede,  den 
Ausbrucb  der  Feindseligkeiten  zu  verhindern,  so  komme  dieser  Gedanke  zu 
spat,  da  gestem  bereits  serbiscberseits  auf  unsere  Grenzsoldaten  gescbossen  und 
beute  von  uns  der  Kjrieg  an  Serbien  erklart  wurde.  Was  die  Idee  eines  Tran- 
sigierens  auf  Grund  der  serbiscben  Antwortnote  anbelangt,  miisse  icb  eine  solcbe 
ablebnen.  Wir  batten  die  integrale  Annabme  gefordert,  Serbien  babe  sicb  durch 
Winkelziige  aus  der  Verlegenbeit  zu  zieben  gesucht.  Uns  seien  diese  serbiscben 
Metboden  nur  zu  gut  bekannt. 

Sir  Maurice  Bunsen  konne  unseren  Standpunkt  durcb  seine  bier  erworbenen 
Lokalkenntnisse  gewili  ricbtig  einscbatzen  und  werde  in  der  Lage  sein.  Sir 
E.  Grey  bieriiber  ein  genaues  Bild  zu  geben. 

Insofeme  Sir  E.  Grey  dem  europaiscben  Frieden  dienen  woUe,  wiirde 
er  gewiil  nicht  auf  Widerstand  bei  uns  stoBen.  Er  miisse  jedocb  bedenken,  dafi 
der  europaiscbe  Friede  nicbt  dadurcb  gerettet  wiirde,  daO  sicb  Grolimacbte  binter 
Serbien  stellen  und  fiir  dessen  Straffreibeit  eintreten.  Denn  selbst  wenn  wir  auf 
einen  solcben  Ausgleicbsversucb  eingeben  wollten,  wiirde  dadurcb  Serbien  nuf 
umsomebr  ermutigt,  auf  dem  bisberigen  Pfade  weiterzugehen,  was  den  Frieden 
binnen  der  allerkiirzesten  Zeit  abermals  in  Frage  stellen  mocbte. 

Der  engliscbe  Botscbafter  versicberte  micb  zum  Scblusse,  daii  er  unseren 
Standpunkt  voUkommen  verstebe,  andererseits  aber  bedauere,  dali  unter  diesen 
Umstanden  der  Wunsch  der  engliscben  Regierung,  einen  Ausgleicb  zu  erzielen, 
derzeit  keine  Aussicbt  auf  Verwirklicbung  babe.  Er  boffe,  mit  mir  weiterbin  in 
Kontakt  bleiben  zu  diirfen,  was  ibm  wegen  der  grolien  Gefabr  einer 
europaiscben  Konflagration  von  besonderem  Werte  ware.- 

Icb  erwiderte,  icb  stunde  dem  Herrn  Botscbafter  jederzeit  zur  Verfiigung, 
womit  unsere  Konversation  scblofi. 


96 


42. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  SzQgy^ny  in  Berlin. 

Telegramm.  Wten,  am  28.  Juli  1914. 

Ich  ersuche  JEuer  Exzellenz  sich  sofort  zum  Herm  Reichskanzler  oder 
Staatssekretar   zu   begeben    und    ihm  folgendes    in  meinem  Namen  mitzuteilen : 

Nacb  iibereinstimmenden  Nachrichten  aus  St.  Petersburg,  Kiew,  Warschau, 
Moskau  und  Odessa  trifft  Rutland  umfangreiche  militarische  Vorbereitungen. 
Herr  Sazonow  hat  zwar  ebenso  wie  der  russische  Kriegsmimster  unter  Ehren- 
"wort  versichert,  daO  eine  Mobilisierung  bisher  nicht  angeordnet  wurde,  der 
letztere  hat  jedoch  dem  deutschen  Militar-Attach6  mitgeteilt,  dali  die  gegen 
Osterreich-Ungarn  gelegenen  JVIilitarbezirke  Kiew,  Odessa,  Moskau  und  Kasan 
mobilisiert  werden  wiirden,  wenn  unsere  Truppen  die  serbische  Grenze  iiber- 
scbritten. 

Unter  diesen  TJmstanden  mochte  ich  das.  Berliner  Kabinett  dringend  er- 
suchen,  der  Erwagung  nahcr  zu  treten,  ob  nicht  Ruliland  in  freundschaftlicher 
Weise  darauf  aufmerksam  gemacht  werden  sollte,  dafi  die  Mobilisierung  obiger 
Bezirke  einer  Bedrohung  Osterreich-Ungarns  gleichkame  und  daher,  falls  sie 
tatsachlich  erfolgt,  sowohl  von  der  Monarchie  als  vom  verbiindeten  Deutschen 
Reiche  mit  den  weitestgehenden  militarischen  Gegenmaiiregeln  beantwortet 
•werden  miifite. 

Um  RuGland  ein  eventuelles  Einlenken  zu  erleichtem,  schiene  es  uns 
angezeigt,  dali  ein  solcher  Schritt  vorerst  von  Deutschland  allein  untemommen 
werden  soUte:  doch  waren  wir  naturlich  bereit,  den  Schritt  auch  zu  zweien  zu 
machen. 

Eine  deutliche  Sprache  schiene  mir  in  diesem  Augenblick  das  wirksamste 
Mittel,  um  Rufiland  die  ganze  Tragweite  eines  drohenden  Verhaltens  zum  Be- 
"wulitsein  za  bringen. 


43. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  SzOgy^ny  in  Berlin. 

Telegramm.  Wien^  28.  Juli  1914. 

Der  kaiserlich  deutsche  Botschafter  hat  hier  mitgeteilt,  daO  Sir  E.  Grey 
sich  mit  der  Bitte  an  die  deutsche  Regierung  gewendet  habe,  sie  moge  ihren 
Einfluli  bei  der  L  u.  k.  Regierung  geltend  machen,  daft  diese  die  Antwort  aus 


97 

Belgrad  ebtweder  als  geniigend  betrachte  oder  als  Grundlage  fur  Besprechungen 
unter  den  Kabinetten  akzeptiere. 

Herr  von  Tscliiirsclilcy  war  beauftragt,  den  englischen  Vorsoblag  dem  Wiener 
Kabinette  zur  Erwagung  zu  unterbreiten. 


44. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  St.  Petersburg,  London,  Paris 

und  Rom. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  29.  JuU  1914, 

Zu  Euer  Exzellenz  Information: 

Ich  babe  heute  dem  kaiserlich  deutschen  Botschafter  das  nachfolgende 
Memoire  in  Beantwortung  eines  von  demselben  bei  mir  unternommenen  Schrittes 
zukommen  lassen: 


Memoire. 

Die  k.  u.  k.  Regienmg  hat  mit  dem  ergebensten  Danke  von  der  Mitteilung 
Kenntnis  genommen,  welche  ihr  der  Herr  kaiserliche  deutsche  Botschafter  am 
28.  1.  M.'  iiber  das  Ersuchen  des  englischen  Kabinettes  gemacht  hat,  es  moge 
die  kaiserlich  deutsche  Eegierung  ihren  Einfluli  beim  Wiener  Kabinette  geltend 
machen,  damit  dieses  die  Antwort  aus  Belgrad  entweder  als  geniigend  betrachte 
oder  aber  als  Grundlage  fiir  Besprechungen  annehme.  Was  die  Aussprache 
des  Herrn  englischen  Staatssekretars  zu  Fiirst  Lichnowsky  betrifft,  mochte  die 
k.  u.  k.  Regierung  zunachst  darauf  aufmerksam  machen,  dafi  die  serbische 
Antwortnote  keineswegs,  wie  dies  Sir  E.  Grey  arjzunehmen  scheint,  eine  Zu- 
stimmung  zu  alien  unseren  Forderungen  mit  einer  einzigen  Ausnahme  enthalte, 
dali  vielmehr  in  den  meisten  Punkten  Vorbehalte  formuliert  sind,  welche  den 
Wert  der  gemachten  Zugestandnisse  wesentlich  herabdriicken.  Die  Ablehnung 
betreffe  aber  gerade  jene  Punkte,  welche  einige  Garantie  fiir  die  faktische 
Erreichung  des  angestrebten  Zweckes  enthalten. 

Die  k.  u.  k.  Regierung  kann  ihre  Uberraschung  uber  die  Annahme  nicht 
unterdriicken,  als  ob  ihre  Aktion  gegen  Serbien  Rufiland  und  den  russischen 
Einfluli  am  Balkan  trefifen  woUe,  denn  dies  hatte  zur  Voraussetzung,  dafi  die 
gegen  die  Monarchie  gerichtete  Propaganda  nicht  allein  serbisch,  sondern 
russischen  Ursprungs    sei.    Wir   sind   bisher   vielmehr  von  der  Auffassung  aus- 


98 

gegangen,  daft  das  offlzielle  Ruliland  diesen  der  Monarchie  feindllchen  Tendenzen 
fernstelie  und  richtet  sich  unsere  gegenwartige  Aktion  ausschlielilicli  gegen 
Serbien,-  wahrend  unsere  Gefiihle  ftir  Ruliland,  wie  wir  Sir  E.  Grey  versichern 
konnen,  durchaus  ffeundschaftliche  sind. 

Im  iibrigen  muli  die  k.  u.  k.  Regierung  darauf  hinweisen,  daO  sie  zu 
ibrem  lebbaften  Bedauern  nicbt  mebr  in  der  Lage  ist^  zu  der  serbiscben 
Antwortnote  im  Sinne  der  engllscben  Anregung  Stellung  zu  nebmen,  da  im 
Zeitpunkte  des  bier  gemacbten  deutscben  Schrittes  der  Kriegszustand  zwiscben 
der  Monarcbie  und  Serbien  bereits  eingetreten  war  und  die  serbiscbe  Antwort- 
note demnr»cb  durcb  di6  Ereignisse  bereits  iiberbolt  ist. 

Die  k.  u.  k.  Regierung  erlaubt  sicb  bei  diese^  Anlasse  darauf  aufmerksam 
zu  macben,  dali  die  koniglicb  serbiscbe  Regierung  nocb  vor  Erteilung  ibrer 
Antwort  mit  der  Mobilisierung  der  serbiscben  Streitkrafte  vorgegangen  ist  und 
dali  sie  aucb  hacbber  drei  Tage  verstreicben  lieO,  obne  die  Geneigtbeit  kund- 
zugeben,  den  Standpunkt  ibrer  Antwortnote  zu  verlassen,  worauf  unsererseits 
■die  Kriegserklarung  erfolgte. 

Wenn  im  iibrigen  das  engliscbe  Kabinett  sicb  bereit  findet,  seinen  Einfluli 
auf  die  russiscbe  Regierung  im  Sinne  der  Erbaltang  des  Friedens  zwiscben 
den  Grofimacbten  und  der  Lokalisierung  des  uns  durcb  die  jabrelangen  serbiscben 
XJmtriebe  aufgezwungenen  Krieges  geltend  zu  macben,  so  kann  dies  seitens  der 
k.  u.  k.  Regierung  nur  begriilit  werden. 


45. 
Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Paris,  29.  Juli  1914. 

Frankreicb  trifft  unzweifelbaft  gewisse  militarische  Vorbereitungen,  wie 
dies  von    den    Zeitungen  vielleicbt  mit  gewisser  tjbertreibung   verkiindet    wird. 

Wie  icb  streng  vertraulicb  erfabre,  ist  Baron  Scboen  beauftragt,  diese  Vor- 
bereitungen beute  bei  Herrn  Viviani  zur  Spracbe  zu  bringen  und  darauf  bin- 
zuweisen,  dati  Deutscbland  unter  diesen  Umstanden  gezwungen  werden .  konnte, 
abnlicbe  Malinabmen  zu  treffen,  die  liatUrHcb  nicbt  gebeim  bleiben  konnten  und 
deren  Bekanntwerden  in  der  OfFentlicbkeit  groGe  Aufregung  verursacben  wiirde. 
So  konnten  beide  Lander,  trotzdem  sie  nur  den  Frieden  anstreben,  zu  einer 
wenigstens  teilweisen  Mobilisierung  gedrangt  werden,  was  gefabrlicb  ware. 

Ferner  wird  Baron  Scboen  auftraggemafi  erklaren,  Deutscbland  wunscbo 
lebbaft,  daD  der  Konflikt  zwiscben  uns  und  Serbien  lokalisiert  bleibe,  wobei 
Deutscbland  auf  die  Unterstiitzung  seitens  Frankreicbs  zable. 


99 


46. 
Graf  Sz6gy§ny  an  Graf  Berchtold.. 

Telegramm.  Berlin,  29.  JuU  1914. 

Bereits  Sonntag  hat  die  deutsche  Regierung  in  St.  Petersburg  erklart,  daO 
!die  russische  Mobilisierung  die  deutsche  Mobilisierung  zur  Folge  hatte. 

Darauf  erfolgte  russischerseits  die  mit  meinem  Telegramm©  vom  27.  d.  Mts. 
gemeldete  Antwort.  Hieranf  wurde  heute  neuerdings  nach  St.  Petersburg  tele- 
graphiert,  dafi  durch  das  weitere  Fortschreiten  der  russischen  Mobilisierungs- 
malinahmen  Deutschland  veranlafit  werden  konnte,  zu  mobilisieren. 


47. 
Graf  Szdpiry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  St.  Petershurg,  29.  JuU  1914. 

Da  ich  vom  deutschen  Botschafter  erfabren  babe,  HeiT  Sazonow  zeige  sich 
liber  Euer  Exzellenz  angeblicbe  Abgeneigtbeit,  Gedankenaustauscb  mit  Rutland 
fortzusetzen  und  iiber  vermeintlicb  weit  iiber  das  notwendige  Mali  ausge- 
debnte  und  daber  gegen  Rufiland  gericbtete  Mobilisierung  Osterreicb-Ungarns 
sebr  aufgeregt,  suchte  icb  den  Herrn  Minister  auf,  um  einige  mir  vorbanden 
scbeinende  Unklarbeiten  zu  bebeben. 

Der  Herr  Minister  begann  damit  zu  konstatieren,  dafi  Osterreicb-Ungarn 
kategoriscb  weitereh  Gedankenaustauscb  ablebne.  Icb  stellte  auf  Grund  Euer 
Exzellenz  Telegrammes  vom  28.  d.  M.  ricbtig,  dali  Euer  Exzellenz  es  zwar 
abgelehnt  batten,  nacb  allem,  was  vorgefallen,  iiber  die  Notentexte  und  den  oster- 
reicbiscb-ungariscb-serbischen  Konflikt  iiberbaupt  zu  diskutieren,  dali  icb  aber  fest- 
stellen  miisse,  in  der  Lage  gewesen  zu  sein,  eine  viel  breitere  Basis  des  Gedanken- 
austauscbes  dadurcb  anzuregen,  dali  icb  erklarte,  wir  wunscbten  kein'e  russischen 
Interessen  zu  verletzen,  batten  nicht  die  Absieht,  natiirlich  unter  der  Voraus- 
setzung,  daft  der  Konflikt  zwischen  Osterreicb-Ungarn  und  Serbien  lokalisiert 
bleibe,  serbiscbes  Territorium  an  uns  zu  bringeh  und  gedachten  auch  die 
Souveranitat  Serbiens  nicht  anzutasten.  Icb  sei  uberzeugt,  daO  Euer  Exzellenz 
iiber  osterreichisch-ungariscbe  und  russische  Interessen  immer  bereit  sein  wUrden, 
mit  St.  Petersburg  Fiiblung  zu  nehmen. 


100 

Herr  Sazonow  meinte,  in  temtorialer  Hinsicht  habe  er  sich  uberzeugen 
lassen,  aber  was  die  Souveranitat  anbelang^,  miisse  er  den  Standpunkt  festhalten, 
die  Aufzwingung  tinserer  Bedingungen  sei  ein  Vasallentum.  Dieses  aber  verstofie 
gegen  das  Gleichgewicht  ■  am  Balkan  uiid  letzteres  sei  das  in  Frage  kommende 
russische  Interesse.  Nun  kam  er  wieder  auf  die  Diskussion  iiber  die  Note,  die 
Aktion  Sir  E.  Greys  etc.  zuriick  und  woUte  mir  neuerlich  nabelegen,  daii  man 
unser  legitimes  Interesse  zwar  anerkenne  und  voll  befriedigen  wolle,  dafi  dies 
aber  in  eine  fiir  Serbien  annehmbare  Form  gekleidet  werden  soUte.  Ich  meinte, 
dies  sei  kein  russiscbes,  sondern  ein  serbiscbes  Interesse,  worauf  Herr  Sazonow 
geltend  macbte,  russiscbe  Interessen  seien  in  diesem  Falle  eben  serbiscbe,  so 
daO  icb  dem  Circulus  vitiosus  durcb  Ubergan^  auf  ein  anderes  Thema  ein 
Ende  machte. 

Icb  erwabnte,  icb  batte  gebort,  man  sei  in  EuJOland  beunrubigt,  weil  wir 
fur  die  Aktion  gegen  Serbien  acbt  Korps  mobilisiert  baben.  Herr  Sazonow 
bestatigte  mir,  daO  nicbt  er,  der  hievon  gar  nicbts  gewufit,  sondern  der  General- 
stabscbef  diese  Bedenken  geauliert  babe.  Icb  suchte  dem  Herrn  Minister  darzu- 
legen,  dali  jeder  Unbefangene  sicb  leicbt  uberzeugen  konne,  unsere  siidlicben 
Korps  konnten  keine  Bedrobung  fiir  Ruftland  bilden. 

Icb  bedeutete  dem  Herm  Minister,  dali  es  gut  ware,  wenn  sein  kaiserlicber 
Herr  iiber  die  wabre  Situation  informiert  wiirde,  umsomebr  als  es  diingend 
geboten  sei,  wenn  man  den  Frieden  wolle,  dem  militariscben  Lizitieren,  welcbes 
sich  jetzt  auf  Grund  falscber  Nachricbten  einzustellen  drohe,  ein  rascbes  Ende 
zu  bereiten.  Herr  Sazonow  meinte  sebr  cbarakteristiscberweise,  er  konne  dies 
dem  Generalstabscbef  mitteilen,  denn  dieser  sebe  Seine  Majestat 
alle  Tage. 

Der  Herr  Minister  sagte  mir  weiter,  es  werde  heute  ein  Ukas  unterzeicbnet, 
welcher  eine  Mobilisierung  in  ziemlicb  weitem  Umfang  anordne.  Er  konne  mir 
aber  auf  das  alleroffiziellste  erklaren,  daft  diese  Truppen  nicbt  dazu  bestimmt 
seien,  iiber  uns  berzufallen ;  sie  wiirden  nur  Gewebr  bei  Fufi  bereit  steben  fiir 
den  Fall,  als  Rufilands  Balkaninteressen  gefabrdet  wUrden.  Eine  note  explicative 
werde  dies  feststellen,  denn  es  handle  sich  nur  um  eine  Vorsichtsmaliregel,  die 
Kaiser  Nikolaus  gerechtfertigt  gefunden  babe,  da  wir,  die  wir  ohnedies  den 
Vorteil  rascherer  MobiHsierung  batten,  nunmebr  auch  den  so  grolien  Vorsprung 
batten.  Icb  macbte  Herrn  Sazonow  in  emsten  Worten  auf  den  Eindruck  auf- 
merksam,  den  eine  solche  Maftregel  bei  uns  erwecken  werde.  Icb  miisse  be- 
zweifebi,  dali  die  note  explicative  diesen  Eindruck  zu  mildern  geeignet  sein 
werde,  worauf  der  Herr  Minister  sicb  nochmals  in  Versicberungen  iiber  die 
Harmlosigkeit  (!)  dieser  Verfiigung  erging. 


101 


48. 
Graf  Berchtofd  an  Graf  SzSgy^ny  in  Berlin. 

Telegratnm.  Wien,  29.  JuU  1914. 

Soebeti  wurde  mir  von  Herm  von  Tschirscliky  mitgetellt,  der  russische 
Botschafter  babe  ibm  gesagt,  daft  er  von  seiner  Regierung  verstandigt  worden 
sei,  dali  die  Militarbezirke  von  Kiew,  Odessa,  Moskau  und  Kasan  mobilisiert 
Avurden.  Euliland  sei  in  seiner  Ebre  als  Grofimacht  gekrankt  und  genotigt, 
entsprecbende  Malinabmen  zu  ergreifen.  Die  russiscbe  Mobllisierung  wird  von 
unseren  galiziscben  Korpskommanden  bestatigt  und  wurde,  einer  Meldung  des 
k.  u.  k.  Militarattaches  zufolge,  beute  aucb  von  Herm  Sazono\\''  dem  deutscben 
Botscbafter  gegeniiber  nicht  raebr  geleugnet. 

Icb  ersuebe  Euer\  Exzellenz,  vorstebendes  unverziiglicb  zur  Kenntnis  der 
deutscben  Regierung  zu  bringen  und  biebei  zu  betonen,  daii,  wenn  die  russi- 
scben  Mobilisierungsmalinabmen  nicbt  obne  Saumen  eingestellt  werden,  unsere 
allgemeine  MobilisierUng  aus  militariscben  Griinden  unverziiglicb  veranlaCt 
werden  miilite. 

Als  letzter  Versucb,  den  europaiscben  Kj-ieg  bintanzubalten,  bielte  icb  es 
fiir  wiinscbenswert,  dali  unser  und  der  deutscbe  Vertreter  in  St.  Petersburg 
eventuell  aucb  in  Paris  sogleicb  angewiesen  werden,  den  dortigen  Regierungen 
in  freundscbaftlicber  Weise  zu  erklaren,  dali  die  Fortsetzung  der  russiscben- 
Mobilisierung  Gegenmaiiregeln  in  Deutscbland  und  Osterreicb-Ungarn  zur  Folgfr 
baben  wurde,  die  zu  ernsten  Konsequenzen  fubren  miiliten. 

Euer  Exzellenz  wollen  binzufiigen,  dali  wir  uns  selbstverstandlicb  in  unserer 
kriegeriscben  Aktion  in  Serbien  nicbt  beirren  lassen  werden. 

Die  k.  u.  k.  Botscbafter  in  St.  Petersburg  und  Paris  erbalten  unter  einem 
die  Weisung,  die  vorerwabnte  Erklarung  abzugeben,  sobald  ibr  deutscher  Kollege 
anologe  Instruktionen  erbalt. 


49. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Sz^piry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  30.  Juli  1914. 

Antwort  auf  Euer  Exzellenz  Telegramm  vom  29.  Juli. 
Tcb  bin  selbstverstandlicb  nacb  wie  vor  bereit,  die  einzelnen  Punkte  unserer 
durcb  die  Ereignisse   iibrigens   bereits    uberbolten    an  Serbien  gericbteten  Note 


102 

durcli  Euer  Exzellenz  Herm  Sazonow  erlautern  zu  lassen.  Auch  wiirde  ict  besiDii- 
deren  Wert  darauf  legen,  bei  dieser  Gelegenheit  der  mir  durch  Herm  Schebeko 
verdolmetschten  Anregung  entsprecbend  auch  die  unsere  Beziebungen  zu  RuO- 
land  direkt  betreffenden  Fragen  einet  vertrauensvollen  und  freundscbaftlicben 
Ausspracbe  zu  unterzieben,  wovon  sich  eine  Bebebung  der  in  diesem  Belange 
bedauerlicberweise  bestebenden  Unklarbei.ten  und  Sicberstellung  der  so  wunscbens- 
werten  friedlicben  Entwicklung  unserer  Nacbbarverbaltnisse  erboffen  lielie. 


50. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Sz^p^ry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  SO.Juli  1914. 

Zu  Eurer  Exzellenz  Orientierung  und  Kegelung  Ibrer  Sprg,cbe: 

Ich  babe  beute  Herm  Scbebeko  auseinandergesetzt,  es  sei  mir  gemeldet 
worden,  daO  Herr  Sazonow  iiber  meine  glatte  Ablebnung  seiner  Proposition 
beziiglicb  Ausspracbe  mit  Euer  Exzellenz  peinlicb  beriibrt  sei,  wie  nicbt  minder 
dariiber,  daO  kein  Gedankenaustauscb  zwiscben  •  mir  nnd  Herm  Scbebeko  statt- 
gefunden  babe. 

Beziiglicb  des  erster-en  Punktes  batte  icb  Euer  Exzellenz  bereits  telegrapbiscb 
freigestellt,  aucb  weiterbin  seitens  Herm  Sazonows  etwa  gewunscbte  Erlaute- 
ruiigen  beziiglicb  der  Note  —  welcbe  iibrigens  durcb  den  Kriegsausbracb 
iiberbolt  erscbeint  —  zu  geben.  Es  konne  sicb  dies  allerdings  nur  im  Babmen 
nacbtraglicber  Aufklarungen  bewegen,  da  es  niemals  in  unserer  Absicbt  gelegen 
war,  von  den  Punkten  der  Note  etwas  abbandeln  zu  lassen.  Aucb  batte  icb 
Euer  Exzellenz  ermacbtigt,  unsere  speziellen  Beziebungen  zu  Ruliland  mit 
Herm  Sazonow  freundscbaftlicb  zu  besprecben. 

DaO  Herr  Sazonow  sicb  dariiber  beklagen  konnte,  es  batte  kein  Gedanken- 
austauscb zwiscben  Herm  Scbebeko  und  mir  stattgefunden,  mull  auf  einen 
Irrtum  bemhen,  da  wir  —  Herr  Scbebeko  und  icb  —  vor  zwei  Tagen  die 
aktuellen  Fragen  durcbgesprocben  batten,  was  mir  der  Herr  Botscbafter  mit 
dem  Bemerken  bestatigte,  er  babe  Herrn  Sazonow  in  ausfiibrlicber  Weise  iiber 
diese  Unterredung  referiprt. 

Herr  Scbebeko  fiibrte  dann  aus,,  warum  man  in  St.  Petersburg  unser  Vor- 
geben  gegen  Serbien  mit  solcber  Besorgnis  betracbte.  Wir  seien  eine  Groli- 
macbt,  die  gegen  den  kl  einen  serbischen  Staat  vorgebe,  obne  daO  man  in 
St.  Petersburg  etwas  dariiber  wisse,  was  wir  mit  demselben  beabsicbtigten,  ob  wir 
dessen  Souyeranitat  tangieren,  ibn  ganz  niederwerfen  oder  gar  zertreten  woUten, 


103 

Durch  historlsche  nnd  andere  Bande  mit  RuGland  verbunden,  konne  letzterem 
das  weitere  Schicksal  Serbiens  nicbt  gleicbgultig  sein.  Man  habe  sich  in 
St.  Petersburg  angelegen  sein  lassen,  mit  allem  Nacbdruck  auf  Belgrad  ein- 
zuwirken,  dafi  es  alle  unsere  Forderungen  erfiille,  allerdings  zu  einer  Zeit,  wo 
man  nocb  nicbt  wissen  konnte,  was  fiir  Forderungen  wir  nacbmals  gestellt. 
Aber  selbst  beziiglicb  dieser  Forderungen  wurde  man  alles  einsetzen,  um 
wenigstens  das  Moglicbe  durcbzubringen. 

Icb  erinnerte  den  Herrn  Botscbafter  daran,  dafi  wir  wiederholt  betont  batten, 
wir  wollten  keine  Eroberungspolitik  in  Serbien  treiben,  aucb  dessen  Souveranitat 
nicbt  antasten,  bloO  einen  Zustand  berstellen,  der  uns  Sicberbeit  biete  gegen 
Beunrubigung  seitens  Serbiens.  Hieran  kniipfte  icb  eine  langere  Erorterung 
unseres  unleidlicben  Verbaltnisses  zu  Serbien.  Aucb  gab  icb  Herrn  Schebeko 
deutlicb  zu  versteben,  in  welcb  bobem  Malie  die  russiscbe  Diplomatic,  wenn  aucb 
gewili  gegen  den  Willen  der  leitenden  Faktoren,  an  diesen  Zusfanden  scbuld  sei. 

Im  weiteren  Verlaufe  unserer  Unterredung  .erwahnte  icb  die  nunmebr  zu 
meiner  Kenntnis  gelangte  russiscbe  Mobilisierung.  Nacbdem  sicb  dieselbe  auf 
die  Militarbezirke  Odessa,  Kiew,  Moskau  und  Kasan  bescbranke,  trage  dieselbe 
einen  hostileii  Cbarakter .  gegen  die  Monarcbie.  Was  der  Grund  bievon  sei, 
wisse  icb  nicbt,  da  ja  gar  kein  Streitfall  zwiscben  uns  und  Rutland  existiere. 
Ost^rreicb-Ungarn  babe  ausscblielilicb  gegen  Serbien  mobilisiei-t,  gegen  Ruliland 
nicbt  einen  Mann,  was  allein  aus  dem  Umstande  zu  erseben  sei,  dafi  das  I.,  X.  und 
XI.  Korps  nicbt  mobilisiert  worden  seien.  Bei  dem  Umstande  jedocb,  daii  Ruft- 
land  offensicbtlicb  gegen  uns  mobilisiere,  miiliten  aucb  wir  unsere  Mobilisierung 
erweitem,  wobei  icb  jedocb  ausdriicklicb  erwabnen  wolle,  dafi  diese  Mafinabme 
selbstverstandlicb  keinen  feindseligen  Cbarakter  gegen  Ruliland  trage  und  sicb 
lediglicb  als  notwendige  Gegenmalinabme  gegen  die  russiscbe  Mobilisierung 
darstelle. 

Icb  bat  Herrn  Scbebeko,  dies  seiner  Regierung  zu  melden,  was  er  mir 
zusagte. 


51. 

Graf  Berchtold  an  die  k.  u.  k.  Botschafter  in  London  und  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  SI.  Juli  1914. 

Icb  telegrapbiere  wie  folgt  nacb  Berlin: 

Herr  von  Tscbirscbky  bat  auftraggemaO  gestern  bier  Mitteilung  tiber  eine 
Unterredung  zwiscben  Sir  E.  Grey  lind  Furst  Licbnowsky  ge'macbt,  in  welcber  der 
engliscbe  Staatssekretar  dem  deutscben  Botscbafter  das  Nacbfolgende  eroffnete: 


104 

,Sazonow  habe  die  englische  Kegierung  wissen  lassen,  daO  er  nacb  der 
Kriegserklaning  Osterreich-Ungams  an  Serbien  nicbt  mehr  in  der  Lage  sei, 
mit  Osterreicb-Ungarn  direkt  zn  verbandeln  und  Jaher  die  Bitte  aussprecbe, 
England  moge  seine  Vemiittlung  wieder  aufnebmen.  Als  Varaussetzung  betracbte 
die  russische  Regierung  die  vorlaufige  Eiristellimg  der  FeindseKgkeiten. 

Zu  dieser  russiscben  Eroffnung  bemerkte  Sir  E.  Grey  zu  Fiirst  Licbnowsky, 
England  denke  an  eine  Vermittlxmg  A  quatre  und  balte  dieselbe  fiir  dringend 
geboten,  wenn  nicbt  ein  Weltkrieg  entsteben  soUe. 

Icb  ersucbe  Euer  Exzellenz,  dem  Herm  Staatssekretar,  fiir  die  uns  dureb 
Herm  von  Tscbirscbky  gemacbten  Mitteilungen  verbindlicbst  zu  danken  und 
ibm  zu  erklaren,  dafi  wir  trotz  der  Anderung^,  die  in  der  Situation  seitber  dureb 
die  Mobilisierung  RuBlands  eingetreten  sei,  geme  bereit  seien,  dem  Vorscblag 
Sir  E.  Greys,  zwiscben  uns  und  Serbien  zu  vermitteln,  naber  zu  treten. 

Die  Voraussetzungen  unserer  Annabme  seien  jedocb  natiirlicb,  dali  unsere 
militariscbe  Aktion  gegen  Serbien  einstweilen  ibren  Fortgang  nebme  und  dafi 
das  engliscbe  Kabinett  die  russiscbe  Regierung  bewege,  die  gegen  uns  gericb- 
tete  russiscbe  Mobilisierung  zum  Stillstand  zu  bringen,  in  welcbem  Falle  selbst- 
verstandlicb  aucb  wir  die  uns  dureb  dieselbe  aafgezwungenen  defensiven  mili- 
tariscben  Gegenmaliregeln  in  Galizien  sofort  wieder  riickgangig  macben  wiirden. 


52. 
Graf  Szdpdry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  St.  Petersburg,  31.  JuU  1914. 

Heute  friib  Ordre  zur  allgemeinen  Mobilisierung  der  gesamten  Armee  und 
Flotte  erfolgt 


53. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  die  k.  und  k.  Missionen. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  31.  JuU  1914. 

Zu  Euer  etc.  Information  und  Verwertung  bei  dortiger  Regierung: 

Da    Yon    der    russiscben    Regierung    Mobilisierungen    an    unserer    Grenze 

angeordnet  worden  sind,  seben  wir  uns  zu  milifariscben  MaDnabmen  in  Galizien 

^ezwungen. 


105 

Diese  Mafinahmen  sind  rein  defensiven  Charakters  und  lediglich  nuter  dem 
Brucke  der  russischen  Vorkehrungen  erfolgt,  die  wir  selir  bedauern,  da  wir 
selbst  keinerlei  aggressive  Absichten  gegen  Ruliland  haben  nnd  die  Fortdauer 
der  bisherigen  guten  nachbarlicben  Beziebungen  wunschen. ' 

Die  der  Situation  ^ntsprecbenden  Pourparlers  zwiscben  dem  Wiener  und 
St.  Petersburger  Kabinett,  von  denen  wir  uns  eine  allseitige  Berubigung  erboifen, 
nebmen  inzwiscben  ibren  Fortgang. 


54. 
Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Paris,  31.  JuU  1914, 

Deutscber  Botscbafter  bat  im  Auftrage  seiner  Regierung  bier  erklart,  daii, 
wenn  angeordnete  russiscbe  allgemeine  Mobilisierung  nicbt  binnen  12  Stunden 
eingestellt  wird,  Deutscbland  gleicbfalls  mobilisieren  werde.  Gleicbzeitig  fragte 
Baron  Scboen,  ob  Frankreicb  im  Falle  deutscb-russiscben  Krieges  neutral  bliebe. 
Diesbeziiglicbe  Antwort  binnen-  18  Stunden  erbeten.  Termin  lauft  morgen, 
Samstag,  1  Ubr  nacbmittags  ab. 


55. 
Graf  Szdpiry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  St.  Petershurgy  31.  JuU  1914. 

Euer  Exzellenz  Telegramm  vom  30,  d.  M.  erbalten. 

Hocbdieselben  werden  meinem  Telegramm  vom  29.  d.  M.  entnommen 
baben,  daii  icb,  obne  einen  Auftrag  abzuwarten,  Konversation  mit  Sazonow 
nabezu  auf  der  mir  nunmebr  aufgetragenen  Grundlage  wieder  aufgenommen  babe, 
obne  daO  sicb  die  beiderseitigen  Standpunkte  wesentlicb  genabert  batten. 

Inzwiscben  bat  sicb  aUerdings  aus  den  vom  deutscben  Botscbafter  mit 
russiscbem  Minister  des  Auliem  gefiibrten  Konversationen  ergeben,  daO 
Ruliland   sicb   selbst  mit    einer   formellen   Erklarung,  Osterreicb-Ungarn    werde 


106 

weder  das  serbisclie  Territorium  solimalern  noch  die  serbische  Souveranitat 
antasten,  noch  russische  Balkan-  oder  sonstige  Interessen  verletzen,  nicht 
zufriedengeben  wurde,  und  ist  auch  seitber  russiscberseits  die  allgemeine 
Mobilisierung  angeordnet  worden. 


56. 
Graf  Szdp^ry  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  St.  Petersburg,  1.  August  1914. 

Bei  einem  heutigen  Besucbe  legte  icb  Herrn  Sazonow  dar,  dafi  ich  Instruk- 
tionen  erbalten  batte,  icb  miisse  aber  vorausschicken,  die  augenblicklicbe, 
durcb  die  russiscbe  allgemeine  Mobilisierung  in  Wien  gescbaffene  Lage  sei  mir 
ganzlicb  unbekannt,  so  dafi  icb  von  dieser  bei  Verdolmetscbung  meiner  nocb 
vorber  abgegangenen  Weisungen  vollkommen  abseben  miisse.  Icb  sagte,  daO  die 
beiden  Weisungen  Euer  E?:zellenz  von  dem  Miliverstandnis  bandeln,  als  ob  wir 
weitere  Verbandlungen  mit  RuDland  abgelehnt  batten.  Dies  sei,  wie  icb  ibm 
scbon  obne  Auftrag  versicbert  batte,  ein  Irrtum.  Euer  Exzellenz  seien  nicbt  nur 
gerne  bereit,  mit  RuOland  auf  breitester  Basis  zu  verbandeln,  sondern  aucb 
speziell  geneigt,  unsefen  Notentext  einer  Besprecbung  zu  unterzieben,  sofern  es 
sicb  um  dessen  Interpretation  bandle. 

Icb  betonte,  wie  sebr  die  Instruktionen  Euer  Exzellenz  an  micb  einen 
weiteren  Beweis  guten  Willens  boten,  wenn  icb  ibm  aucb  nocb  einmal  in  Er- 
innerung  rufen  miisse,  dali  mir  die  durcb  die  seitberige  allgemeine  Mobilisierung 
gescbaffene  Situation  unbekannt  sei,  icb  konne  nur  boffen,  daO  uns  der  Gang  der 
Ereignisse  nicbt  scbon  zu  weit  gefiibrt  babe;  jedenfalls  batte  icb  es  fiir  meine 
Pflicbt  gebalten,  im  gegenwartigen  bocbernsten  Augenblicke  den  guten  Willen 
der  k.  u-  k.  Regierung  nocbmals  zu  dokumentieren.  Herr  Sazonow  erwiderte,  er 
nebme  von  diesem  Beweise  guten  Willens  mit  Befriedigung  Akt;  docb  mocbte 
or  micb  aufmerksam  macben,  daii  ibm  Unterbandlungen  in  St.  Petersburg  aus 
nabelicgenden  Griinden  weniger  Erfolg  versprecbend  erscbienen  als  solcbe  auf 
dem  neutralen  Londoner  Terrain.  Icb  erwiderte,  Euer  Exzellenz  gingen,  wie  icb 
scbon  dargelegt  batte,  vom  Gesicbtspunkte  einer  direkten  FUblungnabme  in 
St.  Petersburg  aus,  so  daO  icb  nicbt  in  der  Lage  sei,  zu  seiner  Anregung 
beziiglicb  Londons  Stellung  zu  nebmen,  docb  wGrde  icb  Euer  Exzellenz  bievon 
Meldung  erstatten. 


107 


57. 
Graf  SzSgy^ny  an  Graf  Berchtoid. 

Telegramm.  Berlin,  2.  August  1914, 

Der  Herr  Staatssekretar  sagte  mir  soeben,  dafi  von  Ruliland  keine  Antwort 
anf  deutsclie  Anfrage  eingelangt  sei. 

Russische  Truppen  haben  die  deutsche  Grenze  bei  Schwidden  (sudostlich 
Bialla)  iiberscbritten. 

RuDland  hat  daber  Deutscbland  angegriffen. 

Deutscbland  betracbtet  sicb  daber  im  ICriegszustande  mit  Ruliland. 

Russiscber  Botscbafter  bat  beute  vormittags  Passo  zugestellt  erbalten;  er 
wird  voraussicbtlicb  nocb  beute  abreisen. 


58. 

Graf  Mensdorff  an  Graf  Berchtoid. 

Telegramm.  London,  4.  August  1914. 

Icb  babe  eben  Sir  E.  Grey  geseben.  Engliscbe  Regierung  bat  an  Deutscb- 
land Ultimatum  wegen  Belgiens  gericbtet,  erwartet  Antwort  beute  um  Mitternacbt. 

Sir  E.  Grey,  sagte  mir,  er  sebe  vorlaufig  keine  Veranlassung  zu  einer  Mitteilung 
an  die  k.  u.  k.  Regierung  und  keine  Ursacbe,  mit  uns  in  Konflikt  zu  geraten, 
solange  wir  nicbt  im  Kriegszustande  mit  Frankreicb  sind.  Jedenfalls  boffe  er, 
dali  wir  keine  Feindseligkeiten  eroffnen  wiirden  obne  vorberige  Formalitat  der 
Kriegserklarung.  Er  wird  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  nicbt  abberufen. 

Falls  wir  mit  Frankreicb  im  Kriegszustande  waren,  wiirde  es  fiir  England 
als  Bundesgenosse  Frankreicbs  wobl  scbwer  sein,  mit  demselben  im  Atlantiscben 
Meere  zu  kooperieren  und  nicbt  im  Mittellandiscben  Meer. 


108 


59. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Sz^p^ry  in  St.  Petersburg. 

Telegramm.  Wim^  5.  August  1914, 

Ich  ersuche  Euer  Exzellenz,  dem  dortigen  Minister  des  AuJQern  folgeDde 
Note  zu  ubergeben: 

„D'ordre  de  son  Gouvemement,  le  soussign6  Ambassadeur  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie  a  Itonnear  de  notifier  a  Son  Excellence  Monsieur  le  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrang^res  de  Russie  ce  qui  suit: 

Vu  I'attitude  mena9ante  prise  par  la  Russie  dans  le  conflit  entre  la 
Monarcbie  austro-hongroise  et  la  Serbie,  et'  en  presence  du  fait  qu'en  suite 
de  ce  conflit  la  Russie,  d'apr^s  une  communication  du  Cabinet  de  Berlin,  a  cru 
devoir  ouvrir  les  bostilit^s  contre  I'Allemagne  et  que  celle-ci  se  trouve,  par 
consequent,  en  6tat  de  guerre  avec  la  dite  Puissance,  I'Autricbe-Hongrie  se 
consid^re  ^galement  en  6tat  de  guerre  avec  la  Russie." 

Nacb  Uberreichung  dieser  Note  wollen  Euer  Exzellenz  sicb  die  Ausfertigung 
der  Passe  erbitten  und  ungesaumt  mit  dem  gesamten  Botscbaftspersonal,  aus- 
genommen  etwa  zuriickzulassende  Organe,  abreisen.  Herrn  von  Scbebeko 
werden  gleichzeitig  unsererseits  die  Passe  zugestellt. 


60. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  6.  August  1914. 

Erhalten  Euer  Exzellenz  Telegramm  vom  4.  1.  M. 

Ich  ersucbe  Hocbdieselben  Sir  E.  Grey  zu  versichem,  dafi  wir  keinesfalls 
ohne  vorbergehende  formelle  Kriegserklarung  Feindseligkeiten  gegen  England 
eroffnen  wiirden,  aber  aucb  erwarteten,  dali  England  uns  gegeniiber  ein  analoges 
Verhalten  beobachten  und  vor  Eintritt  des  formellen  Kriegszustandes  keine 
hostilen  Akt«  gegen  uns  unternehmen  werde. 


109 

61. 
Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Paris,  8.  August  1914, 

Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrang^res  m'a  fait,  appellor  pour  me  dire  que,  selon 
des  renseignements  positifs  qui  lui  seraient  parvenus,  le  corps  d'arm^e  d'lnns- 
bruck  serait  transport^  a  la  fronti^re  fran9aise.  Monsieur  Doumergue  desire 
savoir  d'urgence  si  cette  nouvelle  est  exacte  et  -au  cas  afiirmatif  quelles  sent 
les  intentions  du  Gouvernement  I.  et  R  La  France  se  trouvant  en  guerre  avec 
I'Allemagne  envoi  de  nos  troupes  h.  la  fronti^re  fran9aise  n'est  pas  compatible 
selon  I'avis  du  Ministre  avec  ^tat  de  paix  existant  entre  I'Autriclie-Hongrie  et 
France.  Monsieur  Dumaine  est  charge  d'une  d-marche  semblable  aupr^s  do 
Votre  Excellence. 


62. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Sz^csen  in  Paris. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  9.  August  1914. 

Mit  Bezug  auf  Euer  Exzellenz  Telegramm  vom  8.  d.  M. 

Nach  mit  Generalstab  genommener  Riickspraclie  ermacbtige  icb  Euer 
Exzellenz,  franzbsiscber  Regierung  zu  erklaren,  daO  Nacbrichten  iiber  Teilnabme 
unserer  Truppen  an  deutscb-franzosiscbem  KJrieg  voUsfandig  erfunden.  Analog 
babe  icb  micb  Herrn  Dumaine  gegeniiber  ausgesprocben. 


.     63. 
Graf  Sz^csen  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Paris,  10.  August  1914. 

Re9u  t6l6gramme  du  9  aout.  Ai  imm^diatement  communiqu6  contenu  5. 
Monsieur  Doumergue.  Ministre  qui  avait  re9u  rapport  t^l6grapbique  analogue 
de  Monsieur  Dumaine  sur  sa  conversation  avec  Votre  Excellence  a  reconnu 
que  nos  troupes  ne  se  trouvaient  pas  k  la  fronti^re  fran9aise,  mais  il  dit  avoir 
renseignements  positifs  qu'un  corps  d'arm^e  austro-bongrois  a  ii^  transports  en 


no 

Allemagne,  ce  qui  permet  h  celle-ci  de  retirer  ses  troupes  des  territoires 
allemands  occup6s  par  nos  soldats  et  constitue,  selon  avis  du  Ministre,  facili- 
tation des  operations  de  guerre  allemandes.  J'ai  k  diff^rentes  reprises  attir6 
attention  da  Ministre  sur  le  texte  de  la  rd^onse  de  Votre  Excellence,  il  a 
reconnu  qu'on  nc  pouvait  pas  parler  de  participation  effective  de  nos  troupes 
h.  la  guerre  franco-allemande,  mais  il  insista  sur  ce  que  j)resence  de  nos  troupes 
sur  territdire  allemand  6tait  incontestable  et  que  ceci  constituait  aide  militaire 
pret6  h  TAllemagne.  Dans  ces  conditions  ii  a  charg6  Ambassadeur  de  France 
h  Vienne  de  demander  imm^diatement  ses  passeports  et  de  quitter  Vienne 
aujourd'hui  avec  tout  le  personnel  de  I'Ambassade.  Le  Ministre  m'a  dit  que 
dans,  ces  circonstances  ma  presence  ici  ne  saurait  eire  d'aucune  utilit6,  mais 
que,  vti  excitation  populau-e,  elle  pourrait  donner  lieu  a  des  incidents  regret- 
tables  qu'il  d6sirerait  6viter.  II  m'a  offerf  de  mettre  d^.s  ce  soir  on  train  h  ma 
disposition  pour  quitter  la  France.  J'ai  r^pondu  qu'il  me  serait  impossible 
d'avoir  instruction  de  Yotre  Excellence  jusqu'au  soir  mais  que,  vu  le  rappel  de 
Monsieur  Dumaine,  je  le  priai  de  me  faire  d6livrej"  mes  passeports. 


64. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Mensdorff  in  London. 

Wieti,  11.  August  1914. 

Franzosiscbe  Regierung  hat  ibren  biesigen  Botscbafter  beauftragt,  seine 
Passe  mit  der  Motivierung  zu  verlangen,  dali  ein  osterreicbiscb-ungariscbes 
Armeekorps  nacb  Deutscbland  entsendet  worden  sei,  woduicb  es  der  deutscben 
Heeresleitung  ermoglicbt  wiirde,  ibre  Truppen  aus  den  deutscben  Gebieten 
zuriickzuzieben,  welcbe  von  unseren  Abteilungen  besetzt  seien.  Diese  Mafinabme 
unseres  Generalstabes  bedeute  eine  militariscbe  Hilfeleistung  an  Deutscbland. 

Euer  Exzellenz  wollen  zur  Kenntnis  der  engliscben  Regierung  bringen, 
daO  den  an  zustandiger  Stelle  eingebolten  Informationen  zufolge  die 
franzosiscberseits  aufgestellte  Bebauptung  unbegriindet  ist. 


Ill 


65. 
Graf  Mensdorff  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  London,  l9.^  Angust  19l4, 

Je  viens  de  recevoir  de  la  part  de  Sir  E.  Groy  la  communication 
suivante: 

„Sur  la  demande  du  Gouvernement  fran9ais  qui  ri'est  pas  a  m^me  do 
communiquer  directem^nt  avec  Votre  Gouvernement,  j'ai  k  Vous  faire  la  com- 
munication suivante: 

^Apres  avoir  d6clar6  la*  guerre  h  la  Serbie  et  pris  ainsi  la  premiere  initia- 
tive des  hostilites  en  Europe,  le  Gouvenicmont  austro-hongrois  s'est  mis  sans 
aucune  provocation  du  Gouvernement  de  la  R6publique  fran9aise  en  6tat  de 
guerre  avec  la  France: 

1;  Apres  que  I'AUemagne  avait  succesivement  dcclar6  la  guerre  h  la  Russie 
et  h  la  France,  il  est  intervenu  dans  ce  conflit  en  declarant  la  guerre  a  la 
Eussie  qui  combattait  d^h.  aux  c6t6s  de  la  France. 

2.  D'apr^s  de  nombreuses  informations  dignes  de  foi  I'Autricbe  a  envoyo 
des  troupes  sur  la  frontiere  allemande  dans  des  conditions  qui  constituent  uno 
menace  directe  h  I'^gard  de  la  France. 

En  presence  de  cet  ensemble  de  faits  le  Gouvernement  fran9ais  se  voit 
oblig6  de  declarer  au  Gouvernement  austro-bongrois  qu'il  va  prendre  toutes  les 
mesures  qui  lui  permettront  de  r6pondre  h  ces  actes  et  k  ces  menaces." 

Sir  E.  Grey  ajoute:  Rupture  avec  la  France  ayant  i6t6  amende  de 
cette  mani^re,  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majest6  britannique  se  voit  oblige 
d'annoncer  que  r6tat  de  gueiTe  existe  entre  la  Grandc-Bretagne  et  TAutriche- 
Hongiie  h  partir  de  minuit. 


112 


66. 
Der  japanische  Botschafter  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Wien,  20.  August  J 914. 
Monsieur  le  Comte, 

No  doubt  Your  Excellency  liave  already  been  informed  by  His 
CEJxcellency  Baron  Muller  of  the  nature  of  the  communication  made, 
(to  the  German  Government  by  my  Government  on  the  15***  inst.; 
but,  for  Your  Excellency's  personal  information,  I  beg  to  enclose 
therewith  a  copy  of  a  telegram  received  from  Tokio  on  the  subject 
although  I  have  no  instruction  to  do  so. 


113 

Beilage. 


The  Japanese  Government,  taking  into  serious  consideration  tlie  present 
situation,  and  as  the  result  of  full  commanication  with  the  British  Government 
for  the  purpose  of  consolidating  and  maintaining  the  general  peace  in  the 
regions  of  Eastern  Asia  which  forms  one  of  the  objects  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
alliance,  have  come  to  the  decision  of  taking  the  necessary  measures  therefore 
in  common  with  Great  Britain;  but  before  taking  such  measures,  the  Japanese 
Government  thought  it  proper  to  once  approach  the  German  Government  with 
a  friendly  advice  which  was  communicated  to  them  to  the  following  effect  on 
the  15'h  of  August  1914. 

1.  All  German  vessels  of  war  to  be  immediately  withdrawn  from  the 
waters  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Japan  and  China.  The  vessels,  which  cannot 
be  so  withdrawn,  to  be  disarmed. 

"2.  The  German  Government  to  deliver,  unconditionally  and  without  com- 
pensation, to  the  Japanese  authoi'ities,  the  entire  leased  territory  of  Kiau-Chau 
before  the  16*'^  of  September  1914,  for  the  purpose    of   returning  it  to  China. 

The  Japanese  Government  have  declared  to  the  German  Government  that 
unless  their  reply  of  unconditional  acceptance  of  the  above  advice  should  be 
received  before  noon  of  Sunday  the  23'"^  instant,  the  Japanese  Government  shall 
take  such  action  as  they  deem  necessary. 

It  is  sincerely  hoped  that  the  above  advice,  with  such  ample  allowance  of 
time  for  reply,  may  be  accepted  by  the  German  Government;  but  should, 
unfortunately,  the  German  Government  not  accept  the  advice  of  the  Japanese 
Government  the  latter  will  be  obliged  to  take  the  necessary  measures  in  order 
to  accomplish  their  object. 

The  reason  that  led  the  Imperial  Government  to  assume  the  present  attitude 
is,  as  already  mentioned,  none  other  than  to  safeguard  the  Common  interests 
of  Japan  and  Great  Britain  mentioned  in  the  Anglo- Japanese  alliance  by  con- 
solidating the  foundation  of  permanent  peace  in  the  regions  of  Eastern  Asia, 
and  the  Japanese  Government  have  no  intention  whatever  of  embarking  on  k 
policy  of  territorial  expansion  or  any  other  design  of  self-interest.  Consequently, 
the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  are  resolved  to  respect,  with  the  utmost 
care,  the  interests  of  third  powers  in  Eastern  Asia  and  not  in  the  least  to 
injure  them. 


114 

67. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Graf  Clary  in  Brlissel. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  22.  August  1914. 

Ich  ersuclie  Euer  Exzellenz,  dem  koniglicli  belgischen  Minister  des  AuOern 
sofort  folgendes  mitzuteilen: 

^D'ordre  de  mon  GouvernepQent  j'ai  I'honneur  de  notifier  k  Votre  Excellence 
ce  qui  suit: 

Vu  que  la  Belgique,  apr^s  avoir  refuse  d'accepter  les  propositions  qui  lui 
avaient  6t6  adress6es  %  plusieurs  reprises  par  I'Allemagne,  prete  sa  cooperation 
militaire  h.  la  France  et  a  la  Grande-Bretagne  qui,  toutes  deux,  ont  d6clar6 
la  guerre  h.  FAutriche-Hongrie,  et  en  presence  du  fait  que,  comme  il  vient 
d'etre  constate,  les  ressortissants  autrichiens  et  hongrdis  se  trouvant  en  Belgique 
ont,  sous  les  yeux  des  autoiit^s  Roy  ales,  dd  subir  un  traitement  contraire  aux 
exigences  les  plus  primitives  de  Thumanite  et  inadmissible  m^me  vis-k-vis 
des  sujets  d'un  Etat  ennemi,  I'Autriclie-Hongrie  se  voit  dans  la.  n^cessit^  de  rompre 
les  relations  diplomatiques  et  se  consid^re  d^s  ce  moment  en  ^tat  de  guerre 
avec  la  Belgique. 

Je  quitte  le  pays  avec  le  personnel  de  la  Legation  et  confie  la  protection 
de  mes  administr^s  au  Ministre  des  Etats-Unis  d'Am^rique  en  Belgique. 

De  la  part  du  Gouvernement  I.  et  E-.  les  passeports  sont  remis  au  Comte 
Errembault  de  Dudzeele. 


Prinz  Hohenlohe  an  Graf  Berchtold. 

Telegramm.  Berlin,  23.  August  1914. 

Dem  hiesigen  japanischen  Geschaftstrager  wurde  heute  durch  das  Ans- 
wartige  Amt  mitgeteilt,  dali  die  kaiserlicb  deutsche  Regierung  nicht  die  Absicht 
babe,  eine  Antwort  auf  das  japanische  Ultimatum  zu  erteilen.  Die  deutsche 
Regierung  babe  ihrem  Botscbafter  in  Tokio  den  Auftrag  erteilt,  nacb  Ablauf 
d.er  von  Japan  fur  beute  12  Ubr  gestellten  Frist  Japan  zu  verlassen  und  sie 
werde  zu  gleicber  Zeit  dem  hiesigen  japanischen  Geschaftstrager  seine  Passe 
zuatellen. 

Zu  Mittag  warden  dann  dem  Herrn  Geschaftstrager  die  Passe  zugestellt 
and    wird   derselbe   mit   dem   Botschaftspersonal  Berlin  morgen  friih  verlassen. 


115 

69. 
Graf  Berchtold  an  Freiherrn  von  MUller  in  Tokio. 

Telegramm.  Wien,  24.  Augttst  1914. 

Der  Kommandant  S.  M.  S.  „ElisabetiL"  erliielt  den  Auftrag,  in  Tsin^u 
mitzukampfen.  Ersuche  Euer  Exzellenz,  mit  Rucksicht  auf  das  Vorgelien  Japans 
gegen  das  nns  verbiindete  Deutsclie  Reich  Ihre  Passe  zu  verlangen.  Konsulate 
zu  verstandigen  und  mit  Kolonie  und  Botschafts-  und  Konsulatspersonal  nach 
Amerika  abzureisen.  Schutz  unserer  Staatsangehorigen  und  Interessen  wollen 
Euer  Exzellenz  amerikanischem  Botscbafter  anvertrauen.  Hiesigem  japanischen 
Botschafter  werden  Fasse  zugestellt. 


ROYAUME  DE  BELGlQUE. 


MINfSTfeRE    DES    AFFAIRES    feTRANGfeRES. 


Correspondance  diplomatique 


RELATIVE    A    LA 


n 


Guerre  de  1914. 


(24  JUlLLET-29  AOUT.) 


ANVERS. 
Imprimerie  et  Publicity  Flor  BURTON,  Soatrt  Anonyme. 

COURTE  RUE   NEUVE.   28. 


TABLE  DES  MATlfeRES. 


No 


Date 


RESUME 


40 


12 


2*  juillet 

24  juillet 

25  juillet 

25  juillet 

26  juillet 

27  juillet 

28juiUet 
2y  juiUet 

31  juillet 

31  juillet 
31  juillet 

31  juillet . 
i"  aoat 

l«»aoitt 

I"  aout 


Le  Comte  Errembault  de 
Dudzeele  h  M.  Davignon. 

M.  Davignon  aux  Legations 
a  Paris,  Berlin,  Londres, 
Vlenne  et  S»-P6tersbourg. 


M.  Davignon  aux  Legations 
h  Rome,  La  Haye  et  Lu- 
xembourg. 


M.   Michotte  de  Welle  4  M. 
Davignon. 


Le  Comte  Clary  et  Aldringen 
k  M.  Davignon.. 


Le  fearon  Beyens  h  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 


Le  Comte  Errembault  de 
Dudzeele  a  M.  Davignon. 

M.  Davignon  aux  Legations 
k  Berlin,  Paris,  Londres, 
Vienne,  Saint-P6tersbourg, 
Rome,  „La  Haye,  Luxem- 
bourg. 

M.  Davignon  aux  L6gations 
A  Berlin,  Paris  et  Londres. 


M.  Davignon  h  tous  les  Chefs 
de  mission  k  I'^tranger. 


M.   Davignon  aux  Legations 
k  Berlin,  Paris-  et  Londres. 


M.  Davignon  aux  L6gations 
k  Berlin.  Paris  et  Londres.. 


Le   Comte  de  Lalaing  k  M. 
Davignon. 


Le  Baron  Bey«as  4M.  X>avi- 
, gnon. 


M.   Davignon  :aux  Legations 
k  Berlin,  Paris  .^t  Londres. 


Communication  du  texte  de  I'ultiinatum  aus- 
tro-hongrois  k  la.'Serbie. ,    . 


Envoi  d'une  note  k  remettre  6ventuellement 
aux  Ministres  respectifs  des  Affaires  Etran- 
g6res  pour  leur  faire  connaltre  la  volont^ 
de  la  Belgique  de  rester  neutre  en  cas  de 
conflit    europ6en.    .    .    .    .    ,    .    ,    ....    . 

Les  dites  Legations  remettront  aux  Ministres 
des  Affaires  Etrangferes  une  note  identique 
k  celle  qui  aura  et6  communigu6e  aux  cinq 
Puissances,  garantes  de  la  neutralit6  beige. 

Communication  de  la  r^ponse  du  Gouveme- 
ment  serbe  a  Tultimatum  austro-hongrois. 

Le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  juge  la 
r6ponse  de  la  Serbie  insuffisante  et  rompt 
les  relations  diplomatiques  avec  elle.    .    .    . 

Le  Gouvernement  britannique  propose  I'inter- 
vention  k  Vienne  et  k  Saint-P6tersbourg  de 
I'Angleterre,  de  la  France,  de  I'AUemagne 
et  de  ritalie  pour  trouver  un  terrain  de  con- 
ciliation. L'Allemagne  seule  n'a  pas  encore 
r6pondu  , 

Nbtification  de .  la  declaration  de  guerre  de 
I'Autriche-Hongrie    k  la    Serbie.    .    .    .    ,    . 

Le  Gouvernement  beige  a  mis  I'armSe  sur  le 
pied  de  paix  renforc6.  Cette  mesure  ne  doif 
pas  6tre  confondue  avec  la  mobilisation.    . 


La  France  donne^  I'assurance  k  la  Belgique 
qu'aucune  incursion  des  troupes  francaises 
n'aura  lieu  en  Belgiigue  m6me  si  des  forces 
importantes  6taient  mass6es  sur  les  fron- 
ti6res  beiges. 

La  mobilisation  de  I'^armSe  beige  est  d6cr6- 
Ue  et  le  samedi  1"  aout  en. est  le- premier 
jour.     . 

Le  Gouvernement  anglais  a  demand^  s6par6- 
ment  aux  Gouvernements  francais  et  alle- 
mand  si  chacun  d'eux  etait  pr6t  a  respecter 
la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique  pourvu  que 
I'autre  Puissance  ne  la  viole  pas 

Le  Baron  van  der  Elst  rappelle  au  Ministre 
d'AUemagne  les  assurances  donn^es  par 
I'Empire  k  la  Belgique  au  sujet  -du  respect 
de  sa  neutrality 

La  France  a  accept6  la  proposition  de.  I'An- 
gleterre de  ne  pas  violer  la  neutralit6  beige 
dans  le  cas  ou  ce\le-ci  serait  respect6e  par. 
I'AUemagne.  (Voir  n°  11.)    ........ 

L'Allemeigne  refuse  de  r6pondre  k  la  proposi- 
tion anglaise  de  respecter  la  neutrality  de 
la  Belgique.  <Voir  n°  11.)  .    ,    .    .    .   .'  .    . 

La  France  explique  les  conditions  dans  les- 
quelles  elle  respectera  la  neutrality  de  la 
Belgique 


Date 


RESUME 


1"  aoOt 


1"  aoat 


2aout 


5  aout 


2  aoCit 


2  aout 


3  aout 


3  aout 


3ao<lt 


3  aout 


3  aout 


4aot:it 


4  aout 


4  abut 
4  aoCit 
4  aoat 

4ao0t 


M.  Davignon  aux  Legations 
prfes  des  Puissances  garan- 
tes. 

M.  bavignon  aux  Legations 
a  Rome,  La  Haye,  Luxem- 
bourg. 

M.  Eyschen    A  M.  Davignon. 


M.  Davignon  aux  Lfegations 
pr6s  des  Puissances  garan- 
tes. 


M.  de  Below  Saleske  a  M. 
Davignon. 

Entrevue  entre  M.  de  Below 
Saleske  "et  le  Baron  van 
der  Elst. 

M.  Davignon  a,  M.  de  Below 
Saleske. 


M.  Davignon  aux  Legations 
a  Paris,  Londres,  Vienne, 
Berlin,  6aint-P6tersbourg, 
La  Haye. 

M.  Davignon  aux  Legations 
h  Berlin,  Paris,  Londres, 
,  Vienne  et  S'-P6tersbourg. 


S.  M.  le  Roi  4  S.  M.  le  Roi 
d'Angleterre, 


Le  Comte  de  Lalaing  a  M. 
Davignon. 


M.   de   Below  Saleske   k  M. 
Davignon. 


Sir  F  H.  vmiers  k  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 


Le  Baron  Fallon  i  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 


M.   Davignon  aux  Legations 
,  k  Londres  et  k  Paris. 

M.  Davignon  i  M.  de  Below 
Saleske. 

M.   de   Below  Saleske   k  M. 
■  Davignon. 

M.  Davignon  au  Baron  Ore- 
nier. 


Ex6cutez  les  instructions  donn6es  par  la  let- 
tre  du  24  juillet  (voir  n"  2) 


Ex6cutez  les  instructions  donn6es  par  la  let- 
tre  du  25  juiUet  (voir  n°  3) 


Le  President  du  Gouvernement  luxembour- 
geois  proteste  centre  la  violation  de  la  neu- 
trality du  Grand-Duch6  garantie  par  le  trait6 
de  Londres  de  1867 

Le  Ministre  de  France  a  rendu  publique  sa 
declaration  du  1*''  aoilt.  La  Belgique  atta- 
cherait  le  plus  grand  prix  k  recevoir  de 
I'AUemagne  une  assurance  analogue  ^i  celle 
donn6e  par  la  France 

Remise  de  I'ultimatum  de  I'Allemagne.  L'Em- 
pire  sommela  Belgique  de  ne  pas  s'opposer 
au  passage  des   troupes   allemandes.    .    .    . 

L'AUemagne  se  plaint  k  la  Belgique  de  la 
violation  de  ses  fronti^res  par  des  dirigea- 
bles  et  une  patrouille  venant  de  France.    . 

R6ponse  du  Gouvernement  beige  k  I'ultima- 
tum allemand.  La  Belgique  ne  peut  faillir 
aux  devoirs  que  lui  imposent  les  trait^s 
de    1839.    .    .    : 

Telegramme  adress^  pour  faire  connaltre  aux, 
Ministres  du  Roi  prfes  des  grandes  Puissan- 
ces le  sens  de  I'ultimatum  allemand  et  de 
la    r6ponse    du  Gouvernement  beige.    .    .    . 

La  Belgique  a  fait  savoir  k  la  France  que 
pour  I'instant  elle  ne  faisait  pas  appel  k  la 
garantie  des  Puissances.  Elle  appr6ciera 
ult6rieurement  ce  qu'il  y  aura  lieu  de  faire. 

La  Belgique  fait  un  suprfime  appel  au  Gou- 
vernement anglais  pour  la  sauvegarde  de 
sa     neutrality 

L'Angleterre  declare  qu'elle  fera  la  guerre  k 
I'Allemagne  si  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique 
est  viol6e.  (Voir  n°  23.)  .    .    . 

L'Allemagne  ex<^cutera,  au  besoln  par  la  force 
des  armes,  les  mesures  de  s6curit6  qu'elle 
juge  indispensables  vis  k '  vis  des  menaces 
frangaises 

L'Angleterre  s'attend  k  ce  que  la  Belgique  r6- 
siste  par  tous  les  moyens  possibles  k  la 
prejssion  de  TAUemagne  tendant  k  lui  faire 
abandonner  son  r61e  de  pays  neutre  et  h  ce 
qu'elle  fasse  appel  aux  Puissances  garantes. 

La  Hollande  fait  savoir  au  Gouvernement 
beige  qu'elle  sera  peut-fetre  obligee  d'insti- 
tuer  sur  I'Escaut  le  balisage  de  guerre.    .    . 

Violation  du  territoire  national  &  Gemmenich. 


Remise  des  passeports  au  Ministre  d'Alle- 
magne . .,'  .,..;. 

L'Allemagne  Vemet  aux  Etats-Unis  le  soln  de 
la  protection  des  inti^rets  allemapds  en 
Belgiqye    .,.,    ...........    , 

Le  Gouvernement  beige  demande  au  Gouver^ 
nement  espagnol  de  se  charger  de  la  prot 
tection  des  int^rfits  beiges  en  Allemzigne.    . 


N» 

Date 

•RESUME 

Page 

34- 

4aoat 

M.      Davignon      au      Baron 
Beyens. 

Ordi-e  de  demander  ses  passeports .    .    .    .    . 

l:i 

35 

4aout 

Le  Baron  Beyens.  i  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

Discours  prononc6  par  M.   de  Bethmann-Hol- 
-     weg  au  Reichstag  et  dans  lecjael  le  Chance- 
lier  de  I'Empire    reconnalt  que  I'AIlemagne 
commet  une  injustice  en  passant  outre  aux 
protestations    des    Gouvernements    luxem- 
bourgeols    et   beige 

iZ 

36 

4aoat 

Le   Comte  de   Lalaing   h  M. 
Davignon. 

Expos6  de  I'attitude  de  I'Angleterre  dans  le 
conflit  europ6en 

i^,: 

37 

4aout 

Le  Comte   de   Lalaing   4  M. 
Davignon  (t616gramme) . 

L'Angleterre   s'attend    k   ce    que   la   Norvfege, 
la   Hollande   et  la   Belgique   r6sistent   k   la 
pression  de  I'AIlemagne  et  gardent  la  neu- 
trality. Elles  seront  soutenues  dans  ce  cas 
par    I'Angleterre                  .    .        

13 

38 

4aoat 

M.  Davignon    aux    Ministres 
du  Roi  h  Paris,  Londres  et 
Saint-P6tersbourg. 

R6sum6  de  la  situation  diplomatique.  Comme 
aucun  fait  de  guerre  ne  s'est  produit  k  Vex- 
piration    de    I'ultimatum,     le    Consell    des 
Ministres  a  d6cid6,  le  3  aont,  k  10  heures, 
de  ne  pas  encore  faire  appel  aux  Puissan- 
ces   garantes  

13 

39 

4  aovit 

Le   Comte   de,  Lalaing   k  M. 

Davignon. 

L'Angleterre  a  somm6  PAUemagne  de  respec- 
ter la  neutralit6  de  la  Belgique.  L'ultimatum 
expire    k  minuit. 

14 

40 

4aoai 

M.   Davignon    aux    Ministres 
;  de  Grande  Bretagne,  Fran- 
ce et  Russle  k  Bruxelles. 

Les  forces  allemandes  ayant  p6n6tr6  en  Bel- 
gique,  le  Gouvemement  du  Roi  fait  appel 
k  I'Angleterre,   k  la  France  et  k  la  Russie 
pour  coop6rer,  comme  garantes.  k  la  defense 
de   son  territoire 

14 

41 

5aout 

Le   Comte   de  Lalaing  h  M. 
Davignon. 

L'Angleterre  a  d6clar6  la  guerre  k  I'AIlema- 
gne   . 

15 

42 

oaout 

M.   Davignon   aux  Legations 
k  Paris,  Londres  et  Saint- 
P6tersbourg. 

La   Belgique   fait   appel  aux   Puissances   ga- 
rantes  de   sa   neutrality 

15 

43 

5aoat 

M.   Davignon   aux  Legations 
a  Paris,  Londres  et  Saint- 
P^tersbourg. 

Expose  de  la   situation   diplomatique.    .    .    . 

15 

44 

Saoilt 

M.  Davignon  k  tous  les  Chefs 
de  mission  a  r6tranger. 

En  ve-tu  de  I'article  10  de  la  V«  Convention  de 
La  Haye  de  1907,  la  Belgique,  en  repoussant 
par  la  force  une   atteinte   k  sa   neutrality, 
ne  pose  pas  un  acte  hostile 

15 

45 

5aoul 

Le  Baron  Beyens  a  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

Le  Baron  Grenier  a  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

La    Mission    du    Roi    en    AUemagne    quittera 

15 

46 

5aout 

Le   Gouvemement  espagnol   se   charge  de  la 
protection  des  int6r6ts  beiges  en  Allemagne. 

16 

4T 

5aoat 

Le   Baron   Guillaume    k    M. 
Davignon. 

L'Allemagne  a  d6clar6  la  guerre  k  la,  France 
le  3  aotit  k  18  heures 

16- 

48 

5aout 

Sir  F.  H.  Villiers  k  M.  Davi-. 
gnon. 

L'Angleterre  accepte  de  coop6rer  comme  ga- 
rante  k  la  defense  du  territoire  beige.    .    . 

16 

49 

oaoat 

Le  Comte   de   Lalaing  k  M. 
Davignon. 

La  flotte  anglaise  assurera  le  libre  passage 
de  I'Escaut  pour  le  ravitaillement  d'Anvers. 

16 

50 

SaoCit 

Le  Barpn  FaUon  i  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

Le  balisage  de  guerre  va  6tre  6tal)ll.   (Voir 
no  29.) 

16 

51 

5aoat 

M.  Davignon  au  Baron  Gre- 
nier. 

Le  Gouvemement  du  Roi  remercle  le  Gouver- 
nement  espagnol  de  bien  vouloir  se  charger 
de  la  protection  des  int6r6ts  beiges  en  Alle- 

16 

52 

5aoat 

M.   Davignon  aux  Legations 
k  Paris,  Londres  et  Saint- 
P6tersbourg. 

La  France  et  la  Russie  acceptent  de  coop6rer 
avec  I'Angleterre  k  la  d6fense  du  territoire 
beige                    

16 

No 

Dale       j 

RESUME 

Page 

53 

6aout 

M.  de  Weede  4  M.  Davignon. 

Communication  de  la  declaration  de  neutra- 
lity des  Pays-Bas  dans  la  guerre  entre  la 
Belgiaue  et   TAlleroagne 

17 

54 

6  aoul 

M.   Davignon  au  Baron  Fal- 
lon. 

R6glementation  de  la  navigation  commerciale 
sur  I'Escaut.   (Voir  n<>  50.) 

18 

55 

6aout 

Le  Bafon  Fallon  &  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

MSme    sujet         

18 

56 

7  aoul 

M.  Davignon  au  Baron  Fal- 
lon. 

M6me    sujet 

19 

57 

7  aoul 

M.    Davignon   aux  L6gations 
a  Paris  et  4  Londres  (tel6- 
gramme). 

Le  Gbuvernement  beige  souhaite  que  la  guerre 
ne  s'etende  pas  en  .Afrique  centrale.  Les  Gou- 
vernements  frangais  et  anglais  se  rallient- 
ils   k  .notre    proposition    de    neutraliesr    le 
bassin  conventionnel  du  Congo 

19 

58 

7  aoul 

M.  Davignon  aux  L6gations 
k  Paris  et  ft  Londres. 

Lettre  pour  expliquer  le  t616gramme  precedent. 

19 

59 

8  aoul 

Le   Baron   Guillaume    h    M. 
Davignon. 

La  France  reserve  sa  r6ponse  k  la  proposition 
beige  de  neutraliser  le  bassin  du  Congo.    .    . 

19 

60 

9adai 

Le  Baron  Fallon  k  M.  Davi- 
gnon  (t616gramme) . 

Communication  d'une  nouvelle  proposition  de 
I'Allemagne    reproduisant    Tultimatum     du 
2    aoOt 

19 

01 

9  aoul 

Le    Baron  Guillaume    h    M. 
Davignon. 

Le  Gouvemement  francais  est  dispos6  k  pro- 
clamer  la  neutralit6   du  bassin   du   Congo. 
(Voir  n"  59.) 

20 

62 

10  aoul 

Le  Baron  Fallon  k  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

Transmission    du    texte   allemand    (contenant 
une    faute)    de    la  seconde    proposition    de 
I'Empire  et  d'une  traduction  (contenant  une 
autre  erreur)   de    cette  pifece.    ...... 

20 

63 

10  aoul 

M.  Davignon  au  Baron  Fal- 
lon. 

Le  Gouvemement  a  regu  les  nouvelles  propo- 
sitions   du    Gouvemement    allemand    et    y 
repondra   prochainement 

20 

64 

fOaoCil 

M.  Davignon  au  Baron  Fal- 
lon. 

Demandez  au  Gouvemement  allemand  le  sens 
qu'il  attache  au  mot  t  auseinandersetzung». 

21 

65   • 

10  aoul 

M.    Davignoil   aux   Ministres 
d'Angleterre.   de  Russia  et 
de  France. 

Le  Gouvemement  du    Roi    communique    aux 
Repr6s6ntants    des    Puissances    garantes    le 
texte  de  la  seconde  note  allemande  ainsi  que 
celui  de  la  r6ponse  qu'il  se  propose  de  faire 
k   cette    communication 

21 

66 

10  aofll 

M.   Davignon  aux  Legations 
k  Londres.  Paris  et  Saint- 
P6tersbourg. 

Les    autorit^s    luxembourgeoises   ont    pri6    le 
Ministre  du  Roi  pr6s  la  Cour  Grand-Ducale 
de  quitter  Luxembourg.  Vu  les  circonstances 
le.  Gouvemement  beige  n'a  pas  pris  une  me- 
sure  analogue  k  I'dgard  du  Repr6sentant  du 
Luxembourg  k  Bruxelles 

21 

67 

Haoat 

M.  Brand  WhiUock  k  M.  Da- 
vignon. 

Les  Etats-Unis  d'Am6rique  acceptent  de  pro- 
t6ger  les  int6r6ts  allemands  en  Belgique.    . 

21 

68 

11  aoai 

Sir  F.  H.  Villiers  k  M.  Davi- 
.gnon. 

La  Grande  Bretagne  approuve  la  r6ponse  que 
le  Gouvemement  beige  propose  de  faire  au 
second    ultimatum    de    I'Allemagne.     (Voir 
no  65 )       • 

22 

69 

11  aofli 

M.  Klobukowski  k  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

Le  Gouvemement   de    la    R6publlque    donne 
6galement  son  entifere  adh6sion  k  ce  projet 

Ho    r/Snr>r>c*»     /Vnir   n*   G.5  1                         .... 

22 

% 

12  aoiil 

Le  Baron  Fallon  h.  M-  £>&vi- 
trnon. 

Le  texte  allemand  contenait  une  faute.  Le  sens 
est :  « son  conflit  avec  la  France »  .    .    .    .    . 

22 

ii 

lUotl 

M.  Davison  eu  'pajroh  Pftl- 
ion. 

La  nouvelle  proposition  allemande  reproduit. 
la  proposition  formul6e  dans  I'ultlmatum  du 
2  aotit.  La  Belgique  ne  peut  <jue  r6it6rer  sa 
>inftr>QP  A  p.pt  ultimatum                    

22 

Date 


RESUME 

Le  Gouvernement  russe  f61icite  la  Belgique 
de  son  attitude  ferme  et  digne.  (Voir  n°  65.)  . 

La  r6ponse  du  Gouvernement  beige  k  la  se- 
conde  proposition  allemande  a  6te  remise 
le   13   aout 

La  France  n'est  plus  d'avls  de  neutraliser  le 
bassin  conventionnel  du  Congo.  (Voir  n°*  57 
et  58.) .    . 

Le  Gouvernement  anglais  refuse  de  se  rallier 
k  la  proposition  beige  de  neutraliser  le  bas- 
sin   du   Congo 

Les  Allemands  ont  atta<iu6  le  22  aoOt  le 
Congo  beige 

L'Autriche-Hongrie  declare  la  guerre  h  la 
Belgigue 

R6ponse  du  Gouvernement  beige  h  la  d6clara- 
tion  de  guerre  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie.    .    .    . 

Renseignement  sur  des  all6gations  alleman- 
des  contre  la  Belgique  mentionn6es  au  Blue 
Book  anglais 


13  aout 
13  aovit 

16  aoflt 

17  aoat 

S6  aoM 

28  aoat 

29  aout 

29  aoM 


M.  Sazonow  k  M.  Davignon. 


Le  Baron  FaUon  a  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 


Le   Baron   Guillaume    &    M. 
Davignon. 


Le  Comte   de  Lalaing  h  M. 
Davignon. 


M.  Tombeur  &  M.  Renkin. 


Le  Comte  Clary  t  M.  Davi- 
gnon. 

M.  Davignon  au  Baron  Fal- 
lon. 

M.  Davignon  h  tons  les  Chefs 
de  mission   h  r^tranger. 


24 


CORRESPONDANCE  DIPLOMATIQUE 

RELATIVE 

A  LA  GUERRE  DE  1914. 

(24  juillet-29  aout.) 


No  1. 

Leltre  adressie  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  d 
Vienne  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrang^res- 

Vienne,  le  24  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  rhonneur  de  vous  faire  parvenir,  sous 
ce  pli,  le  texte  de  rultimatum  de  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  a  la  Serbie. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Comte  Errembault  de  Dudzeele. 
Annexe  Au- No- 1. 

Le  Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  s'est 
vu  oblige  d'adresser  jeudi  le  23  de  ce  mois, 
par  I'entremise  du  Ministre  Imperial  et  Royal 
a  Belgrade,  la  note  suivante  au  Gouvemement 
Royal  de  Serbie  : 

«  Le  31  mars  1909  le  Ministre  de  Serbie  a 
,Vienne  a  fait,  d'ordre  de  son  Gouvemement, 
au  Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  la  decla- 
ration suivante  : 

« La  Serbie  reconnait  qu'elle  n'a  pas  et6 
atteinte  dans  sss  droits  par  le  fait  accompli 
cree  en  Bosnie-Herzegovine  et  qu'elle  se  con- 
formera  par  consequent  a  telle  decision  que 
les  Puissances  prendront  par  rapport  k  I'arti- 
cle  25  du  Traite  de  Berlin.  Se  rendant  aux 
conseils  des  Grandes  Puissances,  la  Serbie 
s'engage  des  a  present  a  abandonner  I'attitude 
de  protestation  et  d'opposition  qu'elle  a  obser- 
vee  a  I'egard  de  I'annexion  depuis  I'automne 
dernier,  et  elle  s'engage,  en  outre,  a  changer 
le  cours  de  sa  politique  actuelle  envers  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie  pour  vivre  desormais  avec  cette 
derniere  sur  le  pied  d'un  bon  voisinage.  » 

Or,  I'histoire  des  dernieres  ann6es,  et  notam- 
ment  les  ev6nements  douloureux  du  28-juin, 
ont  demontre  I'existence  en  Serbie  d'un  mou- 
vement  subversif  dont  le  but  est  de  detacher 
de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise  certaines 
parties  de  ses  territoires.  Ce  mouvement,  qui 
a  pris  jour  sous  les  yeux  du  Gouvernement 
serbe,  est  arrive  a  se  manifester  au  dela  du 
territoire  du  royaume  par  des  actes  de  terro- 
risme,  par  une  serie  d'attentats  et  par  des 
meurtres. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe,  loin  de  satis- 
faire  aux  engagements  formels  contenus  dans 
la  declaration  du  31  mars  1909,  n'a  rien  fait 
pour  supprimer  ce  mouvement  :  il  a  tol6r6 
I'activite  criminelle  des  diff^rentes  societes  et 
affiliations  d.irig6es  contre  la  Monarchie,  le 
langage  effrene  de  la  presse,  la  glorification 
des  auteurs  d'attentats,  la  participation  d'offi- 


ciers  et  de  fonctionnaires  dans  les  agisse- 
ments  subversifs,  une  propagande  malsaine 
dans  I'instruction  publique,  tol6re  enfin  toutes 
les  manifestations  qui  pouvaient  induire  la 
population  serbe  a  la  haine  de  la  Monarchie 
et  au  m6pris  de  ses  institutions. 

Cette  tolerance  coupable  du  Gouvernement 
Royal  de  Serbie  n'avait  pas  cesse  au  moment 
ou  les  evenements  du  28  juin  demier  en  ont 
demontre  ay  monde  entier  les  consequences 
funestes. 

II  resulte  des  depositions  et  aveux  des  au- 
teurs criminels  de  I'attentat  du  28  juin  que 
le  meurtre  de  Sarajevo  a  ete  tram6  a  Belgrade, 
que  les  armes  et  explosifs  dont  les  meurtrieris 
se  trouvaient  etre  munis  leur  ont  ete  donnes 
par  des  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  serbes  fai- 
sant  partie  de  la  «Narodna  Odbrana»,  et  enfin 
que  le  passage  en  Bosnie  des  criminels  et  de 
leurs  armes  a  et6  organist  et  effectu6  par  des 
chefs  du  service-frontiere  serbe. 

Les  resultats  mentionn^s  de  I'instruction  ne 
permettent  pas  au  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  de  poursuivre  plus  longtemps  I'attitude 
de  longanimity  expectative  qu'il  avait  observee 
pendant  des  ann6es  vis-a-vis  des  agissements 
concentres  a  Belgrade  et  propages  de  la  sur 
les  territoires  de  la  Monarchie;  ces  resultats 
lui  imposent  au  contraire  le  devoir  de  mettre 
fin  a  des  menees  qui  forment  une  menace 
perpetuelle  pour  la  tranquillite  de  la  Monar- 
chie. 

C'est  pour  atteindre  ce  but  que  le  Gouver- 
nement Imp^cial  et  Royal  se  voit  'oblig6  de 
demander  au  Gouvemement  serbe  I'enoncia- 
tion  offioielle  qu'il  condamne  la  propaganda- 
dirigee  contre  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise,' 
c'est-a-d*ire  I'ensemble  des  tendances  qui  aspi- 
rent  en  dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monar- 
chie des  territoires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  qu'il. 
s'engage  a  supprimer,  par  tons  les  moyens, 
cette  propagande  criminelle  et  terroriste. 

Afin  de  donner  un  caractere  solennel  h.  cet 
engagement,  le  Gouvernement  RoyaLde  Serbie 
fera  publier  a  la  prefniere  page  du  "Journal 
officiel"  en  date  du  26  juin  (13  juillet)  I'enon- 
ciation  suivante  : 

«  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  de  Serbie  con- 
damne la  propagande  dirig6e  contre  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie,  c'est-a-dire  I'ensemble  des  tendances 
.aui  aspirent  en  dernier  lieu  k  detacher  de"  la 
Monarchie  austro-hongroise  des  territoires  qui 
en  font  partie,  et  il  deplore  sinc6rement  les 
consequences  funestes  de  ces  agissements  cri- 
minels. 

»  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  regrette  que  des 
officiers  et  ionctionnaires  serbes  aient  parti- 
cipe  a  la  propagande  susmentionnee  et  com- 
promis  par  la  les  .relations  de  bon  voisinage 


auquel  le  Gouvernemenf  Royal  s*!§tait  solen- 
nellement  engage  par  sa  declaration  du  31 
mars    1909. 

»  Le  Gouvernement  Royal,  qui  desapprouve 
et  repudie  toute  idee  ou  tentative  d'immixtion 
dans  les  destinees  des  habitants  de  quelque 
partie  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  con- 
sidere  de  son  devoir  d'avertir  formellement 
les  officiers,  les  fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  po- 
pulation du  royaume  que  dorenavant  il  pro- 
cedera  avec  la  derniere  rigueur ;  contre  les' 
personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables  de 
pareils  agissements  qu'il  mettra  tons  ses  ef- 
forts a  prevenir  et  a  reprimer.  » 

Cette  enonciation  sera  portee  simultan^ment 
^  la  connaissance  de  I'Armee  >Royale  par  un 
ordre  du  jour  de  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  et  sera 
publiee  dans  le  "Bulletin  officiel»  de  I'armee. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe  s'engage  en 
outre: 

r  a  supprimer  toute  publication  qui  excite 
a  la  haine  et  au  mepris  de  la  Monarchic  et 
dont  la  tendance  generale  est  dirigee  contre 
son   integrite  territoriale, 

2°  a  dissoudre  immediatement  la  societe  dite 
«  Narodna  Odbrana  »,  a  confisquer  tous  ses 
moyens  de  propagande,  et  k  proceder  de  la 
m6me  mani^re  contre  les  autres  societes  et 
affiliations  en  Serbie  qui  s'adonnent  a' la  pro- 
pagande contre  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroi- 
se;  le  Gouvernement  Royal  prendra  les  mesu- 
res  necessaires  pour  que  les  societes  dissoutes 
ne  puissent  pas  continuer  leur  activite  sous  un 
autre  nom  et  sous  une  autre  forme, 

3°  a  eliminer  sans  delai  de  I'instruction 
publique  en  Serbie,  tant  en  ce  qui  concerne 
le  corps  enseignant  que  les  moyens  d'instruc- 
tion,  tout  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourrait  servir  a 
fomenter  la  propagande  contre  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie, 

^  4°  h  Eloigner  du  service  militaire  et  de 
I'administration  en  general  tous  les  officiers 
et  fonctionnaires  coupables  de  la  propagande 
contre  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise  ef  dont 
le  Gouvernement  linp^rial  et  Royal,  se  reserve 
de  communiquer  les  noms  et  les  fails  au  Gou- 
vernement Royal, 

5°  k  accepter  la  collaboration  en  Serbie  des 
organes  du  Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
dans  la  suppression  du  mouvement  subversif 
dirige  contre  I'int^grite  territoriale  de  la  Mo- 
narchie, 

6°  k  ouvrir  une  enquSte  judiciaire  contre  les 
partisans  du  complot  du  28  juin  se  trouvant 
sur  territoire  serbe; 

des  organes,  del6gues  par  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal,  prendront  part  aux  recher- 
ches  y  relatives, 

T  k  proceder  d'urgence  k  I'arrestation  du 
Commandant  Voija  Tankosic  et  du  nomme 
Milan  Ciganovic,  employ^  de  I'Etat  serbe, com- 
promis  par  les  r^sultats  de  instruction  de 
Sarajevo, 

8°  k  empgcher,  par  des  mesures  efficaces, 
le  concours  des  autorit6s  serbes  dans  le  trafic 
illicite  'd'armes  et  d'explosifs  k  travers  la 
frontiers; 

k  licencier  et  punir  s^v^rement  les  fonction- 
naires du  service-fronti^re  de  Schabatz  et  de 
Loznica  coupables  d'avoir  aid6  les  auteilrs  du 
crime  de  Sarajevo  en  leur  facilitant  le  passage 
de  la  fronti^re, 

9°  k  donner  au  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  des  explications  sur  les  propos  injus- 
lifiables  de  hauls  fonctionnaires  serbes  tant 
en  Serbie  qu'k  I'^tranger,  qui,  malgr6  leur 


position  officielle,  n'ont  pas  h6sit6  aprfes  I'at- 
tentat  du  28  juin  de  s'exprimer  dans  des 
interview's  d'une  maniere  hostile  envers  la 
Monarchic  austro-hongroise,  enfin 

10°  d'avertir,  sans  retard,  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal  de  I'execution  des  mesures 
comprises  dans  les  points  precedents. 

Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  attend 
la  reponse  du  Gouvernement  Royal  au  plus 
tard  jusqu'au  samedi,  25  de  ce  mois,  a  6  heu- 
res  du  soir- 

Un  memoire  concernant  les  resultats  de  I'in- 
struction  de  Sarajevo  a  I'egard  des  fonction- 
naires mentionnes  aux  points  7  et  8  est  annexe 
a  cette  note. 

J'ai  I'honneur  d'inviter  votre  Excellence  de 
vouloir  porter  le  contenu  de  cette  note  a  la 
connaissance  du  Gouvernement  aupres  duquel 
vous  etes  accredite,  en  accompagnant  cette 
communication-  du  commentaire  que  voici   : 

Le  31  mars  1909,  le  Gouvernement  Royal 
serbe  a  adresse  a  I'Autriche-Hongrie  la  decla- 
ration dont  le  texte  est  reproduit  ci-dessus. 

Le  lendemain  mgme  de  cette  declaration  la 
Serbie  s'est  engagee  dans  une  politique  ten- 
dant  k  inspirer  des  id6es  subversives  aux  res- 
sortissants  serbes  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hon- 
groise et  a  preparer  ainsi  la  separation  des 
territoires  austro-hongrois,  limitrophes  k  la 
Serbie. 

La  Serbie  devint  le  foyer  d'une  agitation 
criminelle. 

Des  societes  et  affiliations  ne  tarderent  pas 
a  se  former  qui,  soit  ouvertement,  soit  clan- 
destinement,  6taient  destinees  k  cr6er  des  des- 
ordres  sur  le  territoire  austro-hongrois.  Ces 
societes  et  affiliations  comptent  parmi  leurs 
membres  des  generaux  et  des  diplomates,  des 
fonctionnaires  d'Etat  et  des  juges,  bref  les 
sommites  du  monde  officiel  et  inofficiel  du 
royaume. 

Le  journalisme  serbe  est  presque  entifere- 
ment  au  service  de  cette  propagande,  dirig6e 
contre  I'Autriche-Hongrie,  et  pas  un  jour  ne 
passe  sans  que  les  organes  de  la  presse  serbe- 
n'excitent  leurs  lecteurs  k  la  haine  et  au  me- 
pris de  la  Monarchic  voisine  ou  a  des  attentats 
dirig^s  plus  ou  moins  ouvertement  contre  sa 
surete  et  son  int6grit6. 

Un  grand  nombre  d'agents  est  appel6  k  sou- 
tenir  par  tous  les  moyens  I'agitation  contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  k  corrompre  dans  les 
provinces  limitrophes  la  jeunesse  de  ces  pays. 

L'esprit  conspirateur  des  politiciens  serbes, 
esprit  dont  les  annales  du  royaume  portent 
les  sanglantes  empreintes,  a  subi  une  recru- 
descence depuis  la  derniere  crise  balkanique; 
des  individus  ayant  fait  partie  des  bandes  jus- 
que-la  occupees  en  Mac6doine  sont  venus  se 
mettre  a  la  disposition  de  la  propagande  ter- 
roriste  contre  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En  presence  de  ces  agissements,  auxquels 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  est  expos6e  depuis  des  an- 
n^es,  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Serbie  n'a  paf 
cru  devoir  prendre  la  moindre  mesure.  C'est 
ainsi  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  a  manqu6  au 
devoir  que  lui  imposait  la  declaration  solen- 
nelle  du  31  mars  1909,  et  c'est  ainsi  qu'il  s'est 
mis  en  contradiction  avec  la  volont6  de  I'Eu- 
rope  et  avec  I'engagement  qu'il  avait  pris  vis- 
^-vis  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

La  longanimity  du  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  k  I'egard  de  I'attitude  provocatrice 
d3  la  Serbie  6tait  inspir6e  du  d6sint6ressement 
territorial  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongrois9 
et  de  I'espoir  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  fini- 


-    3    - 


fait  tout  de  m6me  par  appr^cier  a  sa  juste 
valeur  I'amitie  de  I'Autriche-HoTigrie.  En  ob- 
servant une  attitude  bienveillante  pour  ies 
intergts  politiques  de  la  Serbie,  le  Gouverne- 
ment  Imperial  et  Royal  esperait  que  le  royau- 
me  se  deciderait  finalement  a  suivre  de  son 
cote  une  ligne  de  conduite  analogue.  L'Autri- 
che-Hongrie  s'attendait  surtout  a  une  pareille 
evolution  dans  Ies  idees  politiques  en  Serbie, 
lorsque,  apres  Ies  evenements  de  I'annee  1912, 
le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  rendit  pos- 
sible, par  une  attitude  desinteressee  et  sans 
rancune,  Tagrandissement  si  considerable  de 
la  Serbie. 

Cette  bienveillance  manifestee  par  I'Autri- 
che-Hongrie  a  I'egard  de  FEtat  voisin  n'a  ce- 
pendant  aucunement  modifie  Ies  procedes  du 
royaume,  qui  a  continue  a  tolerer  sur  son 
territoire  une  propagande,  dont  Ies  funestes 
consequences  se  sont  manifestees  au  monde 
entier  le  28  juin  dernier,  jour  ou  I'heritier 
presomptif  de  la  Monarchie  et  son  illustre 
epouse  devinrent  Ies  victimes  d'un  complot 
trame  a  Belgrade. 

En  presence  de  cet  6tat  de  choses  le.  Gou- 
vernement Imperial  et  Royal  a  du  se  decider 
ci  entreprendre  de  nouvelles  et  pressantes  de- 
marches a  Belgrade  afin  d'amener  le  Gouver- 
nement serbe  a  arreter  le  mouvement  incen- 
diaire  menagant  la  surete  et  I'integrite  de  la 
Monarchie  austro-hongroise. 

Le  Gouvernement  Impetial  et  Royal  est  per- 
suade qu'en  entreprenant  cette  demarche  il 
se  trouve  en  plein  accord  avec  Ies  sentiments 
de  toutes  Ies  nations  civilisees,qui  ne  sauraient 
admettre  que  le  regicide  devint  une  arme  dont 
on  puisse  se  servir  impunement  dans  la  lutte 
politique,  et  que  la  paix  europeenne  fut  con- 
tinuellement  troublee  par  Ies  agissements  par- 
tant  de  Belgrade. 

C'est  a  I'appui  de  ce  qui-  precede  que  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  tient  a  la 
disposition  du  Gouvernement  Royal  de  Gran- 
de-Bretagne  un  dossier  elucidant  Ies  menees 
serbes  et  Ies  rapports  existanfentre  ces  menees 
et  le  meurtre  du  28  juin- 

Une  communication  identique  est  adress6e 
aux  representants  Imperiaux  et  Royaux  au- 
pres  des  autres  Puissances  signataires. 

Vous  etes  autorise  de  laisser  une  copie  de 
cette  depeche  entre  Ies  mains  de  M.  le  Mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  24  juillet    1914. 

Annexe. 

L'instruction  criminelle  ouverte  par  le  Tri- 
bunal de  Sarajevo  contre  Gavrila  Princip  et 
consorts  du  chef  d'assassinat  et  de  complicite 
y  relative  —  crime  commis  par  eux  le  28  juin 
dernier  —  a  jusqu'ici  abouti  aux  constatations 
suivantes  • 

r  Le  complot  ayant  pour  but  d'assassiner, 
lors  de  son  sejour  a  Sarajevo,  I'Archiduc 
Frangois-Ferdinand  fut  forme  a  Belgrade  par 
Gavrilo  Princip,  Nedeljko  Cabrinovic,  le  nom- 
ine Milan  Ciganovic  et  Trifko  Grabez  avec 
le  concours  du  commandant  Voija  Tankosic. 

2°  Les  6  bombes  et  Ies  4  pistolets  Browning 
avec  munition,  moyennant  lesquels  les  mal- 
faiteurs  ont  commis  I'attentat,  furent  livr6s 
ci  .Belgrade  a  Princip,  Cabrinovic  et  Grabez 
par  le  nomm6  Milan  Ciganovic  et  le  comman- 
dant Voija  Tankosic 


3'  Les  bombes  sont  des  grenades  2l  la  mam 
provenant  du  depdt  d'armes  de  I'arm^e- serbe 
a  Kragujevac. 

4"  Pour  assurer  la  r6ussite  de  Fattentat, 
Ciganovic  enseigna  a  Princip,  Cabrinovic  et. 
Grabez  la  mani^re  de  se  servir  des  grenades  et 
donna,  dans  une  foret  pres  du  champ  de  tir 
a  Topschider,  des  legons  de  tir  avec  pistolets 
Browning  a  Princip  et  Grabez. 

5°  Pour  rendre  possible  a  Princip,  Cabri- 
novic et  Grabez  de  passer  la  frontiere  de  Bos- 
nie-Herzegovine  et  d'y  introduire  clandestine- 
ment  leur  contrebande  d'armes, .  un,  systeme 
de  transport  secret^ fut  organise  par  Ciganovic. 

D'apres  cette  organisation  I'introduction  en 
Bosnie-Herzegovine  des  malfaiteurs  et  de  leurs 
armes  fut  operee  par  leS  capitaines-frontieres 
de  Chabac  (Rade  Popovic)  et  de  Loznica  ainsi 
que  par  le  douanier  Rudivoj  Grbic  de  Loz- 
nica avec  le  concours  de  divers  particuliers. 


N°  2. 

Lettre  adressSe  par  M.  Davignon,  Mmistre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Rot 
a  Paris,  Berlin,  Londres,  Vienne  et  Saini- 
Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  24  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  s'est  demande  si, 
dans  les  circonstances  actuelles^  il  n'y  aurait 
pas  lieu  d'adresser  aux  Puissances  qui  ont 
garanti  son  independance  et  sa  neutralite,  une 
communication  destinee  a  leur  confirmer  sa 
resolution  de  remplir  les  devoirs  internatio- 
naux  que  lui  imposent  les  traites  au  cas  ou  une 
guerre  viendrait  a  6clater  aux  frontieres  de  la 
Belgique- 

II  a  ete  amene  ci  la  conclusion  qu'une  telle 
communication  serait  prematuree.  a  I'heure 
presente  mais  que  les  evenements  pourraient 
S3  precipiter  et  ne  point  lui  laisser  le  temps 
de  faire  parvenir,  au  moment  voulu,  les 
instructions  opportunes  a  ses  repres6ntants 
a  I'etranger. 

Dans  cette  situation,  j'ai  propose  au  Roi  et 
a  mes  collegues  du  Cabinet,  qui  se  sont  ral- 
lies a  ma  maniere  de  voir,  de  vous  donner, 
des  a  present,  des  indications  precises  sur  la 
demarche  que  vous  auriez  a  faire  si  I'eventua- 
lite  d'une  guerre  franco-allemande  deven^it 
plus  menagante. 

Vous  trouverez,  sous  ce  pli,  une  lettre 
sign6e,  mais  non  datee  dont  vous  aurez  k  don- 
ner lecture  et  a  laisser  copie  au  Ministre  des 
Affaires  etrangeres  si  les  circonstances  exigent 
cette  communication. 

Je  vous  indiquerai  par  t^legramme  le  mo- 
ment d'agir. 

Le  telegramme  vous  sera  adresse  a  I'heure 
ou  la  mobilisation  de  I'armee  beige  sera  de- 
cretee,  si,  contrairement  ci  notre  sincere  espoir, 
et  aux  apparences  de  solution  paeifique,  nos 
renssignements  nous  amenaient  k  prendre 
cette  mesure  extreme  de  precaution. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 

Annexe  au  N"  2. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

La  situation  internationale  est  grave;  I'^ven- 
tualit6  d'un  conflit  entre  plusieurs  puissances 


4    — 


ne  peut  Sire  6cart6e  des  preoccupations  du 
gouvernement  du  Roi. 

La  Belgique  a  observ6  avec  la  plus  scrupu- 
leusG  exactitude  les  devoirs  d'Etat  neutre  que 
lui  imposent  les  traites  du  19  avril  1839.  Ges 
devoirs,  elle  s'attachera  inebranlablement.  a 
les  remplir,  quelles  que  soient  les  circonstan- 
ces. 

Les  dispositions  amicales  des  puissances  k 
son  egard  ont  ete  affirmees  si  souvent  que  la 
Belgique  a  la  confiance  de  voir  son  territoire 
demeurer  hors  de  toute  atleinte  si  des  hosti- 
lites  venaient  a  se  produire  a  ses  frontieres. 

Toutes  les  mesuves  necessaires  pour  assurer 
I'observation  de  sa  neutralite  n'en  ont  pas 
moins  ete  prises  par  le  Gouvernement  du  Roi. 
L'armee  beige  est  mobilisee  et  se  porte  sur 
les  positions  strategiques  choisies  pour  assurer 
la  defense  du  pays  et  le  respect  de  sa  neutra- 
lite. Les  forts  d'Anvers  et  de  la  Meuse  sont 
en  etat  de  defense. 

II  est  a  peine  necessaire,  Monsieur  le  Mi- 
nistre,  d'insister  sur  le  caractere  de  ces  mesu- 
res.  Elles  n'ont  d'autre  but  que  de  mettre  la 
Belgique  en  situation  de  remplir  ses  obliga- 
tions Internationales;  elles  ne  sont  et  n'ont  pu 
6tre  inspirees,  cela  va  de  soi,  ni  par  le  dessein 
de  prendre  part  a  une  lutte  armee  des  puis- 
sances, ni  par  un  sentiment  de  defiance  envers 
aucune  d'elles. 

Me  conformant  aux  ordres  regus,  j'ai  I'hon- 
neur  de  remettre  a  Votre  Excellence  une  copie 
de  la  declaration  du  gouvernement  du  Roi  et 
de  La  prier  de  bien  vouloir  en  prendre  acte. 

Une  communication  identique  a  ete  faite  aux 
autres  Puissances  garantes  de  la  neutralite 
beige. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 


Nf>  3. 

Letlrc  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Minislre 
des  Affaires  E/rangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
a  Rome,  La  Uaije  et  Luxembourg . 

Bruxelles,  le  25  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  adresse  h.  vos  Collegues  accredit^s  au- 
pres  des  Puissances  garantes  de  I'indepen- 
dance  et  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  une 
circulaire,  sans  date,  dent  vous  trouverez  le 
texte  sous  ce  pli. 

Si  la  menace  d'une  guerre  franco-allemande 
devenait  imminente,  cette  circulaire  serait 
communiquee  aux  Gouvernements  des  Puis- 
sances garantes,  pour  leur  faire  connaitre  no- 
tre  resolution  bien  arret^e  de  remplir  les  de- 
voirs internationaux  que  nous  imposent  les 
traites  de  1839. 

La  communication  dont  il  s'agit  ne  serait 
effectuee  que  sur  un  ordre  tel6graphique  de 
ma  part. 

Si  les  circonstances  m'amenent  a  donner  cet 
ordre,  je  vous  prierai,  egalement  par  la  voie 
lelegraphique,  de  donner  connaissance  de  no- 
ire demarche  au  gouvernement  aupres  duquel 
vous  etes  accredite,  en  lui  communiquant  une 
copie  de  la  circulaire  ci-jointe,  a  titre  de  ren- 
seignement,  et  sans  demander  qu'il  vous  soit 
donne  acte  de  cette  communication. 

Mon  t616gramme  vous  indiquerait,  eventuel- 
lement,  la  date  qui  devrait  etre  attribute  a 
la  circulaire,  date  que  vous  auriez  soin  d'in- 
scrire  sur  la  copie  que  vous  remettriez  au 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrang^res. 


!1  va  de  soi  que  la  pr6sente  d^peche  et  son 
annexe  doivent  conserver  un  caractere  stric- 
tement  confidentiel,  jusqu'au  recu  de  nouvel- 
les  instructions  de  ma  part. 

(s)  Dg.vignon, 

Annexe  au  N"  3. 

(Voir  Vannexe  au  N°  2.) 


N"  4. 

Lethe  adressee  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  d.  Bel- 
grade a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Elranghres. 

Belgrade,  le  25  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  parvenir,  sous 
ce  pli,  le  texte  de  la  reponse  faite  par  le  gou- 
vernem.ent  serbe  k  la  communication  austro- 
hongroise  du  10/23  juillet. 

Veuillez  agr^er,  etc. 

(s)  Michotte  de  Welle. 

Annexe  au  N°  4. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe  a  rcQu  la 
communication  du  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  du  10  de  ce  mois  et  il  est  persuade  que 
sa  reponse  eloignera  tout  malentendu  qui  me- 
nace de  gatcr  les  bons  rapports  de  voisinage 
entre  la  Monarchic  auslro-hongroise  et  le 
Royaume  de  Serbie. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  conscient  que  les 
protestations  qui  ont  apparu  tant  de  la  tribune 
de  la  Skoupchtina  nationale  que  dans  les  de- 
clarations et  les  actes  des  representants  res- 
ponsables  de  I'Elat,  protestations  qui  furent 
coupees  court  par  les  declarations  du  Gouver- 
nement serbe,  faites  le  18  mars  1909,  ne  se 
sont  plus  renouvel6es  vis-a-vis  de  la  grande 
Monarchic  voisine  en  aucune  occasion  et  que, 
depuis  ce  temps,  autanl  de  la  part  des  Gouver- 
nements Royaux  qui  se  sont  succede  que  de 
la  part  de  leurs  organes,  aucune  tentative  n'a 
ete  faite  dans  le  but  de  changer  I'etat  de 
choses  politique  et  juridique  cre6  en  Bosnie 
et  Herz6govine,  le  Gouvernement  Royal  con- 
state que  sous  ce  rapport  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal  n'a  fait  aucune  represen- 
tation, sauf  en  ce  qui  concerne  un  livre  sco- 
laire,  et  au  sujet  de  laquelle  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal  a  regu  une  explication  en- 
tierement  satisfaisante.  La  Serbie  a  de  nom- 
breuses  fois  donn6  des  preuves  de  sa  politique 
pacifique  et  moderee  pendant  la  duree  de  la 
crise  balkanique,  et  c'est  grace  a  la  Serbie 
et  au  sacrifice  qu'elle  a  fait  dans  I'interet 
exclusif  de  la  paix  europeenne  que  cette  paix 
a  ete  pr6serv6e.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  ne 
peut  pas  etre  rendu  responsable  pour  les 
manifestations  d'un  caractere  priv6,  telles  que 
les  articles  des  journaux  et  le  travail  paisible 
des  societes,  manifestations  qui  se  produisent 
dans  prcsque  tous  les  pays  comme  une  chose 
ordinaire  et  qui  6chappe,  en  regie  generale, 
au  controle  officiel,d'autant  moins  que  le  Gou- 
vernement Royal,  lors  de  la  solution  dc  toute 
une  s6rie  de  questions  qui  se  sont  presentees 
entre  la  Serbie  et  I'Autriche-Hongrie,  a  montr6 
une  grande  provenance  et  a  r6ussi,  de  cette 
fagon,  a  en  regler  le  plus  grand  nombre  au 
profit  du  progrOs  des  deux  pays  voisins. 


5    - 


C'est  pourquoi  le  Gouvernement  Royal,  4 
dt6  peniblement  surpris  par  les  affirmations, 
d'apres  lesquelles  des  personnes  du  Royaume 
de  Serbie  auraient  participe  a  la  preparation 
de  Tattentat  commis  a  Sarajevo;  il  s'attendait 
a  ce  qu'il  soit  invite  a  collaborer  a  la  recherche 
de  tout  ce  qui  se  rapporte  a  ce  crime,  et  \\ 
etait  pret,  pOur  prouver  son  entiere  correc-. 
tion,  a  agir  contre  toules  les  personnes  a  re- 
gard desquelles  des  communications  lui  se- 
raient  faites,  se  rendant  done  au  desir  du 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal,  est  dispos6 
h,  remettre  au  Tribunal  tout  sujet  serbe,  san^ 
6gard  ci  sa  situation  et  a  son  rang,  pour  la 
complicity  duquel,  dans  le  crime  de  Sarajevo, 
des  preuves  lui  seraient  fournies,  et  speciale- 
ment,  il  s'engage  a  faire  publier  h  la  premiere 
page  du  "Journal  of ficiel»  en  date  du  13  .(26) 
juillet,  Fenonciation  suivante  : 

«Le  Gouvernement  Royal  de  Serbie  condam- 
ne  toute  propagande  qui  serait  dirigee  contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie,  c'est-a-dire  I'ensemble  des 
tendances  qui  aspirent  en  dernier  lieu  a  deta- 
cher de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise  des 
territoires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  il  deplore  sin- 
cerement  les  consequences  funestes  de  ces 
agissements  criminels.Le  Gouvernement  Royal 
regrette  que  certains  officiers  et  fonctionnaires 
serbes  aient  participe,  d'apres  la  communica- 
tion du  Gouvernement  Royal  et  Imperial,  a 
!Ia  propagande  susmentionnee,  et  compromis 
par  la  les  relations  de  bon  voisinage  auxquel- 
les  le  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe  etait  solen- 
nellement  engage  par  sa  declaration  du  31 
mars  1909,  qui  desapprouve  et  repudie  toute 
idee  ou  tentative  d'une  immixtion  dans  les 
destinees  des  habitants  de  quelque  partie  de 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  consid^re  de 
son  devoir  d'avertir  formellement  les  officiers 
et  fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  population  du 
royaume  que,  dorenavant,  il  procedera  avec 
la  derniere  rigueur  contre  les  personnes  qui 
se  rendraient  coupables  de  pareils  agissements, 
qu'il  mettra  tous  ses  efforts  a  prevenir  et  a 
r6primer.» 

Gette  enonciation  sera  portee  h  la  connais- 
sance  de  I'arm^e  Royale  par  un  ordre  du  jour, 
au  nom  de  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi,  par  Son  Altesse 
Royale  le  Prince  heritier  Alexandre,  et  sera 
public  dans  le  prochain  bulletin  officiel  de 
I'armee. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  s'engage  en  outre  : 

1.  D'introduire  dans  la  premiere  convocation 
reguliere  de  la  Sk6upchtina  uhe  disposition 
dans  la  loi  de  la  presse,par  laquelle  sera  punie 
de  la  maniere  la  plus  severe  la  provocation 
a  la  haine  et  au  mepris  de  la  Monarchic 
austro-hongroise,  ainsi  que  contre  toute  publi- 
cation dont  la  tendance  generale  serait  dirigee 
contre  I'integrite  territoriale  de  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie.  II  se  charge^  lors  de  la  revision  de 
la  Constitution,  qui  est  prochaine,  a  faire 
introduire  dans  I'article  22  de  la  Constitution 
un  amendement  de  telle  sorte  que  les  publi- 
cations ci-dessus  puissent  etre  confisquees,  ce 
qui  actuellement  aux  termes  categoriques  de 
Particle  22  de  la  Constitution  est  impossible. 

2.  Le  Gouvernement  ne  possede  aucune 
preuve  et  la  note  du  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  ne  lui  en  fournit  non  plus  aucune 
que  la  soci6te  «Narodna  Odbrana»  et  autres 
societes  similaires  aient  commis,  jusqu'a  ce 
jour  quelques  actes  criminels  de  ce  genre,  par 
le  fait  d'un  de  leurs  membres.  Neanmoins,  le 
Gouvernement  Royal  acceptera  la  demande  du 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  et  dissoudra 
la  societe  «Narodna  Odbrana»  et  toute  autre 
society  qui  agirait  contre  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 


3.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe  s'engage 
a  eliminer  sans  delais  de  I'rnslruction  publi- 

,que  en  Serbie  dans  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourrait 
servir  ^  fomenter  la  propagande  contre  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie, quand  le  Gouvernement  Im- 
perial et  Royal  lui  fournira  des  fails  et  des 
preuveS  de  cette  propagande. 

4.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  accepte  de  meme 
h,  Eloigner  du  service  militaire  ceux  pour  qui 
I'enquete  judiciaire  aura  prouve  qu'ils  sont 
coupables  d'actes  diriges  contre  I'integrite  du 
territoire  de  la.  Monarchic  austro-hongroise, 
et  il  attend  que  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  lui  communique  ult6rieurement  les 
noms  et  les  fails  de  ces  officiers  et  fonction- 
naires aux  fins  de  la  procedure  qui  doit  s'en- 
suivre.  .        , 

5.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  doit  avouer  qu'il 
ne  se  rend  pas  clairement  compte  du  sens 
et  de  la  portee  de  la  demande  du  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  que  la  Serbie  s'engage 
ci  accepter  sur  son  territoire  la  collaboration 
des  organes  du  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal,  mais  il  declare  qu'il  admettra  la  colla- 
boration qui  repondrait  aux  principes  du  droit 
international  et  h  la  procedure  criminelle  ainsi 
qu'aux  bons  rapports  de  voisinage. 

6.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal,  cela  va  de  soi, 
considere  de  son  devoir  d'ouvrir  une  enquete. 
contre  tous  ceux  qui  sont  ou  qui,  eventuelle- 
ment,  auraient  ete  meles  au  complot  du  15 
juin,  et  qui  se  trouveraient  sur  le  territoire 
du  royaume.  Quant  ci  la  participation  a  cette 
enquSte  des  agents  ou  autorites  austro-hon- 
grois  qui  seraient  delegues  a  cet  effet  par  le 
Gouyernement  Imperial  et  Royal,  le  Gouver- 
nement Royal  ne  pent  pas  I'accepter,  car  ce 
serait  une  violation  de  la  Constitution  et  de- 
la  loi  sur  la  procedure  criminelle;  cependant 
dans  des  cas  concrets  des  communications  sur 
les  r6sultats  de  I'instruction  en  question  pour- 
raient  etre  donnees  aux  agents  austro-hon- 
grois. 

7.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  a  fait  proceder, 
d^s  le  soir  meme  de  la  remise  de  la  note,  a 
I'arrestation  du  Commandant  Voislav  Tankos- 
sitch.  Quant  a  Milan  Ziganovitch,  qui  est  su- 
jet de  la  Monarchic  austro-hojigroise  et  qui 
jusqu'au  15  juin  6tait  employe  (comme  aspi- 
rant) a  la  direction  des  chemins  de  feri  il  h'a 
pas  pu  encore  Stre  arrSte. 

Le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  est  prie  de 
vouloir  bien,  dans  la  forme  accoutumee,  faire 
connaitre  le  plus  tot  possible,,  les  pr^somptions 
de  culpabilite  ainsi  que  les  preuves  6ventuelles 
de  leur  pulpabilite  qui  ont  et6  recueillies  jus- 
qu'^  ce  jour  par  I'enquSte  h  Sarajevo,  aux 
fins  d'enquete  ult6rieure. 

8.  Le  Gouvernement  serbe  renforcera  et 
etendra  les  mesures  prises  pour  emp§cher  le 
trafic  illicite  d'armes  et  d'explpsifs  h  travers 
la  frontiere.  II  va  de  soi  qu'il  ordonnera  de 
suite  une  enquete  et  punira  s6verement  les 
fonctionnaires  des  frontiferes  sur  la  ligne  Scha- 
batz-Loznitza  qui  ont  manqu6  k  leurs  devoirs 
et  laisse  passer  les  auteurs  du  crime  de  Sara- 
jevo. 

9.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  donnera  volon- 
tiers  des  explications  sur  les  propos  que  ses 
fonctionnaires,  tant  en  Serbie  qu'a  I'^tranger, 
ont  eu  apres  I'attentat  dans  des  entrevues  et 
qui,  d'apres  I'affirmation  du  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal,  ont  6t6  hostiles  envers  la 
Monarchic,  d^s  que  le  Gouvernement  Impe- 
rial et  Royal  lui  aura  communique  les  passa- 
ges en  question  de  ces  propos,  et  des  qu'il 
aura  demontre  que  les  propos  employes  ont, 
en  effet,  616  tenus  par  lesdits  fonctionnaires, 


6      - 


quoique  le  Gouvernement  Royal  Iu)-m6mt 
aura  soin  de.  recueillir  des  preuves  et  con 
victions. 

10.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  informera  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  de  I'ex^cu 
tion  des  mesures  comprises  dans  les  points 
precedents  en  tant  que  cela  n'a  pas  ete  dejcJ 
fait  par  la  presente  note,  aussitot  que  chaque 
mesure  aura  ete  ordonnee  et  executee 

Dans  le  cas  ou  le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  ne  serait  pas  satisfait  de  cette  reponse, 
le  Gouvernement  serbe,  considerant  qu'il  est 
de  I'interet  commun  de  ne  pas  precipiter  la 
solution  de  cette  question,  est  pret  comme 
toujours  d'accepter  une  entente  pacifique,  soit 
en  remettant  cette  question  a  la  decision  du 
Tribunal  international  de  La  Haye,  soit  aux 
Grandes  Puissances  qui  ont  pris  part  a  I'ela- 
boration  de  la  declaration  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment serbe  a  faite  le  18  (3l)  mars  1909 

Belgrade,  le  12  (25)  juUlet    1914. 


N°  5, 

Communication  faite  le  26  juillet  1914  par 
la  Legation  d" Autriche-Hongrie  a  Bruxelles  a 
M.  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

M.  Pachitch  a  donne  hier  avant  6  heures 
la  reponse  du'  Gouvernement  serbe  a  la  note 
austro-hongroise.  Cette  reponse  n'ayant  pas 
ete  jugee  satisfaisante,  les  relations  diploma- 
tiques  ont  ete  rompues  et  le  Ministre  et  le 
personnel  de  la  Legation  d'Autriche  ont  quitt6 
Belgrade.  La  mobilisation  serbe  avail  et6  de- 
cretee  deja  avant  3  heures. 


No  6. 

T^legramme  adresse  par  le  Baron  Beyens, 
Ministre  du  Roi  a  Berlin,  a  M  Davignon, 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Berlin,  27  juillet  1914. 

D'apr^B  un  t§legramme  du  Charge  d'Affaires 
Britannique  a  Belgrade,  le  Gouvernement  ser- 
be a  cede  sur  tous  les  points  de  la  note  autri- 
chienne.  II  admet  meme  I'immixtion  de  fonc- 
tionnaires  autrichiens  si  c^lle-ci  pent  s'accor- 
der  avec  les  usages  du  droit  des  gens.  Le 
Charge  d'Affaires  Britannique  estime  que  cette 
reponse  devrait  satisfaire  I'Autriche  dans  le 
cas  ou  celle-ci  ne  voudrait  pas  la  guerre. 
N^anmoins  I'impression  est  plus  favorable  ici 
aujourd'hui,  surtout  parce  que  les  hostilites 
centre  la  Serbie  n'ont  pas  commence.  Le  Gou- 
vernement Britannique  propose  I'intervention 
de  I'Angleterre,  de  I'Allemagne,  de  la  France 
et  de  ritalie  a  Sainl-Petersbourg  et  a  Vienne 
pour  trouver  un  terrain  de  conciliation.  L'Al- 
lemagne  seule  n'a  pas  encore  repondu.  L'Em- 
pereur  d6cidera. 


Lettre  adressee  par  M  Damgnon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  awr  Minis/res  du  Roi 
d  Berlin,  Pari!,,  Londrrs,  Vienne.  Saint-Pe 
lersbourg,  Romi-    La  Hayr.-  Luxembourg 

Bruxelles,  le  29  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  a  decid6  de  mettre 
I'armee  sur  le  pied  de  paix  renforce 

Cette  mesure  ne  doit  etre  en  aucune  fa^on 
confondue  avec  la  mobilisation. 

A  cause  du  peu  d'etendue  de  son  territoire, 
la  Belgique  toute  entiere  constitue  en  quelque 
sorte  une  zone  frontiere.  Son  armee,  sur  le 
pied  de  paix  ordinaire,  ne  comporte  qu'une 
classe  de  milice  sous  les  armes.  Sur  le  pied 
de  paix  renforce  ses  divisions  d'armee  et  sa 
division  de  cavalerie,  grace  au  rappel  de'  3 
classes  ont  des  effectifs  analogues  a  ceux  des 
corps  entretenus  en  permanence  dans  les  zones 
frontieres  des  Puissances  voisines. 

Ces  renseignements  vous  permettraient  de 
repondre  aux  questions  qui  pourrafent  vous 
etre  posees. 

Veuillez  agr6er,  etc. 

(s)  DavigTion. 


NO  9. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  Vavignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
a  Berlin,  Paris  et  Londres. 

Bruxelles,  le  31  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

M.  le  Ministre  de  France  6tant  venu  me 
montrer  un  telegramme  de  I'Agence  Havas, 
decretant  I'etat  de  guerre  en  Aliemagne,  m'a 
dit  :  Je  profite  de  cette  occasion  pour  vous 
declarer  qu'aucune  incursion  des  troupes  fran- 
^aises  n'aura  lieu  en  Belgique,  meme  si  des 
forces  importantes  6taient  massees  sur  les 
frontieres  de  votre  pays.  La  France  ne  veut 
pas  avoir  la  responsabilit6  d'accomplir  vis-^- 
vis  de  la  Belgique,  le  premier  acte  d'hostilit6. 
Des  instructions  dans  ce  sens  seront  donn6es 
aux  autorites  frangaises. 

J'ai  remerci6  M.  Klobukowski  de  sa  com- 
munication et  j'ai  cru  devoir  lui  faire  remar- 
quer  que  nous  avions  toujours  eu  la  plus 
grande  con  fiance  dans  la  loyaute  que  nos 
deux  Etats  voisins  mettraient  a  tenir  leurs 
engagements  a  notre  6gard.  Nous  avons  £Cussi 
tout  lieu  de  croire  que  I'attitude  du  Gouver- 
nement allemand  sera  identique  k  celle  du 
Gouvernement   de   la   Republique    frangaise. 

Veuillez  agr6er,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


NO  ,7. 

T^gramme  adressi  par  le  Comte  Err  em- 
bault  de  Dudzeele,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  Vienne, 
t  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
gkres. 

Vienne,  28  juniet  1914. 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  me  no- 
Ufie  la  declaration  de  .guerre  de  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  a  la  Serbie. 


No  10. 

TSlSgramme  adres&S  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  "Etrang^Tes,  h  tous  les 
Chefs  de  mission  d.  VMranger 

Bruxelles,  31  juillet  1914. 

Le  Ministre  de  la  Guerre  me  fait  savoir  que 
la  mobilisation  est  d6cr6t6e  et  que  le  samedi 
l"  aoiit  est  le  premier  jour  de  la  mobilisation, 
Cs)  Davignon. 


-    7    — 


NO  11. 

Lettre  adrcssee  par  M  .Davignon,Ministre  des 
Affaires  Eirangercs,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi  «: 
Berlin,  Londrcs  et  Paris. 

Bruxelles,  le  31  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Le  Ministre.  d'Angleterre  a  demande  a  me 
voir  d'urgence  et  m'a  fait  la  communication 
suivante.  qu'il  souhaitait  etre  a  meme  de  m'ex- 
poser  depuis  plusieurs  jours.  En  raison  de 
la  possibilite  d'une  guerre  europeenne.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  a  demande  aux  Gouvernemenls 
frangais  et  allemand,  separement,  si  chacun 
d'eux  etait  pret  a  respecter  la  neutralite  de 
la  Belgique  pourvu  qu'aucune  puissance  ne 
la  viole. 

«Vu  les  traites  qui  existent,  je  suis  charge 
d'informer  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres 
de  Belgique  de  ce  qui  precede  et  de  dire  que 
Sir  Edward  Grey  presume  que  la  Belgique 
fera  tout  son  possible  pour  maintenir  sa  neu- 
tralite et  qu'elle  desire  et  s'attend'a  ce  que 
les  autres  puissances  I'observent  et  la  main- 
tiennent". 

•Je  me  suis  empresse  de  remercier  Sir  Fran- 
cis Villiers  de  cette  communication  que  le 
Gouvernement  beige  apprecie  particulierement 
et  j'ai  ajoute  que  la  Grande-Bretagne  et  les 
autres  nations  garantes  de  notre  independance 
pouvaient  etre  assurees  que  nous  ne  neglige- 
rions  aucun  effort  pour  maintenir  notre  neu- 
tralite, et  que  nous  etions  convaincus  que  les 
autres  puissances,  vu  les  excellents  rapports 
d'amitie  et  de  confiance,  que  nous  avions 
toujours  entretenus  avec  elles,  observeraient 
et  maintiendraient  cette  neutralite. 

.Je  n'ai  pas  manque  d'affirmer  que  nos  forces 
militaires,  considerablement  developpees  a  la 
suite  de  notre  reorganisation  recente,  etaient 
a  meme  de  nous  permettre  de  nous  defendre 
energiquement  en  cas  de  violation  de  notre 
territoire. 

Au  cours  de  la  conversation  qui  a  suivi, 
Sir. Francis  m'a  paru  un  peu  surpris  de  la 
rapidite  avec  laquelle  nous  avions  decide  la 
mobilisation  de  notre  armee.  J'ai  fait  remar- 
quer  que  les  Pays-Bas  avaient  pris  une  resolu- 
tion identique  avant  nous  et  que  d'autre  part 
Ici  date  recente  de  notre  nouveau  regime  mili- 
taire  et  les  mesures  transitoires  que  nous 
avions  dij  decider  a  cette  occasion,  nous  impo- 
saient  des  mesures  urgentes  et  completes.  Nos 
voisins  et  garants  devaient  voir  dans  cette 
resolution  le  desir  de  manifester  notre  pro- 
fonde  volonte  de  maintenir  nous-memes  notre 
neutralite. 

Sir  Francis  m'a  paru  satisfait  de  ma  reponse 
et  m'a  annonce  que  son  Gouvernement  atten- 
dait  cette  reponse  pour  continuer  les  n6gocia- 
tions  avec  la  France  et  rAllemagne,  liegocia- 
tions  dont  la  conclusion  me  serait  communi- 
quee. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  12. 

Lettre  adressec  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres'du  Roi 
a  Berlin,  Londres  et  Paris. 

Bruxelles,  le  31  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 
Ce  matin,  au  cours  d'une  conversation  que 
le  Secretaire  General  de  mon  Departem^nt  a 


eue  avec  M.  de  Below,  11  a.expliqul^  au  Mi. 
nistre  d'Allemagne  la  portee  des  mesures  mili- 
taires que  nous  avons  prises  et  lui  a  dit  qu'el- 
les  etaient  une  consequence  de  notre. volonte 
d'accomplir  nos  obligations  internationales, 
qu'elles  n'impliquaient  en  aucune  facon  une 
attitude   de   defiance  envers  nos  voisins.- 

Le  Secretaire  General  a  demande  ensuite  au 
Ministre  d'Allemagne  s'il  avait  connaissance 
de  la  conversation  qu'il  avait  eue  avec  son 
predecesseur  M.  de  Flotow,  et  de  la  reponse 
que  le  Chancelier  de  I'Empire  avait  charge 
celui-ci'de  lui  faire. 

Au  cours  de  la  polemique  so.ulev6e  en  1911 
par  le  depot  du  projet  hollandais  concernant 
les  fortifications  de  Flessingue,  certains  jour- 
naux  avaient  affirme  qu'en  cas  de  guerre  fran- 
co-allemande.  notre  neutralite  serait  violea 
par  VAllemagne. 

Le  Departement  des  Affaires  Etrangeres 
avait  suggere  I'idee  qu'une  declaration  faitc 
au  Parlement  allemand  a  I'occasion  d'un  debat 
sur  la  politique  etrangere  serait  de  nature  a 
apaiser  I'opinion  publique  et  a  calmer  ses 
defiances,  si  regrettables  au  point  de  vue  des 
relations  des  deux  pays. 

M.  de  Bethman-Holweg  fit  repondre  qu'il 
avait  ete  tres  sensible  aux  sentiments  qui 
avaient  inspire  notre  demarche.  II  declarait 
que  I'Allemagne  h'avait  pas  I'intention  de  vio- 
ler  notre  neutralite,  mais  il  estinrtait  qu'en 
faisanf  publiquement  une  declaration,  I'Alle- 
magne affaiblirait  sa  situation  militaire  vis-a- 
vis de  la  France  qui,  rassuree  du  cote  du 
Nord,  porterait  toutes  ses  forces  du  cote  de 
I'Est. 

Le  Baron  van  der  Elst  poursuivant,  dit  qu'il 
comprenait  parfaitem'ent  les  objections  qu'a- 
vaient  faites  M.  de  Bethman-Holweg  a  la 
declaration  publique  suggeree  et  il  rappela  que 
depuis  lors  en  1913,  M.  de  Jagow  avait  fait 
a  la  Commission  du  budget  du  Reichstag,  de« 
declarations  rassurantes  quant  au  respect  de 
la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique. 

M.  de  Below  repondit  qu'il  6tait  au  courant 
de  la  conversation  avec  M.  de  Flotow  et  qu'il 
etait  certain  que  les  sentiments  exprimes  a 
cette  epoque  n'avaient  pas  change. 

Veuillez    agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 

Annexe  aun°  12< 

Lettre  adressee  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a.  Ber- 
lin, a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin,  le  2  mai  1913. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  connaitre, 
d'apr^s  I'officieuse  «Norddeutsche  Allgemeine 
Zeitung",  les  declarations  faites,  au  cours  de- 
la  seance  du  29  avril  de  la  commission  du 
budget  du  Reichstag,  par  le  secretaire  d'Etat 
aux  Affaires  Etrangeres  et  le  Ministre  de 
la  Guerre,  relativement  a  la  neutralite  de  la 
Belgique.  ,.  .  . 

«  Un  membre  du  parti  social-d6mocrate  dit  : 
En  Belgique  on  voit  avec  apprehension  s'ap- 
procher  une  guerre  franco-allemande,  car  on 
craint  que  I'AUfemagne  ne  respectera  pas  la 
neutralite  de  la  Belgique. 

»  M.  de  Jagow,  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Af- 
faires Etrangeres  repondit:  la  neutralite  de  la' 
Belgique  est  determinee  par  des  conventions 
internationales  et  I'Allemagne  est  decid^e  h. 
respecter  ces  conventions. 


-    8 


»  Cette  declaration  ne  satisfit  pas  un  autre 
membre  du  parti  social-d6mocrate.  M.  de 
Jagow  observa  qu'il  n'avait  rien  ^  aj  outer 
aux  paroles  claires  qu'il  avait  pron'oncees  rela- 
tivement  aux  relations  de  i'AIlemagne  avec  la 
Belgique. 

»  A  de  nouvelles  interrogations  d'un  mem- 
bre du  parti  social-democrate  M.de  Heeringen, 
Ministre  de  la  Guerre,  repondit:  la  Belgique 
.ne  joue  aucun  role  dans  la  justification  du, 
projet  de  reorganisation  militaire  allemand; 
celui-ci  se  trouve  justifie  par  la  situation  en 
Orient.  L'AIlemagne  ne  perdra  pas  de-vue  que 
la  neutralite  beige  est  garantie  par  les  trait6s 
internationaux. 

»  Un  membre  du  parti  progressiste  ayant 
encore  parle  de  la  Belgique,  M.  de  Jagow  fit 
remarquer  a  nouveau  que  sa  declaration  con- 
cernant  la  Belgique  6tait  suffisamment  cj|^ire.» 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Baron  Beyens. 


No  13. 

Tiligramme  adress^  par  le  Comte  de  La- 
laing,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  Londres,  a  M.  Davi- 
gnon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Londres,  i"  aout  1914. 

L'Angleterre  a  demande  s^parement  a  la 
France  et  a  I'AIlemagne  si  elles  respecteraient 
le  territoire  de  la  Belgique  dans  le  cas  ou 
leur  adversalre  ne  la  violerait  pas.  On  attend 
la  r^ponse  ailemande.  La  France  a  accepte. 


N"  14. 

Tilegramme  adresse  par  le  Baron  Beyens, 
Ministre  du  Roi  a  Berlin,  a  M.  Davignon, 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Berlin,  i"  aout  1914. 
L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  6te  charge 
de  demander  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres si  en  cas  de  guerre,  I'AIlemagne  respec- 
terait  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique  et  le  Ministre 
aurait  dit  qu'il  ne  peut  pas  repondre  h  cette 
question. 


No  15. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
d.  Berlin,  Paris  et  Londres. 

Bruxelles,  1"  aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  le 
Ministre  de  France  m'a  fait  verbalement  la 
communication  suivante   : 

«Je  suis  autorise  a  declarer  qu'en  cas  de 
conflit  international,  le  Gouvernement  de  la, 
Republique,  ainsi  qu'il  I'a  toujours  declare,' 
respectera  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique.  Dans 
rhypothese  ou  cette  neutralite  ne  serait  pas 
respectee  par  une  autre  puissance,  le  Gouver- 
nement fran^ais,  pour  assurer  sa  propre  de- 
fense, pourrait  Stre  amene  a  modifier  son  atti- 
tude." 

J'ai  remerci6  Son  Excellence  .et  ai  ajout6 
que  de  notre  cote  nous  avions  pris  sans  aucun 
retard  toutes  les  mesures  voulues  pour  faire 
respecter  notre  ind6pendance  et  nos  f rontieres, 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


NO  le. 

Td^gramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres  aux  Ligations  du  Roi  a- 
Paris,  Berlin,  Londres,  Vienne,  Saint-Peters- 
bourg. 

Bruxelles.  1"  aout  1914. 

Executez  instructions  donnees  par  lettre  du 
24  juillet. 

(s)  Davignon. 
(Voir  pihce  N"  2.) 


No  17. 

TiUgramme  adressS .  par  le  Ministre  des 
Affaires.  Etrangeres  aux  Ligations  a  Rome,  La. 
Haye,  Luxembourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  1""  aoiit  1914. 

Executez  instructions  donnees  par  lettre  du 
25  juillet. 

(s)  Davignon. 
(Voir  piece  n°  3.) 


No  18. 

Tiligramme  adressi  par  M.  Eyschen,  Pri- 
sident  du  Gouvernement  Ivxemhourgcois,  a 
M,  Davignon, Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangires. 

Luxembourg,.  2  aoflt  1914. 
J'ai  I'honneur  de  porter  k  la  connaissance 
de  Votre  Excellence  les  faits  suivants:  Diman- 
che  2  aout,  de  grand  matin,  les  troupes,  alle- 
mandes,  d'apres  les.  informations  qui  sont 
parvenues  au  Gouvernement  Grand.  Ducal  ^ 
I'heure  actuelle,  ont  p6n6tr6  sur  le  territoire 
luxembourgeois  par  les  ponts  de  Wasserbillig 
et  de  Remich,  se  dirigeant  specialement  vers 
le  Sud  du  pays  et  vers  la  ville.de  Luxembourg, 
capitale  du  Grand  Duch6.  Un  certain  nombre 
de  trains  blind^s  avec  des  troupes  et  des  muni- 
tions ont  6t6  achemin6s  par  la  voie  de  chemin 
de  fer  de  Wasserbillig  k  Luxembourg,  ou  Ton 
s'attend  a. les  voir  arriver  d'un  instant  a  I'au- 
tre.  Ces  faits  impliquent  des  actes  manifeste- 
ment  contraires  k  la  neutrality  du  Grand  Du- 
che,  garantie  par  le  traits  de  Londres  de  1867. 
Le  Gouvernement  Luxembourgeois  n'a  pas 
manqu6  de  protester  6nergiquement  contre 
cette  agression  aupr^s  du  Repr^sentant  de 
Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne  k  Luxem- 
bourg. Une  protestation  identique  va  6tre 
transmise  t^legraphiquement  au  Secretaire 
d'Etat  pour  les  Affaires  Etrangeres  a  Berlin. 
Le  Ministre  d'Etat, 
President  du  Gouvernement : 
(s)  Eyschen. 


No  1^. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
a  Paris,  Berlin^  Londres^  Vienne  et  Saint-Pi- 
tersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  2  aoiit  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'avais  eu  soin  de  faire  avertir  par  M.  de 

Baesompierre   ie  Ministre  d'Allemagne  qu'un 

communique  de  M.  Klobukowski,  Ministre  de 

France,,  k  la  presse  bruxelloise,  annoncerait 


^    9    - 


la  declaration  formelle  que  ce'dernier  m'avait 
faite  le  1"  aout.  Rencontrant  M.  de  Below, 
ce  dernier  m'a  remercie  de  cette  attention  et 
a  ajoute  "que  jusqu'a  present  il  n'avaif  pas  616 
charg6  de  nous  faire  une  communication  offi- 
cielle,  mais  que  nous  connaissions  son  opinipTi 
personnelle  sur  la  securite  avec  laquelle  npus 
ayions  le  droit  de  considerer*  nos  voisins  de 
I'Est,  J'ai  immediatement  r^pondu  que  tout 
ce  que  nous  connaissions  des  intentions  de 
ceux-ci,  intentions  indiquees  dans  les  multi- 
ples entretiens  anterieurs,  ne  nous  permet- 
tait  pas  de  douter  de  leur  parfaite  correction 
vis-a-vis  de  la  Belgique;  je  tenais  cependant 
t  ajouter  que  nous  attacherions  le  plus  grand 
prix  a  gtre  en  possession  d'une  declaration 
formelle  dont  1^  nation  prendrait  connaissanqe 
avec  joie  et  reconnaissance. 
Veuillez  agr^ei*,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  20. 

Note  remise  le  2  aoUt,  d.  19  heures,  par  M. 
Below  Saleske,  Ministre  d'Allemagne,  a  M. 
Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangbre^. 


Briissel,  den  2  August  1914. 

Kaiserlich 

Deutsche  Gesandtschaft 

In  Belgien. 

TRES  CONFIDENTIEL. 

Der  Kaiserlichen  Regierung  liegen  zuyeriaa- 
sige  Nachrichten  vor  ueber  den  beabsichitigten 
Aufmarsch  franzosischer  Streitkraft.e  an  der 
Maas-Strecke  Givet-Namur.  Sie  lassen  keinen 
Zweifel  ueber  die  Absicht  Frankreichs,  durch 
belgisches  Gebiet  gegen  Deutschland  vorzu- 
gehen. 

Die  Kaiserliche  Regierung  kann  sich  der 
Begorgniss  nicht  erwehren,  dass  Belgien,  trotz 
besten  Willens,  nicht  im  Stande  sein  wird, 
ohne  Hiilfe  einen  franzosischen  Vormarsch 
mit  so  grosser  Aussicht  auf  Erfolg  abzuweh- 
ren,  dass  darin  eine  ausreichende  Sicherheit 
gegen  die  Bedrohung  Deutschlands  gefunden 
werden  kann.  Es  ist  ein  Gebot  der  Selbster- 
haltung  fiir  Deutschland,  dem  feindlichen  An- 
griff  zuvorzukonjmen.  Mit  dem  grossten  Be- 
dauern  wiirde  es  daher  die  deutsche  Regie- 
rung  erfiillen,  wenn  Belgien  einen  Akt  der 
Feindseligkeit  gegen  sich  darin  erblicken  wiir- 
de, dass  die  Massnahmen  seiner  Gegner 
Deutschland  zwingen,  zur  Gegenwehr  auch 
seinerseits  belgisches  Gebiet  zu  betreten. 

Um  jede  Missdeutung  auszuschliessen,  er- 
klart  die  Kaiserliche  Regierung  das  Folgende: 

1.  Deutschland  beabsichtigt  keinerlei  Feind- 
seligkeiten  gegen  Belgien.  Ist  Belgien  gewillt, 
in  dem  bevorstehenden  Kriege,  Deutschland 
gegeniiber  eine  wohlwollende  Neutral  itat  ein- 
zunehmen,  so  verpflichtet  sich  die  deutsche 
Regierung,  beim  Friedensschluss  Bezitzstand 
und  Unabhangigkeit  des  Konigreichs  in  vol- 
lem  Umfang  zu  garantieren. 

2.  Deutschland  verpflichtet  sich  unter  obi- 
.ger  Voraussetzung,  das  Gebiet  des  Konigreichs 
wieder  zu  raumen,  sobald  der  Friede  geschlos- 
sen  ist. 

3.  Bei  einer  freundschaflticher  Haltung  Bel- 
giens  ist  Deutschland  bereit,im  Einvernehriien 
mit  den  Koniglich  Belgischen  Behorden  alle 
Bediirfnisse  seiner  Truppen  gegen  Barzahlung 
anzukaufen  und,  jeden  Schaden  zu  ersetzen, 


der  etwa  durch  deutsche  Truppen  verursacht 
werden  konnte. 

4.  Sollte  Belgien  den  deutschen  Truppen 
feindlich  entgegen  treten,  insbesondere  ihrem' 
vorgehen  durch  Widerstand  der  Maas-Befes- 
tigungen  oder  durch  Zerstorungen  von  Eisen- 
bahnen,  Strassen,  Tunneln  oder  sonstigen 
Kunstbauten  Schwierigkeilen  bereiten,  so 
wird  Deutschland  zu  seinem  Bedauern  ge- 
zwungen  sein,  das  Konigreich  als  Feind  zu 
betrachten.  In  diesem  Falle  wiirde  Deutsch- 
land dem  Konigreich  gegeniiber  keine  Ver- 
pflichtungen  iibernehmen  konnen,  sondern 
miisste  die  spatere  Regelung  des  Verhaltnisses 
beider  Staaten  zu  einander  der  Entscheidung- 
der  Waff  en  -iiberlassen. 

Die  Kaiserliche  Regierung  giebt  sich  der 
bestimmten  Hoffnung  bin,  dass  diese  Eventua- 
litat  nicht  eintreteh,  und  dass  die  Konigliche 
Belgische  Regierung  die  geeigneten  Massnah- 
men zu  treffen  wissen  wird,  um  zu  verhinde- 
ren,  dass  Vorkommnisse,  wie  die  vorstehend 
erwahnten,  sich  ereignen.  In  diesem  Falle 
wiirden  die  freundschaftlichen  Bande,  die  bei- 
de  Nachbarstaaten  verbinden,  eine  weitere 
und  dauernde  Festigung  erfahren. 

Annexe  au  N°  20. 

Traduction  de  Vultimatum  de  CAllemagne. 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  a  regu  des  noa- 
velles  sures  d'apres  lesquelles  les  forces  fran- 
caises  auraient  I'intention  de  marcher  sur  la 
Meuse  par  Givet  et  Namur.'  Ces  nouvelles  ne 
laissent  aucun  doute  sur  I'intention  de  la 
France  de  marcher  sur  I'Allemagne  par  le 
territoire  beige.  Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  al- 
lemand ne  pent  s'empecher  de  craindre  que 
la  Belgique,  malgr6  sa  meilleure  volont6,  ne 
sera  pas  en  mesure  de  repousser  sans  secours 
une  marche  frangaise  d'un  si  grand  d6velop- 
pement.  Dans  ce  fait  on  trouve  une  certitude 
suffisante  d'une  menace  dirig6e  centre  I'Al- 
lemagne. 

C'est  un  devoir  imp6rieux  de  conservation 
pour  I'Allemagne  de  prevenir  cette  attaque  de 
I'ennemi 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  regretterait  tr6s 
vivement  que  la  Belgique  regardit  comme  un 
acte  d'hostilit6  contre  elle  le  fait  que  les  me- 
sures  des  ennemis  de  I'Allemagne  I'obligent 
de  violer  de  son  c6t6  le  territoire  beige. 

Afin  de  dissiper  tout  malentendu  le  Gou- 
vernement allemand  declare  ce  qui  suit: 

1.  L'Allemagne  n'a  en  vue  aucun  acte  d'hos- 
tilite  contre  la  Belgique.  Si  la  Belgique  con- 
sent dans  la  guerre  qui  va  commencer  a  pren- 
dre une  attitude  de  neutralite  amicale  vis-a-vis 
de  I'Allemagne,  le  Gouvernement  allemand  de 
son  c6t6  s'engage;  aii  moment  de  la  paix,  h. 
garantir  le  royaume  et  ses  possessions  dans 
tcute  leur  etendue. 

2.  L'Allemagne  s'engage  sous  la  condition 
6nonc6e  k  6vacuer  le  territoire  beige  aussitdt 
la  paix  conclue 

3.  Si  la  Belgique  observe  une  attitude  ami- 
cale, I'Allemagne  est  prete,  d'accord  avec  les 
autorit6s  du  Gouvernement  beige,  k  acheter 
contre  argent  comptant  tout  ce  qui  est  n6ces- 
saire  k  ses  troupes  et  a  indemniser  pour  les 
dommages  causes  en  .Belgique. 

4  Si  la  Belgique  se  comcorle  d'une  fagon 
hostile  contre  les  troupes  allemandes  et  par- 
ticuli^rement  fait  des  difficult6s  k  leur  marche 
en  avant  par  une  opposition  des  fortifications 
de  la  Meuse  ou  par  des  destructions  de  routes 
cbemins  de  fer,  tunnels  ou  autres  ouvrages 


10    — 


d'art,  I'Allemagne  sera  obligee  de  consid^rer 
la  Belgique  en'ennemie. 

Dans  ce  cas  TAllemagne  ne  prendra  aucun 
engagement  vis-a-vis  du  royaume,  mais  elle 
laissera  le  .reglement  ulterieur  des  rapports 
des  deux  Etats  I'un  vis-a-vis  de  I'autre  a  la 
decision  des  armes.  Le  Gouvernement  allC: 
mand  a  I'espoir  justifie  que  cette  eventualite 
ne  se  produira  pas  et  que  le  Gouvernement 
beige  saura  prendre  les  mesures  appropriees 
pour  I'empecher  de  se  produire.  Dans  ce  cas 
les  relations  d'amitie  qui  unissent  les  deux 
Etats  voisins  deviendront  plus  etroites  et  du- 
rables. 


No  21. 

Note  SUT  Ventrevue  dernandee  le  3  aoUt  d.  une 
heure  et  demie,  par  M.  de  Below  Sales ke, 
Ministre  d" Allemagne ,  a  M.  le  Baron  van  der 
Elst,  Secretaire  General  au  Ministere  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 

A  une  heure  et  demie  de  la  nuit,  le  Ministre 
d'AIlemagne  a  demand^  a  voir  le  Baron  van 
der  Elst.  II  lui  a  d.it  qu'il  etait  charge  par 
son  Gouvernement  de  nous  informer  que  des 
dirigeables  frangais  avaient  jete  des  bombes  et 
qu'une  patrouille  de  cavalerie  francaise,  vio- 
lant  le  droit  des  gens,  attendu  que  la  guerre 
h'etait  pas  declaree,  avait  traverse  la  fron- 
ti^re. 

Le  Secretaire  G^n^ral  a  demande  a  M.  de 
Belovi^  ou  ces  faits  s'^taient  passes;  en  Alle- 
magne, lui  fut-il  r^pondu.  Le  Baron  van  der 
Elst  fit  remarquer  que  dans  ce  cas  11  ne 
pouvait  s'expliquer  le  but  de  sa  communica- 
tion. M.  de  Belov^^  dit  que  ces  actes,  contraires 
au  droit  des  gens,  6taient  de  nature  h  faire 
supposer  d'autres  actes  contre  le  droit  des 
gens  que  poserait  la  France. 


No  22. 

l^ote  remise  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  M.  de  Below  Saleske, 
Ministre  d'AIlemagne. 

Bruxelles,  le  3  aout  1914. 
(7  heures  du  matin). 

Par  sa  note  du  2  aout  1914,  le  Gouvernement 
allemand  a  fait  connaitre  que  d'apr^s  des  nou- 
velles  silres  les  forces  frangaises  auraient  I'in- 
tention  de  marcher  sur  la  Meuse  par  Givet  et 
Namur,  et  que  la  Belgique,  malgre  sa  meil- 
leure  volenti  ne  serait  pas  en  6tat  de  repousser 
sans  secours  une  marche  en  avant  des  troupes 
francaises. 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  s'estimefait 
dans  I'obligation  de  pr6venir  cette  attaque  et 
de  violer  le  territoire  beige.  Dans  ces  condi- 
tions, I'Allemagne  propose  au- Gouvernement 
du  Roi  de  prendre  vis-^-vis  d'elle  une  attitude 
amicale  et  s'engage  au  moment  de  la  paix  a 
garantir  I'int^grit^  du  Royaume  et  de  ses  pos- 
sessions dans  toute  leur  6tendue.  La  note  ajou- 
te  que  si  la  Belgique  fait  des  difficult^s  h  la 
marche  en  avant  des  troupes  allemandes,  I'Al- 
lemagne sera  obligee  d©  la  consid^rer  comme 
ennemie  et  de  laisser  le  rfeglement  ulterieur 
des  deux  Etats  I'un  vis-a-vis  de  I'autre  k  la 
decision  des  armes. 

Cette  note  a  provoqu6  chez  le  Gouverne- 
ment du  Roi  un  profond  et  douloureux  6tonne- 
ment. 


Les  intentions  qu'elle  attribue  h  la  France 
sonten  contradiction  avec  les  declarations  for- 
melles  qui  nous  ont  ete  faites  le  ler  aout, 
au  nom  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique. 

D'ailleurs  si  contrairement  a  notre  attente 
une.  violation  de  la  neutralite  beige  venait  a 
etre  commise  par  la  France,  la  Belgique  rem- 
plirait  tous  ses  devoirs  internationaux  et  son 
armee  opposerait  a  I'envahisseur  la  plus  vi- 
goureuse  resistance. 

Les  traites  de  1839  confirmes  par  les  traites 
de  1870  consacrent  I'independance  et  la  neu- 
tralite de  la  Belgique  sous  la  garantie  des 
Puissances  et  notamment  du  Gouvernement  de 
Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  de  Prusse. 

La  Belgique  a  tou jours  ete  fidele  k  ses  obli- 
gations Internationales;  elle  a  accompli  ses 
devoirs  dans  un  esprit  de  loyale  impartialite; 
elle  n'a  neglige  aucun  effort  pour  maintenir 
ou  faire  respecter  sa  neutrality. 

L'atteinte  a  son  independance  dont  la  me- 
nace le  Gouvernement  allemand  cOnstituerait 
une  flagrante  violation  du  droit  des  gens. 
Aucun  interet  strategique  ne  justifie  la  viola- 
tion du  droit. 

Le  Gouvernement  beige  en  acceptant  les 
propositions  qui  lui  sont  notifiees  sacrifierait 
I'honneur  de  la  nation  en  meme  temps  qu'il 
trahirait  ses  devoirs  vis-a-vis  de  I'Europe. 

Conscient  du  role  que  la  Belgique  joue 
depuis  plus  de  80  ans  dans  la  civilisation  du 
monde,  il  se  refuse  ci  croire  que  I'independance 
de  la  Belgique  ne  puisse  etre  conserv^e  qu'au 
prix  de  la  violation  de  sa  neutrality. 

Si  cet  espoir  etait  d^gu  le  Gouvernement 
beige  est  fermement  decide  k  repousser  par 
tous  les  moyens  en  son  pouvoir  toute  atteinte 
k  son  droit. 


No  23. 

Telegramme  adrress^  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Minis tres 
du  Roi,  d.  Saint-Petersbourg,  Berlin,  Londres, 
Paris,  Vienne,  La  Haye. 

Bruxelles,  le  3  aout  1914. 

L' Allemagne  a  remis  hier  soir  7  heures  une 
note  proposant  la  neutrality  .amicale  compor- 
tant  le  passage  libre  par  notre  territoire,  pro- 
mettant  le  maintien  de  I'jnd^pendance  du 
Royaume  et  de  ses  possessions  a  conclusion  de 
la  paix,  menacant  en  cas  de  refus  de  traiter 
la  Belgique  comme  ennemie,  d61ai  de  la  re- 
ponse  fixe  a  douze  heures. Nous  avons  r^pondu 
que  l'atteinte  k  notre  neutrality  serait  une  vio- 
lation flagrante  du  droit  des  gens.  L'accepta- 
tion  de  la  proposition  allemande  sacrifierait 
I'honneur  de  la  nation.  Consciente  de  son  de- 
voir, la  Belgique  est  ferinement  d^cid6e  k  re- 
pousser une  agression  par  tous  moyens. 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  24. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
a  Paris,  Berlin,  Londres,  Vienne  et  Saint-Pi- 
tersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  3  ao<it,19i4. 
{k  midi). 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Comme  vous  le  savez,  I'Allemagne  a  remis 
k  la  Belgique  un  ultimatum  expirant  ce  matin 


-   11 


3  aout,  a  7  heures.  Aucun  fait  de  guerre  ne 
s'etant  encore  produit  a  I'heure  actuelle,  le 
Conseil  des  Ministres  a  decide  qu'il  n'y  avail 
pas  lieu,  pour  le  moment,  de  faire  appel  aux 
Puissances  garantes. 

Le  Ministre  de  France  m'a  dit  a  ce  sujet  : 
«Sans  etre  charge  d'une  declaration  de  mon 
Gouvernement,  je  crois  cependant,  m'inspi- 
rant  de  ses  intentions  connues,  pouvoir  dire 
que  si  le  Gouvernement  royal  faisait  appel  au 
Gouvernement  frangais,  comme  puissance  ga- 
rante  de  sa  neutralite,  nous  repondrions  im- 
mediatement  a  son  appel;  si  cet  appel  n'etait 
pas  formule,  il  est  probable,  a  moins  bien 
entendu  que  le  souci  de  sa  propre  defense  ne 
determine  des  mesures  exceptionnelles,  qu'il 
attendra  pour  intervenir  que  la  Belgique  ait 
fait  un  acte  de  resistance  effective." 

J'ai  remercie  M.  Klobukowski  de  I'appui 
que  le  Gouvernement  frangais  voulait  bien 
nous  offrir  eventuellement  et  lui  ai  dit  que 
le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  ne  faisait  pas  appel, 
pour  I'instant,  a  la  garantie  des  Puissances  et 
se  reservait  d'apprecier  ulterieurement  ce  qu'il 
y  aura  lieu  de  faire. 

(s)   Davignon. 


W  25. 

THegrarhme  adressS  par  S.  M.  le  Roi  ^ 
S.  M.  le  Roi  (VAngleterre. 

Bruxelles,  le  3  aout  1914. 

Me  souvenant  des  nombreuses  marques  d'a- 
mitie  de  Votre  Majesty  et  de  ses  pr6d6cesseurs, 
de  I'attitude  amicale  de  I'Angleterre  en  1870, 
et  de  la  preuve  de  sympathie  qu'elle  vient 
encore  de  nous  donner,  je  fais  un  supreme 
appel  h.  I'intervention  diplomatique  du  Gou- 
vernement de  Sa  Majeste  pour  la  sauvegarde 
de  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique. 

(s)  -Albert. 


NO  26. 

TiUgramme  adress^  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a  Londres  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangdres. 

Londres,  3  aoilt  1914. 

J'ai  montre  votre  t616granime  au  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres  qui  I'a  communique 
au  Conseil  des  Ministres.  Le  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres  m'a  dit  que  si  notre  neu- 
trality etait  viol6e,  c'6tait  la -guerre  avec  I'Al- 
lemagne. 

(s)  Comte  de  Lalaing. 

(Voir  pikce  N"  23.) 


.Xo  27. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  de  Below  Saleske, 
Ministre  d'Allemagne,  d.  M.  Davignon,  MiniS' 
tre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  (L'original  est  en 
f  rangais) . 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aoilt  1914. 
(6  heures  du  matin). 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  6t6  charge  et  j'ai  I'honneur  d'informer 
Votre  Excellence  que  par  suite  du  refus  oppo- 
se par  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi 
aux  propositions  bien  intentionnees  que  lui 


avait  soumises  le  Gouvernement  Imperial,  ce-" 
lui-ci  se  verra,  a  son  plus  vif  regret,  forc6 
d'executer  —  au  besoin  par  la  force  des  armes 
—  les  mesures  de  securite  exposees  comme 
indispensables  vis-a-vis  des  menaces  frangai- 
ses. 

Veuillez  agreer.  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  les 
assurances  de  ma  haute  consideration. 

(s)  von  Below. 


No  28. 

Note  remise  par  Sir  Francis  H.  Villiers,  Mi- 
nistre d'Angleterre,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aout  1914. 

Je  suis  charge  d'informer  le  Gouvernement 
beige  que  si  I'AUemagne  exerce  une  pression 
dans  le  but  d'obliger  la  Belgique  a  abandonner 
son  role  de  pays  neutre,  le  Gouvernement  de 
•Sa  Majeste  britannique  s!attend  h.  ce  que  la 
Belgique  resiste  par  tous  les  moyens  possir 
bles. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  S..  M,  Britannique, 
dans  ce  cas,  est  pret  a  se  joindre  ci  la  Russie 
et  a  la  France,  si  la  Belgique  le  desire,  pour 
offrir  au  Gouvernement  beige  sans  deiai  une 
action  commune,  qui  aurait  comme  but  de 
resister  aux  mesures  de  force  employees  par 
I'AUemagne  contre  la.  Belgique  et  en  meme 
temps  d'offrir  une  garantie  pour  -  mairitenir 
I'independance  et  I'integrite  de  la  Belgique 
dans  I'avenir. 


NO  29. 

Lett/re  adressie  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a  La 
Haye  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Et/rangbres. 

La  Haye,  le  4  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  m'a  dit 
hier  soir  que  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Reine 
serait  peut-etre  oblige,  dans  les  circonstances 
graves  actuelles,  d'instituer  sur  I'Escaut  le 
balisage  de  guerre. 

Le  Jhr.  Loudon  m'a  lu  un  projet  de  note 
qui  allait  rm'annoncer  cette  .decision. 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  transmettre,  sous  ce 
pli,  une  copie  de  la  note  en  question  qui  m'a 
ete  remise  dans  la  soiree  d'hier.  . 

Comme  vous  le  verrez,  I'Escaut  ne  sera  fer- 
me  que  pendant  la  nuit.  Pendant  le  jour,  la 
navigation  sera  possible  mais  seulement  avec 
des  pilotes  neerlandais  qui  ont  ete  munis  des 
indications  nautiques ,  necessaires  k  ce  sujet. 
De  cette  fagon  les  interets  de  la  defense  du 
territoire  neerlandais  et  ceux  de  la  navigation 
beige  d' An  vers  sont  sauvegardes. 

Vous  -emarquferez  qu'ensuite  le  Gouverne- 
.ment  des  Pays-Bas  nous  demande  qu'en  cas 
oil  le  balisage  de  guerre  serait  institue,  nous 
fassions  retirer  les  bateaux-phare  «Wielingen)> 
et  "W^andelaarw  en  vue  de  faciliter  le  maintien 
de  la  neutralite  du  territoire  des  Pays-Bas. 

Je  vous  ferai  remarquer  que  le  terme  eni- 
ploy6  dans  cette  note  «remonter  I'Escaut"  n'est 
pas  assez  explicite;  descendre  le  fleuve  sera 
permis  dans  les  mSmes  conditions.  Le  Minis- 
tre vient  de  m'en  donner  Tassurance. 


-    12    - 


Aussit6t  que  le  Gouvernement  n^erlandais 
aura  decid6  cette  mesure  d'exception  j'en  serai 
inform^. 

11  faut  environ  six  heures  pour  effectuer  ce 
balisage  de  guerre. 

Je  vous  telegraphierai  aussitdt. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Baron  Fallon. 

Note  annexee  au.N<»  29. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Reine  pourrait  se 
voir  oblige  dans  I'interel  du  maintien  de  la 
neutralite  du  territoire  des  Pays-Bas  d'insti- 
tuer  sur  I'Escaut  le  balisage  de  guerre,  c'est- 
a-dire  d'enlever  ou  de  modifier  une  partie  do 
'balisage  actuel  et  des  phares. 

Toutefois,  ce  balisage  de  guerre  a  ete  congu 
de  maniere  a  ce  qu'apres  son  institution  il 
sera  encore  possible  de  remonter  I'Escaut  pour 
gagner  Anvers  pendant  le  jour,  mais  seule- 
ment  avec  des  pilotes  neerlandais,  qui  ont  et6 
munis  -des  indications  nautiques  necessaires 
a  ce  sujet.  En  agissant  de  la  sorte,  le  Gouver- 
nement de  la  Reine  est  convaincu  de  pouvoir 
tenir  compte  egalement  des  int^rets  de  la  de- 
fense du  territoire  neerlandais  et  de  ceux  de 
la  navigation  beige  d' Anvers. 

Apres  I'institution  du  balisage  de  guerre  sur 
I'Escaut,  il  n'y  aurait  plus  de  raison  d'entrer 
dans  la  passe  de  mer  de  Flessingue  pendant 
Ja  nuit  et  comme  la  presence  des  bateaux- 
phare  «Wielingen»  et  «Wandelaarj)  n'est  pas 
indispensable  pour  la  navigation  pendant  le 
jour,  le  Gouvernement  Neerlandais  mettrait 
un  haut  prix  a  ce  que  le  Gouvernement  Royal 
Beige  voulM  bien,  au  cas  ou  le  balisage  de 
guerre  serait  institu6  par  lui,  faire  retirer 
lesdits  bateaux  en  vue  de  faciliter  le  maintien 
de  la  neutrality  du  territoire  des  Pays-Bas. 


N°  30. 

Tiligramme  adressS  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  Etrangkres,  aux  Ministres 
du  Roi  d.  Londres  et  a  Paris. 


Bruxelles,  le  4  aout  1914. 

L'Etat  Major  fait  savoir  que  le  territoire 
national  a  6t6  viql6  k  Gemmenich. 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  31. 

Leltre  adress^e  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  M.  de  Below  Sales- 
ke,  Ministre  d'Allemagne. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  faire  savoir  a  Votre  Ex- 
cellence que  des  aujourd'hui  le  Gouvernement 
du  Roi  ne  saurait  plus  Lui  reconnaitre  de 
caractere  diplomatique  et  cesse  d'avoir  des 
relations  officielles  avec  Elle.  Votre  Excellence 
trouvera  sous  ce  pli  les  passeporls  qui  sont 
necessaires  a  son  depart  et  a  celui  du  per- 
sonnel de  la  Legation. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


NO  32. 

Lettre  adressee  par  M.  de  Below  SaUske, 
Mi/nistre  d'Allemagne,  a  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangbres. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  d'accuser  reception  k  Votre 
Excellence  de  sa  lettre  du  4  aout  et  de  Lui 
faire  savoir  que  j'ai  remis  la  garde  de  la 
Legation  Imperiale  k  Bruxelles  aux  soins  de 
n^on  collegue  des  Etats-Unis. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

(s)  de  Below. 


No  33. 

Telegramme  adresse  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  d.  M.  le  Baron 
Grenier,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  Madrid. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aout  1914. 

Veuillez  demander  au  Gouvernement  espa- 
gnol  s'il  veut  bien  se  charger  de  la  protection 
des  interets  beiges  en  Allemagne  et,  dans  ce 
cas,  donner  les  instructions  necessaires  a  son 
Ambassadeur  a  Berlin. 

(s)  Davignon. 


N"  34. 

Teligramme  adresse  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  M.  le  Baron 
Bey  ens,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  Berlin. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aout  1914. 

Le  Ministre  d'Allemagne  quitte  le  pays  ce 
soir;  demandez  vos  passeports.  Nous  prions 
le  gouvernement  de  Madrid  d'autoriser  I'Am- 
bassadeur  d'Espagne  de  vouloir  bien  se  char- 
ger de  la  protection  des  interets  beiges  en 
Allemagne. 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  35. 

Lettre  adrissie  par  le  Ministre  de  Belgique 
a  Berlin  a  M.  Davignon^  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Berlin,  4  aoCit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  parvenir,  ci- 
apres  en  traduction,  la  partie  du  discours  pro- 
nonce  aujourd'hui  k  la  tribune  du  Reichstag 
par  le  Ghancelier  de  I'Empire  et  relative  a 
I'odieuse  violation  de  notre  neutralite  : 

«<  Nous  nous  trouvons  en  6tat  de  legitime 
defense  et  la  necessite  ne  connait  pas  de  lois. 

»  Nos  troupes  ont  occupe  Luxembourg  et 
ont,  peut-etre,  deja  penetre  en  Belgique.  Cela 
est  en  contradiction  avec  les  prescriptions  du 
droit  des  gens.  La  France  a,  il  est  vrai, 
declare  k  Bruxelles  qu'elle  etait  resolue  a  res- 
pecter la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique,  aussi 
longtemps  que  I'adversaire  la  respecterait. 
Mais  nous  savions  que  la  France  se  tenait 
prete  pour  envahir  la  Belgique.  La  France 
pouvait  attendre.  Nous  pas.  Une  attaque  fran- 
caise  sur  notre  flanc  dans  la  region  du  Rhin 
inferieur  aurait  pu  devenir  fatale.  C'est  ainsi 
que  nous  avons  ete  forces  de  passer  outre  aux 
protestations  justifi6es  d«;s  Gouvernements  lu^ 


13 


xembourgeois  et  beige.  L'injustice  que  nous 
commettons  de  cette  faQon,  nous  la  reparerons 
des  que  notre  but  militaire  sera  atteint. 

>«  A  celui  qui  est  menace  au  point  oii  nous 
le  sommes  et  qui  lutte  pour  son  bien  supreme, 
il  n'est  permis  que  de  songer  au  moyen  de 
se  degager;  nous  nous  trouvons  cote  a  cote 
avec  I'Autriche.)) 

II  est  a  remarquer  que  M.  de  Bethmann- 
HoUweg  reconnait,  sans  le  moindre  detour, 
que  I'Allemagne  viole  le  droit  international 
en  envahissant  le  territoire  beige  et  qu'elle 
commet  une  injustice  a  notre  egard. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Baron  Beyens. 


N°-36. 

Lettre  adressee  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  d. 
Londres  a  M.  Davignon,  Mmistre  des  Affmres 
Etrangbres. 

Londres,  le  4  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  le 
Premier  Ministre  a  fait  cet  apres-midi  ci  la 
Chambre  des  Communes  une  nouvelle  de- 
claration relativement  a  la  crise  europeenne. 

Apres  avoir  rappele  les  principaux .  points 
exposes  hier  par  Sir  E. '  Grey,  le  Premier 
Ministre  a  donne  lecture  : 

r  d'un  telegramme  de  Sir  F.  Villiers,  regu 
ce  matin,  qui  fait  connaitre  la  teneur  du  se- 
cond ultimatum  adresse  par  le  Gouvernement 
allemand  au  Gouvernement  beige  et  qui  vous 
a  et6  remis  ce  matin;  (voir  N"  27). 

2°  du  telegramme  par  lequel  vous  m'annon- 
cez  la  violation  de  la  frontiere  a  Gemmenich, 
dont  j'ai  remis  copie  a  Sir  A.  Nicolson; 

3°  d'un  telegramme  adresse  ce  matin  par 
le  Gouvernement  allemand  a  son  Ambassa- 
deur  a  Londres  dans  le  but  evident  d'egarer 
I'opinion  publique  sur  son  attitude.  En  voici 
la  traduction  d'apres  un  journal  de  ce  soir  : 
«Veuillez  dissiper  toute  mefiance  que.  le  Gou- 
vernement Britannique  pourrait  avoir  au  su- 
jet  de  nos  intentions,  en  repetant,  de  la  ma- 
niere  la  plus  positive,  I'assurance  formelle  que' 
meme  en  cas  de  conflit  armeavecla  Belgique, 
I'Allemagne  n'annexera  sous  aucun  pretexte 
le  territoire  beige. 

»  La  sincerite  de  cette  declaration  est  cor- 
roboree  par  le  fait  que  I'Allemagne  a  solen- 
nellement  donne  sa  parole  a  la  Hollande  de 
son  intention  de  respecter  sa  neutralite.- 

>'  II  est  evident  que  nous  ne  pourrions  nous 
annexer  le  territoire  beige  d'une  mani^re 
avantageuse  sans  faire,  en  meme  temps,  une 
acquisition  territoriale  au  detriment  de  la 
Hollande. 

»  Priere  de  faire  bien  comprendre  a  Sir 
E.  Grey  qu'il  etait  impossible  d'exposer  I'ar- 
m6e  allemande  a  une  attaque  frangaise  portee 
en  traversant  la  Belgique,  attaque  qui,  d'apres 
des  informations  absolument  incontestables, 
etait  projetee. 

»  En  consequence  I'Allemagne  n'a  pas  tenu 
compte  de  la  neutralite  beige  afin  d'eviter 
ce  qui  est  pour  elle  une  question  de  vie  ou 
de  mort,  une  attaque  frangaise  par  la  Bel- 
gique." 

M.  Asquith  a  ensuite  expose  a  la  Chambre 
qu'en  reponse  a  cette  note  du  Gouvernement 
allemand  le  Gouvernement  britannique  lui 
avait  renouvel6  sa  proposition  de  la  semaine 
derni^re,  a, savoir  de  donner  au  sujet  de  la 


neutralite  beige  les  memes  assurances  que  la 
France  en  avait  donnees  la  semaine  derniere, 
tant  a  I'Angleterre  qu'a  la  Belgique.  Le  Cabi- 
net anglais  accordait  k  celui  de  Berlin  jusqu'a 
minuit  pour  lui  faire  connaitre  sa  reponse. 
Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Comte  de  Lalaing. 


No  37. 

TeUgramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a.  Londres  a  M.  Davignon,  Mindstre  des  Af- 
faires Btra/ngeres. 

Londres,  4  aoiit  1914. 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  a  fait 
savoir  aux  Ministres  anglais  en  Norvege,  Hol- 
lande, Belgique,  que  I'Angleterre  s'attend  k 
ce  que  ces  trois  Royaumes  resistent  a  la  pres- 
sion  de  I'Allemagne  etr  gardent  la  neutralite. 
Dans  leur  resistance  ils  seront  soutenus  par 
I'Angleterre  qui,  dans  ce  cas,  est  prete  a 
coop6rer  avec  la  France  et  la  Russie  si  tel 
est  le  desir  de  ces  trois  Gouvernements  en 
off  rant  alliance  aux  dits  Gouvernements,  pour 
repousser  I'emploi'contre  eux  de  la  force  par 
rAllemagrie,  et  garantie,  pour  le  maintien 
futur  de  I'independance  et  de'  I'integrit^  des 
trois  Royaumes.  J'ai  fait  remarquer  que  la 
Belgique  est  neutre  a  perpetuite.  Le  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres  a  repondu  :  c'est  pour 
le  cas  de  neutralit6  violee. 

(s)  Comte  de  Lalaing. 


No  38. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  Davigyion,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
Ci  Paris,  Londres  et  Saint-Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aoiit  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre., 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  porter  a  votre  connaissan- 
ce  I'ordre  des  fails  successifs  qui  ont  marqu6 
pendant  les  derniers  jours  les  relations  de  la 
Belgique  avec  certaines  des  Puissances  garan- 
tes  de  sa  neutralite  et  de  son  independance. 

Le  31  juillet  le  Ministre  d'Angleterre  me 
fit  une  communication  verbale  aux  termes  de 
laquelle,  en  prevision  d'une  guerre  europeen- 
ne. Sir  E.  Grey  avait  demande  aux  Gouver-^ 
nements  allemand  et  frangais,  separement, 
si  chacun  d'cux  etait  resolu  a  respecter  la 
neutralite  de  la  Belgique  dans  I'^ventualit^ 
ou  cette  neutralite  ne  serait  pas  violee  par 
aucune  autre  puissance. 

En'  raison  des  traites  existants.  Sir  Francis 
Villiers  etait  charge  de  porter  cette  d-marche 
a  la  connaissance  du  Gouvernement  du  Roi 
en  ajoutant  que  Sir  E.  Grey  presumait  que 
la  Belgique  6tait  resolue  a  maintenir  sa  neu- 
tralite et  qu'elle  s'attendait  k  ce  que  les  autres 
puissances  la  respectent. 

J'ai  dit  k  M.  le  Ministre  d'Angleterre  que 
nous  appr6ciions  hautement  cette  communcia- 
lion  qui  repondait  a  notre  attente  et  j'ai  ajoute 
que  la  Grande-Bretagne  ainsi  que  les  autres 
Puissances  garantes  de  notre  independance 
pourraient  etre  pleinement  assurees  de  notre 
ferme  volonte  de  maintenir  notre  neutralite; 
celle-ci  ne  nous  paraissant  d'ailleurs  pas  pou- 
voir  etre  menacee  par  aucun  de  ces  Etats  avec 
lesquels  nous  entretenons  les  rapports  les  plus 
cordiaux  et  les  plus  confiants.  Le  Gouverne- 
ment, ai-je  fait  remarquer,  avait  donn6  une 


14    - 


preuve  d^  celte  resolution  en  prenant  des  a 
present  toutes  les  mesures  militaires  que  la 
situation  lui  paraissait  coinporter. 

A  son  tour,  M.  le  Ministre.de  France  se 
declara,  le  l"  aoiit,  dans  une  conversation 
verbale,  autorise  ~a  faire  connaitre  au  Gou- 
-vernement  beige,  qu'en  cas  de  con  flit  inter- 
^national,  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique, 
econformement  a  ses  declarations  constantes, 
respecterait  le  territoire  de  la  Belgique  et  qu'il 
ne  serait  amene  a  modifier  son  attitude  que 
dans  le  cas  de  violation  de  la  neutralite  beige 
par  une  autre  Puissance. 

Je  remerciai  Son  Excellence  et  ajoutai  que 
nous-  avipns  deja  pris  toutes  les  dispositions 
requises  pour  assurer  le  respect  de  notre 
independance  et  de  nos  frontieres. 

Le  2  aout,  dans  la  matinee,  j'eus  avec  Sir 
Francis  Villiers  un  nouvel  entretien  au  cours 
duquel  il  me  fit  part  de  ce  qu'il  avait  transmis 
telegraphiquement  samedi,  des  la  premiere 
heure,  a  son  Gouvernement  notre  conversation 
du  31  juillet  en  ay  ant  soiri  de  reproduire  fide- 
lement  la  declaration  solennelle  qu'il  avait. 
irecueillie  de  la  volonte  de  la  Belgique  de 
defendre  ses  frontieres,  de  quelque  cote  qu'el- 
jles  soient  envahies.  II  ajouta  :  «Nous  savons 
{que  la  France  vous  a  donne  des  assurances 
iformelles;mais  I'Angleterre  n'a  regu  a  ce  sujet 
aucune  reponse  de  Berlin. 

Ce  dernier  fait  ne  provoqua  en  moi  aucune 
Amotion  particuliere,  parce  que  la  declaration 
^u  Gouvernement  allemand  pouvait  paraitre 
surabondante  en  presence  des  trait6s  exis- 
tants.  D'ailleurs  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  af- 
faires Etrangeres  avait  affirme  a  la  seance 
de  la  commission  du  Reichstag  du  29  avril 
1913  «que  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  est 
etablie  -conventionnellement  et  que  I'Allema- 
,gne  a  I'intention  de  respecter  ce  traite.» 

he  meme  jour,  M.  de  Below  Saleske,  Minis- 
tre  d'Allemagne,  se  presenta  au  Ministere  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres  a  19  heures  et  me  remit 
la  note  ci-jointe  (voir  piece  N"  20).  Le  Gou-. 
vernement  allemand  accordait  au  Gouverne- 
,ment  beige  un  delai  de  douze  heures  p.our 
'lui  faire  connaitre  sa  decision. 

Aucune  hesitation  ne  pouvait  se  manifes- 
(er  au  sujet  de  la  reponse  qu'appelait  la  pro- 
.position  surprenante  du  Gouvernement  alle- 
mand. Vous  en  trouverez  une  copie  sous  ce 
pli.  (Voir  piece  N°  22.) 

L'Ultimatum  expirait  le  3  aout,  a  7  heures 
du  matin  ;  comme  a  10  heures  aucun  fait  de 
guerre  ne  s'etait  produit,  le  Conseil  des  Minis- 
.tres  decida  qu'il  n'y  avait  pas  lieu,  pour  le 
imoment,  de  faire  appel  aux  Puissances  ga- 
Tantes. 

Vers  midi,  le  Ministre  de  France  m'inter- 
frogea  sur  ce  point  et  me  dit : 

«  Bien  qu'en  raison  de  la  soudainet6  des 
evenements  je  ne  sois  encore  charg6  d'aucune 
declaration,  je  crois  cependant,  m'inspirant 
des  intentions  bien  connues  de  mon  Gouver- 
nement, pouvoir  dire  que  si  le  Gouvernement 
Tloyal  faisait  appel  au  Gouvernement  fran- 
gais  comme  puissance  garante  de  sa  neutra- 
lite, il  repondrait  immediatement  a  son  appel. 
Si  cet  appel  n'etait  pas  formule  il  est  proba- 
ble, a  moins  bien  entendu  que  le  souci  de  sa 
propre  defense  ne  determine  des  mesures  ex- 
ceptionnelles,  qu'il  attendrait,  pour  interve- 
nir,  que  la  Belgique  ait  fait  un  acte  de  resis- 
tance .effective.  » 

J'ai  remercie  M.  Klobukowski  de  I'appui 
flue  le  Gouvernement  frangais  voulait    bien 


nous  offrir  6ventueTlemenl  el  lui  ai  dit  que  le 
Gouvernement  du  Roi  ne  faisait  pas  appel, 
pour  I'inslant,  a  la  garantie  des  Puissances 
et  se  r6servait  d'apprecier  ulterieurement  ce 
qu  il  y  aura  lieu  de  laire. 

Enfin,  le  4  aoilt,  a  6  heures  du  matin,  le 
Ministre  d'Allemagne  me  fit  la  communica- 
tion suivante  :  (voir  piece  N"  27). 

Le  Conseil  des  Ministres  delibere  en  ce  mo- 
ment au  sujet  de  I'appel  aux  Puissances  ga- 
rantes  de  notre  neutralite. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


NO  39. 

TeUgramme  adressS  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a  Londres  a  M.  Davignon^  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 

Londres,  4  aout  1914. 

L'Angleterre  a  somme  ce  matin  I'Allemagne 
de  respecter  la  neutralite  beige.  L'ultimatum 
dit  que  vu  la  note  adressee  par  I'Allemagne  k 
la  Belgique  menagant  cette  derniere  de  la  for- 
ce des  armes  si  elle  s'oppose  au  passage  de 
ses  troupes,  vu  la  violation  du  territoire  beige 
a  Gemmenich,  vu  le  fait  que  I'Allemagne  a 
refuse  de  donner  k  I'Angleterre  la  meme  as- 
surance que  celle  donnee  la  semaine  derniere 
par  la  France,  I'Angleterre  doit  demander  a 
nouveau  une  reponse  satisfaisante  au  sujet  du 
respect  de  la  neutralite  beige  et  d'un  traite 
dont  I'Allemagne  est  signataire  aussi  bien 
qu'elle-meme.  L'ultimatum  expire  a  minuit. 

En  consequence  de  l'ultimatum  de  I'Angle- 
terre k  I'Allemagne,  la  proposition  anglaise 
que  je  vous  ai  transmise  par  tel^gramme  est 
annul6e  'pour  le  moment. 

(s)  Comte  de  Lalaing. 
{Voir  piice  N"  37.) 


No  40. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  de 
Orande-Bretagne,  de  France  et  de  Russie. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aoiit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Le  Gouvernement  beige  a  le  regret  de  de- 
voir annoncer  a  Votre  Excellence  que  ce  ma- 
tin les  forces  armies  de  I'Allemagne  ont  p6- 
netre  sur  le  territoire  beige  en  violation  des 
engagements  qui  ont  6te  pris  par  traite. 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  est  fermemenl 
decide  a  resister  par  tous  les  moyens  en  son 
pouvoir. 

La  Belgique  fait  appel  a  I'Angleterre,  a  la 
France  et  a  la  Russie  pour  cooperer,  comme 
garantes,  a  la  defense  de  son  territoire. 
•  II  y  aurait  une  action  concertee  et  commune 
ayant  pour  but  de  resister  aux  mesures  de 
forces  employees  par  I'Allemagne  contre  la 
Belgique  et  en  meme  temps  de  garantir  le 
maintien  de  l'ind6pendance  et  de  i'int6grite 
de  la  Belgique  dans  I'avenir. 

La.  Belgique.  est  heureuse  de  pouvoir  decla- 
rer qu  elle  assumera  la  defense  des  places  for- 
tes. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

^s^  Davignon. 


—     15    — 


N041 

Teligramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  du  Rot 
sh  Londres  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrang^res 

Londres,  5  aout  1914. 

L'Allemagne  ayant  fejete  les  propositions 
anglaises,  TAngleterre  lui  a  declare  que  I'etat 
de  guerre  existait  entre  les  deux  pays,  a  partir 
de  onze  heares 

(s)  Comte.  de  Lalaing 


NO  42. 

Telegramme  adresse  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrang^res,  aux  Ministres 
du  Roi  a  Paris,  Londres  et  Saint-Petersbourg. 

Bruxeiles,  le  5  aout  1914. 

Apr^s  la  violation  du  territoire  a  Gemme- 
nich,  la  Belgique  a  fait  appel,  par  I'interme- 
diaire  de  leurs  Representants  accredites  a 
Bruxelles,  a  I'Angleterre,  a  la  France  et  a  la 
Russie  pour  coop6rer,  connme  garantes,  a  la 
defense  de  son  territoire. 

La  Belgique  assume  la  defense  des  places 
fortes. 

(s)   Davignon. 


No  43. 

Lettre  adressie  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
ides  Affaires  Etrangbres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
[d  Paris.  Londres  et  Saint-Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  5  aoiit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Par  ma  d6p§che  du  4  aout  (voir  pikce  N°  38), 
j'ai  eu  rhonneur  de  vous  exposer  la  suite  des 
evenements  qui  ont  rriarqu6  les  relations  in- 
■ternationales  de  la  Belgique  du  31  juillet  au 
4  aout.  J'ajoutais  que  le  Conseil  des  Ministres 
€xaminait  la  question«de  savoir  si  la  Belgique, 
dont  le  territoire  avait  6te  envahl  depuis  le 
matin,  ferait  appel  k  la  garantie. 

Le  Conseil  venait  de  se  decider  en  faveur 
de  I'affirmative,  lorsque  le  Ministre  d'Angle- 
terre  me  fit  savoir  que  la  proposition  dont  il 
m'avait  saisi  et  d'apr^s  laquelle  le  Goaverne- 
ment  britannique  6tait  dispose  a  r^pondre  a 
notre  appel  en  garantie,  6tait  annul^e  pour 
le  moment.  (Voir  pibce  N°  37). 

On  telegramme  de  Londres  m'apprit  que  ce 
changement  d'attitude  etait  motiv6  par  un 
ultimatum  de  I'Angleterre  laissant  h  I'Alle- 
m.agne  un  delai  de  dix  heures  pour  6vacuer  le 
sol  beige  et  respecter  la  neutrality  de  la 
Belgique.  (Voir  pihce  N°  39).  Dans  la  soir6e, 
le  Gouyernement  du  Roi  a  adress6,  par  Tin 
tcrmediaire  de  leurs  representants  respectifs 
a  Bruxelles.  a  la  France,  h  la  Grande-Breta- 
gne  et  a  la  Russie,  la  note  dont  vous  trouverez 
la  copie  ci-jointe.  (Voir  pibce  N°  40) 

Comme  vous  le  remarquerez  la  Belgique 
fait  appel  k  I'Angleterre,  k  la  "France  et  k 
la  Russie  pour  coop6rer  comme  garants  a  la 
defense  de  son  territoire  et  au  maintien  dans 
I'avenir  de  ri-nd^pendance  et  de  I'int6grit6 
du  territoire.  Elle  assurera -la  defense  des 
places  fortes. 


Jusqu'ici  nous  ne  connaissons  pas  raccueil 
qui  a  6te  reserve  a  notre  appel. 
Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon, 

No  44. 

Lettre  adrcssee  par  M  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Chefs  de  mission 
dans  tous  les  pays  entretenant  avec  la  Belgi- 
que des  nupports  dvplomatjiques 

Bruxelles,  le  5  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Par  le  traite  du  18  avril  1839,  la  Prusse,  la 
France,  I'Angleterre,  I'Autriche  et  la  Russie 
se  sont  declarees  garantes  du  traite  conclu 
le  meme  jour  entre  S.  M.  le  Roi  des  Beiges  et 
S.  M.  le  Roi  des  Pays-Bas.Ce  traite  porte  .'«  La 
Belgique  formera  un  Etat  independant  et  per- 
petuellement  neutre.»  La  Belgique  a  rempli 
toutes  ses  obligations  Internationales,  elle  a 
accompli  ses  devoirs  dans  un  esprit  de  loyale 
impartialite,  elle  n'a  neglige  aucun  effort 
pour  maintenir  et  faire  respecter  sa  neutra- 
lite. 

Aussi  est-ce  avec  une  penible  emotion  que 
le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  a  appris  que  les 
forces  armees  de  rAllcmagne,  puissance  ga- 
rante  de  notre  neutralite,  ont  penetre  sur  le 
territoire  de  la  Belgique  en  violation  des  en- 
gagements qui  ont  ete  pris  par  traite. 

II  est  de  notre  devoir  de  protester  avec  in- 
dignation cohtre  un  attentat  au  droit  des  gens 
qu'aiicun  acte  de  notre  part  n'a  pu  provoquer. 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  est  fermement 
decide  a  repousser  par  tous  les  moyens  en 
son  pouvoir  I'atteinte  portee  a  sa  neutralite 
et  il  rappelle  qu'en  vertu  de  I'article  10  de  la 
convention  de  La  Haye  de  1907,  concernant 
les  droits  et  les  devoirs  des  Puissances  et 
.des  personnes  neutres  en  cas  de  guerre  su-r 
terre,  ne  peut  etre  considere  comme  un  ^cte 
hostile  le  fait,  par  une  Puissance  neutre,  de 
repousser.  meme  par  la  Torce,  les  atteintes  a 
sa  neutralite. 

Vous  voudrez  bien  demander  d'urgence  une 
audience  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres 
et  donner  lecture  a  Son  Excellence  de  la 
presente  lettre  dont  vous  lui  laisserez  copie. 
Si  I'audience  ne  pouvait  vous  etre  immediate- 
men  t  accordee,  vous  ferez  par  ecrit  la  conv 
munication  dont  il  s'agit. 

Veuillez  agreer.  etc. 

(s)  Davigno.n. 


No  45. 

Telearam/tne  adressi  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a  Berlin,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affai- 
res Etrangkres. 

Berlin,  le  5  aout  1914. 

J'ai  recu  mes  passeports.  Je  quitterai  Berlin 
demain  matin  avec  personnel  pour  la  Hollan- 
de. 

(s)  Baron  Beyens. 

No  46. 

T6leqramme  adressi  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a  Madrid,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 

Saint-Sebastien,  5  aoAt  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  espagnol  se  charge  des 
mterets  beiges  en  Allemagne.  Il  donne  au- 


-     16    — 


jourd'hui  telegraphiquenitnt  des  instructions 
a  son  Ambassadt'ur  a  Berlin. 

(s)  Baron  Grenier. 
(Voir  pihcc  N"  35.) 


N°  47. 

Let  Ire  adressec  par  le  M  mist  re  du  Roi  d. 
Paris  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  5  aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  parvenir,  sous 
ce  pli,  une  copie  de  la  notification  de  I'etat 
de  guerre  existant  entre  la  France  et  TAlle-. 
magne,  qui  m'a  et6  remise  aujoufd'hui. 

Veuillez  ag'r^er,  etc. 

(s)  Baron  Guillaume. 

Annexe  au  N^  47. 

Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  AUemand,  apres 
avoir  laisse  ses  forces  armees  franchir  la  fron- 
tiere  et  se  livrer  sur  le  territoire  frangais  a 
divers  actes  de  meurtre  et  de  violence;  apres 
avoir  viole  la  neutrality  du  Grand  Duche  de 
Luxembourg  au  mepris  des  stipulations  de  la 
convention  de  Londres  du  11  mai  1867  et 
de  la  convention  de  La  Haye  du  18  octobre 
1907,  sur  Ics  droits  el  devoirs  des  Puissances 
et  des  personnes  neutres  en  cas  de  guerre  sur 
lerre  (articles  1  a  11),  conventions  signees  de 
lui;  apres  avoir  adresse  un  ultimatum  au 
Gouvernement  royal  de  Belgique,  tendant  ^ 
exiger  le  passage  des  forces  allemandes  par 
le  territoire  beige,  en  violation  des  Trailes 
du  19  avril  1839  egalement  signes  par  lui  et 
de  la  susdite  convention  de  La  Haye; 

A  declare  la  guerre  a  la  France  le  3  aoiit 
1914,  a  18  heures  45; 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  se  voit 
dans  ces  conditions  oblige  de  son  cote  de 
recourir  a  la  force  des  armes. 

II  a  en  consequence  I'honneur  de  faire  sa- 
voir  par  la  presente  au  Gouvernement  Royal 
que  I'etat  de  guerre  existe  entre  la  France 
et  I'Allemagne  a  dater  du  3  aoilt,  18  heu- 
res 45. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  pro- 
teste  aupres  de  toutes  les  nations  civilisees 
et  sp^cialement  aupres  des  Gouvernements 
signataires  des  conventions  et  trait^s  sus- 
rappeles,  contre  la  violation  par  I'Empire  al- 
lemand  de  ses  engagements  internationaux; 
il  fait  toutes  reserves  quant  aux  repr^sailles 
qu'il  pourrait  se  voir  amene  a  exercer  contre 
un  ennemi  aussi  peu  soucieux  de  la  parole 
donn^e. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique,  qui 
entend  observer  les  principes  du  droit  des 
gens,  se  conformera  durant  les  hostilites  et 
sous  reserve  de  r6ciprocite  aux  dispositions 
des  conventions  inlemationales  sign6es  par 
la  France  concernant  le  droit  de  la  guerre 
sur  terre  et  sur  mer. 

La  pr6sente  notification  faite  en  conformity 
de  I'article  2  de  ladite  IP  Convention  de  La 
Haye  du  18  octobre  1907  relative  a  I'ouverture 
des  hostilites  est  remise  ci  M.  le  Ministre  de 
Belgique  k  Paris,  le  5  aoiit  1914,  a  14  heures. 


N"  48. 

Communication  faite  le  5  aout  par  Sir  Fran- 
cis Villiers,  Ministre  d'Angletcrre,  a  M.  Da- 
vignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Je  suis  charge  d'informer  le  Gouvernement 
beige  que  le  Gouvernement  de  S.  M.  Bri- 
tannique  considere  Taction  commune  dans  le 
but  de  resister  k  I'Allemagne  comme  etant 
en  vigueur  et  justifiee  par  le  Iraite  de  1839. 


No  49. 

Tiligramme  adresse  jmr  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a  Londres  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affai- 
res Etrangeres. 

Londres,  5  aout   1914. 
L'Angleterre   accepte   de   cooperer   comme 
garante  a  la  defense  de  notre  territoire.  La 
flotte  anglaise  assurera  le  libre  passage  de 
i'Escaut  pour  le  ravitaillement  d'Anvcrs. 

(s)    Comte   de   Lalaing. 


NO  50. 

TeUgramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
d  La  Haye  a.  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires E  tr  ang.br  es. 

La  Haye,  5  aoilt   1914. 
Le  balisage  de  guerre  va  etre  etabli. 

(s)  Baron  Fallon. 
(Voir  pihce  N"  29). 


NO  51. 

Telegramtne  adresse  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
ndsPre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  M.  le  Baron 
Grenier,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  Madrid. 

Bruxelles,  5  aout  1914. 

Exprimez  au  Gouvernement  espagnol  les 
remerciements  tr^s  sinceres  du  Gouverne- 
ment du  Roi. 

(s)  Davignon. 

(Voir  jnhce  N^  46.) . 


No  52. 

Lettre  adresskc  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
h  Paris,  Londres  et  Saint-Pitersbourg. 

Bru.xelles,  le  5  aoiit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

.rai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  les 
Ministres  de  France  et  de  Russie  ont  fait  ce 
matin  une  demarche  aupres  de  moi,  pour 
me  faire  connaitre  la  volonte  de  leurs  gou- 
vernements de  repondre  k  notre  appel  et  de 
cooperer  avec  I'AngleteYre  k  la  defense  de 
notre  territoire. 

Veuillez  agr6er,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon; 


17 


No  53. 

Lettre  adressee  par  le  Minislre  des  Pays- 
Bas  t  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Bruxelles,  le  6  aoilt  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  rhonneur  de  faire  parvenir  ci-joint  k 
Votre  Excellence  un  exemplaire  du  numero 
extraordinaire  du  «Staalscourant)>,  contenant 
la  declaration  de  neutralite  des  Pays-Bas  dans 
la  guerre  entre  la  Belgique  et  I'Allemagne,  et 
I'Angleterre  et  TAUemagne. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Jonkheer  de  Weede./ 

Annexe  au  N°  53. 

LOIS,  ARR£t£S,  nominations,  etc. 

Ministere  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  de  la  Justice, 

de  la  tAarine,  de  la  Guerre  et  des  Colonies. 

Les  Ministres  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  de 
la  Justice,  de  la  Marine,  de  la  Guerre  et 
des  Colonies,  autorises  a  cette  fin  par  Sa 
Majeste  la  Reine,  portent  a  la  connaissance 
de  tous  ceux  que  la  chose  concerne,  que  le 
Gouvernement  neerlandais  observera  dans  la 
guerre  qui  a  eclate  entre  les  Puissances  amies 
des  Pays-Bas,  Grande-Bretagne  et  Allemagne, 
et  Belgique  et  Allemagne,  une  stride  neu- 
tralite et  qu'en  vue  de  Tobservation  de  cette 
neutralite  les  dispositions  suivantes  ont  ete 
arretees  : 

.\RTICLE  I. 

Dans  les  limites  du  territoire  de  I'Etat,  com- 
prenant  le  territoire  du  Royaume  en  Europe, 
outre  les  colonies  et  possessions  dans  d'autres 
parties  du  monde,  aucun  genre  d'hostilites 
n'est  permis  et  ce  territoire  ne  pent  servir 
de  base  pour  des  operations  hostiles. 

ARTICLE  2. 

Ni  I'occ.upation  d'une  partie  qu^lconque  du 
territoire  de  I'Etat  par  un  belligerant,  ni  le 
passage  a  travers  ce  territoire  par  voie  de 
terre  par  des  troupes  ou  des  convois  de  muni- 
tions appartenant  a  un  des  belligerants  ne 
sont  permis,  non  plus  que  le  passage  a  travers 
le  territoire  situ6  a  I'interieur  des  eaux  terri- 
toriales  neerlandaises  par  des  navires  de  guer- 
re oil  des  batiments.  des  belligerants  assimiles 
a  ceux-ci. 

ARTICLE  3. 

Les  troupes  ou  les  niilitaires,  appartenant 
aux  belligerants  ou  destines  a  ceux-ci  et  arri- 
vant  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat  par  voie  de 
terre  seront  immediatement  desarmes  et  in- 
ternes jusqu'a  la  fin  de  la  guerre. 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  assimi- 
les a  ces  derniers,  appartenant  a  un  belli- 
gerant, qui  contreviendront  aux  prescriptions 
des  articles  2,  4  ou  7,  ne  pourront  quitter 
ce  territoire  avant  la  fin  de  la  guerre. 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  assimi- 
les a.  ces  derniers,  appartenant  a  un  bellige- 
rant, qui  contreviendront  aux  prescriptions 
des  articles  2,  4  ou  7,  ne  pourront  quitter  ce 
territoire  avant  la  fin  de  la  guerre. 


ARTICLE  4. 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  assi- 
miles a  ces  derniers,  qui  appartiennent  h  un 
belligerant,  n'auront  pas  acces  au  territoire 
de  I'Etat. 

ARTICLE  5. 

La  disposition  de  I'article  4  n'est  pas  appli- 
cable : 

r  aux  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  d'un 
belligerant  assimiles  a  ces  derniers,  et  qui 
par  suite  d'avarie  ou  de  I'etat  de  la  mer  sont 
tenus  d'entrer  dans  un  des  ports  ou  rades  de 
I'Etat.  Les  navires  pourront  quitter  les  dits 
ports  ou  rades  des  que  les  circonstances  qui 
les  ont  contraints  de  s'y  r6fugier  auront  cess6 
d'exister; 

2°  aux  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments 
assimiles,  appartenant  ci  un  belligerant,  et 
qui  font  escale  dans  un  port  ou  une  rade 
situes  dans  le  lerritoire  des  colonies. et  pos- 
sessions d'outre-mer,  exclusivement  dans  le 
but  de  completer  leur  provision  de  denrees 
alimentaires  ou  de  combustibles.  Ces  navires 
devront  repartir  des  que  les  circonstances  qui 
les  ont  forces  k  faire  escale  ont  cess6  d'exister, 
avec  cette  condition  que  le  sejour  en  rade  ou 
dans  le  port  ne  pourra  durer  plus  de  24  heu- 
res. 

3°  aiix  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  as- 
similes, appartenant  a  un  belligerant,  et  qui 
sont  utilises  exclusivement  pour  une  mission 
religieuse,  scientifique,  ou  humanitaire. 

ARTICLE  6. 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  assi- 
miles, appartenant  a  un  belligerant,  ne  peu- 
vent  reparer  leurs  avaries  dans  les  ports  ou 
rades  de  I'Etat  qu'en  tant  que  cette  reparation 
est  indispensable  a  la  securite  de  la  naviga- 
tion, et  ils  ne  pourront  en  aucune  fa^on  ac- 
croitre  leurs  capacites  de  combat. 

ARTICLE.  7. 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  assimi- 
les, appartenant  k  un  belligerant,  et  qui,  au 
commencement  de  la  guerre,  se  trouveraient 
sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat,  sont  tenus  de  le 
quitter  dans  les  24  heures  de  la  publication 
de  la  presente. 

ARTICLE  8. 

Si  des  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  assi- 
miles appartenant  k  divers  belligerants  se 
trouvent,  en  meme  temps,  dans  les  condi- 
tions visees  ci  I'article  5,  dans  une  meme  par- 
tie  du  monde,  et  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat, 
un  deiai  d'au  moins  24  heures  doit  s'ecouler 
entre  le  depart  des  navires  de  chacun  des 
belligerants.  A  moins  de  circonstances  spe- 
ciales,  I'ordre  de  depart  est  determine  par 
I'ordre  d'arrivee.  Un  navire  de  guerre  ou  un 
bMiment  assimiie,  appartenant  a  un  belli- 
gerant, ne  pent  quitter  le  territoire  de  I'Etat 
que  24  heures  apres  le  depart  d'un  navire 
de  commerce  portant  le  pavilion  de  I'autre 
belligerant. 

ARTICLE  9. 

Les  navires  de  guerre  ou  batiments  assimi- 
les, appartenant  a  un  belligerant,  vises  k 
I'art.  5  et  i  I'art.  7,  ne  peuvent  etre  ravitailles 


18 


en  denrees  alimentaires  dans  les  ports  et  les 
rades  du  pays  que  dans  la  mesure  necessaire 
pour  parfaire  leurs  provisions  jusqu'^  la  li- 
nnite  normale  du  temps  de  paix. 

De  meme,  ils  ne  peuvent  charger  de  coni* 
bustible  que,  dans  la  mesure  n^cessaire  pour 
pouvqir  atteindre,  avec  la  provision  qu'ils  ont 
encore  h  bord,  le  port  le  plus  rapproche  de 
leur  propre  pays. 

Un  m6me  batiment  ne  peut  §tre  ravitaille 
h  nouveau  en  combustible  qu'a  I'expiration 
d'une  periode  de  trois  mois  au  moins  apres 
son  precedent  ravitaillement  dans  le  terri-. 
toire  de  I'Etat. 

ARTICLE  iO. 

Une  prise  ne  peut  etre  amende  dans  le 
territoire  que  lorsqu'elle  est  incapable  de  na- 
viguer,  qu'elle  tient  mal  la  mer,  qu'elle  man^ 
que  de.  conibustible  ou  de  derir^es  alimen- 
taires. 

Elle  doit  s'^loigner  d6s  que  la  cause  de 
son  entree  dans  le  territoire  cesse  d'exister. 

Si  elle  ne  le  fait  pas,  I'ordre  lui  sera  donne 
|de  partir  imm^diatement;  en  cas  de  refus,  il 
[sera  fait  usage  des  moyens  disponibles  pour 
lib^rer  la  prise  avec  ses  officiers  et  son  equi- 
page et  pour  interner  Tequipage  place  k  bord 
par  le  bellig6rant  qui  a  fait  la  prise. 

ARTICLE  il. 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat, 
de  former  des' corps  combattants  ou  d'ouvrir 
des  bureaux  de  recrutement  au  profit  des 
bellig^rants. 

ARTICLE  i2. 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat,  de 
prendre  du  service  k  bord  de  navires  de  guer- 
re ou  de  batiments  assimil6s, 

ARTICLE  13. 

II  est  interdit, .  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat, 
d'am^nager.  d'armer  ou  d'^quiper  des  navires 
destines  k  des  fins  militaires  au  profit  d'un 
belligerant,  ou  de  fournir  ou  conduire  k  un 
bellig6rant  de  tels  navires. 

ARTICLE  14. 

n  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat,  de 
fournir  des  armes  ou  des  munitions  k  des  navi- 
res de  guerre  ou  batiments  assimil6s  apparte- 
nant  k  un  belligerant,  ou  de  leur  venir  en  aide 
d'une  mani^re  quelconqije  en  vue  de  I'aug- 
mentation  de  leur  ecjuipage  oil  de  leur  ame- 
nagement. 

ARTICLE  15. 

II  est  interdit.  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat,  sauf 
autorisation  pr^alable  des  autorit§s  locales 
comp6tentes,  de  faire  des  reparations  aux  na- 
vires de  guerre  ou  batiments  assimil6s  appar- 
tenant  k  un  bellig6rant,  ou  de  leur  fournir  des 
provisions  de.bouche  ou  de  combustible. 

ARTICLE  16. 

II  est  interdit,  sur  le  territoire  de  I'Etat,  de 
cooperer  au  degr6ement  ou  a  la  reparation  de 
prises,  sauf  en  ce  qui  est  necessaire  pour  les 
rendre  propres  a  tenir  la  mer;  ainsi  que 
d'acheter  des  prises  ou  des  merchandises  con- 
fisqu^es,  et  de  les  recevoir  en  ^change,  en  don 
ou  en  depdt. 


ARTICLE  17. 

Le  territoire  de  I'Etat-  comprend  -la  mer 
cdtiere  sur  une  largeur  de  3  milles  marins 
a  raison  de  60  par  degre  de  latitude,  a  partir 
de  la  laisse  de  la  basse  mer. 

En  ce  qui  concerne  les  bales,  cette  distance 
do  3  milles  marins  est  mesuree  a  partir  d'une 
ligne  droite  tiree  a  travers  la  bale  aussi  pres 
que  possible  de  I'entree,  au  point  ou  I'ouver- 
ture  de  la  baie  ne  depasse  pas  dix  milles  ma- 
rins, k  raison  de  60  par  degre  de  latitude. 

ARTICLE  18. 

En  outre,  i'attention  est  attiree  sur  les  arti- 
cles 100,  1°,  et  205  du  Code  penal  ;  Indisch 
Staatsblad  1905,  N"  62  ;  Art.  7,  4°,  de  la  loi  sur 
ja  qualite  de  Neerlandais  et  sur  le  domicile 
(Nederlandsch  Staatsblad  1892,  N°  268;  1910, 
N°  216);  art.  2,  N°  3,  de  la  loi  sur  la  qualite 
de  sujet  neerlandais  (Nederlandsch  Staatsblad 
1910,  N"  55;  Indisch  Staatsblad  1910,  N"  296; 
art.  54  et  55  du  Code  p^nal  de  Suriname; 
art.  54  et  55  du  Code  penal  de  Curagao). 

De  meme,  I'attention  des  commandants  de 
navirps,  armateurs  et  affreteurs,  est  attiree  sur 
le  danger  et  les  inconvenients  auxquels  ils 
s'exposeraient  en  ne  respectant  pas  le  blocus 
effectif  des  belligerants,  en  transportant  de  la 
contrebande  de  guerre  ou  des  depeches  mili- 
taires pour  les  belligerants  {k  moins  qu'il  ne 
s'agisse  du  service  postal  regulier)  ou  en  exe- 
cutant pour  eux  d'autres  services.de  transport. 

Quiconque  se  rendrait  coupable  d'actes  pr6- 
vus  ci-dessus,  s'exposerait  a  toutes  les  conse- 
quences de  ces  actes,  et  ne  pourrait  obtenir 
k  cet  egard  aucune  protection  ni  intervention 
du  Gouvernement  neerlandais. 


N"  54. 

TiUgramme  adressi.  -par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nislre  des  Affaires  Etrangkres,  a  M.  le  Barori 
Fallon,  Ministre  du  Roi  d.  La  Haye. 

Bruxelles.  6  aout  1914. 

Veuillez  communiquer  au  Gouvernement 
neerlandais  la  note  suivante  : 

Le  Gouvernement  beige  a  pris  note  de  I'eta- 
^blissement  du  balisage  de  guerre  sur  I'Escaut 
et  de  ce  que  le  Gouvernement  hollandais  a&- 
surera  le  maintien  de  la  navigation. 

II  conviendrait  que  la  navigation  put  se 
faire  k  partir  de  30  minutes  avant  le  lever 
du  soleil  jusqu'k  30  minutes  apres  son  coucher 
et  que  I'echange  des  pilotes  se  fit  k  Bath.  - 

Si  desireux  qu'il  soit  de  consentir  aux  de- 
mandes  du  gouvernement  hollandais,  le  Gou- 
vernement beige  estime  qu'il  y  a  lieu,  ci  raison 
des  ports  du  littoral,  de  maintenir  les  bateaux- 
phares  de  Wielingen  et  de  Wandelaar,  ainsi 
que  les  bouees  du  chenal  de  Wielingen. 

(s)  Davignon. 
(Voir  pihce  N"  50.) 


NO  55. 

TUigramme  adressi  -po-'r  le  Ministre  du  Roi  d. 
La  Hage,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrang^res. 

La  Haye,  6  aoflt  1914. 

La  navigation  sur  I'Escaut  peut  se  faire  d^s 
I'aube  et  tant  qu'il  fait  clair.  Les  bouees  de 


-    19 


Wielingen  seront  r^tablies.  L'echange  des  pi- 
lotes  a  Hansweert  est  plus  facile  et  mieux 
organise.  Insistez-vous  pour  Bath. 

(s)   Baron  Fallon. 


N"  56. 

Telegramme  adresse  par  M .Davignon,Minis- 
tre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  M.  le  Baron 
Fallon,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  La  Haye. 

Bruxelles,  7  aout   1914. 

Veuillez  exprimer  au  Gouvernement  neer- 
landais  les  remerciements  sinceres  du  Gou-" 
vernement  beige  pour  les  niesures  prises  pour 
assurer  la  navigation  sur  I'Escaut.  Le  Gou- 
vernement est  d'accord  avec  le  Gouvernement 
hollandais  au  sujet  de  la  duree  de  la  naviga- 
tion. II  avait  propose  Bath,  mais  accepte  Hans- 
weert, puisque  ce  port  est  mieux  outille  pour 
I'echange  des  pilotes. 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  57. 

Tdlegramme  adresse  par  M .  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres 
du  Roi  a  Paris  et  a  Londres. 

Bruxelles,  7  aout  1914. 

La  Belgique  souhaite  que  la  guerre  ne  soit 
pas  etendue  en  Afrique  centrale.  Le  Gouver- 
neur  du  Congo  beige  a  regu  pour  instructions 
d'observer  une  attitude  strictement  defensive. 
Priez  le  Gouvernement  frangais  (anglais)  de 
faire  savoir  si  son  intention  est  de  proclamer 
la  neutralite  au  Congo  frangais  (colonies  bri- 
tanniques  du  bassin  conventionnel  du  Congo), 
conformement  a  I'article  onze  de  TActe  gene- 
ral de  Berlin.  Un  telegramme  de  Boma  an- 
nonce  que  les  hostilites  sont  probables  entre 
Frangais  et  Allemands  dans  I'Ubangi, 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  58. 

Lettre  ddressSe  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  du  Roi 
a  Paris  et  a  Londres. 

Bruxelles,  le  7  aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Comme  suite  a  mon  telegramme  de  ce  ma- 
tin, j'ai  I'honneur  de  yous  prier  de  porter  a 
la  connaissance  du  Gouvernement  frangais 
(anglais)  I'information  suivante: 

Tout  en  prescrivant  au  Gouverneur  General 
du  Congo  de  prendre  des  mesures  de  defense 
sur  ies  frontieres  communes  de  la  colonie 
beige  et  des  colonies  allemandes  de  I'Est  afri- 
cain  et  du  Kameroun,  le  Gouvernement  du 
Roi  a  invite  ce  haut  fonctionnaire  a  s'abstenir 
dfe  toute  action  offensive  centre  ces  colonies. 

Vu  la  mission  civilisatrice  commune  aux  na- 
tions colonisatrices,  le  Gouvernement  beige 
d6sire,  en  effet,  par  un  souci  d'humanite,  ne 
pas  ^tendre  le  champ  des  hostilites  k  I'Afrique 
centrale.  II  ne  prendra  done  point  I'initiativc 
d'infliger  une  pareille  epreuve  a  la  civilisation 
dans  cette  region  et  les  forces  militaires  qu'il 
y  poss6de  n'entreront  en  action  que  dans  le 
cas  ou  elles  devraient  repousser  une  attaque 
;directe  contre  ses  possessions  africaines. 


J'attacherais  du  prix  ^  savoir  si  le  Gouver- 
nement de  la  Republique  (de  S.  M.  britanni- 
que)  partage  cette  mahiere  de  voir  et,  le  cas 
echeant,  s'il  entre  dans  ses  intentions,  k  Toc- 
casion  du  conflit  actuel,  de  se  prevaloir  de 
la  disposition  de  I'article  II  de  I'Acte  general 
de  Berlin  pour  placer  sous  le  regime  de  la 
neutrality  celles  de  ses  colonies  qui  sont  com- 
prises dans  le  Bassin  conventionnel  du  Congo. 

J'adresse  une  communication  identique  a 
votre  collegue  a  Londres  (Paris). 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


NO  59. 

Lettre  adressee  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a 
Paris  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  8  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  parler  au  President  de  la 
Republique  de  votre  telegramme  d'hier.  Je 
I'avais  regu  dans  la  soiree  et  I'avais  immedia- 
tement  communique  au  Ministere  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres. On  avait  demande  a  reflechir^  avant 
de  me  repondre. 

M.  Poincare  m'a  promis  de  parler  de  cette 
question  aujourd'hui  au  Ministre  des  Colo- 
nies. A  premiere  vue,  il  ne  verrait  guere  d'in- 
convenient  a  proclamer  la  neutralite  du  Congo 
frangais,  mais  il  reserve  cependant  sa  reponse. 
II  croit  que  des  faits  de  guerre  ont  deja  eclat6 
dans  I'Oubanghi.  II  a  profile  de  la  circonstance 
pour  me  rappeler  que  la  protection  que  nous 
accorde  la  France  s  etend  aussi  a  nos  colonies 
et  que  nous  n'avons  rien  a  craindre. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Baron  Guillaume. 


No  60. 

Telegramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a  La  Haye  d  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Af- 
faires Etrangeres. 

La  Haye,  9  aout  1914, 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  m'a  prie 
de  vous  transmettre  les  informations  suivan- 
tes,  parce  que  le  Ministre  d'Amerique  a  Bru- 
xelles s'y  refuse. 

.  La  forteresse  de  Liege  a  ete  prise  d'assaut 
apres  une  defense  courageuse.  Le  Gouverne- 
ment Allemand  regrette  tres  profondement 
que  par  suite  de  I'attitude  du  Gouvernement 
beige  contre  I'Allemagne,  on  en  est  arrive  a 
des  rencontres  sanglantes.  L'Allemagne  ne 
vient  pas  en  ennemie  en  Belgique,  c'est  seule- 
ment  par  la  force  des  6venements  qu'elle  a 
dii,  a  cause  des  mesures  militaires  de  la  Fran- 
ce, prendre  la  grave  determination  d'entrer  en 
Belgique  et  d'occuper  Liege  corhme  point  d'ap- 
pui  pour  ses  operations  militaires  ulterieures. 
Apres  que  I'armee  beige  a  par  sa  resistance 
h6roique  contre  une  grande  superiority,  main- 
tenu  I'honneur  de  ses  armes,  le  Gouverne- 
ment allemand  prie  le  Roi  des  Beiges  et  le 
Gouvernement  beige  d'eviter  k  la  Belgique  les 
horreurs  ult6rieures  de  la  guerre.  Le  Gouver- 
nement est  pr§t  a  tous  accords  avec  la  Bel- 
gique qui  peuvent  se  concilier  avec  ses  arran- 
gements (voir  piece  N°  70)  avec  la  France. 
L'Allemagne  assure  encore  solennellement 
qu'elle  n'a  pas  rintention  de  s'approprier  le  ter- 


20    - 


ritoire  beige  et  que  cette  intentioh  est  loin 
d'elie.  L'Allemagne  est  toujours  prete  a  eva- 
cucr  lu  Belgique  aussitot  que  I'etat  de  guerre 
ie  lui  permetlra. 

L'Ambassadeur  des  Etats-Unis  avait  prie 
son  collegue  de  se  charger  de  cette  tentative 
de  mediation.  Lc  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres  a  accepte  sans  enthousiasme  cette  mis- 
sion. Je  m'en  suis  charge  pour  lui  faire  plai^ 
sir. 

(s)  Baron  Fallon. 


N"61. 

Telegramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi 
a  Paris  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Elrang&res. 

Paris,  9  aout  1914. 

Le  Go'uvernement  fran<jais  est  tres  dispose 
a  proclamer  la  neutral ite  des  possessions  du 
Bassin  conventionnel  du  Congo  et  prie  I'Es- 
pagne  de  le  proposer  a  Berlin. 

(s.)  Baron  Guillaume. 

(Voir  piece  N°'59.) 


No  62. 

Letlre  adrcssee  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a 
La  Haye,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affai- 
res Elrangeres. 

La  Haye,  le  10  aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

.  Repondant  a  un  appel  tel^phonique,  hier  a. 
9  heures  du  soir,  je  me  suis  rendu  au  Depar- 
tement  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Le  Jhr.  Loudon  m'a  dit  que  mon  collegue 
d'Allemagne  sortait  de  son  Cabinet  et  lui  avait 
remis  un  document  que  le  Representant  des 
Etats-Unis  a  Bruxelles  avait  refuse  de  vous 
transmettre. 

Le  diplomate  americain,  charge  de  la  Lega- 
tion d'Allemagne  a  Bruxelles  a  pretendu  qu'il 
n'a  pas  regu  d'ordres  speciaux  de  Washing- 
ton pour  intervenir  officiellement  aupres  du 
Gouvernement  beige  dans  I'interet  de  I'Alle- 
magne. 

Le  Ministre  d'Amerique  a,  en  consequence^ 
telegraphic  a  son  collegue  a  La  Haye,  lequel 
a  inform^  le  Representant  allemand  du  refus 
de  Mr.  Whitlock. 

La  premiere  demarche  a  done  6te  faite  par 
le  Gouvernement  allemand  aupres  de  I'ambas- 
sadeur  des  Etats-Unis  ci  Berlin. 

Dans  ces  conditions  et  vu  I'urgence  <ju6 
presentent  ces  affaires,  M.  von  Miiller  a  pri^ 
le  Jhr.  Loudon  de  servir  d'intermediaire  du 
Gouvernement  allemand  aupres  de  vous. 

Son  Excellence  m'a  lu  le  texte  alle- 
mand du  document.  Je  n'ai  pas  cache  mon 
etonnement  de  cette  tentative  de  mediation 
et  sa  fajble  chance  de  succes  dans  cette  forme; 
mais  uniquement  pour  etre  agreable  au  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres  des  Pays-Bas 
j'ai  promis  de  vous  telegraphier  immediate- 
ment;  ce  que  j'ai  fait  hier. 

Vous  trouverez,  sous  ce  pli,  le  document 
allemand  dans  son  texte  original  et  en  traduc- 
tion. 

(s)  Baron  Fallon. 

1«  Annexe  au  N^  62. 

Die  Festijng  Liittich  ist  nach  tapfrer  Gegen- 
wehr  im  Stui-m  genommen  worden.  Die  Deut- 
sche Regierung   bedauert  es  auf  das  liefste, 


dass  es  infolge  der  Stellv^ngnahme  der  Bel- 
gisohen  Regierung  gegen  Deutschland  zu  blu- 
tigen  Zusammenstossen  gekommen  ist. 
Deutschland  kommt  nicht  als  Fcind  nach  Bel- 
gien.  Nur  unter  dem  Zwang  des  Verhaltnisse 
hat  es  angesichts  der  militarischen  Massnah- 
mep.  Frankreichs  den  schweren  Entschluss 
fasscn  mussen,  in  Belgien  einzurucken  und 
Lutlich  als  Stiitzpunkt  fur  seine  weiteren 
militarischen  Operatibnen  beselzen  zu  mus- 
sen,  Nachdem  die  Belgische  Arniee  in  helden- 
mutigem  Widersland  gegen  die  grosse  Ueber- 
legenheit  ihre  Waffenehre  auf  das.glanzendste 
gewahrt  hat,  bittet  die  Deutsche  Regierung 
seine  Majestat  den  Kbnig  und  die  Belgische 
Regierung,  Belgien  die.  weiteren  Schrecken 
des  Krieges  zu  ersparen.  Die  Deutsche  Jle- 
gierung  ist  zu  jedem  Abkommen  mit  Belgien 
bereit  das  sich  irgendwie  mit  Riicksicht  auf 
seine  (voir  piece  N°  70)  Auseinandersetzung 
mit  Frankreich  vernigen  -lasst.  Deutschland 
versichert  nochmals  feierlichst,  dass  es  nicht 
von  der  Absicht  geleitet  gewesen  ist  sich  Bel- 
gisches  Gebiet  anzueighen,  und  dass  ihm  diese 
Absicht  durchaus  fernliegt.  Deutschland  is 
noch  immer  bereit  das  Belgische  Konigreich 
unverzijglich  zu  raumen,  sobald  die  Kriegs- 
lage  es  ihm.gestattet.  «Der  hiesige  Amerika- 
nische  Botschafter  ist  mit  diesem  Vermitt- 
lungsversuch  seines  Brusseler  Kollegen  ein- 
verstanden." 

2">e  Annexe  aO  N^  62.- 
(Traduction-) 

La  forteresse  de  Liege  a  et6  prise  d'assaut 
apres  une  defense  courageuse.  Le  Gouverne- 
ment allemand  regrette  le  plus  profondement 
que  par  suite  de  I'at.titude  du. Gouvernement 
beige  contre  I'AUemagne  on  en  soit  arrive  a 
des  rencontres  sanglantds.  L'AUemagne  ne 
vient.  pas  en  ennemie  en  Belgique.  C'est  seu« 
lement  par  la  force  des  evenements  qu  elle  a 
du,  a  cause  des  mcsurfis  militaires  de  la  Fran- 
ce, prendre  la  grave,  determination  d'entrer 
en  Belgique  et  d'occuper  Liege- comme  point 
d'appul  pour  ses  operations  militaires  ulte- 
rieures.  Apres  que  rarfnee  beige  a,  dans  une 
resistance  heroique  contre  une  grande  supe- 
riorite,  maintenu  I'honneur  de  ses  armes  de 
de  la  fagon  la  plus  brillante,  le  -Gouvernement 
allemand  prie  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  et  le  Gou- 
vernement beige  d'eviter  a  la  Belgique 
les  horreurs  ulterieures  de  la  guerre.  Le  Gou- 
vernement allemand  est  pret  k  tout  accord 
■avec  la  Belgique,  qui  peut  se  concilier  de  n'im- 
porte  quelle  maniere  avec  ses  arrangements 
avec  la  France.  L'AUemagne  assure  encore 
une  fois  solennellement  qu'elle  n'a  pas  ete  di- 
rigee  par  I'intention  de  s'approprier  le  terri- 
toire  beige  et  que  cette  intention  est  loin  d'elle. . 
L'AUemagne  est  encore  toujours  prete  a  6va- 
cuer  ia  Belgique  aussitdt  que  I'etat  de  la 
guerre  le  lui  permettra. 

L'Ambassadeur  des  Etats-Unis  ici  est  d'ac- 
cord  avec  cette  tentative  de  mediation  de  son 
collegue  de  Bruxelles. 


No  63. 

TiUgramme  adressS  par -M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  M.  le  Baron 
Fallon,  Ministre  du  Roi  4'  la  Haye. 

Bruxelles,  le  10  aotit  1914. 
Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  a  regu  les  propo- 
sitions que  le  Gouvernement  allemand  lui  a 


-     21     - 


fait  parvenir  par  rentremise  du  gouvernement 
neerlandais.  II  vous  transmeltra  prochaine- 
ment  sa  reponse. 

(s)   Davignon 
(Voir  piece  N°  62  el  annexes.) 


N"  64. 

Telegrarmne  adresse  par  M  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistfe  des  Affaires  Elranghres^  nu  Minislre  du 
Roi  a  La  Haye. 

Bruxelles,  10  aout  19i4. 

Un  doute  subsiste.  quant  a  la  signification  du 
mot  «auseinanderselzung»  que  vous  traduis.ez 
par  "arrangement".  Veuillez  vous  informer  si 
dans  la  pens6e  du  Gouvernement  allemand  il 
s'agit  des  arrangements  que  nous  aurions  pris 
avec  la  France  ou  du  reglement  du  differend 
entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne. 

(s)   Davignon. 


Leitre  adressie  par  M.  Davignon, Minis  Ire  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,  aUx  Ministres  de  Grande 
Bretagne^  Hussie  et  France,  accredites  en  Bel-^ 
gique. 

Bruxelles,  le  10 .aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  rhonneur  de  faire  savoir  a  Voire  Ex- 
cellence que  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a  La  Haye, 
a  la  demande  du  Minislre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres des  Pays-Bas,  nous  a  Iransmis  la  pro- 
position suivante  du  Gouvernement  allemand 
(voir  piece  N°  62,  annexe  2). 

Voici  le  texte  de  la  reponse  que  le  Gou- 
vernement du  Roi  se  propose  de  faire  a  cette 
communication   : 

«La  proposition  que  nous  fait  le  Gouverne- 
ment allem.and  reproduit  la  proposition  qui 
avait  ete  formulee  dans  I'ultimatum  du  2  aout. 
Fidele  a  ses  devoirs  internationaux,la  Belgique 
ne  peut  que  reiterer  sa  reponse  a  cet  ultima- 
tum, d'autant  plus  que  depuis  le  3  aoiit  sa 
neutralite  a  ete  violee,  qu'une  guerre  dou- 
loureuse  a  ete  portee  sur  son  territoire  et  que 
les  garants  de  sa  neutralite  bnt  loyalement  et 
immediatement  repondu  a  son  appel.)> 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  tient  a  ce  que  les 
Puissances  garantes  de  la  neutralite  de  Bel- 
gique aient  connaissance  de  ces-  documents. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

(s)   Davignon. 


N0  66. 


M.  von  Buch  adressa  a  M.  Eyschen.  Presi- 
dent du  Gouvernement,  une  lettre  dont  la 
traduction  suit: 

«Luxembourg,  le  8  aout  1914. 

Excellence, 

En  consequence  de  Vattrtude  compretement 
hostile  que  la  Belgique  a  prise  vis-a-vis  dd 
TAllemagne,  les  autorites  militaires  se  voient 
contraintes  d'insister  pour  le  depart  d'ici  du 
Ministre  de  Belgique. 

Son  Excellence  le  general  commandant  fait 
prier  le  Comte  van, den  Steen  de  Jehay,  d'or- 
ganiser  son  voyage  de  depart.de  telle  fagon 
qu'il  puisse,  end6ans  les  24  heures,  enlrer  en 
relation  personnellement  a  Coblence  avec  le 
general,  de  Ploetz,  au  sujet  de  son  voyage 
ulterieur.  Le  depart  n'est  possible  que  par  la 
VQie  Treves-Coblence.w 

(s)  de  Buch. 

M.  Eyschen  transmit  cette  lettre  le  ni&me 
jour  au  Comte  van  den  Steen  de  Jehay»  dans 
les  termes  suivants  : 

« Luxembourg,  le  8  aoiit  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  le  tres  vif  regret  de  vous  communiquer 
ci-joint  copie  dune  lettre  du  Ministre  d'AUe^ 
magne  m'informar.t  que  I'autorite  militaire 
allemande  demande  vofre  d6part. 

Vous  y  trouverez  les  conditions  y  attach6es-. 

M.  von  Buch  me  dit  que  les  autorites  mili 
taires  conseilleraient  plutot  le  voyage  par  che- 
min  de  fer,  parce  que  le  voyage  par  automo- 
bile vous  exposerait  a  etre  arrete  trop  souvent 
pour  des  motifs  de  controle.  Mais  le  choix 
vous  est  abandonn6. 

Le  Ministre  d'Allemagne  viendra  chez  moi 
prendre  votre  reponse. 

Je  ne  saurais  vous  dire  combien  la  tache 
que  je  remplis  en  ce  moment  m'est  "p^nible. 
Je  n'oublierai  jamais  les  relations  si  agreables 
que  nous  avons  eues  et  je  fais  des  voeux  pour 
que  votre  voyage  se  fasse  dans  les  meilleures 
conditions. 

(s)   Eyschen.)) 

Le  Gouvernement  beige  estimant  que  le  Gou-j, 
vernement  Grand  Ducal  n'avait  pas  eu  le 
choix  de  son  attitude  et  que  celle  qu'il  avail 
6t6  oblige  d'adopter  n'impliquait  en  aucune 
maniere  une  intention  discourtoise  ci  l'6gard 
du  Roi  et  de  la  Belgique,  decida  qu'il  n'y 
avait  pas  lieu,  dans  ces  conditions,  de  prier 
le  Charge  d'Af f aires  du  Grand  Duch6  de  quit- 
ter la  Belgique. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etranghres,  dux  Ministres  du  Roi 
a  LondreSy  Paris  et  Saint-Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  10  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  connaitre  les 
Circonstances  qui  ont  amene  le  depart  de'  Lu- 
xembourg du  Representant  du  Roi. 

Le  general  commandant  des  troupes  alle- 
mandes  dans  le  Grand-Duche  de.  Luxembourg 
lit  part,  le  8  aout,  au  Ministre  d'Allemagne 
en  cette  ville,  de  la  volonte  des  autorites  mili- 
taires de  provoquer  le  depart  du  Representant 
du  Roi  pres  la  Cour,  Grand  Ducale.. 


N»  67. 

Lettre  adressee  d  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,. par  le  Ministre  des  Etats- 
Unis,  accrMdte  a  Bruxelles. 

Bruxelles,  le  11  aoat  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 
La  L(§gation  a  regu  aujourd'hui  de  V^ashing- 
ton  une  depeche  I'informant  que  le  Gouver- 
nement des  Etats-Unis  avait,  k  la  demande 
du  Gouvernenient  allemand,  consenti  a  litre 
de  courtoisie  internationale,^  accepter  la  pro- 
tection des  int^rets  des  sujets  allemands  en 
Bejgique. 


22    - 


En  vertu  des  instructions  qui  accompa- 
gnaienl  cette  depeciie,  nous  nous  occuperons 
done,  si  vous  n'y  voyez  pas  d'incorivenient^ 
d'exercer  nos  bons  et  amicaux  offices  aupres 
du  Gouvernement  du  Roi,  pour  la  protection 
de§  sujets  allemands.  Les  agreables  rapporls 
■que  nous  avons  eus  a  ce  sujet  jusqu'a  present 
me  donnent  la  conviction  que  c'est  avec  le  me- 
me  et  mutuel  sentiment  que  nous  pourrorls  les 
poursuivre,  dans  le  meme  but. 

Je  saisis  cette  occasion,  Monsieur  le  Mi- 
.nistre,  pour  vous  renouveler  I'assurance  de  ma 
haute  consideration. 

(s)  Brand  Whitlock. 


N«  68. 

Leltre  adressee  d.  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,  par  sir  Francis  H.  Vil- 
liers,  Ministre  d'Angleterre. 

(Traduction.) 

Bruxellies,  le  ll.aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  telegraphic  a  Sir  Edward  Grey  la  com- 
munication allernande  et  la  reponse  projetee. 

J'ai  reQu  I'ordre  d'exprimer  a  Voire  Excel- 
lence I'entiere  approbation  du  Gouvernement 
de  Sa  Majeste  britannique.  Ce  dernier  ne  peut 
que  se  declarer  d'accord  sur  les  termes  de  la 
reponse  que  le  Gouvernement  beige  se  propose 
de  faire  a  une  tentative  de  semer  la  desunion, 
parmi  les  pays  maintenant  unis,  pour  la  de- 
fense des  Traites  violespar  I'Mlemagne. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

(s)  F.  H.  Villiers. 

(Voir  piece  N"  65.) 


No  69 

Lettre  adressee  d.  M,  Davignon^  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,  par  le  Ministre  de  France, 
accredite  a  Bruxelles. 

Bruxelles,  le  11  aoiit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  faire  savoir  a  Votre  Ex- 
cellence que  le  Gouvernement  frangais  donne 
son  entiere  adhesion  a  la  reponse  que  le  gou- 
vernement beige  se  propose  de  faire  au  nouvel 
ultimatum  de  I'Allemagne. 

Cette  reponse  est  bien  celle  qu'on  pouvait 
attendre  d'un  Gouvernement  et  d'un  peuple 
qui  ont  resists  aussi  heroiquement  a  la  viola- 
tion odieuse  de  leur  territoire. 

La  France  cohtinuera  a  remplir  ses  devoirs 
de  garante  de  la  neutralite  beige  et  de  fidele 
amie  de  la  Belgique. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

(s)  Klobukovvski. 

(Voir  pihce  N°  65.) 


No  70. 

TiUgramme  adresse  a  M.  Davignon, Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  par  le  Ministre  du 
f{Qi  a  La  Haye. 

La  Haye,  12  aout  1914. 
Le  texte  allemand  contenait  une  faute;  au 
.lieu  de  «seine  auseinandersetzung»  il  faut  lire 


<(ihre»  et  done  traduire  "Son  conflit  avec  la 
France". 

(s)  Baron  Fallon. 
(Voir  pikce  N°  64.) 


NO  71. 

Telegramme  adressd  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  a  M.  le  Baron 
Fallon,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  La  Haye. 

Bruxelles.  12  aout  1914. 

Priere  de  remettre  le  telegramme  suivant 
au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  :  La  propo- 
sition que  nous  fait  le  Gouvernement  allemand 
reproduit  la  proposition  qui  avail  ete  formulee 
dans  rultimatum  du  2  aout.  Fidele  a  ses 
devoirs  internationaux,  la  Belgique  ne  peut 
que  reiterer  sa  reponse  a  cet  ultimatum,  d'au- 
tant  plus  que  depuis  le  3  aout  sa  neutralite 
a  ete  violee,  qu'une  guerre  douloureuse  a  ete 
portee  sur  son  territoire  et  que  les  garanls 
de  sa  neutralite  ont  loyalement  et  immedia- 
tement  repondu  a  son  appel. 

(s)  Davignon. 


No  72. 

Telegramme  adressi  a  M.  Davignon,  Minis- 
tre des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  par  S.  E.  M.  Sazo- 
noff.  President  du  Conseil  des  Ministres  de 
Russie. 

Saint-Petersbourg,  13  aotit  1914 
Veuillez  remereier  le  Gouvernement  Royai 
pour  sa  communication  et  lui  exprimer  le 
plaisir  que  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  eprouve 
k  voir  son  attitude  ferme  et  digne  dont  il  le 
fClicite  tr^s  vivement. 

(s)  Sazonoff. 
(Voir  piece  N"  65.) 


No  73. 

Lettre  adressie  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres,  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a 
La  Haye. 

La  Haye,  le  13  aoiit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  eu  I'honneur  de  recevoir  votre  tele- 
gramme d'hier  et  j'ai  remis  aussitot  h.  M. 
le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  la  reponse 
de  la  Belgique  a  la  seconde  proposition  alle- 
mande. 

Son  Excellence  m'a  promis  de  faire  parvenir 
•immediatement  au  Ministre  d'Allemagne  la 
communication  du  Gouvernement  du  Roi. 

Veuillez  agreer,  ete. 

(s)  Baron  Fallon. 

(Voir  pibce  N°  VI.) 


No  74. 

Lettre  adressie  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a 
Paris  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  AJiaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  16  aoiit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 
Au  cours  de  I'entretien  que  j'ai  eu  ce  matin 
avec  M.  de  Margerie,  j'ai  amene  la  conversa- 
tion sur  les  affaires  coloniales  et  sur  la  de- 


23     — 


marche.que  vous  m'arez  charg6  de  faire  par 
votre  telegramme  et  votre  dep^che.  du  7  de  ce. 
mois. 

Mon  interlocuteur  m'a  rappele  que  le  Gou- 
vernement  de  la  Republique  s'etait  adresse  a 
I'Espagne  qui  n'avait  pas  donne  reponse  avant 
d'avoir  I'avis  de  I'Angleterre.  II  parait  que 
celle-ci  continue  h  ne  pas  donner  de  reponse. 

M.  de  Margerie  estime  qu'en  presence  de  la 
situation  actuelle,  il  importe  de  frapper  I'Al 
lemagne  partout  ou  on  peut  I'atteindre  ;  il 
croit  que  telle  est  aussi  I'opinion  de  I'Angle- 
terre qui  aura  certes  des  pretentions  a  faire 
valoir;  la  France  desire  reprendre  la  partie 
du  Congo,  qu'elle  a  dti  c6der  k  la  suite  des 
incidents  d'Agadir.  Un  succ^s,  me  dit  mon 
interlocuteur,  ne  serait  pas  difficile  k  obtenir. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Baron  Guillaume. 

(Voir  pieces  N"'  51  et  58.) 


No  75. 

Lettre  adressee  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  h 
Londres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Elranghes. 

Londres,  le  17  aoiit  19t4. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

En  reponse  a  votre  dep§che  du  7  aoilt,  j'ai 
I'honneur  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  le  Gou- 
vernement  britannique  ne  peut  se  ralliet  k  la 
proposition  beige  tendant  a  respecter  la  neu- 
tralite  des  possessions  des  Puissances  bellig^- 
rantes  dans  le  bassin  xon ventionnel  du  Congo. 

Les  troupes  allemandes  de  I'Est  Africain  al- 
lemand  ont  dej^  pris  Toffensive  contre  le 
protectorat  anglais  de  I'Afrique  centrale.  D'au- 
tre  part,  des  troupes  britanniques  ont  dejci 
attaqu6  le  port  allemand  de  Dar-Es-Salaam,  oii. 
elles  ont  d^truit  la  station  de  t^legraphie  sans 
fil. 

Dans  ces  circonstances,  mgme  si  le  Gouver- 
nement  anglais  6tait  persuade  de  I'utilit^  po- 
litique et  strat6gique  de  la  proposition  beige, 
irne  pourrait  I'adopter. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  Londres  croit  que  les 
forces  qu'il  envoie  en  Afrique  seront  suffi- 
santes  pour  vaincre  toute  opposition.  II  fera 
tous  ses  efforts .  pour  emp§cher  des  souleve- 
ments  dans  la  population  indigene. 

La  France  est  du  meme  avis  que  I'Angle- 
terre, vu  I'activite  allemande  que  Ton  remar- 
que  pr^s  de  Bonar  et  Ekododo. 

Veuillez  agr6er,  etc. 

(s)  Comte  de  Lalaing. 

(Voir  pieces  N"*  57  et  58.) 


No  76. 

TSligramrfie  adress6  vat  le  Vice-Gouverneur 
du  Katanga  it  M .  Renkin,  Ministre  des  Colo- 
nies. 

Elisabethville,  26  aoilt  1914. 

Allemands  continuant  leurs  escarmouches 

au  Tanganika   ont  attaqu6  le  22  aoClt  le  port 

de  Lukuga.  lis  ont  eu  deux  noirs  tu6s  et  deux 

blesses.  De  nouvelles  attaques  sont  attendues. 

(s)  TombeuP. 


No  77. 

Telegramme  adresse' par  le  Comte  Clary  H 
Aldringcn,  Ministre  d' Aittriche-Hongrie,  d.  M . 
Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Efrangeres,  et 
transmis  par  VintermSdiaire  du  Ministre  des, 
Affaires  Etrangercs  des  Paijs-Bas. 

La  Haye,  le  28  aout  1914. 

D'ordre  de  mon  Gouvernement  j'ai  I'hon- 
neur de  notifier  a  Votre  Excellence  ce  qui 
suit  :  «Vu  que  la  Belgique,  apres  avoir  refuse 
d'accepter  les  propositions  qui  lui  avaient  ete 
adressees  a  plusieurs  reprises  par  rAllemagne, 
prete  sa  cooperation  militaire  a  la  France  et 
a  la  Grande-Bretagne  qui,  toutes  deux  ont 
declare  la  guerre  a  I'Autriche-Hongrie,  et  en 
presence  du  fait  que,  comme  il  vient  d'etre 
constate,  les  ressortissants  autrichiens  et  hon- 
grois  se  trouvant  en  Belgique  ont  sous  les 
yeux  des  autorites  Royales,  du  subir  un  traite- 
ment  contraire  aux  exigences  les  plus  primi- 
tives de  I'humanite  et  inadmissable  meme 
vis-a-vis  des  sujets  d'un  Etat  ennemi,  I'Autri- 
che-Hongrie se  voit  dans  la  n6cessite  de  rom- 
pre  les  relations  diplomatiques  et  se  considere 
des  ce  moment  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la  Bel- 
gique. Je  quitte  le  pays  avec  le  personnel  de 
la  Legation  et  confie  la  protection  de  mes 
administres  au  Ministre  des  Etats-Unis  d'Ame- 
rique  en  Belgique.  De  la  part  du  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  les  passeports  sont 
remis  au  Comte  Errembault  de  Dudzeele." 

(s)  Clary. 


No  78. 

TkUgramme  adressi  par  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  Etrangbres  a  M.  le  Baron 
Fallon,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  La  Haye. 

Anvers,  le  29  aoilt  1914. 

Pri^re  accuser  reception  k  Legation  Au- 
triche  par  interm§diaire  Ministre  Affaires 
Etrangeres  declaration  de  guerre  Autriche- 
Hongrie  a  Belgique  et  ajouter  ce  qui  suit: 

«La  Belgique  a  toujours  entretenu  des  re- 
lations d'amitie  avec  tous  ses  voisins  sans 
distinction.  Elle  a  scrupuleusement  rempli  les 
devoirs  que  la  neutrality  lui  impose.  Si  elle 
n'a  pas  cru  pouvoir  accepter  les  propositions 
de  I'AUemgane,  c'est  que  celles-ci  avaient  pour 
objet  la  violation  des  engagements  qu'elle  a 
pris  k  la  face  de  I'Europe,  engagements  qui 
ont  ete  les  conditions  de  la  creation  du  Royau- 
me  de  Belgique.  Elle  n'a  pas  cru  qu'un  peuple, 
quelque.faible  qu'il  soit,  puisse  meconnaitre 
ses  devoirs  et  sacrifier  son  honneur  en  s'incli- 
jiant  devant  la  force.  Le  Gouvernement  a 
attendu,  non  seulement  les  d61ais  de  I'ultima- 
tum,  mais  la  violation  de  son  territoire  par 
les  troupes  allemandes  avant  de  faire  appel 
k  la  France  et  k  I'Angleterre,  garantes  de  sa 
neutrality  au  mSme  titre  que  I'Allemagne  et 
I'Autriche-Hongrie,  pour  coop^rer  au  nom  et 
en  vertu  des  trait^s  a  la  defense  du  territoire 
beige. 

En  repoussant  par  les  armes  les  envahis- 
seurs,  elle  n'a  mSme  pas  accompli  un  acte 
d'hostilite  aux  termes  de  I'article  10  de  la 
convention  de  La  Haye,  sur  les  droits  et  de- 
voirs des  Puissances  neutres. 


w.    24    ^ 


L'Ai'leina'gn^  g,  rqconnu  elle-'mlme  qoe  son 
agression  constitue  Urte  violation  du  droit  des 
gens  et  ne  pouvant  la  justified  ellea  mvoquef 
son  inter^t  slrat^gique. 

La  Belgique  oppose  urt  dementi  formel  b, 
Taffirniation  q\ie  les  ressortissants  aulrichicins 
et  hongi'ois  auraient  subi  en  Belgique  uii  ti-ai- 
tement  contraire  aux  exigen<;es  leS  plua  primi- 
tives de  I'humanite.  . 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  a  donne,  des  16  d4- 
but  des  hostilites,  les'  ordres  les  plus  stricts 
quant  a  la  sauvegafde  de's  personnes  et-des 
proprietes  austrO'Eptigroises. 

(s)  Davignou. 


LettT6  adressed  par  M.  Davignon,  Minimi 
de$  Affaires  Htfangdres,  aux  Legations.  ■  4u 
Hoi  a  Vetrang^f. 

Anvjers,  le  29  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Sous  la  date  du  17  aout,  j'ai  adress6  au  Mi- 
nistre du  Roi  a  Londres  une  lettre  dans 
laquelle  j'ai  cru  devoir  relever  certaines  alle- 
gations produites  par  le  Gouvernement  alle- 
mand,  et  dont  faisait  mention  le  Blue  Book 
public  recemment  par  le  Gouvernement  an- 
glais. 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  placer  sous  vos  yeux  une 
copie  de  cette  lettre  et  de  ses  annexes.  Veuil-. 
lez,  je  vous  prie,  en  donner  connaissance  au 
Gouvernement  aupres  duquel  vous  etes  accr©* 
dite. 

Veuillez  a^eer,  etc.  % 

(s)  Davignon. 

1'^  Annexe  au  N"  79. 

Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrang^res,  au,  Comte  de  La» 
laing,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  Londres. 

Bruxelles,  le  17  aoiit  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Comte, 

Le  Blue  BooJc  public  recemment  par  le  Gou- 
vernement britannique  reproduit,  sous  le 
n°  122  (page  65),  le.  texte  d'un  telegramme 
adress6  de  Berlin,  le  31  juillet,  par  Sir  E.  Gro- 
schen  k  Sir  E.  Grey,  telegramme  dont  i'ex- 
trais  le  passage  suivant : 

«  It  appears  from  what  he  (His  Excellency 
>>  The  Secretary  of  State)  said  that  German 
»  Government  consider  that  certain  hostile 
»  acts  have  been  already  committed  by  Bel- 
»  gium.  .  As  an  instance  af  this,  he  alleged 
»  that  a  consignement  of  corn  of  Germany 
»>  had  been  placed  under  an  embargo  al- 
»  ready.  » 

Le  fait  auquel  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  allemand 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres  a  fait  allusion  dans 
son  entretien  avec  Sir  E.  Groschen,  et  qu'il 
consid6rait  comme  un  acte  hostile  de  la  part 
de  la  Belgique,  se  rapporte  sans  doute  a  I'ap- 
plication  des  arretes  royaux  du  30  juillet,  qui 
ont  prohib6  provisoirement  I'exportation  de 
Belgique  de  certains  produits.  Comme  vous 
le  constaterez  par  I'expose  que  je  tiens  a  vous 
faire  ci-apres,  le  fait  qui  nous  est  reproche  n'a 
nullement  le  caractere  qu'on  a  voulu  lui  don- 
ner en  AUemagne. 


pes  arrgtfis'  royaux-  dat$s  du  30  j'uiUet  el 
publics  au  Moniie'ur  beige  du  lendemain  ont 
prohibe  ci  titre  provisoire,  par  toutes  les  fron- 
litres  de  terre  et  de  mer,  I'exportation  d'une 
s6rie  de  produits,  des  cereales  notamment. 
Sous  la  date  du  31  juillet,  M.  le  Ministre 
d' AUemagne  a  Bruxelles  m^  signala  que  la 
douane  d'Anvers  retenait  des  chargements  de 
grains  a  destination  de  TAllemagne  qui,  sim- 
plemen.t  transbordes  dans  notre  port,  ne  fai-^ 
saient  6n  realite  qu'y  Iransiter.  M.  de  Below 
Saleske  demandait  la  libre  sortie  des  bateaux 
portant  ces  chargements.  Le  jour  meme  oii  il 
recut  la  reclamation  du  Ministre  d'Allema- 
gne,  mon  Departement  en  saisit  le  Minister^ 
des  Finances, .et  des  le  surlendemain  2  aout» 
Celui-ci  nous  annonga  qu'il  avait  ete  transmis 
k  la  douane  beige  des  instructions  donnanl 
pleine  et  eiitiere  satisfaction  h  I'Allemagne, 

Je  crois  ne  pouvoir  mieux  faire,  Monsieuf 
le  Comte,  que  de  placer  sous  vos  yeux  uno 
copie  de  la  correspondance  echangee  ^  ce 
sujet  avec  M.  de  Below  Saleske.  Vous  y  ver- 
rez  que  rien  dans  notre,  attitude  ne  pouvait 
etre  considere  comme  teihoignant  de  dispo- 
sitions hostiles  a  I'egard  de  I'Allemagne  ;  les 
mesuries  prises  par  le  Gouvernement  beige  a 
ce  moment  ne  constituaient  que  les  simples 
precautions  que  tout  Etat  a  le  droit  et  le  de- 
voir de  prendre. dans  des  circonstances  aussi 
exceptionnelles. 

II  serait  bon  que  vous  adressiez  au  Gouver- 
nement de  S.  M.  Britannique  une  communi- 
cation afin  de  I'eclairer  sur  la  realite  de» 
faits. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 

2™«  Annexe  au  N*  79. 

Lettre  ddress6e  par  M.  Dstvignon,  Ministry' 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  diM.de  Below  5<z-» 
leske,  Ministre  d' AUemagne. 

Bruxelles,  3  aoiit  1914, 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Comme  suite  a  la  lettre  que  Votre  Excel- 
lence a  bien  voulu  m'adresser  le  31  juillet 
j'ai  I'honneur  de  Lui  faire  savoir  que  mon  col- 
legue  des  Finances  a  porte  a  la  connaissance' 
du  service  des  douanes  que  les  prohibitions 
etablies>  par  .les  arretes  royaux  du  30  juillet 
ecoule  he  visent  que  I'exportation  proprement 
dite  et  ne  s'6tendent  done  pas  aux  marchan- 
dises  regulierement  a6clarees  en  transit  lors 
de  I'importatioh.Au  surplus,  lorsque  des  mar- 
chandises  libres  de  droits  sont  declarees  en 
consommation,  bien  qu'elles  soient  en  reality 
destinies  a  I'exportation,  elles  font  commune- 
ment  I'objet  de  declarations  de  libre  entree 
specialeSi  qui  sont  considerees  comme  des 
documents  de  transit.  Enfin,  s'il  arrivait  que 
de  telles  marchandises  avaient  ete  declarees 
en  consommation  sans  restrictions,  comme  si 
elles  devaient  rester  effectivement  dans  le 
pays,  la  douane  en  permettrait  encore  la  sor- 
tie du  moment  oii  il  serait  dument  etabli, 
par  les  documents  d'expedition-manifestes, 
connaissements,  etc.,  qu'elles  devaient  etre 
export6es  immediatement  en  transit. 

Je  puis  ajouter  que  I'exportation  des  grains 
auxquels  se  rapportait  la  lettre  pr6citee  de  la 
Legation  Imperiale  a  6te  autorise  le  1"  aofit. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

(s)  Davignon. 


*-    29    - 


3""^  Annexe  au  N"  79. 

tettte  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  MifiiStfe 
des  Affaires  Elrangcres,  d.  M.  de  BelOw  Sa- 
teske,  Ministre  d'Allemagne. 

Bruxelles,  le  T"  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

En  reponse  a  la  lettre  de  Votre  Excellence 
<iu  31  juiJlet,  j'ai  I'honneur  de  Lui  faire 
savoir  que  I'arrete  beige  du  130  juillet  ne 
vise,  que  I'exportation  "et  non  te  transit  des 
produits  cites. 

J'ai  eu  soin  de  faire  part  (h  votre  commu- 
nication a  mon  coliegue  des  Finances,  en  le 
priant  de  vouloir  bien  donner  aux  bureaux 
de  la  douane  des  instructions  precises  de  na* 
ture  a  prevenir  toute  erreur  dans  rappljcat.ion 
de  I'arrete  precite. 

Je  sa^is,  etc. 

ifi)  B4vignon> 


4"»  Annexe  au  N»  79. 

'Lettra  adressee  par  M.  de  Below  Saleske^ 
ministre  d'Allemayne,  'a  M.  Davignon,  Mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres. 

Bruxelles,  le  31  juillet  19U. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

On  m'a  informe  d'Anvers  que  la  douane  a 
defendu  le  depart  des  bateaux  charges  de 
grains  pour  rAllemagne. 

Vu  qu'il  ne  s'agit  pas  dans  ces  cas  d'une 
exportation  de  grains,  mais  d'un  transit,  parce 
que  la  marchandise  a  et^  seulement  transbor- 
dee  k  Anvers,'  j'ai  I'honneur  de  recourir  a 
votre  .bienveillante  entremise  afin  qu'on 
laisse  partir  pour  VAllemagne  les  bateaux  en 
question. 

En  m§me  temps,  je  prie  Votre  Excellence 
de  me  faire  savoir  si  le  port  d'Anvers  est  fer- 
me  pour  le  transit  des  marchandises  6nume- 
rees  au  Moniteur  daujourd'hui. 

En  attendant  la  reponse  de  Votre  Excel! en* 
ce  dans  le  plus  bref  delai  possible,  je  profile 
do  cette  occasion,  etc. 

(s)  de  Below  Saleske. 


MINISTfeRE  DES  AFFAIRES  filRANGfeRES 


DOCUMENTS  DIPLOMATIQUES 


1914 


LA  GUERRE  EUROPEENNE 


I 

PlfeCES 

RELATIVES   AUX   NEGOCIATIONS 

QUI  ONT  PR]^C6di5   LES  DECLARATIONS  DE   GUERREi 

DE  L'ALLEMAGNE  A  LA  RUSSIE   (T"  AOUT  19U) 

ET  A  LA  FRANCE   (3  AOUT  191^) 

Dl^CLARATION  DU  ft   SEPTEMBRE   1914 


PARIS 
IMPRIMERIE  NATIONALE 

MDCCCCXIV 


MINISTfeRE  DES  AFFAIRES  filRANGfeRES 


DOCUMENTS   DIPLOMATIQUES 


GUERRE   EUROPfiENNE 


TABLE  DES  JVfATlfeRES. 


NUMB- 
ROS. 


NOMS 

BO  SIGilATAIRE. 


LIEU 
et 

DATE    D'ENVOI. 


SOMMAIRE. 


CHAPITRE  premier; 


AVERTISSEMENTS. 


(1913. 


M.  Jules  Camroh. 


1913. 


Berlin,  17  mars  . 


M.    ElfENNE. 


M.  Jules  Camhon. 


M.  ALLrzE. 


Note  au  Ministrc. . 


Jules  Cambon;  . .., 


Paris,  2  avril 


Berlin,  6  mai. 


Munich,  lojuilici. 


Paris,  3o  juiilet 


Berlin,  22  nov. 


"ransmission  de  rapports  de  I'altache  militaire  et  de  I'atta 
che  naval  a  Berlin  sur  la  nouvelle  loi  militaire.  Efforts 
du  Gouvernement  allemand  pour  representer  cette  loi 
comme  une  reponse  au.projet  fran^ais  de  loi  de  Irois  ans 
et  pour  exalter  dans  les  masses  le  sentiment  guerrier. . 


Annexe  1.  —  Rapport  du  lieutenant-colonel  Serret.  Les 
armemehts  allemands  sont  destines  a  mettre  la  France 
dans  un  etat  d'inferiorite  deGnitif.  Colere  provoqu^e  dans 
les  milieux  olTiciels  par  les  mesures  de  precaution 
francaises. 

ANME-tE  II.  —  Rapport  de  M.  de  Faramond.  Le  projet 
de  loi  militaire  a  pour  objet  de  rendre  facile  une  offen- 
sive foudroyante  contre  la  France.  Coafiance  des  Alle- 
mands dans  la  superiorite  de  leur  armee.  Mesures  Cnan- 
cieres  projetees  pour  couvrir  les  depenses  militaires. 

Envoi  d'un  rapport  officiel  et  secret  allemand  sur  le  renfor- 
cement  de  I'armee 


Annexe.  —  Texte  de  ce  rapport.  Aper?u  rctrospectif 
sur  les  armcments  successifs  provoques  par  la  Conference 
d'Algesiras,  I'affaire  d'Agadir  ct  la  guerce  balkanique. 
Necessite  d'accomplir  un  nouvel  effort,  d'habitucr  I'opi- 
nion  publique  a  I'idee  de  guerre,  de  susciter  des  troubles 
dans  les  colonies  francaises  ou  anglaises  et  de  prevoir  I'in- 
vasion  de  la  Bela;ique  et  de  la  Hollande. 

Fin  de  la  crise  balkanique.  Elle  a  faiili  amener  fAllemagne 
a  une  guerre  d'agression  contre  la  France  et  a  provoque, 
dps  preparatifs  de  mobilisation , 


L'opinion  bavaroise  n'accepte  les  nouveaux  armements  qUe 
comme  destines  a  provoquerune  guerre  dans  laquelle  elle 
s'habitue  a  voir  la  seule  solution  possible  aux  dinTiculles 
interieures 


Sentiments  dominants  dans  l'opinion  allemande  :  desir  d'une 
revanche  d'Agadir,  crainte  de  resurrection  d'une  FraMce 
foFte.  Impuissance  du  parti  de  la  paix.  Formation,  com- 
position et  developpement  croissant  d'un  parti  de  la 
guerre,  encouragd  dans  ses  ambitions  par  la  faiblesse  pre- 
sum^e  de  la  Triple-Entente .  .  .  > 


Conversation  du  Roi  des  Beiges  avec  I'Empereur,  qui  a  cesse 
d'etre  pacifique,  cede  au  courant  belliqueux  dont  son  fils 
est  le  centre,  et  se  familiarise  avec  la  perspective  d'un 
conflit  prochain  avec  la  France. 


21 


VI 


ROS. 

NOMS 

on  SICNATiTBK. 

LIEU 
et 

DATE  D'EirvOI. 

SOMMAIRE. 

PAGES. 

CHAPITRE  U. 

PRELIMINAIRES. 

DE  LA  MORT  DE  L'ARCHIDUC  HERITIER  (28  JUIN   igiA) 

i 

X   LA  REMISE 

DE    LA    NOTE    AUTRICHIENNE  X    LA    SERBIE    (SO    JUILLET    igiAj. 

1914. 

7 

Mr  PTyM*!?"?-  t  •  •  •  1 1  > . . . . 

Vienne,  aS  juin... 

Nouvelle  de  I'assassinat  de  I'arcbiduc  Franjois-Ferdinand  k 

2! 

8 

M.  DcMAIHE ••••• 

Vienne,  ajuiUet.. 

Exploitation  de  cet  evdnement  par  le  parti  militaire  autri- 
chien 

2; 

9 

M.  DE  Mabreviixb 

Beriin.  AjniUet.. 

Confiance  afiectee  du  Gouvernement  allemand  da^ns  un  ar- 
rangement a  I'amiable  du  differend  auslro-serbe 

2< 

10 

M.  Paleolo&de.  .  .^ . . . . . 

Petersbourg,6juill. 

M.  Sazonoffa  averti  I'Ambassadeur  d'Aulriche  que  le  Gou- 
vernement russe  ne   saurait  accepter   que  I'assassinat  de 
I'Arcbiduc  servit  de  pretexle  a  une  action  sur  terriloire 
serbe 

2i 

11 

Budapest,  11  juill.. 

Optimisme  officiel  de   commande,  contrastanl  avec  de  s^- 
rieuz  preparatifs  uilitaires  en  Horcrie ..••••••..•... 

27 

12 

Vienne,  iSjuiUet. 

Les  journaux  odlcieux  autricbiensprechent  une  guerre  a  fond 
au  panserbisme,  la   Russie   el  la  France  leur  paraissant 
bors  d'etat  d'intervenir 

1 

13 

M.  DtHAnfB «...c.. 

Vienne,  ig  juillet. 

Transmission  d'un  rapport  consulaire 

14 

Rapport  •  consulaire      de 
Vienne.. 

Vienne,  igjuiUel. 

Les  milieux  polillques  autricbiens   semblent  resolus  a  une 
guerre  d'agression  contre   la  Serbic,  et  les  milieux  mili- 
taires  envisagent  I'evenlualild  d'un  conflit  europ^en 

1 

15 

M.  Jules  Cambon 

Berlin,  ai  juiHet.. 

Le   Gouvernement  allemand,  qui  a  deja  envoyd  des  tavis 
prdliminaircs  de  mobilisation*,  declare  calegoriquement 
qu'il  ignore  la  teneur  de  la  note  que  I'Autricbe  doit  en- 
voyer  a  la  Serbie 

3 

16 

M.  BtENTERC-MARTIIf 

Paris,  31  juillet.. 

L'AHemagne     appuiera    fortement    les    demarches    aulri- 
cbiennes,  sans  cbercher  a  jouer  un  role  de  mddialion. . . 

3 

17 
18 

M.  Bientbhd-Marti5 

M,  Dduaine.  ► 

Paris,  a  a  juillet.. 
Vienne,  a  a  juUlet. 

Le    Gouvernement   fran^ais   prescrit    a    I'Ambassadeur   de 
France  de  donner  amicalement  a  Vienne  des  conseils  de 

3 
3 

Dispositions  con cilianfes  de  la  Russie  et  de  la  Serbie.  Indi- 
cations    rassurantes   fournies   aux  diplomales  etrangers. 
Propos  violents  de  I'Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne 

19 

M.  Paul  Cambok 

Londres,  a  a  juillet. 

Graves  inquietudes   de  sir   Edward  Grey  h  la  suite  d'une 
conversation  ayec  I'Ambassadeur  d  AHemagne.  Conseils  de 
prudence  et  de  moderation  donnes  a  I'Ambassadeur  d'Au. 
tricbe-Uongrie , 

3 

20 

M.  Bientenc-Martw.'. . . . 

Paris,  aS juillet.. 

Remise  procbaine  de  la  Note  autrichienne  a  la  Serbie.  Im- 
pressions conlradicloires  des  diplomates  sur  son  conlenu 
et  sa  portee.  Assurances  apaisanles  donndes  a  Vienne. . . . 

3 

21 

M.  ALLni 

Munich,  a 3  juillet. 

Pessimisme  des  milieux  ofliciels'bavarois,  en  particuller  du 
President  du  Conseil,  qui  a  eu  connaissance  de  la  Note 

3 

1  , 

NUME- 

NOMS 

LIEU 
el 

SOMMAIRE. 

PAGES. 

ROS. 

DO   SIGNATAIBE. 

DATE   D'ENVOI. 

1 

CHAPITRE  m. 

tA 

NOTE    AUTRICHIENNE    ET  LA   REPONSE    SERBE.] 

(Du  vendredi  24  juillet  au  samedi  25  juillet.) 

22 

M.  Rene  Viviani 

Reval,  3  4  juillet.. 

D'accord  avec  M.  Sazonoff,  M.  Viviani  p'rie  M.  Bienvenu- 
Martin,  Ministre  interimaire  des  Affaires  elrangeres.  de 
donner  des  instructions  pour  que  de  Paris  et  de  Londres 
des  conseils  de  moderation  soient    adresses    au   Comte 
Berchtold ,  ia  remise  de  la  Note  autrichienne  la  veilie  au 

23 

M.  Bienvend-Martin 

Paris.  2 A  juiUet.. 

soir  ctant  encore  i^noree 

39 

Instructions  transmises  dans  ce  sens  a  Vienne,  oil  elles  ne 

parviennent  qu  apres  la  remise  de  la  Note  a  Belgrade. . . 

40 

24 

Note  actrichienne 

Vienne,  24  juillet. 

Texte  de  la  Note  autrichienne  a  la  Serbie,  communiqu^e 

25 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin 

Paris,  2^  juillet.. 

dans  ia  matinee  du   2  4  juillet  par  le  Comte  Szecsen  a 

40 

Analyse  de  cette  Note.  Le  Comte  Szecsen  a  ete  avise,  lors- 

qu'il  I'a  apportee,   de  la  penible  impression  que  ne  pou- 
vaient    manquer    de    produire,    specialement  dans    les 
conditions  actuelles,  I'etendue  des  exigences  autrichiennes. 

• 

comme  la  brievete  du  delai  fixe  a  la  Serbie  pour  la  re- 

ponse 

45 

26 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin 

Paris,  2  4  juillet.. 

Conseil  donne  par  le  Gouvernement  fran?ais  au  Gouverne- 
ment  serbe  d'accepter  les  demandes  de  i'Autriche  dans 
tout  ce  qu'elles  peuvent  avoir  d'admissible  et  de  proposer 
de  soumettre  la  question  a  I'arbitrage  de  i'Europe 

46 

2, 

M.  Biekvenu-Martin 

Paris,  24  juillet.. 

Renseignements  donnes  a  nos  ambassadeurs  sur  ies  ten- 
dances belliqueuses  du  parti  militaire  autrichien,  sur  la 
difficulte  pour  la  Serbie  d'accepter  I'inlegralite  des  exi- 

28 

M.  Bienvend-Martin 

Paris,  2  4  juillet.. 

gences  autrichiennes  et  sur  ie  ton  mdnacant  de  ia  presse 

47 

D-marche  de  M.  de  Schoen  au  Quai  d'Orsay  pour  appuyer, 
au  nom  de  son  Gouvernement,  ia  demarche  de  I'Autriche- 

Hongrie,  approuver  sa  Note,  et  faire  ressortir  les  « conse- 

quences incalculables »  qu  entratnerait ,  en  raison  du  jeu 
des  alliances,    toute  .tentative  d'immixtion   d'une   tierce 

29 

M.  Jules  Cambon 

Berlin,  a 4  juillet. . 

puissance  dans  le  conflit  austro-serbe 

48 

Manifestations   austrophiles  et  chauvines   a  Berlin;  pessi- 

misme  des  milieux  diplomatiaues 

49 

30 

Ml  Jules  Cambon 

Berlin,  24  juillet.. 

M.  de  Jagow  declare  approuver  la  Note  autrichienne,  mais 
se  defend  absolument  d'en  avoir  connu  prealabiement  le 
contenu.   II  espere  que  .la  Serbie  recevra  de  ses  amis  le 
conseil  de  ceder.  La  presse  officielle  se  solidarise  egale- 
ment  avec  i'Autriche 

50 

31 
32 

M.  Paleologde 

Petersbourg,  2  4j'. 
Londres,  24  juillet. 

Dispositions    pacifiques   du    Gouvernement    russe,    malgre 
i'emolion  profonde  produite  dans  le  public  par  la  remise 

5i 

M.  Paul  Cambon 

Sir  E.  Grey  expose  a  M.  Paul  Cambon  son  projet  de  media- 
lion  a   quatre.   Pessimisme  du  Comte   Benckeadorf  au 

sujet  des  dispositions  de  I'Ailemagne 

52 

D0£DMENTS  0IPL0MATIQUES»  — >  Guerre  europdenne. 


- 

-  vm  

If 

NOMB- 

ROS. 

NOMS 

DU   SIGNATAIRK. 

LIEU 
et 

DATE    D'ENVOI. 

SOMMAIRE. 

PAGEi 

33 
34 

35 
36 

37 

.. 

39 
40 
41 

42 
43 

44 
45 

46 

47 

M.  Paul  Cambon 

M.  Bienveno-Martin 

M.  Jules  Cambon 

M.  BiervehuMartiw 

M.  DE  Fleuriau 

M.   PALEOtOGCE.  >.....». 

Londres,  a^juillet. 
Paris,  24  juiilet..  . 

Beriin,  2 5  juiilet.. 
Paris,  2 5 juiilet... 

LoDch-es,25  juillef. 

Petersboarg,  25j'. 

Pam,  35jaillet... 
Londres,  aSjurllet. 
Berlin,  25  juHiet.  . 

Berlin,  2 5  juiilet.  . 
Berlin,  25  juiUel. . 

Rom^,  25  juiHfit.  , 

Vienne,  25  juiilet. 

Belgcadfr,  2SjuiUet. 
Beriini,  a5  juiilet. . 

Une  intervention  officieuse  de  TAUemagne  a  Vienne  scmLlc 
a  M.  Paul  Cambon  le  meilleur  moyen  d'arreter  le  conflit. 

Sir  E.  Grey  veut  proposer  a  I'Allemagne  d'agir  en  commun 
a  Vienne  et  a  Petersbourg,  en  vue  de  sdumettre  le  conflit 
austro-serbe  a  la  mediation   des  quatre  puissances  non 
inleressees  dans  la  question.  Conseils  de  prudence  donnes 
au  Mfnistre  de  Serbie  a  Paris ', 

53 

53 
54' 

55 

56 

56 
57 

58 

58 

Le  ]VIinistre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin  voit.dans  la'  crise  en  cours 
Texecution  de  projets  de  guerre  premedites  par  I'AUe- 
magne 

Resume  de  la  situation.  A  Paris,  M.  de  Schoen  vient  de- 
i       mentir  au  Quai  d'Orsay  le  caractere  menacant  de^a  de- 
marche de  la  veiHe.  A  Londres ,  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche 
declare  que  la  Note   autrichienne  n'a  pas   le  caractere 
d 'iin  ultimatum.  Sir  E.  Grey  fait  donner  des  conseils  de 
prudence  a  Belgrade  et  expose  a  I'Ambassadeur  d'Alie- 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  se  refusant  a  intervenir  entre 
Vienne  et  Belgrade,  Sir  E.  Grey  fait  remarquer  au  prince 
Licbnowsky  que  cette  attitude  contribuera  a  araener  un 
conflit  general  dans  lequel  I'Angleterre  ne  saurait  rester 

Efforts  de  conciliation  de  M.  Sazonoff  :  il  demande  a  Vienne 
une  prolongation  du  delai  imparti  a  la  Serbie  pour  sa 

M.  Bienvknu-Martin 

M.  DE  Flecriaxi 

M.   Jules  Ca5!B05 

M,  Jules  Cambon 

1 

M.  Jules  Cambon »,. 

M.  Barrere w . . 

Le  Gouveriiement  francais  appuie  cette  demande  ^e  prolon^ 
gation 

Le  Gouvernement  anglais  s'associe   egalement  a  cetle  de- 

M.  de  Jagow  declare  de  nouveau  categoriquement  n'avoir 
pas  eu  connaissance  de  la  Note  autrichienne  avant  sa  re- 
mise. 11  repond  evasivement  a  une  demande  du  Chargd 
d' Affaires  d'Angleterre  pour  intervenir  a  Vienne  en  vue 
idle    prevenir    un    conflit   et   de   prolongcr    le   delai    de 
I'ultimatum 

Le  Charge  d'Affaires  de  Russie  presentc  a  son  tour  cette 
dcraiere  demande  a  Berlin.  11  insiste  sur  I'urgence  d'unc 
reponse  que  M.  de  Jagow  cherche  a  ajourner 

Sac  une  nouvelle  demarche  pressante  du  Charge  d'Afi'aires 
de  Russie,  M.  dt  Jagow  declare  qu'il  consiclere  le  diffu- 
pend  austro-serbe  comme  une   afffiire   purcment  locale, 
qui  doit  rester  limitee  a  I'Autriche  et  a  la  Serbie  et  qui 
ne  lui  paraitpas  susceptible  d'amener  des  difficultes  inter- 
nationales 

59 

59 

L'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  a  Rome  demande  au  gouverne- 
ment ilalien  d'intervenir  pour  la  prolongation  du  delai 

60 

Le  Gouvernement  autrichien  elude  la  demande  de  prolon- 
gation du  delai,  qu'a  presentee  a  Vienne  le  Charge  d'Af- 
faires de  Russie. ,^ 

Resume  de  la  reponse  serbe  a  la  Note  autrichienne 

La  nonvelle  du  depart  de  Belgrade  du  Minislrft  d'Autriche 
provoquc  a  Berlin  des  manifestations  de  chauvinisme.  Les 
iioanciers  croient  a  la  guerre 

M    Boppe 

60 
61 

62 

M.  Jules  Camdor 

IX 


>UME- 
ROS. 

NOMS 

DES  SIG.NATAIRES. 

UEU 

ET  DATE  D'ENTOI. 

SOMMAIRE. 

■  H— ill  III' 

PAGES. 

48 

49 

Vienne,  25  juillel. 
Belgrade,  sBjuillet. 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne,  en  raison  du  retard 
impose  au  telegramme  qui  lui  a  ete  envoye  de  Paris,  ne 
recoit  pas  asscz  t6t  ses  instructions  pour  s'associer  en  temps 

62 
63 

Texte  de  la  reppnse  serbQ  a  la  Note  auslro-hongroise 

CHAPITRE  IV, 

De  la  rupture  des  relations  diplomatiques  (25    juiiiet  191 4)  A.  la  declaration  de  gtjerre 
(28  juillet  1914)  DE  l'Autriche  a  Ca  Serbie, 


50       M.  Bienvenu-Mahtin  . 


58 


59 


M.  Barrebe  

M.  Barrerb 

M.  Bienvenc-Martin  . . 

M.  Paleologce.  . . . . . 

M.  Ddmaine..  ....... 

M.  Bienveno-Martin  . . 

Note  pour  le  Ministre. 


M.  Chevalley. 
M.  d'Annoville 
M.  Faroes.... 


Paris,  26  juiiiet. 


Rome,  26  juiiiet. , 


Rome,  26  juillet. 


Paris,  26  juillet. 


Petersbourg , 
juillet. 


26 


Vienne,  26  juillet. 


Paris,  26  juillet .. 


Paris,  26  juillet. 


Christiania,  2  6  juil- 
let. 

Luxembourg  ,26 
juillet. 

Bale.  27  juillet... 


Resume  de  la  situation  le  2  5  au  soir,  telle  qu'elle  r6sulte 
de  I'attitude  intransigeante  de  I'Autricbe-Hongrie.  Im- 
pressions ressenties  dans  les  difFerentes  capitales  et  ten- 
tatives  pour  emp^cher  I'aggravation  du  conflit  qui  resul- 
terait  de  mesures  militaires  contre  la  Serbie  prises  par 
le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois.  Sir  E.  Grey  espere 
encore  pr6venir  un  conflit  par  i'intervention  des  quatre 
Puissances  non  int^ressees , 

L'ltalie  participera  aux  efforts  pour  le  maintien  de  la  paix, 
mais  veut  se  tenir  en  dehors  du  conflit  s'il  edate 

La  Russie  conserve  I'espoir  d'une  solution  paciiique;  I'opi- 
nion  italienne  se  montre  hostile  a  l'Autriche.. . ... ...... 

Le  Gouvernement  fran^ais  appuie  la  demande  de  "mediation 
que  la  Serbie  adresse  au  Gouvernement  anglais,  sur  les 
conseils  de;  la  Russie 

M.  Sazonoff,  toujours  anime  du  mfime  esprit  de  conciliation, 
propose  une  conversation  directe  entre  Vienne -et  Peters- 
bourg sur  les  modifications  a  introduire  dans  rultimatum 
pour  le  rendre  acceptable 

L'Ambassadeur  de  Russie,  de  retour  a  Vienne,  se  propose 
d'y  presenter  une  nouvelle  proposition  d' arrangement  . . . 

Demarche  de  M.  de  Schoen  au  Quai  d'Orsay  pour  que  la 
France  intervienne  avec  I'Allemagne  a  Petersbourg  seule- 
ment,  pour  donner  des  conseils  pacifiques.  Son  refus  de 
repondre,  faute  d'instructions ,  a  la  demande  de  mediation 
a  quatre  a  Petersbourg  et  a  Vienne i . 

Nouvelle  visile  de  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  pour  afllrmer  et 
accentuer  le  sens  pacifique  de  sa  pr6cedente  demarche.  11 
refuse  de  se  prononcer  sur  I'opportunite  de  conseils  de  mo- 
deration a  donner  par  I'Allemagne  h  Vienne,  et  persiste  a 
tenter  d'engager  le  Gouvernement  francais  dans  la  voie 
d'une  demarche  commune  de  «solidarite  pacifique*  a  Pe- 
tersbourg uniquement,  de  qui,  selon  lui,  depend  la  paix. 


Ordre  a  la  flotte  allemande  de  Norvege  de  rentrer  en  Alle- 
magne 

Premiers  preparatifs  de  mobilisation  a  Thionville 

Premiers  preparatifs  de  mobilisation  dans  ie  Grand-Duche 
de  Bade 


NUME- 
ROS. 


61 


NOMS 

DES  SIGNATAIRES. 


M.  Bienvend-Mabtis. 


02 


M.  BlENVESD-MABTJiX . 


65 


66 


07 


08 


M.  D£  pLEnllUO 

M.  Paleol06UE.  . . .  i^ 

M.  BOMPARD 

M.  D-E.  FtECRlAU 

M.  Jules  Cambor.  . . . 


M.  DE  Fleuriau. 


M.  DE  Fleuriau. 


M.  Bienvenu-Martin. 

M.  DE  Fleuriau 

M.  Barrere  

M«  Joles  Camdon..  . . 

.M.  Jules  Camdon.  . . . 

M.  Biwvesd-Martim. 


LIEU 

ET'  DATE  D'ENVOI. 


Paris.  27  juillet. 


Paris,  27  juiUet . 


Londres,  27  juillet 


Saint-PetcrsbQUfg, 
27  juillet. 

Constantinople,  37 
juillet. 


Londres,  27  juiJlet. 
Berlin,  27  juillet.. 

Londres,  27  juillet. 

Londres,  27  juillet. 

Paris,  27  juillet  . . 

Londres,  27juiljet. 
Rome,  27  juillet. . 

Berlin,  27  juillet.. 

Bfiriin,  a 7  juillet.. 

Piaus,»7.  juillet.. 


SOMMAIRE. 


Resume  des  trois  demarches  successives  de  M.  -de  Schoen.  La 
situation  s'aggrave,  I'Autriche  refusanl  a  la  fois  de  se 
contenter  des  concessions  de  la  Serbie  et  d'enlrer  en  con- 
versation a  ce  sujet  avec  les  Puissances.  —  Nouvelle 
proposition  anglaise  de  rechercher  a  Paris,  Berlin,  Rome 
et  Londres  les  moyens  deviter  une-crise ,  la  Russie  et  I'Au- 
triche, les  Puissances  directement  inleressees,  restanl  a 
I'ecart 


Nouvelle  demarche  de  M.  de  Schoen  au  Quai  d'Orsay,  tehdant 
visiblement  a  comprometire  la  France  a  legard  de  la 
Russie,  tout  en  gagnant  du  temps  pour  faciliter  une  ac- 
tion militaire  de  I'Autriche  en  Serbie,  que  I'Allemagne 
ne  fait  rien  pour  retarder 


Les  ambassadeurs  d'Allemagne  et  d'Autriche  laissent  en- 
tendre quils  sont  surs  de  la  neutrality  anglaise,  malgre 
le  langage  qui  a  ele  tenu  par  Sir  A.  Nicolson  au  prince 
Lichnovrski 


Dispositions  concilianles  de  M.  Sazonoff. 


On  estime  a  Constantinople  que  le  conQit  austro-serbe  res- 
tera  localise  et  que  la  Russie  n'interviendra  pas  en  faveur 
de  la  Serbie 


La  Grande-Bretagne  arr^le  la  demobilisation  de  sa  Oottc  et 
averlit  i'Allemagne  qu'une  invasion  de  la  Serbie  par  I'Au 
triche  risque  d'amener  une  guerre  europeenne 


M.  de  Jagow  donne  de  vagues  assurances  pacifiques  et  de 
dare,  en  reponse  a  une  question,  que  I'Allemagne  n? 
mobiiiserait  pas. si  ia  Russie  nc  mobilisait  que  sur  la  fron 
liere  autrichienne.  Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  temoigne  de  vives 
inquietudes 


Sir  E.  Grey  propose  que  les  Ambassadeurs  de  France,  d'Al- 
lemagne et  d'llalie  a  Londres  examinent,  de  concert  avec 
lui ,  le  moyen  de  resoudre  les  -difliculles  actucUes 


La  Serbie  n'a  pas  demande  la  mediation  anglaise;  il  faut 
done  s'en  tenir  au  projet  de  mediatioii  a  qua\re  preconise 
par  I'Anglelerre 


Le  Gouvernement  francais  accepte  la  proposition  anglaise, 
qu'une  action  siacerement  moderatrice  de  I'Allemagne  a 
Vienne  pourrait  toutefois  seule  faire  aboutir 


Le  Gouvernement  italien  acicepte 
quatre 


la  mediation  a 


Le  Marquis  de  San  Giuliano  declare  n'avoir  pas  eu  connais- 
sance  prealable  de  la  Note  autrichienne  et  adhere,  sans 
hesiler,  a  la  proposition  de  Sir  E.  Grey 


M.  de  Jagow  repousse  I'idee  d'une  conference  des  Puis- 
sances, lout  en  protestant  de  son  desir  d'une  solution 
paciGque » 


II  se  derobe  a  de  nouvelles  instances  de  M.  Jules  Cambon  a 
cet  egard.  Opportunite  de  renouveler  sous  une  forme  dif- 
ferente  la  proposition  anglaise,  pou^  jvellre  i'Allemaghe 
au  pied  du  mur 


Le  Comte  Szecsen  vient  remetlrf.au  .Quai. d'Orsay  un  me- 
morandum de  son  Gouvernement  pour  justifier  les  me- 
sures  de  coercilion  qu'il  annonce  comme  imminentes 
contre  la  Serbie.  —  Texte  de  ce  memorandum 


XI 


NOME- 
ROS. 


15. bis. 


76 


73 


79 


80 


81 


,  83 


NOM 

DU  SIGNATAIRK. 


Communique    da    Bureau 
tie  la  Pressc. 


M..Ilene  Vitiani 


M.  Biervenu-Mabtir. 


M.  BlENVEira-MARTpf . 


IVr.  BlEPiVESU-MARTIPt  ^- 


M1  R&ul.GvMBOB ..^. 


M.  Jules  Camoor. 


M.  Paleologce.  ... 

M.  DOMAJNE 


LIEU 
et 

DATE    D'ENVOI. 


Vienne,  28  juillet. 

A  Lord  (le  la  Fr«rt- 
ce.  28  juillet. 

Paris, '28  juillet. . 


Paris,  28  juillet. . 


Paris,  28  juillet. . 


Londres,  28  juillet. 


Berlin,  28  j.uillel.^ 


Saint- Petersbourg, 
28  juillet. 

Vienne,  28  juillet. 


SOMMAIRE. 


Communique  oflicieux  du  Bureau  de  la  Presse  viennoise  au 
sujet  de  la  reponse  serl)e,  representee  comme  insuffisante. 

Accuse  de  reception  des  communications  revues  de  M.  Bien- 
venu-Martin  et  approbation  des  reponses  qu'il  a  faites, 
soit  a  M.  de  Schoen  ,  soit  a  la  proposition  de  Sir  E.  Grey. 

Resume  de  la  situation  :  refus  de  I'Allemagne  d'intervenir  a 
Vienne,  objection  qu'elle  oppose  a  la  proposition  anglaise. 
remise  du  memorandum  autrichieo.  Dangers  de.la  situa- 
tion  

Yisite  de  M.  de  Scboen  au  Quai  d'Orsay.  11  proteste  a  nou- 
•veau  de  ses  sentiments  pacifiques,  maij  se  derobe  tou jours 
a  I'examen  des  moyens  pratiques  de  prevenir  ie  conDit.  . 

Recommandation  a  M.  Dumaine  de  se  tenir  en  contact  avec 
son  collegue  d'Angleterre,  pour  presenter  a  Vienne-  la 
demande  de  mediation  anglaise.. »-...^. ......  .*..... 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  Londres  insiste,  comme 
M.  de  Schoen  a  Paris,  sur  i'utilite  d*une  action  modera- 
trice  de  I'Angleterre  a  Petersbourg  uniquement.  D'autre 
par  J ,  M.  Sa/.onofT  a  accepte  la  proposition  anglaise  de 
mediation,  mais  il  voudrait  la  faire  preceder  d'une 
conversation  directe  avec  Viennef,  dont  il  attend  de 
Jjons  resultals ._....* •..^.. . ..  .^. . .., 

M.  de  Jagow  se  montre  toujours  hostile  a  la  conference 
proposec  par  Sir  E.  Grey,  etappuie  son  attitude  dilatoire 
sur  la  nouveile  des  efforts  russes  pour  une  entente  directe 
entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg v.-- .... 

M.  Sazonoff  c^t  oblige  de  cohstater  que  I'Autriche  se  derobe 
a  ses  propositions  d'crttente  directe .  —  . ...... .  — 

La  declaration  de  guerre  de  I'Autriche  a  la  Serbie  rend 
inutile  toute  tentative  de  conciliation,  au  dire  du  comle 
Berchtold  qui  romptainsi  tout  pourparler  avec  Petersbourg. 


96 


97 


ds- 


98 


^9 


99 


100 


102 


i.02 


CHAPITRE  V. 

De  la  declaration  Dte  guerre  de  l'Autriche  X  la  Serbie    {28  juillet  igi^)'  a  L'ULTiMAxosr^ 
DE  l'Allemagne  a.  la  Russie  (3 1  juillet  191/i}. 


84      M,  Barrere, 


85 


JVJ.  BlENVEMUrMABTIN  ...  .  .  . 


M.  Paleoiocde.  . 
M.  Kloqckoivski. 
M.Rqrssqi  ...... 


Rome. ;» 9  juillet.. 


Paris...  29  Juillet., 


Saint  -  Petersbourg , 
29  juillet. 

Bruxelles,  a^  juil- 
let. 

-Francforl,  a^^juil 
leh. 


La  Consulta  estime  que  la  declaration  de  guerre  de  I'Au- 
triche ne  doit  pas  empdcher  la  continuation  des  efforts 
diplomatiques  pour  Ja  reunion  d'une  conference  .a 
Londres...  ..^  ...  .v.. .,. . .  .;-...-. .,. ,.  — ^.\.«^ 

L'Allemagne  semble  renoncer  a  I'espoir  d'une  pression 
franco-anglaise  sur  la  Russie  seule,  mais  continue  de  se 
refuser  a  agir  sur  Vienne.  Dans  ces  conditions  il  parait 
indispensable  que  la  Russie  se  raUie  definitivement  et  de 
suite  a  la  proposition  anglaise  de  mediation  aquatrci,  pour 
-la  faire  accepter  par '  Berlin  avant  que  les  mesurcs  mili- 
taires  de  I'Autriclie  ne  compromettent  definitivement  la 
paix. ..  _, . .-»-  .-^  >  >..  >  ,^,>...^..;>.  .  .....,■..  .... . 

Le  Gouvernemenl  russe  adhere  enticremenl  a  cetle  pro- 
position. ... ......  .^...... .........  ^^.^-..-.^.^ ........ . .  .. 


Inquietudes  soulevees  a  Bruxelles  par  raltitude  enigmatique 
et  mena^ante  de  l'Allemagne...,..-.  .«.^. ..... ....... . . . . . 


Importants  motlveihcnts  ^de  .troupes    5tgaoles    autour   de 


lOS 


105 
106 
J  07 

107 


XII 


NDME- 
BOS. 

NOM 

DD    SIGNATAIRE. 

LIEU 
el 

DATE   D- ENVOI. 

SOMMAIRE. 

PAGES. 

89 
90 
91 

92 

93 
94 

95 

96 
97 

98 

99 
100 
101 

102 
103 

M.  AUittE 

Munich,  ag  juHlet 
Vienne,  29  juiUet. 

Saint -Petersbourg, 

29  juillet. 

Berlin ,  sgjuiUet. 

Vienne,  sg  juillet. 
Parts,  29  juillet . . 

P«ris,  ag  juiUet. . 

Rome,  39  juiUet. . 
Paris,  *9  juillet.. . 

Londrcs,  99  juillet 

Bdgrade,  agjuiU. 

Saint -Petersbourg, 
19  juillet. 

Paris,  So  joillet . . 

Saint- Paersbourg, 

30  juillet 

Saint -Petersbourg, 
3o  juillet. 

. 

108 

108 
109 

109 

Ul 

111 

112 
113 

114 

ii4 

115 
115 

116 
117 

117 

KAutriche  se  derobe  a  la  conversation  directe  a  laquelle  elie 

M.  Jui«8  Cambon 

M.  de  Jagow  sest  maintenu  dans   son  attitude    dilatoire, 
Taguement  pacifique,  rejetant  la  responsabilite  evenluene 
du  conflit  sur  la  Russie,   tout  en  declarant  placer  son 
espoir  dans  une  entente  directe  de  Vienne  el  Petersbourg , 
au  succes  de  laquelle  il  pretend  chercher  a  travailler. . . . 

L'Autriche  semble  decidee  a  la  guerre;  elle   y  est  poussee 
energiquement  par  M.  de  Tcbirsky,  ambassadeur  d'AUe- 

M.  Bientend-Maktbi  , , . . . 

M.  BreNVESXJ-MARXTO 

M.  de  Scboen  est  vCYiu  dire  que  rAUemagne  allait  consuller 
Vienne  sur  ses  intentions,  que  cda  fournirait  une  base  de 
discussion ,  el  que   les  operations  militaires  ne  seraient 

La  Russie  en-  presence  de  Tattitude  inquielanle  de  rAUe- 
magne et  du  refus  du  comte  Bercbtod    de  continuer  les 
pourparlers   et  des   preparatifs  militaires  de  TAutriche, 
«st  obligee  de  proceder  a  une  mobUisation  partielle 

M.  de  San  Giuliano  explique  Taltitude  de  I'AUemagne  et  de 
TAutriche  par  leur  conviction  erronee  que  la  Russie  aban- 

M.R^eVxmM 

M.P«al.CAMBOH. 

M.  BOPPB 

Les   conversations    directes  austro-russes  ayanl    ete    inter- 
rompues  par  la  declaration  de  guerre  de  I'Autriche  a  la 
Serbie,  les  gouvemements  franrais  et  russe  prient  Sir  E. 
€rey  de  reprendre  a  Berlin  sa  proposition  d'inlervenlion 
a  qualre,   et  d'agir  sur  I'ltalie  pour  obtenir   son  plein 

L'AUemagne  n'ayant  voulu  accepter  que  le  principe  de  la 
mediation  a  qualre.  Sir  E.  Grey,  pour  eviter  toute  nouvelle 
reponse  dilatoire,  laissera  au  gouvernement  allemand  le 
choix    de   la    forme  sous  laquelle   cette  intervention  lui 
paraitra  praticable.  11  considere  la  situation  comme  tres 
grave ....'...• 

Le  Gouvernement  serbe  a  obtenu  de  la  Russie  I'assurance 
que  cette  puissance  ne  se  desinteressera  pas  du  sort  de  la 

M.  Palsologub. 

L'ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  a  Petersbourg  est  venu  declarer 
que  son  pays  mobiliserait  si  la  Russie  n'arrfitait  pas  ses 
prdparatifs  militaires 

M.ReniVrmia 

M.  Paleologoe 

Informe   de  cette  demarche  mena^ante,   le  Gouvernement 
francais  se  declare  resolu  a  remplir  toutes  les  obligations 
de  I'aUiance  russe,  tout  en  continuant  de  travaiUer  a  une 
solution   pacifique,  et   en  demandant  au  Gouvernement 
russe  d'agir  de  son  cote  dans  le  meme  sens 

Le  Gouvernement  russe  se  declare  pr6t  a  n^gocier  jusqu'au 
bout,  tout  en  restant  convaincu  que  TAUemagne  ne  veut 
pas  agir  it  Vienne  en  faveur  de  la  paix ;....... . . . 

M.  PALioi,oa5s 

Sur  une  nouveUe  demarche  moins  comminatoire  de  l'am- 
bassadeur d'AUemagne,   M.  Sazonoff  s'esl  empresse   de 
faire  une  nouvelle  proposition,   indiquant  que  la  Russie 
interrompra   ses   preparatifs    militaires    si  I'Autriche  se 
-.    -declare  pr^e  a  eliminer  de  son  ultimatum  les  clauses  qui 
^     portent  atteinte  a  la  souverainete  de  ia  Serbie 

no 


111 


112 


13 


114 


115 
116 


117 


NOMS 

DU    SIGNATAIRE. 


M.  Ddmaine 


M.  Jnles  Caaibon. 


M.  Rene  VnruNi 


M.  Jules  Cambon. 
M.  Paul  Cambon  , 


M.  Jules  Cambon. 


M.  Paul  Cambon  , 


LIEU 

et 

DATE    D'ENVOI. 


Vienna,  3o  juillel . 

Berlin,  3o  juillet.  . 
Paris ,  3o  juillet. . . 


Berlin,  3o  juillet. . 
Londres,  3o  juillet, 


M.  MOLLAKD  ■ 


M.  Rene  Vivuni 


M.  PALEOLOCXiS  . 


M.  Ren6  Viviani 


M.  Ddmaink  .... 
M.  Jules  Cambon 

M.  Ren6  VvfUKh 


Berlin,  3o  juillet. 


Londres ,  3 1  juillet 


Luxembourg,      3i 
juillet. 


Paris,  3i  juillet.. 


Saint  -Petersbourg 
3i  juillet ■ 


Paris,  3i  juillet... 


SOMMAIRE. 


Vienne,  3i  juillet.. 
Berlin,  3^  juillet., 

Paris,  3 1  juillet.,. 


A  la  suite  d'un  entretien  tres  cordial  entre  I'ambassadeur  de 
Russie  et  le  comte  Bercbtold,  une  nouvelle  tentative  de 
conversation  directe  austro-russe  sera  faite  a  Petersbourg 
pour  le  reglement  a  Tamiable  de  Taffaire  serbe 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  dement  la  nouvelle  de  la  mobi- 
lisation, mais  prend  toules  les  mesures  necessaires  pour 
la  hater. . 

M.  Paul  Cambon  est  invite  a  porter  a  la  connaissance  du 
Gouvernement  anglais  tous  les  renseignements  concor- 
dants  qui  prouvenl  les  mesures  militaires  actives  et  mena- 
cantes  prises  par  I'Allemagne  depuis  le  26  juillet,  tandis 
que  la  France  maintient  ses  troupes  de  couverture  a  dix 
kilometres  environ  de  la  frontiere. 

M.  de  Jagow  declare  inacccptablc  pour  I'Autricbe  la  propo- 
sition de  M.  Sazonoff 

L'Ambassadeur  d'AUema^ne  n'a  pas  apporte  de  reponse  a  la 
demande  de  sir  Edward  Grey  que  le  Gouvernement 
allemand  propose  lui-meme  une  formule  de  mediation  a 
quatre.  Le  prince  Lichnowski  a  queslionne  le  Gouverne- 
ment anglais  sur  ses  preparatifs  militaires.  Les  renseigne- 
ments dbnnes  a  Sir  E.  Grey  sur  les  preparatifs  militaires 
de  I'AQemagne  I'ont  amene  a  estimer,  comme  M.  Paul 
Cambon ,  que  le  moment  est  venu  d'envisager  en  commun 
toutes  les  hypotheses 

M.  de  Jagow  declare  que,  pour  gagner  du  temps,  il  va  agir 
directement  a  Vienne  en  demandant  les  conditions  autri- 
chiennes,  eludant  ainsi  de  nouveau  la  demande  de  sir 
Edouard  Grey.  11  recrimine  contre  la  Russie 

Sir  E.  Grey  avertit  I'Ambassadeur  d'AlIemagne  a  Londres 
que  TAngieterre  ne  pourrait  pas  rester  neutre  dans  un 
conflit  general  ou  ia  France  serait  impliquee.  11  a  dit 
d'autre  part  a  M.  Paul  Cambon  que  le  Gouvernement 
anglais  ne  pouvait  nous  garantir  son  intervention. 

La  lettre  autographe  que  i\I.  le  President  de  la  Republique 
a  adressee  au  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  ete  remise  a  celui-ci. , 

Le  Ministre  d'Etat  luxembourgeois  signale  les  preparatifs 
militaires  a  la  frontiere  allemande  et  demande  a  la  France 
I'engagement  de  respecter  la  neutralite  du  Grand- 
Duche,  quelle  ne  pent  obtenir  de  I'Allemagne 

Le  Gouvernement  francais  demande  a  Petersbourg,  en  vue 
de  repondre  au  desir  de  I'Angleterre,  de  modifier  la 
proposition  de  M.  Sazonoff  a  I'Autricbe  pour  la  rendre 
acceptable  par  cette  puissance  et  a  permettre  une  solution 
pacifique  du  conflit 

Le  Gouvernement  russe  a  accepte  de  modifier  sa  formule , 
malgreTemotion  provoqueepar  le  bombardement  de  Bel- 
grade et  Taction  constamment  provocatrice  de  TAulriche- 
Hongrie 

Les  efforts  paralleles  poursuivis  par  I'Anglelerre  et  la  Russie 
en  vue  du  maintien  de  la  paix  se  sont  rejoints  et  perraet 
traient  d'esperer  une  entente  avec  I'Autricbe-Hohgrie  qui 
s'y  montre  plus  disposee.  Mais  I'attitude  de  I'Allemagne 
donne  I'impression  que  cette  puissance  n'a  poursuivi  de- 
puis ie  debut  que  rhumiliation  de  la  Russie,  la  desagre- 
gation  de  la  Triple-Entente,  et,  si  ce  resultat  ne  pouvait 
Itre  bbtenu ,  la  guerre 

La  mobilisation  generale  autrichienne  est  decretee. ...... 

A  son  tour,  I'Allemagne  decrete  « Tetat  de  danger  de  guerre 
et  demande  a  la  Russie  de  demobiliser 

En  annoncant  a  Paris  I'ultimatum  adresse  a  la  Russie, 
M.  de  Schoen  demande  au  Gouvernement  francais  de  lui 
dire,  avant  le  lendemain  a  une  heure  de  I'aprfes-midi 
^elle  sera  I'attitude  de  la  France  en  cas  de  conflit  russo 
alLemand 


—    XIY 


BOS. 

NOM 

DD    SlGNiTAIBK. 

LIEU 

et 

DATE    DENVOI. 

SOMMAIRE. 

PAGES. 

U8 

Saint -Petersbourg, 
3i  juiUet, 

La  mobilisation  generale  de  I'armee  ausJro-hongroise  enlrainB 
la  mobilisation  generale  russe 

129 

119 

M.  KloBimowsKi 

Bruxelles.Sijuillet. 

Le  Gouvernemenl  beige  recoit  I'assurance  ofTicielle  que  la 
France  respeclera  la  neutralite  beige 

129 

CHAPITRE  VI. 

Declaration  de  guerr 

e  de  l'Allemagne  a  la  Russie  (samedi  i"  aout,  a  7  h.  10  du  soir) 
et  X  LA  France  (lundi  3  aout,  a  i8  h.  d5). 

120 

M.  Rene  Viviaki 

Paris.  i"aout.. . . 

Les  Ambassadeurs  d'Aulricbe  a  Paris  et  a  Petersbourg  font 
deux  demarcbes  dans  un  sens  conciliant.  Malbeureusement 
I'attitude  de  l'Allemagne  nc  permet  plus  guere  d'esperer 

133 

12J 

M.  Jules  Cambon 

Berlin,  i"aoul.. . 

L'Autriche-Hongrie  annonce  a  Petersbourg  quelle  accepte 
de  discuter  le  fond  de  sort  differend  avec  la  Serbie;  mais 
la  sommation  adressee^iar  rAllemagne  a  la  Russie  d'avoir 
a  demobiliser  dans  les  dou/.e  heures  parait  emporter  les 
dernieres  esperanccs  de  paix 

134 

122 

M.  Rene  Viviani 

Paris,  i"aoul.... 

Le  Gouvernement  francais  declare  au  Gouvernemenl  anglais 

135 

123 
124 

M.  Jules  Cambon 

M.  Barbere 

Berlin,  i",aoiit... 
Rome,  1"  aout. . . 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  se  refuse  a  prendre  un  engage- 

135 
136 

M.  de  San  Giuliano  declare  a  TAmbassadeur  d'AUemagne 
que  rilalie  gardcra  la  neutralite 

125 

126 

M.  Rene  VmAtii 

M.Paul  Cambon 

Paris,  1"  aout..  . . 
Londres,  1"  aout^ 

Informe  des  dispositions  concilianles   de   I'Autriche  ct   de 
I'acceptation  par  la  Russie  de  la  formule  anglaise,  M.  de 
Schoen  ne  parle  plus  de  son  depart  et  protesle  de.scs  dis- 
positions pacifiques,    tout  en  declarant  qu'il  n'a  pas  rccu 

136 
137 

Sir  E.  Grey  declare  que  TAngleterre  a  refuse  la  promesse 
de  garder  la  neutralite  que   lAllemagne  lui  demandail. 
Le  respect  de  la   neutralite  beige   imporle  beaucoup  a 
I'Angleterre  et  TAHemagne  n'a  pas  reponda  a  la  question 
posee  .. .             ...... 

127 

M.Ren6  Viviani..., 

Paris,  I  "aout 

La  mobilisation  francaise  a  ete  ordonnee  dans  la  journee. 

138 

128 

Luxembourg,      1" 
aout. 

Le  Ministre  d'Etat  luxembourgeois  demande  au  Gouverne- 
ment francais  une   assurance    de  neutralite  semblable  a 
celle  qu'a  recue  la  Belcique  .•••••••... 

139 

129 

M.  Rene  Viviani 

Paris,  1"  aout. . . . 

Cette  assurance  est  donnee  par  le  Gouvernement  francais  . . 

140 

130 
131 

132 

M.  Jules  Cambon 

M.  Eyscum 

Berlin,  1"  aout... 
Luxembourg,  2  aout 

Luxembourg,  aao6t 

La  mobilisation  generale  est  ordonnee  a  Beriin.  • 

140 
140 

Violation  de  la  neutralite  luxembourgeoise  par  les  troupes 
allemandes.  Protestation  du  Ministre  d'Etat     •    .....    • 

M    MOLLARD  ...» 

Explications  fournies  par  le  Gouvernement   allemand    qui 
declare  que  les  mesures  prises  en  Luxembourg  sont  Uni- 
quement  preventives  et  n'on  taucun  caractere  d'hoslilite 
centre, le.Grand-Duche .  . 

141 

133 

Note  de  M.  de  Scuoen.  . . . 

Paris,  3  aout  .... 

Meme  explication  loucbant  I'entree  des  troupes  allemandes 
dans  le  Grand-Duchi  'le  Luxembourz.  >,.«»•«»«. 

1/42 

xy  — 


NOME- 
ROS. 


134 
135 

136 
137 

138 

139 
140 

141 

142 
143 

144 

145 


NOMS 

DO   SIGNATAIRE. 


147 

148 
149 
150 
151 

isiz 


M.  PaLeologue.  . , ^. . , . . 

M.  Rbne  Vituni?/  :  : , — 

M.  Rene  VivrANi ,.. 

M.  Paul  Cambon ^. . 

M.  Rene  Viviani* 

M.  Rene  Vivuni.-.  .1..^,. 
l/i.  Pkllet.  . , . .  ^.-. . , . . . 

M.  Klobokowski.  ,,.,... 

M.  Klobukowski.  ...,.». 
M.  Paof  Cambon..*'.  . . » . . 
M.  Paul  Cambon.  ...;,,. 

M.  Paul  Cambon-.  ......... 

M.  Rene  Viviani.  ..*..... 

M.  DE  SCHOEJI 

M.  Rene  Viviani...  .  ,. . . . 

M.  Rene  Viviani.  ,. . . . . . 

M.  Rene  Vivuni.  ....... 

M.  Rene  Vivun... ...... 

M.  Elobdkowski 


LIEU 
et 

DATE    D'BNVOr. 


PetersboOrg,'  a  ao&t 
Paris;  5  aoiktt .•>;.■. 


Paris,  a  aoQt. 


Londres.  a  ao&t. 


Paris,  a  aoiit. 


Paris,  a  aoftt.. . . 
La  Haye ,  3  aout . 

Bruxeiles,  3  aout. 

Bruxelles ,  3  aofit. , 
Londres ,  3  aoilif . 
Londres,  3  aout. , 

Londres,  3  aoilt. , 

Paris ,  3  aout  . . . . 

Paris ,  3  ao6t 

P^ris,  3. aout 

P4)ris:,  3  aoiit. . . . . 

PAris,  3  aout 

Paris,  3  aofit 

Bruxelles,  4  aoM.. 


SOMMAIRE. 


L'AUemagne  vient  de  declarer  la  guerre  a  la  Russie. . .-..., 

Communication  de  cetle  nouvelle  aux  agents  diplomatiques 
frangais  a  I'etranger t. , 

Les  agents  diplomatiques  francais  a  i'etranger  sont  invites  k 
faire  connaitre  cette  situation  aux  gouvernements  aupres 
desquels  ils  sont  accredites 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  donne  I'assurance  que  la  flotte  britannique 
defendrait  les  c6tes  francaises  contre  toute  attaque  alle- 
mande  par  mer.  La  violalion  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Bel- 
gique  serait  consideree  comme  un  casus  belli 

Le  President  du  Conseil  communique  aux  Cbambres  fran- 
caises les  declarations  de  Sir  E.  Grey  relatives  au  concours 
de  la  flotte  britannique ; ,  - . 

Protestation  adressee  a  Berlin  contre  les  violations  de  la 
frontiere  francaise 

Le  Ministre  d'AUemagne  a  La  Haye  annonce  au  Gouverne- 
ment  neerlandais  I'entree  des  troupes  imperiales  en 
Luxembourg  et  en  Belgique,  a  litre  de  mesures  preven- 
tives  

Le  Gouvernement  beige  repousse  la  sommation  qui  lui  est 
adressee  d'avoir  a  laisscr  aux  troupes  allemandes  le  libre 
passage  a  travers  son  terriloire 

11  ne  croit  pas  encore  le  moment  venu  de  faire  appel  a  la 
garantie  des  puissances  pour  defendre  son  independance. 

La  declaration  concernant  l*intervention-de  la  flotte  anglaise 
lie  le  Gouvernement  britannique 

Dcmarcbe  infructueuse  de  TAmljassadeur  d'AUemagne  a 
Londres  aupres  de  Sir  E.  Grey  pour  obtenir  i'assurance 
que  la  neutralite  de  I'Angleterre  ne  dependrait  pas  du  res- 
pect de  la  neutralite  beige 

Sir  E.  Grey  fait  aux  Communes  la  declaration  relative  a 
rinlerventiori  de  la  flotte  anglaise  et  lit  une  iettre  du  roi 
Albert  demandant  I'appui  de  I'Angleterre 

Le  Gouvernement  francais  dement  a  Londres  la  nouvelle 
d'apres  iaquelle  la  frontiere  allemande  aurait  ete  violee 
par  des  ofliciers  francais 

Declaration  de  guerre  remise  par  i'Ambassadeur  d'AUe- 
magne a  Paris  au  President  du  Conseil. 

Communication  de  cette  nouvelle  aux  agents  diplomatiques 
francais  a  I'etranger 

Instructions  envoyees  a  M.  Jules  Cambon,  a  Berlin,  pour 
demander  ses  passeports 

Le  Ministre  de  France  a  Municb  recoit  I'instruction  de  de- 
mander ses  passeports 

Violation  du  territoire  beige  par  les  troupes  allemandes. .  , . 

Appel  adresse  par  la  Belgique  a  I'Angleterre ,  a  la  France  et 
a  la.Russie i 


142 

142 

143 

143 

144 
145 

145 

146 
146 
147 

147 

148 

\ti8 

149 

149 

150 

150 
151 

151 


VOCVMRHTS  oiPLOHATiQUS$.  —  Guerre  europeenne. 


>CME- 
ROS. 

NOMS 

DC    SIGNATAIRE. 

LIEU 

et 

DATE    D'ENVOI. 

SOMMAIRE. 

PAGES. 

153 

M.  Paul  Cambon 

Londres ,  4  aoiil. . . 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  sera  invite  par  le  Gouvernemenl 
anglais  a  retireir  avant  minuil  son  ultimatum  a  la  Bei- 

152 

154 

155 

M.  Klobdkowsm 

M.  Bapst  

Broxefles,  4  aout.. 
Copenhague,  6  aout 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  declare  a  Bruxelles  qu'il  se  voit 

152 

Transmission  d'un  rapport  d'apres  lequel  M.  Jules  Cambon 
rend  compte  au  Gouvernement  des  circonstances  de  son 
voyage  de  relour  et  des  vexations  dont  il  a  ete  I'objet. .  . . 

152 

156 

M.    MOLLARD 

Paris,  h  aout  .... 

Rapport  adresse  au  Gouvernement  par  M.  Mollard  au  sujel 
de  son  depart  de  Luxembourg ,  impose  par  les  auloriles 
mililaires  aliemandes 

157 

157 

M.  Rene  ViviANi 

(Circulaire  aux  puissances.) 

Paris ,  4  aout 

Texte  de  la  notiGcation  aux  Puissances  de  I'etat   de  guerre 
existant  entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne 

100 

158 

M.    Raymond     Poincare  , 

President  de  la  Republique. 

(Message  au  Parlement.) 

Paris,  4  aout 

Message  du  President  de  la  Republique  lu  a  la  seance  du 
Parlement  du  4  aout  ibt4<<-*>>>-    •      • 

161 

159 

M.    Rene   Viviani,    Presi- 
dent  du  Conseil.    (Dis- 
cours  aux  Chambres. ) 

Paris ,  4  aout 

Texte  du  discours  prononce  par  le  President  du  Conseil  a  la 
Chambre  des  Deputes ,  le  4  aofit  i  Q 1 4 • 

163 

CHAPITRE  VII. 


DECLARATION  DE  LA  TRIPLE-ENTENTE. 


160      M.  Delcasse. 


Paris ,  4  septembre 


Declaration  de  I'Angleterre,  de  la  Russie  et  de  la  France  , 
relativement  a  leur  engagement  reciproque  de  ne  pas  con- 
dure  de  paix  separee,  et  de  ne  pas  poser  de  conditions  de 
paix  sans   accord  prealable  avec  chacun  des  autres  allies  . 


ANNEXES. 

ANNEXE  I. 
EXTRAiTS  DU  Livre  blea  relatifs  a  la  position  prise  par  L'angleterre 

PENDANT  LES  POURPARLERS  QUI  ONT  PRECEDE  LA  GUERRE. 


Sir  J.  Bdchanan. 


Sir  E.  Grey. 


Sir  E.  Gret. 


Saint-  Petersbourg , 
i4  juillet. 


Londres,  agjuillet. 


Londres,  agjuillet. 


Conversation  entre  M.  SazonofT,  M.  Palcologue  et  Sir  .1.  Bu- 
chaiian  concernant  une  declaration  eventuelle  de  solid  a - 
rile  de  I'Angleterre  avec  la  Russie  et  la  France  dans  1  a 


crise  europeenne. 


Renseignements  donnes  a  M.  Paul  Cambon  sur  les  vues  du 
Gouvernement  anglais  au  sujet  de  son  attitude :  ne  pas 
donner  a  I'Allemagne  de  fausse  impression  sur  I'abstention 
possible  de  I'Angleterre,  ne  pas  prendre  d'engagement 
precis  des  maintenant  a  I'egard  de  la  France 


Compte-rendu  d'un  entretien  avec  rAmbassadeuB  d'Alle- 
magne  pour  I'avertir  que  I'Angleterre  ne  s'engageait  nul- 
lement  k  ne  pas  intervenir  si  la  crise  se  developpait  el  si 
I'Allemagne  et  la  France  y  etaient  impliquees 


XVII   


NOME- 
ROS. 


99 


119 


148 


NOM 

DU    SIGNATAIRE. 


SirFr.  Bertie. 


Sir  K  GiiE¥. 


Sir  E.  Gret. 


LIEU 
et 

DATE    D'EN vox. 


Paris,  3o  juiilet. 


Londres,  3i  juilleL 


Londres ,  2  aout. . . 


SOMMAIRE. 


Conversation  avec  le  President  de  la  Republique,  qui  estime 
qu'une  declaration  de  I'Angleterre  aEDrmant  son  inten- 
tion de  soutenir  la  France,  don't  la  volonte  pacifique  est 
certaine,  arreterait  rAllemagne  dans  ses  velleit^s  de 
guerre , » 

Declaration  faite  a  I'Ambassadeur  de  France  que,  au  point 
ou  en  est  la  crise ,  le  Gouvernement  anglais  '  ne  peut 
prendre  aucUn  engagement  deGnitif , 

Assurance  donnee  relativement  a  la  protection  des  cdtes  et 
de  la  marine  frafiqaises  par  la  flotte  anglaise  contra  toute 
atlaque  de  la  flotte  allemande  par  le  Pas-de-Calais  oula 
mer  du  Nord 


ANNEXE  n. 


EXTRAITS  DU   LIVRE   BLEU    RELATIFS   AUX    PROPOSITIONS  FAITES    PAR    LE     GOUVERNEMENT   ALLEMAND 
AU  GOUVEBNEMENT   ANGLAIS   EN    VUE   D'OBTENIR    LA   NEUTRALITE  DE  LUNfiLETERRE. 


8>      Sir  E.  GoscHEN . 


101 


123 


Sir  E.  Gret 


Sir  E.  Grey. 


Berlin,  29  juiilet.. 


Londres ,  So  juiilet, 


Londres,  i"aout. 


Offres  faites  piar  le  Chancelier  de  I'Empire  a  I'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre  pour  tenter  d'obtenir  la  neutralite  anglaise  : 
promesse  de  respecter  I'integrite  du  territoire  francais, 
mais  non  de  ses  colonies;  intentions  a  I'egard  de  la 
HoUande  et  de  la  Belgique.  Proposition  d'une  entente 
g^nerale  de  neutralite  enlre  I'Allemagne  et  I'Angleterre  . . 

Refus  des  propositions  allemandes,  non  seulement  ina;ccep- 
tables  en  fait,  mais  dont  I'acceptation  sei'ait  une  honte 
pour  la  reputation  de  I'Angleterre.  Inutilite  d'examiner  la 
perspective  d'une  convention  generale  de  neutralite  entre 
I'Angleterre  et  I'AHemagne  pour  I'avenir.  L'Angleterre 
veiit  garder  son  entiere  liberie  d'action  et  continuer  a 
cooperer  au  maintien  de  la  paix  en  Europe :  c'est  pour 
I'Allemagne  la  seule  facon  de  maintenir  de  bonnes  rela- 
tions avec  rAngleterre 


Compte  rendu  d'une  conversation  avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Alle- 
magne  relativement  a  la  neutralite  beige.  Le  prince 
Lichnowsky  insiste  pour  que  le  Gouvernement  anglais 
formule  les  conditions  anxquelles  I'Angleterr^  garderait 
la  neutralite;  il  lui  est  repondu  qile  le  Gouvernement 
anglais  refuse  definitivement  toute  promesse  de  rester 
neutre  et  veut  garder  les  mains  libres 


ANNEXE  11  his. 

TENTATIYES  ALLEMANDES  POUR  OBTENIR,   SOUS    LE  COUVERT    D'UN    «  MALENTENDU  »  ,   LA  GARANTIE, 
PAR  L'ANGLETERRE  DE  LA  MEUTRALITE  DE  LA  FRANCE 

DANS  UNE  GUERRE  GERMANO-RUSSE  [Gazette  de  I'Allemagne  duNord),  20  aout  i9i4). 


Prince  Lichnowsky  . 


Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur  Gdil- 
laume  U. 


Londres,  3i  juiilet. 


Berlin,  i"aoiit. 


Compte  rendu  d'une  soi-disant  demande  telephonique  visant 
nn  engagemient  eventuel  de  I'Allemagne  de  ne  pas  attaquer 
la  France  si  celle-ci  reste  neutre  dans  une  guerre  entre 
I'Allemagne  et  la  Russie 


Telegramme  de  I'Empereur  Guillaumeau  Roi  George  V  pour 
declarer  qu'il  ne  peut  arr^ter  sa  mobilisation  contre  la 
Russie  et  la  France,  mais  n'attaquera  pas  la  France. 
dans  rhypothcsft  oii  cette  puissance  ofFrirait  sa  neutrality 
gftrantie  par  I'armee  et  la  flotte  anglaises 


XVIII 


>TME- 
BOS. 


NOM 

DO    SIGNATAIHE. 


M.  DE  BeTHMAKN  HOLLWEG. 


S.M.  IcRoi  George  V. 


Prince  L1CHSOWSK.Y . 


LIEU 
et 

DATE   D'E-NVOI. 


Beriin,  1"  aout. 


Londres,.i"ao{it.. 


Lon3res,  »aoiil.. 


SOMMAIRE. 


Telegramme  au  prince  Lichnowsky.  reprodulsant  I'engage- 
ment  de  I'Allema'rne 


Telegramme  du  Roi  d'Angleterre  a  I'Empereur  d'AUemagne 
declarant  que  I'Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  s'est  mepris  et 
quie  sir  Edward  Grey  n'a  parl6  avec  le  prince  Lichnowsy, 
que  des  moyens  de  retander  un  conflit  arme  entre  la 
France  et  I'Allemagne  jusqu'i  ce  qu'un  terrain  d'enlente 
definitif  ait  ete  trouve  entre  I'Autriche-Hongrie  et  la 
Russie 


Avis  donne  a  M.  de  Bethmann  HoHweg  que  les  conversatfons 
dont  il  avaitfaitetat  ontete  abandonnees  comme  « futiles  f. 


ANNEXE  m. 


EXTBAITS  DO  LIVRE  BLEU  VISANT  LE  REFUS  DE  L'ANGLETERRE  D'ADMETTRE  LE  POINT  DE  VUE  ALLEMAND 
DANS  LA  QUESTION  DE  LA  VIOLATION  DE   LA  NEUTRALITE  BELGE. 


153 

155 


157 


159 
160 


Sir  E.  Ghet. 
Sir  £.  Grex. 

M.  DE  Jagow 


Sir  £.  Grey  . . . 
Sir  E.  GoscHEN , 


Londres,  4  aout . 


Londres,  4  aout. 


Berlin,  4  aout. 


Londres,  4  aoiit. . 
Londres,  8  aotA.. 


Demande   d'engagement  immediat   de  I'Allemagne  qu'elle 
respectera  la  neutralite  beige 


Declaration  a  la  Belgique  que  I'Angleterre  est  pr^te  a  s'unir 
a  la  France  et  a  la  Russie  pour  resister  a  une  attaque  de 
TAllemagne  contre  la  Belgique  ;et  pour  garantir  i'inte- 
grite  et  I'independance  de  ce  pays ^. . . 


Declaration  communiquee  par  I'Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  a 
Londres  que  malgre  la  violation  jugee  necessaire  de  la 
Belgique  aucune  annexion  de  territoire  n'aura  lieu.  Preuve 
donnee  de  la  sincerite  de  celte  declaration  par  laflirma- 
tion  que  la  neutralite  de  la  Hollande  sera  respectee,  une 
annexion  du  territoire  beige  ne  pouvant  itre  profitable  sans 
une  annefcion  simultanie  du  territoire  hollandais 


Ultimatum  de  I'Angieterre  a  TAlIemagne . 


Rapport  de  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  k  Berlia  sur  ses 
dernieres  conversations  avec  M.  de  Jagow,  M.  de  Beth- 
mann HoHweg  et  M.  de  Zimmermann.  Le  Cbancelier  de 
I'Empire  ne  pent  s'expliquer  que,  «pour  un  mot,  neutra- 
lite»,  que,  tpour  un  chiffon  de  papier >  I'Angleterre  aille 
faire  la  guerre  a  une  nation  a  laquelle  elle  est  appa- 
rentee  et  qui  ne  desirait  rien  tant  que  d'etre  son  amie. 
L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  essaye  de  faire  comprendre 
a  son  interlocuteur  que  c'est  une  question  de  vie  ou  do 
mort  pour  I'honneur  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  que  de  lenir 
I'engagement  solennel  qu'elle  a  sign6  de  d^fendre  la  neu- 
tralite de  la  Belgique 


ANNEXE  IV. 


BXTBAITS  DU  UVRE  GRJS  INDIQUANT  LES  CONDITIONS  DANS   LESQUELLES    L*ALLEMAGNB 
A  VIOLE  LA  NEUTRALITE  BELGE  : 


Dep6che$  n**  9,  8,9,  11,   13,  i3,  li,  i5,  19,  9o,  aa, 
37.  38.  3o,  3i.  35.  39.  4o.  4i.  44.  48,  5s.  60.  71..     195 


XIX 


NOM 

DO    DESTINATAIRE. 


LIEU 

et 

DATE   D'KNVOI. 


SOMMAIRE. 


ANNEXE  V. 

EXTRAITS  DU  LIVRB   BLANC. 


Telegrammes  ^changes  entre  TEmpereur  d'Allemagne  Guil- 
laume  II  et  I'Empereur  de  Russie  Nicolas  II,  du  28  juii- 


let  au  i"  aout 


ipereu 

'9» 


209 


76 


77 


78 


ANNEXE  VI. 

EXTRAITS  DU  LIVRE   ORANGE  RELATIFS  \  LA  DECLARATION  DE  GUERRE  DE  L'ALLEMAGNE  X  LA  RUSSIE. 
Comte  DE  POURTALES. 


M.  Sazonoff. 


M.  Sazonofp. 


Saint  -Petersbourg , 
1"  avril. 


Saint-Petersbourg, 
2  aout. 


Saint  -  Petersbourg , 
2  aout. 


Note  remise  par  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  i  Saint- 
Petersbourg  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  de 
Russie 

Communique  du  Ministre  des  Aflalres  etrangeres  de  Russie 
resumant  les  evenements  qui  se  sont  succede  du  33  juillet 
au  1"  aout  1 9 1  /j 

Circulaire  du  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  de  Russie 
aux  Representants  de  I'Empire  a  I'etranger 


213 

213 
215 


MINISTfeRE  DES  AFFAIRES  ETRANGERES 

&<8»<i 

bOGUMENTS  DIPLOMATIQUES 


1914 


LA  GUERRE  EUROPfiENNE 


I 

PifeCES 

RELATIVES   AUX   N^GOCIATIONS 

QUI  ONT  PR^CfiDfi  LES   DECLARATIONS  DE  GUERRE 

DE  L'ALLEMAGNE  A  LA  RUSSIE  (I™  AOOT  1914) 

ET  A  LA  FRANCE  (3  AOCt  1914) 

DECLARATION  DU  4  SEPTEMBRE  1914 


PARIS 
IMPRIMERIE  NATIONALS 


MDCCCCXIV 


MINISTfeRE  DES  AFFAIRES  ETRANGfeRES 


■«<»<»- 


DOCUMENTS  DIPLOMATIQUES 

\  . 

LA   GUERRE  EUROPEENNE 

i 

19H 


Note.  —  Les  droits  de  traduction  en  anglais  et  de  reproduc- 
tion de  la  traduclioQ  anglaise  da.  pr^nt  Livre  Jaune,  pour  tons 
pays,  appartiennent  au  journal  anglais  The  Timet. 


CHAPITRE  PREMIER 


AVERTISSEMENTS 

(1913) 


|)ocTJMENTS  i)iPi,OM*tiQCES.  —  GueiTe  europecDne, 


—  3 


M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  la  Republique  k  Berlin, 
a  M.  JoNNART,  Ministre  des  AiFaires  Etrangeres. 

Berlin,  le  17  mars  igiS. 

Nos  attaches  militaire  et  naval  adressent  k  leurs  Ministres  respectifs  des  rapports  sur 
ia  nouvelle  lol  militaire  allemande.  J'appelle  Tattention  de  Votre  Excellence  sur  ces 
importants  documents. 

L  etude  des  moyens  financiers  destines  a  pourvoir  aux  mesures  militaires  que 
f  Aliemagne  a  en  vue  r^tarde  seule  la  publication  des  propositions  definitives  du  Gou- 
vemement.  Malgre  le  patriotisme  affecte  avec  lequel  les  dasses  riches  accepteni  le 
sacrifice  qui  leur  sera  demande ,  elles  n'en  sont  pas  moins ,  particulierement  dans  le 
monde  des  affaires,  mecontentes  des  mesures  financieres  annoncees,  et  elles  sentent 
qu'une  contribution  forcee,  imposee  en  pleine  paix,-cree  pour  I'avenir  un  precedent 
redoutable.  D'autre  part,  les  Gouvernements  confederes  ont  oppose  une  vive 
Resistance  a  I'innovation  qui  attribuera  a  I'Empire  des  ressources  tirees  de  I'impot 
direct.  Jusqu'ici  les  impots  de  cette  nature  etaient  reserves  aux  Etats  confederes,  et 
ceux-ci  voient  dans  I'abandon  de  cette  regie  une  affirmation  nouvelle  de  la  person- 
nalite  de  f Empire ,  qui  constitue  une  certaine  diminution  de  leur  propre  souverainet6. 

Quoi  qu'il  en  soit,  en  augmentant  la  force  de  I'armee  allemande ,  I'Empire  veut  ne 
tien  laisser  a  fimprevu ,  au  cas  ou  une  crise  eciaterait. 

Les  innovations  de  f  Aliemagne  ont  fait  surgir  un  fait  inattendu  pour  elle  :  la  pro- 
position du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  retablissant.  le  service  de  trois  ans,  et  la 
resolution  virile  avec  laquelle  cette  proposition  a  ete  accueillie  en  France.  L'im-r 
pression  d'etonnement  que  ces  projets  ont  produite  a  ete  mise  a  profit  par  le  Gou- 
vernement Lnperialpour  insister  surlanecessite  absolue  de  I'augmentation  des  forces 
militaires  de  TAllemagne;  ses  projets  ont  ete  presentes  comme  une  reponse.  C'est  le 
contraire  de  la  verite ,  puisque  I'immense  effort  militaire  que  la  France  accepte  nest 
que  la  consequence  des  initiatives  de  f  Aliemagne. 

Les  Autorites  Impe^iales  ne  cessent  d'exalter  le  sentiment  patriotique.  L'Empereur 
se  complait  k  rappeler  tous  les  jours  les  souvenirs  de  i8i3.  Hier  soir,  une  retraita 
militaire  a  parcouru  les  ilies  de  Berlin  et  des  discours  ont  ete  prononc^  dans  lesqueb 


—  4  — 
la  situation  presente  etait  assimilee  k  celle  d'il  y  a  un  siecle.  L'entrainement  de  Topi- 
nion  aura  sa  repercussion  dans  les  discussions  qui  s'ouvriront  le  mois  prochain  aul 
Reichstag,  et  j'ai  lieu  de  craindre  que  le  Chancelier  lui-meme  ne  soit  pousse  a  faire 
dans  ses  declarations  des  allusions  aux  relations  de  la  France  et  de  I'Allemagne.  U 
fallait  s'altendre  a  ce  qu'on  exallat  le  palriotisme  de  la  nation  au  moment  ou  on  iui 
demande  de  nouveaux  sacrifices ,  mais  c'est  abuser  du  rapprochement  historique  que 
de  comparer  le  temps  present  a  181 3.  Si  le  mouvement  qui,  il  y  a  un  siecle, 
emportait  le  peuple  allemand  contre  I'homme  de  genie  qui  aspirait  a  la  domination 
universelle,  pouvait  trouver  aujourd'hui  quelque  equivalent,  c'est  en  France  qu'il  le 
faudrait  chercher,  puisque  le  peuple  fran^ais  ne  songe  qu  a  se  'defendre  contre  la 
domination  de  la  force. 

11  n'en  est  pas  moins  vrai  que  cet  et?it  de  fopinion  dans  les  deux  pays  rend  la  ; 
situation  grave. 

Jules  Cambopj. 


Annexe  I. 


Rapport  du  Lieutenant-Colonel  Serret,  Attache  militaire  pres  TAmbassade 
de  la  Republique  Fran9aise  k  Berlin, 

a  M.  Etienne,  Ministre  de  la  Guerre. 

Berlin,  le  i5  mars  191 3. 

Le  mouvement  patriotique  qui  s'est  manifeste  en  France  a  cau$6  dans  certains  milieux 
une  veritable  colere. 

Je  ne  pretends  certes  pas  que  farlicle  virulent  de  la  Gazette  de  Colocjne  soit  fexpression 
dun  sentiment  general.  C'est  rexplosion  de  rage  d'un  journaliste  impulsif ,  aussitot  desavou6 
par  le  Gouvernement. 

Mais,  malgre  son  inconvenance,  la  manifestation  de  la  Gazette  de  Cologne  n'est  pas 
negiigeabie;  elle  a  ete  approuvce  dans  son  esprit,  sinon  dans  sa  forme,  par  plusieurs  jour- 
naux  assez  importants ,  et  elie  me  parait  correspondie  a  un  sentiment  reel,  a  une  colere 
latente. 

II  est  intdressant  de  le  constater,  parce  que  le  sens  des  armements  actuels  s'en  trouve 
eclaire  d'une  lumiere  plus  vive. 

Depuis  quelque  temps  deja ,  on  rencontre  des  gens  qui  declarent  les  projets  militaires  de 
ia  France  extraordinaires  et  injustifics.  Dans  un  salon ,  un  membre  du  Reichstag  et  non  un 
cnergumcne,  pariant  du  service  de  trois  ans  en  France,  allait  jusqua  dire  :  «  C'est  une  pro- 
vocation, nous  ne  le  permettrpns  pas ».  De  plus  moderes,  militaires  ou  civils,  soutiennent 
couramment  la  these  que  la  France,  avec  ses  quarante  millions  d'ames , n'a  pas  le  droit  de 
rivaliser  ainsi  avec  rAllemagne. 

En  somme,  on  est  furieuX,  et  cette  colere  ne  resulte  pas  des  criailleries  de  certaines 
feuilles  frnncaises  auxquelles  les  gens  serieux  ne  s'arretent  guere.  C'est  du  depit.  On  enrage 
de  voir  que,  malgre  I'eflbrt  enorme  enlrepris  I'annee  derniere.  continue  et  accru  encore 


—  5  — 

<iette  annee,  on  ne  poun^a  probablement  pas  encore  cette  fois  mettre  la  France  hers  de 
course. 

Nous  mettre  definitivement  hors  de  course ,  puisque  nous  ne  voulons  ni  ne  pouvons  6ti*e 
avec  elle,  c'est  cela  en  effet  que  poursuit  I'Allemagne.  On  ne  saurait  trop  le  repeter  et  la 
prochaine  loi,  que  i'opinion  francaise  regarde  un  peu  trop  comrae  une  explosion  spontance , 
nest  que  la  suite  fatale,  attendue,  de  la  loi  de  juin  1912. 

Celie-ci,  en  eflet,  en  creant  deux  corps  d'armee  nouveaux,  avait  laisse  a  dessein,  suivanl 
la  maniere  allemande,de  grandes  unites  et  des  regiments  incomplets.  II  etait  evident  quon 
n'attendrait  pas  longtemps  pour  combler  les  lacunes'').  La  crise  balkanique  a  fourni  une 
merveiHeuse  occasion,  eclatant  juste  a  point  voulu,  pour  permettre  d'exploiter  le  centenaire 
des  guerres  de  delivrance,  d'obtenir  plus  facilement  des  sacrifices  au  souvenir  de  ceux 
consentis  naguere,  deja  contre  nous. 

Pour  bien  montrer  la  genese  de  ce  programme  militaire,  je  me  permets  de  rappeler  ce 
qu'ecrivait ,  il  y  a  un  an ,  lors  de  I'apparition  de  la  loi  de  1 9 1  2  ,  mon  predecesseur,  le  colonel 
Pelle  : 

«  Nous  d^cbuvrons  tous  les  jours  combien  sont  profonds  et  durables  les  sentinjents  d'or- 
gueil  froisse  et  de  rancunes  contre  nous  provoqu^s  par  les  evenements  de  Tan  dernier^ 

('  Le  traite  du  k  novembre  1 91  1  est  une  profonde  disillusion. 

«Le  ressentiment  eprouve  dans  loutes  les  parties  du  pays  est  le  meine.  Tous  les  Alle- 
mands,  jusqu'aux  socialistes,  nous  en  veulent  de  leiir  avoir  pris  leur  part  au  Maroc. 

« II  semblait,  il  y  a  un  ou  deux  ans,  que  les  Allemands  fussent  partis  a  la  conqu^te  du 
monde.  lis  s'estimaient  assez  forts  pour  que  personne  n  osat  entamer  la  lulte  contre  eux.  Des 
possibilit^s  indefmies  s'ouvraient  a  Industrie  allemande,  au  commerce  allemand,  k  I'expan- 
sion  allemande. » 

«  Naturellement,  ces  idees  et  ces  ambitions  n'ont  pas  disparu  aujourd'hiii.  Les  Allemands 
ont'toujours  besoin  de  d6bouclies,  d  expansion  economique  et  coloniale.  lis  estiment  qu'ils 
y  ont  droit  parce  qu'ils  grandissent  tous  les  jours,  parce  que  I'avenir  leur  appartient.  Us 
nous  regardent,  avec  nos  ko  millions  d'habitanls,  comme  une  nation  secondaire, 

«  Dans  la  crise  de  1911,  cette  nation  secondaire  leur  a  tenu  tete,  et  TEmpereur  et  leGou- 
vernement  ont  ced^.  L  opinion  publique  ne  I'a  pardonn6  ni  a  eux,  ni  a  nous.  Elle  ne  veatpas 
qn'an  pareilfait  paisse  se  reproduire.  » 

Et  au  moment  ou  la  seconde  et  formidable  parlie  du  programme  va^tre  r^alisee,  ou  la 
force  militaire  allemande  est  sur  ie  point  d'acquerir  cette  superiority  definitive  qui  nous  for- 
cerait  a  subir,  le  cas  echeant ,  I'humiliation  ou  I'^crasement ,  voici  que  soudain  la  France 
refuse  d'abdiquer,  et  quelle  montre,  comme  disait  Renan,  «  son  pouvoir  eternel  de  renais- 
sance et  de  resurrection  ».  On  comprend  a  merveille  le  depit  allemand. 

Sans  doute  le  Gouvernement  invoque  la  situation  generale  de  I'Europe  et  parle  du  p6ril 
slave.  Pom-  ma  part,  fopinion  me  semble  en  realite  indifFerente  au  peril  slave  et  cependant 
elle  a  accepte  avec  une  tres  belle  tenue,  sinon  plus,  les  charges  ^normes  de  ces  deux  lois 
consi^cutives. 

Le  10  mars  dernier,  centenaire  de  I'organisation  de  la  lev^e  en  masse  de  I'AUemagne 
contre  nous,  une  foule  ^nornie  s'est  press^e,  m.ilgrd  une  pluie  battante,  k  la  parade  mili- 
taire devant  le  chateau,  au  milieu  du  Tiergarten  devant  les  statues  de  la  reine  Louise  et  de 
Frederic-Guillaume  III,  entourees  de  monceaux  de  fleurs. 


'•>  Le  probleme  qui  nous  est  pos^  aujourd'hui  se  serait  done  pose  quelques  ann^es  plus  lard  et  d'une 
maniere  plus  angoissanle  encore,  puisque  la  diminution  de  nos  contingents  amoindrit  sans  cesse  le  chiffre 
de  noire  effectif  de  paix. 


—  6  — 

Ces  anniversaires ,  rappelant  la  lutte  contre  la  France,  vont  se  r^peter  toute  I'annee.  En 
I  gill  on  cei^brera  le  centenaire  de  la  premiere  campagne  de  France ,  de  la  premiere  entree 
des  Prussiens  k  Paris. 

En  resum6,si  I'opinion  publique  allemande  ne  montre  pas  la  France  du  doigt,  comme 
le  fjdt  la  Gazette  de  Cologne ,  c  est  cependant  contre  nous  qu'elle  est  et  restera  iongtemps 
braquee.  Elle  trouve  que  pour  nos  ho  millions  d'babitants  nous  tenons  au  soleil  une  place 
vraiment  trop  grande. 

Les  Allemands  desirent  la  paix ,  ne  cesse-t-on  de  proclamet,  et  I'Empereur  plus  que  tout 
autre,  piais  ils  ne  I'entendent  pas  dans  le  sens  de  concessions  mutuelles  ni  dequilibre  des 
armements.  lis  veulent  qu'on  les  craigne  et  ils  sont  en  train  de  faii'e  les  sacrifices  necessaires. 
Si,  a  quelque  occasion,  leur  orgueil  national  se  trouve  bless6,  la  confiance  que  pourra  avoir 
le  pays  dans  I'^norme  superiorite  de  son  armee  favorisera  une  explosion  de  colere  nationale 
devant  laquelle  la  moderation  du  Gouvernement  imperial  sera  peut-etre  impuissante. 

II  faut  constater  d'ailleurs  que  le  Gouvernement  met  tout  en  ceuvre  pour  chauffer  le  sen- 
timent national,  en  felanl  avec  eclat  tous  les  anniversaires  de  1 8 1 3. 

Au  reste,  la  tournur&  de  Topinion  n'aurait  pour  effet  que  de  donner  a  une  guerre  un 
caractere  plus  ou  moins  national.  Par  quelque  pretexte  que  I'AIlemagne  justifie  une  confla- 
gration europeenne,  nul  ne.peut  faire  que  les  premiers  coups  d^cisifis  ne  soient  pas  portes 
contre  la  France. 


Annexe  II. 


M.  DE  Faramond,  attache  naval  pres  TAmbassade  de  France  k  Beiiin, 
a  M.  Baudin,  Ministre  de  la  Marine. 

Berlin,  le  i5  mars  19 13. 

En  vous  rendant  compte  de  I'examen  du  budget  de  la  marine  par  la  Commission  du 
Reichstag,  j'ai  dit  qu'aucune  loi  navale  ayant  pour  objet  un  accroissement  de  la  flotte  ne 
serait  pr^sent^e  cette  ann^e  et  que  tout  Teffort  militaire  serait  dirig6  contre  nous. 

Bien  que  le  nouveau  projet  de  loi  destin^  a  augmenter  les  effectifs  allemands  ne  soit  pas 
encore  d^pos^  devant  ie  Reichstag,  nous  savons  qu'il  s'agit  d'un  « renf'orcement  militaire  de 
grande  envergure»,  suivant  I'expression  de  la  Gazette  de  I'AIlemagne  du  Aoz-rf. 

Les  joumaux  officieux  ont  d'ailleurs  commente  le  projet  militaire  dans  des  termes  qui 
permeltent  de  tenir  pour  exact  le  communique  du  Lokal  Anzeiger. 

Les  ettectifs  allemands  s'elevent  actuellement  a  720,000  hommes;  nous  sommes  autoris^s 
k  conclure  que ,  le  1 "  octobre  1916,  I'armee  imp^riale  sera  port^e  k  un  chiflre  voisin  de 
860,000  hommes, 

L'importance  du  chiffre  serait  moindre  si  les  provisions  "de  la  nouvelle  loi  ( d'apres  ce  que 
nous  ont  laiss6  entrevoir  les  feuilles  officielles)  n'avaient  pas  pour  tendance,  comme  du  reste. 
les  dispositions  de  la  loi  de  1912,  de  mettre  les  corps  d'armee  voisin^  de  notre  fronti^ro 


—  7  — . 
dans  un  etat  aussi  rapproch6  que  possible  du  pied  de  guerre,  afln  de  pouvoir,  le  jour  m^me 
de  I'ouverture  des.  hostiiites,  nous  attaquer  brusqiiement  avec  des  forces  tres  sup^rieures 
aux  notres.  C'est  pour,  ie  Gouvernement  imperial  une  n^cessite  imperieuse  d'obtenir  un 
succ^s  des  le  debut  des  operations. 

Les  conditions  dans  lesquelle§  I'Empereur  allemand  engagerait  aujourd'hui  une  I  utte 
contre  la  France  ne  sont  plus  les  memes  qu'il  y  a  quarante  ans.  Au  d6but  de  la  guerre 
de  1870,  I'Etat-Major  prussien  avait  envisage  la  possibilite  d'une  offensive  victorieuse  des 
Fraiicais  et  Moltke,  prevoyant  que  nous  pourrions  k  la  rigueur  parvenir  jusqu'a  Mayence, 
avait  dit  a  son  souverain  :  «  La  ils  se  heurteront ».  Guillaume  II  ne  peut  pas  admettre  une 
retraite  clans  ses  calculs,  quoique  le  soldat  allemand  ne  soit  plus  aujourd'hui,  cdmme  il  y  a 
quarante  ans ,  un  homme  simple ,  religieux  et  pret  a  mourir  sur  un  ordre  de  son  roi.  Tenant 
compte  des  quatre  millions  de  suffrages  social istes  exp rimes  aux  dernieres  Elections  et  du 
fait  que  le  droit  de  vote  n'est  acquis  en  AUemagne  qu'ci  2  5  ans ,  on  peut  penser  que  Tarmee 
active,  composee  de  jeunesgens  de  20  i  26  ans,  doit  comporter  dans  ses  rangs  une  propor- 
tion sMeuse  de  socialistes. 

Certes,  ce  serait  folie  de  croire  que  les  socialistes  allemands  leveront  la  crosse  en  I'air  ie 
jour  ou  la  France  et  I'Allemagne  en  viendront  aux  mains;  mais  il  sera  extremement  impor- 
tant, pour  le  Gouvernement  imperial  de  leur  persuader,  d'une  part  que  nous  sommes  les 
agresseurs,  et  d'autre  part  qu'ils  peuvent  avoir  pleine  confiance  dans  le  commandement  et 
le  resultat. 

Lors  du  dernier  serment  des  recrues  de  la  garde  ii  Potsdam,  j'ai  ete  frappe  d'entendre 
I'Empereur  prendre  pour  theme  de  son  di^cours  aux  jeunes  soldats  « le  devoir  d'etre  plus- 
courageux  et  plus  discipline  dans  la  mauvaise  fortune  que  dans  la  bonne  ». 

Et  c'est  parce  qu'une  premiere  d^faite  allemande  aurait  pour  I'Empire  une  port^e  incal- 
culable que  Ton  trouve  dans  tous  les  projets  militaires  ^labor^s  par  le  grand  Etat-Majof 
I'objectif  d'une  offensive  fovidroyante  contre  la  France. 

En  r^alite,  le  Gouvernement  imperial  veut  se  mettre  en  etat  de  faire  face  a  toules  les 
6ventualites  possibles.  C'est  du  cote  de  la  Frartce  que  le  danger  lui  parait  le  plus  grand.  La 
Gazette  de  Cologne  I'a  dit  dans  un  article  haineux  et  violent  dont  la  Wilhelmstrasse  a  desa- 
vou^  la  forme  plut6t  que  le  fond. 

Mais  nous  devons  nous  persuader  que  I'opinion  exprimee  par  la  Gazette  de  Cologne  est  k 
I'heure  actuelle  celle  de  I'immense  majorite  du  peuple  allemand. 

A  cet  egard,  je  crois  interessant  de  citer  une  conversation  qu'un  membre  de  notre 
ambassade  a  eue  I'autre  soir  avec  le  vieux  prince  Henckel  de  Donnersmark ,  parce  qu'elle 
pourrait  bien  refl^ter  la  pensee  qui  domine  dans  les  milieux  de  la  Cour. 

Faisant  allusion  au  nouveau  projet  militaire  allemand,  le  prince  de  Donnersmark  a  dit  : 
«  Les  Francais  ont  tout  a  fait  tort  de  croire  que  nous  nourrissons  de  sombres  desseins  et  que 
nous  d^sirons  une  guerre.  Mais  nous  ne  pouvons  pas  oublier  qu'en  1870  i'opinion  populaire 
a  force  le  Gouvernement  Francais  a  nous  attaquer  foUement,  sans  etre  pret.  Qui  peut  nous 
assurer  c[ue  I'opinion  publique,  si  prompte  a  s'enflammer  en  France,  ne  mettra  pas  queique 
Jour  le  Gouvernement.de  la  R6publique  dans  robligalion  de  nous  faire  la  guerre.^  C'est 
contre  ce  danger  que  nous  voulons  nous  premiinir ». 

Et  le  prince  a  ajoute  :  « On  m'a  souvcnt  regards  en  France  comme  un  des  artisans  de  la 
guerre  de  1870.  Cela  est  tout  a  fait  faux.  Si  j'ai  travaille  aux  consequences  de  la  guerre, 
j'avais  au  contraire  fait  mon  possible  pour  en  empecher  I'explosion.  Queique  tenlps  avant  la 
guerre,  me  trouvant  a  un  diner  ou  etaient  reunies  les  personnalites  les  plus  considerables  du 
regime  imperial,  je  pris  la  parole  pour  deplorer  les  sentiments  d'inimitie  qui  se  manifes- 
taient  deja  entre  la  France  et  la  Prusse.  On  me^r6pondit  que  si  je  parlais  ainsi,  c'est  que 


—  8  — 
j'avais  peur  dune  lutte  dont  Tissue  serait  certainement  defavorable  k  la  Prusse.  Je  repliquai : 
«Non,  ce  n'est  pas  parce  que  j'ai  peur  que  je  repudie  I'idee  dune  guerre  entre  la  France  et 
la  Prusse,  mais  bien  parce  que  je  crois  qu'il  est  de  I'interet  des  deux  pays  de  I'eviter.  Et 
puisque  vous  avez  fait  allusion  aux  chances  d'une  telle  iutte,  je  vais  vous  dire  mon  ppinion. 
J'ai  la  conviction  que  vous  serez  battus  pour  la  raison  que  voici  :  en  depit  des  brillantes 
qualites  que  je  reconnais  aux  Frangais  et  que  j  admire,  vous  netes  pas  exacts.  Par  exacti- 
tude, je  n'entends  pas  le  fait  d'arriver  a  I'heure  a  un  rendez-vous,  mais  j'entends  la  ponc- 
tualite  dans  toute  I'etendue  du  mot.  Le  Francais,  qui  a  une  grande  facilite  de  travail,  n'est 
]pas  aussi  ponctuel  que  I'Allemand  dans  I'accomplissement  de  ses  devoirs.  Dans  la  prochaine 
guerre,  ia  nation  victorieuse  sera  celle  dont  tous  les  servjteurs  du  haut  en  bas  de  i'echelle 
seront  exacts  a  remplir  leur  devoir,  si  important  ou  si  infime  que  soit  ce  devoir.  »  Et  le 
prince  de  Donnersmark  a  ajoute  :  «  La  ponctualite,  qui  a  joue  un  si  grand  role  lorsqu'il 
s'est  agi,  il  y  a  quarante  ans,  de  mouvoir  une  armee  de  5 00,000  homm^s,  aura  une  impor- 
tance encore  bien  plus  grande  au  cours  de  la  prochaine  guerre  ou  Ton  devra  mettre  en  action 
des  masses  autrement  nombreuses  ». 

Sous  cctte  forme,  le  vieux  prince  a.exprime  ia  confiance  qu'ont  tous  les  Allemands  dans 
la  superiorite  de  leur  organisation  militaire. 

Lorsque  j'ai  parle  plus  haut  du  nouveau  projet  aliemand,  je  n'ai  fait  allusion  qua  un 
accroissement  des  effectifs.  Mais  le  projet  comportera  aussi  une  augmentation  du  materiel  et 
des  ouvrages  de  defense  dont  le  detail  n'est  pas  connu ,  mais  dont  on  peut  se  faire  une  idee 
par  le  chiflre  des  depenses  envisagees  pour  y  faire  face  :  1 ,2 5o, 000, 000  de  francs. 

L'execution  de  la  ioi  du  quinquennat  de  1911  n'avait  pas  n^cessite  de  mesure  financiere 
sp^ciale. 

La  Ioi  militaire  et  navale  de  1912  avait  6te  provisoirepient  couverte  par  les  excedents 
budgetaires  des  annees  1 9 1  o  et  1911,  par  une  r^forme  de  la  Ioi  sur  i'alcool  et  par  I'ajourne- 
ment  de  I'abaissement  de  I'impdt  sur  les  sucres  (ces  deux  dernieres  ressources  ne  repr^sen- 
tent  d'ailleurs  ensemble  qu'une  somme  d'une  soixantaine  de  millions  de  francs). 

11  faut  en  outre  rappeler  que  de  gros  emprunts  ont  el6  fait  r^ceniment  par  i'Empire  et  la 
Prusse  :  cinq  cents  millions  de  marks  le  29  Janvier  1912  et  trois  cent  cinquante  millions  de 
marks  le  7  mars  1913.  Une  part  assez  importante  de  ces  emprunts  a  du  etre  afiect^e  aux 
depenses  mililaires. 

La  Ioi  militaire  de  1913  exigera  des  mesiires  fmancieres  tout  a  fait  exceptionnelles. 

D'apres  les  indications  donnees  par  la  presse  officieuse,  les  depenses  dites  «  d'une  fois » 
s'eleveraicnt  k  un  milliard  de  marks  et  les  depenses  « permanentes »  annuelles  resultant  de 
i'augmentation  des  eflectifs  depasseraient  deux  cents  millions  de  marks. 

II  parait  a  peu  pres  certain  que  les  depenses  non  renouvelables  seront  couvertes  par  une 
contribution  de  guerre  pr6Iev6e  sur  le  capital.  On  exempterail  lespetites  fortunes  el  I'on 
frapperait  d'une  taxe  progressive  les  fortunes  superieures  k  20,000  marks.  Present^  sous 
cotte  forme  I'impot  de  guerre  ne  saurait  deplaire  aux  socialistes ,  qui  pourront  ainsi ,  sui- 
vant  leur  tactique  habituelle,  repousser  le  prin6ipe  de  la  Ioi  militaire  et  voter  les  credits  qui 
en  assurent  Texecution. 

Le  Gouvernement  craint  que  parmi  les  classes  riches  et  bourgeoises »  cette  imposition 
extraordinaire  d'un  milliard  portant  exclusivement  sur  la  fortune  acquise  ne  cr^e  up  durable 
m^contentement;  aussi  fait-il  tout  ce  qui  est  en  son  pouvoir  pour  persuader  ceux  qu'il  va 
ranconner  si  durement  que  la  securite  de  I'Empire  est  menacee  et  pour  etablir  une  analogic 
entre  les  temps  belliqueux  de  1 8 1 3  et  la  periode  actuelle. 

En  fStantbruyammenllecentenaire  de  la  guerre  de  I'Jndependance^  on  veut  convaincre 


—  9  — 

\e  peuple  de  la  n^cessit^  du  sacrifice  et.  lui  rappeler  que  la  Frande  e$t ,  aujourd'hui.  comme  il 
y  a  oenl  ans,  rennemi  h^redilaire. 

Si  nous  constatons  que  le  Gouvernement  ailemand  s'efforce  d'obtenir  que.  cette  ^norme 
taxe  ne  soit  pas  acquiltee  en  plusieurs  ^ch^ances;  et  si  comrne  le  disent  certains  journaux, 
le  payement  integral  devait  etre  realise  avantle  i"  juillet  1914,  il  y  auraitla  pour  nous  une 
indication  redoutable,  car  rien  ne  saurait  expliquer  une  telle  hate  des  autorit^s  militaires  ^ 
posseder  un  tr^sor  de  guerre  liquide  dun  milliard  dans  leur  caisse. 

En  ce  qui  concerne  la  couverture  des  depenses  permanentes  qui  r^sullerorit  de  I'applica- 
tion  des  lois  de  1912  et  1913,  rien  n'a  encore  6t^  dit.  Une  houvelle  legislation  sera  i^vi 
denlment  necessaire  pour  procurer  les  ressoUrces  annuelles. 

Je  conclus  :  en  Allemagne  I'execution  d'une  reforme  militaire  suit  toujours  de  tres  pres 
la  decision  prise  de  I'accomplir.  Toutes  les  dispositions  nouvelles  pr^vues  par  la  loi  du. 
quinquennat  de  1 9 1 1  et  par  la  loi  de  19 1 2  sont  deja  mises  en  vigueur,  II  est  fort  possible? 
qu'une  partie  du  materiel  dont  la  noiivelle  loi  va  autoriser  I'achat  soit  en  cours  de  fabri- 
cation. Les  secrets  militaires  sont  si  bien  gardes  ici  qii'il  est  extr^mement  difficile  de  suivre 
les  mouvements  du  personnel  et  du  materiel. 

Avec  700,000  hommes  sous  les  armes  (sans  compter  les  reservistes  fort  nombreux  qui 
sont  actuellement  en  instruction)  une  organisation  militaire  parfaite  et  une  opinion  publiqpe 
qui  se  laisse  dominer  par  les  appels  belliqueux  de  la  Ligue  militaire  et  de  la  Ligue  navale, 
ie  peuple  ailemand  est  a  cette  heure  xm  voisin  bien  dangereux. 

Si  le  service  de  trois  ans  est  adopte  et  imm^diatement  appliqu6  en  France,  les  conditions 
seroni  moins  inegales  Tan  prochain.  Les  effectifs  allemands  seront  encore  sensiblement  plus 
considerables  que  les  notres ,  mais  I'appel  de  tout  le  contingent  disponible  ne  permettra  plus 
la  selection  et  amenera  dans  les  rangs  de  Tarm^e  allemande  des  elements  de  second  ordre  et 
meme  des  unites  peu  desirables.  La  valeur  morale  de  I'armee  active  y  perdra. 

Les  Allemands  ont  voulu  rompre  1  equilibre  des  deux  camps  qui  divisent  I'Europe ,  par 
un  grand  eCfort  supreme,  au  deli  duquel  ils  ne  peuvent  plus  grand'chose. 

lis  n'avaient  pas  cru  la  France  capable  dun  grand  sacrifice.  L'adoption  du  service  de 
trois  ans  chez  nous  dejouera  ieurs  calculs. 

Farahond. 


r  2. 

M.Etienne,  Ministre  de  la  Guerre, 
^  a  M.  JoNNART,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

1 

W§  Je  viens  de  recevoir  d'une  source  sure  communicalion  d'un  rapporl.officiel  et  secret 
^ur  le  renforcement  de  I'armee  allemande  :  il  se  divise  en  deux  parties :  une  premiere 
de  generalites,  et  une   secoude,  d'ordre  technique,  precisant  dans  le  plus  grand 

DocuME>'TS  DiPLOMATXQUES.  —  Guerrc  europeenne.  2 


Paris,  le  2  avril  191 3. 


\ 


—   10  — 

detail,  arme  par  arme,  les  mesures  a  prendre  ;  ce  qui  concerne  Temploi  des  aiKcKJ 
mobiles  et  I'utilisation  de  Faeronautique  est  particulierement  frappant. 

TdLi  rhonneur  de  vous  adresser  ci-joint  une  copie  de  la  premiere  partie  de  ce  docu- 
ment, qui  me  parait  devoir  retenirvotre  attention. 

Etienne. 


Annexe. 


Note  snr  le  renforcement  de  Varmee  allemande. 

Berlin ,  ie  1 9  mars  1 9 1 3. 

I.  — ^  GeNERALITES  SUfl  LES  NODVELLES  LOIS  MILITAIRES. 

L'augmentation  a  eu  lieu  en  trois  eta  pes  : 

1°  La  Conference  d'Alg6siras  a  enleve  les  derniers  doutes  sur  i'existence  dune  entente 
entre  la)  France,  I'Angleterre  et  la  Russie.  Nous  avons  vu,  d autre  part,  que  rAutriche- 
Hongrie  etait  obligee  d'immobiiiser  des  forces  contre  la  Serbie  et  I'ltalie ;  enfm,  notre  flotte 
n  etait  pas ,  u  ce  moment-la ,  assez  forte.  A  la  fin  du  conflit ,  on  s'occupa  done  en  premiere 
ligne  de  renforcer  la  defense  de  nos  c6tes,  d'augmenter  notre  force  navale.  Contre  I'inten-s 
tion  anglaise  d'envoyer  un  corps  d'expedition  de  100,000  hommes  sur  le  continent,  on 
devait  repondre  par  une  meilleure  formation  des  reserve^  qui  devaient  etre  employees,  d'aprea 
les  circonstances ,  au  service  sur  les  cotes,  dans  les  lorleresses  et  dans  les  sieges.  11  etait  clair 
deji  a  cette  6poque  qu  il  serait  indispensable  de  faire  un  grand  effort. 

2°  Les  Fran9ais  ayant  viole  les  conventions  marocaines,  amenerent  I'incident  d'Agadir.  A 
cette  6poque,  les  progres  de  I'arm^e  fran9aise,  le  relevement  moral  de  la  nation,  I'avancej 
technique  prise  dans  le  domaine  de  Tavialion  et  dans  celui  des  mitrailleuses,  rendait  une 
attaque  contre  les  Francais  moins  facile  que  dans  la  periode  precedente.  De  plus,  il  fallait 
s'attendre  a  une  attaque  de  la  flotte  anglaise,  Cette  situation  difficile  ouvrit  les  yeux  sur  la 
Ii6cessit6  d'une  augmentation  de  I'armee.  Cette  augmentation  fut,  d6s  cette  epoque ,  consi- 
der^e  comme  un  minimum. 

3'  La  guerre  des  Balkans  aurait  pu  nous  entrainer  a  la  guerre  pour  soutenir  notre  alli6 
La  nouvelle  situation  au  sud  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  diminuait  la  valeur  de  I'aide  que  cet  allid 
pouvait  nous  appprter.  D'autre  part,  la  France  s etait  renforc6e  par  une  nouvelle  loi  dea 
cadres;  il  fallait  done  avancer  les  dates  d'execution  prevues  pour  la  nouvelle  loi  militaire. 

On  prepare  I'opinion  k  un  renforcement  nouveau  de  Tarm^e  active^  qui  assurerait  a  I'Al 
lemagne  une  paix  honorable,  et  la  possibilite  de  garantir  comme  il  convient  son  influence 
dans  les  affaires  du  monde.  La  nouvelle  loi  militaire  et  le  complement  qui  doit  la  suivre 
permettront  presque  completement  de  repondre  a  ce  but. 

Ni  les  ridicules  criailleries  de  revanche  des  chauvinistes  francais,  ni  les  grincements  de 
dents  des  Anglais,  ni  les  gestes  desordonnes  des  Slaves  ne  nous  d^tourneront  de  notre  but 
qui  est  de  fortifier  et  d'^tendre  le  Deutschthum  (puissance  germanique)  dans  le  monde  entier 

Les  Fran9ais  peuvent  armer  tant  qu'ils  voudront;  ils  ne  peuvent,  du  jour  au  lendemain 
augmentcr  leur  population.  L'emploi  d'une  armee  noire  sur  les  theatres  d'operations  e 
p^ens  restera  pour  longtemps  un  reve,  du reste  d^pourvu  de  beauty. 


11  — 


II.  —  But  et  devoirs  de  notre  politique  HATIONALE,  DE  NOTRE  ARMEE 

ET  DE  NOS  ORGANES  SPECIAUX  AU  SERVICE  DE  L'ARMEE. 

Notre  nouvelle  loi  militaire  n  est  qu'une  extension  de  I'oeuvre  d'education  mililaire  du 
peuple  allemand.  Nos  ancetres  de  1 8 1  3 ,  ont  fait  de  plus  gros  sacrifices.  Cest  notre  devoir 
sacre  d'aiguiser  I'epee  que  Ion  nous  a  mise  en  main ,  et  de  ia  tenir  prete  pour  nous  defendre 
comme  pour  porter  des  coups  a  notre  ennemi.  11  fautfaire  pen^trer  dans  le  peaple  I'idie  que 
nos  armcmenU  sont  une  reponse  aux  armements  et  a  la  politique  fran^aise.  H  faut  I'habituer  a 
penser  qu'une  guerre  offensive  de  notre  part  est  unc  necessite  pour  combattre  les  provoca- 
tions de  fadversaire.  II  faudra  agir  avec  prudence  pour  n'eveiller  aucun  soup9on ,  et  6viter 
les  crises  qui  pourraient  nuire  a  notre  vie  ecouomique.  11  faut  mener  les  affaires  de  telle 
facon  que  sous  la  pesante  impression  d'armements  puissants,  de  sacrifices  considerables,  et 
d'une  situation  politique  tendu^,  un  dechainement  (Lo^c/iZa^fen)  soil  considere  comme  une 
deiivrance ,  parce  qu'apres  lui  viendraierit  des  decades  de  paix  et  de  prosp6rite  comme  -apr^s 
1870.  II  faut  preparer  la  guerre  ati  point  de  vue  financier;  il  y  a  beaucoup  a  faii'e  de  ce 
c6te-la.  11  ne  faut  pas  eveiller  la  mefiance  de  nos  financiers ,  mais  bien  des  choses  cependant 
no  pourront  ctre  cachees. 

11  n'y  aurait  pas  a  s'inquieter  du  sort  de  nos  colonies.  Le  r^sultat  final  en  Europe  le  reglera 
pour  elles.  Par  contre ,  il  faudra  susciter  des  troubles  dans  le  Nord  de  I'Afrique  et  en  Russie. 
Cest  un  moyen  d  absorber  des  forces  de  I'adversaire.  II  est  done  absolument  necessaire  que 
nous  nous  meltions  en  relations,  par  des  organes  bien  choisis^  avec  des  gens  influents  en 
Egypte,  a  Tunis,  a  Alger  et  au  Maroc,  pour  preparer  lesmesures  n^cessaires  en  cas  de  guerre 
europeenne.  Bien  entendu,  en  cas  de  g:uerre,  on  reconnaitrait  ouvertement  ces  allies  secrets; 
et  on  leur  assurerait,  a  la  conclusion  de  ia  paix,  la  conservation  des  avantages  conquis.  On 
peut  realiser  ces  ddsiderata.  Un  premier  essai,  qui  a  ete  fait  il  y  a  quelques  annees,  nous 
avait  procure  le  contact  voulu.  Malheureuscment ,  on  n'a  pas  consolide  suflisamment  les  re- 
lations obtenucs.  Bon  gre  mal  gr^,  il  faudra  en  venir  a  des  pr^paratifs  de  ce  genre,  pour 
mener  rapidement  a  sa  fin  une  campagne. 

Les  soulevenients  provoques  en  temps  de  guerre  par  des  agents  poliliques  demandent  a 
elre  soigneusemcnt  prepares,  et  par  des  moyens  materiels.  lis  doivent  eclater  simultanement 
avec  la  destruction  des  moyens  de  communication;  ils  doivent  avoir  une  tete  dirigeante  que 
Ton  peut  trouver  dans  des  chefs  influents,  religieux  ou  politiques.  L'ecole  6gyptienne  y  est 
pnrticulierement  apte,  elle  relie  de  plus  en  plus  entre  eux  les  intellectuels  du  monde 
musulman. 

Quoi  qu  il  en  soit,  noiv*;  devons  ctre  forts  pour  pouvoir  aueantir  d'un  puissant  elan  nos 
enncmis  de  fEst  et  de  I'Ouest.  Mais  dans  la  prochaine  guerre  europeenne,  il  faudra  aussi 
que  les  petils  Etats  soicnl  contraints  a  nous  suivre,  ou  soient  domptes.  Dans  certaines  con- 
ditions, leurs  annees  et  leurs  places  fortes  pcuventetre  rapidement  vaincues  ou  neutralis6es , 
ce  qui  pourrail  elre  vraisemblablement  l,e  cas  pour  la  Belgique  et  la  Hollandc,  afin  d'inter- 
dire  a  notre  ennemi  de  I'Ouest  un  territoire  qui  pourrait  lui  servir  de  base  d'operation  dans 
notre  flanc.  Au  Nord,  nous  n'avons  a  craindre  aucune  menace  du  Danemark  ou  des  Etats 
scandinaves,  d'autant  plus  que  dans  tous  les  cas,  nous  pourvoirons  a  la  concentration  d'une 
forte  arm^e  du  Nord ,  capable  de  repondre  a  toute  mauvaise  intention  de  ce  cote.  Au  cas  le 
plus  defavorable ,  le  Danemark  pouirait  etre  force  par  I'Angleterre  a  abandonner  sa  neu- 
tralite;  mais  a  ce  moment,  la  decision  serait  deja  intervenue  sur  terrc  ct  sur  mer.  Notre 
arniee  du  Nord ,  dont  les  forces  pourraient  etre  notablement  augmentees  par  les  formations 


—  12  — 
hollandaises ,   r^pondrait  par  une  defensive  extremement  active  k  toute  offensive  de  cft 
cdl6. 

Au  Sud,  la  Suisse  forme  un  boulevard  extremement  solide,  et  nous  pouvons  compter 
quelle  defendra  energiquement  sa  neutralite  contre  la  France,  protegeant  ainsi  notre 
flanc. 

Comme  on  I'a  dit  plus  haut,  on  ne  peut  considerer  de  meme  la  situation  vis-^-vis  des 
petits  Etats  de  notre  frontiere  Nord-Ouest.  Lk ,  ce  sera  pour  nous  une  question  vitale ,  et  le 
but  verslequel  il  faudra  tendre,  c'est  de  prendre  I'offensive  avec  une  grande  superiorite  des 
les  premiers  jours.  Pour  cela,  il  faudra  concentrer  une  grande  arm6e,  suivie  de  fortes  for- 
mations de  landwehr,  qui  d6termineront  les  armees  des  petits  Etats  a  nous  suivre ,  ou  tout 
au  moins  a  rester  inactives  sur  le  Itieatre  de  la  guerre ,  et  qui  les  ecraseraient  en  cas  de 
resistance  armee.  Si  Ton  pouvait  decider  ces  Etats  a  organiser  leur  systeme  fortifie  de  telle 
facon  qu'il  constitue  une  protection  elTicace  dd  notre  flanc ,  on  pourrait  renoncer  a  I'invasion 
projet^e.  Mais,  pour  cela,  il  faudrait  aussi,  particulierement  en  Beigique,  qu'on  reformat 
I'armee,  pour  quelle  offrit  des  garanties  serieuses  de  resistance  elficace.  Si,  au  contraire,  son 
organisation  defensive  etait  6tablie  contre  nous,  ce  qui  donnerait  des  avantages  evi dents  k 
notre  adversaire  de  I'Ouest,  nous  ne  pourrions,  en  aucune  facon,  offrir  a  la  Beigique  une 
garantie  de  la  s6curit6  de  sa  neutralite.  Un  vaste  champ  est  done  ouvert  a  notre  diplomatic 
pour  travailler,  dans  ce  pays,  dans  le  sens  de  nos  int^rlts. 

Les  dispositions  arret6es  dans  ce  sens  permettent  d'esp^rer  que  I'offensive  peut  6tre  prise 
[aussitdt  apr^s  la  concentration  complete  de  I'arm^e  du  Bas-Rhin.  Un  ultimatum  h  br^ve 
^ch^ance,  que  doit  suivre  imm^diatement  I'invasion,  permettra  de  justifier  sulTisamment 
[notre  action  au  point  de  vue  dif  droit  des  gens. 

.  Tels  sont  les  devoirs  qui  incombent  k  notre  arm^e,  et  qui  exigent  un  effectif  61ev6.  Si 
I'ennemi  nous  atlaque.  ou  si  nous  voulons  le  dompter,  nous  ferons  comme  nos  freres  d'il  y 
I  a  cent  ans;  I'aigle  provoqu^  prendra  son  vol,  saisira  I'ennemi  dans  ses  serres  acerees,  et  le 
•  rendra  inoffensif.  Nous  nous  souviendrons  alors  que  les  provinces  de  I'ancien  empire  alle- 
mand  :  Comt6  de  Bourgogne  et  une  belle  part  de  la  Lorraine,  sont  encore  aux  mains  des 
I  Francs;  que  des  milliers  de  freres  allemands  des  provinces  balliques  g^missent  sous  le  joiig 
[^lave.  C'est  une  question  nationale  de  rendre  a  I'AUemagne  ce  qu'elle  a  autrefois  poss6d6. 


r  3. 

M.  Jules  Cambon  ,  Ambassadeur  de  France  k  Berlin , 

k  M.  Stephen  Pichon  ,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res. 

Berlin,  le  6  mai  19 13. 

Je  paiiais  ce  soir  avec  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  de  la  Conference  des  Ambassadeurs  et 
des  resullats  obtenus  k  la  seance  d'hier  k  Londres.  La  crise  dent  TEurope  etait  me- 
nacee  est,  k  ses  yeux,  ecartee,  mais  seulement  pour  quelque  temps:  « II  semble,  me 
disait  M.  de  Jagow,  que  nous  marchons  dans  un  pays  de  montagnes*  Nous  venons  de 
passer  un  col  difficile  et  nous  voyons  d'autres  hauteurs  se  dresser  devant  nous. »  — 
«  Celle  que  nous  venons  de  surmonter,  lui  repondis-je,  etait  peut-dtre  la  plus  dure  k 
Tasser. » 


—  13  — ; 

La  crise  que  nous  venons  de  traverser  a  ete  tres  serieuse.  Ici,  on  a  consider^  le 
danger  de  guerre  comme  imminent.  J  ai  eu  la  preuve  des  preoccupations  de 
I'Allemagne  par  un  certain  nombre  de  faits  qu'il  importe  que  Votre  Excellence 
connaisse. 

J'ai  re^u  hier  la  visite  d'un  de  mes  coUegues  avec  qui  j'entretiens  des  relations 
particulieres  et  cordiales.  Lors  de  ia  visite  qu'il  a  faite  a  M.  de  Jagow,  celui-ci  lui  a  de- 
mande,  a  tilre  confidentiel  quelle  etait  exactement  la  situation  de  la  Russie  en 
Extreme-Orient  et  si  cette  Puissance  a,  en  ce  moment,  quelque  chose  a  redouter  de 
ce  cote  qui  y  puisse  retenir  ses  forces.  L'Ambassadeur  lui  repondit  qu  d  ne  voyait 
rien ,  absolument  rien ,  qui  put  etre  une  cause  de  preoccupation  pour  le  Gouverne- 
ment  russe  et  que  celui-ci  avait  les  mains  libres  en  Europe. 

Je  disais  plus  haut  que  le  danger  d'une  guerre  avait  ete  envisage  ici  comme  tres 
proche.  Aussi  ne  s'est-on  pas  contente  de  tater  le  terrain  en  Extreme-Orient,  on  s'est 
prepare  ici-meme. 

La  mobilisation  de  I'armee  allemande  ne  se  borne  pas  h  Tappel  des  reservistes  k  la 
caserne.  H  y  a,  en  AUemagne,  une  mesure  preparatoire  qui  n'existe  pas  chez  nous  et 
qui  consiste  a  prevenir  les  officiers  et  les  hommes  de  la  reserve  de  se  tenir  prets 
pour  Tappel ,  afm  qu'ils  puissent  prendre  les  arrangements  qui  leur  sont  necessaires. 
Cestun  «  garde  k  vous  »  general,  etil  faut  I'incroyable  esprit  de  soumission,  de  disci- 
pline et  de  secret  qui  existe  en  ce  pays,  pour  qu'une  pareille  disposition  puisse 
exister.  Si  un  pareil  avertissement  etait  donne  en  France,  le  pays  fremirait  tout  en- 
tier  et  la  presse  le  dirait  le  lendemain. 

Get  avertissement  a  ete  lance,  en  1 9 1 1 ,  au  cours  des  negociations  que  je  poursui- 
vais  sur  le  Maroc. 

Or,  il  a  ete  lance  de  nouveau,  il  y  a  une  dizaine  de  jours,  c'est-^-dire  aii  moment 
de  la  tension  austro-albanaise.  Je  le  sais,  et  le  tiens  de  plusieurs  sources  differentes, 
nolamment  d'officiers  de  reserve  qui  Tont  dit  a  des  amis  dans  la  plus  stricte  intimite. 
Ges  messieurs  ont  pris  les  mesures  necessaires  pour  assurer  a  leur  famille ,  en  coffre- 
fort,  les  moyens  de  vivre  pendant  un  an.  On  a  meme  dit  que  c'etait  pour  cette  meme 
raison  que  le  Kronprinz ,  qui  devait  faire  le  voyage  d'essai  de  VImperator,  ne  s'est  pas 
embarque. 

La  decision  qui  a  fait  prendre  cette  mesure  preparatoire  a  la  mobilisation  repond 
aux  idees  du  Grand  Etat-Major  general.  Sur  ce  point,  j'ai  ete  mis  au  courant  d'une 
conversation  tenue  dans  un  milieu  allemand  par  le  general  de  Moltke ,  qui  est  consi- 
dere  ici  comme  I'officier  le  plus  distingue  de  I'armee  allemande. 

La  pensee  de  I'Etat-Major  general  est  d'agir  par  surprise.  « II  faut  laisser  de  cote,  a 
dit  le  general  de  Moltke,  les  lieux  communs  siu*  la  responsabilite  de  I'agresseur. 
Lorsque  la  guerre  est  devenue  necessaire ,  il  faut  la  faire  en  mettant  toutes  les  chances 
de  son  cote.  Le  succes  seul  la  justifie.  L' AUemagne  ne  pent  ni  ne  doit  laisser  a  la 
Russie  le  temps  de  mobiliser;  car  eile  serait  obligee  de  maintenir  sur  sa  frontiere  Est 
une  force  telle  qu'elle  se  trouverait  en  situation  d'egalite,  sinon  d'inferiorlte,  avec  la 
France.  Done,  a  ajoute  le  general ,  il  faut  prevenir  notre  principal  adversaire  des  qu'il 
y  aura  neuf  chances  sur  dix  d'avoir  la  guerre,  et  la  commencer  sans  altendre  pour 
ecraser  brutalement  toute  resistance.  » 


—  14  — 

Voil^  exactement  r^tat  d'ame  des  milieux  militaires,  qui  repond  ^  Vetat  d'ame 
des  milieux  poiitiques,  ceux-ci  ne  considerant  pas  la  Russie,  au  coairaire  de  nous» 
comme  un  ennemi  necessaire. 

Voili  ce  qu'on  pensait  et  disait  entre  soi  il  y  a  quinze  jours. 

II  faut  relenir  de  cetle  aventure  la  legon  que  renferment  les  fails  que  j  ai  presentes 
plus  hant :  ces  gens-ci  ne  craignent  pas  la  guerre ,  ils  en  acceptent  pleinemeat  la  pos- 
sibilite  et  ils  ont  pris  leurs  niesures  en  consequence.  Ih  veulent  elre  toujnurs  prels. 

Comme  je  le  disais,  cela  exige  des  conditions  de  secret  et  de  discipline  et  une 
volonte  perseverantc  :  lenthousiasme  ne  suffit  pas  a  tout.  Cette  leqon  peut  etre  utile 
a  mediter  dans  le  moment  ou  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Uepublique  demande  au  Par- 
lement  les  moyens  de  fortifier  le  pays. 

Jules  Cambon. 


N"  4. 

M.  Allize,  Ministre  de  la  Republique  en  Baviere, 

a  M.  Stephen  Pichon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Munich,  le  10  juiliet  19 13. 

Au  point  de  vue  politique ,  on  se  demande  a  quoi  serviront  les  nouveaux  arme- 
ments.  Reconnaissant  que  personne  ne  menace  I'AUemagne,  on  considere  que  la 
diplomatic  allemande  disposait  deja  de  forces  assez  considerables  et  d'alliances  assez 
puissantes  pour  defendre  avec  succes  les  interets  allemands.  Comme  je  le  relevais 
d^ja  au  lendemain  de  faccord  marocain  de  1911,  on  estime  que  la  Chancellerie 
imperiale  sera  aussi  incapable  dans  I'avenir  que  dans  le  passe  d'adopter  une  politique 
exterieure  active  et  de  remporter,  tout  au  moins  sur  ce  terrain,  des  succes  qui  justi- 
fieraient  les  sacrifices  que  la  nation  s'impose. 

Cet  etat  d  esprit  est  d'autant  plus  inquietant  que  le  Gouvernement  imperial  se 
trouverait  actuellement  soutenu  par  fopinion  publique  dans  toute  entreprise  ou  il 
s'engagerait  vigoureusement ,  meme  aux  risques  d'un  conflil.  L'etat  de  guerre,  auquel 
tous  les  evenements  d'Orient  habituent  les  esprits  depuis  deux  ans,  apparait,  non 
plus  comme  une  catastrophe  lointaine,  mais  comme  une  solution  aux  difficultes 
poiitiques  et  economiques  qui  n'iront  qu'en  s  aggravant. 

Puisse  I'exemple  de  la  Bulgarie  exercer  en  Allemagne  une  influence  salutaire. 
Comme  me  le  disait  naguere  le  Prince-Regent  :  <<  Le  sort  des  armes  est  toujours 
incertain;  toute  guerre  est  une  aventure,  et  bien  fou  est  celui  qui  la  court  se  croyant 
assure  de  la  victoire. » 

Allize. 


—  15  - 


r  5. 


Note  a  M.  Stephen  Pichon ,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres 
^  i{surl'opinion  publique  en  Allemagne,  d'apres les  rapports  des  agents  diplomatiques  et  consulaii-es)» 

Paris,  le  3o  juillet  19 13. 

Des  observations  que  nos  agents  en  Allemagne  ont  pu  recueilllr  aupres  de  per- 
sonnes  en  mesure  de  penetrer  dans  les  milieux  les  plus  divers.  Ton  peut  tirer  cettb 
conclusion  que  deux  sentiments  dominent  et  irritent  les  esprits  : 

1°  Le  traite  du  4  novembre  1911  serait,  pour  I'Allemagne,  un  deboire; 

a'*  La  France  —  une  France  nouvelle  —  insoup^onnee  jusqu'a  I'ete  de  1911  — 
serait  belliquease.  Elle  voudrait  la  guerre. 

Deputes  de  tous  les  partis  du  Reichstag ,  depuis  les.  conservateurs  jusqu'aux  socia- 
listes,  et  representant  les  contrees  les  plus  differenles  de  I'Allemagne,  universitaires 
de  Berlin,  de  Halle,  d'lena  et  de  Marbourg,  etudiauts,  instituteurs,  employes  de 
commerce,  commis  de  banque,  banquiers,  artisans,  commer^ants,  industriels,  me- 
decins,  avocats,  redactcurs  de  journaux  democrates  et  de  journaux  socialistes, 
publicistes  juifs,  membres  des  syndicats  ouvriers,  pasteurs  et  boutiquiers  de  la 
Marche  de  Brandebourg,  hobereaux  de  Pomeranie  el  cordonniers  de  Stettin  fetant 
le  5o5®  anniversaire  de  leur  association,  chatelains,  fonctionnaires,  cures  et  gros 
cultivateurs  de  Westphalie  sont  unanimes  sur  ces  deux  points,  sans  nuances  notables, 
selon  les  milieux  et  les  partis.  Voici  la  synthese  de  toutes  ces  opinions  : 

Le  traite  du  l\.  novembre  est  une  defaite  diplomatique,  une  preuve  de  1  incapacity 
de  la  diplomatic  allemande  et  de  Tincurie  du  Gouvernement,  si  souvent  denonc^es, 
la  preuve  que  I'avenir  de  TEmpire  n'est  pas  assure  sans  un  nouveau  Bismarck, 
une  humiliation  nationale,  une  deconsideration  europeenne,  une  atleinte  au  prestige 
allemand,  d'autant  plus  grave  que,  jusquen  1911,  la  suprematie  mihlaire  de  TAlle- 
magne  etait  incontestee  et  que  I'anarchie  frangaise,  Timpuissance  de  la  Bepublique 
etaient  une  sorte  de  dogme  allemand. 

En  juillet  1911,  le  «  coup  d'Agadir «  posa  vraiment,  pour  la  premiere  fois,.la 
question  marocaine  comme  une  question  nationale,  important  a  la  vie  et  a  Texpan- 
sion  de  TEmpire.  Les  revelations  et  proces  de  presse  qui  suivirent  ont  sulTisamment 
demontre  comment  la  campagne  avait  ete  organisee,  quelles  convoitises  panger- 
maniques  elle  avait  allumees  et  quelles  rancunes  elle  a  laissees.  Si  TEmpereur  est 
discute,  le  Chancelier  impopulaire,  M.  de  Kiderlen,  fut  I'homme  le  plus  hai  de 
I'Allemagne,  I'hiver  dernier.  Cependant  il  commence  a  n  etre  plus  que  deconsidere, 
car  il  laisse  entendre  qu'il  prendra  sa  revanche. 

Done,  pendant  I'ete  de  1911,  I'opinion  publique  allemande  se  cabra  en  face  de 
I'opinion  fran9aise  pour  le  Maroc.  Et  I'attitude  de  la  France,  son  calme  tranquille, 
son  unite  morale  refaite,  sa  resolution  de  faire  valoir  son  droit  jusqu'au  bout,  Ic 


^H 


—  16  — 

fait  qu'elle  a  Imsoleiice  de  n'avoirpas  peur  de  la  guerre,  sont  le  plus  constant,  \^ 
plus  grave  sujet  d'inquietude  et  de  mauvaise  humeur  de  I'opinion  pubiique  allemandei. 

Pourquoi  done  rAllemagne  n'a-t-elle  pas  fait  la  guerre  pendant  I'ete  de  1 9 1  i » 
puisque  lopinion  pubiique,  encore  que  moins  unanime  et  resolue  que  ropiniom 
frangaise,  y  etait  cependant  favorable?  Oulre  la  volonte  pacifique  de  TEmpereur  ef 
du  Ghancelier,  on  fait  valoir  dans  les  milieux  competents  des  raisons  militaires  ei 
financieres. 

Mais  ces  evenements  de  191 1  ont  cause  une  profonde  desillusion  en  Allemagne 
Une  France  nouvelle,  unie,  resolue,  decidee  a  ne  plus  se  laisser  intimider,  est 
sortie  du  suaire  dans  lequel  on  la  contemplait  s'ensevelissant  depuis  dix  ans.  Avec 
une  surprise  melee  d'irritation ,  Topinion  pubiique  allemande  a  decouvert,  de  de- 
cembre  a  mai,  a  travers  la  presse  de  tous  les  partis  qui  reprochaient  au  Gouvernement 
imperial  sonr  incap a cit6,  sa  lachete  :  que  la  vaincue  de  1870  n'avait  cesse  depuis  de 
guerroyer,  de  promener  en  Asie  et  en  Afrique  son  drapeau  et  le  prestige  de  ses 
armes,  de  conquerir  de  v^stes  territdires;  que  I'AUemagne  avait  vecu  d'heroisme 
honoraire,  que  la  Turquie  est  le  seul  pays  ou  elie  ait  fait,  sous  le  regne  de  Guil- 
laume  n,  des  conquetes  morales,  bien  compromises  maintenant  par  la  honte  de  la 
solution  marocaine.  Chaque  fois  que  la  France  faisait  une  conquete  coloniale,  on 
consolait  cette  meme  opinion  en  disant «  Oui,  mais  cela  n'empeche  pas  la  decadence, 
i'anarchie,  la  decomposition  de  la  France  a  I'interieur.  B 

On  se  trompait,  et  on  trompait  Topinion.  j 

Etant  donne  ces  sentiments  de  I'opinion  pubiique  allemande,  qui  tient  la  France 
pour  belliqueuse,  que  peut-on  augurer  de  I'avenir  au  point  de  vue  d'une  guerre  pos- 
sible et  prochaine  ? 

L'opinion  pubiique  allemande  est  divisee,  sur  la  question  de  I'eventualite  d'une 
guerre  possible  et  prochaine ,  en  deux  courants. 

Jl  y  a  dans  le  pays  des  forces  de  paix ,  mais  inorganiques  et  sans  chefs  populaires. 
•EUes  considerent  que  la  guerre  serait  un  malheur  social  pour  I'Allemagne ,  que  I'or- 
gueil  de  caste,  la  domination  prussienne  et  les  fabricants  de  canons  et  de  plaques 
<de  cuirasses  en  tireraient  le  meilleur  benefice,  que  la  guerre  profiterait  surtout  i 
I'Angleterre. 

EUes  se  decomposent  ainsi  qu'il  suit  : 

La  masse  profonde  des  ouvriers,  des  artisans  et  des  paysans  qui  sont  pacifiques 
■d'instinct. 

La  noblesse  degagee  des  interets  de  carriere  militaire  et  engagee  dans  les  affaires 
industrielles  —  tels  les  grands  seigneurs  de  Silesie  et  quelques  autres  personnalites 
tres  influentes  k  la  Cour  —  et  assez  eclairee  pour  se  rendre  compte  des  consequences 
politiques  et  sociales  desastreuses  d'une  guerre,  meme  victorieuse. 

Un  grand  nombre  d'industriels ,  de  commer^ants  et  de  financiers  de  moyenne 
importance,  dont  la  guerre,  meme  victorieuse,  amenerait  la  banqueroute,  parce  que 
leurs  entreprises  vivent  de  credit  et  sont  surtout  commanditees  par  des  capitaux 
etrangers. 

Les  Polonais,  les  Alsaciens-Lorrains,  les  habitants  du  Schleswig-Holstein  conquis, 


~  17  — 

mais  non  assimiles,  et  en  hostilite  sourde  centre  la  politique  prussiehne,  soil  environ* 
7  millions  d'Aliemands  annexes. 

Enfin,  les  Gouvernements  et  les  classes  dirigeantes  des  grands  Etats  du  Slid,  la 
Saxe,  la  Baviere,  le  Wurtemberg  et  le  Grand-Duche  de  Bade,  sont  partages  entre 
ce  doable  sentiment  :  une  guerre  malheureuse  compromettrait  la  Confederation » 
dont  ils  ont  tire  de  grands  avantages  economiques;<une  guerre  victorieuse  ne  profi- 
terait  qua  la  Prusse  et  a  la  prussianisation,  contre  laquelle  ils  defendent  avec 
peine  leur  independance  politique  et  leur  autonomie  administrative. 

Ces  elements  preferent,  par  raison  ou  par  instinct,  la  paix  a  la  guerre;  mais  ce  ne 
sont  que  des  forces  politiques  de  contrepoids,  dont  le  credit  sur  I'opinion  est  limite, 
ou  des  forces  sociales  de  silence,  passives  et  sans  defense  contre  la  contagion  dune 
poussee  belliqueuse. 

Un  exemple  eclairera  cette  idee  :  les  i  lo  deputes  socialistes  sont  des  partisans 
de  la  paix.  Usne  sauraient  empecher  la  guerre,  car  elle  ne  depend  pas  d'un  vote  du 
Reichstag,  et,  en  presence  de  cette  eventualile,  le  gros  de  leurs  troupes  ferait  chorus 
dans  la  colere  ou  dans  I'enlhousiasme  avec  le  reste  du  pays. 

II  faut  noter  enfin  que  ces  partisans  de  la  paix  dans  la  masse  croient  a  la  guerre, 
parce  qu'ils  ne  vpient  pas  de  solution  a  la  situation  actuelle.  Dans  certains  contrats* 
nolamment  dans  les  contrats  d'editeurs,  on  a  introduit  la  clause  de  resiliation  en  cas 
de  guerre.  Ils  esperent  cependant  que  la  volonte  de  I'Empereur,  d'une  part,  et  ies 
difficultes  de  la  France  au  Maroc,  d'autre  part,  sont  pour  quelque  temps  des  garan- 
Ires  de  paix.  Quoi  qu'il  en  soit,  leur  pessimisme  laisse  libre  jeu  aux  partisans  de  la 
guerre. 

On  parle  quelquefois  de  parti  militaire  allemand.  L'expression  est  inexacte, 
meme  pour  dire  que  TAUemagne  est  le  pays  de  la  suprematie  du  pouvoir  militaire, 
comme  on  dit  que  la  France  est  le  pays  de  la  suprematie  du  pouvoir  civil.  II  y  a 
un  etat  d'espritplus  digne  d'attention  que  ce  fait  historique,  parce  qu'il  constitue  un 
danger  plus  evident  et  plus  prochain.  II  y  a  un  parti  de  la  guerre,  avec  des  chefs,  des 
troupes,  une  presse  convaincue  ou  payee  pour  fabriquer  I'opinion,  des  moyens 
varies  et  redoutables  pour  intimider  le  Gouvernement.  II  agit  sur  le  pays  avec  des 
idees  clalres,  des  sentiments  ardents,  une  volonte  fremissante  et  tendue. 

Les  partisans  de  la  guerre  se  divisent  en  plusieurs  categories,  chacun  tire  de  sa 
caste,  de  sa  classe,  de  sa  formation  intellectuelle  et  morale,  de  ses  interets,  de  ses 
rancunes,  des  raisons  particulieres  qui  creent  en  un  etat  d'esprit  general  et 
accroissent  la  force  et  la  rapidite  du  courant  belliqueux. 

Les  uns  veulent  la  guerre  parce  qu  elle  est  inevitable  etant  donnees  les  circon- 
stances  actuelles.  Et  pour  I'Allemagne,  il  valut  mieux  plus  tot  que  plus  tard. 

D'autres  la  considerent  comme  necessaire  pour  des  raisons,  economiques  tirees 
de  la  surpopulation ,  de  la  surproductlon,  du  besoin  de  marches  et  de  debouches; 
ou  pour  des  raisons  sociales  :  la  diversion  a  I'exterieur  pent  seule  empecher  ou 
re  larder  la  montee  vers  le  pouvoir  des  masses  democratiques  et  socialistes. 

D'autres,  insuffisamment  rassures  sur  I'avenir  de  I'Empire ,  et  croyant  que  le  temps 
Iravaille  pour  la  France,  pensent  qu'il  faut  precipiter  I'evenement., II  n  est^as  rare  de 
rencontrer,  a  la  traverse  des  conversations  ou  des  brochures  patriotiques,  le  senti- 

DocuMENTS  DiPLOMATiQEES.  —  Guerrc  cufopeenne.  ^ 


— .  18  — 
ment  obscur,  mals  profond,  qu'une  Allemagne  libre.  et  une  France  ressuscitee  sont 
deux  fails  historiques  incompatibles. 

D'autres  sont  belliqueux  par  «  BIsmarckisme  »,  si  I'on  peut  ainsi  dire.  Hs  se  sentent 
humilies  d' avoir  a  discuter  avec  des  Fran^ais,  a  parler  droit,  raison,  dans  des  nego- 
ciations  ou  des  conferences  ou  ils  n'ont  pas  facilement  eu  toujours  raison,  alors 
qu'ils  ont  la  force  plus  decisive.  Ils  tireat  d'un  passe  recent  un  orgueil  sans  cesse 
alimente  par  des  souvenirs  vecus,  par  la  tradition  orale  et  par  leslivres,  et  blesse 
par  les  evenenients  de  ces  dernieres  annees.  Le  depit  irrite  caracterise  I'esprit  d'asso- 
ciation  des  «  Wehrvereine  »  et  autres  groupements  de  la  Jeune  Allemagne. 

D'autres  veulent  la  guerre  par  haine  mystique  de  la  France  revolutionnaire. 
D'autres  enfm,  par  rancune.  Ce  sont  ces  derniers  qui  amassent  les  pretexles. 

Dans  la  realite,  ces  sentiments  se  concretisent  ainsi  :  les  hobereaux,  representes 
au  Reichstag  par  le  parti  conservateur,  veulent  eluder  k  tout  prix  I'impot  sur  les 
successions,  inevitable  si  la  paix  se  prolonge.  Le  Reichstag,  dans  la  derniere  seanoe 
de  la  session  qui  vient  de  se  clore,  en  a  vote  le  principe.  C'est  une  atteinte  grave  aux 
inter^ls  et  aux  privileges  de  la  noblesse  terrienne.  D'autre  part,  cette, noblesse  est 
une  aristocratic  mililaire,  et  il  est  instructif  de  comparer  I'annuaire  de  I'armee  avec 
I'annuaire  de  la  noblesse.  La  guerre  seule  peut  faire  durer  son  prestige  et  servir  ses 
interets  familiaux.  Dans  la  discussion  de  la  loi  militaire,  un  orateur  du  parti  a  fait 
valoir  en  faveur  du  vote  la  necessite  de  I'avancement  des  officiers.  Enfm,  cette  classe 
sociale,  qui  forme  une  hierarchic  dont' le  roi  de  Prusse  est  le  couronnement 
supreme ,  constate  avec  terreur  la  democratisation  de  I'AUemagne  et  ta  force  grandis- 
sante  du  parti  socialiste  et  considere  que  ses  jours  sont  comptes.  Non  seulement  ses 
interets  materiels  sont  menaces  par  un  formidable  mouvement  hostile  au  protec- 
tionhisme  agraire,  mais  encore  sa  representation  politique  diminue  a  chaque  legisla- 
ture. Dans  le  Reichstag  de  1878,  il  y  avait  162  membres  (sur  897)  appartenant  a 
la  noblesse;  dans  celui  de  1898,  83;  dans  le  Reichstag  de  1912,  67.  Sur  ce  der- 
nier nombre,  27  seulement  siegent  a  droite,  i^  au  centre,  7  a  gauche,  un  sur  les 
bancs  sociahstes. 

La  grande  bourgeoisie,  representee  par  le  parti  national  liberal,  parti  des  satis- 
faits,  n'a  pas  les  memes  raisons  que  les  hobereaux  de  vouloir  la  guerre.  Elle  est  belli- 
queuse  cfependanl,  sauf  exceptions.  Hie  a  ses  raisons  d'ordre  social. 

La  grande  bourgeoisie  n'est  pas  moins  afiligee  que  la  noblesse  de  la  democratisation 
de  I'AUemagne.  En  1871,  elle  avait  126  represenlants  au  Reichstag;  i55  en  187/1; 
99  en  1 887 ;  en  1912,  45.  Elle  n'oublie  pas  qu'ils  jouerent  le  grand  role  parlemen- 
taire  au  lendemain  de  la  guerre  en  servant  les  desseins  de  Bismarck  contre  les  hobe- 
reaux. Aujourd'hui,  mal  assise  entre  des  instincts  conservateurs  et  des  idees  libe- 
rales,  elle  demande  h  la  guerre  des  solutions  que  ne  trouvent  pas  ses  representants 
incapables  et  pitoyables.  En  outre,  les  industriels  doctrinaires  professent  que  les 
difficul les  qu'ils  ont  avec  leurs  ouvriers  ont  leurs  originies  en  France,  foyer  revolu- 
tionnaire des  idees  d'emancipation  —  sans  la  France,  I'industric  serait  tranquille. 

Enfin,  fabricants  de  canons  et  de  plaques  d'acier,  grands  marchands  qui  deman- 
dent  de  plus  grands  marches,  banquiers  qui  speculent  sur  I'age  d'or  et  la  prochaine 
indemnile  de  guen'e,  pensent  que  la  guerre  serait  une  bonne  affaire. 


—  19  — 

Parmi  les  « Bismarckiens.)>  il  faut  compter  les  fonctionnalres  de  toutes  carrieres, 
representes  assez  exactement  au  Reichstag  par  les  conservateurs  libres  ou  parti  d'Em- 
pire,  parti  des  retraites  dont  les  idees  fougueuses  se  deversent  dans  la  Post,  lis 
font  ecole  et  souche  dans  les  groupements  de  jeunes  gens  doiit  Tesprit  a  ete  prepare 
et  tendh  par  lecole  ou  Tuniversite. 

L'uhiversite ,  exception  faite  pour  quelques  esprits  distingues,  developpe  une 
ideologie  guerriere.  Les  ecOnomistes  demontrent  a  coups  de  statistiques "  la  necessite 
pour  I'Allemagne  d'avoir  un  empire  colonial  et  commercial  qui  reponde  au  rende- 
ment  industriel  de  I'Empire.  H  y  a  des  sociologues  fanatiques  qui  vont  plus  loin.  La 
paix  armee,  disent-ils,  est  un  ecrasant  fardeau  pour  les  nations,  elle  empeche  Tame- 
lioration  du  sort  des  masses  et  favorise  la  poussee  socialiste.  La  France,  en  s'obsti- 
nant  a  vouloir  la  revanche ,  s'oppose  au  desarmement.  H  faut  une  fois  pour  toutes 
la  reduire  a  I'impuissance  pour  un  siecle,  c'est  la  meilleure  et  la  plus  rapide  fagon 
de  resoudre  la  question  sociale. 

Historiens,  philosophes,  publicistes  politiques  et  autres  apologistes  de  la  »  deutsche 
Kultur »  veulent  imposer  au  monde  une  maniere  de  sentir  et  de  penser  qui  soit  spe- 
cifiquement  allemande.  lis  veulent  conquerir  la  suprematie  intellectuelle  qui,  de 
I'avis  des  esprits  lucides,  reste  a  la  France.  C'est  a  cette  source  que  s'alimente  la 
phraseologie  des  pangermanistes  comme.  aussi  les  sentiments  et  les  contingents  des 
Kriegesvereine.  des  Wehrvereine  et  autres  associations  de  ce  genre,  trop  connues 
pour  qu'il  soit  necessaire  d'insister  sur  ce  point.  II  convient  de  noter  seulement 
que  le  mecontentement  cause  par  le  traite  du  4  novembre  a  considerablemGnt  accru 
le  nombre  des  menlbres  des  societes  coloniales. 

II  y  a  enfm  les  partisans  de  la  guerre  par  rancune,  par  •  ressenliment.  Ce  sont  les 
plus  dangereux.  Us  se  recrutent  surtout  parmi  les  diplomates.  Les  diplomates  alle- 
mands  ont  tres  mauvaise  presse  dans  Topiniou  pidalique.  Les  plus  acharnes  sont 
ceux  qui,  depuis  1906,  ont  ete  meles  aux  negociations  entre  ia  France  et  I'Alle^ 
magne;  ils  accumulent  et  additionnent  les  griefs  contre  nous,  et  un  jour,  ils  preseijb- 
leront  des  comptes  dans  la  presse  belliqueuse.  On  a  I'impression  que  c'est  surtout  au 
Maroc  qu'ils  les  chercheront,  bien  qu'un  incident  soit  toujours  possible  sur  tous  les 
points  du  globe  ou  la  Frauce  et  I'Allemagne  sont  en  contact. 

II  leiir  faut  une  revanphe,  car  ils  se  plaignent  d'avoir  ete  dupes.  Pendant  la  discus- 
sion de  la  loi  niilitaire,  un  de  ces  diplomates  belliqueux  declarait  :  « L'Allemagne  ne 
pourra  causer  serieusement  .avec  la  France  que  quand  elle  aura  tous  ses  hommes 
valides  sous  les  armes ». 

Comment  s'engagera  .cette  conversation  .►^  C'est  une  opinion  assez  repandue» 
meme  dans  les  milieux  pangermanistes,  que  I'Allemagne  ne  declarerait  pas  la  guerre» 
etant  donne  le  systeme  d'alliances. defensives  et  les  dispositions  de  I'Empereur.  Mais 
quand  le  jmoment  sera  venu,  il  devra,  par  tous  les  moyens,  contraindre  ta  France  a 
I'attaquer.  On  I'offensera,  s'il  le  faut.  C'est  la  tradition  prussienne. 

Faut-il  done  tenir  la  guerre  pour  fatale.^ 

II  est  peu  probable  que  I'Allemagne  ose  risquer  I'aventure,  si  la  France  pent  faire 
aux  yeux  de  I'opinion  la  preuve  decisive  que  I'entente  cordiale  et  Talliance  russe  ne 
soiit  pas  seulement  des  fictions  diplomatiques »  mais  des  realites  qui  existent  et  qui 

3. 


—  20  — 
joueront.  La  flotle  anglaise  inspire  une  salulaire  terreur.  Mais  on  sail  bienque  la  vic- 
toire  sur  mer  laissera  tout  en  suspens,  que  c'est  sur  terre  que  se  regleront  les  comples 
decisifs. 

Quant  a  la  Russie,  si  elle  a  dans  Toplnion  un.  poids  plus  considerable  qu'il  y  a 
trois  ou  quatre  ans,  dans  les  milieux  poliliques  et  militaires,  on  ne  croit  pas  que 
son  concours  soit  assez  rapide  et  energique  pour  etre  efficace. 

Les  esprits  s'habiluent  ainsi  a  considerer  la  prochaine  guerre  comme  un  duel  enlre 
la  France  et  TAllemagne. 


N°  6. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  la  Republique  frangaise  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Stephen  Pichon  ,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Berlin V  le  22  novembre  1913. 

Je  tiens  dune  source  absolument  sure  la  relation  d'une  conversation  que  FEmpe- 
ifBur  aurait  eue  avec  le  Roi  des  Beiges,  en  presence  du  Chef  d'Elat-Major  General 
de  Moltke,  il  y  a  une  quinzaine  de  jours,  conversation  qui  aurait,  parait-il ,- vivement 
frappe  le  Roi  Albert;  je  ne  suis  nuUement  surpris  de  son  impression,  qui  repond  a 
celle  que  moi-meme  je  ressens  depuis  queique  temps  :  I'hoslilite  contre  nous  s'ac- 
centue  et  TEmpereur  a  cesse  d'etre  partisan  de  la  paix. 

L'interlocuteur  de i'Empereur  d'Allemagne  pensait  jusqu'ici ,  comme  tout  le  monde , 
que  Guillaume  II,  dont  Tinfluence  personnelle  s'etait  exercee  dans  bien  des  circop- 
stances  critiques  au  profit  du  maintien  de  la  paix,  etait  toujours  dans  les  memes 
dispositions  d'esprit.  Cette  fois,  il  faurait  trouve  complelement  change  :  TEmpereur 
d'Allemagne  n'est  plus  k  ses  yeux  le  champion  de  la  paix  contre  les  tendances  belli- 
queuses  de  certains  partis  allemands.  Guillaume  II  en  est  venu  a  penser  que  la  guerre 
avec  la  France  est  inevitable  et  qu'il  faudra  en  venir  la  un  jour  ou  I'autre.  II  croit 
naturellement  a  la  superlorite  ecrasante  de  I'armee  allemande  et  a  son  succes  certain. 

Le  General  de  Mollke  parla  exactemeni  comme  son  souverain.  Lui  aussi,  il  declara 
la  guerre  necessaire  et  inevitable,  mais  il  se  montra  plus  assure  encore  du  succes, 
«  car,  dit-ilau  Roi,  cetlefois,  il  faut  en  finir,  et  Votre  Majeste  ne  peut  se  douter  de 
Tenthousiasme  irresistible  qui,  ce  jour-la,  entrainerale  peuple  allemand  tout  entier ». 

Le  Roi  des  Beiges  prolesta  que  c'elait  travestir  les  mtentions  du  Gouvernement 
fran^ais  que  les  traduire  de  la  sorie  ei  se  laisser  abuser  sur  les  sentiments  de  la  nation 
fran^aise  par  les  manifestations  de  quelques  esprits  exaltes  ou  d'intrigants.  sans 
conscience. 

L'Empereur  et  son  Chef  d'Etat-Major  n'en  persisterent  pas  moins  dansleurmaniere 
de  voir. 

Au  cours  de  cette  conversation  I'Empereur  etait,  du  resle,  apparu  surmene  et 
irritable.  A  mesure  que  les  annees  s'appesanlissent  sur  Guillaume  II,  les  traditions 


-^  21  — 

famlliales,.  les  senlimenls  retrogrades  de  la  Cour»  et  surtout  i'impalience  des 
militaires  prennent  plus  d'empire  sur  son  esprit.  Peut-etre  eprouve-t-il  on  ne 
salt  quelle  jalousie  de  la  popul^rite .  acqulse.  par  son  fils,  qui  llalte  les  passions 
des  pangermanlstes  et  lie  trouve  pas  la  situation  de  TEmpire  dans  le  monde 
legale  a  sa  puissance.  Peut-dlre  aussl  la  replique  de  la  France  a  la  derniere 
augmentation  de  Tarmee  allemande,  dont  i'objet  etait  d'elabllr  sans  conleste  la  supe- 
riorite  germanlque,  est-elle  pour  quelque  chose  dans  ces  amerlumes,  car,  quol  qu'on 
disfi,  on  sent  qu'on  ne  pent  guere  aller  plus  loin. 

On  pent  se  demander  ce  qu'il  y  a  au  fond  de  celte  conversation.  L'Empereur  et 
son  Chef  d'Etat-Major  General  ont  pu  avoir  pour  objeclif  d'impresslonner  le  Roi  des 
Beiges  et  de  le  disposer  a  ne  point  opposer  de  resistance  au  cas  ou  un  conflit  avec 
nous  se  produirait.  Peut-etre  aussi  voudralt-on  la  Belgique  moins  hostile  k  cerlalnes 
ambitions  qui  se  manlfestent  Ici  a  propos  du  Congo  beige,  mais  celte  derniere  hypp- 
these  ne  me  parait  pas  concorder  avec  Tlnterventlon  du  General  de  Mollke.. 

Au  reste,  I'Empereur  Guillaume  est  moirts  maitre  de  ces  Impatiences  qu'on  he  le 
crolt  communement.  Je  I'ai  vu  plus  d  une  fols  laisser  echapper  le  fond  de  sa  pensee. 
Quel  qu'alt  ete  son  objeclif  dans  la  conversation  qui  m'a  ete  rapportee,  la  confidence 
n'en  a  pas  moins  le  caraclere  le  plus  grave.  EUe  correspond  a  la  precarite  de  la  situa- 
tion generale  et  a  fetal  d'une  certalne  partie  de  f opinion  en  France  et  en  AUemagne. 

S'U  m  etait  pe'rmis  de  conclure ,  je  dirais  qu'Il  est  bon  de  tenir  compte  de  ce  fait 
nouveau  que  I'Empereur  se  familiarise  avec  un  ordre  d'Idees  qui  lul  repugnalt  autre- 
fois, et  que,  pour  lul  emprunter  une  locution  qu'il  alme  a,  employer,  nous  devons 
tenIr  noire  poudre  seche. 

Jules  Cambon, 


—  23   - 


CHAPITRE  II 

PRELIMINAIRES 


DE  LA  MORT  DE  L'ARCHIDUC  HERITIER 
(28  JUIN   1914) 

A  LA  REMISE   DE  LA  NOTE  AUTRICHIENNE  A    LA  SERBIE 
(23  JUILLET   1914) 


^  25  — 


N^7, 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Ren^  Viviani,  President  du  Cons^il,  Ministre  des. Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Vienne,  le  28  juin  1914. 

La  nouvelle  vient  de  parvenir  a  Vienne  que  rArchiduc  heritier  d'Autriche  et  sa 
femme  ont  ete  assassines  aujourd'hui  a  Serajevo  par  un  etudiant  origlnaire  de 
Grahovo.  Quelques  instants  avant  ['attentat  auquel  ils  ont  succombe,  ils  avaleut 
echappe  a  I'explosion  d'une  bombe  qui  a  blesse  plusieurs  officiers  de  leur  suite. 

L'Empereur,  en  ce  moment  a  Ischl,  en  a  ete  aussitot  avise  telegraphiquement. 

DUMAINE. 


]N?8. 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Amba'ssadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran-» 
geres. 

Vienne,  le  2  juillet  igi/i- 

Le  crime  de  Serajevo  suscite  les  plus  vives  rancunes  dans  les  milieux  miiilaires 
autrichiens  et  chez  tons  ceux  qui  ne  se  resignent  pas  a  iajsser  la  Serbie  garder  dans 
ies  Balkans  le  rang  qu'elle  a  conquis. 

L'enquete  sur  les  origines  de  I'attentat  qu'on  voudrait  exiger  du  Gouveinement 
de  Belgrade  dans  des  conditions  intolerables  pour  sa  dignite,  fournirait,  k  la  suite 
d'un  refus,  le  grief  permettant  de  proceder  a  une  execution  militaire. 

Dumaine. 


Docdmehts  diplomatiQCEs  —  Guerre  europeenne. 


—  26 


r  9. 


M.  DE  Man  NEVILLE,  Charge  d'affaires  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  ^L  Ren^  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  ie  k  juillet  1914. 

Le  Sous-Secretaire  d*Etat  des  Affaires  etrangeres  ma  dit  hier,  et  a  repete  aujour- 
d'hui  a  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie,  qu'ii  esperait  que  la  Serbie  donnerait  satisfaction 
aux  demandes  que  TAutriche  pouvait  avoir  k  lui  adresser  en  viie  de  la  recherche  et  de 
la  poursuite  des  complices  du  crime  de  Serajevo.  D  a  ajoute  qu  il  avait  confiance  qu'il 
en  serait  ainsi  parce  que  la  Serbie ,  si  elle  agissait  autrement,  aurait  centre  elle  Topinion 
de  tout  le  monde  civilise. 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  ne  parait  done  pas  partager"  les  inquietudes  qui  se 
manifestent  dans  une  partie  de  la  presse  allemande  au  sujet  d'une  tension  possible 
des  rapports  entre  les  Gouvernements  de  Vienne  et  de  Relgrade,  ou  du  moins  il  n« 
veut  pas  en  avoir  I'apparence. 

DE  Manneville. 


K  10. 


M.  P/LEOLOGDE,  AmbassadeuF  de  France  k  Saint-P^tersbonrg, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Sainl-Petersbourg,  6  juillet  igi^- 

Au  cours  d*un  entretien  qu'il  avait  tenu  a  avoir  avec  le  Charge  d'affaires  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie,  M.  Sazonoff  a  signale  amicalement  a  ce  diplomate  I'irritation  inquietante 
que  les  attaques  de  la  presse  aiitrichienne  contre  la  Serbie  risquent  de  produire  dans 
son  pays. 

Le  Comte  Czemin  ayant  laiss6  entendre  que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 


—  27  — 
serait  peut-etre  oblig^  de  rechercher  sur  le  tenitoire  serbe  les  instlgateurs  de  Tattentat 
de  Serajevo,  M.  Sazonoff  rinterrompit  :  « Aucun  pays  plus  que  ia  Russie,  a-t-il  dit, 
n'a  eu  a  souffrir  des  attentats  pr^par^s  sur  tenitoire  Stranger.  Avons-nous  jamais 
pretendu  employer  contre  un  pays  quelconque  les  precedes  dont  vos  journaux 
menacent  la  Serbie  ?  Ne  vous  engagez  pas  dans  cette  voie  ». 
Puisse  cet  avertissement  n  etre  pas  perdu. 

Pal^ologue. 


r   11. 

M.  d'Apchier  le  Maugin,  Consul  general  de  France  a  Budapest, 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 

geres. 

Budapest,  le  ii  juillet  19 14. 

Interpelle  a  la  Chambre  surl'etat  de  la  question  austro-serbe ,  M.  Tisza  a  declare 
qu'il  fallait  avant  toute  cbose  attendre  le  resultat  de  I'enquete  judiciaire,  dont  il  s'est 
refuse  pour  I'instant  a  reveler  quoi  que  ce  soit.  Et  la  Chambre  I'a  approuve  haute- 
ment.  II  s'est  montre  tout  aussi  discret  sur  les  decisions  prises  dans  la  reunion  des 
ministres  h  Vienne,  et  n'a  pas  laisse  deviner  si  on  donnerait  suite  au  projet  de 
demarche  a  Belgrade  dont  les  journaux  des  deux  mondes  out  retenti.  La  Chambre 
s'est  inclinee  derechef. 

En  ce  qui  concerne  cette  demarche,  il  semble  qu'il  y  ait  un  mot  d'ordre  pour  eu 
attenuer  la  portee  :  la  colere  hongroise  s'est  comme  evaporee  a  travers  les  articles 
virulents  de  la  presse ,  unanime  maintenant  a  deconseiller  ce  pas  qui  pourrait  etre 
dangereux.  Les  journaux  officieux  notamment  voudraient  que  Ton  substituat  k  ce 
mot  de  « demarches  aux  apparences  comminatoires,  le  terme  qui  leur  parait  plus 
arnical  et  plus  poii  de  « pourparlers ».  Ainsi,  officiellement,  pour  le  quart  d'heure, 
tout  est  k  la  paix. 

Tout  est  a  la  paix,  dans  les  journaux.  Mais  le  gros  pubHc  ici  croit  a  la  guerre  et  la 
craint.  Et  par  ailleurs,  des  personnes  en  qui  j'ai  toute  raison  d'avoir  confiance  m'ont 
afFirme  savoir  que  chaque  jour  des  canons  et  des  munitions  etaientdiriges  en  masse 
vers  la  frontiere.  Vrai  ou  non,  ce  bruit  ma  ete  rapporte  de  divers  cotes  avec  des 
details  concordants;  il  indique  au  moins  quell  es  sont  les  preoccupations  generales 
Le  Gouvernement,  soit  qu'il  veuille  sincerement  la  paix,  soit  qu'il  prepare  un  coup, 


—  28  — 
fait  mainteilant  tout  son  possible  pbur  calmer  ces  inquietudes.  Et  c'est  poufquol  I^ 
ton  des  journaux  gouvernementaux  a  baisse  dune  note,  puis  de  deux,  pour  etre  k] 
rheure  actuelle  presque  optimlste.  Mais  ils  avaient  eux-memes  propage  I'alarme 
k  plaisir.  Leur  optimisme  de  commande  est  acluellement  sans  echo ,  la  nervosity  de 
la  Bourse,  barometre  que  Ton  ne  saurait  negliger,  en  est  une  preuve  certaine;  les 
valeurssans  exception  sont  tombees  a  des  cours  invraisemblablement  bas;  la  rente 
hongroise  4  o/o  etait  cotee  hier  79,96,  cours  qui  n  a  jamais  ete  cote  depuis  la  pre- 
miere emission. 

d'Apchier  le  Maugin. 


r  12. 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  6lran- 
geres. 

Vienne,  ie  i5juillet  191 4, 

Certains  organes  de  la  presse  viennoise,  discutant  I'organisation  militaire  de  la 
France  et  de  la  Russie,  presentent  ces  deux  pays  comme  hors  d'etat  de  dire  leur  mot 
dans  les  affaires  europeennes,  ce  qui  assurerait  a  la  monarchie  dualiste,  soutenue 
par  I'AUemagne,  d'appreciables  facilites  pour  soumettre  la  Serbie  au  regime  quil 
plairait  de  lui  imposer.  La  MUildrische  Rundschau  I'avoue  sans  ambage.  « L'instant 
nous  est  encore  favorable.  Si  nous  ne  nous  d^cidons  pas  a  la  guerre,  celle  que  nous 
devrons  faire  dans  deux  ou  trois  ans  au  plus  tard  s'engagera  dans  des  circonstances 
beaucoup  moins  propices.  Actuellement,  c'est  k  nous  qu'appartient  I'initialive  :  la 
Russie  n'est  pas  prete,  les  facteurs  moraux  et  le  bon  droit  sont  pour  nous,  de  meme 
que  la  force.  Puisqu'un  jour  nous  devrons  accepter  la  lulte,  provoquons-la  lout  de 
suite.  Notre  prestige ,  notre  situation  de  grande  Puissance ,  notre  honnei^r  sont  en 
question  :  plus  encore,  car  vraisemblablement  il  s'agirait  de  notre  existence,  d'etre 
ou  ne  pas  etre,  ce  qui  reellement  est  aujourd'hui  la  grande  affaire. » 

En  rencherissant  sur  elle-nieme,  la  Neue  Freie  Presse  de  cejour  s'en  prend  au 
Comte  Tisza  de  la  moderation  de  son  second  discours,  ou  il  a  dit  :  «  nos  relations 
avec  la  Serbie  auraient  toutefois  besoin  d'etre  clarifiees ».  Ces  mots  provoquent  son 
indignation.  Pour  elle,  I'apaisement,  la  securite  ne  peuvent  resulter  que  d'une  guerre 
au  couleau  contre  le  panserbisme,  et  c'est  au  nom  de  I'humanite  qu'elle  reclame  I'ex- 
termination  de  la  maudite  race  serbe. 

DUMAINE. 


29  — 


M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  6tran- 
geres. 

Vienne,  ig  juillet  igiii. 

Le  Chancelier  du  Consulat  qui  m'a  remis  son  rapport  semestriel  resumant  les  fails 
divers  d'ordre  economique  qui  0nt  fait  I'objet  de  ses  etudes  depuis  le  debut  de 
I'annee,  y  a  joint  une  partie  d'information  politique  provenant  dune  source  serieuse. 

Je  I'ai  prie  de  rediger  brievement  les  renseignements  qu'il  a  recueilHs  surla  remise^ 
prochaine  de  la  Note  autrichienne  a  la  Serbie,  que  les  journaux  anrioncent  depuis 
quelques  jours  avec  insistance. 

Vous  trouverez  ci-joint  le  texte  de  cette  note  d'information,  interessante  en 
raison  de  sa  precision. 

DUMAINE. 


r  14. 

V 

Note. 
{Extrait  d'un  rapport  consulaire  sur  la  situation  economique  et  politique  en  Autriche.) 

Vienne,  le  20  juillel  191  A. 

Il.resulte  de  renseignements  fournis  par  une  personnalite  particulierement  au 
courant  des  nouvelles  oflGcielles  que  le  Gouverneinent  frangais  aurait  tort  de  s'en 
rapporter  aux  semeurs  d'optimisme  :  on  exigera  beaucoup  de  la  Serbie,  on  lui 
imposera  la  dissolution  de  plusieurs  societes  de  propagande,  on  la  sommera  de 
reprimer  le  nationalisme,  de  surveilier  la  frontiere  eh  collaboration  avec  des  com- 
missaires  autrichiens,  de  faire  la  police  des  ecoles  au  point  de  vue  de  I'esprit  ariti- 
autrichien,  et  il  est  bien  difficile  qu'un  Gouvernement  accept^  de  se  faire  ainsi  le 
sergent  de  ville  d'un  Gouvernement  etranger.  On  comple  avec  les  echappatoires  par 
lesquelles  ia  Serbie  voudra  sans  doute  esquiver  une  repoose  claire  et  directe;  c'est 


—  30  — 

pourquoi  on  lui  fixera  peul-etre  un  delai  bref  pour  declarer  si  elle  accepte  oui  ou 
non.  La  teneur  de  la  Note  et  son  allure  imperative  garantissent  presque  sArement 
que  Belgrade  refusera.  Alors",  on  operera  militairement, 

H  y  a  ici,  et  pareillenaent  a  Berlin,  un  clan  qui  accepte  Tidee  du  conflita  dimen- 
sions generalisees,  en  d'autres  termes,  la  conflagration.  L'idee  directrice  est  pro- 
bablement  qu'il  faudrait  marcher  avant  que  la  Russie  ait  termine  ses  grands  perfec- 
tionnements  de  I'armee  et  des  voies  ferrees,  et  avant  que  la  France  ait  mis  au  point 
son  organisation  mililaire.  Mais  ici,  il  n'y  a  pas  accord  dans  les  hautes  spheres  :  du 
cote  du  comte  Berchtold  et  des  diplomates,  on  voudrait  tout  au  plus  une  operation 
localisee  contre  la  Serbie.  Mais  tout  doit  etre  envisage  comme  possible.  On  signage 
un  fait  singulier  :  generalement  I'agence  telegraphique  officielle,  dans  ses  resumes 
et  revues  de  presse  etrangere,  ne  lient  compte  que  des  journaux  oilicieux  et  des 
organes  les  plus  importants;  elle  omet  toute  citation,  toute  mention  des  autres. 
Cest  une  regie  et  une  tradition.  Or,  depuis  une  dizaine  de  jours,  I'agence  offi- 
cielle fournit  quotidiennement  a  la  presse  d'Autriche-Hongrie  une  revue  complete 
de  toute  la  presse  serbe,  en  donnant  une  large  place  aux  journaux  les  plus  ignores, 
les  plus  petits  et  insignifiants,  qui  par  cela  meme  ont  un  langage  plus  libre,  plus 
hardi,  plus  agressif  et  souvent  injurieux.  Ce  travail  de  I'Agence  officielle  a  visible- 
ment  pour  but  d'exciter  le  sentiment  public  et  de  creer  une  opinion  favorable  a  la 
guerre.  Le  fait  est  significatif. 


W  15. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Berlin,  le  21  juillet  igiA- 

n  me  revient  que  le  representant  de  la  Serbie  a  Berlin  aurait  fait  hier  une 
demarche  a  la  Wilhelmstrasse  pour  dire  que  son  Gouvernement  6tait  pret  a  accueillir 
la  requete  de  I'Autriche  motivee  par  Tattentat  de  Serajevo,  pourvu  qu'elle  ne 
demandikt  que  des  concoursjudiciaires  en  vue  de  la  repression  et  de  la  prevention 
des  attentats  politiques,  mais  il  aurait  ete  charge  de  prevenir  le  Gouvernement 
allemand  qu'il  serait.dangereux  de  chercher  par  cette  enquete  i  porter  atteinte  au 
prestige  de  la  Serbie. 

Confidentiellement,  je  puis  dire  egalement  k  Votre  Excellence  que  le  Charge 
d'affaires  de  Russie,  i  Taudience  diplomatique  d'aujourd'hui ,  a  parle  de  cette  ques- 


—  31  — 
tion  a  M.  de  Jagow.  II  lui  a  dit  qu'il  supposait  que  le  Gouvernement'  allemand  con- 
naissait  actuellemeht  tres  bien  la  Note  preparee  par  I'Autriche  et  etait  par  suite  k 
meme  de  donner  I'assurance  que  les  difficultes  austro-serbes  seraient  localisees.  Le 
Secretaire  d'Etat  a  proteste  qu'il  ignorait  absolument  le  contenu  de  cette  Note  et  s'est 
exprime  de  meme  avec  moi.  Je  n ai  pu  que  m'etonner  dune  declaration  aussi  peu 
conforme  a  ce  que  les  circonstances  conduisent  a  penser. 

II  m'a  ete  assure  d'ailleurs  que,  des  mainlenant,  les  avis  preliminaires  de  mobili- 
sation  qui  doivent  meltre  I'Allemagne  dans  une  sorte  de  «  garde  h.  vous »  pendant  les 
epoques  de  tension,  ont  ete  adresses  ici  aux  classes  qui  doivent  les  recevoir  en  pareil 
cas.  C'est  la  une  mesure  a  laquelle  les  AUemands,  etant  donne  leurs  habitudes » 
peuvent  recourir  sans  s  exposer  a  des  indiscretions  et  sans  emouvoir  la  population. 
Elle  ne  revet  pas  un  caractere  sensationnel ,  et  n'est  pas  forcement  suivie  de  mobili- 
sation effective  ainsi  que  nous  Tavons  deja  vu,  mais  elle  n'en  est  pas  moins  signifi-^ 
cative. 

Jules  Cambon. 


r  16. 

;M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i., . 
a  Londres,  Saint-Petersbourg,  Vienne,  Rome. 

Paris,  le  21  juiliet  19 id. 

J'attire  specialement  votre  attention  sur  des  informations  que  je  re^ois  de  Berlin  : 
I'Ambassadeur  de  France  signale  Textreme  faiblesse  de  la  Bourse  de  Berlin  d'hier,  et 
i'attribue  aux  inquietudes  que  la  question  serbe  commence  a  provoquer. 
I  M.  Jules  Cambon  a  des  raisons  tres  serieuses  de  croire  que  lorsque  TAutriche  fera 
k  Belgrade  la  demarche  quelle  juge  necessaire  a  la  suite  de  I'attentat  de  Serajevo» 
TAllemagne  I'appuiera  de  son  autorite ,  sans  chercher  k  jouer  un  role  de  mediation. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


—  32  — 


r  17, 


M,  Bienvenu-Martln,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i..» 

a  MM.  les  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-Petersbourg,] 
Vienne,  Rome. 

Paris,  le  2  2  juillet  19 id.  ' 

M.  Jules  Cambon  ayant  interroge  M.  de  Jagow  sur  la  leneur  de  la  Note  autri-: 
chienne  k  Belgrade,  ce  dernier  lui  a  repondu  qu'il  n'en  connaissait  nullement  le.' 
libelle ;  notre  Ambassadeur  en  a  marque  toute  sa  surprise.  II  constate  que  la  baisse  de| 
la  Bourse  de  Berlin  continue  et  que  des  nouvelles  pessimistes  circulent. 

M.  Barrere  a  egalement  entretenu  de  la  meme  question  le  Marquis  de  San  Giu- 
liano,  qui  sen  montre  inquiet  et  assure  qu'il  agit  k  Vienne  pour  qu'il  ne  soit  demande 
a  la  Serbie  que  des  choses  realisables ,  par  exemple  la  dissolution  du  Club  bosniaque 
et  non  une  enquete  judiciaire  sur  les  causes  de  I'attentat  de  Serajevo. 

Dans  les  circonstances  presentes,la  supposition  la  plus  favorable  qu'on  puisse  faire 
est  que  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne ,  se  sentant  deborde  par  sa  presse  et  par  le  parti  mili-i 
taire,  clierche^  obtenir  le  maximum  de  la  Serbie  par  une  intimidation  prealable, 
directe  et  indirecte,  et  s'appuie  sur  I'AUemagne  a  cet  elfet.     • 

J'ai  prie  I'Ambassadeur  de  France  k  Vienne  d'user  de  toute  son  influence  sur  le 
Comte  Berchtold  pour  lui  representor,  dans  une  conversation  amicale ,  combien  la^ 
moderation  du  Gouvernement  autrichien  serait  appr^ciee  en  Europe,  et  quelle 
repercussion  risquerait  d'avoir  une  pression  brutale  sur  la  Serbie. 

*  Bienvenu-Martin. 


r  18. 

M.  Du  MAINE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Vienne,  le  22  juillet  1914. 

On  ne  sait  rien  encore  des  decisions  que  le  Comte  Berchtold,  prolongeant  son 
sejour  k  Ischl,  lenle  d'oblenir  de  I'Empereur.  On  attribuait  au  Gouvernement  Tinlen- 


—  33  — 
lion  d'aglr  avec  la  plus  grande  rigueur  envers  la  Serble,  d'en  fmir  avec  elle,  «de  la 
trailer  comme  une  autre  Pologne ».  Huit  corps  d'armee  seraient  prets  a  entrer  ea 
campagne,  mais  M.  Tisza,  tres  inquiet  de  Tagitation  en  Groatie,  serait  intervenu  acti- 
vement  dans  un  sens  moderateur. 

En  tous  cas,  on  croit  que  la  d-marche  a  Belgrade  aura  lieu  cette  semaine.  Les  de- 
mandes  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  relative ment  a  la  repression  de  Tattentat 
ct  k  certaines  garanties  de  surveillance  et  de  police  paraissent  acceptables  pour  la 
di^^nile  des  Serbes;  M.  Jovanovich  croit  qu  elles  seront  accueillies.  M.  Pacbitcb  desire 
un  arrangement  pacifique,  mais  se  declare  pret  k  toute  resistance.  11  a  confiance 
dans  la  force  de  Tarmee  serbe ;  il  comple,  en  outre,  sur  Tunion  de  tous  les  Slaves  de 
la  Monarcbie  pour  paralyser  Teffort  dirige  contre  son  pays. 

A  moins  d'un  aveuglement  absolu ,  on  devrait  reconnaitre  ici  qu'un  coup  de  force 
a  les  plus  grandes  chances  d'etre  funeste,  aussi  bien  aux  troupes  austro-bongroises 
qua  la  cohesion  dejk  si  compromise  des  national! les  gouvernees  par  I'Empereur. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'AlIemagne ,  M.  de  Tcbirsky,  se  monlre  partisan  des  resolutions 
violentes,  tout  en  laissant  volontiers  entendre  que  la  Chancellerie  imp^riale  ne  serait 
pas  entierement  d'accord  avec  lui  sur  ce  point.  L'Ambassadeur  de  Russie,  parti  hier 
pour  la  campagne,  en  raison  des  declarations  rassurantes  qui  lui  ont  ete  faites  au 
Minislere  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  m'a  confie  que  son  Gouvernement  n  aura  pas  d  ob- 
jection contre  des  demarches  visant  la  punition  des  coupables  et  la  dissolution  des 
associations  notoirement  r^volutionnaires,  mais  ne  pouvait  admettre  des  exigences 
bumiliantes  pour  le  sentiment  national  serbe. 

DUIIAINE. 


N**19. 

M.  Paul  Cambon  ,  Ambassadeur  de  France  k  Londres , 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  i^trang^res  p.  i. 

Londres ,  ie  2  2  j  uillet  1914* 

Voire  Excellence  a  bien  voulu  me  faire  part  des  impressions  recueillies  jpar  notre 
Ambassadeur  k  Berlin,  relativement  aux  consequences  de  la  d-marche  que  le  Gou- 
vernement austro-hongrois  se  propose  de  faire  k  Belgrade. 

Cos  impressions  lii'ont  ^t^  confirmees  par  une  conversation  que  j*ai  eue  hier  avec 
le  Principal  Secretaire  d'Etat  pour  les  Affaires  etrangeres.  Sir  E.  Grey  ma  dit  avoir 
re^ula  visite  de  I'Ambassadeur  d'AlIemagne,  qui  lui  a  d6clar6  qu'i  Berlin  on  s'attendait 
k  une  demarche  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  aupres  du  Gouvernement  serbe. 
Le  Prince  Lichnowski  a  assure  que  le  Gouvernenient  allemand  s'employait  k  retenir 
ct  k  moderer  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne,  mais  que  jusqu'i  present  il  n'y  r6ussissait  pas  et 
qu'il  n'etait  pas  sans  inquietude  sur  les  suites  d'une  telle  demarche.  Sir  E.  Grey  a  r6- 

DoctiMBMS  DiPLOMATiQUES.  —  Guerre  europdcnne.  5 


—  34  — 

pondu  au  Prince  Lichnowski  qu*il  voulait  croire  qu'avant  d'intervenir  k  Belgrade »  ie 
Gouvernement  austrohongrois  se  serait  bien  renseigne  surles  circonstances  du  corn- 
plot  dont  I'archiduc  heritier  et  la  duchesse  de  Hohenberg  ont  6te  victimes,  se  serait 
assure  que  le  Gouvemement  serbe  en  avail  eu  connaissance  et  n'avait  pas  fait  tout  ce 
qui  dependait  de  lui  pour  en  prevenir  les  effets.  Car  s'il  ne  pouvait  pas  etre  prouve 
que  la  responsabilite  du  Gouvemement  serbe  fut  impliquee  dans  une  certaine  mesure , 
Tintervention  du  Gouvemement  austro-hongrois  ne  se  justifierait  pas  et  souleverait 
centre  lui  I'opinion  europeenne. 

La  communication  du  Prince  Lichnowski  avait  laisse  Sir  E.  Grey  sous  une  impres- 
sion d'inqui^tude  qu'il  ne  m'a  pas  dissimulee.  La  meme  impression  m'a  ete  donnee 
par  I'Ambassadeur  d'ltalie  qui  redoute,  lui  aussi,  I'^ventualite  dune  nouvelle  ten- 
sion des  rapports  austro-serbes. 

Ce  matin ,  j'ai  recu  la  visile  du  Ministre  de  Serbie ,  qui  partage  egalement  les  ap- 
prehensions de  Sir  E.  Grey.  II  craint  que  TAutriche  ne  mette  le  Gouvemement 
serbe  en  presence  d'une  demande  que  la  dignite  de  celui-ci  et  surtout  la  suscepti- 
bihte  de  Topinion  publique  ne  lui  permettent  pas  d'accueillir  sans  protestation. 
Comme  je  lui  objectais  le  calme  qui  parait  regner  a  Vienne  et  dont  temoignent  tous 
les  Ambassadeurs  accredites  dans  cette  capitale ,  il  m'a  repondu  que  ce  calme  officiel 
n'etait  qu  apparent  et  recouvrait  les  dispositions  les  plus  foncierement  hostiles  contre 
la  Serbie.  Or,  a-t-il  ajoute,  si  ces  dispositions  viennent  a  se  manifester  par  une  de- 
marche depourvue  de  la  mesure  desirable,  il  y  aura  lieu  de  tenir  compte  de  I'opinion 
publique  serbe,  surexcitee  par  les  mauvais  procedes  dont  TAutriche  a  abreuve  ce 
pays  et  r endue  moins  patiente  par  le  souvenir  encore  tout  frais  de  deux  guerres  vic- 
torieuses.  Malgre  les  sacrifices  dont  la  Serbie  a  paye  ses  re'centes  victoires,  elle  pent  ; 
mettre  encore  sur  pied  4oo,ooo  hommes  et  Topinion  publique,  qui  le  sait,  nest  pas 
disposee  k  tolerer  une  humiliation. 

Sir  E.  Grey  dans  un  entretien  avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  I'a  pri6 
de  recommander  a  son  Gouvemement  de  ne  pas  s'ecarter  de  la  prudence  et  de  la 
moderation  necessaires  pour  eviter  de  nouvelles  complications,  de  ne  demander  k 
la  Serbie  que  des  mesures  auxqueiles  celie-ci  puisse  raisonnablement  se  preter  et 
de  ne  pas  se  laisser  entrainer  au  del^» 

Paul  Cambon. 


—  35  - 

r  20. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  AiFaires  etrangeres  p.  i., 
a  Londres,  Berlin,  Saint-Petersbourg  et  Rome. 

Paris,  le  23  juillet  19 1 4. 

Les  premieres  intentions  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  avaient  ete,  selon  les 
informations  recueillies  par  TAmbassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne ,  d'agir  avec  la  plus 
grande  rigueur  contre  la  Serbie,  en  tenant  huit  corps  d'armee  prets  k  entrer  en 
campagne. 

Ses  dispositions  actuelles  seraient  plus  conciliantes  :  en  reponse  a  une  question 
que  lui  posait  M.  Dumaine,  a  qui  j'avais  prescrit  d'appeler  I'attention  du  Gouvernement 
autrichien  sur  les  inquietudes  eveillees  en  Europe,  le  baron  Macchio  a  affirme  a 
notre  Ambassadeur  que  le  ton  et  les  demandes  qui  seront  formulees  dans  la  note 
autrichenne  permettent  de  compter  sur  un  denouement  pacifique.  Je  ne  sais  quelle 
foi  il  faut  accorder  a  ces  assurances,  en  raison  des  habitudes  de  la  chanceilerie  im- 
periale. 

Dans  tons  les  cas,  la  note  autrichienne  sera  remise  dans  un  tres  bref  delai.  Le 
Ministre  de  Serbie  estime  que  M.  Pacbitch  acceptera,  par  desir  dun  arrangement, 
les  demandes  relatives  a  la  repression  de  I'attentat  et  a  des  garanties  de  surveillance 
et  de  police,  mais  qu'il  resistera  a  ce  qui  attenterait  a  la  souverainete  et  k  la  dignite 
de  son  pays. 

Dans  les  cercles  diplomatiques  de  Vienne,  I'Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  preconise 
des  resolutions  violentes,  tout  en  convenant  que  peiit-etre  la  Chanceilerie  impe- 
riale  nest  pas  entierement  d'accord  avec  lui  sur  ce  point;  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie, 
se  fiant  aux  assurances  qui  lui  ont  ete  donnees,  s'est  absente  de  Vienne  et  a  confie, 
avant  son  depart,  a  M.  Dumaine,  que  son  Gouvernement  n'elevera  pas  d'objections 
contre  la  punition  des  coupables  et  la  dissolution  des  associations  revolutionnaires, 
mais  qu'il  ne  pourrait  tolerer  des  exigences  humiliante§  pour  le  sentiment  national  de 
la  Serbie. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


r  21. 

M.  Allize,  Ministre  de  France  a  Munich, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  AiFaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Munich,  le  i!3  juiilet  191 4» 

La  presse  bavaroise  parait  croire  qu  une  solution  pacifique  de  i'incident  au'stro- 
serbe  est  non  seulement  possible,  mais  ncieme  vraisemblable;  dans  les  spheres  pffi- 

5. 


—  56  — 

cielles,  auconlraiVc,  on  alTecle,  depuis  quelque  temps,  avec  plus  ou  moins  de  since- 
rite,  un  reel  pessimisme. 

Le  President  da  Conseil  nolamment  m'a  dit  aujourd'hui  que  la  note  aulrlchlenne, 
donl  il  avait  connaissance ,  etait,  i  son  avis,  redigoe  dans  des  lermes  acceplables  pour 
la  Serbie,  mais  que  la  situation  acluelle  ne  lui  en  paraissait  pas  moins  tres  serieuse. 

Allize. 


—  37  — 


CHAPITRE  III 

LA  NOTE  AUTRICHIENNE  ET  LA  R^PONSF  SERBE 

DU  VENDRfDI  24  JUILLET  AU  SAMEDl  25  JUILI  ET) 


—  39  — 


N**  22. 


M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil, 

a  M.JBienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Je  voiis  serais  oblige  de  transmettre  d'urgence  a  M.  Dumaine  les  informations  et 
instructions  suivantes  : 

Reval,  le  2 A  juillet  1914,  a  i  heure  du  matio. 

Au  cours  de  mes  entretiens  avec  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  russe ,  nous 
avons  ete  amenes  a  envisager  les  dangers  qui  pourraient  resulter  d'une  demarche 
eveiituelle  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  a  Tegard  de  la  Serbia  vrelativement  a  Tattentat  dont 
a  ete  victime  Tarchiduc  heritier.  Nous  sommes  tombes  d  accord  pour  penser  qu'il 
convenait  de  ne  rien  negliger  pour  prevenir  vme  demande  d'explications  ou  quelque 
mise  en  demeure  qui  equivaudraient  k  une  intervention  dans  les  affaires  interieures- 
de  la  Serbie ,  et  que  celle-ci  pourrait  considerer  conune  tme  atteinte  k  sa  souverai- 
nete  et  k  son  independance. 

En  consequence ,  nous  avons  estime  qu'il  y  avait  lieu ,  dans  une  conversation  amicale 
avecle  ComteBerchtoId,  delui  donner  des  conseils  de  moderation,  propres  a  lui  faire 
comprendre  combien  seralt  mal  inspiree  une  intervention  aBelgrade,ou Ton  pourrait 
voir  une  menace  de  la  part  du  Cabinet  de  Vienne. 

L'Ambassadeur  d' Angle terre,  mis  au  courant  par  M.  Sazonow,  a  exprime  I'idee 
que  son  Gouvemement  se  joindrait  sans  doute  k  une  demarche  tendant  a  ecarter  un 
danger  qui  pent  menacer  la  paix  genersde,  et  a  telegraphic  dans  ce  sens  a  son  Gou- 
vemement. 

M.  Sazonow  a  adress6  des  instructions  k  cet  effet  k  M.  Schebeko.  Sans  qu'il  s'agisse 
ici  d'une  action  collective  ou  concertee  des  representants  de  la  Triple  Entente  k 
Vienne,  je  vous  prie  de  vous  entret^nir  de  la  question  avec  les  Ambassadeurs  de 
Russie  et  d'Ang^eterre ,  et  de  vous  entendre  avec  eux  sur  le  meilleur  moyen,  pour 
chacun  de  vous,  de  faire  entendre  sans  retard  au  Comle  Berchtold  les  conseils  de 
moderation  que  nous  parait  reclamer  la  situation  pr^sente. 

J'ajoute  qu'il  y  aurait  lieu  de  prier  M.  Paul  Cambon  de  faire  valoir  aupres  de  Sir 
E.  Grey  Tutilit^  de  cette  demarche,  et  d'appuyer  la  suggestion  que  TAmbassadeur 
d'Angleterre  en  Russie  a  du  presenter  k  cet  effet  au  Foreign  Office.  Le  Comte  Benc- 
kendorff  est  charg6  de  faire  ime  reconmiandation  analogue. 

Rend  Viviani. 


— .  40 


r  23. 


M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  MInistre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  a  bord  de  la  France. 

Paris,  le  24  juillet  191^. 

J'ai  transtnis  d'urgence  k'Vienne  vos  instructions,  mals  il  resulte  des  informations 
de  presse  de  ce  matin  que  la  Note  aulrichienne  a  6le  remise  hier  soir  a  six  heures  a 
Belgrade. 

Cette  note,  dont  I'Ambassadeur  d'Aulriche-Hongrie  ne  nous  a  pas  encore  remis 
le  texte  officiel,  parait  tres  accentuee ;  elie  tendrait  non  seulement  a  obtenir  la  pour- 
suite  des  Serbes  meles' directement  k  Tatlenlat  de  Serajevo,  mais  demanderait  ia 
repression  immediate  dans  ia  presse  et  dans  i  armee  serbe  de  toute  propagande  anti- 
autrichienne.  Elie  donnerait  jusqu'a  samedi  soir,  a  six  heures,  k  la  Serbie  pour 
s'executer. 

En  transmettant  vos  instructions  k  M.  Dumaine,  je  i'ai  prie  de  se  concerler  avec 
ses  collegues  anglais  et  russe. 

Bienvenc-Martin. 


W  24. 
Texte  de  la  Note  autrichienne. 

(Note  communiquce  par  le  Comte  Szecsen,  Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  Hongrie ,  a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin , 
Miaistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i.,  le  veadredi  24  juillet  1914,  a  jo  h.  1/2  du  matin.) 

Vienne,  le  2  4  juillet  1914. 

Le  Gouvemement  imperial  et  royal  s'est  vu  oblig6  d'adresser  jeudi  28  juillet  cou- 
rant,  par  Tentremise  du  Ministre  imperial  et  royal  a  Belgrade,  la  note  suivante  au 
Gouvemement  royal  de  Serbie  : 

«  Le  3 1  mars  1 909  le  Ministre  de  Serbie  k  Vienne  a  fait,  d'ordre  de  son  Gouver^ 
nement  au  Gouvemement  imperial  et  royal  la  declaration  suivante  : 

«  La  Serbie  reconnait  qu'elle  n'a  pas  et6  atleinte  dans  ses  droits  par  le  fait  accompli 
cr^e  en  Bosnie-Herzegovine  et  qu'elle  se  conformera  par  consequent  a  telle  decision 
que  les  Puissances  prendront  par  rapport  k  I'arlicle  XXV  du  Traite  de  Berlin.  Se  ren- 
dant  aux  conseils  des  grandes  puissances,  la  Serbie  s'engage  des  a  present  a  a])andonner 
I'attilude  de  protestation  et  d'opposition  qu'elle  a  observee  k  I'egard  de  I'annexion 
depuis  I'automne  dernier  et  elie  s'engage,  en  outre,  k  changer  le  cours  de  sa  politique 
actuelle  envers  TAutriche-Hongrie  pour  vivre  desormais  avec  cette  derniere  sur  le  pied 
d'un  bon  voisinage. » 


—  41  — 

Or,  riiisloire  des  dernieres  annees,  et  notamment  les  evenements  douloureux  du 
28  juin  ont  demonlre  Texistcnce  en  Serbia  d  un  mouvemcnt  subversif  dont  le  but  est 
de  detacher  de  la  Monarchie  auslro-hongroise  certaines  parties  de  ses  territoires.  Ce 
mouvement,  qui  a  pris  jour  sous  les  yeux  du  Gouvernement  serbe  est  arrive  k  se 
manifeslcr  au  delk  du  lerriloire  du  royaume  par  des  actes  de  terrorisme ,  par  une  seriei 
d'atlenlats  et  par  des  meurlres. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe ,  loin  de  satisfaire  aux  engagements  formels  contenus 
dans  la  declaration  du  3i  mars  1909,  n'a  rien  fait  pour  supprimer  ce  mouvement. 
II  a  tolero  I'activile  criminelle  des  dififerentes  socieles  et  affiliations  dirigees  contre  la 
Monarchie,  le  langage  eOrene  de  la  presse,  la  glorification  des  auteurs  d'attentats,  la 
participation  d'olficiers  et  de  fonctionnaires  dans  des  agissements  subversifs,  une 
propaganda  malsaine  dans  I'instruction  publique,  tolere  enfm  toutes  les  manifestations 
qui  pouvaient  induire  la  population  serbe  a  la  haine  dc  la  Monarchie  et  au  mepris 
de  ses  institutions. 

Celtc  tolerance  coupable  du  Gouvernement  royal  de  Serbie  n'avait  pas  ccsse  au 
moment  ou  les  evenements  du  28  juin  dernier  en  ont  demontre  au  monde  entier  les 
consequences  funestcs. 

II  resulte  des  depositions  et  aveux  des  auteurs  criminels  de  fattentat  du  28  juin 
que  le  meurtre  de  Serajevo  a  ete  trame  k  Belgrade  ,^ue  les  armes  et  explosifs  dont 
les  meurtriers  se  trouvaient  etre  munis,  leur  ont  ete  donnes  par  des  ofQciers  et  fonc- 
tionnaires serbes  faisant  partie  de  la  « Narodna  Odbrana »  et  enfm  que  le  passage  en 
Bosnie  des  criminels  et  de  leurs  armes  a  ete  organisevct  eflectue  par  des  chefs  du 
service-frontiere  serbe.  $■- 

Les  resultats  mentionnes  de  I'instruction  ne  permettent  pas  au  Gouvernement  im- 
perial et  royal  de  poursuivre  plus  longtemps  I'attitude  de  longanimite  expectative 
qu'il  avait  observee  pendant  des  annees  vis-a-vis  des  agissements  concentres  k  Belgrade 
et  propages  dc  la  sur  les  territoires  de  la  Monarchie :  ces  resultats  lui  imposent  au 
contraire  le  devoir  de  mettre  fm  a  des  menees  qui  forment  une  menace  perpetuelle 
pour  la  tranquillite  de  la  Monarchie. 

C'est  pour  atteindre  ce  but  que  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  se  voit  oblige 
de  demander  au  Gouvernement  serbe  I'enonciation  officielle  qu'il  condamne  la  pro- 
pagande  dirigee  contre  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise ,  c'est-i-dire  I'ensemble  des 
tendances  qui  aspirent  en  dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchie  des  territoires  qui 
en  font  partie,  et  qu'il  s'engage  a  supprimer,  par  tous  les  moyens,  cette  propaganda 
criminelle  et  tcrroriste. 

Afin  de  donncr  un  caractere  solennel  a  cet  engagement  le  Gouvernement  royal  de 
Serbie  fera  publier  a  la  premiere  page  du  Journal  ojjicicl  en  date  du  13/26  juillet 
I'enonciation  suivanle  : 

n  Le  Gouvernement  royal  de  Serbie  condamne  la  propagande  dirigee  contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie,  c'est-^-dire  fensemble  des  tolerances  qui  aspirent  en  dernier  lieu 
a  detacher  de  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise  des  territoires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  il 
deplore  sincerement  les  consequences  funestes  de  ces  agissements  criminels. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  rcgrelte  que  des  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  serbes  aient 
jparticipe  a  la  propagande  sus  mentionnee  et  compromis  par  la  les  relations  dc  bon 

DocDMENTS  DiPLOMATiQUES.  —  Guerre  europecnne.  6 


-  42  — 
voisi&aige  auquel  ie  Gouvernement  royal  s'etait  solennellemeiit  engage  par  ses  decla- 
rations du  3 1  mars  1909. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  qui  d^sapprouve  et  repudie  toute  idee  ou  tentative  d'im- 
mixtion  dans  les  destinees  des  habitants  de  quelque  partie  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  que 
ce  soit,  considere  de  son  devoir  d'avertir  formellement  les  olliciers,  les  fonctionnaires 
et  toute  la  population  du  royaume  que  dorenavant  il  procedera  avec  la  derniere- 
rigueur  contre  les  personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables  de  pareils  agissemenls, 
agissements  qu'il  mettra  tous  ses  efforts  k  prevenir  et  a  reprimer. » 

Cette  enonciation  sera  portee  simultanement  a  la  connaissance  de  Tarmee  royale 
par  un  ordre  du  jour  de  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  et  sera  publiee  dans  le  Biillelin  officiel  de. 
I'armee, 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe  s'engage  en  outre  : 

1"  A  supprimer  toute  publication  qui  excite  k  la  haine  et  au  mepris  de  la  Mo- 
narchie,  et  dont  la,  tendance  generale  est  dirigee  contre  son  integ'rite  territoriale. 

2°  A  dissoudre  immediatement  la  societe  dite  <>  Narodna  Odbrana «»  a  confisquer, 
tous  ses  moyens  de  propagande ,  et  a  proceder  de  la  meme  maniere  contre  les  autres 
societes  et  aflQliations  en  Serbie  qui  s'adonnent  k  la  propagande  contre  la  Monarchie 
austro-hongroise ,  le  Gouverneqpjent  royal  prendra  les  mesures  necessaires  pour  que 
les  societes  dissoutes  ne  puisseo^  pas  continuer  leur  activite  sous  un  autre  nom  et  sous 
ime  autre  forme. 

3°  A  eliminer  sans  delai  de  rinstructiou  publique  en  Serbie,  tant  en  ce  qui  con- 
cerne  le  corps  enseignant  que  les  moyens  d'instruction ,  tout  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourrait 
servir  k  fomenter  la  propagande  contre  rAutriche-Hongrie. 

A**  A  eloigner  du  service  militaire  et  de  I'administration  en  general  tous  les  offi- 
ciers  et  fonctionnaires  coupables  de  la  propagande  contre  la  Monarchie  austro-hon- 
groise et  dont  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  se  reserve  de  communiquer  les 
tooms  et  les  fails  au  Gouverriement  royal. 

5**  A  accepter  la  collaboration  en  Serbie  des  organes  du  Gouvernement  imperial 
et  royal  dsuis  la  suppression  du  mouvement  subversif  dirige  contre  Tintegrite  territo- 
riale de  la  Monarchie. 

6°  A  ouvrir  une  enquete  judiciaire  contre  les  partisans  du  complot  du  28  juin  se 
trouvant  sur  territoire  serbe;  des  organes  delegues  par  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et 
royal  prendront  part  aUx  recherches  y  relatives. 

7°  A  proceder  d'urgence  i  I'arrestation  du  commandant  Voij a  Tankosic  et  du 
nomme  Milan  Ciganovic,  employe  de  I'Etat  serbe,  compromis  par  les  resultats  de 
Tinstruction  de  Serajevo. 

8**  A  emp6cher,  par  des  mesures  efiicaces,  le  concours  des  autorites  serbes  dans 
Je  irafic  illicile  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  a  travers  la  frontiere; 

A  licencier  el  punir  severemcnt  les  fonctionnaires  du  service-frontiere  de  Schabatz 
et  de  Loznica  coupables  d'avoir  aide  les  auteurs  du  crime  de  Serajevo  en  leur  facilir 
ifiiA  ie  passage  <ie  la  frontiere. 

9*  Acldtiner  au.  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal. des  explications  sur  ies  propos 


^  43  — 
injustlfiables  de  hauts  fonctionnaires  serbes  tant  en  Serbie  qu'a  retranger  qui^  malgre 
leur  position  ofBcielle,  n'ont  pas  hesite  apres  Tattentat  du  28  juin  de  s'exprimer  dans 
des  interwiews  d'une  maniere  hostile  envers  ia  Monarchre  austro-hongroise.  Enfmi 

to''  D'averlir,  sans  retard,  le  Gouvemement  imperial  el  royal  de  I'exfecution  des 
mesures  comprises  dans  les  points  precedents. 

Le  Gouvemement  imperial  et  royal  attend  la  reponse  du  Gouvemement  royal  au 
plus  tard  jusqu'au  sartiedi  26  de  ce  mois  k  cinq  heures  du  sdir  (i). 

Un  memoire  concernant  les  resultats  de  I'instruction  de  Serajevo  k  Tegard  des 
fonctionnaires  mentionnes  aux  points  7  et  8  est  annex 6  k  cette  note. 

Jai  riionneur  d'inviter  votre  Excellence  de  vouloirbien  porter  le  contenu  de  cette 
Note  a  la  connaissance  du  Gouvemement  aupres  duquel  vous  etes  accredite,  en 
accompagnant  cette  communication  du  commentaire  que  voici  : 

Le  3i  mars  1909  le  Gouvemement  royal  serbe  a  adresse  k  TAutriche-Hongrie  la 
declaration  dont  le  texte  est  reproduit  ci-dessus. 

Le  lendemain  meme  de  cette  declaration ,  la  Serbie  s'est  engagee  dans  uhe  politique 
tendant  a  inspirer  des  idees  subversives  aux  ressortissants  serbes  de  la  Monarchie 
austro-hongroise  et  a  preparer  ainsi  la  separation  des  territoires  austro-hongrois, 
limitrophes  a  la  Serbie. 

La  Serbie  devint  le  foyer  d'une  agitation  criminelle  : 

Des  socictes  et  affiliations  ne  tarderent  pas  a  se  former  qui,  soit  ouvertement,  soil 
clandestinement,  etaient  destinees  a  creer  des  desordres  sur  le  territoife  austro-hon- 
grois. Ces  societes  et  affiliations  comptent  parmi  leurs  membres  des  generaux  et  des 
diplomates,  des  fonctionnaires  d'Etat  et  des  juges,  href,  les  sommites  du  monde 
officiel  et  inofficiel  du  royaume. 

Le  journalisme  serbe  est  presque  entierement  au  service  de  cette  propagande, 
dirigee  contre  rAutriche-Hongrie,  et  pas  un  jour  ne  passe  sans  que  les  organes  de  la 
presse  serbe  n'excitent  leurs  lecteurs  a  la  haine  et  au  mepris  de  la  Monarchie  voisine 
ou  a  des  attentats  diriges  plus  ou  moins  ouvertement  cohlre  sa  surete  et  son  integrite. 

Un  grand  nombre  d'agents  est  appele  a  soutenir  par  tpiis  les  moyens  I'agitalion 
contre  TAutriche-Hongrie  et  a  corrompre  dans  les  provinces  limitrophes  la  jeunesse 
de  ces  pays. 

L'esprit  conspirateur  des  politiciens  serbes,  esprit  dont  les  annales  du  royaume 
portent  les  sanglantes  cmpreintes,  a  subi  une  recrudescence  depuis  la  derniere  crise 
balkanique;  des  individus,  ayant  fait  parlie  des  bandes  jusque-li  occupees  en  Mace- 
doine,  sent  venus  se  mettre  a  la  disposition  de  la  propagande  terroriste  contre  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie. 


(1)  L'Am])assadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  9  adresse  au  Ministrc  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  par  lettre  parti- 
cuUere,  la  rectification  suivante,  dans  la  journ^c  du  24  juillet :  «Dans  Ja  copie  de  la  depeclie  que  j'al  eu 
I'honneur  de  remettre  ce  matin  a  Votre  Excellence,  il  etail  dit  que  mon  Gouvemement  attendait  la  reponse 
<]u  Cabinet  de  Belgrade  au  plus  tard  jusqu'au  samedi  2^  de  ce  mois  a  ci>j<7  heures  du  soir.  Notre  Ministre 
a  Belgrade  n'ayant  remis  sa'note  hier  qu'a  six  heures  du  soir,  le  delai  pour  la  reponse  se  Irouve  proroge 
de  ce  fait  jusqu'a  demain  samedi  six  heures  du  soir. 

'   « J'ai  cru  de  mon  devoir  d'informer  Voire  Excellence  de  cette  legere- modification  dans  Vex^ii^ation  da 
delai  fixe  pour  la  reponse  du  Gouvemement  serl)e. » 

6. 


1 


—  /i4  — 

En  presence  de  ces  agissements  auxquels  I'Autriche-Hongrie  est  exposee  depuis 
des  annees,  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Serbie  n'a  pas  cru  devoir  prendre  la  moindre 
mesure.  C'est  ainsi  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  a  manque  au  devoir  que  lui  imposait 
la  declaration  solennelle  du  3i  mars  1909,  et  c'est  ainsi  qu'il  sest  mis  en  contra- 
diction avec  la  volonte  de  TEurope  et  avec  I'engagement  qu'il  avait  pris  vis-a-vis  de 
TAutriche-Hongrie. 

La  longanimite  du  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  k  I'egard  de  I'atlitude  provo- 
catrice  de  la  Serbie  etait  inspiree  du  desinteressement  territorial  de  la  Monarchie 
austro-hongroise  et  de  I'espoir  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  finirait  tout  de  meme  par 
apprecier  a  sa  juste  valeur  I'amitie  de  TAutriche-Hongrie.  En  observant  unc  altitude 
bienveillante  pour  les  interets  politiques  de  la  Serbie,  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et 
royal  espdrait  que  le  royaume  se  deciderait  finalement  a  suivre  de  son  cole  une  ligne 
de  conduite  analogue.  L'Aulriche-Hongrie  s  attendait  surloul  a  une  pareille  evolution 
dans  les  idees  politiques  en  Serbie,  lorsque,  apres  les  evenements  de  I'annee  1912, 
le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  rendit  possible,  par  une  attitude  desinteressee  et 
sans  rancune,  I'agrandissement  si  considerable  de  la  Serbie. 

Cetle  bienveillance  manlfestee  par  I'Autriche-Hongrie  k  I'egard  de  I'Etal  voisin  n'a 
cependant  aucunement  modifie  les  procedes  du  royaume,  qui  a  continue  k  lolerer 
sur  son  territoire  une  propagande  dont  les  funestes  consequences  se  sont  manifestees 
au  monde  entier  le  28  juin  dernier,  jour  ou  Theritier  presomptif  de  la  Monarchie  et 
son  illustre  epouse  devinrent  les  victimes  d'un  complot  trame  a  Belgrade. 

En  presence  de  cet  elat  de  choses,  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  a  du  se 
decider  a  entreprendre  de  nouvelles  et  pressantes  demarches  a  Belgrade  afm  d'amener 
le  Gouvernement  serbe  k  arreter  le  mouvement  incendiaire  mena^ant  la  surele  et 
4'integrite  de  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise. 

Le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  est  persuade  qu'en  enlreprenant  cette  demarche, 
il  se  trouve  en  plein  accord  avec  les  sentiments  de  toutes  les  nations  civilisees  qui  ne 
sauraient  admettre  que  le  regicide  devint  une  arme  dont  on  puisse  se  servir  impune- 
ment  dans  la  lutte  politique,  et  que  la  paix  europeenne  fut  conlinuellement  troublee 
par  les  agissements  parlant  de  Belgrade. 

C'est  a  I'appui  de  ce  qui  precede  que  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  tient  a  la 
disposilion  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  fran^aise  un  dossier  elucldant  les 
menees  serbes  et  les  rapports  existant  entre  ces  menses  et  le  meurtre  du  28  juin. 

Une  communication  identique  est  adressee  aux  represenlants  imperiaux  et  royaux 
aupres  des  autres  Puissances  signataires. 

Vous  etes  autorise  de  laisser  une  copie  de  cettB  depeche  entre  les  mains  de  M.  le 
Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 


Annexe. 


L'inslruction  criminelle  ouverte  par  le  tribunal  de  Serajevo  contre  Gravillo  Princip  et 
•consorts  du  chef  d'assassinat  et  de  complicite  y  relative,  crime  commis  par  eux  le  28  juin 
dernier,  a  jusqu'ici  abouli  aux  conslatations  suivanles  : 


—  45  — 
i"  Le  complot  ayant   pour  but  d'assassiner,  lors  de  soa  sejour  a  Serajevo,  I'archiduc 
Francois-Ferdinand   fut  form6  a  Belgrade  par  Gravillo  Princip,  Nedeljko  Cabrinovic,  le 
nomme  Milan  Ciganovic  et  Trifko  Grabez  avec  le  concours  du  commandant  Voija  Tanlcosic. 

2"  Les  six  bombes  et  les  quatre  pistolets  Browning  avec  munitions,  moyennant  lesquels 
les  malfaiteurs  ont  commis  I'attentat,  furent  livres  6  Belgrade  a  Princip,  Cabrinovic  et 
Grabez  par  le  nomme  Milan  Ciganovic  et  le  commandant  Voija  Tankosic. 

3°  Les  bombes  sont  des  grenades  4  main  provenant  du  depot  d'armes  de  I'armee  serbe 
a  Kragnjevaks. 

k"  Pour  assurer  la  rdussite  de  I'attental,  Ciganovic  enseigna  a  Princip,  Cabrinovic  et 
Grabez  la  mani^re  de  se  servir  des  grenades  et  donna,  dans  une  foret  pres  du  champ  de  tir 
a  Topschider,  des  lecons  de  tir  avec  pistolets  Browning  a  Princip  et  a  Grabez. 

5°  Pour  rcndre  possible  i  Princip,  Cabrinovic  et  Grabez  de  passer  la  frontiere  de  Bosnie- 
Herz^govine  et  d'y  introdiiire  clandestinement  leur  contrebande  d'armes,  im  systeme  de 
transport  secret  fut  organise  par  Ciganovic. 

D'apres  cette  organisation ,  Tintroduction  en  Bosnie-Herzegovine  des  malfaiteurs  et  de 
leurs  armes  fut  operee  par  les  capitaines-frontieres  de  Sabac  (Popovic)  et  de  Loznica, 
ainsi  que  par  le  douanier  Rudivoj  Grbic  de  Loznica ,  avec  le  concours  de  divers  particuliers. 


r  25  •.  • 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin  ,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i., 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  a  bord  de  la  France,  et  a 
Londres,  Berlin,  Vienne,  Saint-Petersbourg,  Rome,  Belgrade. 

Paris,  le  2/ijuillet  1914. 

J'ai  Thonneur  de  vous  informer  que  la  Note  autrichienne ,  remise  a  Belgrade  jeudi 
solr,  m'a  ete  laissee  en  copie,  ce  matin,  par  i'Ambassadeur  d'Aulriche-Hongrie. 
Le  comte  Szecsen  m'a  fait  connaitre  que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  attend 
la  reponse  du  Gouvernement  serbe  jusqu^  samedi  26,  a  cinq  heures  du  soir  (1). 

La  Note  s'appuie  sur  Tengagement  pris  par  la  Serbie,  le  3  1  mars  1  909,  de  recon- 
nailre  Tannexion  de  la  Bosnie-Herzegovine  el  reproche  au  Gouvernement  serbe 
d'avoir  tolere  une  propaganda  anti-aulrichienne,  k  laqueile  ont  pris  part  les  fonction- 
naires,  I'armee  el  la  presse,  propagande  mena^ante  pour  la  securite  etTinlegrile  de 
I'Autriche,  et  donl  le  crime  du  28  juin,  Irame  a  Belgrade,  selon  les  constatalions  de 
rinstruclion,  a  demonlre  les  dangers. 

Le  Gouvernement  autrichien  se  declare  oblige  de  metlre  fin  k  une  propagande 
qui  constitue  un  danger  permanent  pour  sa  Iranquilllte,  el  d'exiger  du  Gouvernement 
serbe  une  enoncialion  oflicielle  de  sa  volonle  de  la  condamner  et  reprimer,  par  ia 
publication,  au  Journal  ojjlcicl  du  26,  d  une  declaration  donl  les  termes  sont  indiques, 
reprouvant,   regrettant  el  mena^anl  de  sevir.  Un  ordre  du  jour  du  Roi  a  I'armee 

serbe  porterait  egalemenl  cette  declaration  i  sa  connaissance.  En  outre,  le  Gouver- 

■ 
(l)  Voir  note  page /i 3. 


—  46  — 
nement  serbe  s'engagerait  a  supprimer  les  publications,  k  dissoudre  les  Soci^les ,  ^  revo- 
quer  les  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  dont  les  noms  seraient  communiqnes  par  ie  Gou- 
Teniement  aulriclilen,  a  accepter  la  collaTjotation  de  fonctlomiaires  autricliiens  pour 
la  suppression  de  Taction  subversive  signalee,  ainsi  que  pour  Tenquete  sur  i'attentat 
de  Serajevo,  enlin  a  proceder  a  Tarrestation  immediate'  d'un  officier  et  dun  employe 
serbes  qui  y  sont  compromis. 

Au  memorandum  autrichien  est  annexee  une  Note,  resumant  les  constat ationsde 
Tinstruction  du  crime  de  Serajevo  et  affirmant  qu'il  a  ete  trame  a  Belgrade,  que  les 
bombes  ont  ete  fournies  aux  assassins  et  emanent  d'un  depot  de  Tarmee  serbe,  enfm 
qae  les  assassins  <Mat  ele  -exerces  et  aides  par  des  officiers  et  employes  serbes. 

En  rendant  visite ,  aussilot  apres  cette  -commimication  au  Directeur  politique  p.  i^ 
le  Comte  Szecsen  I'a  informe,  sans  aucun  commentaire,  de  la  remise  de  la 
Note.  M.  Berlhelot  n'a  pu  que  signaler,  sur  mes  indications,  ii  TAmbassadeur 
d'Autriche-Hongrie,  I'impression  d'inquietude  eveillee  par  les  informations  paru.^ 
dans  la  roatinee  sur  ie  contenu  de  la  JMole  autricbienne,  et  le  sentiment  penible 
qae  ;ie  manquerait  pas  dcTeiller,  dans  Topinion  fran^aise,  le  moment  choisi  pour 
une  demarcbe  si  imperative  et  de  si  court  delai;  c'est-a-dire  TheTire  oii  le  Presi- 
dent de  la  Republiqne  et  le  President  du  Conseil,  Ministrc  des  Affaires  etrangeres 
de  la  Republique  avaient  qnittc  Petersbour^  et  ^e  trouvaierit,  en  mer,  par  consequent 
hors  d'elat  d'exercer,  d'accord  avec  les  Puissances  qui  n'etaient  pas  directement  inte- 
ressees.  Taction  apaisante  si  desirable  entreia  Serbie  et  TAutriche,  dans  Tinteret  de 
la  paix  generale. 

Le  Ministre  de  Serbie  n'a  encore  aucune  donnee  sur  les  intentions  de  son  Grou- 
Vernement. 

UAmbassadeur  d'Afleinagne  a  demande  k  elre  regu  par  moi,  cet  apres-midi,  k 
cinq  heures. 

Bienvenu-Martin, 


r  26 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Minastre  des  Affaires  ^tran^^res  p.  i. 

a  M.  Thiebaut,  IVfinistre  de  France  a  'Stockliolin  (pour  le  President 
du  Conseil)  et  ^  Belgrade,  Vienne,  Londres,  Berlin,  Rome,  Pe- 


lersbourg. 


Paris,  le  2  4  juillet  igiil. 


M.  Vesnitchn'avait,  ce  matin  encore,  xegud^  son  Gouvemement  arucun  t«legramme^ 
de  nature  a  le  renseigner  ^W  ^s  intentions  et  ne  oonnaissait  pas  ie  contenu  d©  la 
Note  autrichienne. 

A  la  demande  de  conseil  quil  formulait  k  la  Direction  politique,  M.  Berlhelot 
lui  a-  dit,  k  litre  tout  personnel,  que  la  Serbie  devait  chercher  a  gagner  du  "temps,  le 


-^  47  — 
terme  de  /i8  heures  constituant  peut-etre  plutot  une  « raise  en  demeure »  qu'im 
ultimatum  proprement  dil;  qu'il  pouvait  y  avoir  lieu,  par  exemple,  d  offrir  imme- 
diatemcnt  satisfaction  sur  tous  les  points  qui  n'etaient  pas  inconciliables  avec  la 
dignite  et  la  souverainete  de  la  Serbie ;  il  lui  a  ete  conseille  de  f aire  remarquer  qiics 
les  constat ationsde  I'instruction  autriehieune  de  Serajevo  etaienl  unilalerales,  et  que 
la  Serbia,  tout  en  etant  prete  a  sevir  contre  tous  les  complices  dun  crime  qu'elle 
reprouvait  hautement,  demandait  k  etre  mise  au  couranl  des  preuves,  pour  pouvoir 
les  verifier  rapidement;  de  chercher  surtout  d  echapper  a  la  prise  direcle  de 
I'Autriche,  en  se  declarant  prete  a  §e  soumettre  a  Tarbitrage  de  TEurope. 

J'ai  demande  a  Londres  et  a  Petersbburg  les  vues  et  lea  intentions  des  Gouverne- 
ments  anglais  et  russe.  II  resulte,  d'autre  part,  de  nos  informations,  que  I'ltalie  n^a 
re^u  qu'aujourd'hui  communication  de  la  Note  autrichienne.  au  sujet  de  laquello 
elle  n'avait  ete  ni  pressentie  ni  meme  avertie. 

BrENVENU-MARTIN. 


r  27 

M.  Bienvenu-JVIartin  ,  Ministre  des  Afl'aires  etrangeres 

a  Stockholm   (pour  le  President  du  Conseil],   Belgrade,  Londres, 
Saint-Petersbourg,  Berlin,  Rome. 

Paris,  le  24  juiUet  igrA- 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne  me  fait  savoir  que  lopinion  a  etc  surprise  par 
la  soudainete  et  Texageration  des  demandes  aiitrichiennes,  mais  que  le  parti  milir 
taire  parait  craindre  surtout  que  la  Serbie  ne  cede. 

Le  Ministre  de  Serbie  en  Autriche  pense  que  son  Gouvernement  se  montrera  tres 
conciliant  en  ce  qui  concerne  la  punilion  des  complices'de  faltentat  er  les  garanties 
cL  donner  en  vue  de  la  suppression  de  la  propagande  anli-autrichienne,  mais  qu'il 
ne  saurait  accepter  un  ordre  du  jour  a  Tarmee  dicte  au  Roi,  ni  Ic  licenciement 
d'officiers  suspects  a  TAutriche ,  ni  I'intervention  de  fpnclionnaires  etrangers  en 
Serbie.  M.  Jovanovilch  estime  que  s'il  etait  possible  d'engager  une  discussion »  le 
conflit  pourrait  encore  s'^arranger,  avec  le  concours  des  Puissances.. 

Notre  Ambassadeur  a  Berlin  rend  compte  de  femotion  provoquee  par  la  Note 
autrichienne  et  de  I'etat  d'esprit  du  Charge  d'affaires  de  Russie,  qui  pense  quune 
grande  partie  de  I'opinion  en  AUenaagne  souhaiterait  la  guerre.  Le,  ton  de  la  presse 
est  menaqanl  et  parait  avoir  pour  but  dmtimider  la  Russie.  Notre  Ambassadeur  doit 
voir  ce  soir  M.  de  Jagovv. 

M  Barrere  informe  que  I'ltalie  agit  a,  Vienne  dans  un  sens  .moderatemvet  cherche 
a  eviter  des  complications. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


—  48 


r  28 


M,  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

a  Stockholm  (pour  le  President  du  Conseil),  et  k  Belgrade,  Londres, 
Saint-Petersbourg,  Berlin,  Vienne,  Rome. 

Paris,  le  24  juiUet  igid- 

M.  de  Schoen  est  venu  me  communiquer,  sans  vouloir  m'en  laisser  une  copie, 
mais  en  m'en  donnant  lecture  a  deux  reprises,  sur  ma  demande,  une  Note  de  son 
Gouvernement. 

Celte  Note  s'exprime  presque  texluellement  de  la  maniere  suivante  : 

« Les  declarations  des  journaux  austro-hongrois  relatives  aux  circonstances  dans 
lesquelles  I'attenlat  sur  la  personne  de  rherilier  du  trone  d'Autriche  et  de  son  epouse 
a  eu  lieu,  devoilent  nettement  le  but  que  la  propagande  panserbe  s'etait  propose  et 
les  moyens  dont  elle  s'est  servie  pour  Tatteindre.  D'apres  les  faits  connus,  il  ne  peut 
non  plus  y  avoir  aucun  doute,  que  c'est  a  Belgrade  qu'il  faut  chercher  le  centre 
d'action  des  agitations  qui  tendaient  a  detacher  de  TAutriche-Hongrie  les  provinces 
slaves  du  Sud  pour  les  reunir  au  royaume  de  Serbie  et  que  c'est  1^  tout  au  moins 
que  s'est  developpee  son  activite,  avec  la  connivence  de  membres  du  Gouvernement 
el  de  Tarmee. 

« Les  menees  serbes  remonlent  a  un  grand  nombre  d'ann^es.  Le  chauvinisme  pan- 
serbe s'est  particulierement  manifeste  pendant  la  crise  bosniaque.  C'est  k  la  modera- 
tion du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois,  k  son  grand  empire  sur  lui-meme,  a  I'inter- 
vention  energique  des  Puissances  que  i'on  est  redevable  si  les  provocations  aux- 
quelles  I'Autriche-Hongrie  a  ete,  i  cette  epoque,  en  bultede  la  part  de  la  Serbie, 
n'ont  pas  suscite  un  conflit.  La  promesse  faite  alors  par  le  Gouvernement  serbe 
d'adopter  une  attitude  irreprochable  n'a  pas  ete  tenue.  Sous  les  yeux,  tout  au  moins 
avec  la  tolerance  tacite  de  la  Serbie  ofEcielle,  la  propagande  panserbe  a  continue, 
dans  I'enlretemps,  h  croitre  en  etendue  et  intensite.  C'est  sur  son  comple  qu'il  faut 
meltre  ce  dernier  forfait,  dont  on  doit  rechercher  la  trame  a  Belgrade.  II  est  indubi- 
table qu'il  ne  serait  conciliable  ni  avec  la  dignite  ni  avec  I'esprit  de  conservation  de  la 
Monarchic  auslro-hongroise  de  rester  plus  longtemps  inactive  en  presence  de  I'agita- 
tion  qui  se  poursuit  de  ce  c6te-la  de  sa  frontlere  et  qui  conslitue  une  menace  perpe- 
tuelle  pour  la  surety  et  I'integrite  de  ses  territoires.  En  raison  de  cet  etat  de  choses, 
la  conduile  de  meme  que  les  revendications  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 
dolvcnt  elre  considerees  comme  jusllfiees.  Cependant  I'atlitude  que  Topinion  pu- 
blique  aussi  bien  que  ie  Gouvernement  ont  adoptee  dans  ces  derniers  temps  en 
Serbie,  n'exclul  pas  la  crainle  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  se  refusera  k  acceder  a  ces 
reclamations  et  meme  qu'il  se  laissera  cntrainer  k  une  attitude  provocatrlce  k  I'egard 
de  rAutriche-Hongrie.  Si  celle-cl  ne  veut  pas  renoncef  definltivement  k  son  rang  de 
Grande  Puissance,  11  ne  restera  au  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  plus  rlen  d'autre 
k  falre  qui  poursulvre  ses  revendications  aupres  du  Gouvernement  serbd en  exer^ant 
une  forte  presslon  et  au  besoin  en  prenant  des  mesures  militaires  dont  le  choix 
des  moyens  doit  lui  elre  laiss^. » 


—  49  — 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  appele  parliculierement  mon  attention  sur  les  deux 
dernlers  paragraphes  de  sa  Note,  indiquant  avec  insistance,  avant  de  les  lire,  que 
c'etait  la  le  point  capital.  J'en  ai  note  litteralement  le  texte,  que  voici  :  « Le  Gouver- 
nement  allemand  estime  que  la  question  actuelle  est  une  affaire  k  r^gler  exclusi- 
vement  entre  rAutriche-Hongrie  et  la  Serbie  et  que  les  Puissances  ont  le  plus 
serieux  inleret  a  la  restreindre  aux  deux  Parlies  interessees. 

«Le  Gouvernement  allemand  desire  ardemment  que  le  conflit  soit  localise,  toute 
intervention  dune  autre  Puissance  devant,  par  le  jeu  naturel  des  alliances,  pro- 
voquer  des  consequences  incalculables. » 

J'ai  fait  remarquer  a  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  qu  autanl  il  paraitrait  legitime 
qu'on  demandat  la  punition  de  tous  les  complices  de  I'attentat  de  Serajevo,  autant, 
au  contraire,  il  semblait  difficile  d'exiger  des  mesures  inacceptables  pour  la  dignite 
et  la  souverainete  de  la  Serbie  :  le  Gouvernement  serbe,  meme  s'il  voulait  sy  sou- 
mettre,  risquerait  d'etre  emporte  par  une  revolution. 

J'ai  egalement  fait  observer  k  M.  de  Schoen  que  sa  Note  n'envisageait  que  deux 
hypotheses  :  celle  d'un  refus  pur  et  simple,  ou  celle  dune  attitude  de  provocation 
de  la  Serbie.  Une  troisieme  hypothese  (qui  laisserait  la  porte  ouverte  a  un  accom- 
modement)  devrait  en  tous  cas  etre  envisagee  :  celle  d'une  acceptation  de  la  Serbie, 
qui  consentirait  a  donner  immediatement  toutes  les  satisfactions  pour  la  punition  des 
complices  et  toutes  les  garanties  pour  la  repression  de  la  propagande  anti-autrichienne, 
compatibles  avec  sa  souverainete  et  sa  dignite. 

J'ai  ajoute  que  si,  dans  cette  limite,  les  satisfactions  poursuivies  par  TAutriche 
etaient  admissibles,  les  modalites  de  leur  application  pourraient  ^Ire  examinees ;  si  la 
Serbie  donnait  des  preuves  evidentes  de  bonne  volonte,  on  ne  pourrait  comprendre 
que  I'Autriche  refusat  de  se  preter  a  la  conversation. 

Peut-etre  ne  fallait-il  pas  rendre  trop  difficile  a  de  tierces  Puissances,  qui  ne  sau- 
raient  ni  moralement  ni  sentimentalement  se  desinteresser'de  la  Serbie,  une  attitude 
conforme  au  desir  exprime  par  TAHemagne  de  localiser  le  conflit. 

M.  de  Schoen  a  reconnu  la  valeur  de  ces  considerations  et  a  declare  vaguement 
que  I'espoir  reslait  toujours  possrble.  Comme  je  lui  demandais  s'il  fallait  attribuer  a 
la  Note  autrichienne  le  caractere  d'une  simple  mise  en  demeure,  permettant  une 
discussion,  ou  d'un  ultimatum,  il  a  repondu  qu'il  n'avait  pas  de  sentiment  personnel. 

Bienvenu-Mabtin,^ 


r  29. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

Berlin ,  le  2^  juillet  1 9 1 4. 

La  remise  de  la  Note  autrichienne  a  la  Serbie  a  cause  une  profonde  emotion. 
L'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  declare  que  son  Gouvernement  ne  saurait  rien  relran- 

DoccMENTS  DiPLOMATiQCES.  —  Gucrre  europeenne.  7 


-  50  — 
cher  de  ses  exigences.  A.  la  Wilhelmslrasse ,  ainsique  dans  lapresse,  ontient  le  mcme 
langage. 

La  pkipart  des  Charges,  d  afiKaires^  presents  k  Berlin  sont  venus  me  voir  ce  matin . 
lis  manifestent  peu  d'espoir  dans  une  issne  paeifique.  Le  Charge  d'aflfeires  de  Russie  a 
remarque  avec  amertume^que  I'Autriche  avait  remis  sa  Note  au  moment  meme  oii  le 
President  de  la  Repuhlique-  et  le  President  du  Conseil  avaient  quitte  Petersbourg.  II 
incline  a  penser  qu'une  grande  partie  de  I'opinion  en  Allemagne  souhaite  ia  guerre  et 
voudrait  saisir  cette  occasion  dans  la  quelle  TAutriche  se  montrera  sansdoute  plus  unie 
que  par  le  passe  et  ou  I'Empereur  d' Allemagne,  par  uo  sentiment  de  solidarite 
monarchique  et  par  horrem*  de  I'attentat ,  est  moins  porte  k  se  montrer  conciliant. 

M.  de  Jagow  doit  me  recevoir  a  la  fin  de  rapresHOMdi. 

Jules  Cambon. 


r  30. 

|M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  la  Republique  fran^alse  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Berlin,, le  24  juillet  1914. 

J'ai  demandeau  Secretaire  d'Etal,  dans  rentrevue  que  j'ai  eue  avec  lui,  aujourd'hui, 
sil  etait  exact,  comme  I'annon^aient  les  journaux,  que  TAutriche  eut  remis  une  Note 
aux  Puissances  sur  son  differend  avec  la  Serbie,  s'il  I'avait  re9ue,  et  comment  ii  i'ap- 
preciait. 

M.  de  Jagow  m'a  repondu  affirmativement,  ajoutant  que  la  note  etait  ^nergique ,  et 
qu'il  I'approuvait,  le  Gouvemement  Serbe  ayant  depuis'longtemps  lasse  la  patience 
autrichienne.  U  considere  d'ailleurs  cette  question  comme  d'ordre  interieur  pour 
I'Autriche  et  il  espere  qji'elle  sera  locahsee. 

J'ai  continue  ea  lui  disant  que  n'ayant  regu  encore  aucune  instruction,  je  ne  vou- 
lais  echanger  avec  lui  que  des  vues  toutes  personnelles.  Je  lui  ai  demande  alors  si 
vraiment  le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  avait  totalement  ignore  les  exigences  aulrichiennes 
avant  qu  elles  fussent  communiquees  k  Belgrade  et,  comme  il  me  I'affirmait,  je  lui  ai 
manifesle  ma  surprise  de  le  voir  ainsi  s'engager  a  soulenir  des  pretentions  dont  il 
ignorait  la  limite  et  la  portee. 

•  C'estbien,  m'a  dit  M.  de  Jagow  eh  m'lnterrompant ,  parce  que  nous  causons 
entre  nous  personnellement  que  je  vous  laisse  me  dire  cela. » 

« Certainemeiit,  ai-je  dit;  mai^  si  Pierre  P""  s'humilie,  la  Serbie  sera  probablement 
livree  k  des  troubles  interieurs,  cela  ouvrira  la  porte  k  de  nouvelles  eventualites ,  el 
savez-vous  ou  vous  serez  conduit  par  Vienne  ?  »  J'ai  ajoute  que  leiangage  desjournaux 
allemands  n'etait  pas  le  langage  de  gens  indifferents  et  etrangers  a  I'affaire,  mais 
annon9ait  un  appui  actif.  Enfm,  j'ai  remarque  que  la  brievete  du  delai  imparti  k 
la  Serbie  pourse  soumettre,  impressionnerart  facheusement  I'Europe. 


—  51   — 

M.  de  Jagow  me  repondit  qu'il  s'attendait  bien  k  «  un  peu  d' emotion »  de  la  part 
des  amis  de  la  Serbie,  mais  qu'ii  comptait  qu'ils  lui  donneraient  de  bons  conseils. 

« Je  ne  doule  pas,  lui  dis-je  alors,  que  la  Russie  fasse  effort  aupres  <iu  Cabinet  de 
Belgrade  pour  I'amener  aux  concessions  acceptables ;  mais  ce  qu'on  demande  a  Tun 
pourquoi  ne  pas  le  demandera  I'autre;  et  si  Ton  compte  que  des  conseils  seront  donnes 
k  Belgrade,  n'est-il  pas  legitime  de  compter  que,  d'un  autre  cote,  des  conseils  seront 
aussi  donnes  a  Vienne?  » 

Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  se  laissa  aller  a  dire  que  cela  dependait  des  circonstances,inais 
se  reprenant  aiassitot,  il  repeta  que  Taffaire  devait  etre  localisee.  lime  demanda  si 
vraiment  je  trouvaisia  situation  grave.  "Assurement,  lui  repondis-je,  car,'si  cequise 
passe  a  ete  reflechi,  je  ne  comprendspas  qu'on  ait  coupe  ies  ponts  derriere  soi. » 

Tout  indique  que  I'AUemagne  se  dispose  a  appuyer  dune  faQon  singulierement 
energique  I'altitude  de  FAutriche.  La  faiblesse,  manifestee  depuis  quelques  annees 
parl'alliee  austro-hongroise ,  affaiblissait  la  confiance  que  Ton  avait  ici  en  elle.  On  la 
trouvaitlourde  k  trainer.  Les  mauvais  proces,  comme  Taffaire  d'Agram  et  Taffaire 
Friedjung,  rendaient  sa  police  odieuse  en  la  couvrant  de  ridicule.  On  ne  lui  deman- 
dait  que  d'etre  forte,  mais  Ton  est  satisfait  qu  elle  soit  brutale. 

Un  article  paru  dans  le  Lokal  Anzeiger  de  ce  soir  indique  aussi  dans  la  Chancel- 
lerie  allemande  un  etat  d'esprit  dont,  a  Paris,  nous  sommesnaturellementportesane 
pas  tenir  assez  de  compte,  je  veux  parler  du  sentiment  de  la  solidarite  monarchique. 
Je  suis  convaincu  que  ce  point  de  vue  doit  etre  grandement  considere  pour  apprecter 
lattitude  de  I'Empereiir  Guillaume,  dont  la  nature  impressionnable  a  du  etre  sensible 
4  Tassassinat  d'un  Prince  qui  I'avait  regu  quelques  jours  auparavant. 

H  ji'en  est  pas  moins  frappant  de  voir  le  soin  avec  lequel  M.  de  Jagow,  et  tous 
les  fonctionnaires  places  sous  ses  ordres ,  affectent  de  dire  k  tout  le  monde  qu'ils  igno* 
niient  la  portee  de  la  Note  autrichienne  remise  k  la  Serbie. 

Mes  Camion, 


N'  31. 

I      M.  Paleologue,  Amtassadeur  de  France  aSaint-Pdtersbourg, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin-,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i. 

Pitersbourg,  le  a4  juiii&t  1914. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrle  a  donu^  .communicatioa  k  M.  Sazoftoff  d'une 
note  comminaloire  k  la  Serbie. 

Les  dispositions  de  I'Empereur  de  Russie  et  de  ses  Ministres  son|;  des  jplus  pacji- 


—  52  -- 
fiques,  ainsi  que  le  President  de  lia  Republique  et  fe  President  du  Conseil  ont  pti 
s'en  assurer  directement;  mais  1  ultimatum  que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 
vient  de  remettre  au  Cabinet  de  Belgrade  apporte  dans  la  situation  un  element  nou- 
veau  et  inquietant. 

L'opinion  publique  russe  ne  tolererait  pas  que  rAutriche  fit  violence  k  la  Serbie. 
La  brievete  du  delai  assigne  pour  rultimatum  rend  plus  difficile  encore  Taction  mo- 
deratrice  que  ies  Puissances  de  la  Triple  Entente  pourraient  exercer  k  Vienne. 

D'autre  part,  M.  Sazonoff  presmme  que  i'AUemagne  voudra  soutenir  son  alliee,  et 
je  crains  que  cette  impression  ne  soil  exacte.  La  solidarite  de  la  Triple  Entente,  en 
s'affirmant,  peut  seule  empechei  Ies  Puissances  germaniques  d'accentuer  leur  atti- 
tude provocante. 

Paleologue. 


r  32. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  aLondres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrang^res  p.  i. 

liondi'es,  le  2  4  juiHet  1914. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  m'ayant  entretenu  de  son  ddsir  de  ne  rien  negliger  pour  conjurer  la 
crise ,  nous  avons  et6  d'accord  pour  penser  que  le  Cabinet  anglais  pourrait  demander 
au  Gouvernement  allemand  de  prendre  rinitiative  d'une  demarche  k  Vienne  pour 
offrir  une  m^didtlon^entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Serbie,  des  quatre  Puissances  non  direc- 
tement interess6es.  Si  I'AUemagne  sy  prete,  on  gagnera  du  temps  et  c'est  Tessentiel. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  m*a  dil  qu'ii  entretiendrait  le  Prince  Lichnowsky  du  projet  que  je 
viens  d'exposer.  Jen  jai  fait  part  a  mon  Collegue  de  Russie,  qui  apprehende  une 
surprise  de  FAllemagne  et  suppose  que  TAutriche  n'aurait  pas  envoye  son  ultimatum 
sans  accord  ptealable  avec  Berlin. 

Le  Ctjmte  Benckendorff  m'a  dit  que  le  Prince  Lichnowsky,  k  son  retour  de  conge » 
il  y  a  un  mois  environ ,  lul  ayait  t^moigne  des  vues  pessimistes  au  sujet  des  rapporls 
entre  Petersbourg  et  Berlin.  II  avait  note  I'inquietude  causee  dans  ceile  derniere 
capitale  par  Ies  bruits  d'entente  navale  entre  la  Russie  et  TAngleterre.  par  la  visitc 
du  Tzar  k  Bucarest  et  par  le  renforcement  de  I'armee  russe.  Le  Comte  Benckendorff 
en  avail  conclu  qu'on  envisagerait  volontiers  en  AUemagne  une  guerre  avec  U 
Russia . 

Le  Sous-Secretaire  d'Etat  a  ele  frappe ,  comme  nous  tons  de  Vair  soucleux  du 
Prince  Lichnowsky  depuis  son  retom*  de  Berlin  et  il  pense  que  si  TAllemagne  I'avail 
voulu,  elle  aurait  pu  empecher.la  remise  de  lultimatum. 


—  53  — 

La  situation  est  done  des  plus  graves,  et  nous  ne  voyons  aucun  moyen  d'enrayer 
la  marche  des  evenements. 

Cependant  }e  Comte  Benckendorff  crolt  bon  de  tenter  la  demarche  sur  laquelle 
je  me  suis  mis  d'accord  avec  Sir  Ed.  Grey, 


Paul  Cambon. 


r  33. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  6trang^res  p.  i. 

Londres,  le  24  juillet  191  A. 

Le  Ministre  serbe  a  re^u  cette  nuit  de  M.  Pachitch  un  telegramme  disant  que  le 
Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  lui  avait  adresse  son  ultimatum  dont  le  delai  expire 
demain,  soit  samedi  a  6  heures.  M.  Pachitch  ne  donne  pas  les  termes  de  la  commu- 
nication autrichienne ,  mais,  si  elle  est  telle  que  le  Times  de  ce  jour  le  rapporte,  il 
semble  impossible  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  puisse  I'accepter. 

Nous  nous  sommes  demande  avec  mon  Collegue  russe,  qui  considere  comme 
extremement  difficile  pour  son  Gouvernement  de  ne  pas  soutenir  la  Serbie,  quelle 
intervention  pourrait  arreter  le  conflit. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  m*ayant  convoque  pour  cet  apres-midi ,  je  me  propose  de  lui  suggerer 
de  reclamer  I'intervention  officieuse  du  Gouvernement  allemand  a  Vienne  pour 
empecher  une  attaque  subite. 

Paul  Cambon. 


N°  34. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i.> 

a  Stockholm  (pour  le  President  du  Conseil),  Belgrade,  Saiht-Peters- 
bourg,  Berlin,  Vienne,  Home. 

Paris,  le  2d  juillet  19 id- 

L' Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  ayant  commuqiqu^  la  Note  de  son  Gouvernement  k 
Sir  Ed.  Grey,  celui-ci  a  fait  observer  que  jamais  declaration  aussi  formidable  n'avait 
ete  adressee  par  un  Gouvernement  a  un  autre;  il  a  attire  I'attention  du  Comte 
Mensdorff  siff  les  responsabilit6s  assumees  par  I'Autriche. 


—  54  — 

Envisageant  une  possibilite  de  coufllt  entre  I'Autriche  et  k  Russie,  Sir  Ed.  Grey 
se  propose  de  reclamer  le  concours  du  Gouvernement  allemand  en  vue  d'une 
mediation  des  quatre  Puissances  non  interessees  directement  dans  rafiaire  Serbe  : 
Angleterre,  France,  Italie  et  Aliemagne;  cette  mediation  s'exercerait  a  la  fois  i 
Vienne  et  a  Petersbourg. 

J'ai  donne  au  Ministre  de  Serbie  des  conseils  de  prudence  et  suis  dispose  k 
m'associer  a  toute  action  conciliante  a  Vienne,  dans  I'espoir  que  I'Autriche  ne  main- 
tiendra  pas  I'integralite  de  ses  exigences  vis-^-vis  d'un  petit  Etat,  si  celui-ci  se  montre 
dispose  k  donner  toutes  les  satisfactions  jugees  compatibles  avec  son  independance 
et  sa  souverainete. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


N"  35. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i, 

Berlfnje  2  5 juiHet  1914. 

Le  Ministre  de  Belgique  se  montre  tres  preoccupe  des  evenements. 

II  considere  que  lAutriche  et  lAUemagne  ont  voulu  profiter  du  concours  de  cir- 
constances  qui  fait  qu'en  ce  moment  la  Russie  et  TAngleterre  leur  paraissent  mena- 
cees  de  troubles  interieurs,  et  qu'en  France  le  regime  militaire  est  discute;  aussi  ne 
croit-il  pas  a  i'ignorance  que  le  "Gonvemement  de  Berlin  affecte  au  sujet  de  la 
demarche  de  I'Autriche. 

D  pense  que  si  la  forme  n'en  a  pas  ete  soumise  aii  cabinet  de  Berlin,  le  moment 
en  a  ete  habilement  choisi  avec  lui  pour  §urprendre  la  Triple  Entente  dans  un 
monfient  de  desorganisation. 

n  a  vu  lAmbassadeur  d'ltalie  qui  vient  d'interrompre  son  conge  pour  rentrer. 
II  paraitrait  que  fllalie  ^erait  surprise,  pour  ne  pas  dire  plus,  d'avoir  ete  tenue  ^ 
I'ecart  de  toute  I'aflaire  par  ses  deux  alliees. 

Jules  Cambon, 


—  55  — 


r  36. 


M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i., 

a  Stockholin  (pour  le  President  du  Conseil),  et  a  Londres,  Berlin, 
P^tersbourg,  Vienne. 

Paris,  le  25  juiliet  1914. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Ailemagne  est  venu  protester  k  midi  contre  un  article  de 
L'Echo  de  Paris,  qui  qualifiait  de  « menace  allemande »  sa  demarche  d'hier.  M.  de 
Schoen  a  dit  k  un  certain  nombre  de  journalistes,  et  est  venu  affirmer  k  la  Direction 
politique ,  qu  il  n'y  a  pas  eu  «  concert »  entre  TAutriche  et  TAilemagne  pour  la  Note 
autrichienne  et  que  le  Gouvernement  allemand  ignorait  celle-ci,  bien  qu'ii  i'eut 
approuvee  ulterieurement ,  quand  elle  lui  a  ele  communiquee,  en  meme  temps 
qu'aux  autres  Puissances. 

Le  Baron  de  Schoen  a  ajoute  qu,'iL  n'y  ^vait  pas  davantage  « menace  »  :  le  Gouver- 
nement allemand  s'etait  contente  d'indiquer  qu'il  estimait  desirable  de  localiser  le 
conflit  et  que  I'intervention  d'autres  Puissances  risquerait  de  I'aggraver. 

Le  Directeur  politique  p.  L  a  pris  acte  de  la  demarche  du  Baron  de  Schaen. 
L'ayant  prie  de  repeter  bs  termes  memes  des  deux,  derniers  paragraphes  de  sa  Note , 
il  lui  a  fait  remarquer  que  les  termes  indiquaient  la  volonte  de  TAUemagne  de  s'in- 
terposer  entre  les  Puissances  et  I'Autriche.  M.  Berthelot  a  ajoute  qu'aucune  confi- 
dence n'ayant  d'aiileurs  ete  faile  k  aucun  journaliste,  I'information  de  L'Echo  de  Paris 
n'engageait  que  ce  journal ,  et  marquait  seulement  que  la  demarche  allemande  parais- 
sait  avoir  ete  connue  autre  part  qu  au  Ouai  d'Orsay,  et  en  dehors  de  lui.  L'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Ailemagne  n'a  pas  releve  I'allusion. 

D'autre  part,  TAmbassadeur  d'Autriche  k  Londres  est  venu  egalement  rassurer 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  en  lui  disant  que  la  Note  autrichienne  ne  constituait  pas  un  «  ulti- 
matum » ,  mais  une  «  demande  de  reponse  avec  limitation  de  temps » ;  ce  qui  signifiait 
que,  si  les  demandes  autrichiennes  ne  sont  pas  acceptees  ce  soir  k  six  heures,  le 
Ministre  d'Autriche  quittera  Belgrade,  et  le  Gouvernement  auslro-hongrois  commen- 
cera  les  actes  de  « preparation  »  mihtaire,  mais  non  les  «  operations  »  militaires. 

Le  Cabinet  de  Londres,  comme  ceux  de  Paris  et  de  Petersbourg,  a  fait  donner  k 
Belgrade  le  conseil  d'exprimer  des  regrets  pour  les  complicites  qui  pourraient  etre 
prouvees  dans  I'attentat  de  Serajevo  et  de  promettre  a  cet  egard  les  plus  larges 
satisfactions.  II  a  ajoute  que,  pour  le  reste,  c'est  k  la  Serbie  qu'il  appartient  de 
repondre,  dans  les  termes  que  I'interet  du  pays  lui  paraitra  conseiller.  Le  Ministre 
d'Angleterre  a  Belgrade  doit  consulter  ses  CoUegues  franQais  et  russe  et  conseiller 
au  Gouvernement  serbe,  si  ceux-ci  en  ont  egalement  I'instruction,  de  donner  satisfac- 
tion sur  tous  les  points  ou  il  jugcra  pouvoir  le  faire. 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  dit  au  Prince  Lichnovvsky  (qui  ne  lui  a  fait  jusqu'ici  aucunc  commu- 
nication analogue  a  celle  de  M.  de  Schoen  k  Paris)  que,  si  la  Note  autricliienne  n'ame- 
nait  aucune  difliculte  entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Piussie,  le  Gouvernement  anglais  n'aurail, 


—  56  — 

pas  k  s'ea  occuper,  mais  qu'il  elait  a  craindre  que  h  raldeur  de  la  Note  et  la  brievete 
du  delai  indique  n'amenassent  une  tension.  Dans  ces  conditions,  la  seule  chance 
qu'on  aper^oive  d'eviter  un  conflit  consisterait  dans  une  mediation  de  la  France,  de 
I'Alleniagne ,  de  I'ltalie  et  de  I'Angleterre ,  TAllemagne  seule  pouvant  exercer  dans  ce 
sens  une  action  sur  le  Gouvernement  de  Vienne. 

L'Anabassadeur  d'AUemagne  a  repondu  qu'il  transmettrait  cette  suggestion  k  Berlin , 
mais  a  laisse  entendre  k  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie,  qui  est  son  parent,  que  TAllemagne 
ne  se  preterait  a  aucune  demarche  a  Vienne. 

Bienvenu-Martin, 


N°  37. 

M.  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'AfFaires  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Londres,  le  aS  juillet  1914. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  est  venu  au  Foreign  Office  affirmer  que  son  Gouver- 
nement refuserait  de  s'immiscer  dans  le  conflit  qui  divise  I'Autriche  et  la  Serbie. 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  repondu  que,  sans  le  concours  de  I'AUemagne  a  Vienne,  I'Angleterre 
ne  saurait  agir  a  Petersbourg.  Si  cependant  I'Autriche  et  la  Russie  mobilisaient  toutes 
deux,  ce  serait  bien  I'occasion  d'une  intervention  des  quatre  autres  Puissances.  Le 
Gouvernement  allemand  mainliendrait-il  alors  son  attitude  passive  et  refuserait-il  de 
se  joindre  a  I'Angleterre ,  k  la  France  et  a  I'ltalie  ? 

Le  Prince  Lichnowsky  ne  le  pense  pas,  puisqu'il  ne  s'agirait  plus  de  difficultes 
€ntre  Vienne  et  Belgrade,  mais  dun  conflit  entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg. 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  ajoute  cette  observation  que,  si  la  guerre  venait  k  eclater,  aucune 
Puissance  en  Europe  ne  pourrait  s'en  desinteresser. 

DE  Fleuriau. 


N^  38. 

M.  PAl]§OJ.OGtJE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-P^tersbourg, 
a  WL  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i, 

Petersbourg,  le  25  juillet  j^iii. 

Le  Gouvernement  Russe  va  s^effbrcer  d'obtenir  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 
une  prolongation  du  ddlai  assigne  par  I'ultimatum,  afm  que  les  Puissances  puissent 


—  57  — 
se  former  une  opinion  sur  \e  dossier  judicialre  dont  ia  communication  leuf  est 
offerte. 

M.  Sazonoff  a  prie  I'Ambassadeur  d'AlIemagne  de  signaler  k  son  Gouvcmement 
le  danger  de  la  situation;  il  s'est  abstenu  toutefois  de  faire  allusion  aux  mesures  que 
la  Russie  serait  sans  doute  amenee  a  prendre,  si  la  Serbie  etait  menacee  dans* son 
independance  nationale  ou  dans  I'integrite  de  son  territoire;  les  reponses  evasives 
et  les  recriminations  du  Comte  de  Pourtales  ont  laisse  a  M.  SazonofF  une  impression 
defavorable. 

Un  Conseil  des  ministres  sera  tenu  demaln  sous  la  presidence  de  I'Empereur. 
M.  SazonofF  garde  toute  sa  moderation  : « II  faut  eviter,  m'a-t-il  dit,  tout  ce  qui  pour- 
rait  precipiter  la  arise.  J'eslime  que,  meme  si  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois passait 
k  Taction  contre  la  Serbie,  nous  ne  devrions  pas  rompreles  negociations. » 

Paleologue. 


r  39. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  AfFaires  ^trangeres  p.  i.*   , 
a  M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne. 

Paris,  le  25  juiilet  igi/i. 

Le  Gouvernement  russe  a  donne  comme  instructions  a  son  representant  a  Vienne 
de  demander  au  Gouvernement  autrichien  une  prolongation  du  delai  fixe  k  la  Serbie, 
pour  permettre  aux  Puissances  de  se  faire  une  opinion  sur  le  dossier  que  I'Autriche 
a  offert  de  leur  communiquer,  et  en  vue  d'eviter  des  consequences  regrettables 
pour  tons. 

Un  refus  oppos6  par  rAutriche-Hongrie  k  cette  demande  oterait  toute  signification 
a  la  demarche  qu'elle  a  fait.e  aupres  des  Puissances,  en  leur  communiquant  sa  Note,  et 
la  mettrait  en  contradiction  avec  la  morale  internationale. 

Le  Gouvernement  russe  a  demande  que  vous  fassiez  d'urgence  une  d-marche 
analogue  aupres  du  Comte  Berchtold;  je  vous  prie  d'appuyer  la  demande  de  votre 
Coliegue.  Le  Gouvernement  russe  a  adresse  la  meme  demande  k  Londres,  Rome, 
Berlin  et  Bucarest. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


DocoMENTS  OIPLOMATIQOES.  —  Guerfc  europeennc. 


58  — 


r  40. 

M,  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'affaires  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeresp.  i. 

Londres,  h  25  juilldt  igid- 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  a  re^u  communication  ce -matin  des  instructions  quiprescrivenl  a  I'Am- 
bassadeur  de  Russie  a  Vienne ,  de  demander  la  prolongation  du  delai  donne  a  la  Serbie 
par  la  Note  autrichienne  d'avant-hier.  M.  Sazonoff  demandait  que  la  demarche  russe 
fut  appuyee  par  I'Ambassade  d'Angleterre. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  a  telegraphic  a  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  de  s'exprimer  dans  le  meme  sens 
que  son  collegue  russ6  et  de  rappeler  la  communication  autrichienne  qui  lui  a  ete  faite 
hier  soir  tard  par  le  Comte  Mensdorf,.  communication  aux  termes  de  laquelle  le 
defaut  d'adhesion  de  la  Serbie  aux  conditions  de  Tultimatum  n'entrainerait,  des 
aujourd'hui,  quune  rupture  diplomatique  et  non  des  operations  militaires  imme- 
diates. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  en  concluait  que  le  temps  serait  laisse  aux  Puissances  pour  intervenir, 
et  chercher  les  moyens  de  denouer  la  crise. 

DE  Fleuriau. 


M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i. 

Berlin,  le  2  5  juillet'  19 14. 

Ce  matin, *le  Charge  d'affaires  d'Angleterre  a  demande  a  M.  de  Jagovv,  d'apres  leS 
ordres  de  son  Gouvernement,  siTAllemagne  voudrait  se  joindre  a  I'Angleterre,  a  la 
France  et  a  Titalie ,  pour  intervenir  aupres  de  "PAutriche  et  de  la  Russie  afm  d'empe- 
cher  un  conflit  et,  en  premier  lieu,  pour  demander 'k  Vienne  une  prolongation  du 
delai  imparti  a  "la  Serbie  par  Tultlmatum. 

Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  etrangeres  a  repondu  qu  il  Tivait  dejik,  des  la 
reception  de  Ha  depeche  du  Prince  Lichnowsky  lui  faisant  part  des  intentions  de 
Sir  E.  Grey,  telegraphic  ce  matin  meme  a  I'Ambassadeur  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  a 
Vienne  pour  quil  demandat  cette  prolongation  au  Comte  Berchtold.  Malheureusement 
le  Comte  Berchtold  est  a  Ischl.  Au  resle,  M.  de  Jagow  ne  croit  pas  que  cette  demande 
soit  accueillie. 

Le  Charge  d'affaires  d'Angleterre  s'est  egalement.enquis  aupres  de  M.  de  Jagow, 


-^  59  — 

c  amine  je  l^avais  fait  hier,  si  rAllemagne  n'ayait  eUi  aucune  cojanaissance  de  la  Note- 
auitrichienne  .avant  quelle  fut  lanceev  et  a  re^u.  une  repouse-  si;  riettement  negative' 
qu'il  ne  pourrait  insister;  mais-  il  n*a  pu  s'empechei:  de  s'^tonnej:  du  blanc-seing, 
doime  par  rAllemagne  a  rAutriche-. 

M.  de  Jagow  lui  ayant  repondu  que  la  question  etait  pour  rAutriche  une  qjijestioo 
interieure,  iia  remarque  qu'elle  etait  devenue  au  premier  chef  iotemationaie.. 

Jules  Carbon. 


M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 
a  M.  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Berlin,  le  25  juillet  191A. 

Le  Charge  d'affaires  de  Russie  a  reQu  pour  instruction  de  demander  au  Gouver- 
nement  allemand  d'insister  aupres  du  Cabinet  de  Vienne ,  en  vue  de  faire  prolonger 
le  delai  de  Tultimatum. 

M.  de  Jagow  ne  lui  ayant  donne  rendez-vous  qu'a  la  fin  de  Fapres-midi,  c'iest-k- 
dire  au  moment  oii  ['ultimatum  viendra  a  echeance,  M.  Broniewski  a  envoye  d'urgence 
une  note  ecrite  au  Secretaire  d'Etat,  dans  laquelle  il  marque  que  le  retai:d  de  la 
communication  faite  par  I'Autriche  aux  Puissances  rend  I'elfet  de  cette  communi- 
cation iUusoire,  puisqu'elle  ne  leur  laisse  pas  le  temps  de  prendre,  conn aissance  des 
faits  allegues,  avant  Texpiration  du  delai  fixe.  II  insiste  tres  vivement  sur  la  necessity 
de  le  prolonger,  si  Ton  n'a  pas  en  vue  de  creer  une  grande  crise. 

Jules  CAMBort. 


M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  AifFaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Berlin,  le  25  juillet  1914. 

Le  Charge  d'affaires  de  Russie  a  fait  aupres  du  Secretaire  d'Etat  la  demarche  qui 
lui  etait  prescrite,  en  vue  d'une  prolongation  du  delai  de  I'ultimatum;  M.  de  Jagow 
lui  a  repondu  qu'il  avait  deja  transmis  une  indication  de  ce  genre  i  Vienne,  mais 
qu'il  eslimait  que  toutes  ces  d-marches  etaienttrop  tardives. 

M.  Broniewski  a  insiste,  en  disant  que  si  le  delai  ne  pouvait  etre  prolonge,  les 


—  60  — 
mesures  d'execution  pouvaient  au  moins  etre  retardees,  de  maniere  a  permettre  aux 
Puissances  de  s'employer  k  eviter  un  conflit.  H  a  ajoute  que  la  Note  autrichienne  etait 
con9ue  dans  des  termes  calcules  pour  blesser  la  Serbie  et  la  forcer  a  la  guerre. 

M.  de  Jagow  lui  a  repondu  qu'il  ne  s'agissait  pas  d'une  guerre,  mais  d'une 
«  execution  »  dans  une  affaire  locale. 

Le  Charge  d'affaires  a  repris,  en  exprimant  le  regret  que  le  Gouvernement  allemand 
ne  mesurat  pas  ses  responsabilites  dans  le  cas  ou  des  hostilites  se  produiraient ,  qui 
pourraient  s  etendre  au  reste  de  I'Europe  :  a  quoi ,  M.  de  Jagow  a  repondu  qu'il  se 
refusait  k  croire  a  de  pareilles  consequences. 

Le  Charge  d'aff'aires  de  Russie  a  recueilli  comme  moi  le  bruit  que  TAutriche ,  tout 
en  declarant  ne  vouloir  aucune  annexion  de  territoire,  occuperait  des  parlies  de  la 
Serbie  jusqu'a  cequ'elle  ait  complete  satisfaction.  «  On  sait,  m'a-t-il  dit,  ce  quesignifie 
ce  mot  satisfaction. »  Les  impressions  de  M.  Broniewski  sur  les  arrieres-pensees  de 
I'Allemagne  sent  tres  pessimistes. 

Jules  Cambon. 


M  Barrere,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Rome, 

a  M.  BiENVENU-MARTiN,Ministre  des  Affaires  etrang^res  p.  i. 

Rome,  le  25  juillet  1914. 

L' Ambassadeur  de  Russie  a  fait  k  la  Consulta  la  demarche  prescrite  par  M.  Sazonoff 
aux  representants  de  la  Russie  k  Paris,  Berlin,  Rome,  Bucarest,  et  qui  tendait  a 
obtenir  de  ces  differents  Cabinets  qu'ils  associent  leur  action  a  celle  de  la  Russie  k 
Vienne  en  vue  d'obtenir  une  prolongation  du  d^lai  imparti  a  la  Serbie. 

En  I'absence  du  Marquis  de  San  Giullano,  M.  Salandra  et  M.  de  Martino  ont 
repondu  qu'ils  semettraient  en  rapport  avec  le  MInlstre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres,  mais 
que  sa  reponse  ne  pourrait  leur  parvenir  que  vers  six  heures,  c'est-a-dire  trop  tard 
pour  entreprendre  une  demarche  a  Vienne. 

Barrere. 


M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M*  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i. 

Vienne,  le  25  juiilet  1914. 

Le  Charge  d'affaires  de  Russie  a  re^u  de  son  Gouvernement  I'ordre  de  demander 
un  delai  pour  rultimatum  a  la  Serbie,  au  moment  m^me  ou  le  Comie  Berchtold 


—  61   — 
partailpour  Ischl  avec  I'intenlion,  au  dire  des  journaux,  d'y  rester  pres  de  TEmpereur 
jusqu'i  la  fin  de  la  crise. 

Le  Prince  Koudachefl  I'a  neanmoins  informe  de  la,  demarche  qu'il  avail  a  remplir 
par  deux'  telegrammes  en  clair,  Tun  en  cours  de  route,  I'autre  a  destination.  II  nen 
attend  aucun  effet. 

Le  Baron  Macchio,  Secretaire  general  du  Ministere  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  a  qui 
le  Prince  a  communique  le  sens  de  ses  mslructions  et  de  sa  demarche  telegraphique » 
a  temoigne  une  froideur  glaciale  quand  son  interlocuteur  lui  a  represents  que  donner 
a  juger  des  griefs  avec  pieces  justificatives,  sans  laisser  le  temps  d'etudier  le  dossier, 
est  contraire  a  la  courtoisie  internationale ;  le  Baron  Mftcchio  a  repHque  que  parfois 
I'interet  dispense  d'etre  courlois. 

Le  Gouvernement  autrichien  est  resolu  a  infliger  k  la  Serbie  une  humiliation  :  il 
n'acceptera  Tintervention  d'aucune  puissance ,  jusqu'a  ce  que  le  coup  ait  ete  porte  et 
re9u  en  pleine  face  par  la  Serbie. 

DUMAINE. 


r  46. 

M.  BoppE,  Ministre  de  France  a  Belgrade, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Belgrade,  25  juillet  1914. 

M.  Paohilch  vient  de  me  donner  connaissance  de  la  reponse  qui  sera  remise  ce 
soir  au  Ministre  d'Autriche. 

Le  Gouvernement  serbe  accepte  de  publier  demain  au  Journal  ojjiciel  la  declaration 
qui  lui  est  demandee;  il  la  communiquera  egalement  a  Tarmee,  par  un  ordre  du 
jour ;  il  dissoudra  les  societes  de  defense  nationale  et  toutes  autres  associations  suscep- 
tibles  d'agir  contre  I'Autriche-Hongrie;  il  s'engage  a  modifier  la  loi  sur  la  presse,  a 
renvoyer  du  service  de  Tarmee,  de  I'instruction  publique  et  des  autres  administrations, 
tons  fonctionnaires  dont  la  participation  dans  la  propagande  sera  prouvee ;  il  demande 
seulement  que  le  nom  de  ces  fonctionnaires  lui  soit  communique. 

Quant  a  la  participation  dans  I'enquete  de  fonctionnaires  autrichiens,  il  derhande 
qu'on  lui  explique  comment  elle  s'exercerait;  il  ne  pourrait  accepter  que  celle  qui 
correspondrait  au  droit  international  ou  aux  relations  de  bon  voisinage. 

II  accepte  toutes  les  autres  exigences  de  Tultimatum  et  declare  que  si  le  Gouver- 
nement austro-hongrois  ne  s'en  contente  pas,  il  est  pret  k  s'enremettre  k  la  decision 
du  tribunal  de  La  Haye,.ou  k  celle  des  grandes  Puissances  qui  ont  pris  part  a  lelabo- 
ration  de  la  declaration  du  3 1  mars  i  909. 

BOPPE. 


—  62  — 

r  47. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  AmBassadeur  de  Fpance  k  Berlin, 

a  M.  BiENVENt^-MARTiN  ^  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrang^res  p.  i^ 

Beriia,  1©  a^  juJiJMi  1914. 

Pendant  tout  rapres-midi  le  bruit  a  couni  avec  persistance  que  la.  Serbie  se  sou- 
mettait  aux  exigences  autrichiemies;  ce  soir  les  journaux  publient  des  supplements 
annon^ant  la  rupture  a  Belgrade  et  le  depart  du  Ministre  d'Autricbe-Hongrie. 

Ce  bruit  vient  d'etre  confirme  au  correspondant  de  TAgence  Hayas  a  la  Wilhelm.^ 
stcasse,  Des  groupes  considerables  de  plusieurs  centaines  de  personnes  stalionnent  ict 
devant  les  bureaux  des  journaux,  et  une  nombreuse  manifestation  de  jeunes  gens 
vient  de  passer  sur  Pariser-platz  en  poussant  des  cris  de  «  hurrah ! »  pour  rAllemagne» 
€t  en  chantant  des  chants  palriotiques ;  elle  se  rend  a  la  Golonne  de  la  Victoire,  k 
VAmbassade  d'Autricbe»  puis  ^  celle  ditalie.  C'est  une  explosion  significative  de 
chauvinisme. 

Une  personnalite  allemande,  que  j'ai  xne  ce  soir,  m'a  avoue  qu'on  avait  craint  ici 
que  la  Serbie  n'acceptat  en  bloc  la  note  autrichienne ,  en  se  reservant  d'en  discuter 
I'application ,  pour  gagner  du  temps  et  permettre  aux  efforts  des  Puissances  de  se 
produire  utilement  avant  la  rupture. 

Dans  les  milieux,  financiers »  on  prend  deja  des  mesures  pour  parer  a  toute  even- 
tualite,  car  on  n'y  aper^oit  pas  le  moyen  d'enrayer  la  crise,  en  presence  de  I'appui 
determine  que  donne  TAUemagne  a  I'Autriche. 

Je  ne  vois,  pour  moi,  que  I'Angleterre  qui  puisse,  en  Europe,  etre  ecoutee  k 
Berlin. 

Quoi  qu'il  arrive,  Paris,  Petersbourg  et  Londres  ne  parviendront  a  mainlenir  diguQ^' 
menC  la  paix  quea  se  montrant  fermement  et  absolument  unis. 

Jules  CamboS). 


M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  ViennCt 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrang^res  p.  i. 

Vienne,  le  25juillet  19 id- 

On  me  remel  votre  t^legramme  precisement  a  I'heure  ou  expire  le  delai  imparli  ^ 
la  Serbie.  D^autre  part,  je  viens  de  vous  fairesavoir  dansquelles  conditions  le  Charge 
d'affaires  de  Russie  a  du  executer  sa  demarche.  II  semble  inutile  de  I'appuyer  quand^ 
il  n'en  est  plus  temps. 

Dans  I'apres-midi,  le  bruit  s'etait  repandu  que  la  Serbie  avait  cede  k  Tultimatum 
tout  en  ajoutant  qu'elle  en  appelait  aux  Puissances.  Mais  on  assure,  au  dernier 


^  53  — 
Jnoment,  que  le  Ministre  d'Autriche  vient  de  quitter  precipitamment  Belgrade ;  il 
auraitjuge  insuffisante  fadhesion  du  Gouvernement  serbe  aux  conditions  posees  par 
son  GouvernemenL 

DUMAINE. 


r  49. 

Repovse  da  Goavernament  serhe  a  la  Note  austrd^komjroise. 
(Communique  par  M;  Ydsnitch,  Ministre  de  Serbie,  le  Z7  juillet.) 

Belgrade,  de  2  5  juillet  191 4. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe  a  re9u  la  communication  du  Gouvernement  imperial 
et  royal  du  10/23  de  ce  mois  et  il  est  persuade  que  sa  reponse  eloignera  tout  nialen- 
iQudu  qui  menace  de  comprometlre  les  bons  rapports  de  voisinage  enlre  la  Monarchie 
austro-hongroise  et  le  Hoyaume  de  Serbie. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  a  conscience  que  les  protestations  qui  ont  apparu  tant  a 
la  tribune  de  la  Skoupchtina  nationale  que  dans  les  declarations  et  les  actes  des 
representants  responsables  de  I'Etat,  protestations  auxquelles  coupa  court  la  declaration 
du  Gouvernement  serbe  faite  le  i8/3i  mars  1909,  ne  se  sont  plus  renouvelees  vis- 
a-vis de  la  grande  Monarcbie  voisine  en  aiicune  occasion,  et  que  depuis  ce  temps, 
'autant  de  la  part  des  Gouvernements  royaux  qui  se  sont  succede  que  de  la  part  de 
leurs  organes,  aucune  tentative  n'a  ete  faite  dans  le  but  de  cbanger  Tetat  de  choses 
politique  et  juridique  cree  en  Bosnie-Herzegovine. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  constate  que  sous  ce  rapport  le  Gouvernement  imperial 
et  royal  n'a  fait  aucune  representatio"n ,  sauf  en  ce  qui  concerne  un  livre  scolaire, 
representation  au  sujet  de  laquelle  le  Gouvernemeat  imperial  et  Toyal  a  vequ  une 
explication  entierement  satisfaisante. 

La  Serbie  a,  a  de  nombreuses  reprises,  donne  despreuves  de  sa  politique  pacifique 
et  moderee  pendant  la  duree  de  la  crise  balkanique,  et  c'est  grace  a  la  Serbie  et  aux 
sacrifices  qu'elle  a  faits  dans  Tinteret  exclusif  de  la  paix  europeenne»  que  cette  paix 
a  ete  preservee. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  ne  ,peut  pas  etre  .rendu  responsable  des  manifestations 
d'un  caractere  priye  telles  que  les  articles  des  journaux  et  les  agissemerits  des  socieles» 
manifestations  qui  se  produisent  dans  presquc  tous  les  pays  comme  une  chose  ordi- 
naire et  qui  echappent  en  regie  generale  au  controle  officiel,  d'autant  moins  que  le 
Gouvernement  royal,  lors  de  la  solution  de  toute  une  s^rie  de  questions  qui  se  sont 
preseritees  entre  la  Serbie  et  TAutriche-Hongrie,  a  montre  une  grande  prevenance  et 
a  reussi,  de  cette  fa^on,  a  en  regler  le  plus  grand  nombre  au  profit  du  progi'es  des 
deux  pays  voisrns. 

Cest  pourquoi'le  Gouvernement  royal  a  ete  penfblement  surpris  par  les  affirma- 
tions d'apres  lesquelles  dcB  personnes  du  royaume  de  Serbie  aurarent  pariicip6  h  la 
preparation  de  Tattentat  commis  it  Sarajevo.  II  s'attendait  i  etre  invito  a  collaborer  a 
la  reoherche  de  tout  ce  qui.6e  rapporte  a  ce  crime  etal  etait  pret,  paur^rouver  par 


—  Ci- 
ties actes  son  enliere  correction ,  a  agir  contre  loules  les  personnes  a  I'egard  desquelles 
des  communications  lui  seraient  faites. 

Se  rendant  done  au  desir  du  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal,  le  Gouvernemenl 
royal  est  dispose  k  remettre  aux  Iribunaux  tout  sujet  serbe,  sans  egard  a  sa  situation 
ei  k  son  rang,  pour  la  complicite  duquel,  dans  le  crime  de  Sarajevo,  des  preuves  lui 
seraient  fournies. 

II  s'engage  specialement  a  faire  publier  a  la  premiere  page  du  Journal  ojjiciel  en 
date  du  13/26  juiilet  Tenonciation  suivante  : 

«  Le  Gouvernement  royal  de  Serbie  condamne  toute  propagande  qui  serait  dirigee 
contre  TAutnche-Hongrie,  c'est-a-dire  I'ensemble  des  tendances  qui  aspirent  en  der- 
nier lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise  des  terriloires  qui  en  font  partie , 
et  il  deplore  sincerement  les  consequemces  funestes  de  ces  agissements  criminels. 

« Le  Gouvernement  royal  regrette  que  certains  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  serbes 
aient  partlcipe,  d'apres  la  communication  du  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal,  a  la 
propagande  susmentionnee  et  (Tompromis  par  \k  les  relations  de  bon  voisinage  aux- 
quelles  le  Gouvernement  royal  s'etait  solennellement  engage  par  la  declaration  du 
18/3  1  mars  1  909. 

Le  Gouvernement,  qui  desapprouve  et  repudie  toute  idee  ou  tentative  d'une 
immixtion  dans  les  destinees  des  habitants  de  quelque  partie  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie 
que  cesoit,  considere  qu'il  est  de  son  devoir  d'avertir  formellement  les  officiers,  les 
fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  population  du  royaume  que  dorenavant  il  procedera  avec 
la  derniere  rigueur  contre  les  personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables  de  pareils* 
agissements,  qu'il  mettra  tons  ses  efforts  a  prevenir  et  k  reprimer. » 

Cette  enonciation  sqra  porlee  a  la  connaissance  de  I'armee  royale  par  un  ordre  du 
jour,  au  nom  de  Sa  Majeste  le  roi  par  S.  A.  R.  le  prince  heritier  Alexandre,  et  serai 
publiee  dans  le  prochain  Bulletin  officiel  de  i'armeo 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  s'engage  en  outre  : 

.1*  A  introduire  dans  la  premiere  convocation  reguliere  de  la  Skoupchtina  une 
disposition  dans  la  loi  de  la  presse  par  laquelle  sera  punie  de  la  maniere  la  plus 
severe  la  provocation  a  la  haine  et  au  mepris  de  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise, 
ainsi  que  contre  toute  publication  dont  la  tendance  generale  serait  dirigee  contre 
I'integrite  territoriale  de  rAutriche-Hongrie. 

II  se  charge,  lors  de  la  revision  de  la  Constitution,  qui  est  prochaine,  de  faire 
introduire  dans  Tarticle  22  de  la  Constitution  un  amendement  de  telle  sorte  que  les 
publications  ci-dessus  puissent  etre  confisquees,  ce  qui,  actuellement,  aux  termes 
categoriques  de  I'article  2  2  de  la  Constitution ,  est  impossible. 

2°  Le  gouvernement  ne  possede  aucuhe  preuve  et  la  Note  du  gouvernement 
imperial  et  royal  ne  lui  en  fournit  non  plus  aucune  que  la  ^ociete  Norodna  Obrana  et 
les  autres  societes  similaires  aient  commis  jusqu'a  ce  jour  quelque  acte  criminel  de 
ce  genre  par  le  fait  d'un  de  leurs  membres.  Neanmoins  le  gouvernement  royal 
acceptera  la  demande  du  gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  et  dissoudra  la  Societ6 
Norodna  Obrana  et  toute  autre  societe  qui  agirait  contre  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

3<*  Le  gouvernement  royal  serbe  s'engage  a  eliminer  sans  delai  de  Tinstruction 


—  65  — 
publique  en  Serbie  tout  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourralt  servir  a  fomenter  la  propagande  centre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie ,  quand  le  gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  lui  fournira  des  fails  et 
des  preuves  de  cette  propagande. 

/i"  Le  gouvernement  royal  accepte  du  moins  d'eloigner  du  service  militaire  ceux 
dont  Tenquete  judiciaire  aura  prouve  qu'ils  sont  coupables  d'actes  diriges  contre 
I'integrite  du  territoire  de  la  monarchie  austro-hongroise ;  il  attend  que  le  gouverne- 
ment imperial  et  royal  lui  communique  ulterieurement  les  noras  et  les  faits  de  ces 
officiers  et  fonctionnaires  aux  fms  de  la  procedure  qui  doit  s'ensuivre. 

5°  Le  gouvernement  royal  doit  avouer  qu'il  ne  se  rend  pas  clairement  compte  du 
sens  et  de  la  portee  de  la  demande  du  gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  tendant  k  ce 
que  la  Serbie  s'engage  a  accepter  sur;son  territoire  la  collaboration  des  organes  du 
gouvernement  imperial  et  royal. 

Mais  il  declare  qu'il  admettra  toute  collaboration  qui  repondrait  aux  principes  du 
droit  international  et  a  la  procedure  criminelle,  ainsi  qu'aux  bons  rapports  de  voisi- 
nage. 

6**  Le  gouvernement  royal,  cela  va  de  soi,  considere  de  son  devoir  d'ouvrir  une 
enquete  contre  tous  ceux  qui  sont  ou  qui,  6ventuellement ,  auraient  ete  meles  au 
complot  du  i5/2  8juinetquise  trouveraient  sur  le  territoire  du  royaume.  Quant  a  la 
participation  a  cette  enquete  des  agents  des  autorites  austro-bongroises  qui  seraient 
delegues  a  cet  effet  par  le  gouvernement  imperial  et  royal,  le  gouvernement  royal 
ne  peut  pas  I'accepter,  car  jce  serait  une  violation  de  la  Constitution  et  de  la  loi  sur  la 
procedure  criminelie.  Cependant,  dans  des  cas  concrets,  des  communications  sur  les 
resultats  de  I'instruction  en  question  pourraient  etre  donnees  aux  organes  austro- 
hongrois. 

7°  Le  gouvernement  royal  a  fai^  proceder  des  le  soir  meme  de  la  remise  de  la 
note  a  Tarrestation  du  commandant  Voija^Tankositch.  Quant  a  Milan  Ciganovitch, 
qui  est  sujet  de  la  Monarcbie  austro-hongroise  et  qui  jusqu^au  1 6/28  juin  etait  employe 
(comme  aspirant)  a  la  direction  des  chemins  de  fer,  il  n'a  pas  pu  encore  etre  joint. 
Le  gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  est  prie  de  vouloir  bien,  dans  la  forme  accou- 
tumee,  faire  connaitre  le  plus  tot  possible  les  presomptions  de  culpabilite,  ainsi  que 
les  preuves  eventuelles.de  culpabilite  qui  ont  ete  recueillies  jusqu'^  ce  jour  par 
I'enquete  a  Sarajevo,  aux  fins d'enquetes  ulterieures. 

8°  Le  gouvernement  serbe  renforcera  et  etendrales  mesures  prises  pour  empecher 
le  trafic  illicite  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  a  travers  la  frontiere.  II  va  de  soi  qu'il  ordon- 
nera  tout  de  suite  une  enquete  el  punira  severement  les  fonctionnaires  des  fron- 
tieres  sur  la  ligne  Schabac-Loznica,  qui  ont  manque  k  leur  devoir  et  laisse  passer  les 
auteurs  du  crime  de  Sarajevo. 

9°  Le  gouvernement  royal  donnera  volontiers  des  explications  sur  les  propos  que 
ces  fonctionnaires,  tant  en  Serbie  qua  Tetranger,  ont  tenus  apres  I'attenlat  dans  des 
interviews  et  qui,  d'apres  I'affirmation  du  gouvernement  imperial  et  royal,  ont  ete 
bostiles  a  la  Monarchie,  des  que  le  gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  lui  aura  commu- 
nique les  passages  en  question  de  ces  propos,  et  des  qu'il  aura  demontre  que  les 
propos  employes  ont  en  effet  ete  tenus  par  lesdits  fonctionnaires,  propos  au  sujet 
Documents  diplomatiques.  —  Guerre  europeeane.  0 


desquels  le  gouvemement  royal  lui-meme  aura  soin  de  recueiHir  des  preuves  et  con- 
victions. 

10°  Le  gouvemement  royal  informe  le  gouvemement  imperial  et  royal  de  I'exe- 
culion  des  inesures  comprises  dans  les  points  precedents  en  tant  que  cela  n'a  pas  ete 
deja  fait  par  la  presente  note.  Aussitot  que  chaque  mesure  aura  ete  ordonnee  et 
executee,  dans  le  cas  ou  le  gouvemement  imperial  et  royal  ne  serait  pas  satisfaitde 
cettereponse,  le  gouvemement  royal  serbe,  considerant  qu'il  est  de  I'interet  com- 
mun  de  ne  pas  precipiter  la  solution  de  cette  question,  est  pret,  comme  toujours, 
accepter  une  entente  pacifique ,  en  remettant  cette  question  soit  a  la  decision  du 
Tribunal  international  de  La  Haye,  soit  aux  grandes  Puissances  qui  orit  pris  part 
a  I'elaboration  de  la  declaration  que, le  gouvemement  serbe  a  faite  le  i8/3i  mars 
1909- 


67  -- 


CHAPITRE  IV 
DE  LA  RUPTURE  DES  RELATIONS  DIPLOMATIQUES 

(25    JUILLET   19U), 

A  LA  DECLARATION  DE  GUERRE  DE  L'AUTRICHE  A  LA  SERRIE 

(28   JUILLET    1914) 


—  69  — 


r  50. 


M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  L^ 

a  bord  de  la  France  (pour  le  President  du  Conseil),  et  a  MM.  les  Am* 
bassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres ,  Petersbourg ,  Berlin ,  Vienne ,  Rome. 

Paris,  le  26  juillet  igi^- 

On  pent  resumer  ainsi  les  evenements  de  samedi :  refus  de  rAutriche  d  acceder  a 
la  prolongation  de  delai  demandee  par  la  Russie,  —  depart  du  Ministre  d'Autrichede 
Belgrade  apres  remise  dune  reponse  a  la  Serbie,  estimee  insuffisante,  bien  quelle 
eut  atteint  la  limite  des  concessions  jugees  possibles,  —  ordre  de  mobilisation  donne 
en  Serbie,  dont  le  Gouvernement  sest  retire  a  Kragoujewatz,  pu  il  est  suivi  par 
les  Ministres  de  France  et  de  Russie. 

Le  Gouvernement  italien,  a  qui  la  note  autrlchienne  a  ete  communiquee  ven-. 
dredi,  sans  demande  d'appui  ni  meme  d'avis,  n'apas,  en  I'absence  du  Marquis  de 
San  Giuliano  qui  ne  rentre  que  mardi,  pu  repondre  k  la  suggestion  du  Gouverne- 
ment russe  qui  proposait  d'insister  a  Vienne  pour  une  prolongation  de  delai.  II  resulte 
d'une  confidence  de  i'Ambassadeur  d'ltalie  k  M.  Paleologue  qu'a  Vienne  on  continue 
k  se  bercer  de  I'illusion  que  la  Russie  « ne  tiendra  pas  le  coup  ».  II  ne  faut  pas  oublier 
que  ritalie  nest  tenue  par  les  engagements  de  la  Triple  Alliance  que  si  elle  a  ete  prea- 
iablement  consultee. 

De  Petersbourg,  nous  apprenons  que  M.  Sazonoff  a  conseille  k  la  Serbie  de 
demander  la  mediation  anglaise.  Dans  le  Conseil  des  Ministres  du  26,  tenu  en  pre- 
sence de  TEmpereur,  la  mobilisation  des  treize  corps  d'armee  eventuellement  destines 
k  operer  centre  I'Autriche  a  ete  envisagee;  cette  mobilisation  ne  serait  toutefois 
rendue  effective  que  si  TAutriche  contraignait  la  Serbie  par  la  force  des  armes,  et 
seulement  apres  avis  du  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  a  qui  le  soin  incombe  de 
fixer  la  date,  liberie  lui  etant  laissee  de  continuer  les  negociations  meme  dans  le  cas 
ou  Belgrade  serait  occupee.  L'opinion  russe  manifeste  I'impossibilite  politique  et 
morale  pour  la  Russie  de  laisser  ecraser  la  Serbie. 

A  Londres,  la  demarche  allemande  a  ete  faite  le  aS,  dans  les  memes  lermes  que 
par  le  Baron  de  Schoen  a  Paris.  Sir  E.  Grey  a  repondu  au  Prince  Lichnowski  que, 
si  la  guerre  venait  a  eclater,  aucune  puissance  en  Europe  ne  pourrait  s'en  desinte- 
resser.  II  n'a  pas  precise. davantage  et  a  tenu  un  langage  tres  reserve  au  Ministre 
de  Serbie.  La  communication  faite  le  2  5  au  soir  par  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  rend 
Sir  E.  Grey  plus  optimiste;  puisque  la  rupture  diplomatique  ne  doit  pas  entrainer 
des  operations  militaires  immediates,  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  veut  encore  esperer  que 
les  Puissances  auront  le  temps  d'intervenir. 

A  Berlin,  le  langage  tenu  par  le  Secretaire  d'Elat  au  Charge  d'Affaires  de  Russie 
est  pen  satisfaisant  el  dilatoire ;  comme  celui-ci  lui  demandait  de  s'associer  a  une  de- 
marche a  Vienne  pour  une  prolongation  de  delai,  il  a  repondu  qu'il  avail  deja  agi  dans 
ce  sens,  maisque  c'elait  trop  lard;  k  la  demande  d'oblenir  un  delai  pour  prolonger 


—  70  — 
les  mesures  d*executIon ,   il  a  replique  qu'il  s*agissait  dune  question  Interieure  et 
non  pas  dune  guerre  mais  dune    execution   locale.  M.  de  Jagow  feint  de  ne  pas 
croire  que  Taction  autrichienne  puisse  entrainer  des  consequences  generales. 

n  se  produit  une  veritable  explosion  de  chauvinisme  a  Berlin.  L'Empereur  d*Alle- 
magne  revient  directement  k  Kiel.  M.  Jules  Canabon  estime  que,  aux  premieres 
mesures  militciires  de  la  Russie ,  I'Allemagne  repondrait  immediate  ment  et  n'attendrait 
vraisembfablement  pas  un  pretexte  pour  nous  attaquer. 

A  Vienne,  TAmbassadeur  de  France  n'a  pas  eu  le  temps  de  se  joindre  a  la  de- 
marche de   son  collegue  russe   pour  obtenir  une  prolongation  du  delai  fixe  a  la 
Serbie;  il  ne  le  regrette  pas,  celte  demarche  ayant  ete  repoussee  categoriquement,  .. 
et  I'Angleterre  n'ayant  pas  non  plus  eule  temps  de  donner  des  instructions  a  cet  egard  I 
a  son  agent. 

Une  note  de  TAmbassade  d'Angleterre  m'a  ete  remise:  elle  rend  compte  de  la 
conference  de  TAmbassadeur  britannique  a  Petersbourg  avec  M.  Sazonoff  et 
M.  Paleologue.  Sir  Edward  Grey  estime  que  les  quatre  Puissances  non  interessees 
devraient  insister  aupres  de  la  Russie  et  de  I'Autriche  pour  que  leurs  armees  ne  fran- 
chissent  pas  la  frontiere  et  donnent  le  temps  H  I'Angleterre,  a  la  France ,  a  I'Allemagne 
et  a  ritalie  d'exercer  leur  mediation.  Si  I'Allemagne  accepte,  le  Gouvernement  anglais 
a  des  raisons  de  penser  que  I'ltalie  serait  heureuse  de  s*associer  egalement  a  Taction 
jointe  de  I'Angleterre  et  de  la  France:  I'adhesion  de  I'Allemagne  est  essentielle,  car 
pas  plus  TAutriche  que  la  Russie  ne  lolererait  d'autre  intervention  que  d*amis  impar- 
tiaux  ou  d'allies. 

Bienvenu-Marthl 


r  51. 

M.  Babrere,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Rome, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  de3  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

Rome,  le  26  juiilet  1914. 

Uh  telegramme  de  Vienne  re^n  k  i'inslant  k  la  Consulta  lui  fait  connaitre  que  la 
\ rupture  diplomatique  est  effective  entre  TAutriche  et  la  Serbie.  et  que  I'Autriche 
procede  i  des  mesures  militaires. 

Le  Marquis-  di  San  Giuliano,  qui  est  a  Fiu^i,  ne  reviendra  k  Rome  qo'apres- 
demain. 

J'ai  eu  aujourd'hui  avec  le  President  du  Conseil  un  interessanl  entretien  sur  la 
situation,  dont  il  reconnait  toutela  gravite.  De  I'ensemble  de  ses  propos,  j'ai  emporte 
le  sentiment  que  le  Gouvernement  italien  vdudrait,  en  cas  de  conflit,  se  tenir  en 
dehors  et  rester  dans  une  attitude  d'observation. 

M.  Salandra  m'a  dit,  a  ce  propos  :  «  Nous  ferons  les  plus  grands  efforts  pour  em- 


—  71  -* 
pecher  la  paix  d'etre  rompue  :  notfe  situation  est  un  peu  analogue  h  telle  de  TAngle* 
terre.  Peut-elre  pourrions-nous  Iair6  quelque  chose  dans  un  sens  pacifique  avec  les 
Anglais  ».  M.  Salandratm'a  confirme  que  la  note  autrichieUne  avail  ete  c6mmumque6 
a  Rome  a  la  derniere  heure. 


I 


r  52. 

M.  Barrjere,  Ajnbassadeur  de  France  a  Rome, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  L 

Rome,  le  26  juillet  191  A* 

M.  Sa7onoff  a  dit  hier  &  l*Ambassadeur  dltalie  a  Petersbourg  que  la  Russie  se 
servirait  de  tous  les  moyens  diplomatiqaes  pour  eviter  le  conflit  et  qu  elle  ne  renon- 
^ait  pas  k  I'espoir  qu.une  mediation  pourrait  amener  I'Auiriche  a  une  attitude  moins 
intransigeanle ;  mais  qu'on  ne  pouvait  cependant  lui  demander  de  laisser  ecraser  la 
Serbie. 

Je  remarque  que  ia  majeure  partie  de  ropinion  publique  italienu'e  est  liostile  k 
TAutriche  daris  cetie  grave  affaire. 

Barrere. 


r  53. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i., 
a  M.  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'affaires  a  Londres. 

Paris,  le  26  juillet  iQizi. 

M.  Paleologue  m'adresse  ie  telegramme  survant : « M.  Sazonofif  oonseille  au  Gou* 
vernement  serbe  de  solliciter  la  mediation  du  Gouvernement  brilannique. » 

D'accord  avec  M.  Paul  Cambon,  je  pense  que  le  Gouvernement  franqais  ne  pent 
qu  exprimer  I'espoir  de  voir  le  Gouvernement  anglais  accepter^  si  une  offre  de  oelle 
nature  lui  etait  faite. 

Veuillez  vous  exprimer  dans  ce  sens  aupres  du  Foreign  Office. 

BlENYENU-M.UmX. 


—  72  — 


N''  54, 


M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-Petersbourg» 
a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Saint-Petersbourg,  le  26  juillet  1914. 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  continue  avec  une  louable  persevfe'ance  k 
rechercher  les  moyens  de  faire  prevaloir  une  solution  pacifique.  « Jusqu  au  dernier 
instant,  m'a-t-il  declare,  je  me  montrerai  pret  k  negocier. » 

C'est  dans  cet  esprit  qu  il  vient  de  mander  le  Comte  Szapary  pour  le  convier  k  une 
«  franche  et  loyale  explication*.  Article  par  article,  M.  Sazonoff  a  commerite  devant 
lui  rultimatum  austro-hongrois,  en  faisant  ressortir  le  caractere  injurieux  des  princi- 
pales  clauses.  « L'intention  qui  a  inspire  ce  document,  a-t-il  dit,  est  legitime  si  vous 
n'avez  poursuivi  d'autre  but  que  de  proteger  votre  territoire  contre  les  menees  des 
anarchistes  serbes;  mais  le  procede  auquel  vous  avez  eu  r^cours  n'est  pas  defen- 
dable. »  II  a  conclu  :  « Reprenez  votre  ultimatum,  modifiez-en  la  forme,  et  je  vous 
garantis  le  resuUat ». 

L' Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  s'est  montre  touche  de  ce  langage;  toutefois, 
en  attendant  des  instructions,  il  reserve  I'opinion  de  son  Gouvernement.  Sans  se  de- 
courager,  M.  Sazonoff  a  decide  de  proposer,  des  ce  soir,  au  Comte  Berchtold  Tou- 
verture  d'une  conversation  directe  entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg  sur  les  changements 
k  introduire  dans  Tullimatum. 

Celte  entremise  amicale  et  olficieuse  de  la  Russie  entre  1  Autrlche  et  la  Serbic  a 
I'avantage  d'etre  expeditive.  Je  la  crois  done  preferable  a  loute  autre  procedure »  et 
de  nature  k  aboutir. 

Paleologue. 


r  55. 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  si  Vienne, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Vienne,  le  26  juillet  igii^. 

M.  Scbebeko  est  revenu  pr^cipitamment  d'un  voyage  en  Russie;  il  ne  Tavait 
entrepris  qu'apres  I'assurance  donnee  par  le  Comte  Berchtold  que  les  reclamations 
contre  la  Serbie  seraient  des  plus  acceplables. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  a  Petersbourg  avait  parle  dans  le  meme  sens  a 
M.  Sazonoff  la  veille  de  la  remise  de  la  note.  Ce  procede,  tres  habitue!  dans  la  diplo- 
matic de  la  Monarchic,  el  qui  a  servi  egalement  au  Baron  Macchio  envers  moi,  parail 
avoir  beaucoup  ajoute  k  I'irritation  du  Gouvernement  russe. 


—  73  — 

M.  Schebeko  va  s'efforcer,  cependant,  de  profiler  du  delai  indispensable  a  la  nio- 
bilisation  pour  introduire.une  proposition  d'arrangement,  qui  aura  au  moins  I'avan- 
tage  de  permettre  de  mesurer  ia  valeur  des  declarations  pacifiques  de  TAllemagne. 

Pendant  que  nous  en  deliberions  ce  soir,  en  compagnie  de  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen-, 
celui-ci  a  regu  des  instructions  du  Foreign  0£Gce  concernant  la  demarche  a  tenter 
par  les  representants  des  quatre  Puissances  moins  directement  interessees.  Je  m  at- 
tends done  a  ce  que  nous  ayons  a  nous  concerter  demain  avec  le  due  d'Avarna  et 
M.  de  Tschirsky,  lequel  se  retranchera  presque  surement  derriere  le  principe  de  la 
localisation  du  conflit  pour  refuser  son  concours. 

Mon  impression  est,  d'ailleurs,  que  le  Gouvernement  auslro-hongrois ,  quoique 
surpris  et  pent  etre  au  regret  de  I'energie  qu'on  lui  a  inspiree,  se  croira  oblige  a  un 
commencement  d  action  riiilitaire. 

DuifAINE. 


r  56. 

,M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

a  bord  de  la  France  (pour  le  President  du  Conseil)  et  a  MM.  les  Ambas- 
sadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-P^tersbourg,  Berlin,  Vienne, 
Rome. 

Paris,  ie  26  juillet  igid- 

Le  resume  de  la  reponse  serbe  a  la  note  autrichienne  ne  nous  est  parvenu  qu'avec 
vjngt  heures  de  retard.  Bien  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  eut  cede  sur  tous  les  points, 
saufdcuxpetites  reserves,  le  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongne  a  rompules  relations,  prou- 
vant  ainsi  la  volonte  arretee  de  son  gouvernement  de  proceder  a  I'execution  de  la  Serbie. 

D'apres  un  telegramme  de  M.  Jules  Cambon,  VAmbassadeur  d'Anglet'erre  ale  sen- 
timent dun  peu  de  flechissement;  comme  il  faisait  observer  k  M.  de  Jagow  que 
Sir  Ed.  Grey  ne  lui  demandait  pas  d'intervenir  entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Serbie,  mais, 
cette  question  cessant  d'etre  localisee,  d'intervenir  avec  TAngleterre,  la  France  et 
ritalie  k  Vienne  elPelersbourg,  le  SecretJ\ire  d'Etat  a  declare  qii'il  ferait  son  possible 
pour  maintenir  la  paix. 

Au  cours  d'un  entretien  de  M.  Bairere  avec  le  Secretaire  general  du  Ministere  des 
.Affaires  etrangeres  italien,  celui-ci  a  indique  que  le  Gouvernement  italien  naurait 
vi-aisemblablement  pas  approuve  la  note  autricihienne ;  mais  comme  elle  ne  lui  a  pas 
ete  prealablement  communiqu^e.  Use  trouve,  de  cefait,  liber^  de  toute  responsabi- 
iite  dans  la  grave  initiative  prise  par  TAutriche. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  est  venu  cet  apres-midi  me  faire  uae  communication, 
tendant  a  line  intervention  de  la  France  aupres  de  la  Russie  dans  un  sens  pacifique. 
L'Autriche,  mVt-iJ  dit,  a  fait  declarer  a  la  Russie  qu'elle  ne  poursuivait  ni  agrandis- 
sement  territorial,  ni  atteinte  a  Vintegrite  du  Royaume  de  Serbie;  sa  seule  intention 
estd'assurer  sa  propre  tranqiiillite  et  de  fair6  la  police.  C'est  des  decisions  de  la  Russie 
qu'il  depend  quune  guerre  soit  evitee;  i'Allemagne  se  sent  solidaire  de  la  France  dans 
i'ardent  desir  que  la  paix  puisse  etre  .maintenue,  tji  a  le  femoe  espoir  que  la  France 
ttsera  de  son  influence  dans  un  sens  apaisant  k  Petersbourg. 

OoGritSinrs  diplomatiqcbs.  —  Cuerre  curopeenne.  »o 


—  74  ^ 

J'ai  repondu  k  cette  suggestion  que  la  Russie  ^tait  mod^r^e*,  (ju'elle  n'avait  accom" 
jpli  aucun  acte  qui  put  faire  douter  de  sa  moderation  et  que  nous  etions  d'accord  avec 
elie  pour  rechercher  la  solution  pacifique  de  ce  conflit.  II  nous  paraiss  ait  doncqu  a  tltre 
de  contre-partie,  TAllemagne  devait  agir  k  Vienne,  ou  refficacite  de  son  action  ^tait 
icertaine  en  vue  d'eviter des  operations. miiitaires  tendant-a  I'occupation  de  la  ^erbie. 

L'Ambassadeur  m'ayant  fait  remarquer  que  cela  etait  iiiconciliable  avec  la  position 
prise  par  TAllemagne  «  que  la  question  ne  regardait  que  TAutriche  et  la  Serbie  » ,  je 
iui  ai  dit  que  la  mediation  a  Vienne  et  k  Petersbourg  pourrait  etre  le.  fait  des  quatre 
autres  Puissances  moins  interessees  dans  la  question. 

M.  de  Schoen  se  retrancha  alors  derrlere  le  manque  d'instructions  a  cet  egard,  et 
je  lui.dis  que,  dans  ces  conditions,  je  ne  me  sentais  pas  en  mesure  d'exercer  une  ac- 
tion seulement  a  Petersbourg. 

La  conversation  se  termina  sur  I'assurance ,  renouvelee  par  I'Ambassadeur ,  des  in- 
tentions pacifiques  de  I'Allemagne,  qu'il  declarait  solidaire,  sur  (ie* point,  de  la 
France. 

Btenvenu-Martin. 


N°  57. 
Note  pour  le  Ministre. 

Dimanche  soir,  26  juillet  1916. 

Apres  la  visite  qu'il  avait  faite  au  Ministre  a  5  heures  de  Tapres-midi,  le  Baron 
de  Schoen  s'est  rendu ,  ce  soir  a  7  Heures ,  k  la  Direction  politique ,  pour  demander 
qu'en  vue  d'eviter  des  commentaires  tendancieux  des  journaux,  comme  celui  de 
VEcho  de  Paris  la  veille ,  et  afm  de  bien  preciser  le  sens  des  demarches  du  Gouvernement 
allemand,  un  bref  communique  ful  donne  k  h  presse  sur  I'entrevue  de  I'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Alliemagne  et  du  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

M.  de  Schoen  suggera,  pour  preciser  sa  pensee ,  les  termes  suivants,  dont  le  Direc- 
teur  politique  p.  i.  prit  note  sous  sa  dictee :  « L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  et  le  Ministre 
des  Affaires  6trangeres  ont  eu,  pendant  fapres-midi,  un  nouvel  entretien,  au  cours 
duquel  ils  ont  examine,  dans  I'esprit  le  plus  amical  et  dans  un  sentiment  de  solidarite 
pacifique,  les  moyens  qui  pourraient  etre  employes  pour  maintenir  la  paix  gene- 
rale.  » 

Le  Directeur  politique  p.  i.  repondit  aussitot.:  « Alors,  tout  est  regie  dans 
votre  esprit,  et  vous  nous  apportez  I'assurance  que  I'Autriche  accepte  la  note  serbe, 
ou  se  pretera  aux  conversations  avec  les  Puissances  ^cet  egard?  »  L'Ambassadeur  ayant 
paru  surpris  et  fait  une  vive  denegation,  il  Iui  fut  expose  que  si  rien  n'etait  modifie 
dans  I'attitude  negative  de  fAllemagne ,  les  termes  de  la  « Note  a  la  presse »  suggeree 
^taient  excessifs  et  de  nature  a  donner  a  I'opinion  frauQaise  une  fausse  securite,  en 
creant  des  illusions  sur  la  situation  reelle,  dont  les  dangers  n'etaient  que  trop 
^vidents. 

Aux  assurances  que  prodiguait  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  sur  I'impression  opti- 


—  75  — 
misle  qu'il  eprouvait,  le  Directeur politique  p.  i.  repondit  en  lui  demandant  s'il  lui  pei- 
mettait  de  lui  parler  a  titre  tout  personnel  et  prive,  d'homme  a  homme,  en  toute 
iiberte,  et  sans  tenir  compte  de  ieurs  fonctions  respectives.  Le  B^on  de  Schoen  le 
pria  de  le  faire. 

M-  Berthelot  dit  alors  qae  pour  tout  esprit  simple,  I'attitude  de  TAUemagne  ne 
pouvait  s'expliquer,  si  elle  ne  tendait  pas  a  la  guerre  :  une  analyse  purement  objective 
des  faits  et  la  psychologie  des  rapports  austro-allemands  conduisaient  logiquement  a  cette 
conclusion.  Devant  Taffirmation  repetee  que  TAUemagne  ignorait  le  contenu  de  la  note 
autrichienne,  il  netait  plus  permis  d'elever  de  doutes  sur  ce  point;  etait-il  vraisem- 
blable,  cependant,  que  I'Allemagne  se  fut  rangee,  les  yeux  fermes,  a  cote  de  I'Au- 
triche,  dans  une  pareille  aventure?  La  psychologie  de  toutes  les  relations  passees  de 
Vienne  etde  Berlin  permeltait-elle  d'admettre  querAutricheeutpris  une  position  sans 
recul  possible,  avant  d'avoir  pese,  avec  son  alliee ,  t(^tes  les  consecpienccs  de  son 
intransigeance?  Combien  le  refus  de  TAUemagne  de  donner  un  conseil  de  mediation 
a  Vienne  paraissait  surprenant,  maintenant  qu'elle  connaissait  le  texte  extraordinaire 
de  k  note  autrichienne!  Quelle  responsabilite  le  Gouvernement  allemand  prendrait, 
€t  quelifes  suspicions  peseraient  sur  lui,  s'il  persistait  a  s'interposer  entre  I'Autriche  et 
les  Puissances,- apres  la  soumission  pour  ainsi  dire  absolue  de  la  Serbie,  et  quand  le 
moindre  conseil  donne  par  lui  k  Vienne  mettrait  fin  au.cauchemar  qui  pesait  sur 
I'Europe ! 

La  rupture  des  relauons  diplomatiques  par  I'Autriche,  ses  menaces  de  guerre  et  la 
mobihsation  quelle  powsuit,  donnent  One  particuliere  urgence'a  Taction  pacifica- 
trice  de  I'Allemagne ,  car  du  jour  ou  les  troupes  autrichiennes  auraient  franchi  la 
frontiere  serbe,,  op  se  tronverait  en  presence  dun  fait  qui  obligerait  sans  doute  le 
Cabinet  de  Petersbourg  a  intervenir  et  risquerait  de  dechainer  une  guerre  que  I'Al- 
lemagne declare  vouloir  eviter. 

M.  de  Schoen,  qui  ecoutait  en^ouriant,  affirma  de  nouveau  que  I'Allemagne  avait 
ignore  le  texte  de  la  note  autrichienne  ( i )  et  ne  I'avait  appro uvee  qu'apressa  remise ;  elle. 
estimait  toujours  que  la  Serbie  avail  besoin  d'une  le^on  assez  severe  pour  qu'elle  ne 
put  I'oublier,  et  que  I'Autriche  se  devait  k  elle-meme  de  mettre  fin  a  une  situation 
dangereuse  et  intolerable  pom;  une  grande  puissance.  II  declara,  d'ailleurs,  ne  pas 
connaitre  le  texte  de  la  reponse  serbe,  et  se  montra  personnellement  surpris  qu'elle 
n'eut  pas  satisfait  I'Autriche,  si  tpiitefois  elle  etait  telle  que  les  journaux,  souvent  mal 
informes,  la  representaient. 

II  insista  encore  sur  les  intentions  pacifiques  de  I'Allemagne  et  donna  son  impres- 
sion sur  TelTet  que  pourraient  avoir  de  bons  conseils  adresses,  par  exemple  a  Vienne, 
par  r Angle terre,  sur  un  ton  amical.  Selon  lui,  I'Autriche  n'etait  pas  intransigeante; 
ce  qu'elle  repousse,  c'est  I'idee  d'une  mediation  formelle,  le  « spectre »  d'une  confe- 
rence :  un  mot  pacifique  venu  de  Petersbourg ,  de  bonnes  paroles  dites  d'un  ton  con- 

(i)  Voir  pifece  n*  21.  Lettre  du  Ministre  de  France  a  Munich  relatant  que  le  President  du  Conseil  bavarois 
a  dil,  le  23  juillet,  avoir coni;iaissance  du  texte  de  la  note  autrichienne  a  la  Serbie. 

V.  aussi  Livre  Bleu,  la  pi^ce  n°  g5  oil  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  k  Vienne,  declare  : 
«  Quoique  je  ne  puisse  p£is  le  verifier,  je  tiens  d'une  source  privee  que  TAmbassadeur  allemand  connaissait 
le  texte  de  I'uhimatum  aulrichien  a  la  Serbie  avant  qu'il  ne  fut  expedie  et  qu'il  I'a  telegraphic  a  TEmpe- 
reur  d'Allemagne  ;  je  sais  par  TAmbassadeur  allemand  lui-mSme  qu'il  en  approuve  chaque  ligne. » 


~  76  - 

ciliant  par les  Puissances  de  la  Triple  Entente,  auraient  chance  d'etre  bien  accueillles. 
H  ajouta  enfm  quil  ne  disait  pas  que  TAUeniagne,  de  son  cote,  ne  donnerait  pas 
quelques  conseils  a  Vienne. 

Dans  ces  conditions,  leDirecteur  pplitique  declara  quil  demanderait  au  Ministre 
s'il  lui  paraissait  opportua  de  conaoiuaiquer  a  la  presse  une  courte  note  de  ton 
modere. 


N^  58. 

M.  Chevalley,  Ministre  de  France  a  Christiania, 

a  M.  Bien^venu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Christiania ,  le  26  juillct  1914. 

Toute  la  flotte  allemandc  en  Norvege  a  re^u  I'ordre  de  prendre  la  mer.  Les  auto- 
rites  allemandesa  Bergen  declarent  que  c'est  pourrallier  directement  TAlleniagne. 

Les  navires  allemands  disperses  dans  les  fiords  au  nord  de  Bergen  rejoindraient 
ceux  qui  sont  aux  Environs  de  Stavanger. 

Chevalley. 


N^  59. 

M.  d'Annoville,  Charge  d'affaires  de  France  a  Luxembourg, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Luxembourg,  \e  26  juillet  191/i. 

D'apres  des  renseignements  que  je  viens  de  recevoir  de  Thionville,  les  qualre  der- 
nieres  classes  liberees  ont  ordre  de  se  tenir  a  la  disposition  de  la  Komniandatur  a 
toule  heure. 

Sans  elre  completement  mobilises,  les  reservistes  ont  interdiction  de  s'absenter  du 
lieu  de  leur  domicile. 

d'Annoville. 


—  77  -^ 


N°  60. 


M.  Faroes,  Consul  general  de  France  a  Bale» 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministredes  Affaires etrangeres  p^L 

Bale,  le  27  juillet  igiil* 

Les  ofEciers  allernands  en  vacances  dans  cette  region  ont  recu,  il  y  a  quatre  jours, 
1  ordre  de  les  inlerrompre  pour  regagner  TAllemagne. 

D'autre  part,  j'apprends  de  deux  sources  serieuses  qu*avis  a  ete  donne  aux  pro- 
priclaires  de  yoitures  automobiles  du  Grand-Duche  de  Bade  dese  preparer  a  les 
mettre  a  la  disposition  des  autorites  railitaires,  deux  jours  apres  un  nouvel  ordre.  Le 
secret,  sous  peine  d'amende,  a  ete  recommande  sur  cet  avi^. 

La  population  baloise  est  tres  inquiete  et  les  facilites  bancaires  se  resserxent. 

Farges* 


r  61. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i.* 

a  M.  Jules  Cambon,  Arabassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin,  communique 
a  bord  de  la  France  (pour  le  President  du  Conseil)  et  a  MM.  les 
Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-Petersbourg,  Vienne, 
Rome. 

Paris,  ie  27  juiilet  1914. 

Les  trois  demarches  de  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  Paris  semblent  caracteris- 
liques  :  —  le  vendredi,  il  lit  une  note  ou  le  Gouvernement  allemand  se  pose  categorique- 
ment  enlre  TAulriche  et  les  Puissances,  approuvant  I'ultimatum  autrichien  a  la  Serbie 
et  ajoutant  que  « I'Allemagne  desire  ardemment  que  le  conflit  r^ste  localise,  toute 
isilervention  d'une  autre  Puissance  devant,  par  le  jeu  de  ses  alliances,  provoquer 
d'iricalculables  consequences  »;  —  le  second  jour,  le  samedi,  Teffet  ayant  ete  produitet 
les  Puissances  ayant,  en  raison  de  la  surprise,  dela  brievete  du  delai  et  des  risques 
de  guerre  generale,  conseille  kla.  Serbie  de  ceder,  M.  de  Schoen  revient  attenuer  sa 
demarche,  feignant  de  s'etonner  de  I'impression  produite  et  proteste  quon  prete  h 
I'Allemagne  des  intentions  quelle  n'apas,  puisque,  dit-il,  il  n'y  a  eu  ni  concert  avaat, 
ni  menace  apres ;  —  le  troisieme  jour,  le  dimanche,  le  resultat  ayant  ete  obtenu,  puisque 
la  Serbie  a  cede  en  fait  pour  ainsi  dire  a  toutes  les  exigences  de  TAulriche,  TAmbas- 
sadeur  d'Allemagne  repai^ait  k  deux  reprises,  pour  insisler  sur  les  intentions  pacifiques 


—    78  — 
de  FAllemagne  et  sur  son  desir  ardent  de  collaborer  au  mainllen  de  la  paix,  apres 
avoir  enregistre  le  succes  autrichien,  qui  clot  ja  premiere  phase  de  la  crise. 

La  situation  a  i'heure  actuelle  reste  inquietante,  en  raison  du  refus  incomprehen- 
sible de  i'Autriche  d  accepter  la  soumission  serbe,  de  ses  operations  de  mobilisation 
et  de'ses  menaces  d'envahir  la  Serbie.  L  attitude  prise  depuis  le  debut,  avec  I'appui 
allemand,  par  le  Gouvemement  autrichien,  son  refus  d'accepteraucune  conversation 
des  P  uissances  ne  permettant  pas,  en  pratique,  a  celles-ci  d'intervenir  utilement  aupres 
deluisans  Tintermediait-e  de  I'Allemagne.  Cependant  le  temps  presse,  car  si  I'armee 
autrichienne  franchit  la  frontiere,  ilsera  Ires  difficile  d'enrayer  la  crise,  laRussie  ne 
paraissant  p-as  pouvoir  tolerer  I'occupalion  de  la  Serbie,  apre^  que  celle-ci  s'e'st  en 
realite  soumise  k  la  Note  autrichienne  en  lui  donnant  toutes  satisfactions  et  garanties. 
L'Allemagne,  du  fait  meme  de  la  position  prise  par  elle,  est  qualifiee  pour  intervenir 
utilement  et  etre  ecoutee  a  Vienne;  si  elle  ne  le  fait  pas,  elle  justifie  tous  les  soupgons 
et  assume  la  responsabilite  de  la  guerre. 

Les  Puissances,  et  en  particulier  la  Russie,  la  France  et  I'Angleterre  ont  determine 
par  leurs  pressants conseils  Belgrade  a  ceder;-elles  ont  done  rempli  leur  role;  main- 
tenant  c'est  a  I'Allemagne,  seule  en  situation  d'etre  entendue  rapidement  a  Vienne, 
k  donner  des  conseils  k  I'Autriche  qui  a  obtenu  satisfaction  et  ne  peut,  pour  un  detail 
facile. i  regler,  dechainer  la  guerre  generale. 

C'est  dans  ces  CO  nditions  que  se  presente  la  proposition  faite  par  le  cabinet  de  Lon- 
dres;  M.  Sazonoff  ayant  dit  k  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  qu'a  la  suite  de  I'appel  dela 
Serbie  aux  Puissances,  la  Russie  accepteraitde  se  tenir  ^I'ecart,  SirE.  Grey  a  formule 
aupres  des  Cabinets  de  Paris,  Berlin  et  Rome,  la  suggestion  suiyante  :  les  Ambassa- 
deurs  de  France,  d'Allemagne  et  d'ltalie  a  Londres  seraient  charges  de  chercher  avec 
Sir  E.  Grey  un  moyeti  de  resoudre  les  difEcultes  actuelles ,  etant  entendu  que  pendant 
cette  conversation,  la  Russie,  TAutriche  et  la  Serbie  s'abstiendraient  de  toute  opera- 
tion militaire  active.  Sir  A.  Nicolson  a  parle  de  cette  suggestion  a  TAmbassadeur  d'Alle- 
magne, qui  s'y  est  monlre  favorable;  elle  sera  egalement  bien  accueillie  a  Paris  et 
aussi  a  Rome,  selon  toute  vraisemblance.  Ici  encore,  la  parole  est  k  I'Allemagne, 
qui  a  I'occasion  de  temoigner  autrement  qu'en  paroles  sa  bonne  volonte. 

Je  vous  prie  de  vous  concerter  avec  votre  coUegue  anglais  et  d'appuyer  aupres  du 
Gouvernemenl  allemand  sa  demarche  dans  la  forme  qui  vous  paraitra  opportune. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


K  62; 

M.  Bienvewu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i., 

a  bord  de  la  France  (pour  le  President  du  Conseil)  et  a  MM.  les 
x\mbassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-Petersbourg,  Berlin, 
Vienne. 

Paris,  le  27  juiilet  1914. 

Apres  sa  demarche  d'hier  tendant  k  une  intervention  apaisante  de  la  France  k 
Petersbourg,  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  etait  revenu,  ainsi  que  je  vous  en  ai  in- 
forme ,  a  la  Direction  politique ,  sous  le  pretexte  qu'il  pourrait  y  avoir  interet  a  com- 


—  79  — 
muniquer  k  la  presse  une  courte  note  indiquant  le  sens  pacifiquc  et  arnica!  de  la 
conversation;  il  avait  meme  suggere  les  termes  suivants  :  « L'Ambassadeur  et  le  Mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  ont  eu,  pendant  I'apres-midi ,  un  nouvel  entretien  au 
cours  duquel  on  a  examine ,  dans  I'esprit  le  plus  amical  et  dans  un  sentiment  de 
solidarite  pacifique ,  les  moyens  qui  pourraient  etre  employes  pour  maintenir  la  paix 
generale. »  II  fut  repondu  de  suite  que  les  termes  paraissaient  excessifs  et  de  nature 
k  donner  a  I'opinion  des  illusions  sur  la  situation  reelle,  que  cependarit  une  breve 
note  dans  le  sens  indiqu6,  c'est-a-dire*.rendant compte  dune  conversation  oii  avaient 
ete  examines  les  moyens  employes  pour  sauvegarder  la  paix,  pourrait  etre  donnee 
si  je  I'approuvais. 

La  note  communiquee  a  ete  la  suivante  :  «  L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  et  le  Mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  ont  eu  un  nouvel  entretien,  au  cours  duquel  ils  ont 
recherche  les  moyens  d'action  des  Puissances  pour  le  maintien  de  la  paix. »  Cette 
redaction,  volontairement  terne,  evitait  une  solidarite  avec  TAllemagne  qui  pourrait 
etre  mal  interpretee. 

Ce  matin ,  M.  de  Schoen  a  adresse  une  lettre  particuliere  dn  Directeur  politique ,  sous 
le  pretexte  de  resurher  son  entretien  avec  le  Ministre ,  et  a  ajoute  :  « Notez  bien  la 
phrase  sur  la  solidarite  des  sentiments  pacifiques.  Ce  n'est  pas  une  phrase  banale , 
mais  la  sincere  expression  ^e  la  realite.  >-  Le  resume  jomt  k  la  lettre  etait  ainsi  con^u  : 
a  Le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  a  fait  formellement  et  oJ0B.ciellement  declarer  a  celui  de 
Petersbourg  qu'il  ne  poursuit  aucune  acquisition  territoriale  en  Serbie  et  qu'il  ne  veut 
point  porter  atteinte  k  I'integrite  du  royaume ;  sa  seule  intention  est  celle  d'assurer  sa 
tranquillite.  En  ce  moment,  la  decision,  si  une  guerre  europeenne  doit  eclater, 
depend  uniquement  de  la  Russie.  Le  Gouvernement  AUeo^and  a  la  ferme  confiance 
que  le  Gouvernement  Fran(5ais,  avec  lequel  il  se  skit  solidaire  dans  I'ardent  desir  que 
la  paix  europeenne  puisse  etre  maintenue,.usera  de  toute  son  influence  dans  un  esprit 
apaisant  aupres  du  Cabinet  de  Petersbourg. » 

Je  vous  ai  fait  connaitre  ia  reponse  qui  avait  et^  faite  (une  demarche  frangaise  a 
Petersbourg  s'expliquait  mal  et  devait  avoir  pour  coroUaire  une  d-marche  allemande 
k  Vienne,  ou,  a  defaut,  une  mediation,  dans  les  deux  capitales,  des  quatre  Puissances 
moins  interessees). 

La  lettre  de  M.  de  Schoen  est  susceptible  de  diverses  interpretations  :  la  plus  vrai- 
semblable  est  qu'elle  t^nd,  comme  sa  demarche  meme»  a  chercher  k  compronaettre  la 
France  au  regard  de  la  Russie,  quitte,  en  cas  d'echec,  a  rejeter  sur  la  Russie  et  sur 
la  France  la  responsabilite  dune  guerre  eventuelle ,  enfin  a  masquer,  par  des  assu- 
rances pacifiques  non  ecoutees,  une  action  militaire  de  rAutriche'en  Serbie,  destinee 
k  completer  le  succes  aulrichien. 

Je  vous^  communique  ces  renseignements  k  titre  d'information  el  a  toutes  fins 
utiles. 

BlENVENU-MABTm. 


80  — 


r  63. 


1 


M.  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'Affaires  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin.  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  L 

Londres,  ie  27  juillet  191/i. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  ct  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  laissent  en-' 
lendre  qu'ils  sont  surs  qne  I'Angleterre  garderait  la  neulralite  si  un  confllt  venait  6. 
eclaler.  Sir  Arthur  Nicolson  m'a  dit  que,  cependant,  le  Prince  Lichnowski  ne  pou- 
vait,  apre  ia  conversation  qu  il  a  eue  avec  lui  aujourd'hui,  conserver  aucun  doute  sur 
la  liberte  qu'enlendait  garder  le  Gouvernement  britannique  d'inlervenir,  au  cas  ou  il 
le  jugerait  utile. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  n'aura  pas  manque  d'etre  frappe  de  cette  declaration , 
mais  pour  peser  sur  I'Allemagne  et  pour  eviter  un  conflit,  il  semble'indlspensahlQ 
que  celle-ci  soil  amenee  a  tenir  pour  certain  quelle  Irouveralt  I'Anglelerre  et  la 
Russie  aux  cotes  de  la  France. 

DE  Fleuriau. 


N"  64. 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-P^tersbourg, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Saint-Pelersbourg,  2  7  j uillet  1 9 1  A- 

M.  Sazonoff  a  tenu  a  tous  mes  collegues  un  ^ang.^ge  conciliant. 
Malgre  I'emotion  publique ,  le  Gouvernement  Russe  s  applique  et  reussit  k  conlenir 
ia  presse;  on  a  notamment  recommande  une  grande  moderation  envers  TAUemagne. 
Depuis  bier,  M.  Sazonoff  n'a  re9u  de  Vienne  ni  de  Berlin  aucune  information. 

Paleolggue. 


N**  65. 

M.  BoMPARD,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Constantinople,      ' 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  p.  i. 

Therapia,  Ic  2 7  juillet  191 4. 

Le  conflit  au^lro-serl)e  retient  I'altention  du  Gouvernement  Olloman  et  les  Turcs. 
se  rejouissent  des  epreuves  de  la  Serbie,  mais  on  est  porte  a  croirc  ici  en  general  ((ue 


—  si- 
ce conflit  restera  localise.  L'on  eslime  generalement  que,  celle  fois  encore,  la  Riissie 
n'interviendra  pas  en  faveur  de  WSerbie  dans  des  conditions  qui  6tendraienl  le  conflil 
arme. 

Le  sentiment  unanime,  dans  les  milieux  politiques  ottomans,  est  que  TAutriche, 
avec  Tappui  de  I'AHemagne,  arrivera  k  sesfms  et  quelle  fera  entrer  la  Serbie,  apres 
la  Bulgarie,  dans  Torbile  de  la  Triple  Alliance. 

BOMPARD. 


r  66. 

M.  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'affaires  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^Irangeres  p.  i. 

Londres,  le  27  juillet  191 4. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  a  dil  ce  matin  k  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  que  si  TAutriche 
envahissait  la  Serbie  apres  la  reponse  serbe,  elle  demontrerait  qu'elle  ne  poursuivail 
pas  seulement  le  re^ement  des  questions  mentionnees  dans  sa  note  du  2  3  juillet, 
mais  qu'elle  voulait  ecraser  un  petit  Etal.  «Alors,  a-t-il  ajoute,  se  poserait  une 
question  europeenne,  et  il  s'ensuivrait  une  guerre,  a  laquelle  d'autres  Puissances 
seraient  amen^es  a  prendre  part ». 

L'attitude  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  s'affirme  par  I'arret  de  la  demobilisation  de  sa 
flotte.  Le  Premier  Lord  de  I'Amiraute  avait  pris  discretement  cette  mesure  des 
vendredi,  de  sa  propre  initiative;  cette  nuit,  sir  Edward  Grey  et  ses  collegues  ont 
decide  de  la  publier.  Ce  resultat  est  du  a  I'altitude  concilfante  de  la  Serbie  et  de  la 
Russie. 

-  DE  Fleuruu. 


r  67. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin , 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

Berlin,  ic  27  juillet  1914. 

J'ai  entretenu  aujourd'hui  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  de  la  demarche  de  I'Angleterre  ten- 
dant  k  ce  que  I'Allemagne  se  joigne  aux  Cabinets  de  Londres,  Paris  et  Rome  pour 
empecher  les  hostilites  entre  Petersbourg  et  Vienne. 

Documents  diplomatiques.  —  Guerre  europeenne.  n 


—  82  — 

Je  lui  ai  fait  remarquer  que  la  proposition  de  sir  Edward  Grey  ouvrait  la  voie  a 
une  issue  pacifique.  M.  de  Jagow  m'a  repondu  qu'il  etait  dispose  k  y  entrer,  mais 
il  m'a  fait  Temarquer  que  si  la  Russie  mobilisait,  rAUemagrte  serait  obligee  de 
mobiliser  aussitot,  que  nous  y  serions  forces  egalement  et  qu'alors  le  con  flit  serait 
presque  inevitable.  Je  lui  ai  demande  si  i'Allemagne  se  croirait  engagee  a  mobiliser 
dans  le  cas  oii  la  Russie  ne  mobiliserait  que  sur  la  frontiere  autricliienne  ;  ii  m'a  dit 
que  non  et  m'a  autorise  formellement  k  vous  faire  connaitre  Cette  restriction.  Aussi 
attacherait-il  la  plus  grande  importance  k  ce  que  les  puissances  amies  e&  all  lees  de  la 
Russie  intervinssent  aupres  d'elle. 

Enfm  il  a  remarque  que  si  la  Russie  attaqualt  rAutficlie,  TAllemagne'  devralt 
attaquer  aussitot  de  son  cote.  L'interventlon  proposee  par  VAngleterre  a  Petersbo  ucg 
et  a  Vienne  nepourrait  done  s'exercer  a  sesyeux  que  si  les  evenements' ne .  se  preci- 
pitaient  pas.  II  ne  desespere  pas  dans  ce  cas  qu  elle  puisse  reussir.  J'ai  exprime  le 
regret  que  rAutriche,  par  son  inlransigeance,  eul  conduit  I'Europe  au  pas  difficile 
que  nous  traversons,  mais  j'ai  temolgne  I'espoir  que  1  intervention  aboutirait. 

Jules  Cambox. 


N"  63. 

M.  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'affaires  a  Londres, 

4  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  ,  Ministre  des  AiBaires  ^trangeres  p,  i.. 

Londres,  le  27  juillet  1914- 

Hier,  au  conrs  d'une  conversation  entre  M.  Sazonoff,  M.  Paleologue  et  Sir  G.  Bu- 
chanan, le  Ministre  russe  aurait  dit  que  la  Serbie  etait  dlsposee  a  en  appeler  aux 
Puissances,  et,  qu*en  ce  cas,  son  Gouvernement  accepteralt  de  se  lenir  k  lecart. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  a  pris  texte  de  ces  paroles  pour  formuler  aupres  des  Cabinets  de 
Paris,  de  Berlin  et  de  Rome  une  proposition  dont  Sir  Francis  Bertie  salslra  Votrc 
Excellence.  Les  quatre  puissances  interviendraient  dans  le  conflit,  et  les  Ambassadeurs 
de  France,  d'Allemagne  et  d'ltalie  k  Londres  seraient  charges  de  chercher,  avec 
Sir  Ed.  Grey,  un  moyen  de  resoudre  les  diflicultes  actuelles. 

II  serait  entendu  que,  pendant  les  debats  de  cette  petite  conference,  Ja  Russie, 
I'Autriche  et  la  Serbie  s'abstiendraient  de  to«te  operation  milltaire  active.  Sir  A.  Ni- 
colson  a  parle  de  cette  suggestion  a  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  qui  s'y  est  montre 
favorable. 

DE  Fleuriau. 


-.  83  -^ 


r  09. 

M.  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'affaires  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

Londres,  le  27  juillet  1914. 

Le  Ministre  de  Serbie  n'a  pas  re^u  d'instructions  de  son  Gouvernement  en  vue  de 
demander  la  mediation  de  I'Angieterre;  il  est  d'ailleurs  possible  que  les  telegrammes 
de  son  Gouvernement  soient  arretes  en  route. 

La  proposition  anglaise  d'intervenir  a  quatre,  indiquee  dans  mon  telegramme; 
precedent,  est  d'ailleurs  lancee,  et  me  parait  devoir  etre  soutenue  en  premier  lieu. 

DE  Fleuma-U, 


r  70. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

a  M.  DE  Fleuriau,  Charge  d'affaires  de  France  a  Londres. 

Paris,  le  27  juillet  1914. 

L'Ambassadeurd'Angleterre  m'a  communique  la  proposition  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey  ten- 
dant  a  une  action  commune  de  VAngleterre,  de  TAUemagne,  de  la  France  et  de  Tllalie 
a  Vienne,  Belgrade  et  Petersbourg  pour  arreter  les  operations  militaires  actives,  pea- 
dant  que  les  Ambassadeurs  d'AUemagne,  d'ltalie  et  de  France  a  Londres  examine- 
raient,  avec  Sir  E.  Grey,  les  moyens  de  trouver  une  solution  aux  complications 
presentes. 

J'ai  prescrit  ce  matin  a  M.  Jules  Cambon  de  se  concerter  avec  I'Ambassadeur 
d'Angleterre  a  Berlin,  et  d'appuyer  sa  demarche,  dans  la  lorme  ou  il  le  jugerait 
opportun. 

Je  vous  autorise  a  prendre  part  a  la  reunion  projetde  par  Sir  E.  Grey.  Je  suis  pret 
egalement  a  donner  a  nos  agents  a  Vienne,  Petersbourg  et  Belgrade  des  instructions 
dans  le  sens  demande  par  le  Gouvernement  anglais. 

Toutefois,  j'estime  que  les  chanoes  de  succes  de  la  proposition  de  Sir  E.  Grey 
reposent  essemiellement  sur  Taction  qi>e  Berlin  serait  dispose  k  exercer  a  Vienne; 
une  demarche  de  ce  cote  pour  amener  la  suspension  des  operations  militaires  nae 
paraitrait  vouee  a  lechec,  si  Tinfluence  de  I'AUemagne  ne  setait  pas  exercee  au 
prealable. 

J  ai  egalement  note  parmi  les  observations  de  M.  de  Scboen,  que  le  Gouvernement 


—  u  — 

austro-liongrois  etalt  speclalement  susceptible  quand  on  prononQalt  les  termes  de 
«  mediation » , « intervention  » , « conference » ,  el  plus  capable  d'admettre  des  «  conseils 
amicaux »  et  des  t  conversations ». 

Bienvenu-Martin, 


r  71. 

M.  DE  Fleoriau,  Charge  d  affaires  de  France,  k  Londres, 

a  M.Biewvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Londres,  ie  27  juillet  1914. 

J'ai  fait  connailre  k  Sir  E.  Grey  voire  adhesion  a  sa  proposition  de  mediation  k 
quatre  et  de  confereribe  a  Londres.  L*Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  Vienne  a  re9U  les 
instructions  necessaires  pour  saisir  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  des  que  ses 
collegues  fran9ais,  allemand  ou  italien  auront  ete  autorises  a  laire  la  meme  de- 
marche. 

Le  Gouvernement  italien  a  accepte  I'intervention  k  quatre  en  vue  de  prevenir  les 
operations  militaires;  il  consulte  le  Gouvernement  allemand  sur  la  proposition  de 
conference  et  la  procedure  a  suivre  k  legard  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois.  Le 
Gouvernement  allemand  n  a  pas  encore  repondu. 

DE  Fleobiap. 


N**  72. 

M.  BarkeRe,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Rome. 

a  M.  BienvEnd-Martin,  Mmistre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

Rome,  le  27  juillet  1914. 

Le  Marquis  de  San  Giuliano,  est  rentre  a  Rome  ce  soir  et  je  Tai  vu  aussitot  apres 
son  arrivee.  11  m'a  parle  du  contenu  de  la  Note  autrichienne  et  m'a  assure  formel- 
lement  qu'iln'en  a  eu  aucune  connaissance  prealable. 

II  savait  bien  que  celte  Note  devait  avoir  un  caraclere  rigoureux  el  energique ; 
mais  il  ne  s'etait  pas  doute  qu*elle  put  prendre  une  telle  forme.  Je  lui  ai  demande 
s'il  etait  vrai  qu'il  eut  fait  exprimer  k  Vienne  k  ce  propos ,  comme  le  pretendent 
certains  joumaux,  une  approbation  de  Taction  autrichienne  et  Tasstirance  que  lltalie 
re.mplirait  a  I'egard  de  rAulriche  ses  devoirs  d'alliee.  «  En  aucune  fa9on,  m'a 
repondu  ie  Minislre  c  nous  n  avons  pas  ete  consultes,  on  ne  nous  a  rien  dit;  nous 
n'avons  done  eu  k  faire  aucune  communication  de  cette  nature  k  Vienne  ». 


—  85  -. 

Le  Marquis  de  San  Giuliano  eslime  que  la  Serbie  aurait  agi  plus  sagement  en 
acceptanl  la  note  dans  son  iniegralite;  aujourd'hui  encore  il  eslime  que  ce  serait  la 
seule  chose  a  faire,  etant  convaincu  que  I'Autriche  ne  retirera  aucune  de  ses  pre- 
tentions, etlesmaintiendra,  meme  au  risque  d'amener  une  conflagration  generale;  il 
doute  que  TAllemagne  soil  disposee  a  se  preler  a  une  action  aupres  de  son  alliee.  II 
constate  toutefois  que  rAllemagne  tient  en  ce  moment  un  grand  compte  de  ses 
rapports  avec  Londres,  et  il  croit  que  si  une  Puissance  pent  determiner  Berlin  a  une 
action  pacifique,  c'est  TAngleterre. 

Quant  a  ritalie,  elle  continuera  h  faire  tous  ses  efforts  en  faveur  de  la  paix.  C'est 
a  cet  effet  qu  il  a  adhere  sans  hesiter  a  la  proposition  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey  de  r6unir  a 
Londres  les  Ambassadeurs  des  Puissances,  qui  ne  sont  pas  directement  interessees 
dans  le  conflit  auslro-serbe. 

Barrebe. 


r  73. 

M.  Jule.  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res  p.  i. 

Berlin,  le  27Juillet  igid. 

L' Ambassadeur  d'Anglelerre ,  qui  est  renlr6  aujourd'hui,  a  vu  le  Secretaire  d'Etat 
et  I'a  entretenu  de  la  suggestion  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey.  M.  de  Jagow  lui  a  repondu  en 
manifestant  toujours  son  desir  de  la  paix,  mais  en  ajoulant  qu'il  ne  pourrait  consentir 
a  ce  qui  ressemblerait  a  une  conference  des  Puissances;  ce  serait  inslituer  une  espece 
de  cour  d'arbilrage,  dont  I'idee  ne  serait  acceptable  que  si  elle  etait  demandee  par 
Vienna  el  Petersbourg.  Le  langage  de  M.  de  Jagow  confirme  celui  de  M.  de  Schoen 
[a  Voire  Excellence. 

A  la  verite  une  demarche  des  quatre  Puissances  a  Vienne  et  Petersbourg  pent  se 
produire  par  la  voie  diplomatique,  sans  prendre  la  forme  d'une  conference  et  est 
susceptible  de  bien  des  modalites ;  ce  qui  importerait  c'est  de  manifester  a  Vienne  et 
a  Petersbourg  le  desir  commun  des  quatre  Puissances  qu'un  conflit  soil  evite*  La 
lemporisation  permettrait  seule  d'arriver  k  'une  issue  pacifique  des  difficultes  ,pre- 
sentes. 

Jules  Cambon. 


—  86  — 


r  iL 


M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  BerJin, 

a  M.  Bienvend-Martiw,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^es  p.  i 

Berlin,  le  27  juillet  igid* 

Je  me  suis  entretenu  aujoiird'hui  avec  le  Secretaire  d'Elat  et  j'ai  appuye  aupres 
de  lui  la  demarche  que  venait  de  faire  Sir  E.  Goschen. 

M.  de  Jagow  m'a  repondu,  comme  il  I'avait  fait  a  TAmbassadem-  d'Anglelerre , 
qu'il  ne  pouvait  accepter  la  proposition  de  charger  les  Ambassadeurs  d'ltalie,  de 
France  et  d'Ailemagne  de  chercher  avec  Sir  Ed.  Grey  les  moy^ns  de  resoudre  les 
difficultes  actuelles,  parce  que  ce  serait  instituer  une  veritable  conference  pour 
traiter  des  affaires  de  I'Autriche  et  de  la  Russie. 

J'ai  r^plique  k  M.  de  Jagow  que  je  regrettais  sa  reponse,  mais  que  le  grand  objet 
que  Sir  Edw.  Grey  avait  en  vue  depassait  une  question  de  forme ;  que  ce  qui  impor- 
tait  c'eiait  I'association  de  I'Angleterre  et  de  la  France  avec  I'AUemagne  et  I'ltalie 
pour  travailler  a  une  oeuvre  de  paix;  que  cette  association  pouvait  se  manifester  par 
des  demarches  communes  a  Petersbourg  et  k  Vienne ;  qu'il  m'avait  souvent  exprime 
son  regret  de  voir  les  de^ix  groupes  d'alHance  opposes  toujours  inn  a  I'autre  en 
Europe;  qu'il:  avait  \k  I'occasion  de  prouver  qu'il  y  avait  un  esprit  europeen,  en  mon- 
trant  quatre  Puissances  appartenant  aux  deux  groupes  agissant  d'un  commun  accord, 
pour  empecher  un  conflit. 

M.  de  Jagow  s'est  derobe  en  disant  que  TAllemagne  avait  des  engagements  avec 
I'Autriche.  Je  lui  ai  fait  remarquer  que  les  rapports  de  I'Allemagne  avec  Vienne 
n'etaient  pas  plus  etroits  que  ceux  de  la  France  avec  la  Russie  et  que  c'etait  lui-meme 
qui  mettait  dans  I'espece  les  deux  groupes  d'alliance  en  opposition. 

Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  m'a  dit  alors  qu'il  ne  se  refusait  pas  a  agir  pour  ecarter  le 
conflit  austro-russe ,  mais  qu'il  ne  pouvait  pas  intervenir  dans  le  conflit  austro-serbe. 
«  L'un  est  la  consequence  de  I'autre,  ai-je  dit^  et  il  importe  d'empecher  quii  ne  sur- 
•«  vienne  un  etat  de  fait  nouveau,  de  nature  a  amener  une  intervention  de  la  Kussie.  » 

Comme  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  persistait  a  dire  qu'il  etait  oblige  de  tenir  ses  engage- 
ments ad'egard  de  I'Autriche,  je  lui  ai  demandi§  s'il  s'etait  engage  k  la  suivre  partout, 
lesyeux  bandes,  et  s'il  avait  pris  connaissance  dela  reponse  dela  Serbie  a  TAutriche, 
que  le  Charge  d'affaires  de  Serbie  lui  avait  remise  ce  matin.  «  Je  n'en  ai  pas  encore 
«  eu  le  temps, »  me  dit-il.  «  Je  le  regrette.  Yous  verriez  que,  sauf  sur  des  points  de 

*  detail,  Ta  Serbie  se  soumet  entierement.  II  semble  dome  que,  puisque  I'Autriche  a 

*  oblenu  les  satisfactions  que  votre  appui  lui  a  procurees,  vous  pouvez  aujourd'hui 
ii  lui  conseiUer  de  s'en  contenter  ou  d'examiner  avec  la  Serbie  les  termes  de  la  reponse 
f  de  celle-ci* » 

Comme  M.  Jagow  ne  me  repondait  pas  clairement,  je  lui  ai  demande  si  I'Alle- 
magne  voulait  la  guerre.  II  a  proteste  vivement,  disant  qu'il  savait  que  c'etait 
ijpaa  pens^e,  mais  que  c'etait  tout  k  fait  inexact.  « D  faut  done,  ai-je  repris,  agir  en 


—  87  - 
« consequence.  Quand  vous  lirez  la  reponse  serbe ,  pesez-en  les  terraes  avec  votre 
•  conscience,  je  Vous  en  prie,  au  nom  de  I'huinanite,  et  n'assumez  pas  persoonelle- 
€  ment  une  part  de  respoosabilite  dans  les  caitastrophes  que  vous  laissez  preparer.  » 
M.  de  Jagow  a  proleste  de  nonveau,  ajoutant  qu  il  etait  prel  a  s'unir  a  I'Anorleterre 
el  k  la  France  dans  un  effort  commun,  mais  qu  il  fallait  trouver  a  cette  intervention 
line  forme  qu'il  put  accepter  et  que  les  Cabinets  devaieat  s'entendre  a  ce  sujet. 

« Au  reste,  a-t-il  ajoute,  les  conversations  directes  entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg 
«  sont  entamees  et  se  poursuivent :  j'en  augure  beaucoup  de  bien  et  j'espere. » 

Au  moment  de  le  quitter,  je  lui  dis  que  j'avals  eu  ce  matin  Timpression  que  Theiire 
de  la  detente  avait  sonne,  mais  que  je  voyais  bien  qu'il  n'en  etait  rien.Il  m'a  repondu 
que  je  me  trompais;  qu'il  esperait  que  les  choses  etaient  en  bonne  v6ie  et  abouti- 
raient  peut-etre  rapidement.  Je  lui  ai  demande  d'agir  a  Vienne  pour  qu'elles  marchent 
vite-,  parce  qu'il  importait  de  ne  pas.-  laisser  se  creer  en  Russie  un  de  ces  courants 
d'opinion  qui  emportent  tout. 

A  mon  sentiment.,  il  y  aurait  lieu  de  demander  k  Sir  E.  Grey„  qui  a  dti  etre  avise 
par  Sir  E.  Goschen  du  refua  oppose  a  sa  proposition  dans  la  forme  qui  lui  ^tait 
donnee,  de  la  renoiiveler  sous  une  autre  forme,  de  telle  fa^on  que  TAUemagne  n'ait 
pas  de  pretexte  pour  refuser  de  s'y  associer  et  prenne  jesresponsabilites  aux  yeux  de 
i'Angleterre. 

Jules  Cambon. 


N*  75. 

ML  Biewvenu-Martiis,  Minislre  des  Affaires  6trangeres  p^.  i. 

a  MM.  les  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-Petersbcmrg, 
Berlin,  Vienne,  Rome. 

Paris,  ie  nj  juillct  i9i4« 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongi^ie  est  venu  me  voir  pour  me  remettre  un  me- 
moire,  veritable  acte  d'accusation  contre  k  Serbie;  il  m'a  declare,  d'ordre  de  soq 
Gouvememenl,  que  la  Serbie  n'ayant  pa&  repondu  d'une  maniere  satisfaisanle  aux 
demandes  du  Gouvernement  imperial,  celui-ci  5e  voit  contraint  d'employer  des 
moyens  energiques  pour  amener  la  Serbie  a  domier  les  satisfactions  et  garanties  qui 
sont  reciamees  d'elle.  Cest  demain  que  le  Gouvernement  autrichien  prendra  ies 
mesures  k  eel  effet. 

Tai  prie  FAmbassadeur  de  me  faire  connailre  les  mesures  envisagees  par  I'Autriche, 
et  le  Comte  Szecsen  m'a  repondu  que  cela  pourrail  etre  soil  un  ultimatum,  soil  une 
declaration  de  guerre,  soil  le  passage  de  la  frontiere,  mais  qu'il  n'avait  aucuue  indi- 
cation precise  sur  ce  point. 

J'ai  alors  fait  remarquer  k  TAmbassadeur  que  la  Serbie  avait  accepte  sur  presque 
tous  ies  points  ies  exigences  de  l'Aulricbe»  que  la  divergence  qui  subsistail  sur 


—  88  — 
quelques  points  pounail  disparaiire  avec  un  peu  de  bonne  volonte  reciproque,  et  par 
i'aide  des  Puissances  amies  de  la  paix;  en  fixant  a  demain  Texeculion  de  ses  resolu- 
tions, TAutriche  rendait,  pour  la  seconde  fois,  leur  concours  presque  impossible  et 
assumait  une  lourde  responsabilite  en  risquant  de  dechainer  une  guerre,  dont  oa 
ne  pourrait  mesurer  I'exlension. 

Je    vous    communique,   a  litre  d'information ,  le  memoire   que  ma  remis  le 
Comte  Szecsen. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


Annexe. 


Memoirs  da  Gouvemement  aaslro-hongrois ,  remis  par  le  Comte  Szecsen 
A  M.  Bienvena-Martin  le  27  jaillet  19 U. 

L'agitation  serbe,  qui  s'est  dojxne  pour  but  d'arriver  a  ia  separation  de  la  Monarchie  aulri- 
ehienne  des  jiartis  slaves  du  Sud  pour  les  rattacher  a  un  grand  Etat  serbe,  remonle  tres 
loin  en  arriere.  Celte  propaganda  sur  le  sol  serbe,  toujours  la  meme  quant  a  son  but  final, 
quoique  diverse  dans  ses  moyens  et  intensit^s,  avait  atteint  son  plus  haut  point  lors  de  la 
crise  de  Tannexion.  Rejetant  le  manteau  protecteur  du  secret,  elle  s'^tait  montr^e  alors  avec 
toute  la  franchise  de  ses  tendances  et  avait  montre  sous  le  patronage  du  Gouvernement 
serbe  son  intention  de  realiser  ses  desseins  avec  tous  les  moyens  disponibles. 

Tandis  que  la  Presse  serbe  tout  entiere  appelait  au  combat  centre  la  Monarcbie  par  des 
cris  haineux  ct  en  denaturant  les  faits,  il  se  creait  des  associations  pour  encourager  a  celte 
lutte  —  meme  abstraction  faite  d'autres  moyens  de  propagande. 

L  association  qui  est  devenue  la  plus  importante  est  la  «  Narodna  Odbrana ».  Issue  d'un 
comite  r^volutionnaire  qui  existait  alors,  elle  fut  constituee  en  Society  priv^e,  cependant, 
sous  forme  d'organisation  dependant  du  Departement  des  AfTaires  ^trangere?  de  Belgrade 
par  des  fonctionnaires  serbes  militaires  et  civils.  Parmi  ces  fondateurs,  on  doit  citer  notam- 
ment :  le  general  Buzo  Jankovic,  les  anciens  ministres  Ljuba  Jovanovic,  Ljuba  Davidovic 
et  Valislav  Valovic,  le  directeur  de  I'lmprimerie  nationale  Zivojin  Dacic,  et  les  anciens  capi- 
taines,  maintenant  commandants,  Voja  Tankovic  et  Milan  Pribicevic.  Cette  association 
s'etait  impose  comme  but  la  creation  et  i'organisation  de  bandes  en  vue  de  la  guerre  esperee 
contre  la  Monarchie.  On  trouvera  une  description  saisissante  de  I'activil^  d'alors  de  la 
«  Narodna  Odbrana  »,  notamment  dans  les  declarations  du  sujet  bosn^o-herz^govinien  Trifko 
Krstanovic,  entendu  comme  temoin  par  le  conseii  de  guerre  de  Sarajevo,  qui  se  trouvait 
alors  a  Belgrade  et  qui,  avec  d'autres  sujets  de  la  Monarchie,  a  ^te  accept^  comme  comi- 
tadji  par  la  « Narodna  Odbrana ».  Avec  environ  cent  quarante  autres,  Krstanovic  avait  ^te 
amen^  a  une  dcole  Cr^ee  pour  la  formation  de  nouveHes  bandes  k  Cuprija,  district  de  Jago- 
dina,  et  dirigce  par  les,  capitaines  Voja  Tankosic  et  Dusan  Putnick.  11  n'y  avait  comme 
maitresdans  cette  ecole  que  des  officiers  serbes;  le  general  Bozo  Jankovic  et  le  capitaine 
Milan  Pribicevic  donnerent  une  grande  r^gularite  a  ces.  cours  d'organisation  de  bandes,  qui 
duraient  trois  mois. 

Les  comitadji  y  recevaient  un  enseignement  complet  du  tir,  du  jet  des  bombes,  des  mines, 
de  la  destruction  des  chemins  de  fer,  timnels ,  ponls  et  tel6graphes.  Leur  devoir  6tait,  d'apres 


—  89  — 
leurs  chefs,  de  mettre  en  pratique  les  connaissances  nouvcllement  acquises  en  Bosnie-Her- 
z^govine. 

Par  cette  aclion  de  la  «  Narodna  Odbrana  »  exerc^e  de  la  maniere  la  plus  publique  et  favo- 
ris6e  par  le  Gouvernement  Serbe,  a  ^t6  r^pandue  la  guerilla  des  bandes  centre  la  Monar- 
chic. Par  la,  les  sujets  de  la  Monarchic  6taient  conduits  a  la  Irahison  contre  leur  patrie,  et 
amenes  syst6matiquement  a  pratiquer  comme  ^missaires  serbes  des  attaques  secretes  contre 
les  moyens  de  defense  de  leur  patrie. 

Cette  periode  des  aspirations  agressives  s'est  termin^e  avec  la  declaration  faite  par  le  Gou- 
vernement serbe  le  3i  mars  1909,  dans  laquelle  celui-ci  se  d^clarait  pret  k  accepter  le 
nouvel  ^tat  de  choses  cr6e  par  I'annexion  de  la  Bosnie-Herzegovine  au  point  de  vue  du  droit 
public,  et  a  promis  solennellement  vouloir  vivre  en  relations  amicales  de  bon  voisinage, 
dans  I'avenir,  avec  la  Monarchie. 

Avec  cette  declaration ,  il  semblait  que  dut  prendre  fm  I'agitation  con§tituant  une  source 
permanente  de  troubles  contre  TAutriche-Hongrie  et  qu'on  eut  trouve  un  moyen  de, rappro- 
chement amical  entre  la  Serbie  et  la  Monarchie.  Privee  de  Tappui  du  Gouvernement  serbe, 
et  combattue  par  lui  conformement  a  ces  engagements,  la  propagande  hostile  n'aurait  pii 
durer  que  dune  nianiere  occulte,  vou^e  a  une  prompte  destruction.  Par  contre,  les  points 
de  contact  existant  entre  les  partis  slaves  du  Sud  de  la  Monarchie  et  la  Serbie  dans  le 
domaine  de  la  langue,  des  races  et  de  la  culture  auraient  du  conduire  h  la  realisation  dun 
travail  de  developpement  commun  inspire  d'amities  r^ciproques  et  d'interets  paralleles. 

Cependant  ces  espoirs  ne  se  sont  pas  realises.  Les  aspirations  hostiles  a  la  Monarchie  ont 
subsist^,  et,  sous  les  yeux  du  Gouvernement  serbe  qui  n'a  rien  fait  pour  etouffer  cette  agi- 
tation, la  propagande  institute  contre  I'Autriche  n'a  fait  que  gagner  en  6tendueet  prolondeur. 
La  haine  contre  la  Monarchie  a  et4  tenue  en  haleine  et  s'est  transform^e  en  un  sentiment 
irreconciliable.  Le  peuple  serbe,  tant  paries  moyens  anciens,  mieux  adaptes  a  la  situation, 
que  par  des  methodes  plus  completes,  a  et^  appele  « au  combat  d'aneantissement  in^luc 
table »  contre  I'Autriche.  Systematiquement,  des  fils  secrets  ont  ele.  tiss^s  vers  les  donaaines 
slaves  du  sud  de  la  Monarchie,  dont  les  sujets  ont  et^  incites  ^  la  trahison. 

Par-dessus  tout,  c'estla  presse  serbe  qui  n'a  cesse  d'agir  dans  cet  esprit. 

Pas  moins  de  quatre-vingt  un  journaux  paraissant  en  Serbie  ont  du  ^tre  retires  de  la  circu- 
lation postale  jusqu'aujourd'hui,  en  raison  de  leur  contenu  qui  tomba  sous  le  coup  de  la  loi 
p^uale.  II  n'est  guere  une  loi  penale  protegeant  la  personne  sacr6e  du  Monarque  et  des 
membres  de  la  famille  imp^riale  ou  fint^grite  de  I'Etat  qui  n'ait  ete  viol^e  par  les  feuilles 
serbes.  On  trouvera  k  I'annexe  I  quelques-unes  des  uonabreuses  preuves  donndes  par  la  presse 
dans  I'ordre  d'idees  ci-dessus. 

Sans  entrer  dans  un  examen  d6taill6  des  manieres  de  voir  de  Topuiion  publique  serbe,  il 
y  a  lieu  d  observer  que  la  presse  n'a  cesse  de  considerer  i'annexion  .de  la  Bosnie-Herz6govine , 
malgre  la  reconnaissance  formelle  serbe,  apres  comme  avant,  comme  un  rapt  exerc^  contre 
la  Serbie  ayant  besoin  d'etre  repare.  Cette  pens6e  ne  revient  pas  seulement  dans  les  feuilles 
d'opinion  avancee,  mais  aussi  dans  la  nSamupfavaw  qui  tient  de  si  pres  k  I'OiEce  des 
Affaires  etrangeres  de  Belgrade ,  ou  elie  est  exprim^e  sous  une  forme  k  peine  envelopp^e 
(voir  annexe  IP). 

On  ne  peut  pas  non  plus  n^gliger  de  considerer  comment  I'attentat  commis  le  1 5  juin 
1910  4  Sarajevo  par  Bogdan  Zerajic  contre  le  Gouverneur  de  Bosnie-Herzegovine,  mailre 
de  camp  von  Varesanin ,  a  ete  loue  par  la  presse. 

On  se  souvient  que  Zerajic  s'^tait  tue  immediatement  apres  son  acte  et  avait  brul6,  avant 
de  le  commettre,  tous  ses  papiers.  Pour  ces  raisons,  il  n'avait  pas  ^t^  possible  de  mettre  en 
lumiere  pleinement  les  motifs  de  cet  attentat ,  on  a  cependant  pu  coiiclure  d'une  piece  trouvee 

DocQMEKTS  DIPL0MATIQCB8.  —  GuciTe  europcennc.  >.♦ 


—  90  — 

pr^  de  lui  qu'il  etait  partisan  des  ide^  de  Kropotkine.  Les  indicBs  relev^s  ont  egalement 
conduit  a  penser  quil  s'agissait  d un  attentat  d un  caractere  anarchiste, 

Ceci  n'empecha  pas  cependant  la  presse  serbe  de  celebrer  le  criminal  comrae  un  heros 
•national  serbe  et  deiouer  son  acte.  Meme,  ie  «  Politika  s'est  eleve  contre  i'idee  que  Zerajic 
fut  un  anarchiste  et  la  reclame  comme un  «  heros  serbe  dont  le  nom  sera  repete  par  (ous ies 
Serbes  avec  respect  et  douleur  «. 

Le«  Politika »  considere  la  date  du  18'aout  de  la  meme  annee  a  jour  de  naissance  de 
S.  M.  ImpSriale  et  Royale »  comme  une  occasion  favorable  pour  parler  a  nouveau  de 
Zerajic  «  dont  le  nom  sera  dans  le  peuple  qaelque  chose  comme  celui  d'un  saint «  et  pour 
iouer  solennellement  Tattentat  en  une  poesie  (annexe  if  I). 

Cest  ainsi  qua, etc  exploit^  ce  crime  n  ayant  rien  de  commun  avec  les  aspirations  sur  des 
territoires  de  la  Monarchie ,  pour  le  progres  de  cette  idee  et  que  le  meurtre  a  ete  reconnu 
de  la  maniere  la  pins  explicite  comme  un  moyen  glorieux  et  digne  d'imitation  dans  ia  lutte 
pour  la  realisation  de  cette  pensee.  Cette  sauclification  du  meurtre  comme  une  methode 
pleinement  admissible  dans  la  lutte  contre  la  Monarchie  revient  plus  tard  dans  les  feuilles 
parlant  de  I'attentat  commis  pal-  Jukic  contre  le  Commissaire  royal  de  Cuvaj  (annexe  I^). 

Ces  journauxrepahdus,  uon  pas.seulement  en  Serbie,  mais  comme  on  I'a  vu  plus  tard 
par  des  voies  secretes  bien  organisees  et  par  fraudes  dans  la  Monarchie  qui  ont  arnen^  et 
maintenu  ^veillee  dans  les  grandes  masses  cette  disposition ,  laquelle  a  fourni  un  terrain 
nourricier,  favorable  pour  les  m^faits  des  associations  hostiles  h  la  Monarchie. 

Cest  !a  R  Narodna  Odbrana  y>  qui  est  devenue  le  centre  de  Tagitation  menee  par  les  asso- 
'dations.  Les  mSmes  personnes  qui,  au  temps  de  I'annexion,  etaient  a  sa  tete,  sont  encore 
celles  qai  la  dirigent.  On  retrouve  parmi  elles  comme  organisateurs  energiques  et  pleins 
d'aclion  les  plus  violents  opposants  de  la  Monarchie  cites  plus  haut.  Organis^e  sur  une  base 
large  et  profonde  et possedant  une  hierarchie  (voir  annexe  II «  organisation  »),  la  «  Narodna 
Odbrana D  posseda  bientot  environ  quatre  cents  adherents,  qui  repandirent  une  agitation 
tres  active. 

En  outre ,  la  Narodna  s'est  mise  en  association  etroite  avec  la  «  Federation  des  Tireurs  » 
(762  societes),  Tassociation  des  Sokol  « Dusan  Silni  (2,600  membres),  le  Club  olympique, 
f  Association  des  cavaliere  « Knez  Mihajlo  d,  ia  Societe  des  chasseurs  et  la  Ligue  de  d^velop- 
pement,  ainsi  que  de  uombreuses  autres  associations,  qui  toutes,  conduites  et  protegees  par 
la  Narodna ,  agissaient  dans  le  m^me  esprit.  Se  penetrant  de  plas  en  plus  les  unes  les  autres, 
ces  associations  parvinrent  a  une  fusion  complete ,  de  telle  maniere  qu^elles  ne  sont  plus 
aujourdTiui  que  des  membres  du  Corps  unique  de  la  Narodna.  Ainsi  cette  derniere  a  con- 
stitue  sur  toute  la  Serbie  un  reseau  tres  serre  d'agitation  et  a  attire  a  toutes  ses  idees  tous 
ceux  capables  de  les  recevoir. 

Quel  est  lespril  de  Taction  de  la  Narodna,  cest  ce  que  demontre  avec  tme  suffisaiite 
dart^  les  publications  officielles  de  cette  Spciete. 

Dans  ses  statuts ,  revetus  de  Vapparence  d  une  societe  de  developpement  ne  se  pr^occu- 
pant  que  du  perfectionnement  spirituel  et  cprporeldeia  population  serbe  et  de  son  renfor- 
cement  materiel,  la  Narodna  devoile  dans  sou  organe  corporatif  (voir  annexe  U)  le  vrai  et 
unique  mobile  de  son  existence,  en  ce  quelle  appelle  son  « programme  reorganise ». 

Precher  au  peuple  serbe  notammeut « la  verite  sainie  par  un  travail  fanatique  et  infati- 
gable  »sous  I'allegation  que  la  Monarchie  Veut « lui.prendre  sa  liberte  et  sa  langue  et  m^me 
detruirela  Serbie));  qu'il  est  une  necessite  ineluctable  de  conduire  cOutre  TAutriche-Hon- 
grie,  son  premier  et  plus  grand  entwmi,  ie  «  combat  de  destruction  avec  fusils  et  canons  i»  et 
de  preparer  le  peuple  a  ce  combat «  par  tous  ies  moyens » ,  pour  la  liberation  des  territoires 
soamis,  dans  lesquels  sont  sous  I'opprobe  el  ie  joug  sept  millions  de  freres.  Tous  les  «  efforts 


-  91  -^ 

pour  le  dldveloppement »  de  la  Narodlna  sont  au  service  exclusif  do  cetie  idl^e  cdmme  simple 
moyen  poiir  rorganisation  et  i'eduCation  du  peuple  en  vue  dekiutte  poiir  l'an6anli$$emen* 
prevu. 

C'est  dans  le  meme  esprit  que  travaillcnt  toytes  les  associations  affiliees  k  la  Narodna  ^ 
regard  desquelles  rassociation  des  « Sokol »  de  Kragujevac  peut  seryir  comme  exemple 
(voir  annexe  III). 

Comme  pour  la  Narodna,  ce  sont  des  officiers,  professeurs  et  agents  de  i'Etat  qui  sont  a 
sa  tete. 

LediscotDEs  par  lequel son  President,  major  Kovacevic,  a  ouvert  Tassemblee  annuelie  de 
igi4  renonb'e.  total ement  h  mentionner  la  gymnastique,  ce  qui  est  cependant  ie  but  veri- 
table des «  Sokol »  et  ne  parle  que  de  {a  a  preparation  k  la  guerre »  contre  « I'Ennemi  danger 
reux,  sans  coeur,  odieux  et  envahissant  du  Nord»  qui  enleve  h  des  millions  de  freres 
serbes  leurs  libertes  et  leurs  droits  et  Ifes  maintient  dans  I'esclavage  et  les  fers. 

Dans  les  rapports  administratifs  de  cette  association,  les  developpements  techniques 
passcnt  totalement  h  I'arriere-plan  et  ne  servent  que  de  rubriques  pour  ia  connaissance  da 
veritable  «  but  de  1  activite  de  I'administration  »,  notamment  «  la  preparation  da  dSveloppemenf 
nallonai  et  la  necessity  de  fortifier  la  «  nation  Scrasee »  dans  VobjectiffjaeUe  puisse  ainsi  mener  &. 
lien  son  >■<■  procjramme  non  encore  rempli,  sa  idcke  nan  encore  accompliej>,  et  accomplir  cette 
ngrande  action  qui  doit  s'accomplir  dans  I'avenir  prochain  :  la  liberation  des  freres  vivant  au  dela 
de  la  Drina  qui  endurent  le  martyre  des  crucifiSs  ». 

II  n  est  pas  jusqu'au  tresorier  qui  ne  fasse  servir  son  rapport  financier  pour  lancer  cet 
appel  que  Ton  doit «  elever  des  faucons  »  qui  sont  en  mesure  «  d'apporter  la  iiberte  aux  freres 
non  encore  liberes. » 

De  meme  que  les  aspirations  au  developpement  dans  la  Narodna,  I'activite  en  gymnastique' 
des  «  Sokol »  n'est  pas  le  but  lui-meme,  mais  un  simple  moyen  au  service  de  la  meme  propa-- 
gande  menee  avec  les  memes  intentions  pour  ne  pas  dire  avec  les  metoes  mots  exactement.' 

Lorsque  la  Narodna  appelle  au  combat  daneantissement  contre  la  Monarcbie,  elle  ne) 
s'adresse  pas, seulement  au  peuple  de  la  Monarchic,  mais  h  tous  les  peuples  slaves  du  sud.l 
Pour  la  Narodna,  les  territoires  slaves  du  sud  de  la  Monarchic  font  partie  de  « nos  terri-' 
toires  serbes  soumis »  (voir  aussi  annexe  IV).  De  m^me  les  sujets  slaves  du  sud  de  la  mo- 
narcbie doivent  prendre  part  a  cette  «  oeuvre  natio.nale » ».  de  mSme  cette  activite  a  saine  et 
necessaire »  doit  s'exercer  de  I'autre  cote  de  la  frontiere  serbe  et  meme  sur  le  sol  de  la 
monarcbie,  la  Narodna  recherche  ses  « heros  pour  la  guerre  sainte »,  dont  Obilic,  lassassin 
de  Mourad ,  est  cite  comme  exemple  digne  d'imitation  du  sacrifice  a  la  patrie. 

Mais ,  pour  amener  les  freres  <t  hors  de  Serbie  »  a  participer  au  « travail  d'initiative  privee » 
la  Narodna  entretient  une  association  intime  avec  les  «  Freres  de  ce  c6te-ci  de  la  frontiere  ». 
Comment  cette  intimite  est  exercee,  c'est  ce  qui  n'est  pas  dit,  sans  doute  parce  que  cela 
appartient  a  cette  partie  da  « travail  d' ensemble  »  qui  «  pour  des  raisons  nombreuses  ne  peut  ni 
ne  doit  etre  explique  ». 

Combien  cette  branche  de  son  activity  est  etendue,  c'est  ce  que  montre  le  fait  que  non 
seulement  le  Comite  central  de  la  Narodna,  mais  encore  certains  de  ses  comites  regionaux, 
possede  des  sections  speciales  pour  « les  affaires  ext^rieiires ». 

L  activite  exterieure  de  la  Narodna  et  de  ses  affilies  est  particulierement  variee. 

Celle  qui  est  relativement  la  moins  dangereuse  parce  que  controlable  ofTiciellement ,  con- 
siste  en  toumees  de  conferences  qu'entreprennent  les  membres  influents  de  la  Narodna  vers 
les  parties  sud-ouest  de  la  Monarchic  ou  iis  parlent  dans  diverses  societes  sur  des  sujets  natio- 
naux  ou  de  culture.  Ces  occasions  permettent  aux  orateurs  d'exposer  aux  cercles  les  plus 

19. 


—  92  — 

releves  de  leiirs  adherents,  en  paroles  plus  ou  moins  gazees,  comprehensibles  pour  ceux  qui 
sonl  dej^  au  courant,  les  veritables  tendances  de  I'association. 

Parmi  ces  emissan^es,  un  desplus  connus  est  le  Directeur  de  I'Imprimerie  d'Etat  Zivojin 
Daciodeja  nomme;  cest  lui  qui,  le  8  aout  1909,  a  lance  un  appel  au  peuple  serbe,  dans 
lequcl  ii  a  designe  I'Autriche  comme  « I'ennemi  de  la  Serbie »  et  I'a  invite  a  se  preparer  au 
combat  contre  la  Monarcbie.  A  plusieurs  reprises,  il  a  entrepris  des  voyages  d'agitation  de  ce 
genre.  A  Karlova  (en  191  2)  il  a  meme  abandonne  toute  prudence  et  a  parle  dans  le  sens  de 
« I'union  de  tous  les  Serbes  contre  rennemi  commun  ». 

Plus  dangereuses  sont'  les  relations  entretenues  par  les  associations  imbues  de  I'esprit  de 
la  Narodna,  sous  le  manteau  de  la  communautd  des  interets  et  de  la  culture,  avec  les  asso- 
ciations dans  la  Monarchic;  car  les  envoy es  respectifs  et  les  visites  corporatives  de  ces  asso- 
ciations, qui  echappenf  a  tout  controle,  sont  utilisees  par  les  Serbes  k  toutes  especes  de 
machinations  contre  la  Monarchic. 

Cest  ainsi,  par  exemple,  qu'un  envoye  de  la  Narodna  h  la  fete  de  Sarajevo  en  sep- 
tembre  1912  (annexe  VI)  ne  s'est  pas  g^ne  pour  recruter  en  secret  des  adherents  bosniaques 
a  sa  societe.  L'envoi  dun  representant  de  I'association  des  Sokol  de  Kragujevac  a  cette  fete 
devait  signifier  pour  les  freres  de  Bosnie  :  « Nous  ne  vous  avons  pas  oublies,  les  ailes  de 
faucon  desumadija  sonl  encore puissantes.»Unepensee  cpii,  dans  la  circulation  intime,  aura 
trouve  sans  doute  une  toute  autre  expression  conforme  aux  tendances  ci-dessus  exposees  de  la 
Narodna  (annexe  III).  Quant  aux  evenements  qui  sepassent  lors  des  reunions  du  meme  genre 
en  Serbie,  il  est  Evident  qu'ils  echappent  a  un  controle  quelconque  des  autorit^s  Imperiales 
€t  Royales  qui  ne  possederit  a  cet  egard  que  des  informations  confidentielles  difficilement 
controlables.  En  relaiion  avec  ces  faits  il  y  aurait  lieu  d'elever  des  doutes  sur  la  visite  des 
etudiants  d'Agram  en  Serbie  (avril  1912)  qui  ont  re^u  du  cote  serbe  un  accueil  olficiel 
pres(pje  militaire  accompagne  meme  dune  parade,  dune  revue  de  troupes  en  leur  honneur 
et  cela  dune  maniere  assez  suggestive  pour  que  I'association  des  Sokol  de  Kragujevac  puisse 
dire  :  «  Get  evenement  signifie  le. commencement  et  la  clef  d'un  grand  acte  qui  doit  s'accom- 
plir.dans  un  ^v^nement  rapproche,  cest  un  germe  qui  miirira  lorsque  lame  du  peuple 
g'evanouira  jusqu  a  ce  qu'il  n'y  ait  plus  aucune  barriere  qui  ne  soit  detruite. » 

Ce  n'est  que  recemment  qu'il  est  parvenu  h  la  connaissance  des  autorites  austro-hongroises 
que  les  associations  de  Sokol  serbes  ont  reussi  k  determiner  quelques  corporations  analogues 
de  la' Monarchic  a  se  mettre  avec  elles  dans  un  lieu  jusqu'i  present  secret  dont  le  caractere 
nest  pas  encore  completement  eclairci ;  car  les  constatations  a  cet  egard  continuent  a  etre 
relevees.  Jusqu'i  present  cependant  les  renseignements  obtenus  permettent  d'estimer  que 
Ton  a  decouvert  les  traces  d'un  des  moyens  par  lesquels  les  tendances  subversives  des  Sokol 
serbes  ont  detourne  et  conduit  a  I'erreur  certains  groupes  de  personnes  dans  la  Monarcbie. 

Cette  prbpagande  dans  les  cercles  de  plus  en  plus  dilT^rents  parait  cependant  relegu^e  au 
second  plan  si  on  lui  compare  celle  du  « travail  ext^rieur  »  qui  est  conduite  par  la  Narodna  et 
ses  amis  vers  une  agitation  d'homme  a  homme.  Cest  dans  ce  domaine  que  se  constatent  les 
resultats  les  plus  tristes. 

Par  ses  hommes  de  confiance  et  emissaires  secrets,  elle  apporte  le  poison  de  la  mutirierie 
dans  les  cercles  des  gens  d'age  comme  dans  ceux  de  la  jeunesse  irresponsaWe. 

Cest  ainsi  par  exemple  que,  detournes  par  Milan  Pribicevitch  les  anciens  officiers  de  Honved 
V.B..D. K.V.N,  et  le  lieutenant  de  gendarmerie  de  Croatie  Esclavone  V.  K.  ont  abandonn6 
le  service  de  i'arm^e  de  la  Monarchic  dans  les  conditions  les  plus  suspectes  et  se  sont  toumes 
vers  la  Serbie ;  ils  virent  entre  temps  la  plupart  de  leurs  esp^rances  decues  ou  du  moins  en 
partie,  et  pensent  a  retoumer  dans  la  patrie  qu'ils  ont  trahie.  L'agitation  introduite  de  Serbie 
dans  les  ecoles  moyennes  de  Croatie  et  de  Bosnie  ^est  malheureusement  si  connue  qu'elle  a  k 


-^  93  — 
'  peine  besoin  d'exemples.  Ce  qui  est  moins  connu,  cest  que  ceux  qui  ont  ete  elimin^s  pour 
infraction  disciplinaire  grave  des  6coles  creates  et  bosniaques  sont  accueillis  en  Serbie  les 
bras  ouverts  et  souvent  mcme  proteges  par  I'Etat  et  entretenus  comme  des  adversaires  de  la 
Monarcbie.  Les  ^coles  serbes  avec  leurs  maitres  hostiles  h  rAutricbe,  qui  sont  en  grande 
partie  adherents  de  la  Narodna,  sont  evidemment  des  etablissements  tout  k  fait  appropries 
ppur  Teducation  d'adeptes  de  ce  genre.  Un  cas  parliculierement  notable  doit  etre  cite  ici. 
En  mars  dernier,  plusieurs  ecoliers  des  ecoles  norinales  de  maitres  de  Pakrac  (Croatie)  ont 
ete  expuls^s  pour  raison  de  greve.  lis  se  sont  retournes  vers  la  Serbie  ou  ils  ont  obtenu  illico 
des  positions  de  maitres  d'ecole  ou  ont  ete  admis  dans  des  ecoles  normales  de  maitres.  Un 
de  ces  rel^gues,  en  relations  avec  des  cercles  hostiles  a  la  Monarchie  a  declare  publiqhement 
que  lui  et  ses  gens  donneraient  le  conseil,  emettraient  I'opinion  pendant  la  duree  du  sejour 
de  larchiduc  h^ritier  en  Bosnie,  que  cette  province  est  une  terre  serbe.  II  est  particuliere- 
ment  k  remarquer  que  le  Prelet  du  cercle  serbe  de  Krajna  a  accorde  a  trois  de  ces  etudiants 
si  compromis,  pendant  la  duree  du  sejour  de  I'Archiduc  Francois-Ferdinand  en  Bosnie,  des 
passeports  serbes  dans  lesquels  il  les  designe  faussement  comme  des  sujets  serbes,  quoiqu'il 
eut  du  connaitre  leur  qualite  de  Croates.  Munis  de  ces  passeports,  les  trois  agitateurs  ont 
pu  gagner  la  Monarchie  sans  etre  remarques ,  oil  cependant  ils  ont  fmi  par  etre  reconnus 
et  arretes. 

Mais  ce  qui  precede  ne  sufTit  pas  k  caracteriser  integralement  I'activite  «  exlerieure »  de  la 
Narodna. 

Depuis  longtemps  deja  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  a  ete  informe  par  des  infor- 
mations confidentielles  que  la  Narodna  a  prepare  la  guerre  qu'elle  a  desir^  a  I'encontre  de  l?i 
Monarchie  par  des  moyens  militaires  en  ce  sens  qu'elle  y  envoie  des  emissaires  charges  a  la 
maniere  des  bandes  de  tenter,  des  louver ture  des  hoslililes,  la  destruction  des  moyens  de 
transport  et  d'amener  des  revokes  ou  des  paniques  (voir  annexe  VII). 

La  procedure  criminelle  intentee  en  iQiS  par  le  Conseil  de  guerre  de  Sarajevo  contre 
Jovo  Jajlicic  et  consorts  pour  crimes  d'espionnage  a  amen^  la  confirmation  de  ces  informa- 
tions confidentielles.  Comme  au  temps  de  sa  fondation,  aujCurd'hui  encore,  la  preparation 
de  la  guerre  par  bandes  armees,  figure  encore  au  programme  de  la  Narodna,  auquel  est  venu 
se  joindre  en  plus  toute  une  activite  dans  I'ordre  de  I'espionnage.  Cest  pour  cela  que  le  pro- 
gramme dit « reorganise  »  de  la  Narodna  est  en  reality  nn  programme  ^iendu.  D'une  atmo- 
sphere de  haine  ainsi  exasperee  publiquement  et  secretement,  d'une  agitation  echappant  k 
toute  responsabilite  pour  lesquelles  clans  la  lutte  contre  I'Autriche  tous  les  moyens  sont  bons 
jusques  et  y  compris,  sans  en  avoir  honte,  le  meurtre  vulgaire,  devait  fmalement.  resuiter 
des  actes  de  terrorisine. 

Le  8  juin  1912,  le  nomme  Jukic  a  tire  sur  le  Commissaire  royal  a  Agram ,  von  Cuvaj ,  ce 
qui  a  amcne  la  blessure  mortelle  du  conseiller  von  Hervvic  assis  dans  la  meme  voiture;  dans 
9ft  fuite,  a  tue  un  policier  qui  le  poursuivait  et  en  a  blesse  deux  autres. 

II  est  connu  par  les  poursuites  que  Jukic  etait  imbu  des  idees  et  des  plans  dela  Narodna, 
meme  si  Jukic  se  livrait  deja  depuis  quelque  temps  a  des  projets  d'attentat.  ceux-ci  n'arri- 
verent  cependant  a  malurite  qu'apres  quil  eut  fait  le  18  aVril  1912  avec  les  Etudiants 
d' Agram  I'excursion  de  Belgrade  aux  fetes  prepar^es  pour  honorer  ces  visiteurs,  ce  Jukic 
est  entre  en  rapporls  avec  diverses  personnes  appartenant  aux  cercles  de  la  Narodna  et  avec 
lesquelles  il  a  discut^  de  politique.  Peu  de  jours  apres,  il  est  revenu  a  Belgrade  et  la  ii  a 
recu  cl'un  major  serbe  ane  bombe  et  d'an  camarade  un  broivning,  avec  lesquels  il  a  execute  I'at- 
tentat.  La  bombe  trouvee  a  Agram  provenait,  d'apreS  les  experts,  d'un  arsenal  militaire. 

Le  coup  de  Jukic  n^tait  pas  encore  oublie  lorsque,  le  18  aout  191 3,  Stephan  Dojcic. 
revenu  d'Am^rique  a  Agram,  a  commis  un  attentat  contre  le  Commissaire  royal  baron 


t  —  94  — 

Skerlecz,  attentat  resultant  des  actions  organis^es  par  ies  Serbes  parmi  les  cercles  des  Slaves 
du  Sud  vivant  en  Am6rique,  et  qui  itait  I'oBUvre  de  la  propagande  exterieure  de  ia 
Karodna. 

line  brochure  du  serbe  T.  Dimitrijevitch  imprimee  a  Chicago,  avec  ses  attaques  sans 
mesui  es  contre  S.  M.  Imperiale  et  Royale  et  ses  appels  aux  Serbes  de  la  Monarchie  touchant 
leur  prochaine  «  d^iivrance  »  Ies  poussant  k  rentrer  en  Serbie  montre  le  parallelisme  de  la 
propagande  menee  par  Ies  Serbes  en  toute  liberie  en  Am6rique,  et  de  celle  men^e  de  Serbie 
^ans  Ies  domaines  de  la  Monarchie. 

Et  de  nouveau,  k  peine  un  an  apres.,  Agram  etait  le  theatre  d'un  nouvel  attentat,  manqu6 
cette  fois. 

Le  2  0  mai  191 3,  Jacob  Schafer  a  tent^,  au  theatre  d'Agram,  sur  le  ban  Freiherr  von 
Skerlecz ,  un  attentat  qui  a  ete  arrete  au  dernier  moment  par  un  policier.  L'enquete  a  mis 
au  jour  Texistence  d'un  complot  dont  1  ame  etait  Rudolf  Hercigonja.  Des  d^arations  de  ce 
dernier  et  de  ses  cinq  co-inculpes,  il  resulte  que  cet  attentat  aussi  avait  son  origine  en 
Serbie. 

Ayant  pris  part'^  une  tentative  manquee  pour  mettre  en  liberie  Jukic,  Hercigonja  s'etait 
sauv6  en  Serbie  (octobre  1912)  ou  il  frequentait  avec  son  complice  Marojan  Jakcic,  des 
comitadji  et  des  membres  de  la  Narodna.  Comme  cela  est  arrive  frequemmont  avec  des 
esprits  juveniles  s occupant  trop  tot  de  questions  politiques,  ces  frequentations  ont  amene 
Ies  plus  mauvais  resultats.  Hercigonja  rentra  chez  lui  avec  le  dogme  preche  a  Belgrade  que 
Ies  pays  slaves  du  sud  de  la  Monarchie  doivent  en  etre  separes  pour  elre  reunis  au  royaume 
serbe.  11  avait  en  outre  ^te  persuade  par  Tenseignement  recu  de  ses  amis  que  ce  but  devait 
^tre  poursuivi  par  I'ex^cution  d'attentat  sur  de  hauts  personnages  ayant  part  k  la  politique 
de  la  Monarchie. 

G'est  dans  cet  esprit  qu'Hercigonja  a  Agram  a  exerce  son  action  sur  ses  amis  et  Ies  a 
amenes  k  ses  idees.  Au  premier  plan  de  ses  projets ,  etait  I'ex^cution  d'un  attentat  sur  I'heri' 
tier  du  trone. 

Peu  de  mois  auparavant,  des  poursultes  en  haute  trahison  avaient  it6  intentees  contre 
Suka  Alginovic.  Au  coUrs  de  ce  proces,  trois  t^moins  ont  declare  qu'Alginovic -avait  dit 
devant  eux  avoir  re^u  cent  dina  de  la  Narodna  et  autant  d'une  association  secrete  d'eludiants 
pour  debut  de  propagande,  mais  piincipalement  pour  I'execution  d'un  attentat  sur  I'archi- 
duc  Francois-Ferdinand. 

On  voit  a  quel  point  I' agitation  criminelle  de  la  Narodna  et,  de  ceux  qui  partagent  ses  opinions , 
s'est  concentric  ces  demiers  temps  sur  la  personne  de  I'archidac  heritier. 

De  toutes  ces  constatations ,  on  arrive  a  la  conclusion  que  la  Narodna  ainsi  que  Ies  cercles 
hostiles  k  la  Monarchie  group^s  autour  d'elle  consideraient  depuis  peu  le  moment  venu  de 
faire  realiser  leur  enseignement  par  des  actes. 

II  est  remarquable  quelle  se  contente  pour  ces  actes  de  donner  Yincitqtion  et  la  ou  cette 
incitation  etait  tomb^e  sur  un  sol  fertile  de  placer  Ies  moycns  de  secours  mat^riels  h  leur  dispo- 
sition, mais  qu'elle  a  fait  reposer  tout  le  role  dangereux  de  cette  propagande  par  le  fait, 
uniquement  sur  la  jeunesse  de  la  Monarchie  excitee  el  detournee  par  elle  qui  doit  supporter 
seule  le  fardeau  de  ce  triste  « h^roisme  ». 

Tous  Ies  trails  de  celle  facon  de  faire  se  retrouvent  dans  Thistoire  et  I'origine  de  I'attentat 
profond^menl  regrettable  du  28  juin. 

Princip  el  Grabez  sont  des  exemples  de  cette  jeunesse  empoisonn^e  des  I'dcole  par  Ies 
pensees  de  la  Narodna.  A  Belgrade,  frequentant  Ies  cercles  d'etudiants  imbus  de  ces  idees, 
Princip  s'est  occupe  de  plans  d'attentat  contre  I'Archiduc  heritier  contre  lequel  s'exer9ait  la 


—  95  — 

haine  particulierement  aigue  des  elements  hostiles  41a  xnonarchie,  4  foccasion  deson  voyage 
dans  les  pays  annexes. 

II  se  lia  d'amitie  avec  Kabrinovitch  qui  freqaentait  les  memes  cercles  et  dont  les  opinions 
radicalement  r^volutionnaires,  d'apres  ses  propres"  aveux ,  i'amenaient  au  m^me  sentiment 
hostile  a  la  Monarchic  et  a  la  propagande  par  le  fait.  Mais,  si  soigneusement  qu'ait  et^  pre- 
pare cecomplot,  et  si  decides  qu'aient  ete  les  conjures,  cependant  i'attentat  n'aurait  jamais 
ete  accompli  s'il  ne  s'etait  pas  trouve,  comme  dans  le  cas  Jukic,  des  ^ens  pour  donner  aux 
complices  les  moyens  d'ex^cuter  leur  agression ,  car  Princip  et  Kabrinovitch  I'ont  expresse- 
ment  reconnu,  ils  manquaient  awtant  des  armes  necessaires  que  d'argent  pour  les  acheter. 
11  est  interessant  de  voir  oia  les  cOmplices  se  sont  procure  leurs  armes-  Milan  Pribicevic  et 
Zivojin  Dacic,  ces  deux  hommes  principaux  de  la  Narodna  sont  les  premiers  auxquels  les 
complices  se  sont  adresses  dans  leur  besoin  comme  a  une  aide  sure  sans  doute  parce  qu'il 
etait  deja  devenu  une  traduction  dans  le  cercle  de  ceux  qui  sont  prets  a  commettre  des  atten- 
tats quil  etait  possible  d'obtenir  des  representants  de  la  Narodna  des  instruments  demeurtre. 
Le  fait  accidentel  que  ces  deux  hommes,  au  moment  critique,  ne  se  trouvaient  pas  a  Bel- 
grade, dejoua  sans  doute  ce  projet,  cependant  Princip  et  Kabrinovic  ne  furent  pas  embar- 
rasses pour  trouver  une  autre  assistance,  celle  de  Milan  Ciganovic,  un  ancien  comitadji, 
maintenant  fonctionnaire  des  cherains  de  fer  a  Belgrade  et  membre  de  la  Narodna.  Ce  der- 
nier et  son  ami,  le  major  Voja  Tankosic  deja  nomm6,  egalement.un  des  chefs  dela  Narodna 
qui  a  ete  en  1 908  le  chef  de  I'ecole  des  bandes  armees  de  Kuprija  (annexe  V)  apparaissent 
maintenant  comme  les  chefs  spirituels  du  complot.  lis  n'^urent  qu'une  hesitation ,  legere  au 
debut,  h  savoir  si  les  trois  conjur6s  6taient  reellement  decides  a  commettre  cet  acte,  hesita- 
tion qui  disparut  bientot  grace  k  leurs  suggestions.  Des  lors ,  ils  furent  prets  a  fournir  toute 
assistance,  Tankosic  a  procur6  quatre  brownings  et  des  munitions  et  de  I'argent  pour  le 
voyage.  Six  grenades  a  main  provenant  de  1  armee  serbe  oonstituaient  le  complement  d'arme- 
ment,  ce  qui  nous  rappelle  le  cas  Jukic.  Preoccupe  du  succes,  Tankosic  procura  fenseigne- 
ment  du  tir,  mais  Tankosic  et  Ciganovic  se  sont  pr^occupes  en  outre  d  assurer  un  moyen 
special  non  desir^  d'assurer  le  secret  du  complot.  Ils  aposterent  Zian  Kali  avec  Tindication 
que  les  deux  auteurs,  apres  I'attentat,  devaient  se  tuer,  acte'de  precaution  qui  devait  leur 
profiter  en  premiere  ligne ,  car  le  secret  leur  enlevait  le  faible  danger  qu'ils  avaiehf  assume 
dans  cette  entreprise.  La  mort  sure  pour  les  victimes  de  leur  d^toarnement ,  lapkine  Si^carii^  pour 
elle-meme,  telle  est  la  devise,  connue  maintenant,  de  la  Narodna. 

Pour  rendre  possible  I'execution  de  latlentat,  il  fallait  que  les  armes  et  bombes  par- 
vinssent  en  fraude  et  sans  etre  apercues  ero  Bosnie.  La  encore,  Ciganovic  a  donne  toute  son 
assistance ,  il  prescrit  aux  conjures  une  route  determinee  el  leur  assure  la  protection  des, 
autorites  fronti^res  serbes.  La  maniere  dans  laquelle  ce  voyage  decrit  par  Princip  comme 
K.mysterieux »  a  ete  organise  et  execute  ne  laisse  subsister  aucun  doute  qu'il  s'agit  d'une  voie 
secrete  bien  prepar^e  et  deja  parcourue  souvent  en  vue  de  desseins  secrets  de  la  Narodna. 
Avec  une  simplicite  et  tine  surety  resultant  de  la  seule  habitude,  les  capitaines  de  la  fron- 
tiere  a  Sabak  et  Losnika  ont  prete  dans  ce  but  leur  oi'ganisatioii  administrative ;  sans  difficulte 
s'est  effectue  ce  transport  secret,  avec  son  systeme  complique  de  guides  toujours  changeants 
qui,  appeles  comme  par  miracle,  se  trouvaient  toujours  sur  place  quand  on  avait  besoin 
d'eux.  Sans  s'enquerir  du  but  de  ce  voyage  curieux  de  quelques  etudiants  .trop  jeunes,  les 
autorites  serbes  ont  laiss^  sur  I'indication  de  I'ancien  comitadji  et  du  fonctionnaire  subal- 
terne  des  chemins  de  fer  Ciganovic,  jouer  cet  appareil  fonclionnant  si  facilemenl.  Ils 
n'avaient  d'ailleurs  pas  besoin  de  demander,  car  d'apres  les  indications  re9ues,  il^  etait  clair 
pour  eux  qu'il  s'agissait  de  remplir  de  nouveau  une  mission  de  la  « Narodna ».  La  vue  de 
i'af  senal  de  bombes  et  de  revolvers  arrachait  seulement  au  surveillant  Grbic  un  sourire  bien- 


—  96  — 
veillant  d  approbation  donnant  la  preuve  complete  combien  Ton  etait  habitue  sur  cette  route 
4  rencontrer  une  contrebande  de  ce  genre. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe  s'est  charg^  dune  faute  lourde  en  laissant  s'accomplir  tout 
cela. 

Tenu  a  cultiver  des  relations  de  bon  voisinage.avec  TAutriche-Hongrie ,  il  a  permis  a  la 
presse  de  repandre  la  haine  contre  la  Monarchic,  tolere  que  des  associations  elablies  sur  son 
sol  sous  la  conduite  d'officiers  eleves,  de  foncUonnaires,  de  raaitres  et  de  juges^se  livrent 
contre  la  Monarchic  a  une  campagne  publique  menant  ses  citoyens  aux  idees  revolution- 
naires ,  il  n'a  pas  empech^  que  des  hommes  ayant  une  part  a  la  direction  de  son  administra- 
tion militaire  et  civile  empoisonnent  la  conscience  publique  contre  tons  les  sentiments 
moraux  au  point  que,  dans  cette  lutte,  I'assassinat  vuigaire  par  guet-apens  apparaisse  comma 
I'arme  la  plus  recommandable. 


N°  75  BIS. 
Communique  ojficieiix  da  bureau  de  la  Presse  : 

Vienne,  2  8juillet  igiA- 

Le  Minislre  autrichien  k  Belgrade  a  presente  des  son  retour  a  Vienne  le  texte  de 
la  reponse  serbe. 

Celte  reponse  est  remplie  d'un  esprit  de  manque, de  sincerite  :  elle  laisse  appa- 
raitre  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe  est  sans  intention  serieuse  de  ndeltre  fin  k  la  tole- 
rance coupable  grace  k  laquelle  ont  ete  permises  les  menees  anti-autrichiennes.  La 
reponse  serbe  conlient  de  telles  restrictions  et  limitations,  non  seulemenl  sur  le  prin- 
cipe  meme  de  la  demarche  austro-hongroise,  mais  encore  en  ce  qui  concerne  les 
revendications  exposees  par  i'Autriche,  que  les  concessions  faites  sont  sans  impor- 
tance. 

En  particulier,  refus  sous  pretexte  vain,  d'accepter  la  participation  des  organes 
autro-hongrois  pour  la  poursuite  des  auteurs  des  attentats  residant  en  territoire 
serbe. 

,De  meme  la  reponse  serbe  a  la  demande  autrichienne  pour  mettre  fin  aux  menees 
hostiles  de  la  presse  equivaut  k  un  refus. 

La  demande  relative  aux  mesures  qui  devraient  etre  prises  pour,  que  les  associa- 
tions hostiles  k  rAutriche-Hongrie  ne  puissent,  apres  leur  dissolution,  continuer  leur 
action  sous  un  autre  nom  et  forme,  n'a  pas  meme  ete  envisagee. 

Ces  revendications  constituant  le  minimum  necessaire  au  retablissement  du  calme 
permanent  dans  le  Sud-Est  de  la  Monarchie,  la  repbnse  serbe  est  consideree  comme 
insuffisante. 

Le  Gouvernement  serbe  en  a  conscience  d'ailleurs,  puisqu'il  envisage  le  reglement 
du  conflit  par  voie  d'arbitrage,  et  que  le  jour  ou  sa  reponse  devait  etre  remise  et 
avant  cette  remise,  il  avait  ordonne  la  mobilisation. 


—  97 


r  76. 


M.  Ren^  ViYiANi,  President  du  Conseil, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrang^res  p.  i. 

A  bord  de  la  France,  le  28  juiliet  1914. 

J'ai  re^u  par  Copenhague  votre  telegramme  resumant  les  faits  de  samedi,  le  tele- 
gramme  relatant  la  derniere  visite  de  I'ambassadeur  d'Allemagne,  celui  relatif  a  la 
mediation  que  la  Russie  conseille  a  la  Serbie  de  demander  et  aux  demarches  anglaises 
k  Berlin ,  ainsi  que  votre  telegramme  venu  ce  matin  directement  par  la  tour  Eiffel. 
J'approuve  pleinement  la  reponse  que  vous  avez  faite  au  baron  de  Schoen;  la  these 
que  vous  avez  soutenue  est  I'evidence  meme  :  dans  la  recherche  d'une  solution 
pacifique  du  conflit,  nous  sommes  pleinement  d'accord  avec  la  Russie,  qui  n'est  pas 
responsable  de  la  situation  actuelle,  et  n'a  encore  precede  h  aucune  mesure  quel- 
conque  pouvant  eveiller  le  moindre  soup9on ;  mais  il  est  evident  qu'k  titre  de  contre- 
partie  I'Allemagne  ne  saurait  se  refuser  a  donner  des  conseils  au  Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois ,  dont  Taction  a  ouvert  la  crise. 

.  II  y  a  done  lieu  de  continuer  a  tenir  a  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  le  meme  langage. 
Ce  conseil  est  d'ailleurs  en  harmonie  avec  la  double  proposition  anglaise  mentionnee 
dans  votre  telegramme.  J'approuve  entierement  la  combinaison  suggeree  par  sir  Edward 
Grey  et  j*invite  directement  M.  Paul  Cambon  k  le  lui  fjiire  savoir.  II  est  essentiel  que 
Ton  sache  a  Berlin  et  k  Vienne  que  notre  plein  concours  est  acquis  aux  efforts  que 
poursuit  le  Gouvernement  britannique  en  vue  de  chercher  une  solution  au  conflit 
austro-serbe.  L'action  des  quatre  puissances  moins  interessees  ne  peut,  pour  les 
raisons  exposees  ci-dessus,  s'exercer  uniquement  k  Vienne  et  a  Petersbourg.  En  pro- 
posant  de  I'exercer  aussi  k  Belgrade,  ce  qui  veut  dire  surtout,  en  fait,  entre  Vienne  et 
Belgrade,  sir  Edward  Grey  rentre  dans  la  logique  de  la  situation;  et,  en  n'excluant  pas 
Petersbourg,  il  ofl^re,  d'autre  part,  k  I'Allemagne,  un  moyen  de  se  deplfeurtir,  en  toute 
dignite,  de  la  demarche  parlaquelle  le  Gouvernement  allemand  a  fait  savoir  k  Paris 
et  a  Londres  que  I'affaire  etait  envisagee  par  lui  conmae  purement  autro-serbe  et  de- 
pourvue  de  caractere  general. 

Je  vous  prie  de  communiquer  le  present  telegramme  a  nos  representants  aupres 
des  grandes  puissances  et  a  noire  Ministre  k  Belgrade. 

Rene  Viviani. 


Documents  DiPtOMAnQUES.  —  Guerre  europ^enne.  13 


98--. 


r  77. 


M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etraiig^res  p  ■  i. 

a  M.  Rene  ViviAm ,  President  du  Conseil,  a  bord  de  la  France. 

Paris,  28  juillet  1914. 

Malgreles assurances  donnees,,tant a Berliaqaii  Paris, par. les agents  allemands, du 
desir  de  leur  gouverxiement  de  cotocourir.  aux.  efforts,  pour  la maintlen  de  la  paix, 
aucune.  action,  sincere  nest  exercee  par  eux  pour  retenir.  I'Auttiche ;  la  proposition 
anglaise,  qui.  consist e  dans- une  action  des.quatre  puissances  mains,  interessees  pour 
oblenir  un  arret  des  operations >militaires.^  Vienne,  Belgrade  etPetersbourg,  et  dans 
une  reunion. a. Londres  des  A[hbassadeurs.d'AUeinagne,  de  France  et  d'ltalte,  sous  la 
presidence.  de  Sir  E-  Grey  en  vue  de  chercher  une  solution  aux.  difflcidtes.  austro- 
serJies,  rencontre,  a  Berlin  des  objections  de  nature  ala  faire  echouer. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  a  fait  une  demarche  pour  annoncer  que  son  gouverae- 
ment  pTjendrait  demain  des  mesures  energiques  pour  contraindre  la  Serbie  a  lui 
donner  les  satisfactions  et  les  garanties  qu'il  exige  de  cette  puissance;  1©  Comte 
Szecsenme  s'est  pas  explique  surces mesures;  la  mobilisation,  k  partir  du  28  juillet, 
parait.certaine  d'lgpres  notre  attache  militaire  k  Vienne. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


r  78. 

M..BiENVB5}U-^ARTiN%  Mini&tre  dcs  Affaires  Elrangeres  p.  L. 
a  Londies,  Berlin,  P^tersbourg,  Vienne,  Rome. 

Paris,  le  28  juiHeti^jiii. 

J'ai  eu  de  nouveau  la  visite  de  I'Ambassad^ar  d'AUemagne  ce  matin;. il.  ma  dit 
qu'il  n'avait  pas  de  communication,  pas  de  proposition  officielle  k  me  faire,  mais 
qu'il  venait,,commelaveille,  causer  de  la  situation  et  des  moyens  k  employer  pour 
eviter  des  actes  irreparables.  Interroge  sur  les  intentions  de  I'Autriche,  il  a  declare 
ine  pas  les  connaitre,  et  ignorer  la  nature  des  moyens  de  coercition  qu'elle  prepare. 

L'AUemagne,  selon  le  Baron  de  Schoen,  ne  den;iande  qu  k  agir  avec  la  France  pour 
le  mainti^n  de  la  paix.  Sur  I'observation  qui  lui  etait  faite  qu'un  projet  de  mediation 
des  quatre  puissances ,  auquel  nous  avons  adhere ,  et  qui  a  obtenu  I'assentiment  dc  prin- 
cipe  de  Fltalie  et  de  TAUemagne ,  a  ete  mis  en  avant  par  TAngleterre ,  Tambassadeur  a 
dit  qi^e  le  Gouvemenient  allemand  ne  demandait  en  effet  qu'^  s'associer  a  Taction  des 


—  09  —     . 
puissances,  pourvu  que  «ette  action  n'affecte  pas  la  fomie  d'un  arbitrage  ou  d'une 
Gonference ,  repousses'  par  TAutricfie. 

J'ai  repondu  que  $i  le  mot  seul  arrete  le  Gouvernement  autrichien ,  le  but  p«ut 
^tre  atteint  par  d'autres  moyens;  le  Gouvernement  allemand  est  bien  place  pour 
demandera  TAutriche  de  laisser  awx  puissances  le  temps  d'intervenir,  de  trouver  une 
conciliation. 

M.  de  Schoen  m'a  fait  alors  observer  quil  n'a  pas  d'instructions  et  sail  seulement 
que  I'Allemagne  se  refuse  k  exercer  une  pression  sur  TAutriche,  qui  ne  veut  pas  de 
conference.  II  reproche  aux  journaux  frangais  de  preter  a  TAllemagne  une  attitude 
quelle  n'a  pas,  en  pretendant  qu'elle  pousse  TAutriche  :  sans  doute  elle  approuve 
son  attitude,  mais  elle  n'a  pas  connu  sa  note;  elle  ne  saurait  Tarreter  trop  brusque- 
ment,  car  I'Autriche  a  besoin  de  garanties  contre  les'procedes  serbes. 

Bienvbnu-Martin. 


W  79. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martun,,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrsngeres  p.  i. 
a  M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

Paris,  le,2.8:jiuUet  igiA- 

Vous  connaissez,  par  les  telegrammes  de  nos  Ambassades,  que  je  vous  ai  transmis, 
la  proposition  anglaise  de  mediation  a  quatre  et  de  conference  a  Londres,  ainsi  que 
notre  adhesion  a  cette  suggestion,  Tacceptation  conditionnelle  de  lltalie  et'les  reserves 
de  Berlin. 

Je  vous  prie  de  vous  tenir  en  contact  a  ce  siijet  avec  votre  CoUegue  d' Angleterre , 
qui  a  regu  les  instructions  necessaires  pour  saisir  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 
de  la  suggestion  anglaise,  des  que  ses  trois  CoUegues  auront  ete  autorises  a  faire  la 
meme  demarche;  vous  vous  conformerez  a  son  attitude. 


r  80. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvej^u-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Londres,  le  28  juiliet  19 14.. 

Sir' Ed.  Greya  re9u  hiermes'Collegues  d'Autriche  Hongrie^ et  d'Ailemagne.  Le  pre- 
Tnier  a'  coiltiniie  asoutenir  que  la  reponse  sel'be  ^tait  inaceeptable.  Le  second  attenu 


.  _  iOO  — 
un  langage  analogue  k  celui  de  M.  de  Schoen  a  Paris.  II  a  insiste  sur,  I'utilite  d'une 
action  moderatrice  de  TAngleterre  a  Petersbourg.  Sir  Ed.  Grey  lui  a  repondu  que  la 
Russie  s'etait  montree  tres  moderee  d*epuis  I'ouverture  de  la  crise ,  notamment  dans  ses 
conseils  au  Gouvernement  serbe,  et  qu'il  serait  tres  embarrasse  de  lui  faire  des 
recommandations  pacifiques.  II  a  ajoute  que  c'eta[it  a  Vienne  qu'il  convenait  d'agir  et 
que  le  concours  de  I'Allemagne  etait  indispensable. 

D'autre  part  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  Petersbourg  a  telegraphic  que  M.  Sazo- 
noCP  avait  propose  a  TAmbassadeur  d'Autriche  une  conversation  sur  I'affaire  serbe. 
Cette  infornaation  a  ete  confirmee  par  TAmbassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  Vienne  qui  a  fait 
savoir  qu'un  premier  entretien  entre  le  Ministre  russe  des  Affaires  etrangeres  et  le 
Comte  Szapary  avait  produit  un  bon  effet  au  Ballplatz. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  et  Sir  A.  Nicolson  m'ont  dit  que,  si  un  accord  pouvait  s'etablir  directe-' 
ment  entre  Petersbourg  et  Vienne,  il  faudrait  s'en  feliciter,  mais  ils  ont  eleve  quelques 
doutes  sur  le  succes  de  I'initiative  de  M.  Sazonoff . 

Interroge  par  Sir  G.  Buchanan  sur  la  convocation  eventuelle  a  Londres  d'une 
Conference  des  Representants  de  I'Angleterre,  de  la  France,  de  I'Allemagne  et  de 
I'ltalie  pour  chercherune  issue  k  la  situation  actuelle,  M.  Sazonoff  a  repondu  :  «  qu'il 
avait  entame  des  pourparlers  avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  dans  des  conditions  qu'il 
esperait  favorables;  que  cependant  il  n'avait  pas  encore  re^u  de  reponse  a  sa  proposi- 
tion d'une  revision  de  la  Note  serbe  par  les  deux  Cabinets. »  Si  des  explications 
directes  avec  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  sont  irrealisables ,  M.  Sazonoff  se  declare  pret  a 
accepter  la  proposition  anglaise  ou  toute  autre  de  nature  a  resoudre  favorablement 
le  conflit. 

II  serait,  en  tous  cas,  tres  desirable  que  cette  negociation  directe,  a  un  moment 
ou  le  moindre  retard  pent  avoir  de  si  serieuses  consequences ,  fut  menee  de  maniere 
k  ne  pas  entraver  faction  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey  et  a  ne  pas  fournir  a  I'Autriche  un  pretexte 
pour  se  derober  a  f  intervention  amicale  des  quatre  puissahces . 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  Berlin  ayant  insiste  aupres  de  M.  de  Jagow  pour 
obtenir  une  adhesion  a  la  suggestion  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey,  le  Ministre  allemand  des  Affaires 
etrangeres  a  repondu  qu'il  convenait  d'attendre  te  resultat  de  la  conversation 
engagee  entre  Petersbourg  et  Vienne.  Sir  Ed.  Grey  a,  en  consequence,  prescrit  a 
Sir  Ed.  Goschen  de  suspendre  pour  le  moment  ses  demarches.  Au  surplus  I'annonce 
que  fAutriche  vient  de  notifier  officiellement  sa  declaration  de  guerre  k  la  Serbie 
fait  entrer  la  question  dans  une  nouvelle  phase. 

Paul  Cambon. 


N**  81. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Berlin,  le  28  juillet  191  A. 
La  conversation  que  M.  Sazonoff  a  eue  avec  le  Comte  Szapary  a  ete  portee  k  la 
connaissance  de  M.  de  Jagow  par  le  Charge  d'Affaires  de  Russie.  Le  Secretaire  d'Etat 


—  101  — 
lui  a  dit  que,  conformement  aux  remarques  de  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  en  Russie, 
pulsque  apres  rexpiralion  de  ruitimatum  de  I'Autriche  le  Gouvernement  de  Vienne 
ne  se  refusait  pas  k  causer  avec  le  Gouvernement  de  Petersbourg,  il  y  avait  lieu 
d'esperer  que  de  son  cote  le  Gomte  Berchtold  pourrait  causer  avec  M.  Schebeko  et 
qu'une  issue  pourrait  etre  trouvee  aux  difBcultes  actuelles.  Le  Charge  d  affaires  russe 
Yoit  avec  faveur  cette  disposition  des  esprits,  qui  correspond  aux  desirs  de  M.  de 
Jagow  de  voir  Vienne  et  Petersbourg  s'entetidre  directement  et  degager  TAllemagne. 
D  y  a  lieu  de  se  demander  seulement  si  I'Autriche  ne  cherche  pas  a  gagner  du  temps 
pour  se  preparer. 

J'ai  aujourd'hui  appuye  la  demarche  de  mon  CoUegue  d'Angleterre  aupres  du 
Secretaire  d'Etat.  Gelui-ci  m'a  repondu  comme  a  Sir  Ed.  Goschen,  qu'il  lui  etait 
impossible  d'accepter  I'idee  d'une  sorte  de  conference  a  Londres  entre  les  Ambas- 
sadeurs  des  quatre  Puissances,  et  quil  faudrait  donner  a  la  suggestion  anglaise  une 
autre  forme,  pour  quelle  put  etre  realisee.  Je  lui  ai  fait  valoir  le  danger  d'un  retard, 
qui  pouvait  amener  la  guerre ,  et  lui  ai  demande  s'il  la  souhaitait.  II  a  proteste  et  a 
ajoute  que  les  conversations  directes  entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg  etaient  entamees,  et 
que,  des  maintenant,  il  en  attendait  une  suite  favorable. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  et  I'Ambassadeur  d'ltalie  sont  venus  me  voir  ce 
matin  ensemble ,  pour  m'entrelenir  des  conversations  qu'ils  avaient  eues  avec  M.  de 
Jagow  hier  au  sujet  de  la  proposition  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey.  Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  leur  a, 
somme  toute,  tenu  le  mem6  langage  qua  moi  :  acceptant  en  principe  de  s'unir  dans 
une  demarche  commune  a  I'Angleterre ,  a  I'ltalie  et  a  nous-memes,  mais  repoussant 
toute  idee  de  conference. 

Nous  avons  pense,  mes  collegues  et  moi,  qu'il  n'y  avait  la  qu'une  question  de 
forme  et  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  va  suggerer  a  son  Gouvernement  de  libeller 
autrement  sa  proposition,  qui  pourrait  prendre  le  caractere  d'une  demarche  diplo- 
matique a  Vienne  et  a  Petersbourg. 

En  raison  de  la  repugnance  manifestee  par  M.  de  Jagow  contre  toute  demarche  a 
Vienne,  Sir  Ed.  Grey  pourrait  le  mettre  au  pied  du  mur,  en  lui  demandant  de  for- 
muler  lui-meme  comment  pourrait  se  produire  Taction  diplomatique  des  puissances 
pour  eviter  la  guerre. 

Nous  devons  nous  associer  a  tons  les  efforts  en  faveur  de  la  paix  compatibles  avec 
nos  engagements  vis-a-vis  de  notre  alliee;  mais,  pour  laisser  les  responsabilit^s  ou 
elles  sont,  il  importe  d'avoir  soin  de  demander  i  I'Allemagne  de  preciser  ce  qu'elle 
veut. 

Jules  Cambon. 


^  102 


N'*  82. 

M.  Paleologue,  Amhassadeur  de  France  a  Petersbourg, 

a  M.  BiEM£N.u-MARTmvMinistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  ,p.  i. 

Petersbourg,  le  28  juillet  igi4- 

Le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  n'a  pas  encore  repondu  a  la  proposition  du 
Gouvemement  rnsse,  tendant.a  I'ouverture  d'unc  conversation  directe  entrc  Peters- 
bourg et  Vienne. 

M.  Sazonoir  a  re^u  cet  apres-midl  les  Ambassadeurs  d'Allemagne  et  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie;rimpressioi5  qu'il  a.gardee  de  son  double  entretien  est  mauvaise.:  «.Decid6- 
ment,  ma-t-il  dit,  TAutriche  ne  veut  pas  causer ». 

A  la  suite  dune  conversation  que  je  viens  d'avoir  avec.mes  deux  collegues,  j'e- 
prouvcla  meme  injpression  de  pessimisme. 

Paleqlogue. 


r  83. 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  BiENVENU-MARTiNvMinistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p,  i. 

Vienne,  le  28  juiliet  1914. 

Le'Comte  Berchtold  vient  de  declarer  a  Sir  M.  deBuusen  que  to.ute  intervention 
tendant  a  la  reprise  de  la  discussion  entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Serbie>  sur  la  base  de  la 
reponse  serbe,  serait  inutile,  et  d'ailleurs  trop  tardive,  la  guerre  ayant  ete  oiTicielle- 
ment  declaree  a  midi. 

L'attitude  de  mon  collegue  russe  n'a  jusqu  a  present  pas  varie  :  il  ne  s  agissait  pas 
a  son  avis  de  localiser  le  conflit,  mais  bien  de  Tempecher.  La  declaration  de  guerre 
rendra  bien  difficile  Tengagemeilt  des  pourparlers  aquatre,  ainsi  que' la  continuation 
des  etitretiens  directs  entre  M.  Sazonoff  et  le  Comte  Szapary. 

On  pretexte  ici  que  laformiile  qui  paraissait  pouvoir  obtenir  I'adhesion  de  TAlle- 
magne,  «  me'diation  entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Russie  »,  a  I'inconvenient  d'accuser  entre  ces 
deux  empires  un  conflit  qui  n'existe  pas,jusqu'a  present. 

Parmi  les  soup^ons  qu'inspire  la  soudaine  et  violente  resolution  de  I'Autriche,  le 
plus  inquietant  est  que  I'Allemagne  Taurait  poussee  a  I'agression  contre  la  Serbie  afin 
de  pouvoir  elle-meme  entrer  en  lutte  avec  la  Russie  et  la  France,  dans  les  circon- 
stances  quelle  suppose  devoir  lui  etre  le  plus  favorables,  et  dans  des  conditions 
deliberees. 

DOMAINE. 


—  103  — 


CHAPITRE   V 

DE  U  DfiCLARATION  DE  GUERRE  DE  L'AUTRICHE  A  LA  SERRIE 

(28  JWLLET  19U 

A  L'ULTIMATUM  DE  L'ALLEMAGNE  A  LA  RUSSIE 

(31   JUILLET  1914) 


—  105  — 


N"  84. 


r  ■ 

M.  Barrere,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Rome, 
I  a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i. 

Rome,  le  29  juUlet  19 14. 

La  Consulta  estlme  que,  malgre  fa  declaration  de  guerre  de  I'Autriche  kh  Serbie, 
il  n'y  a  pas  lieu  d'interrompre  ies  efforts  diplomatiques  tendant  a  la  reunion  dune 
Conference  ^  Londres  en  vue  d  une  mediation. 

Barrere. 


N°  85. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i., 

a  Saint-Petersbourg,  Londres,  Berlin,  Rome,  Vienne,  Constantinople, 
Belgrade. 

Paris,  le  29  juillet  191 4. 

L'attitude  austro-allemande  se  precise.  L'Autriche,  inquiete  de  la  propagande 
slave,  a  saisi  Toccasion  do  lattentat  de  Serajevo  pour  chatier  Ies  menees  serbes,  el 
prendre  de  ce  cote,  des  garanties  qui  peuvent,  selon  que  Ton  laissera  ou  non  se 
developper  Ies  evenements,  ne  porter  que  sur  le  Gouvernement  et  I'armee  serbes, 
ou  devenir  territoriales.  L'AUernagnc  s'interpose  entre  son  alliee  et  Ies  autres  puis- 
sances, en  declarant  qu'il  s'agit  d'une  question  locale,  chatiment  d'un  crime  politique 
dans  le  passe,  garanties "certaines  pour  favenir  que  Ies  menees  anti-autricbiennes 
prendront  fin.  Le  Gouvernement  allemand  estime  que  la  Russie  doit  se  contenter 
des  assurances  officielles  et  formelles  donnees  par  I'Autricbe  qu  elle  ne  poursuit 
pas  d'agrandissement  territorial  et  respectera  fintegrite  de  la  Serbie;  dans  ces  con- 
ditions, c'est  de  la  Russie  seule,  si  elle  voulait  intervenir  dans  une  question  bien 
delimitee,  que  pent  venir  un  danger  de  guerre.  Dans  ces  conditions  c'est  a  Peters- 
bourg  seulement  qu'il  faut  agir  pour  le  maintien  de  la  paix. 

Ce  sophisme,  qui  dispenserait  TAUemagne  d'inlervenir  k  Vienne,  a  ete  soutenu 
sans  succes  k  Paris  par  M.  de  Sch'oen,  qui  a  vainement  tenle  de  nous  entratner  dans 
une  action  solidaire  franco-allemande  a  Petersbourg;  il  a  6te  egalement  developpe 
a  Londres  aupres  de  Sir  E.  Grey  :  en  France  comme  en  Angleterre,  on  a  repondu 
que  le  cabinet  de  Petersbourg  a  donne,  depuis  le  d^but,  Ies  plus  grandes  preuveiS 
de  sa  moderation,  en  particulier  en  s'associant  aux  puissances  pour  donner  k  la 

Documents  DiPLOMATigt^ES.  '—  Gaerre  europdenne.  1 4 


~-  106  — 
Serbie  \e  conseil  de  ceder  aux  exigences  de  la  note  autrichienne.  La  Russle  ne  menace 
done  nuUement  la  paix ;  c'est  a  Vienna  qu'il  faut  agir,  c'esl  de  la  que  vient  le  danger, 
du  moment  qu'on  y  refuse  de  se  conlenter  de  la  soumission  presque  totale  de  la 
Serbie  a  des  exigences  exorbitantes  et  qu'on  ne  veut  pas  accepter  la  collaboration  des 
puissances  pour  la  discussion  des  points  restant  a  regler  entre  I'Autricbe  et  la  Serbie, 
et  enfin  qu'on  n'hesile  pas  devant  une  declaration  de  guerre  aussi  precipitee  que  la 
note  primitive  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

L attitude  a  Berlin,  comme  a  Vienne,  reste  dilatoire.  Dans  la  premiere  capitale, 
tout  en  protestant  du  d^sir  allemand  de  sauvegarder  la  paix  generate  par  une  action 
conunune  des  quatre  puissances,  on  repousse  I'idee  d'une  Conference,  sans  suggerer 
aucun  autre  moyen  et  en  refusant  d'agir  positiyement  a  Vienne.  Dans  la  capitale 
autrichienne,  on  voudrait  amuser  Petersbourg  par  I'illusion  d'une  entente  pouvant 
resulter  de  conversations  directes,  et  Ton  agit  contre  la  Serbie. 

Dans  ces  conditions,  il  parait  essentiel  que  le  cabinet  de  Petersbourg,  dont  le 
desir  de  denouer  pacifiquement  la  crise  est  manifeste ,  adhere  immediatement  a  la 
proposition  anglaise.  Celle-ci  a  besoin  d'etre  tres  appuyee  k  Berlin  pour  decider  M.  de 
Jagow  a  une  action  reelle  sur  Vienne,  susceptible  d'arreter  I'Autriche  et  d'empecher 
que  son  avanlage  diplomatique  se  double  d'un  succes  mililaire.  Le  Gouvernement 
austro-hongrois  ne  manquerait  pas  en  effet  d'en  profiler  pour  imposer  a  la  Serbie, 
sous  le  nom  elastique  de  garanties,  des  conditions  qui  modifieraient  en  fait,  malgre 
toutes  les  assurances  de  desinteressement  territorial,  le  statut  de  TEurope  orientale, 
et  risqueraient  de  compromettre  gravement,  soit  des  main  tenant,  soit  dans  un  avenir 
prochain,  la  paix  g6n6rale. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


N°  86. 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-Petersbourg  , 
k  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  AfF&ires  ^trangeres  p.  i. 

Saint-Petersbourg,  le  29  juillet  1914. 

Des  maintenant,  je  suis  en  mesure  d'assurer  a  Votre  Excellence  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment russe  acquiesce  a  toutes  les  procedures  que  la  France  et  I'Angleterre  lui  propo- 
seront  pour  sauvegarder  la  paix.  Mon  coUegue  d'Anglelerre  telegraphic  dans  le  m6me 
sens  k  Londres. 

Pal^ologue.  ' 


107  — 


N**  87, 


M.  Klobukowski,  Ministre  de  France  a  Bruxelles, 

a  M.  BiENVENU- Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  toang^resp.  i. 

Bruxeiles,  le  29  juillet  191 4. 

De  mon  entretien  avec  M.  Davignon  et  diverses  personnes  en  mesure  d'etre  exac- 
tement  informees,  je  rapporte  rimpression  suivante  :  Tattitude  de  rAilemagne  est 
enigmatique  et  autorise  toutes  les  apprehensions.  II  parait  invraisembiable  que  le 
Gouvemement  austro-hongrois  ait  pris  une  initiative  le  conduisant,  suivant  un  plan 
precongu,  k  une  declaration  de  guerre  sans  accord  prealable  avec  I'empereur  Guil- 
laume. 

Le  Gouvemement  allemand  reste  I'arme  au  pied,  reservant,  selon  les  circon- 
stances,  son  action  pacifique  ou  guerriere,  mais  I'inquietude  est  telle  dans  tous  les 
milieux  qu'une  intervention  brusque  contre  nous  ne  surprendrait  ici  personne.  Mes 
Collegues  de  Russie  et  d'Angleterre  partagent  ce  sentiment. 

Le  Gouvemement  beige  prend  des  dispositions  conforaaes  ^la  declaration  que  m*a 
faite  hier  soir  M.  Davignon  que  tout  sera  mis  en  oeuvre  pour  la  defense  de  la  neu- 
tralite  du  pays. 

Klobukowski. 


r  88. 

M.  RoNSSiN,  Consul  g^n^ral  de  France  a  Francfort, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Francfort,  le  29  juillet  1914. 

Je  vous  signals  d'importants  mouvemenls  de  troupes  hier  et  cette  nuit.  Ce  matin, 
plusleurs  regiments  sont  arrives  en  tenue  de  campagne,  notamment  par  jes  routes  de 
Darmstadt,  CasseletMayence,  qui  sont  remplies  de  militaires.  Les  ponts  et  chemins  de 
fer  sont  gardes  sous  pretexte  de  preparer  les  manoeuvres  d'automne. 

RONSSIN. 


tA 


108  — 


r  89. 

M.  Allize,  Ministre  de  France  a  Munich, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Munich,  le  29  juillet  1914. 

On  m'assure  que  les  moulins  d'lUkirch  (Alsace-Lorraine)  ont  ele  invites  a  cesser  de 
livrer  a  leur  clientele  ordinaire  et  a  reserver  toule  leur  production  pour  Tarmee. 

De  Strasbourg  sont  signales  des  transports  de  canons  automobiles  employes  pour 
le  tir  sur  aeroplanes  et  dirigeables. 

Sous  pretexte  de  modification  dans  les  exercices  d'automne,  les  sous-officiers  el 
soldats  des  regiments  d'infanterie  bavaroise  de  Metz,  qui  etaient  en  permission  en 
Bavierc  a  Toccasion  des  recoltes,  ont  re^u  Tordre  hier  de  rentrer  immedial^ment, 

Allize. 


r  90. 

M.  DuMALNE,  ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,. Ministre  des  Affaires  elrangeres  p.  i. 

Vienne,  le  29  juillet  191  A. 

Le  Consul  de  France  a  Prague  me  confirme  la  mobilisation  du  8*=  corps  d'armee 
dejii  annoncee,  et  celle  de  la  division  de  landwehr  de  ce  corps  d'armee.  Les  divisions 
de  cavalerie  de  Galicie  mobilisent  egalemenl;  des  regiments,  des  divisions  de  cava- 
lerle  de  Vienne  et  de  Buda-Pest  ont  deja  ete  transportes  a  la  frontiere  russe.  Des 
convocations  de  reservistes  ont  actuellement  lieu  dans  cette  region. 

En  vue  de  faire  face  h  toute  menace,  el  peut-elre  pour  en  imposer  a  Petersbourg, 
Ic  bruit  court  que  le  Gouvernemcnl  auslro-hongrois  aurait  Tinlenlion  de  decider  le 
'60  juillet  on  le  i*""  aout,  la  mobilisation  generale  des  armees.  Enfin  le  retour  de 
TEmpereur  d'Iscbl  a  Vienne  est  assure  pour  demain. 

DUMAINE. 


—  109  — 


^  r  91. 

m 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-Petershourg, 
a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^Irangeres  p.  i. 

Saint-Petersboarg,  le  agjuillet  1914. 

La  conversation  directe  k  laquelle  le  Gouvernemenl  russe  avail  amicalement  convie 
le  Gouvernenient  austro-hongrois  est  refusec  par  celul-ci. 

D'autre  part^TEtat-Major  russe  a  constate  que  TAutiiche  precipite  ses  preparalifs 
militaires  contre  la  Russie  et  active  sa  mobilisation,  qui  a  commence  sur  ia  frontiere 
de  Galicie".  En  consequence,  Tordre  de  mobilisation  sera  expedie,  cette  nuit,  aux  treize 
corps  d'armee  destines  i  operer  eventuellement  contre  TAutriche. 

Malgre  I'echec  de  sa  proposition,  M.  Sazonoff  accepte  I'idee  d'une  conference  des 
quatre  Puissances  a  Londres;  il  n'attache  d'ailleurs  aucune  importance  autitre  officiel 
de  cette  deliberation  et  se  pretera  k  toutes  les  tentatives  anglaises  en  faveur  de  la 
paix. 

Paleologue. 


1\°  92. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  h.  Berlin, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Bciiin,  le  29  juillet  19l4> 

J'ai  demande  aujourd'hui  au  Secretaire  d'Etal  ou  en  etait  la  question  des  conver- 
sations directes  entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg,  qui  lui  semblait  bier  la  meilleure  pro- 
cedure pour  arriver  k  une  detente.  II  m'a  repondu  qu  i  Petersbourg  les  dispositions 
sur  ce  point  etaient  bonnes  et  qu'il  avail  demande  k  V,ienne  d'entrer  dans  cette  voie. 
11  altendail  la  reponse.  Le  Gouvernemenl  britannique,  apres  avoir  vu  rep6usser  la 
suggestion  d'une  conference,  avail  fait  connaitre  qu'il  verrail  avec  faveur  ces  conver- 
sations s'ouvrir  entre  TAutrichc  el  la  Russie  et  avail  demande  que  I'Allemagne  y 
poussat  I'Autriche,  ce  que  le  Gouvernemenl  imperial  ne  manque  pas  de  faire. 

J'ai  demande  a  M.  de  Jagow  sll  avail  enfih  la  reponse  de  la  Serbie  a  I'Autriche,  ot 
ce  qu'il  en  pensait.  II  m'a  repondu  qu'il  y  voyait  une  base  de  negocialion  possible. 
J'ai  repris  que  c'esl  juslemenl  pour  cela  que  je  trouvais  inexplicable  la  rupture  de 
I'Autriche  apres  la  reception  d'un  document  pareil. 

Le  Secretaire  d'Elat  a  alors  fail  remarquer  qu'avec  les  peuples  d'Orienl  on  n'avait 
jamais  assez  de  suretes  et  que  I'Autriche  voulait  conlroler  rexecutioa  des  promesses 


—  110  — 

qui  lui  etaient  faites,  controle  que  ia  Serbie  refusait.  C'est  la  aux  yeux  du  Secretaire 
d'Etat,  le  point  capital.  J'ai  replique  a  M.  de  Jagow  que,  voulant  rester  indepen- 
dante,  la  Serbie  devait  repousser  le  controle  d'une  seule  Puissance,  mais  qu'une 
Commission  Internationale  ne  presenterait  pas  le  meme  caractere.  Les  Etats  Balka- 
niques  en  comptent  pins  d'kme,  a  commencer  par  la  Commi^ion  finartciere  a  Athenes. 
On  pourrait  par  exenjple,.  ai-je  dit,,  imaginer,  entre-  autres  combinaisor^s,  une  Com- 
mission internalionale  provisoire  chargee  de  controler  I'enquete  de  police  demandee 
par  rAutciche;.ii  etait  clairpar  cet  exemple  que  la  reponse  de  la  Serbie  ouvrait  la 
porte  a  des  conversations  et  ne  justifiait  pas  ime  rupture. 

Tai  ensuite  demarlde  au  Secretaire  d'Etat  si,  en  dehors  des  conversations  direcles 
entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg^,  auxqiielles  Sir  Ed.  Grey  s'etait  rallie,  il  ne  peinsait  pas 
que  Taction  conimiine  des  quatre  Puissances  pourrait  s'exercer  par  Tintermediaire  de 
leurs  Ambassadeurs;  11  ma  repondu  affirmativemeijt  ajoutant  qu'acluellemeni  lie 
Cabinet  de  Londres  se  confentait  dappuyer  dans  le  sens  des  conversations  directes. 

A  la  fin  de  I'apres-midi,  le  Chancelier  de  I'Empire  a  prie 'VAmbassadeur  d'Angle- 
terre  de  venir  le  Voir.  II  lui  a  parle  de  la  proposition  de  Sir  E;  Grey  tendant  a  .la 
reunion  d'une  Conference ;  il lui  adit  qu'il  n'avait  pas  pu  accepter  une  proposition  qui 
semblait  imposer"  Tautortte  des  Puissances  a  TAiitnche;  il  a  assure  mon  Collegue  de 
son  sincere  desir  de  la  paix  et  des  efforts  qu'il  faisait  a  Vienne,  mais  il  a  ajoute  que; 
la  Russie  etait  seule  la  maitresse  de  maintenir  la  paix  ou  de  dechainer  la  guerre. 

Sir  Ed.  Goschen  lui  a  repondu  qu'il  ne  partageait  pas  son  sentiment  et  que  si  la 
guerre  eclatait,  I'Autriche  aurait  la  plus  grosse  part  de  responsabilite ,  car  il  etait 
inadmissible  qu'elle  eut  rompu  avec  la  Serbie  apres  la  reponse  de  celle-ci. 

Sans  discuter  sur  ce  point,  le  Chancelier  a  dit  qu'il  poussait  autant  qu'il  le  pouvait 
aux  conveY-sations  directes  entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Russie;  il  savait  que  I'Angleterre 
voyait  cette  conversation  d'un  ceil  favorable.  H  a  ajoute  que  sa  propre  action  serait 
bien  difficile  k  Vienne ,  s'il  etait  vrai  que  la  Russie  eut  mobilise  sur  la  Irontiere  au- 
trichienne  quatorze  corps  d*armee.  II  a  prie  moa  collegue  d'appeler  sur  toules'  ces 
observations  raitefitiOD  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey. 

Sir  E.  Goschen  a  telegraphic  dans  ce  sens  6  Londres* 

Lattitude  du  Chancelier  est  tres  probablement  la  consequence  du  dernier  entre- 
lien  de  Sir  Ed.  Grey  avec  le  prin6e  Lichnowslci.  Jusqu'^  ces  tout  derniers  joUrs,  on 
s*est  flalte  ici  que  TAngleterre  reslerait  hers  du  d^bat,  et  Timpression  produite  par 
son  altitude  est  profonde  sur  le  Goiivemement  allemand  et  sur  les  financiers  et 
hommes  .d'affaires. 

Jules  Cambon. 


~  111  — 

r  93. 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Allaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Vienne,  le  29  juillet  1914. 

L'opinion  de  mes  coUegues  anglais,  russe  et  italien  concorde  avec  la  mienne  con- 
cernant  Timpossibilite  d'empecher  une  premiere  lutte  entre  rAutriche  et  la  Serbia, 
toutes  les  tentatives  pour  retarder  le  choc  ayanl  echoue. 

M.  Schebeko  avail  demande  que  les  pourparlers  engages  a  Petersbourg  entre 
MM.  Sazondff  et  Szapary  fussent  poursuivis  et  renduspliis  efficaces  par  des  pouvoirs 
specialement  conferes  a  celui-ci,  le  comle  Berchtold  s  y  est  n'etlement  oppose.  II 
marquait  ainsi  que  TAutriche-Hongrie  ne  tolere  aucune  intervention  qui  rempeche- 
rait  d'infliger  a  la  Serbie  un  chatiment  et  une  humiliation. 

Le  due  d'Avarna  adinet  comme  Ires  vraiseojblable  que  Timminence  d'une  insurrec- 
tion generale  de  ses  sujets  Sud-Slaves  ait  precipite  les  resolutions  de  la  Monarchie. 
II  s'attache  encore  a  lespoir  qu'apres  un  premier  succes  des  armees  auslro-hongroises, 
mais  pas  plus  tot,  une  mediation  pourrait  limiter  le  conffit. 

Du  MAINE. 


W  94, 


M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Miflistre  des  Allaires  Etrangeres,  p.  i.  ^ 

a  Londres,  Berlin^  Saint-PEtersbourg,  Rome,  Vienne,  Constantinople, 


Belgrade. 


Paris,  le  29  juillet  1914. 


Ce  matin ,  la  communication  suivante  m'a  ete  faite  par  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne 
a  litre  ofiicieux  :  le  Gouvernement  allemand  poursuit  ses  efforts  en  tue  d'amener  le 
Gouvemement  autrichien  a  une  conversation  amicale  qui  permettra  a  ce  dernier  de 
faire  connaitre  exactement  le  but  et  I'extension  des  operations  en  Serbie.  Le  Cabinet 
de  Berlin  espere  recevoir  des  precisions  qui  seraient  de  nature  a  donner  satisfactioa 
a  la  Russie.  Les  efforts  allemands  ne  sont  aucunement  enlraves  par  la  declaration  de 
guerre  intervenue.  Une  communication  semblable  sera  faite  k  Petersbourg. 

Au  cours  d'une  conversation  que  j'ai  eue  ce  matin  avec  le  baron  de  Schoen, 
celui-ci  m'a  declare  que  le  Gouvernement  allemand  ignorait  les  intentions  de  Vienne. 
Quand  Berlin  saura  jusqu'ou  I'Autriche  veut  aller,  on  aura  une  base  de  discussion, 
qui  rendra  plus  faciles  les  conversations  en  vue  d  une  intervention. 


—  112  — 

Sur  mon  observation  que  les  operations  militaires  engagees  ne  laisseraient  peut- 
etre  pas  le  temps  de  causer,  el  que  le  Gouvernement  allemand  devraiit  user  de  son 
influence  a  Vienne  en  vue  de  les  retarder,  Fambassadeur  m'a  repondu  que  Berlin  ne 
pouvait  exercer  de  pression,  mais  qu'il  esperait  que  les  operations  ne  seraient  pas 
poussees  tres  activement. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


N°  95. 

M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  p.  i., 

a  Londres,  Berlin,  Saint-Petersbourg,  Vienne,  Constantinople,  Rome,^ 
Belgrade. 

Paris,  le  29Juillet  191  A. 

D'ordre  de  son  Gouvernement,  M.  Iswolsky  est  venu  me  communiquer  un  tele- 
gramme  adresse  par  M.  Sazonoff  ^  Berlin.  11  resulte  de  cette  information  que  la  Russie, 
a  la  suite  de  la  declaration  de  guerre  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  k  la  Serbie ,  des  mesures 
de  mobilisation  deja  appliquees  a  la  plus  grande  parlie  de  I'armee  austro-hongroise , 
enfm  du  refus  du  comte  Berchtold  de  continuer  les  pourparlers  entre  Vienne  et 
Saint-Petersbourg,  avail  decide  la  mobilisation  dans  les  arrondissements  d'Odessa, 
Kiew,  Moscou  et  Kazan.  En  portant  ce  fait  a  la  connaissance  du  Gouvernement  alle- 
mand,  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  a  Berlin  a  ete  charge  d'ajouler  que  ces  precautions 
militaires  n'etaient  a  aucun  degre  dirigees  contre  TAllemagne,  et  ne  prejugeaient  pas 
non  plus  des  mesures  agressives  contre  rAutriche-Hongrie ;  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie 
a  Vienne  n'etait,  d'ailleurs,  pas  rappele  de  son  poste. 

L'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  m'a  donne  egalement  le  sens  de  deux  telegrammes  adresses 
&  Londres  par  M.  Sazonoff  :  le  premier,  indiquant  que  la'  decoration  de  guerre  a  la 
Serbie  mettait  fin  aux  conversations  du  Ministre  russe  avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche, 
demandait  k  I'Angletcrre  d'exercer  aussi  rapidement  que  possible^  son  action  dans  le 
sens>  de  la  mediation  et  de  I'arret  immediat  des  operations  de  guerre  de  I'Autriche 
(dont  la  continuation  donnait  le  temps  k  I'Autriche  d'ecraser  la  Serbie  pendant  que 
ia  mediation  Irainerait);  le  second  communiquait  I'impression  gardee  par  M.  Sazonoff 
de  ses  Conversations  avec  I'Ambassadeur  allemand,  que  I'AlIemagne  favorise  I'intran- 
si^eance  de  I'Autriche  et  n'exerce  pas  d'action  sur  elle.  Le  Ministre  russe  considere 
I'attilude  de  I'AlIemagne  comme  Ires  inquietante  et  croit  que  I'Angleterre  est  en  meil- 
leure  posture  que  les  aulres  Puissances  pour  entreprendre  des  demarches  k  Berlin , 
en  vue  d'une  action  sur  Vienne. 

Bienvenu-Martin. 


113  — . 


r  96. 


M.  Barrere,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Rome, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeresjp.  i. 

Rome,  ie  29  juillet  191 4. 

Le  Ministre  des  Aflaires  etrangeres  a  ete  informe  officiellement  par  TAmbassadeur. 
de  Russie  que  son  Gouvernement,  a  la  suite  de  la  declaration  de  guerre  de  TAutriche. 
a  laSerbie  et  des  mesures  de  mobilisation  prises  d'ores  et  deja  par  rAutriche,  avait 
donne  I'ordre  de  mobiliser  dans  les  districts  de  Kiew,  Odessa,  Moscou  et  Kazan.  II 
a  ajoute  que  celle  mesure  n'avait  pas  un  caractere  agressif  contre  TAUemagne  et  que 
I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  a  Vienne  n'avait  pas  ete  rappele. 

En  commentant  cette  conamunication ,  le  Marquis  de  San  Giuliano  m'a  dit  que 
malheureusement  dans  toute  cette  affaire  la  conviction  de  TAutriche  et  celle  de  TAl- 
lemagne  avaient  ete  et  etaient  encore  que  la  Russie  ne  marcherait  pas.  II  m'a  lu  k  ce 
propos  une  depeche  de  M.  BoUati  lui  rendant  compte  d'un  entretien  qu'il  avait  eu 
aujourd'hui  avec  M.  de  Jagow,  et  ou  ce  dernier  lui  avait  encore  repete  qu'il  ne  croyait 
pas  que  la  Russie  marcherait.  II  fondait  cette  croyance  sur  le  fait  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment russe  venait  d'envoyer  a  Berlin  un  agent  pour  traiter  de  certaines  questions 
linancieres.  L'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  a  Berlin  a  dit  egalement  a  son  Gollegue 
anglais  qu'il  ne  croyait  pas  k  une  guerre  generale ,  la  Russie  n'etant  ni  en  humeur  ni 
en  etat  de  faire  la  guerre. 

Le  Marquis  de  San  Giuliano  ne  partage  pas  du  tout  cette  opinion.  II  estime 
que  si  I'Autriche  se  contente  d'humilier  la  Serbie,  et  d'exiger,  en  outre  de  1' ac- 
ceptation de  la  note,  certains  avantages  materiels  qui  ne  touchent  pas  k  son  terri- 
toire,  la  Russie  peut  encore  trouver  matiere  a  composition  avec  elle.  Mais  si  I'Au- 
triche veut  soit  demembrer  la  Serbie,  soit  la  detruire  comme  Etat  independant, 
il  considere  comme  impossible  k  la  Russie  de  ne  pas  intervenir  militairement. 

Malgre  I'extreme  gravite  de  la  situation,  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  ne  me 
parait  pas  desesperer  de  la  possibilite  d'un  arrangement.  II  croit  que  I'Angleterre  peut 
encore  exercer  beaucoup  d'influence  k  Berlin  dans  un  sens  pacifique.  II  a  eu  hier 
soir,  m'a-t-il  dit,  une  longue  conversation  avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre, 
Sir  R.  Rodd,  pour  lui  demontrer  combien  I'inlervention  anglaise  pourrait  etre  effi- 
cace.  II  m'a  dit  en  terminant  :  «  Si  tel  est  aussi  I'avis  de  votre  Gouvernement,  il  pour- 
rait, de  son  cote,  insister  dans  ce  sens  a  Londres.  » 

BARRlfcRE. 


Documents  diplomatiooes.  —  Guerre  europecnne.  l5 


116 


r  97. 


1 


M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res, 
a  M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France,  a  Londres. 

Paris,  le  29  juillet  1914. 

Je  vous  serais  oblige  de  prier  Sir  Ed.  Grey  de  bien  vouloir  reprendre  le  plus  tot 
possible  k  Berlin,  sous  la  forme  qu'il  jugera  la  plus  opportune  et  la  plus  efficace,  sa 
proposition  de  mediation  des  quatre  Puissances,  qui  avait  obtenu  I'adhesion  de 
principe  du  Gouvemement  allemand. 

Le  Gouvemement  russe  a  du,  de  son  cote,  faire  exprimer  directement  le  meme 
d6sir  au  Gouveraement  anglais;  la  declaration  de  guerre  de  TAutriche  a  la  Serbie,  ses 
envois  de  troupes  sur  la  frontiere  austro-russe ,  la  mobilisation  russe  consecutive  sur 
la  frontiere  de  Galicie,  ont  en  effet  mis  fin  aux  conversations  directes  austro-russes. 

Les  precisions  que  le  Gouvemement  allemand  va  demander  k  Vienne,  conforme- 
ment  k  la  declaration  du  baron  de  Schoen  que  je  vous  ai  fait  connaitre,  pour  s'infor- 
mer  des  intentions  du  Gouvemement  autrichien,  permettront  aux  quatre  Puissances 
d'exercer  une  action  utile  entre  Vienne  et  Petersbourg  pour  le  maintien  de  la  paix. 

Je  vous  prie  de  signaler  egalement  au  Secretaire  d'Elat  anglais  combien  il  serait 
important  qu'il  obtint  du  Gouvemement  italien  le  maintien  de  son  concours  le  plus 
entier  pour  sa  collaboration  a  faction  des  quatre  Puissances  en  faveur  de  la  paix. 

Ren4  Viviani. 


N-  98. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France,  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin  ,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Mrang^res  p.  i.  / 

Londres,  le  29  juiHet  19 14- 

Dans  son  entretien  d'aujourd'hui  avec  mon  collegue  d'Allemagne,  Sir  Ed.  Grey  a 
fait  observer  que  I'ouverture  de  M.  Sazonoff  pour  une  conversation  directe  entre  la 
Russie  et  I'Autriche  n'ayant  pas  ete  accueillie  k  Vienne ,  il  conviendrait  d'en  revenir  a 
sa  proposition  d 'intervention  amicale  des  quatre  Puissances  non  directement  interessees. 
Cette  suggestion  a  ete  acceptee  en  principe  par  le  Gouvemement  Allemand ,  mais  il  a 
fait  des  objections  k  I'idee  d'une  conference  ou  d'une  mediation.  Le  Secretaire  d'Etat 
des  Affaires  etrangeres  a  invite  le  Prince  Lichnowski  k  prier  son  Gouvemement  de 


—   115  — 
proposer  lui-meme  une  formule.  Quelle  quelle  soit,  si  elle  permet  de  maintenir  la 
paix,  elle  sera  agreee  par  I'Angleterre,  la  France  et  I'ltalie. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  du  transxnettre.immediatement  k  Berlin  la  demande 
de  Sir  Ed.  Grey.  En  me  rendant  compte  de  cette  conversation,  le  Secretaire  d'Etat 
des  Affaires  etrangeres  a  ajoute  que  la  reponse  de  TAllemagne  a  cette  communication , 
ainsi  qu  a  celle  de  la  Russie  relative*  a  la  mobilisation  de  quatre  corps  d'armee  sur  la 
frontiere  autrichienne ,  nous  permettra  de  nous  rendre  compte  des  intentions  du 
Gouvernement  allemand.  Mon  collegue  d'Allemagne  ayant  interroge  Sir  Ed.  Grey 
sur  les  intentions  du  Gouvernement  britannique,  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires 
etrangeres  a  repondu  qu'il  n'avait  pas  a  se  prononcer  quant  a  present. 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  ne  m'a  pas  cache  qu'il  trouvait  la  situation  tres  grave  et  qu'il  gardait 
peu  d'espoir  dans  une  solution  pacifique. 

Paul  Cambon. 


X  99. 

M.  BoppE,  Ministre  de  France  a  Belgrade, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Belgrade,  le  29  juiliet  191  A. 

Le  Prince  heritier  avait,  des  la  remise  de  Tultimatum  austro-hongrois,  telegraphic 
au  Tzar  pour  demander  sa  protection.  Mon  collegue  de  Russie  me  confie  qil'il  vienl 
de  communiquer  a  M.  Pachitch  la  reponse  de  Sa  Majeste. 

Le  Tzar  remercie  le  Prince  de  s'elre  adresse  a  lui  dans  une  circonstance  aussi  cri- 
tique ;  il  declare  que  toutes  les  dispositions  sont  prises  pour  arriver  a  une  solution 
pacifique  du  conflit ,  et  donne  au  Prince  I'assurance  formelle  que ,  si  ce  but  ne  peut 
etre  atteint,  la  Russie  ne  se  desinteressera  jamais  du  sort  de  la  Serbie. 

BOPPE. 


r  100. 

~~  » 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-Petersbourg, 

a  M.  Bienvenu-Martijs,  Ministre  des  Aff'aires  etrangeres  p.  i. 

Saint-Petcrsbourg,  le  29  juiliet  1914. 

L' Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  est  venu  declarer  a  M.  Sazonoff"  que  si  la  Russie  n'ar- 
rele  pas  ses  preparatifs  militaires,  I'armee  allemande  recevra  I'ordre  de  mobiliser. 


—  116  — 

M.  Sazonoff  a  repondu  que  les  preparalifs  russes  sont  motives:  dun  cote,  par 
rintransigeance  obstinee  de  I'Autriche;  d'autre  part,  par  le  fait  que  huit  corps 
austro-hongrois  sont  dejk  mobilises. 

Le  ton  sur  lequel  le  comte  de  Pourtales  s'est  acquitte  de  la  notification  a  decid6 
le  Gouvernement  russe,  cette  nuit  meme,  k  ordonner  la  mobilisation  des  treize 
corps  destines  a  operer  contre  I'Autriche. 

Paleologue. 


IN*'   101. 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres, 
aux.  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Saint-Pete rsbourg  et  Londres. 

Paris,  ie  3ojuillet  1914 

.  M.  Iswolski  est  venu  cette  nuit  me  dire  que  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  nollfie  k 
M.  Sazonoff  la  decision  de  son  Gouvernement  de  mobiliser  ses  forces  armees,  si 
la  Russie  ne  cesse  pas  ses  preparatifs  militaires. 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  du  Tsar  fait  remarquer  que  ces  preparatifs 
n'ont  ete  commences  qu'^  la  suite  de  la  mobilisation  par  I'Autriche  de  huit  corps 
d'armee  et  du  refus  de  celle  puissance  de  r^gler  pacifiquement  son  differend  avec  la 
Serbie.  M.  Sazonoff  declare  que,  dans  ces  conditions,  la  Russie  ne  peut  que  hdter 
ses  armements  et  envisager  I'imminence  de  la  guerre ,  qu  elle  compte  sur  le  secours 
d'alliee  de  la  France  et  qu'elle  considere  comrae  desirable  que  I'Angleterre  se  joigne 
sans  perdre  de  temps  k  la  Russie  et  k  la  France. 

La  France  est  resolue  a  remplir  toutes  les  obligations  de  ralllance. 

Elle  ne  negligera,  d'ailleurs,  aucun  effort  en  vue  de  la  solution  du  conflit  dans 
il'interet  de  la  paix  generale.  La  conversation  engagee  enlre  les  Puissances  moins  direc- 
tement  interessees  permet  d'esperer  encore  que  la  paix  puisse  etre  preservee;  j'estime 
done  qu'il  serait  opportun  que,  dans  les  mesures  de  precaution  et  de  defense  aux- 
quelles  la  Russie  croit  devoir  proceder,  elle  ne  prit  immediatement  aucune  dispo- 
sition qui  offrit  k  I'Allemagne  un  pretexle  pour  une  mobilisation  totale  ou  parlielle 
de  ses  forces. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  est  venu  a  la  fin  de  I'apres-midl  d'hier  me  parler  des 
mesures  militaires  que  prenait  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republlque  en  ajoutant  que 
la  France  etait  libre  d'agir  ainsi,  mais  qu'en  Allemagne  les  preparatifs  ne  pouvaient 
etre  secrets  et  qu'il  ne  faudrait  pas  que  I'opinion  fran^aise  s'alarmat  si  I'Allemagne  s'y 
decidait. 

J'ai  r6pondu  que  le  Gouvernement  fran^ais  n'avait  pris  aucune  mesure  dont  ses 


—  117  — 

voisins  pussent  etre  inquiets  et  que  sa  volonte  de  se  preter  a  toute  negociation  pour! 
le  maintien  de  la  paix  ne  pouvait  elre  mise  en  doute. 

Ren^  VivjANi. 


r  102. 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-P^tersbourg, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 

geres. 

Si^int-Petersbourg,  le  3o  juillet  igi'd- 

M.  SazonofF,  k  qui  j'ai  fait  connaitre  votre  desir  de  voir  eviter  toute  mesure  mili- 
taire  qui  pourrait  oQrir  k  TAllemagne  un  pretexte  k  la  mobilisation  generale,  m'a  repondu 
que  juslement,  dans  le  cours  de  la  nuit  derniere,  I'Etat-Major  avait  fait  surseoir  k  des 
mesures  de  precaution  militaire  pour  eviter  toute  equivoque.  Hier,  le  Chef  d'Etat- 
Major  general  russe  a  convoque  I'Attache  militaire  del'Ambassade  d'Allemagne,  et  lui 
a  donne  sa  parole  d'honneur  que  la  mobilisation  ordonnee  ce  matin  vise  exclusiv«- 
ment  I'Autriche. 

Toutefois,  dans  un  entretien  qu'il  a  eu  cet  apres-midi  avec  le  comte  de  Pourtales, 
M.  SazonofI  a  du  se  convaincre  que  TAUemagne  ne  veut  pas  prononcer  k  Vienne  la 
parole  decisive  qui  sauvegarderait  la  paix.  L'empereur  Nicolas  garde  la  meme  impres- 
sion d  un  echange  de  telegrammes  qu'il  vient  d'avoir  personnellement  avec  fempereur 
Guillaume. 

D'autre  part,  I'Etat-Major  et  I'Amiraute  russes  ont  requ.  d'inquietants  renseigne- 
ments  sur  les  preparatifs  de  farmee  et  de  la  marine  allemandes. 

En  me  donnant  ces  informations,  M.  Sazonolf  a  ajoute  que  le  Gouvernement 
russe  ne  continue  pas  moins  ses  elfoi-ls  de  conciliation.  II  m'a  repete  :  «  Jusqu'au  der- 
nier instant,  je  negocierai. » 

Paleologue. 


r  103. 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint- Petersbourg, 

a  M.  Ren^  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 

geres. 

Saint-Petersbourg,  le  3o  juillet  19' 4. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  est  venu  cette  nuit  insister  de  nouveau ,  mais  dans 
des  termes  moins  categoriques,  aupres  de  M.  Sazonoff  pour  que  la  Russia  cesse 


—  118  — 
ses  preparatifs  militaires,  en  affirmant  que  TAutriche  ne  porterait  pas  atteinte   k 
I'inlegrite  territoriale  de  la  Serbie  : 

«  Ce  n  est  pas  seulement  Tintegrite  territoriale  de  la  Serbie  que  nous  devons  sau- 
«  vegarder,  a  repondu  M.  SazonolT,  c'est  encore  son  independance  et  sa  souverainete. 
«  Nous  ne  pouvons  pas  admettre  que  la  Serbie  devienne  vassale  de  TAutriche, » 

M.  Sazonoff  a  ajoute  :  «  L'heure  est  trop  grave  pour  que  je  ne  vous  declare  pas 
toule  ma  pensee.  En  intervenant  a  Pelersbourg,  tandis  qu'elle  refuse  d'intervenir 
a  Vienne,  I'Allemagne  ne  cherche  qu'i  gagner  du  temps,  afm  de  permettre  a  I'Au- 
triche  d'ecraser  le  petit  royaume  serbe  avant  que  la  Russie  n'ait  pu  le  secourir.  Mais 
I'empereur  Nicolas  a  un  tel  desir  de  conjurer  la  guerre  que  je  vais  vous  faire  en  son 
nom  une  nouvelle  proposition  : 

«  Si  I'Autriche,  reconnaissant  que  son  conflit  avec  la  Serbie  a  assume  le  caractere 
d'une  question  d'interet  europeen,  se  declare  prete  k  eliminer  de  son  ultimatum  les 
clauses  qui  portent  atteinte  a  la  souverainete  de  la  Serbie ,  la  Russie  s'engage  a  cesser 
loutes  mesures  militaires. » 

Le  comle  de  Pourtales  a  promis  d'appuyer  cette  proposition  aupres  de  son  Gou^ 
vernement. 

Dans  la  pensee  de  M.  Sazonoff,  Tacceptation  de  sa  proposition  par  TAutriche  aurait 
pour  corollaire  logique  Touverture  d'une  deliberation  des  Puissances  a  Londres. 

Le  Gouvernement  russe  montre,  une  fois  encore,  par  son  attitude,  qu'il  ne  neglige 
rien  pour  enrayer  le  conflit. 

pALtOLOGUE. 


I 


no4. 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Vienne,  ie  3o  juillet  19 1 4- 

Malgre  la  communication  faite  hier  par  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  a  plusieurs  de  ses 
collegues,  dont  celui  d'Allemagne,  au  sujet  de  la  mobilisation  partielle  dans  son 
pays,  la  presse  de  Vienne  s'etait  abstenue  den  publier  la  nouvelle.  Ce  silence  impose 
vient  de  s'expliquer  dans  un  entretien  de  haule  importance  entre  M.  Schebeko  et  le 
comte  Berchtold,  qui  ont  longuement  envisage  les  redoutables  difficultes  pre^entes, 
avec  une  egale  bonne  volonte  d'y  adapter  des  solutions  reciproquement  acceptablcs. 

Les  preparatifs  militaires  du  cote  russe,  a  explique  M.  Schebeko,  n'ont  d'autre  but 
que  de  repondre  k  ceux  de  I'Autriche  et  d'indiquer  I'intention  et  les  droits  du  Tzar 
d'emettre  son  avis  dans  le  reglemenl  de  la  question  serbe.  Les  mesures  de  mobilisa- 
tion prises  en  Galicie,  a  repondu  le  comte  Berchtold,  n'impliquent  non  plus  aucune 
intention  agressive  et  visent  seulement  a  maintenir  la  situation  sur  le  meme  pied.  De 


—  119  — 
part'  et  d  autre  on  s  appliquera  a  ce  que  ces  mesures  ne  soient  pas  interpr§tees  comme 
des  marques  d'hostilite. 

Pour  ie  reglement  du  conflit  austro-serbe ,  il  a  ete  convenu  que  les  pourparlers 
seraient  repris  a  Petersbourg  entre  M.  Sazonoll"  et  Ie  comte  Szapary ;  s'ils  ont  ete 
interrompus  c'est  par  suite  d'un  malentendu,  Ie  comte  Berchtold  croyant  que  Ie 
Mlnistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  de  Russie  reclamait  pour  son  interlocuteur  des  pou- 
voirs  qui  iui  permettraient  de  modifier  les  termes  de  Tultimatum  autrichien.  Le 
comte  Szapary  sera  seulemenl  autorise  a  discuter  quel  accommodement  serait  com- 
patible avec  la  dignite  et  le  prestige  dont  les  deux  Empires  ont  un  souci  egal. 

Ce  serait  done,  pour  le  moment,  sous  cette  forme  directe  et  reduite  aux  deux 
plus  interessees  qu'aurait  lieu  fexamen  que  Sir  Ed.  Grey  proposait  de  confier  aux 
quatre  Puissances  non  directement  interessees. 

Sir  M,  de  Bunsen,  qui  se  trouvait  chez  moi,  a  aussitot  declare  a  M.  Schebeko  que 
le  Foreign  Office  approuvera  entierement  cette  nouvelle  procedure.  Repetant  fexpose 
fait  par  Iui  au  Ballplatz,  I'Ambassadeur  de  Russie  a  affirme  que  son  Gouvernement 
tiendra  un  compte  beaucoup  plus  large  qu'on  ne  le  suppose  des  exigences  de  la  Mo- 
narchic ;  rien  n'a  ete  neglige  par  M.  Schebeko  pour  convaincre  le  comte  Berchtold 
de  la  sinc6rite  du  desir  de  la  Russie  d'arriver  a  une  entente  acceptable  pour  les 
deux  Empires. 

L'entretien  s'etait  maintenu  dans  un  ton  amical  et  permettait  de  croire  que  toute 
chance  de  localiser  le  conflit  n'etait  pas  perdue,  lorsque  la  nouvelle  de  la  mobilisation 
allemande  est  parvenue  a  Vienne. 

Dlmaine. 


r  105. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Gonseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  3o  juillet  191 4- 

M.  de  Jagow  m'a  telephone  a  deux  heures  que  la  nouvelle  de  la  mobilisation  alle- 
mande, repandue  une  heure  auparavant,  etait  fausse,  etm'a  prie  de  vous  en  informer 
d'urgence;  le  Gouvernement  imperial  faitsaisir  les  supplements  de  journaux  qui  fan- 
nonqaient.  Mais  ni  cette  communication  ni  ces  mesures  ne  diminuent  mes  apprehen- 
sions au  sujet  des  projets  de  rAllemagne. 

H  parait  certain  que  le  Gonseil  extraordinaire  tenu  hier  soir  a  Potsdam  avec  les 
autorites  militaires  et  sous  la  presidence  de  I'Empereur  avait  decide  la  mobilisation, 
ce  qui  explique  la  preparation  de  fedition  speciale  du  Lokal  Anzeiger,  mais  que  sous 
des  influences  diverses  (declaration  de  I'Angleterre  quefle  reserve  son  entiere  liberte 


—  uo  — 

d action,  echange  de  telegrammes  entre  le  Tzar  et  Guillaume  II)  les  graves  mesures 
arretees  ont  ete  suspendues. 

Un  des  Ambassadeurs  avec  lequel  je  suls  le  plus  lie  a  vu,  a  deux  heures,  M.  Zini- 
mermann.  D'apres  le  Sous-Secretaire  d'Etat,  les  autorites  militaires  pressent  beaucoup 
pour  que  la  mobilisation  soit  decretee,  parce  que  tout  retard  fait  perdre  a  TAllemagne 
quelques-uns  de  ses  avantages.  Cependant,  jusqu  a  present  on  aurait  reussi  a  com- 
battre  la  bate  de  TEtat-Major  qui,  dans  la  mobilisation,  voit  la  guerre.  Quoi  qu'il  en 
soit,  la  mobilisation  pent  etre  decidee  dun  moment  a  I'autre.  Je  ne  sais  qui  a  lance 
dans  le  Lokal  Anzeiger,  journal  generalement  officieux,  une  nouvelle  prematuree  de 
nature  a  soulever  les  esprits  en  France. 

J'ai  les  plus  fortes  raisons  de  penser,  d'ailleurs,  que  toutes  les  mesures  de  mobi- 
lisation qui  peuvent  etre  realisees  avant  la  publication  de  I'ordre  general  de  mobilisa- 
tion sont  prises  ici,  ou  Ton  voudrait  nous  faire  publier  notre  mobilisation  les  pre- 
miers pour  nous  en  attribuer  la  responsabilite. 

Jules  Cambon. 


r  106. 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres, 
a  M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres. 

Paris,  le  3o  juillel  1914. 

Je  vous  prie  de  porter  k  la  connaissance  de  Sir  Edward  Grey  les  renseignemenls 
suivants  touchr.nt  les  preparatifs  militaires  fran^ais  et  allemands.  L'Angleterre  y  verra 
que  si  la  France  est  resolue,  ce  n'est  pas  elle  qui  prend  des  mesures  d'agression. 

Vous  atlirerez  Tattcntion  de  Sir  Edward  Grey  sur  la  decision  prise  par  le  Conseil 
des  Ministres  de  ce  matin :  bien  que  I'Allemagne  ait  pris  ses  dispositifs  de  couverture 
k  quelques  centaines  de  metres  de  la  frontiere,  sur  tout  le  front  du  Luxembourg  aux 
Vosges,  et  porte  ses  troupes  de  couverture  sur  leurs  positions  de  combat,  nous  avons 
retenu  nos  troupes  k  1  o  kilometres  de  la  frontiere ,  en  leur  interdisant  de  s'en  rappro- 
cher  davantage. 

Notre  plan,  con^u  dans  un  esprit  d'oflensive,  prevoyait  pourtant  que  les  positions 
de  combat  de  nos  troupes  de  couverture  seraient  aussi  rapprochees  que  possible  de 
la  frontiere.  En  livrant  ainsi  une  bande  du  territoire  sans  defense  k  I'agression  sou- 
daine  de  I'ennemi,  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  tient  a  montrer  que  la  France, 
pas  plus  que  la  Russie,  n'a  la  responsabilite  de  Tattaque. 

Pour  s'en  assurer,  il  suffit  de  comparer  les  mesures  prises  des  deux  cotes  de  noire 
frontiere :  en  France,  les  permissionnaires  n'ont  ete  rappeles  qu'apres  que  nous  avons 
acquis  la  certitude  que  I'Allemagne  I'avait  fait  depuis  cinq  jours.  « I 


—  121  — 

En  Allemagne,  non  seulemenl  les  troupes  en  garnison  a  Metz  ont  ete  poussees 
jusqua  la  frontiere ,  mais  encore  elles  ont  ete  renforcees  par  des  elements  transportes 
en  cheniin  de  fer  de  garnisons  de  Tinteneur,  telles  que  celles  de  Treves  on  de  Cologne. 
Rien  d'analogue  n  a  ete  fait  en  France. 

L'armement  des  places  de  la  frontiere  (deboisements,  mise  en  place  de  Tarme- 
nient,  construction  de  batteries,  renforcement  des  reseaux  de  fil  de  fer)  a  ete  com- 
mence en  Allemagne  des  le  samedi  25;  chez  nous,  il  va  fetre,  la  France  ne  pouvanl 
plus  se  dispenser  de  prendre  les  meines  mesures. 

Les  gares  ont  ete  occupees  militairement  en  Allemagne  le  samedi  2  5 ,  en  France 
le  mardi  28. 

Enlln,  en  Allemagne,  les  reservistes,  par  di-zaine  de  milliers,  ont  dte  rappeles  par 
convocations  individuelles,  ceux  residant  a  I'etranger  (classes  de  1  goS  a  1911)  rappe- 
les, les  ofTiciers  de  reserve  convoques;  a  I'interieur,  les  routes  sent  barrees,  les  auto- 
mobiles ne  circulent  qu'avec  un  permis.  G'est  le  dernier  stade  avant  la  mobilisation. 
Aucune  de  ces  mesures  n'a  ete  prise  en  France* 

L'armee  allemande  a  ses  avant-postes  sur  nos  bornes  frontieres;  par  deux  fois» 
hier,  des  patrouilles  allemandes  ont  penetre  sur  notre  territoire.  Tout  le  XVP  Corps 
de  Metz,  renforce  par  une  partie  du  VHP  venu  de  Treves  et  de  Cologne,  occupe  la 
frontiere  de  Metz  au  Luxembourg;  le  XV*"  Corps  d'armee  de  Strasbourg  a  serre  sur 
la  frontiere. 

Sous  menace  d'etre  fusilles,  les  Alsaciens-Lorrains  des  pays  annexes  ont  defense  de 
passer  la  frontiere. 

Rene  Viviani. 


r  107. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 

geres. 

Berlin ,  le  3o  juillet  1914. 

L' Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  n'a  pas  regu  communication  de  la  reponse  de  I'Alle- 
magne  a  la  demande  de  Sir  E.  Grey.  II  ma  dit  que  Berlin  avail  consulte  Vienne  et 
attendait  encore  favis  de  son  allie. 

Mon  collcgue  de  Russie  vient  de  me  faire  connaitre,  de  son  cote,  que  M.  de 
Jagow  (auquel  le  Comte  de  Pourtales  avail  communique  la  formule  de  conciliation 
suggeree  par  M.  Sazonoff  pour  une  entente  austro-russe)  venait  de  lui  declarer  qu'il 
Irouvait  cette  proposition  inacceptable  pour  fAutriche,  marquanl  ainsi  Taction  nega- 
tive de  la  diplomatic  allemande  a  Vienne. 

Jules  Cambon. 


Documents  diplomatiques. — Guerre  ciiropdenne. ,  16 


-   122  — 


r  10^. 


M.  Paul  Cambon  ,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres , 

a  M.  Ren^  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  AfFaires  etran- 
geres. 

Londres,  le  3o  juiilet  1914. 

Le  Prince  Lichnowski  n'a  pas  apporte  de  reponse  k  la  demande  que  lui  avail 
adressee  hier  Sir  Ed.  Grey  pour  obtenir  du  Gouvemement  allemand  une  formula 
d'intervention  des  quatre  puissances  dans  Imteret  de  la  paix,  Mais  mon  collegue 
d'AHemagne  a  questionne  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  des  Aflaires  etrangeres  sur  les  prepa- 
raiifs  jnilitaires  de  I'Angleterre. 

.  Sir  Ed.  Grey  lui  a  repondu  qu'ils  n  avaient  aucun  caractere  offensif ,  mais  que  , 
dans  I'etat  actuel  des  aflaires  sur  le  continent,  il  etait  naturel  de  prendre  quelques 
precautions;  qu'en  Anglelerre,  comme  en  France,  on  desirait  le  maintien  de  la  paix, 
et  que  si,  en  Angleterre,  comme  en  France,  on  envisageait  des  mesures  defensives, 
ce  n'etait  pas  dans  le  but  de  preparer  une  agression. 

'  Les  renseignements  que  Votre  Excellence  m'a  adress6s  au  sujet  des  mesures  mili- 
taires  prises  par  I'Allemagne  sur  la  frontiere  Iran^aise  m'ont  permis  de  marquer  k  Sir 
Edward  Grey  qu'il  ne  s'agit  plus  seulement  au  jourd'hui  d'un  conflit  d'influence  entre 
ia  Russie  et  rAutricbe-Hongrie;  une  agression  risque  d'etre  commise  qui  pourrait 
provoquer  une  guerre  generale. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  a  parfaitement  compris  mon  sentiment  et,  comme  moi,  il  estime 
que  le  moment  serait  venu  d'envisager  toutes  les  hypotheses  et  de  les  discuter  en 
commun. 

Paul  Cambon^ 


N^  109. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  h  Berlin, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Berlin ,  le  3o  j uillet  1 9 1 4- 

Dans  Tentreyue  que  jai  eue  aujourd'hui  avec  le  Secretaire  d'Etat,  j'ai  demande  k 
M.  de  Jagow  quelle  reponse  il  avait  faite  k  Sir  Ed.  Grey,  qui  lui  avait  demande  de 
dpnner  lui-meme  la  formule  de  I'intervention  des  puissances  desinteressees. 


—  123  — 

II  m'a  repondu  que,  «  pour  gagner  du  temps  »,  il  avail  decide  d'agir  directemenl 
€t  qu'il  avail  demaiide  a  rAutriche  de  dire  sur  quel  lerrain  on  pourrait  causer 
avec  elle.  Celte  reponse  a  pour  effel»  sous  pretexle  d'ailer  plus  vile,  d'eliminer  TAn- 
gleterre ,  la  France  el  I'llalie  el  de  confier  a  M.  de  Tehirsky,  donl  les  senlimenls 
pangermanisles  el  russophobes  sonl  conuus,  le  soin  d'amener  I'Aulriche  k  une  altilude 
conciliante. 

M.  de  Jagow  m'a  parle  ensuile  de  la  mobilisalion  russe  sur  la  froutiere  autrichiennei 
ii  m'a  dil  que  cette  mobilisation  compromeltait  Ic  succes  de  loute  intervention  aupres 
<3e  rAutriche ,  el  que  lout  dependail  de  \k.  II  a  ajoute  qu  il  craignail  que  TAulricbe 
ne  mobilisat  completement  a  la  suite  de  la  mobilisation  parlielle  russe,  ce  epii  pou- 
yait  entrainer  par  contre-coup  la  mobilisation  lolale  russe,  el  par  suite  celle  de  FAl- 
iemagne. 

J'ai  fait  remarquer  au  Secretaire  d'Elat  qu'il  m  avail  dit  lui-meme  que  TAUemagne 
ne  se  considererait  comme  obligee  de  mobiliser  que  si  la  Russie  mobilisaiit  sur  les 
frontieres  aHemandes  el  que  lei  n'etait  pas  le  cas,  II  m'a  repondu  que  c'etait  vrai, 
mai^  que  les  chefs  de  I'Artoee  insistaienl,  car  tout  retard  est  une  perle  de  force* 
pour  I'armee  allemande,  el «  que  les  paroles  que  je  rappelais  ne  constituaienl  pas,  de 
sa  part,  un  engagement  ferme  ». 

L'impression  'que  je  rapporte  de  cet  entretien  est  que  les  chances  de  paix  ont 
encore  decru. 

Jules  Cambon. 


r  no. 

M.  Paul  Cambon i  AmLassadeur  de  France  h  Londres, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 
geres. 

Londres,  le3i  juiflet  191 4. 

Au  debut  de  notre  entretien  d'aujourd'hui ,  Sir  E.  Grey  nia  dit  que  le  Prince 
Lichnowski  lui  avail  demande  ce  matin  si  TAngleterre  observerait  la  neulralite  dans 
le  conflit  qui  se  prepare.  Le  Secretaire  d'Elat  aux  Affaires  etrangeres  lui  a  repondu 
que,  si  le  conflit  devenail  general,  I'Angleterre  ne  pourrait  pas  rester  neutre  el, 
nolamment,  que  si  la  France  y  elait  impliquee,  I'Anglelerre  y  serail  enlrainee. 

J'ai  interroge  alors  Sir  E.  Grey  sur  la  deliberation  du  Cabinet  qui  avail  eu  lieu 
ce  matin.  II  m'a  repondu  qu'apres  avoir  examine  la  situation,  le  Cabinet  avail  pense 
que  pour  le  moment  le  Gouvernemenl  britannique  ne  pouvail  nous  garanlir  son  inter- 
vention, qu'il  avail  I'intention  de  s*entremellre  pour  obtenir  de  I'Allemagne  el  de  la 
France  Tengagement  de  respecter  la  neulralite  beige,  mais  que  pour  envisager  une 
intervention  il  convenait  d'atlendre  que  la  situation  se  developpslt. 

J'ai  demande  a  Sir  E.  Grey  si,  pour  intervenir,  le  Gouvernemenl  britannique 
altendrait  Tenvahissement  du  territoire  fran^ais.  J'ai  insiste  sur  le  fail  que  les  me- 


—  124  — 
sures  deja  adoptees  sur  notre  frontiere  par  I'Allemagne  revelaient  des  intentions 
d'agression  prochaine,  et  que  si  Ton  voulait  eviter  devoir  se  renouveier  I'erreur  de 
i'Europe  en  1870,  il  convenait  que  TADgleterre  erivisageat  des  maintenant  les  con- 
ditions dans  lesquefles  elle  nous  donnerait  le  concours  sur  lequel  la  France  comptait. 

Sir  E.  Grey  m'a  repondu  que  I'opinion  du  Cabinet  ne  s'etait  formee  que  sur  la 
situation  actuelle,  que  cette  situation  pouvait  se  modifier  et  ^ue,  dans  ce  cas,  on 
appellerait  aussitot  le  Conseil  des  Ministres  a  en  deliberer. 

Sir  A.  Nicolson,  que  j'ai  vu  en  sortant  du  Cabinet  du  Secretaire  d'Etal,  ma  dit  que 
le  Conseil  se  reunirait  de  nouveau  demain,  et,  confidentiellement,  m'a  fait  entendre 
que  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  etrangeres  nemanquerait  pas  de  reprendre  la 
discussion. 

Conformement  a  vos  instructions,  j'ai  fait  le  necessaire  pour  que  la  lettre  auto- 
graphe  que  M.  le  President  de  la  Republique  adresse  a  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  d'Angleterre 
soit  remise  ce  soir  au  Roi.  Cette  demarche,  qui  sera  cerlainement  communiquee  au 
Premier  Ministre,  des  demain  matin,  sera,  je  n'en  doute  pas,  prise  en  serieuse  con- 
sideration par  le  Cabinet  britannique. 

Paul  C AMBON. 


N°  111. 
M.  MoLLARD,  Ministre  de  France  a  Luxembourg, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres- 

Luxembourg,  ie3i  juiilet  1914. 

Le  Ministre  d'Etat  sort  de  la  Legation,  il  venait  de  me  dire  que  les  AUemands 
avaient  ferme  les  ponts  sur  la  Moselle  de  Schengen  el  de  Remich  avec  des  voilures, 
celui  de  Wormeldange  avec  des  cordes.  Sur  la  Sure,  les  ponts  de  Wasserbillig  et 
d'Echternach  ne  sont  pas  condamnes,  mais  les  AUemands  ne  laissent  plus  sortir  de 
Prusse  ni  ble,  ni  betail,  ni  automobiles. 

M.  Eyschen  m'a  prie,  el  c'est  le  vrai  but  de  sa  visile,  de  vous  demander  une  decla- 
ration officielle  assuranl  que  la  France  respeclera  .en  cas  de  conflit  la  neutrality  du 
Luxembourg.  Comme  je  lui  demandais  s'il  avail  re^u  une  declaration  analogue  du 
Gouvememenl  allemand,  il  m'a  dit  qu'il  allait  se  rendre  chez  le  Ministre  d'Allemagne 
pour  avoir  la  meme  declaration. 

Post-scn'pium.  —  Jusqu'i  present,  aucune  mesure  particuliere  n'a  ete  prise  par  le 
Gouvememenl  luxembourgeois.  M.  Eyschen  revient  de  la  Legation  d'Allemagne,  il 
s'esl  plaint  des  mesures  de  suspicion  prises  contre  un  voisin  neutre.  Le  Ministre  d'Etat 
a  demande  au  Ministre  d'Allemagne  une  declaration  officielle  de  son  Gouvememenl, 
prenant  fengagement  de  respecter  la  neutralite.  M,  de  Buch  lui  aurait  repondu  : 
« Cela  va  de  soi  mais  il  laudrait  que  le  Gouvememenl  fran^ais  prit  le  meme  enga- 
gement », 

MOLLARD. 


—  125  — 


r  112. 


M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Aflaires  ^trangeies, 
a  MM.  les  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-P^tersboiirg, 
Berlin ,  Vienne  et  Rome.  ^ 


Paris,  le  3i  juillet  1914. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  m'a  remis  une  note  de  son  Gouvernement  demandant 
au  Gouvernement  frangais  d'appuyer  k  Saint-Pel ersbourg  une  proposition  tendant 
k  la  solution  pacifique  du  conflit  austro-serbe. 

Cette  note  expose  que  I'Ambassadeur  d'Aliemagne  a  inform^  Sir  Edw.  Grey  de 
I'intention  qu'a  son  Gouvernement  de  s'efforcer  d'agir  sur  le  Gouvernement  austro- 
hongrois,  apres  la  prise  de  Belgrade  et  I'occupation  des  regions  voisines.de  la  fron- 
tiere,  pour  obtenir  la  promesse  de  ne  pas  avancer  davantage,  pendant  que  les  Puis- 
sances chercheraient  a  obtenir  que  la  Serbie  donnat  des  satisfactions  suffisantes  a 
I'Aulriche;  le  territoire  occupe  serait  evacu6  une  fois  quelle  aurait  regu  satisfaction. 

Sir  Edw.  Grey  a  fait  cette  suggestion  le  2  9  juillet  et  exprime  Tespoir  que  les 
preparatifs  militaires  seront  suspendus  de  tons  cotes.  Bien  que  I'Ambassadeur  de 
Russie  a  Londres  ait  informe  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  qu'il  craint  que  la  condition  russe 
[si  rAairiche,  reconnaissant  que  son  conflit  avec  la  Serbie  a  assume  le  caractere  (Pane 
question  d'lnleret  europeen,  se  declare  prete  a  eliminer  de  son  ultimatum  les  points 
qui  portent  atteinte  au  principe  de  la  souverainete  serhe,  la  Russie  s  engage  a  arreter 
ious  prSparatifs  militaires).  ne  puisse  elre  modifiee,  Sir  Edw.  Grey  pense  que,  si  I'Au- 
triche  arrete  son  avance  apres  Toccupation  de  Belgrade,  le  Gouvernement  russe 
pourrait  accepter  de  cbanger  sa  formule,  dans  ce  sens  que  les  Puissances  examineraient 
comment  la  Serbie  donnerait  des  satisfactions  completes  a  I'Autriche  sans  porter 
atteinte  a  la  souverainete  ou  a  I'independance  du  Royaume.  Dans  le  cas  ou  TAutriche, 
ayant  occupe  Belgrade  et  le  territoire  serbe  voisin ,  se  declarerait  prete ,  dans  Tinterct: 
de  I'Europe,  a  cesser  d'avancer  et  k  discuter  comment  Ton  pourrait  arriver  a  un 
arrangement,  la  Russie  pourrait  aussi  consentir  k  la  discussion  et  suspendre  ses  pre- 
paratifs militaires,  pourvu  que  les  autres  Puissances  agissent  de  meme. 

Gonformemeht  a  la  demande  de  Sir  Edw.  Grey,  le  Gouvernement  frangais  s'esl 
rallie  a  la  suggestion  anglaise  et  a  prie  dans  les  termes  suivants  son  Ambassadeur  k 
Petersbourg  de  s'efforcer  d'obtenir  sans  retard  Tassentiment  du  Gouvernement  russe : 

«  Je  vous  prie  de  faire  connaitre  d'urgence  a  M.  Sazonoff  que  la  suggestion  de  Sir 
Ed.  Grey  ,me  par  ait  foumir  une  base  utile  de  conversation  entre  les  Puissances  ega- 
lement  desireuseis  de  travailler  k  un  reglement  honorable  du  conflit  austro-serbe  et 
d'ecarter  ainsi  les  dangers  qui  menacent  la  paix  g^nerale. 

«Le  plan  propose  par  le  Principal  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  ^trangeres,  en 
arretantla  marcbe  en  avant  de  Farmee  autrichienne,  et  en  confiant  aux  Puissances  le 
soin  d'examiner  comment  la  Serbie  pourrait  donner  pleine  satisfaction  a  I'Autriche 


"^mm 


~  126  — 

sans  porter  alteinte  aux  droits  souverains  et  k  I'ind^pendaace  du  Royaume ,  en  donnant 
ainsi  un  moyen  a  la  Russie  de  suspendre  lous  preparatifs  militaires,  les  autres  Puis- 
sances devant  agir  de  meme ,  est  de  nature  a  donner  egalement  satisfaction  a  la  Russie 
et  a  I'Autriche  et  a  menager  a  la  Serbie  une  sortie  acceptable  de  la  difficulte  actuelle. 
« Je  vous  prie  de  vous  inspirer  des  considerations  qui  precedent  pour  engager  tres 
instamment  M.  Sazonoff  k  donner  sans  retard  son  adhesion  k  la  proposition  de 
Sir  Ed.  Grey  donl  il  a  du  etre  saisi  de  son  cole. »  / 

Rene  Viviani. 


W  113. 

M.  Paleologde,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-Petersbourg, 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Saint-Petersbourg,  le  3i  juillet  191^. 

La  nouvelie  du  bonobardement  de  Belgrade  dans  la  nuit  el  la  matinee  d'hier  a 
provoque  en  Russie  la  plus  vive  emotion.  On  ne  parvienl  pas  a  s'expliquer  Tattitude 
de  rAulriche,  donl  les  provocations  ont  constaniment  suivi,  depuis  le  debut  de  la 
crise,  les  tentatives  de  conciliation  de  la  Russie  el  les  conversations  satisfaisantes 
echangees  entre  Petersbourg  et  Vienne. 

Quoi  qu'il  en  soil,  deslreux  de  ne  rien  n^gliger  pour  prouver  la  sincerlle  de  son 
deslr  de  sauvegarder  la  paix,  M.  Sazonofl  minforme  qu'il  a  modifie  sa  formula,  k  la 
demande  de  Tambassadeur  d'Angleterre,  de  la  maniere  suivante  : 

«  Si  rAulriche  consent  k  arreter  la  marche  de  ses  troupes  sur  le  lerritoire  serbe  el 
si ,  reconnaissant  que  le  conOit  auslro-serbe  a  assume  le  caractere  dune  (jueslion  d'in- 
l^rel  europeen,  elle  admet  que  les  grandes  Puissances  examinent  les  satisfactions  que 
la  Serbie  pourrait  accorder  'au  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois,  sansi  porter  atteinte 
a  ses  droits  souverains  et  a  son  independance,  la  Russie  s'engage  a  conserver  son 
attitude  expectante.  » 

PALtOLOGUE. 


—  127 


r  114. 


M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres, 
a  MM.   les  Ambassadeurs  de  France,  a  Londres,  Saint-P^tersbourg', 
Berlin,  Vienne,  Rome,  Constantinople. 

Paris,  le  3i  jaillet  igiA. 

Les  efforts  poursiiivis  jusqu'ici  parallelement  par  TAngleterre  et  la  Russie,  avec  le 
concours  empresse  de  la  France  (acquis  d'avance  k  toute  tentative  pacifique),  en  vue 
d'une  entente  directe  entre  Vienne  et  Saint-Petersbourg  ou  d'une  mediation  des 
quatre  puissances  sous  la  forme  la  plus  appropriee,  se  rejoignent  aujourd'hui  :  la 
Russie  ,donnant  une  nouvelle  preuve  de  sondesir  d'entente ,  s^est  empressee  de  repondre 
k  la  premiere  apparence  d'ouverture  faite  par  I'Allemagne  depuis  le  debut  de  la  crise 
(sur  les  conditions  auxquelles  la  Russie  arreterait  ses  preparatifs  militaires),  en  indi- 
quant  une  formule  et  la  modifiant  de  suite  confoimement  k  la  demande  de  I'Angle- 
terre;  on  devrait  done  esperer,  les  pourparlers  ayant  repris  d'autre  part  entre  les 
ambass^deiirs  russe  et  autrichien,  que  la  mediation  anglaise  viendra  achever  k  Londres 
Teffort  des  negociations  directes  de  Vienne  et  Saint-Petersbourg. 

Toutefois  I'attitude  constante  de  I'Allemagne  qui,  depuis  le  commencement  du 
conflit,  tout  en  protestant  sans  cesse  aupres  de  chacuue  des  puissances  de  ses  inten- 
tions pacifiques,  a  iait  echouer  en  fait,  par  son  attitude  ou  dilatoire  ou  negative, 
toutesles  tentatives  d'accord  etna  pas  cesse  d'encourager^par  son  ambassadeur  I'in- 
transigeance  deVienne;lespreparatifsmilitairesallemands,  commences  desle  26  juillet 
et  poursuivis  sans  arret  depuis;  I'opposition  immediate  de  I'Allemagne  a  la  formule 
russe,  declaree  a  Berlin  inacceptable  pour  I'Autriche  avant  meme  d'avoir  consulte 
cette  Puissance;  enfin  toutes  les  impressions  venues  de  Berlin  imposent  la  conviction 
que  I'Allemagne  a  poursuivi I'humiliation  de  la  Russie,  la  desagregalion  de  la  Triple- 
Entente  et,  si  ces  resultats  ne  pouvaient  elre  obtenus,  la  guerre. 

Rene  Viviani. 


r  115. 

M.  DuMAiNE,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Vienne, 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  6tran- 

geres. 

Vienne,  le  3i  juillet  1914. 

La  mobilisation  generale  atteignant  tous  les  homnies  de  19  k  4  2  ans  a  ete  decr^ 
tee  par  le  Goiivemement  austro-hongrois  ce  matin  k  !a  premiere  heure. 

Mon  collegue  russe  estime  encore  que  cette  mesure  n'est  pas  nettement  en  contra- 
idiction  avec  le:>  declarations  du  Comte  Berchtold  d'hier. 

DUMAINE. 


128 


r  116. 


M.  Jules  Cambon,  Anibassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviam,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
gores. 

Berlin,  le  3i  juillet  191/1. 

M'ayanl  fait  demander,  M.  de  Jagow  vient  de  me  dire  qu'il  avait  le  grand  regret 
de  me  faire  connaitre  quen  presence  de  la  mobilisation  totale  de  I'armee  russe,  I'Al- 
lemagne,  dans  Tinteret  de  la  securite  de  I'Empire,  se  voyait  obligee  de  prendre  de 
graves  mesures  de  precaution.  On  a  decrete  ce  qu'on  appelle  « Kriegsgefahrzustand » 
(I'etat  de  danger  de  guerre),  qui  permet  k  Tautorite  de  proclamer,  si  elle  le  juge 
utile,  letat  de  siege,  de  suspendre  certains  services  publics  et  de  fermer  la  frontiere. 

En  njeme  temps,  on  demande  a  Petersbourg  de  demobiliser,  aussi  bien  du  cote 
aulrichien  que  du  cote  allemand,  sans  quoi  I'Allemagne  serait  obligee  de  mobiliser 
de  son  cote.  M.  de  Jagow  m'a  fait  connaitre  que  M.  de  Scboen  etail  charge  d'informer 
le  GoCivernement  fran^ais  des  resolutions  du  cabinet  de  Berlin,  et  de  lui  demander 
quelle  attitude  il  pensait  adopter. 

Jules  Cambon.. 


r  117. 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres, 
a  M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Petersbourg. 

Paris,  le  3i  juillet  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  a  decide  k  midi  de  prendre  toutes  les  dispositions 
militaires  .que  comporte  Tetat  dit  «  etat  de  danger  de  guerre  ». 

En  me  communiquant  cette  decision,  ce  soir  a  7  heures,  le  Baron  de  Schoen  a 
ajoute  que  le  Gouvernement  exigeait  en  meme  temps  que  la  Russie  demobilise.  Si'le 
Gouvernement  russe  n'a  pas  donne  une  r6ponse  satisfaisante  dans  un  delai  de  douze 
heures,  I'Allemagne  mobllisera  a  son  tour. 

J'ai  repondu  a  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  que  je  n  etais  nuUement  renseigne  sur 
une  pretendue  mobilisation  totale  de  Tarmee  et  de  la  flotte  russes,  que  le  Gouver- 
nement allemand  invoquait  comme  raison  des  nouvelles  mesures  militaires  quil 
prend  des.  aujourd'hul. 

Le  Baron  de  Schoen  m'a  demands  en  terminant,  au  nom  de  son  Gouvernement, 
quelle  serait,  en  cas  de  condit  entre  TAllemagne  et  la  Russie,  Tattitude  de  la  France, 
11  m'a  dit  qu'il  viendrait  prendre  ma  reponse  demain  samedi  k  une  heure. 


~  129  — 

Je  n*ai  pas  rintention  de  lui  faire  une  declaration  a  ce  sujet  et  je  me  bomerai  k 
lui  dire  que  la  France  s'inspirera  de  ses  interets.  Le  Gouvernement  de  Ja  R^publicjue 
ne  doit,  en  effet,  compte  de  ses  intentions  qu'i  son  alli6e. 

Je  vous  prie  de  porter  imm^diatement  ce  qui  precede  k  la  connaissance  de 
M.  Sazonoff.  Ainsi  que  je  vous  I'ai  dej^  fait  connaitre,  je  ne  doute  pas  que  le  Gou- 
vernement imperial,  dans  Tint^ret  superieur  de  la  paix,  n'evite  pour  sapart  tout  ce 
qui  pourrait  rendre  inevitable  ou  precipiter  la  crise. 

Rene  Viviani. 


r  118. 

M.  Paleologue,  Ambassiadeur  de  France  a  Saint-P^tersbourg, 

a  M.  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Ajffaires  ^trang^res. 

Saint-P^tersbourg,  le  3i  juijlet  1914. 

En  raison  de  la  mobilisation  generate  de  TAutriche  et  des  mesures  de  mobilisatioa 
prises  secretement,  mais  d'une  maniere  continue,  par  TAllemagne  depuis  six  jours, 
Tordre  de  mobilisation  generale  de  I'armee  russe  a  ete  donne,  la  Russie  ne  pouvant, 
sans  le  plus  grave  danger,  se  laisser  davantage  devancer;  en  rdalite,  elle  ne  fait  que 
prendre  des  mesures  militaires  correspondant  k  celles  prises  par  TAllemagne. 

Pour  des  raisons  strategiques  imperieuses,  le  Gouvernement  russe  ne  pouvait 
plus,  sachant  que  I'AUemagne  s'armait,  retarder  la  conversion  de  sa  mobilisation  par- 
tielle  eu  mobilisation  generale. 

Paleologue. 


r  119. 

M.  Klobukowski,  Ministre  de  France  a  Bmxelles, 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  PrfSsident  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 
g^res. 

Bruxelles,  le  3i  juiUet  1914. 

L*Agence  Havas  ayant  annonc6  que  Tetat  « de  danger  de  guerre »  etait  d6cret6  en 
Allemiagne,  j*ai  dit  k  M.  Davignon  que  je  pouvais  lui  donner  I'assurance  que  le 
Gouvernement  de  la  RepubUque  respettei-ait  la  oeutrdiit^  de  la  Belgique. 

PocoiiBNTS  fiipjipAUTiQUEs*  —  Guerre.  euro^'eooe.  17 


I 


—  130  — 
Le  Minislre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  m'a  repondu  que  le  Gouvernemeht  royal  avaft 
loujours  pense  qu'il  en  serait  ajjnsi  et  m'a  remercie.  Le  Ministre  de  Russie  et  le 
Ministre  d'Angielerre,  que  j'ai  vns  ensuite,  se  sont  monlres  tres  satisfaits  qu'en  la 
circonsUucc  j'aie  donne  cette  assurance,  conforme  d'ailleurs^ m'a  ditle  Ministre  anglais, 
k  ia  declaration  de  Sir  Edw.  Grey. 

Klobukowskl 


—  131  — 


CHAPITRE  VI 

DECLARATION  DE  GUERRE 

DE  L'ALLEMAGNE  A  U  RUSSIE  (SAMEDI  r  AOUT,  A  19'  10) 

ET  A  LA  FRANCE  (LUNDI  3  AOUT,  A  18"  45) 


^  133  ^, 


N*  120. 


M.Tlene  Viviani,  President  dn  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res* 
k  MM.  Jes  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-P^tetsbourg-; 
Berlin » Vienne,  Rome. 

t*aris,  le  i"  aoAt  1914. 

Deux  demarches  ont  ete  failes  hier  soir  par  les  Ambassadeurs  d'Autriche,  Tune 
assez  vague  a  Paris,  i'aulre  precise  a  Pelersbourg  dans  un  sens  conciliant. 

Le  Comle  Szecsen  est  venu  me  declarer  que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 
avail  avise  officiellemenl  la  Russie  qu'il  n'avait  aucune  ambition  territoriale  et  ne  tou- 
chera  pas  i  la  souverainete  d'Etat  de  la  Serbie;  qu'il  repudie  ^galement  toute 
intention  d'bccuper  le  sandjak;  mais  que  ces  declarations  de  desinteressement  ne 
conservent  leur  valeur  que  si  la  guerre  reste  iocalisee  a  I'Autriche  et  k  la  Serbie,  une 
guerre  europeenne  ouvrant  des  eventualites  impossibles  a  prevoir.  L'Ambassadeur 
d'Autriche,  en  commentant  ces  declarations,  a  laisse  entendre  que,  si  son  Gouverne- 
ment ne  pouvait  repondre  aux  questions  des  Puissances  parlant  en  leur  propre  nom, 
ii  pourrait  sans  doute  repondre  a  la  Serbie  ou  a  une  Puissance  iui  demandant  ses 
conditions  au  nom  de  la  Serbie.  11  ajoutait  qu'il  y  aurait  Ik  peut-etre  encore  une 
possibilite. 

APetersbourg,  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  est  venu  voir  M.  Sazonoff  et  luL  a  de- 
clare que  sou  Gouvernement  consentait  k  enlamer  une  discussion  quant  au  fond 
de  I'ultimatum  adresse  k  la  Serbie..  Le  Ministre  russe  s'est  declare  satisfait  de  cette 
declaration  et  a  propose  que  les  pourparlers  aient  lieu  k  Londres  avec  la  parti- 
cipation des  Puissances.  M.  Sazonoff  a  du  demander  au  Gouvernement  anglais  de 
se  charger  de  la  direction  de  la  negociation ;  il  a  indique  qu'il  serait  tres  important 
que  I'Autriche  arretat  ses  operations  en  Serbie. 

II  resulte  de  ces  faits  que  rAutricbe  se  montrerait  enlin  disposee  a  un  arrangement, 
de  meme  que  le  Gouvernement  russe  est  pret  k  entrer  en  negociations  sur  la  base 
de  la  proposition  anglaise. 

Malheureusement  ces  dispositions,  qui  permettraient  d'esperer  une  solution  paci- 
lique,  paraissent  en  fait  devoir  etre  annulees  par  I'attitude  de  I'Allemagne.  Cette 
Puissance  a  en  effet  pose  un  ultimatum  donnant  douze  heures  au  Gouvernement 
russe  pour  accepter  de  dembbiliser,  non  seulement  du  cote  allemand,  mais  aussi  da 
cote  autrichien;  c'est  a  midi  que  le  delai  expire.  L'ultimatum  ne  se  justifie  pas, 
puisque  la  Russie  a  accepte  la  proposition  anglaise  qui  imphque  un  arret  des  pr6- 
paralifs  militaires  de  toutes  les  Puissances. 

L'altitude  de  I'Allemagne  prouve  qu'elie  veut  la  guerre.  Et  elle  la  veut  contre  la 
France.  Hier,  lorsque  M.  de  Schoen  est  venu  demander  au  quai  d'Orsay  quelle  atti- 
tude la  France  comptait  prendre  en  cas  de  conflit  russo-allemand,  I'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne,  bien  qu'il  n'y  ait  directement  entre  la  France  et  I'Allemagne  aucun 
conflit  etque  nous  ayons  employe  depuis  le  debut  de  la  crise  et  employions  encore 
jtous  nos  efforts  en  vue  d'une  solution  pacifique,  a  ajoute  qu'il  me  priait  de  presenter 


—  134  — 

au  Presideni  de  la  Republique  ses  hommages  et  remerciements,  et  demandait  que 
I'on  voulut  bien  prendre  « des  dispositions  pour  sa  propre  personne » ;  nous  savons 
egalement  qu'il  a  deja  mis  en  siirete  les  archives  de  TAmbassade.  Celte  attitude  de 
rupture  des  relations  diplomatiques  sans  conflit  direct ,  et  bien  qu'aucune  reponse 
negative  precise  ne  lui  ait  ete  faite ,  est  caracteristique  de  la  volonte  arretee  de  TAlle- 
magoe  de  faire  ia  guerre  A  la  France.  Le  defaut  de  slncerite  de  ses  protestations 
pacifiques  est  demontre  par  la  rupture  quelle  impose  k  TEurope,  lorsque  les  nego- 
ciations  etaient  enfin  acceptees  par  TAutriche,  d'accord  avec  la  Russie. 

Rene  Viviani. 


r  121. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

.a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  -des  Affaires  etran- 
geres.. 

Berlin,  le  i"  aoilt  19  li, 

Mon  Collegue  de  Russie  a  regu  bier  soir  deux  lelegrammes  de  M.  Sazonoff  I'avi- 
sant  que  I'Ambassadeur  d'Aulrichc  a  Petersbourg  avait  declare  que  son  Gouverne- 
ment  etait  pret  a  discuter  avec  le  Gouvernement  russe  la  note  a  la  Serbie,  meme 
quant  au  fond ;  M.  Sazonoff  lui  aurait  repondu  que  ces  conversations  devraient,  k] 
ses  yeux ,  avoir  lieu  a  Londres. 

L' ultimatum  a  la  Russie  ne  pent  qu'ecarter  les  dernieres  chances  de  paix  que  ces 
conversations  semblaient  laisser  subsister.  On  peut  se  demander  si,  dans  de  pareilles 
conditions,  Tacceptation  de  rAutriche  etait  serieuse  et  n avait  pas  pour  objet  de 
faire  peser  la  responsabilite  du  conllit  sur  la  Russie. 

Mon  Collegue  d'Angleterre  a  fait  dans  la  nuit  un  appel  pressant  aux  sentiments 
d'humanile  de  M.  de  Jagovv.  Celui-ci  lui  a  repondu  (jue  la  question  elait  trop  enga- 
gee  et  qu'il  fallait  attendre  la  reponse  russe  a  I'ultimatum  allemand.  Or  il  a  dit  a  sir 
E.  Goschen  que  ruUimatum  recdamait  le  retrait  de  la  mobilisation  russe  non  seule- 
ment  du  cote  de  I'Allemagne,  mais  encore  du  cote  de  I'Autriche;  mon  Collegue 
anglais  s'en  est  vivement  elonne  et  lui  a  declare  que  ce  dernier  point  scmblait  inac- 
ceplable  pour  la  Russie. 

L'ultimatumde  I'Allemagne,  inlervenant  a.l'heure  precise  ou  I'accord  semble  pres 
de  s'elablir  entre  Vienne  et  Saint-Pctersbourg,  est  significatif  de  sa  politique  belli- 
queuse. 

Le  conllit  n'exislait  en  fait  quenlre  la  Russie  ct  rAutriche ,  I'Allemagne  n'ayant  h 
intervenir  que  comme  alliee  de  TAutriche;  dans  ces  conditions,  les  deux  Puissances 
principalement  inleressees  etant  disposees  a  causer,  si  I'Allemagne  ne  desirait  pas  la 


—  135  — 

guerre  pour  son  propre  compte,  il  est  inconaprehensible  qu  elle  envoie  un  ultima- 
tum a  la  Russle,  au  lieu  de  continuer  a  travaiiier,  comme  toutes  ies  autres  Puis- 
sances, k  une  solution  pacifique.. 

J.  Cambok. 


r  122. 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseit,  Ministre  des  A.ffaires  etrangeres, 
k  MM.  Ies  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Berlin,  et  au  Ministre 
de  France  a  Bruxelles. 

Paris,  le  i*'  aoiit  igti. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  est  venu,  d'ordre  de  son  GoavernemeQt»me  deman- 
der  quelle  serait„  en  cas  de  conflit  avec  TAllemagne,  rattitude  du  Gouvernement 
Franqais  vis-a-vis  de  la  Belgique. 

J'ai  declare  que^  comme  nous  I'avions  repete  k  plusieurs  repri^ses  au  Gouverne- 
ment Beige ,  nous  entendions  respecter  sa  neutralite. 

'  Ce  serait  seulement  dans  le  cas  oii  cette  neutralite  serait  violee  par  une  autre  Puis- 
sance que  la  France,  pour  remplir  ses  obligations  de  Puissance  garante,  pourrait 
etre  amenee  a  penetrer  sur  le  territoire  belse. 

Rene  Yiviani. 


r  123. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin, 

a  M.  Rene  Viyiani,  President  du  Conseil^  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 

geres. 

Berlin  J  le  i""  aeiit  19 14. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  ^te  charge  par  son  Gouvernement  defaire  aupres 
du  Gouvernement  AUemand  la  meme  demarche  qui  a  ete  faite  aupres  de  vous  au 
sujet  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique. 

M.  de  Jagow  a  repondu  qu'il  prendrait  Ies  ordres  de  rEmpereuret  du  Cbancelier» 
mais  qu'il  doutait  qu^une  reponse  put  etre  donnee,  car  FAllemagne  ne  pouvait  ainsi 
decouvrir  ses  projets  militaires.  L'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  reverra  demain  M.  do 
Jagow  dans  Tapres-midi. 

J.  GmBON. 


—   136  — 

N°  124. 
M.  Barrere^  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Rome, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Rome,  le  i""  aout  1914. 

J*ai  ete  ce  matin  a  8  heures  1/2  chez  le  Marquis  de  San  Giuliano  pour  connaitre 
de  lui  d'une  fa^on  precise  quelle  serait  I'allitude  de  lltalie  en  presence  des  actes 
provocateurs  de  I'Allemagne  et  des  suites  qu'ils  peuvent  avoir. 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  m'a  repopdu  qu  il  avait  re^u  hier  soir  la  visite 
de  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne.  M.  de  Flotow  liii  aurait  dit  que  TAllemagne  avait 
demande  au  Gouvernement  Russe  de  suspendre  sa  mobilisation  et  au  Gouvernement 
Fran9ais  d'indiquer  ce  qu'il  avait  I'intention  de  faire;  TAllemagne  avait  donne  a  la 
France  un  delai  de  dix-huit  heures  et  a  la  Russie  un  delai  de  douze  heures  pour 
repondre. 

M.  de  Flotow  a  demande,  k  la  suite  de  cette  communication,  quelles  etaient  les 
intentions  du  Gouvernement  Italien. 

Le  Marquis  de  San  Giuliano  a  repondu  que  la  guerre  ehtreprise  par  TAutriche, 
etant  donne  surtout  les  consequences  qui  pouvaient  en  sortir  d'apres  les  paroles 
de  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne,  ayant  un  caractere  agressif  ne  cadrant  pas  avec  le 
caractere  purement  defensif  de  la  Triple-Alliance,  I'ltahe  ne  pourrait  participer  k  la 
guerre. 


BARRiRE. 


r  125. 
M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil ,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres, 

a  MM.  les  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint- Petersbourg, 
Berlin,  Vienne,  Rome,  Madrid,  Constantinople. 

Paris,  le  i""  aout  191 4- 

L'AmbassadeuT  d'Allemagne  est  revenu  me  voir  ce  matin  k  1 1  heures.  Apres  lui 
avoir  rappele  tous  les  efforts  poursuivis  par  la  France  en  vue  d'un  reglement  hono- 
rable du  conflit  austro-serbe  et  de  la  difficulte  qui  s'en  est  suivie  entre  TAiitriche  et 
la  Russie,  je  Tai  mis  au  courant  des  pourparlers  continues  depuishier : 

1"  Proposition  transactionnelle  anglaise  pr^voyant,  entre  autres,  de  la  part  de  la 
Russie,  la  suspension  des  preparatifs  militaires,  k  condition  que  les  autres  Puissances 
en  fassent  autant;  adhesion  de  la  Russie  k  cette  proposition; 

2°  Communications  du  Gouvernement  Autrichien  declarant  ne  vouloir  ni  s'agrandir 
en  Serbie,  ni  meme  penetrer  dans  le  sandjak  et  se  disant  pret  k  discuter  k  Londres 
avec  les  autres  Puissances  lefond  meme  de  la  question  austro-serbe.* 

J'ai  mis  en  regard  I'attilude  de  I'Allemagne  qui,  abandonnant  tout  pourparler,, 
posait  a  la  Russie  un  ultimatum  au  moment  meme  ou  cette  Puissance  vient  d'accepter 
la  formule  anglaise  (qui  implique  I'arret  des  preparatifs  militaires  de  tous  les  pays 
ayant  mobilise)  et  envisageail  comme  imminente  une  rupture  diplomatique  avec  la 
France. 


~  137  — 

Le  Baron  de  Schoen  m'a  repondu  qu'il  ignorait  les  developpemenls  survenus  dans 
cette  question  depuis  vingt-qiialre  heures,  qu'il  y  avail  peul-etre  la  une  «lueur 
d'espoir »  pour  un  accommodement,  qu'il  n'avait  re^u  aucune  nouvelle  communication 
de  son  Gouvernement  et  qu'il  allait  s'iriformer.  II  a  de  nouveau  proteste  de  son  sin- 
cere desir  de  joindre  ses  efforts  a  ceux  de  la  France  pour  arriver  a  la  solution  du 
conflit,  J'ai  insiste  sur  la  grave  responsabilite  qu'a'ssumerait  le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
si,  dans  de  pareilles  circonstances,  ilprenait  des  initiatives  non  justifiees  et  de  nature 
k  compromettre  irremediablement  la  paix. 

Le  Baron  de  Schoen  n'a  plus  fait  allusion  k  son  depart  immedial  et  ne  m'a  plu^ 
demande  de  repondre  a  sa  question  concernant  I'attitude  de  la  France  en  cas  de 
conflit  auslro-russe.  II  s'est  borne  a  dire  de  lui-meme  qu'elle  n'etait,  pas  douteuse. 

II  ne  convient  a  aucun  degre  d'exagerer  les  possibilites  qui  peuvent  resulter  de  ma 
conversation  avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne,  car,  de  son  cote,  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  continue  les  plus  dangereux  preparatifs  sur  notre  frontiere.  II  ne  faut  pas  les 
negliger  cependant  et  nous  ne  devons  pas  cesser  de  travailler  a  un  arrangement.  La 
France,  de  son  cote,  procede  a  toutes  les  mesures  militaires  propres  a  la  garantir 
contre  une  avance  trop  grande  des  preparatifs  militaires  allemands.  EUe  estime  que 
ses  tentatives  de  conciliation  n'auront  de  chances  d'aboutir  que  dans  la  mesure  ou 
on  lasentira  prete  et  resolue,  si  la  lutte  lui  est  imposee. 

Rene  Viviani. 


r  126. 
M.  Paul  C AMBON,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.   Rene  Viviani,  President  du   Conseil,    Ministre   des   Affaires 
Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  i"  aoiit  1914. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  m'a  dit  que ,  dans  le  Conseil  de  ce  matin ,  le  Cabinet  avait  de 
nouveau  envisage  la  situation.  L'Allemagne  ayant  reclame  de  I'Angleterre  une  decla- 
ration de  neutralite  et  ne  I'ayant  pas  obtenue ,  le  Gouvernement  britannique  demeu- 
rait  maitre  de  son  action  et  celle-ci  pourrait  se  manifester  dans  differentes  hypotheses. 

En  premier  lieu,  la  neutralite  beige  importe  beaucoup  a  I'Angleterre.  La  France  a 
renouvele  immedialement  I'engagement  de  la  respecter.  L'Allemagne  a  declare  «  n'etre 
pas  en  etat  de  repondre  ».  Sir  Edward  Grey  saisira  le  Cabinet  de  cette  reponse  et 
demand  era  Tautorisation  de  dire  lundi  a  la  Chambre  des  Communes  que  le  Gouver- 
nement britannique  ne  permettra  pas  une  violation  de  la  neutralite  beige. 

En  second  lieu,  les  escadres  anglaises  sont  mobilisees  et  Sir  Edward  Grey  propo- 
sera  k  ses  collegues  de  declarer  qu'elles  s'opposeront  au  passage  du  Detroit  par  les 
escadres  allemandes  ou ,  si  elles  venaient  a  le  passer,  k  toute  demonstration  sur  les 
cotes  fran9aises.  Le  Conseil  de  lundi  traitera  ces  deux  questions ;  j'ai  fait  remarquer 
au  Principal  Secretaire  d'Etat  que  si,  d'ici  U,  quelque  incident  venait  a  se  produire, 
il  ne  fallait  pas  se  laisser  surpren^re  et  qu'il  conviendrait  de  songer  a  intervenir  a 
temps. 

Paul  Cambon. 

X  —————— MMIM^ _— — 

Documents  DtPtOMAxiQUES.  —  Guerre  europeenae.  18 


—  138  — 

r  127. 

M..Ren6  ViviANi,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Elrsing^res,. 
a  M.  Paul   Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France,  a  Londres. 

Paris,  le  i"  aout  1914. 


Nous  sommes  avises  par  plusieurs  voies  que  le  Gouvernement  allemand  et  le 
GouTemement  autrichien  essaient  en  ce  moment  d'impressionner  I'Angleterre  en  lui 
faisant  croire  que  la  responsabilite  de  la  guerre,  si  elle  eclate,  incombera  k  la  Russie. 
On  fait  eftort  pour-  obtenir  la  neutralile  de  TAngleterre  en  denaturant  la  verite; 

La  France  n'a  cesse  de  donner,  d'accord  avec  I'Angleterre,  des  conseiis  de 
moderation  a  Petersbourg ;  ces  conseiis  ont  ete  ecoutes. 

Des  le  debut,  M.  Sazonoff  a  fait  pression  sur  la  Serbie  pour  qu'elle  acceptal 
toutes  celles  des  clauses  de  I'ultlmatum  qui  etaient  compatibles  avec  sa  souverainete. 

II  a  ensuite  engage  avec  I'Autriche  une  conversation  directe  qui  etait  un  nouveau 
temoignage  de  son  esprit  de  conciliation.  II  a  enfm  accept^  de  laisser  les  puissances, 
les  moins  interessees  rechercher  les  moyens  d'apaiser  le  conflit. 

Conformement  au  desir  qui  lui  a  ete  exprime  par  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  M.  Sazo- 
noff a  consenti  k  modifier  la  premiere  formule  qu'il  avait  presentee  et  il  en  a  redige 
une  seconde  qui  ne  s'eloigne  pas  sensiblement  des  declarations  qui  ont  ete  faites  hier 
a  M.  de  Margerie  par  le  comte  Szecsen.  Ce  dernier  affirme  que  fAutriche  n'a 
aucune  intention  d'acquisition  territoriale  et  qu'elle  ne  veut  pas  toucher  a  la  souve- 
rainete de  la  Serbie.  II  ajoute  express^ment  que  I'Autriche  n'a  aucune  vis^e  sur  ie 
Sandjak  de  Novi-Bazar. 

II  semblerait  done  que  faccord  fut  facile  a  ^tablir  entre  la  suggestion  de  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  la  formule  de  M.  Sazonoff  et  les  declarations  de  rAutriche. 

La  France  est  r^solue  k  poursuivre  jusqu'au  bout,  avec  I'Angleterre,  la  realisation 
de  cet  accord. 

Mais  pendant  que  Ton  negociait  et  que  la  Russie  montfait  dans  la  negociation  une 
bonne  volonte  incontestable,  TAutriche  a ,  la  premiere ,  procede  a  une  mobilisation 
generale. 

La  Russie  s'est  vue  I'orcee  de  fimrter  pour  ne  pas  se  trouver  en  etat  d'inferiorite , 
mais  elle  eist  toujours  restee  prete  k  negocier. 

Je  n'ai  pas  besoin  de  rep^ter^ue ,  quant  k  nous,  nous  continuerons  k  travail|er, 
avec  I'Angleterre,  au  succes  de  ces  pourparlers! 

Mais  I'attilude  de  TAllemagne  nous  a  mis  dans  I'obligation  absolqe  de  prendre  au- 
jourd'hui  le  d^cret  de  mobilisation. 

Bien  avant  la  mobilisation  russe,  des  mercredi  dernier,  ainsi  que  je  vous  I'ai  deji 
t^Ugraphie ,  M.  de  Schoen  m'avait  annonce  la  publication  prochaine  du «  Kriegsgefahr- 


—  139  — - 
zustand  ».  Cette  mesure  a  dte  prise  par  rAUemagne  et,  k  Tabri  de  ce  paravent,  elle  a 
immediatement  commence  sa  mobilisation  proprement  dite. 

Aujourd'hui  M.  Paleblogue  a  telegrapbie  que  le  Gomte  de  Pourtales  avait  an-! 
nonce  au  Gouvernement  russe  la  mobilisation  allemande. 

Des  renseignements  parvenus  au  Ministere  de  la  Guerre  confirment  que  cette 
mobilisation  est  elTectivement  en  pleine  execution. 

Notre  decret  de  mobilisation  est  done  une  mesare  ^ssentielle  de  presei'vation.  Le 
Gouvernement  I'a  accompagnee  dune  proclamation  signee  du  President  de  la  Re- 
publique  et  de  tous  les  Ministres,  et  dans  laquelle  il  explique  que  la .  mobilisation 
n  est  pas  la  guerre,  quen  I'etat  actuel  c'est  pour  la  France  le  meilleur  moyen  de 
sauvegarder  la  paix,  et  que  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  multipliera  ses  efforts 
pour  faire  aboutir  les  negociations. 

Veuillez  transmeltre  d'urgence  toutes  ces  indications  k  Sir  Edward  Grey  et  lui 
marquer  que  nous  avons  obei  constamment  k  la  preoccupation  de  ne  commettre 
aucun  acte  de  provocation. 

Je  suis  persuade  que,  au  cas  ou  la  guerre,  eclaterait,  Topinlon  anglaise  verrait 
clairement  de  quel  cote  vient  I'agression  ^  et  qu'elle  saisirait  les  raisons  si  fortes  que 
nous  avons  donnees  k  Sir  Edward  Grey  pour  reclamer  une  intervention  armee  de 
lAngleterre  dans  Tint^ret  de  I'avenir  de  Tequilibre  europeen. 

Rene  Viviani. 


N°  128; 

M.  MoLLARD,  Ministre  de  France  a  Luxembourg, 

a  M,  Rene  YiYiAm,  President  du  Conseii,  Ministre  des  Afiisdres  ^tran- 
geres. 

Luxembourg,  le  i"  aout  1914. 

Le  Ministre  d'Etat  me  charge  de  demander,  au  Gouvernement  fran9ais  une  assu- 
rance de  neutralite  semblable  k  celle  qui  a  ete  donnee  k  la  Belgique.  M,  Eyschen  m'a 
declare  qu  a  present,  du  fait  que  <;'est  le  Ministre  de  France  k  Bruxelles  qui  a  fait  la 
declaration  en  question  au  PriRsid^nt  du  Conseil  du  Gouvernement  beige,  il  a  pense 
que  la  meme  procedure  conviendrait  le  mieux  vis-a-vis  du  Graud-Duche- 

G'est  pourquoi  il  s'est  abstenu  de  faire  la  demande  directement  au  Gouvernement 
de  la  Republique.  Comme  la  Chambre  des  deputes  se  reunit  lundi,  M.  Eyschen 
desire  etre  en  possession  de  la  reponse  a  cette  date ;  une  demarche  analogue  est  faite 
en  meme  temps  aupr^s  du  Ministre  d'Allemagne  k  Luxembourg. 

MOLLABJO. 


—  140  — 


r   129, 


M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres, 
a  M.  MoLLARD,  Ministre  de  France  a  Luxembourg. 

Paris,  le  i"  aout  igxh. 

Veuiliez  declarer  au  President  du  Conseil  que ,  conformement  au  traite  de  Londres 
de  1867,  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republicjue  entend  respecter  la  neutialite  du 
Grand-Duche  du  Luxembourg,  comme  il  Ta  demontre  par  son  attitude. 

La  violation  de  cettc  neutralite  par  I'Allemagne  serai t  toutefois  de  nature  a  oblige r 
la  France  k  s'inspirer  desormais,  a  cet  egard,  du  souci  de  sa  defense  et  de  ses 
int^rets. 

Rene  Viviani. 


r   130. 

M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin. 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Berlin,  le  i"aout  191^. 

On  distribue  dans  les  rues  de  Berlin  des  editions  specialesdesjournaux  annon^ant 
que  la  mobilisation  generale  de  I'armee  et  de  la  flotte  efet  ordonnee  etque  le  i^'^jour 
de  la  mobilisation  est  le  dimanche  2  aout. 

Jules  C AMBON. 


r  131. 

M.  Eyschen,  Ministre  d'Etat  du  Luxembourg, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 
g^res. 

Luxembourg,  le  2  aout  1914. 

J'ai  Thonneur  de  porter  a  la  connaissance  de  Vptre  Excellence  les  fails  suivants. 
Dimanche  2  aout  de  grand  matin  les  troupes  allemandes,  d'apres  les  informations 
qui  sont  parvenues  au  Gouvernement  Grand-DuCal  k  I'heure  actuelle,  ont  penetre 
sur  ie  territoire  Luxen)bourg;e9is  par  les  ponts  de  Wasserbiilig  et  de  Remich,  se 


—  141  — 
dirigeant  specialement  vers  le  Sud  du  pays  et  vers  ia  ville  de  Luxembourg,  capitale 
du  Grand-Duche ;  un  certain  nombre  de  trains  blindes  avec  des  troupes  et  des  mu- 
nitions ont  ete  achemines  par  la  voie  de  cliemin  de  fer  de  Wasserbillig  a  Luxembourg 
ou  Ton  s'atlend  a  les  voir  arriver  d'un  instant  k  I'autre. 

Ces  fails  impliquent  des  acles  manifestement  contraires  a  la  neutralite  du  Grand- 
Duche,  garantie  par  le  traite  de  Londres  de  1867.  ^®  Gouvernement  Luxembour- 
geois  n'a  pas  manque  de  protester  energiquement  contre  celte  agression  aupres  des 
representants  de  Sa  Majeste  I'Etnpereur  d'AUemagne  a  Luxembourg ;  une  protesta- 
tion identique  va  etre  transmise  telegraphiquement  au  Secretaire  d'Etat  pour  les 
Affaires  etrangeres  k  Berlin. 

Le  Minisire  d'Etat,  President  da  Gouvernement , 
Eyschen, 


K  132. 

M.  MoLLARD,  Ministre  de  France  a  Luxembourg, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres. 

Luxembourg,  le  2  aoAt  19 1^. 


Le  Ministre  d'Etat  du  Luxembourg,  M.  Eyschen,  vient  de  recevoir,  par  Tinterme- 
diaire  du  Ministre  d'AUemagne  a  Luxenabourg,  M.  de  Buch,  un  telegramme  du 
Chancelier  de  I'Empire  allemand  Bethmann  Hollweg,  disant  que  les  mesures  militaires 
prises  par  I'Allemagne  en  Luxembourg  ne  constituent  pas  un  acte  hostile  contre  ce 
pays,  "naais  sont  uniquement  des  mesures  destinees  a  assurer  contre  I'attaque  6ven- 
luelle  d'une  armee  frangaise  I'exploitation  des  voies  ferrees  affermees  a  I'Empire, 
Le  Luxembourg  recevra  une  complete  indemnite  pour  les  dommages  evenluels. 

MOLLARO. 


—  142  — 

r  133. 

JVoTE  remise  par  V Amhassadenr  ^Allemacjue,, 

Paris,  le  2  aoAt  1914. 

UAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  vient  d'etre  charge  et  s'empresse  de  faire  savoir  air 
Ministere  d«s  Affaires  etrangeres  que  les  mesures  mililaires  prises  par  I'Allemagne 
dans  le  Grand-Duche  de  Luxembourg  ne  constituent  pas  un  acte  d'hostilite.  Elles 
doivent  etre  considerees  comme  des  mesures  purement  preventives  prises  pour  la 
protection  des  chemins  de  fer  qui,  par  suite  des  traites  existant  entre  I'Allemagne  e* 
le  Grand-Duche  de  Luxembourg,  se  trouvent  sous  I'administration  allemande. 

DE    SCHOEN, 


M.  Paleologue,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Saint-P^tersbourg, 

k  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trati- 
geres. 

P^tersl)ourg,  le  a  aoAt  igiA* 

L' Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  remis  k  M.  Sazonoff,  hier,  37  h.  10  du  soir,  la 
declaration  de  guerre  de  son  Gouvernement;  il  quittera  Petersbourg  aujourd'hui. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  n'a  re^u  aucune  instruction  de  son  gouverne- 
ment pour  la  declaration  de  guerre. 

Paleologue. 


r  135. 

M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres , 
k  MM.  les  Repr^sentants  de  la  France  h.  I'Etranger. 

Paris,  le  2  aoiit  igiil. 

L* Ambassadeur  de  Russia  me  fait  connaitre  que  FAllemagne  vient  de  declarer  la 
gaerre  i  la  Russie,  malgr6  les  negociations  en  cours,  et  au  moment  ou  TAutriche- 
Hongrie  acceptait  de  discuter  avec-  les.  puissances  le  fond  m^me  de  son  conflit  avep 
l^a  Serbie. 

Ren6  Viviani. 


143  — 


N*   136. 

M.  Ben6  ViviANi,  President  du  Conseii,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres, 
a  MM.  les  Ambassadeurs  de  France  a  Londres,  Saint-P^tersbourg, 
Berlin,  Vienne,  Rome,  Madrid,  Constantinople. 

Paris,  le  2  aoAt  rgi^. 

Le  territoire  fraiiQais  a  ete  viole  ce  matin  par  les  troupes  allemandes  k  Cirey  et 
pres  de  Longwy.  Elies  marchent  sur  le  fort  qui  porte  ce  dernier  horn.  D'autre  part, 
le  poste  douanier  de  Delle  a  et6  assailli  par  une  double  fusillade.  Enfm,  les  troupes 
allemandes  oht  viole  ce  matin  aussi  le  territoire  neutre  du  Luxembourg. 

Vous  utiliserez  ces  renseignements  sans  retard  pour  faire  constater  comment  le 
Gouvernement  AUemand  se  iivre  conlre  la  France  k  des  actes  de  guerre  sans  provo- 
cation de  notre  part,  ni  declaration  de  guerre  prealable,  alors  que  nous  avons 
scrupuleusement  respecte  la  zone  de  dix  kilometres  que  nous  avons  maintenue  memo 
depuisla  mobilisation,  entre  nos  troupes  et  la  frontiere. 

Ren6  ViviANi. 


N°  137. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  Px^sideot  du  Conseii,  Ministre  des  Affaires  §tran- 
geres. 

Londres,  le  2  aout  1914. 

A  i'issue  du  Con^efl  des  IWSmstres  tenu  ce  matin.  Sir  Edward  Grey  m'a  fait  la  dd- 
claration^uivante  : 

« Jci^^uis  autoiise  k  donner  rassxirance  (jue  si  la  flotte  allemande  p^netre  dans  la 
^'lanche  ou  traverse  la  mer  du  Nord  afin  d'entreprendre  des  Operations  de  guerre 
contre  la  cote  fran^iseoula  marine  marchande  frauQaise,  la  flotte  britannique  don- 
nera  touXe  la  protection  en  son  pouvoir. 

« C6tte  assurance  est  naturellement  donnee  sous  la  reserve  que  la  politique  du 
Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  sera  approuvee  par  le  Parlement  britannique  et  ne  doit 


4 


—  144    — 

pas  etre  consideree  comme  obligeant  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  k  agir  jusqu  a 
ce  que  leventualite  ci-dessus  mentionnee  d'une  action  de  la  flotte  allenxande  se  soil 
produite ». 

Me  parlant  ensuite  de  la  neutralile  de  la  Belglqiie  et  de  celle  du  Luxembourg,  le 
Principal  Secretaire  d'Etat  m'a  rappele  que  la  Convention  de  1867  relative  au  Grand- 
Duche  differait  du  Traite  relatif  a  la  Belgique  en  ce  sens  que  I'Angleterre  etait  tenue 
de  faire  respecter  cette  derniere  convention  sans  le  concours  des  autres  Puissances 
garantes,  tandisque,  pour- le  Luxembourg,  toutes  les  Puissances  garantes  devaient 
agir  de  concert. 

La  sauvegarde  de  la  neutralite  beige  est  consideree  ici  comme  si  importante  que 
I'Angleterre  envisagerait  sa  violation  par  TAIlemagne  comme  un  casus  belli.  Cast  la 
un  interet  proprement  anglais ,  et  on  ne  pent  douter  que  le  Gouvernement  britan- 
nique,  fidele  aux  traditions  de  sa  politique,  ne  le  fasse  prevaloir,  meme  si  le  monde 
des  affaires,  ou  I'influence  allemande  poursuit  des  efforts  tenaces,  pretendait  exercer 
une  pression  pour  empecher  le  Gouvernement  de  s'engager  contre  I'AUemagne. 

Paul  Cambon. 


r  138. 

M.  Rene  ViviANi,  President  du  Conseii,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res, 
a  M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres. 

Paris ,  le  2  aout  1 9 1 4. 

Je  prends  note  des  indications  contenues  dans  vos  telegrammes  des  27,  3o» 
3i  juillet.et  1*'  aout  et  dans  celui  que  vous  m'avez  adresse  aujourd'hui. 

En  communiquaut  aux  Chambres  la  declaration  meme  que  vous  a  faile  Sir  Edward 
Grey  el  dont  votre  dernier  telegramme  me  donne  le  texle ,  j'ajouterai  que  nous  avons 
oblenu  la  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  un  premier  concours  dont  la  valeur  nous  est  pre- 
cieuse. 

Je  me  propose,  en  outre,  d'indiquer  que  Fassistance  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  a  Tin- 
tention  de  donner  a  la  France  en  vue  de  protdger  les  cotes  de  France  ou  la  marine 
marchande  fran9aise  s'appliquerait  de  telle  fa^on  que  notre  marine  de  guerre  fut 
egalement  soutenue  par  la  flotte  anglaise,  en  cas  de  conflit  franco-allemand ,  dans 
I'Atlantique,  comme  dans  la  mer  du  Nord  et  dans  la  Manche.  Je  noterais,  en  outre, 
que  les  ports  anglais  ne  pourraient  pas  servir  de  points  de  ravitaillement  k  la  flotte 
allemande. 

Rene  Viviani. 


145 


r  139. 

M.  Ren6  Vivtatii,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tranjg^res, 
k  M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin. 

Paris,  le  2  aoilt  igiA. 

Les  troupes  aliemandes  ayani  aujourd'hui  yiole  la  frontiere  de  I'Est  sur  plusieurs 
points,  je  vous  prie  de  protester  sans  retard  par  6crit  aupres  du  Gouvernenaent  alle- 
mand.  Vous  youdrez  bien  vous  inspirer  de  la  note  suivante  que,  dans  I'incertitude 
des  communications  entre  Paris  et  Berlin,  j'ai  adresse  directement  k  TAmbassadeur 
d'Allemagne  : 

«  Les  autorit^s  administratives  et  militaires  fran^aises  de  la  region  d&  I'Est  viennent 
de  signaler  plusieurs  faits  que  j'ai  charge  TAmbassadeur  de  ia  Republique  k  Berlin 
de  porter  k  la  connaissance  du  Gouvernement  Imperial. 

«  L'un  s'est  produit  k  Delle,  dans  la  region  de  Belfort  :  k  deux  reprises,  le  poste  de 
douaniers  fran^ais  stationne.  dans  cette  localite  a  ete  Tobjet  dune  fusillade  de  la 
part  d'un  detachement  de  soldats  allemands.  Au  nord  de  Delle,  deux  patrouilles  alie- 
mandes du  5**  chasseurs  k  cheval  ont  franchi  la  frontiere  dans  la  matinee  d'aujourd'hui 
et  pen6tre  jusqu'aux  villages  de  Joncherey  et  Baron  a  plus  de  i  o  kilometres  de  la 
frontiere.  L'officier  qui  commandait  la  premiere  a  brule  la  cervelle  k  un  soldat 
fran^ais.  Les  cavaliers  allemands  ont  emmene  des  chevaux  que  le  maire  fran^ais  de 
Suarce  etait  en  train  de  reunir  et  ont  force  les  habitants  de  la  commune  k  conduire 
les  dits  chevaux. 

«  L'A.mbassadeur  de  la  Republique  k  Berlin  a  ete  charge  de  protester  formellement 
aupres  du  Gouvernement  Imperial  contre  des  faits  qui  constituent  une  violation 
caracteri see  de  la  frontiere  par  des  troupes  aliemandes  en  armeset  que  rien  ne  justifie 
dans  I'etat  actuel.  Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  ne  peut  que  laisser  au  Gou- 
vernement, Imperial  I'entiere  responsabilite  de  ces  actes  ». 

Rene  Viviani. 


N''  140. 

M.  Marcelin  Pellet,  Ministre  de  France  a  La  Haye, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 
geres. 

La  Haye,  le  3  aodt  1914. 

Le  Ministre  d'Allemagne  s'est  rendu  hier  chez  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrang^res 
pour  lui  expliquer  la  necessite  011  s  etait  trouvee  I'Allemagne,  a-t-il  dit,  de  violer  la 

DocDMENTS  DiPLQMATiQUES.  —  Gucrrc  curopeennc.  ,  ig 


—  146  — 
neutralite  du  Luxembourg,  ajoutant  qu'il  aurait  aujourd'hui  une  nouvelle  commu- 
nication a  lui  faire.  En  efFet,ce  matin,  il  a  annonce  I'entr^e  des  troupes  allemandes  en 
Beigique  pour  eviter,  a-t-il  declare,  une  occupation  de  ce  pays  par  la  France. 

Pellet. 


N°  Ul. 

M.  Klobdkowski,  Ministre  de  France  A  Bruxeite^ 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 
g^res. 

Bruxelles,  le  3  aoAt  191^. 

Le  Ministre  d'Ailemagne  a  remis  hier  soir  au  Gouvemement  beige  un  ultimatum 
oti  il  est  dit  que  son  Gouvemement,  ayant  appris  que  les  Fran^ais  se preparaient  k  des 
operations  dans  les  regions  de  Givet  et  de  Namur,  se  voyait  dans  Tobligation  de  prendre 
desmesures  dont  la  premiere  etait  d'inviter  le  Gouvemement  beige  k  lui  faire  savoir, 
dans  les  sept  heures,  s'il  etait  dispose  k  lui  faciliter  en  Beigique  les  operations  mili- 
taires  contre  la  France.  En  cas  de  refus,  le  sort  des  armes  d^ciderait. 

Le  Gouvemement  du  Roi  a  repondu  que  les  renseignements  sur  les  mouvements 
franijais  lui  paraissaient  inexacts  en  raison  des  assurances  formelles,  toutes  r^centes 
encore,  donnees  par  la  France;  que  la  Beigique  qui,  depuis  sa  constitution,  s'est  pr^- 
occupee  d'assurer  la  sauvegarde  de  sa  dignite  et  de  ses  interets  et  a  consacr6  tous  ses 
efiforts  au  developpement  pacifique  du  progr^s,  proteste  hautement  contre  toute  violation 
de  son  territoire,  d'ou  quelle  vienne,  et  que,  dans  cette  eventualite,  elle  saura 
defendre  energiquement  sa  neutrality,  garar.tie  par  les  puissances  et  notammentpar  le 
Roi  de  Pmsse. 

Klobukowski. 


N"  U2. 

M.  Klobukowski,  Ministre  de  France  a  Bruxelles, 

a   M.   Ren6  Viviani,   President   du    Conseil,   Ministre   des  Affaires 
etrang^es. 

Bruxelles,  le  3  aoAt  1914. 

A  I'assurance  que  je  lui  donnais  que ,  si  la  Beigique  faisait  appel  k  la  garantie  des 
Puissances,  contre  la  violation  de  sa  neutralit6  par  I'AUemagne ,  la  France  r^pondrait 
imm6diatement^  son  appel,  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  6trangeres  m'a  repondu  : 


—  147  — 
« C'est  bien   sincerement"  que  nous  remercions  le  Gouvememeut  de  la  Repu- 
blique  de   I'appui  eventuel.  qu'O  pourrait  nous  oft'rir,  mais  dans  la  circonstance 
actueiie,  nous  ne  faisons  pas  appel  k  la  garantie  des  Puissances.  Ulterieuremeht  le 
Gouvernement  du  Roi  appreciera  ce  qu  il  y  a  lieu  de  faire  ». 


r  143. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Ren6  Viviani^  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires 
etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  3  aoi!lt  iQi^* 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  m'a  autorise  k  vous  faire  savoir  que  vous  pourriez  declarer  au  Parle - 
ment  qu'il  ferait  aux  Communes  des  declarations  sur  Tattilude  actueiie  du  Gouver- 
nement Britannique  et  que  la  principale  de  ces  declarations  serait  la  siiivante  : 

« Dans  le  cas  oii  I'escadre  allemande  franchirait  le  detroit  ou  remonterait  la  Mer 
du  Nord  pour  doubler  les  iles  britanniques  dans  le  but  d'attaquer  les  cotes  frangaises 
ou  la  marine  de  guerre  fran^aise  et  d'inquieter  la  marine  marcbande  frangaise, 
I'escadre  anglaise  interviendrait  pour  preter  k  la  marine  frangaise  son  entiere  protec- 
tion, en  sorte  que  des  ce  moment  I'Angleterre  et  I'Allemagne  seraient  en  etat  de 
guerre. » 

Sir  Ed.  Grey  m'a  fait  observer  que  la  mention  d'une  operation  par  la  Mer  du  Nord 
impliquait  la  protection  contre  une  demonstration  dans  I'Ocean  Atlantique. 

La  declaration  concemant  I'intervention  de  la  flotte  anglaise  doit  etre  consider^e 
comme  liant  le  Gouvernement  britannique.  Sir  E.  Grey  m'en  a  donne  I'assurance  et 
a  ajoute  que  le  Gouvernement  fran^ais  etait  par  Ik  meme  en  mesure  d'en  donner  con- 
naissance  aux  Chambres. 

A  mon  retour  a  I'Ambassade,  j  ai  eu  conniissance  de  votre  communication  t6le- 
phonique  relative  k  fultimatum  allemand  adresse  k  la  Belgique.  J^en  ai  fait  part 
immediatement  k  Sir  Ed.  Grey. 

Paul  Caiibon,. 


N'  144. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a   M.   Rene  Viviani,   President  du  Conseil,   Ministre  des   Affaires 
^trang^res., 

Londres,  le  3  aput  1914. 

Au  moment  ou  Sir  Ed.  Grey  partait  ce  matin  pour  le  Conseil, ^mon  coUegue  alle- 
mand, qui  favait  deja  vu  bier,  est  venu  le  prier  avec  insist^iace  de  lui  dire  que  la 

>97 


—  148  — 
neutralite  de  I'AngleteiTe  ne  dependait  pas  du  respect  de  la  neulralite  beige. 
Sir  Ed.  Grey  s*est  refuse  a  toute  conversation  k  ce  sujet. 

X'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  adresse  k  la  presse  un  commtfniqu6  disant  que  si 
TAnglelerre  restait  neutre,  TAllemagne  renoncerait  a  toute  operation  navale  etne  se 
servirait  pas  des  cotes  beiges  comme  point  d'appui.  Je  fais  repondre  que  le  respect 
des  coles  n'est  pas  le  respect  de  la  neutralite  du  terriloire,  et  que  rultimatum  alle- 
mand  est  deja  une  violation  de  cette  neutralite. 

Paul  Cambon. 


N"  145. 

M.  Paul  Cambon*  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a   M.   Ren6  Viyiani^   President   du   Conseil,   Ministre  des  Affaires 
etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  3  aoAt  igiA. 

Sir  E.  Grey  a  fait  la  declaration  relative  a  I'intervention  de  la  flotte  anglaise ;  il  a 
precise,  en  raison  des  evenements,  celle  qu'il  comptait  faire  au  sujet  de  la  neutralite 
beige ;  et  la  lecture  d  une  lettre  du  Roi  Albert  demandant  I'appui  de  I'Angleterre  a 
vivement  emu  I'Assembl^e. 

La  Cbambre  votera  ce  soir  les  credits  demandes;  des  k  present  son  appui  est 
acquis  k  la  politique  du  Gouvemement  et  elle  suit  Topinion  publique,  qui  se  pro- 
nonce  de  plus  en  plus  en  notre  faveur. 

Paul  Cambon. 


r  146. 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres, 
k  M,  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  k  Londres. 

Paris,  le  3  aoiit  1914. 

n  me  revient  que  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  aurait  d6clar6  au  Foreign  Office  que 
bier  matin  quatre-vingts  officiers  fran9ais  en  uniforme  prussien  auraient  essaye  de 
traverser  la  frontiere  allemande  dans  douze  automobiles  i  Walbeck  a  I'ouest  de  Gel-' 
dern,  et  que  ceci  conslituait  une  tres  serieuse  violation  de  la  neutralite  de  Ta  part  de  la 
France. 

Veuillez  d^mentir  d'urgence  cette  nouvelle  de  pure  invention  et  attii  er  I'attention 
du  Foreign  Office  sur  ia  campagne  allemande  de  fausses  nouvelles  qui  commence. 

Rene  VrviANi. 


-  149  — 


r  U7. 

Lettre  remise  par  VAmhassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  M.  Rene  Viviani^  President  da 
Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres^  au  cours  de  son  audience  de  depart, 
le  3  aout  1914,  a  18  h.  45. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

Les  aulorltes  administratives  et  militaires  allemandes  ont  constate  un  certain 
Tiombre  d'actes  d'hostiiite  caracterisee  commis  sur  le  territoire  allemand  par  des  avia- 
teurs  militaires  fran^ais.  Plusieurs  de  ces  derniers  ont  manifestement  viole  la  neutra- 
lity de  la  Belgique  survolant  le  territoire  de  ce  pays;  I'un  a  essaye  de  detruire  des 
constructions  pres  de  Wesel,  d'autres  ont  ete  apergus  sur  la  region  de  TEiffel,  un 
autre  a  jete  des  bombes  sur  le  chemin  de  fer  pres  de  Karlsruhe  et  de  Nuremberg. 

Je  suis  charge,  et  j'ai  I'honneur  de  faire  connaitre  k  Votre  Excellence  qu'en  pre- 
sence de  ces  agressions,  TEmpire  allemand  se  considere  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  ia 
France,  du  fait  de  cette  derniere  Puissance. 

J'ai  en  meme  temps  I'honneur  de  porter  a  la  connaissance  de  Votre  Excellence  que 
les  autorites  allemandes  retiendront  les  navires  marchands  fran^ais  dans  des  ports 
allemands,  mais  qu'elles  les  relacheront  si,  dans  les  quarante-huit  heures,  la  reci- 
procite  complete  est  assuree. 

Ma  mission  diplomatique  ayant  ainsi  pris  fm,  il  ne  me  reste  plus  qu'k  prier  Votre 
Excellence  de  vouloir  bien  me  munir  de  mes  passeports  et  de  prendre  les  mesures 
quelle  jugera  utiles  pour  assurer  mon  retour  en  AUemagne  avec  le  personnel  de 
I'Ambassade,  ainsi  quavec  le  personnel  de  la  Legation  de  Baviere  et  du  Gonsulat 
general  d' AUemagne  a  Paris. 

Veuillez  agreer,  Monsieur  le  President,  i'expression  de  ma  tres  haute  conside- 
ration, 

Signe:  SGHOEN; 


r  U8. 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  6trangeres, 
a  MM.  les  Representants  de  la  France  a  Tetranger. 

Paris  le  3  aout  19 id' 

L'ambassadeur  d' AUemagne  a  demande  ses  passeports  et  part  ce  soir  avec  le  per- 
sonnel de  I'Ambassade  et  du  Gonsulat  general  d'AUemagne,  et  de  la  Legation  de 
Baviere.  Le  Baron  de  Schoen  a  donne  pour  pretexte  la  constatation  par  les  autorites 
administratives  et  militaires  allemandes  d'actes  d'hostiiite  qui  auraient  6te  commis 


—  150  — 

sur  territoire  alleman^  par  des  aviateurs  militaires  fran^ais  accuses  d'avoir  survole  le 
tenitoire  de  I'empire  et  jete  des  bombes;  I'ambassadeur  ajoute  que  des  aviateurs 
auralent  6galement  viole  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  en  survolant  son  territoire.  « En 
presence  de  ces  agressions,  dit  la  lettre  de  M.  de  Schoen,  I'Empire  allemand  se 
considere  en  6tat  de  guerre  avec  la  France  du  fait  de  cette  demiere  puissance ». 

J'ai  formellement  contest^  les  allegations  inexactes  de  rambassadeur  et,  de  mon 
cote,  j'ai  rappele  que  des  hier,  je  lui  avais  adresse  une  note  protestant  contre  les 
violations  caracterisees  de  la  frontiere  fran^aise  commises  depuis  deux  jours  par  des 
detachements  de  troupes  aliemandes. 

Ren6  Viviani. 


N°  149. 

M.  Ren6  ViviANi,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  AfiFaires  ^tranglres, 
k  M.  Jules  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin^ 

( Telegramme  commanique  aux  Repriseniants  de  la  France  a  Vetranger.) 

Paris,  le  3  aout  1914. 

Je  vous  invite  a  demander  vos  passeports  et  i.  quitter  immediatement  Berlin  avec 
le  personnel  de  I'ambassade  en  laissant  la  charge  des  interets  fi'an9ais  et  la  gai'de  des 

'  archives  k  I'ambassadeur  d'Espagne.  Je  vous  prie  de  protester  en  meme  temps  par 
icni  contre  la  violation  de  la  neutrality  du  Luxembourg  par  les  troupes  allemande^ 
signal^e  par  le  premier  ministre  luxembourgeois ,  contre  Tultimatum  adresse  au 

,  gouvemement  beige  par  le  Ministre  d'Allemagne  k  Bruxelles  pour  lui  imposer  la 
violation  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  et  exiger  de  celle-ci  quelle  lui  facilite  sur 
territoire  beige  les  operations  militaires  contre  la  France ;  enlin  contre  la  fausse  alle- 
gation d'un  pretendu  projel  d'invasion  de  ces  deux  pays  par  les  armees  fran^aises, 
par  lequel  il  a  cssaye  de  justifier  I'etat  de  guerre  qu'il  declare  exister  desormais  entre 
PAUemagne  et  la  France. 

Ren6  VrvriANi. 


N'  150, 

M.  Ren^  YiviANi,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^ti'ang^reSi 

k  M.  Allize,  Ministre  de  France  a  Munich. 

Parisle  Saoiit  igid* 

Veuillez  faire  connaitre  au  Gouvemement  royal  bavarois  que  vous  ave^  re^u  pour 

'instruction  de  conformer  votre  attitude  k  celle  de  TAmbassadeur  de  la  R^publique  k 

^Berlin  et  de  ^tter  Munich^ 

Ren6  Viviawi. 


—  151 


r  151. 


M.  Ren6  ViviANi,  President  du  Gonseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trang^res, 

a  MM.  les  Repr^sentants  de  la  France  a  Londres,  Saint-P^tersbourg, 
Vienne,  Rome,  Madrid,  Berne,  Constantinople,  La  Haye,  Copen- 
hague,  Christiania,  Stokholm,  Bucarest,  Athenes,  Belgrade. 

Palis,  le  3  aoiit  igi4. 

J'apprends  de  source  officielle  beige  que  les  troupes  allemandes  out  vioU  le  terri' 
toire  beige  k  Genimerich  dans  la  region  de  Verviers. 

Rene  Vivuni. 


N''  152. 

M.  Klobukowski,  Ministre  de  France  a  Bruxelles, 

k  M.  Ren6  Viviani,  President  du  Conseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 
g^res. 

Bruieltes,  le  d  aoAt  igi/i. 

Le  Chef  de  Cabinet  du  Ministere  des  Affaires  etrangeres  me  remet  une  lettre  par 
laquelle  le  «  Gouvemement  du  Roi  declare  etre  lermemenl  decide  k  resister  par  tons 
les  moyens  en  son  pouvoir  a  ragression  de  I'Allemagne.  La  Belgique  fait  appel  a 
rAngleterre ,  ia  France  et  la  Russie  pour  cooperer  comme  garantes  k  la  defense  de 
.son  territoire. 

<  fl  y  aurait  une  action  concertee  et  commune  ayant  pour  but  ae  resister  aux  mesures 
de  .force,  employees  par  TAiiemagne  contre  la  Belgique,  et  en  meme  temps  de 
garantir  le  maintien  de  I'independance  et  de  I'integrite  de  la  Bejgique  dans  Tavenir. 

i  La  Belgique  est  heureuse  de  pouvoir  declarer  qu'elle  assurera  la  defense  des 
places  fortes. » 

Klobukgws&i. 


--  152  — 

r  153. 

M.  Paul  Cambon,  Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Londres, 

a  M.  Rene  ViViani,  President  du  Gonseil,  Ministre  des  Affaires  %an* 
geres. 

Londres,  le  4  ao6t  i9i.4« 

Sir  Edw.  Grey  m'a  pri6  de  venir  ie  voir  a  I'lnstant  pour  me  dire  que  le  premier 
Ministre  declarerait  aujoiu-d'hui  k  la  Chambre  des  Communes  que  I'Ailemagne  avait 
6le  invitee  a  retirer  son  ultimatum  k  la  Belgique  et  a  donner  sa  reponse  a  I'Angleterre 
ce  soir  avant  minuit. 

Paul  Gambon. 


r   154. 

M.  Klobukowski^  Ministre  de  France  a  BruxeHes, 

a  M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  du  Conseii,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tran- 

geres. 

Bruxelles,  Ic  4  aout  1911. 

Le  Ministre  d'Allemagne  informe  ce  matin  le  Ministere  des  Affaires  elrangeres 
beige  que,  par  suite  du  refus  du  Gouverment  beige,  le  Gouvernement  imperial  se 
voit  force  d'ex^cuter,  par  la  force  des  armes,  les  mesures  de  securite  indispensables 
vis-a-vis  des  menaces  fran9aises. 

Klobukowskl 


155. 

M.  Bapst,  Ministre  de  France  a  Copenbague, 

a  M.  DouMERGUE,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Copenhague,  6  aout  1914- 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  me  prie  de  communiquer  k  votre  Excellence 
le  telegramme  suivant  : 

J'ai  ele  dirige  par  le  Gouvernement  allemand  sur  le  Danemark.  Je  viens  d'arriver 
a  Copenhague.  Tout  le  personnel  de  I'Aoibassade  et  le  Charge  d'affaires  de  Russie  a 
Darmstadt  avec  sa  famille,  m'accompagnaient.  On  a  use  de  tels  procedes  k  notre 
egard  que  je  crois.  utile  d'en  faire  le  rapport  complet  a  Votre  Excellence  par  le 
telegraphe. 

Lundi  matin,  3  aout,  apres  que  j'avais,  conformement  k  vos  instructions,  adress6 
a  M.  de  Jagow  une  protestation  contre  les  actes  d'agression  commis  sur  le  territoire 


—  153  — 

fran^ais  par  ies  troupes  allemandes>,  le  Secretaire  d'Etatvint  me  voir.  M.  de  Jagovv 
venait  se  plaindre  d'actes  d'agression  qu  il  pretendait  avoir  ete  commis  en  Allemagne, 
a  Nuremberg  et  a  Coblentz  riotamment,  par  des  aviateurs  fran^ais  qui,  selon  lui, 
«  seraient  venus  de  Belgique  ».— -  Je  repondis  que  je  n'avais  pas  la  moindre  donnee 
sur  les  faits  dont  il  voulait  faire  etat  et  dont  Tinvraisemblance  me  paraissait  evidente; 
je  lui  demandai  a  mon  tour  s'il  avait^pris  connaissance  de  la  Note  que  je  lui  avais 
adressee  au  sujet  de  Tenvahissement  de  notre  territoire  par  des  detachements  de 
I'armee  allemande.  —  Comme  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  me  disait  n'avoir  pas  encore  lu 
cetteNote,  je  lui  en  donnai  connaissance.  J'appelai  son  attention  sur  Tacte  commis 
parl'officier  commandant  un  de  ces  detachements, qui  s'etaitavance  jusqu'au  village 
francais  de  Joncherey,  a  lo  kilometres  a  I'interieur  de  nos  frontieres,  et  avail  briile 
la  cervelle  a  un  soldat  frangais  qu'il  y  avait.  rencontre.  Apres  avoir  qualifie  cet  acte, 
j'ajoutai  :  —  «  Vous  reconnaitrez  qu'en  aucune  hypothese  il  ne  saurait  etre  compare 
a  un  vol  d'aeroplane  sur  territoire  etranger,  accompli  par  des  particuliers  animes  de 
cet  esprit  daudace  individuelle  qui  distingue  les  aviateurs. 

Un  act€  d'agression  commis  sur  le  territoire  d'un  voisin  par  des  detachements  de 
troupes  regulieres  commandes  par  desofficiers  presente  unegravite  toute  autre. » 

M.  de  Jagpw  me  declai-a  qu'il  ignorait  les  fails  dont  je  lui  parlais  et  ilconclut 
qu'il  etait  difficile  qu'il  ne  s'en  produisit  pas  de  cette  nature  lorsque  deux  armees,. 
remplies  des  sentiments  qui  animaient  nos  troupes,  se  trouvaienl  face  k  face  de 
chaque  cote  de  la  frontiere. 

A  ce  moment,  les  attroupements  qiii  se  trouvaient  sur  la  Parezer  Platz,  devant 
I'Ambassade  et  que  nous  apercevions  ^travers  la. fenetre  entr'ouverle  demon  cabinet, 
pousserent  des  cris  contre  la  France.  Je  demandai  au  Secretaire  d'Etat  quand  lout 
cela  fmirail. 

«  Le  Gouvernement  n'a  pas  encQre  pris  de  decision ,  me  repondit  M.  de  Jagovv.  II 
est  probable  que  M.  de  Schoen  recevra  aujourd'hi  I'ordre  de  demander  ses  passe- 
ports,  et  ensuite,  vous  recevrez  les  votres  ».  —  Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  m'assura  que  du 
reste  je  n'avais  aucune  preoccupation  k  avoir  au  sujet  de  mon  depart  et  que  toutes 
les  convenances  seraient  pbservees  a  mon  egard  ainsi  qu'^  I'egard  de-mon  personnel. 
Nousne  devious  plus  nous  voir  et  nous  primes  conge  I'un  de  I'auire ,.  apres  un  entre-^ 
tien  qui  avait  ete  courtois  et  qui  ne  pouvait  me  faire  prevoir  ce  que  Ton  me  reser- 
vail. 

Avantde  quitter  M.  de  Jagow,  je  lui  avais  exprime  le  desir  de  faire  une  visile 
personnelle  au  Chancelier,  puisque  ce  serait  la  derniere  fois  q^ue  j'aurais  I'occasion 
de  le  voir. 

M.  de  Jagow  me  repondit  qu  il  ne  m'engageait  pas  k  donner  suite  a  cette  intention,, 
car  cette  entrevue  ne  servirait  k  rien  et  ne  pourrait  elre  que  penible. 

A  -6  heures  du  soir,  M.  de  Langwerlh  m'a  apporte  mes,  passeports.  II  refusa  au 
nom  de  son  Gouvernement  d'acceder  au  desir  qiie  je  lui  exprimais  de  me  laisser  par- 
tir  par  la  Hollande  ou  la  Belgique.  II  me  proposa  de  parlir  soil  par  Copenhague  „  bien 
qu'il  ne  put  m'assurer  le  libre  passage  de  la  mer,  soil  par  fa  Suisse,  via  Constance. 

J'^cceptai  cette  derniere  voie;  M.  de  Langwerlh  m'ayant  demande  de  parlir  le  plus 
tot  possible,  il  fut  convenu,  en  raison  de  la  necessite  oii  j'elais  de  m'entendre  avec 

DoccMENTS  0IPLOM4TIQCES.  —  Gucrre  europeenne."  ao 


I 


—  154  — 

I'Ambassadeur  d'Espagne,  qui  prend  nos  int6rets  en  main,  que  je  quitterais  I'Ambas- 
sade  le  lendemain  mardi  4  aout,  k  i  o  heures  du  soir. 

Une  Iieure  apres  le  depart  de  M.  de  Langwerth,  a  7  heures,  M.  de  Lancken,  ancien 
Conseiller  d'Ambassade  k  Paris,  vint  me  dire  de  la  part  du  Ministere  des  Affaires 
etrangeres,  d'inviter  le  personnel  de  mon  Ambassade  a  ne  plus  prendre  ses  repas  dans 
les  restaurants.  Cette  consigne  etait  si  stricte  que  le  lendemain  mardi  j'eus  besoin  de 
recourir  a  I'autorite  de  la  Wilhelmstrasse  pour  que  I'hotel  Bristol  nous  envoyat  nos 
repas  a  I'Ambassade. 

Le  meme  soir,  lundi  a  1  1  heures,  M.  de  Langwerth  revint  mapprendre  que  son 
Gouvernement  me  refusait  le  retour  par  la  Suisse  sous  le  pretexte  qu'il  faudrait  trois 
jours  et  trois  nuits  pour  me  conduire  a  Constance.  II  m'annon^a  que  je  serais  dirige 
sur  Vienne.  Je  ne  consentis  k  ce  changement  que  sous  reserve  et  dans  la  nuit  j'ecrivis 
k  M.  de  Langwerth  la  lettre  suivante  : , 

« Berlin ,  3  ao6t  191^. 
M.  LE  Baron, 

«  Je  reflechis  a  la  route  dont  vous  etes  venu  me  parler  ce  soir  pour  me  faire  rentrer 
dans  mon  pays.  Vous  me  proposez  de  passer  par  Vienne.  Je  suis  expose  a  me  irouver 
retenu  dans  cette  ville ,  sinon  du  fait  du  Gouvernement  autrichien ,  du  moins  du  fait 
des  circonstances  de  sa  mobilisation ,  qui  lui  cr^e  des  difficultes  analogues  a  celles  de 
I'AUemagne  pour  la  circulation  des  trains. 

•  Dans  ces  conditions,  je  crois  devoir  reclamer  du  Gouvernement  allemand  fengage- 
raent  d'honneur  que  le  Gouvernement  autrichien  me  dirigera  sur  la  Suisse  et  que  le 
Gouvernement  suisse  ne  fermera  ni  k  moi,  ni  aux  personnes  qui  m'accompagnent,  sa 
fronti^re  qu'on  me  ditjustementfermee  aux  elrangers. 

« Je  ne  puis  done  accepter  la  proposition  que  vousm'avez  faite  que  si  j'ai  les  suretes 
que  je  reclame  et  si  je  suis  assure  de  ne  pas  etre  retenu  quelques  mois  hors  de  mon 
pays. . 

Jules  Cambon. 

En  reponse  k  cette  lettre,  le  lendemain  matin,  mardi  4  aout,  M.  de  Langwerth  me 
donna  par  ecrit  Tassurance  que  les  autorites  autrichiennes  et  suisses  avaient  recu  les 
communications  n6cessaires. 

En  meme  temps,  on  arretait  chez  lui,  dans  son  lit,  M.  Miladowski ,  attache  au 
Consulat  de  Berlin,  ainsi  que  d'autres  Fran^ais.  M.  Miladowski,  pour  qui  un  passe- 
port  diplomatique  avait  ete  demands ,  put  ^tre  relftche  au  bout  de  4  heures. 

Je  me  preparais  a  partir  pour  Vienne,  quand,  a  4  heures  45,  M.  de  Langwerth 
revint  m'annoncer  que  je  devrais  partir  avec  les  personnes  m'accompagnant  k 
1  o  heures  du  soir,  mais  que  je  serais  conduit  en  Danemark.  Devant  cette  exigence 
nouvelle,  je  demandai  si  Ton  me  mettrait  dans  une  forteresse,  au  cas  ou  je  ne  I'accep- 
terais  pas.  M,  de  Langwerth  me  repondit  simplement  qu'il  reviendrait  chercher  la 
reponse  dans  une  demi-heure.  Je  ne  voulais  pas  donner  au  Gouvernement  allemand 
le  pretexte  de  dire  que  je  m'etais  refuse  k  sortir  d'Allemagne.  Je  declarai  done  a  M.  de 
Langwerth,  lorsqu'il  revint,  que  je  me  soumetlrais  a  I'ordre  qui  m'etait  donne,  mais 
« que  je  protestais »» 


—  155  — 
J'ecrivis  aussitot  k  M*  de  Jago^  la  kltre*  dont  ia  copiesuit-; 

« Berlin,  4  aodt  1914* 
«  Monsieur  le  Secretaire  d'Etat, 

« Votre  Excellence  m'avait  dit  a  plusleurs  reprises  que  le  Gouvernement  imperial, 
conformement  aux  usages  de  la  courtoisie  internationale ,  me  faciliterait  mon  retoiu" 
dans  mon  pays  et  me  donnerait  tous  les  moyens  d'y  rentrer  rapidement. 

« Cependant  bier,  apres  m' avoir  refuse  I'acces  de  ia  Belgique  et  de  la  Hollande, 
M.  le  baron  de  Langwerth  m'a  informe  que  je  passerais  par  la  Suisse  via  Constance. 
Danslanuit,  j'al  ete  avis6  que  je  serais  envoye  en  Autriche,  pays  qui  preud  part  du 
cote  de  TAllemagne  k  ia  presente  guerre.  Comme  j'ignorais  les  intentions  de  TAu- 
tricbe  a  mon  egard,  puisque  sur  son  sol  je  ne  suis  qu'un  simple  particulier,  j*ai  6crit 
au  baron  de  Langwerth  que  je  demandais  au  Gouvernement  imperial  Tengagement 
que  les  autorites  imperiales  et  royales  autrichiennes  me  donneraient  toutes  les  faci- 
lites  possibles  pour  continuer  ma  route,  et  que  la  Suisse  ne  se  fermerait  pas  devant 
moi.  M.  de  Langwertb  a  bien  voulu  me  r^pondre  par  ecrit  que  je  pouvais  etre  assure 
d'un  voyage  facile  et  que  les  autorites  autrichiennes  feraient  tout  le  necessaire. 

« II  est  pres  de  5  heures  et  le  baron  de  Langwerth  vient  de  m'annoncer  que  je  serai 
dirige  sur  le  Danemark.  Etant  donne  les  evenements,  je  ne.  suis  pas  assure  de  trou- 
ver  un  bailment  pour  me  transporter  en  Angleterre,  et  c'est  cette  consideration  qui 
m'avait  fait  ecarter  cette  proposition,  d^accord  avec  M.  de  Langwerth. 

« En  realite,  on  ne  me  laisse  aucune  liberte,  et  on  me  traite  presque  en  prisonnier, 
Je  suis  oblige  de  me  soumettre,  n'ayant  aucun  moyen  d'obtenir  qu'il  soit  tenu 
compte  des  regies  de  la  courtoisie  internationale  k  mon  egard,  mais  je  tiens  a  protes- 
ter entre  les  mains  de  Votre  Excellence  centre  lafacon  dont  je  suis  traite. 

Jules    C AMBON. 

Pendant  qu'on  portait  ma  leltre,  j'6tais  avis6  que  le  voyage  ne  s'efTectuerait  pas 
direclement,  mais  par  la  voie  du  Schleswig.  A  10  heures  du  soir,  je  quittais  I'Am- 
bassade,  avec  mon  personnel,  au  milieu  d'un  grand  concours  de  police  a  pied  et  k 
cheval. 

A  la  gare ,  un  employe  inferieur  du  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  representait 
seul  cette  administration. 

Le  voyage  s'est  efTectu6  avec  une  lenteur  extreme.  Nous  avons  mis  plus  de  vingt- 
quatre  heures  pour  gagner  la  frontiere.  II  a  sembl^  qu'a  chaque  station  on  attendait 
des  ordres  pour  repartir.  Jetais  accompagne  du  major  von  Rheinbaben,  du  regi- 
ment Alexandre  de  la  Garde,  et  d'un  fonctionnaire  de  la  police.  Aux  environs  du 
canal  de  Kiel,  la  troupe  a  envahi  nos  wagons.  On  a  fait  fermer  les  fenetres  et  les 
rideaux  des  voitures;  chacun  de  nous  a  dii  se  tenir  isolement  dans  son  compartiment 
avec  defense  de  se  lever  el  de  toucher  k  ses  sacs  de  voyage.  Dans  le  coidoir  des 
wagons,  devant  la  porte  de  chacun  de  nos  compartiments  maintenue  ouverte,  se 
tenait  un  soldat,  le  revolver  an  poing  et  le  doigt  sur  la  gachette.  Le  charge  d'affaires 
de  Russie,  les  femmes,  les  enfants,  tout  le  monde  a  ete  soumis  au  meme  traitement. 

A  la  demiire  station  allemande,  vers  1  i  heures  du  soir,  le  major  von  Rheinbaben 


—  156  — 
est  Tenu  prendre  conge  de  moi.  Je  lui  ai  remis,  pour  M.  de  Jagovv,  ia  lettre  qui 
suit : 

•  Mercredi  soir,  5  aodt  191^1. 
«  Monsieur  le  Secretaire  d'Et/^, 

•  Hier,  avant  de  quitter  Berlin,  ^'ai  proteste  par  ecrit  aupres  de  Voire  Excellence 
contre  les  changements  successifs  de  direction  qui  m'ont  ete  imposes  par  le  Gouver- 
nement  imperial ,  pour  sortir  d'AUemagne. 

« Aujourd'hui,  lors  du  passage  du  train  qui  m'emportait  au-dessus  du  canal  de 
Kiel,  on  a  voulu  visiter  tons  nos  bagages,  comme  si  nous  pouvions  cacher  quelque 
instrument  de  destruction.  Grace  a  I'intervention  du  major  von  Rheinbaben,  cet 
affront  nous  a  ete  epargne. 

«  Mais  on  a  fait  plus. 

«  On  nous  a  oblige  de  rester  cbacun  dans  nos  compartiments,  dont  les  fenetres  et 
les  rideaux  etaient  fermes.  Pendant  ce  temps,  dans  le  couloir  des  voilures,  a  laporte 
de  chaque  compartiment  et  faisanl  face  k  chacun  de  nous,  se  tenait  un  soldat,  le 
revolver  a  la  main,  le  doigt  sur  la  gachette,  durant  pres  d  une  demi-heure. 

« Je  crois  devoir  protester  contre  cette  menace  de  violences  a  Tegard  de  I'Ambassa- 
deur  de  la  Republique  et  du  personnel  de  son  Ambassade ,  violences  que  rien  n'avait 
pu  seulement  me  faire  pressentir.  J'avais  Thonneur  d'ecrire  hier  a  Votre  Excellence 
que  j'etais  traite  presque  en  prisonnier.  Aujourd'hui ,  c'est  en  prisonnier  dangereux 
que  j'ai  ete  traite.  Je  dois  noter  que,  dans  le  cours  du  voyage  qui,  depuis  Berlin 
jusqu'au  Danemark,  a  pris  vingt-quatre  heures,  aucun  repas  n'a  ete  prepare ,  ni  fourni 
a  moi,  non  plus  quaux  personnes  reconduites  avec  moi  jusqu'k  la  frontiere. 

Jules  Cambon. 

Je  croyais  tout  termine,  lorsque  peu  apres  le  major  von  Rheinbaben  vint,  un  pen 
confus,  m'annoncer  que  le  train  ne  poursuivrait  pas  jusqu'a  la  frontiere  danoise  si  je 
ne  payais  pas  le  prix  de  ce  train.  Je  m'etonnai  qu'on  ne  me  Teut  pas  fait  payer  a 
Berlin  et,  quen  tout  cas,  on  ne  m'eut  pas  prevenu.  Je  proposai  de  payer  parun 
cheque  sur  une  des  plus  grandes  banques  de  Berlin ;  cette  facilite  me  fut  refusee. 
Avec  le  concours  de  mes  compagnons ,  je  pus  reunir  en  or  la  somme  qui  m'elait 
demandee  immediatement  et  qui  s'elevait  a  3,Ci  1  marks  76,  soit  a  environ 
5,000  francs  au  taux  actuel  du  change  (1). 

Apres  ce  dernier  incident ,  je  crus  devoir  demander  k  M.  de  Rheinbaben  sa  parole 
d'officier  et  de  gentilhomme  qu  on  allait  me  conduire  jusqu  i  la  frontiere  danoise.  II 
me  la  donna  et  j'exigeai  que  I'hommede  police  qui  etait  avec  nous  nous  accompagnat. 

Nous  arrivames  ainsi  a  la  premiere  station  danoise  oii  le  Gouvernement  danois 
avait  fait  preparer  un  train  pour  nous  conduire  a  Copenhague. 

On  m'assurfe  que  mon  coUegue  d'Angleterre  et  le  Ministre  de  Belgique,  bien  qu'ils 
aient  quitte  Berlin  apres  moi,  sont  partis  directement  pour  la  Hollande.  Je  suis frapp6 
de  cette  difference  de  Iraitement.  Et  coinme  le  Danemark  et  la  Norvege  sont  remplis 
en  ce  moment  d'espions,  si  je  reussis  a  m'embarquer  en  Norvege,  on  craint  que  je 
ne  sois  arrete  en  mer,  avec,  les  officiers  qui  m'accompagnent. 

'  ^1)  UU^rieurement  la  somme  ainsi  demandee  a  M.  Jules  Cambon  a  ete  reversee  a  I'Ambassadeur  d'Es- 
pagoe  4  JBeriin  poor  &lre  remboursi^e  at  I'Ambassadeur  de  France, 


—  157  — 
Je  ne  veux  pas  terminer  cette  d^peche  sans  signaler  a  voire  Excellence  le  devoue- 
ment  et  T^nergie  dont  tout  le  personnel  de  I'Ambassade  n  a  pas  cesse  de  faire  preuve 
pendant  la  duree  de  cette  crise;  je  serais  heureux  quil  lui  fiit  tenucompte  des  ser- 
vices rendus  a  cette  occasion  au  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique ,  en  particulier  par 
les  Secretaires  de  I'Ambassade  ainsi  que  par  I'Attach^  militaire  et  I'Attaqhe  naval. 

Jules  Gambon. 


r  156. 

M.  MoLLARD,  Ministre  de  France  a  Luxembourg, 

a  M.  DouMERGUE.  Ministre  des  AfFaires  etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  4  aout  191 4. 

Le  Ministre  d'Etat  est  venu  mardi  matin  4  aout,  vers  huit  heures  et  demie,  a  la 
Legation  pour  me  notifier  que  les  autorites  mililaires  allemandes  exigeaient  mon 
depart,  Sur  ma  reponse  que  je  ne  cederais  que  devant  la  force,  M.  Eyschen  me  dit 
qu'il  connaissait  mes  sentiments  a  ce  sujet  et  que  c  etait  precisement  pour  cela  qu'il 
etait  venu  lui-meme  me  faire  cette  communication  qui  lui  coiitait  beaucoup ,  car 
c' etait  effeclivement  devant  la  force  qu'il  me  priait  de  partir.  II  ajouta  qu'il  allait 
men  apporter  la  preuve  ecrite. 

Je  ne  cachai  pas  a  M.  Eyschen  la  tristesse  et  I'inqui^tude  que  j'avais  de  laisser  mes 
compatriotes  sans  defense  et  lui  demandai  de  vouloir  bien  se  charger  de  leur  pro- 
tection, ce  quil  accepta. 

Au  moment  de  partir,  il  me  remit  la  lettre  ci-jointe  (annexe  I),  qui  est  la  reponse 
du  Gouvernement  luxembourgcois  a  la  declaration  que  j'avais  faite  la  veille  au  soir, 
selon  les  instructions  telegraphiques  de  M.  Viviani. 

Vers  dix  heures,  le  Ministte  d'Etat  vint  de  nouveau  a  la  Legation  et  me  laissa, 
avec  un  mot  de  lui,  une  copie  certifiee  de  la  lettre  que  lui  avait  adressee  le  Ministre 
d'Allemagne  au  sujet  de  raon  depart  du  Luxembourg  (annexes  11  et  III). 

lime  ditegalement  qu'il  avait  fait  connaitre  a  M.  von  Buch  que  le  Gouvernement 
luxembourgcois  serait  charge  deJa  protection  des  Fran^ais  et  aurait  la  garde  de  la 
Legation  et  de  la  Chaucellerie.  Cette  nouvelle  ne  parut  pas  plaire  a  mon  collegue 
d'Allemagne,  qui  conseilla  a  M.  Eyschen  de  m'inciter  k  confier  ce  soin  au  Ministre  de 
Belgique.  J'expliquai  au  Ministre  d'Etat  que  la  situation  etait  particuliere.  Etant 
accredite  aupres  die  S,  A.  R.  la.  Grande-Duchesse  et  mon  pays  n'etant  pas  en  etat  de 
guerre  avec  le  Luxembourg,  il  etait^  dans  ces  conditions,  lout  indique  que  ce  fut  le 
Gouvernement  luxembourgcois  qui  assurat  la  sauvegarde  de  mes ,  compatriotes. 
M.  Eyschen  n'insista  pas  et  accepta  de  nouveau  la  miission  que  je  lui  confiai. 

Le  Ministre  d'Etat  me  demanda  dors  de  vouloir  bien  partir  sans  bruit,  afin  d'eviler 
des  manifestations  qui  ne  manqueraient  pas,  me  dit-il,  d'amener  des  represailles  vis- 
a-vis des  Fran^ais  de  la  part  des  autorites  mililaires  allemandes.  Je  lui  repondis  que 
j'atlachais  Irop  de'prix  a  la  s6curite  de  mes  compatriotes  pour  la  comprometlre  et 
qu'il  n  avail  rien  k  craindre. 


—  158  — 

Mon  depart,  qu'on  exigeait  le  plus  tot  possible,  fut  fixe  a  2  heures,  ii  ful  egale- 
ment  entendu  que  je  partirais  dans  mon  automobile.  Pour  le  sauf-conduit,  M.  Eyschen 
me  dit  que  le  Ministre  d'Allemagne  etait  actuellement  au  quartier  general  allemand 
pour  le  demander  et  qu'il  aurait  soin  de  me  le  faire  lenir  en  temps  utile. 

A  2  heures  un  quart,  M.  le  Ministre  d'Etat ,  accompagne  deM.  Henrion,  Conseiller 
du  Gouvernement ,  vint  me  faire  ses  adieux  et  recevoir  les  clefs  de  la  Legation  et 
«celles  de  la  Chancelierie. 

II  me  fit  connaitre  que  les  ordres  avaient  ete  donnes  pour  mon  fibre  passage  el 
que  je  devais  gagner  Arlon  par  la  route  de  Merle,  la  route  de  Mamers  et  la  route 
d'Arlon.  II  ajouta  qu'iin  oflicier  allemand  m'attendrait  route  de  Merle  pour  preceder 
ma  voiture. 

Je  quittai  alors  la  Legation  et  me  rendis  a  Arlon  par  I'itineraire  fixe,  mais  je  ne 
rencontrai  personne. 

Votre  Excellence  voudra  bien  trduver  ci-contre  (annexe  IV)  le  texte  de  la  lettre  que 
j'ai  remise  a  M.  le  Ministre  d'Etat  avant  de  quitter  mon  poste. 

MOLLARD. 


Annexe  I. 


M.  Eyschen,  Ministre  d'Etat,  President  du  Gouvernement, 

a  M.  MoLLARD,  Envoye  extraordinaire  et  Ministre  plenipotentiaire  de  France  k 
Luxembourg. 

Luxembourg,  le  4  aoi!^t  1914. 
Monsieur. LE  Ministre, 
Par  sa  communication  verbale  dliier  soir.  Voire  Excellence  a  eu  la  haute  obfigeance  de 
porter  a  ma  connaissance  que,  conform^ment  au  lrait6  de  Londres  de  1867,  le  Gouverne- 
ment de  la  Republique  entendait  respecter  la  neutraUt6  du  Grand-Duche  de  Luxembourg, 
comme  il  Tavail  montre  par  son  altitude,  mais  que  la  violation  de  cette  neutrality  par  TAlle- 
magne  etait  toulefois  de  nature  k  obliger  la  France  a  s'inspirer  d^sormais  a  cet  egard  du 
souci  de  sa  defense  et  de  ses  int^rets. 

Vous  me  permettrez  de  constater,  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  que  la  decision  du  Gouverne- 
ment de  la  Republique  est  uniquement  bas^e  sur  le  fait  d'une  tierce  Puissance  dont,  certes, 
le  Grand-Duche  nest  pas  responsable. 

Les  droits  du  Luxembourg  doivent  done  rester  inlacls. 

L'Empire  allemand  a  formellement  declare  que  seule  une  occupation  teraporaire  du 
Luxembourg  enlrait  dans  ses  intentions. 

Jaime  a  croire,  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  que  le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  n'aura  pas 
de  peine  a  constater  avec  moi  que  de  tout  temps  et  en  toules  circonstances ,  le  Grand-Duch6 
a  pleinement  et  loyalement  rempli  toules  les  obligations  generalement  quelconques  qui  lui 
incombaient  en  verlu  du  Iraite  de  1867. 
Veuiliez  agreer,  etc.  ^ 

Le  Ministre  d'Etat, 

President  du  Gouvernement, 
Eyschen. 


^  159  — 


Annexe  II. 


Lettre  particuliere  adressee  par  M.  Eyschen,  Ministre  d'Etat,  President  du  Gouverne- 
ment, 

a  M.  MoLLARD,  Ministre  de  France  k  Luxembourg. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Tout  a  I'heure,  j'ai  eu  le  tres  vif  regret  de  vous  faire  connaitre  les  intentions  du  General 
von  Fuchs  au  sujet  de  votre  sejour  h  Luxembourg. 

Comme  j'ai  eu  Thonneur  de  vous  le  dire,  j'avais  demande  une  constatation  par  ^crit  de 
la  decision  prise  a  ce  sujet  par  Tautorite  militaire. 

Ci-joint  copie  dune  lettre  que  je  viens  de  recevoir  a  I'instant  de  la  part  du  Ministre 
d'Allemagne. 

II  m'a  ete  assure  que,  dans  I'ex^cution  de  la  mesure,  on  ne  manquera  d'avoir  tons  les 
|(5gards  dus  a  votre  quality  et  k  votre  personne. 

Veuiliez  recevoir  I'expression  r^iteree  de  tous  mes  regrets  et  de  mes  sentiments  les  meii-. 
leurs. 

Eyschbn. 


Annexe  III. 


A  Son  Excellence  le  Ministre  d'Etat ,  M.  le  D'  Evschen. 


Excellence 


J  ai  I'honneur,  conformement  aux  instructions  de  Son  Excellence  M.  le  general  Fuchs, 
de  vous  prier  de  vouloir  bien  inviter  le  Ministre  de  France,  M.  Mollard,  a  quitter  aussitot 
que  possible  le  Luxembourg  et  a  se  rendre  en  France;  autrement  les  autorites  militaires 
allemandes  se  trouveraient  dans  la  penible  obligation  de  placer  M.  Mollard  sous  la  surveillance 
dune  escorte  militaire  et  en  cas  extreme  de  proceder  a  son  arrestation. 

Je  prie  Votre  Excellence  de  vouloir  bien  agreer  a  cette  occasion  lassurance  de  ma  consi- 
deration la  plus  distinguee. 

VON  BucH. 


160  -- 


IV. 


M.  MoLLARD,  Ministre  de  France  k  Luxembourg, 

a  Son  Excellence  M.  Eyschen,  Ministre  d'Etat,  President  du  Gouveniement  de 


Luxembourg. 


Monsieur  le  Ministre, 


Luxemboui^,  le  4  aoiit  191.4. 


Je  viens  de  recevoir  votre  comaiunicalion  et  m'incline  devant  la  force. 

Avant  de  quitter  le  Luxembourg,  jai  le  devoir  de  me  preoccuper  du  sort  et  de  la  securile 
de  mes  compatriotcs.  Connaissant  I'csprit  de  justice  et  d'equite  du  Gouvernement  luxem- 
bourgeois,  j'ai  I'honneur  de  prier  Votre  Excellence  de  les  prendre  sous  sa  haute  protection 
et  de  veiiler  a  la  sauvegarde  de  leur  vie  et  de  leurs  biens. 

Je  demanderai  egalement  a  Votre  Excellence  d'assurer  la  garde  de  i'hotel  de  la  Legation 
et  des  bureaux  de  la  Chancellerie. 

Je  serais  tres  oblige  a  Votre  Excellence  de  vouloir  bien  .fairc  agreer  a  S.  A.  R.  Madame  la 
Grande-Duchesse  THommage  de  mon  profond  respect  et  toutes  mes  excuses  de  n'avoir  pu 
aller  ie  lui  exprimer  moi-meme. 

En  vous  remerciant,  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  do  toutes  les  marques  de  sympathic  que  vous 
m'avez  donnees,  je  vous  prie  d'agreer  la  nouvelle  assurance  de  ma  haute  consideration. 

Armand  Mollard. 


N"  157, 


Notification  du  Gouvernement  fran(^ais 
Aux    Representants   des   Puissances    A    Paris., 

Le  Gouvernement  imperial  allemand,  apres  avoir  laisse  ses  forces  armees  franchir 
la  frontiere  et  se  livrer  sur  le  territoire  fran^ais  k  divers  actes  de  meurtre  et  de 
pillage;  apres  avoir  viole  la  neutralite  du  Grand-Duch6  de  Luxembourg,  au  mepris  des 
stipulations  de  la  Convention  de  Londres  du  1  i  mai  1  867  et  de  la  Convention  V  de 
la  Have  du  1 8  octobre  1907,  sur  les  droits  et  devoirs  des  puissances  tt  des  personnes  en 
cos  de  guerre  sur  terre  (articles  I  el  U),  conventions  signees  de  lui;  apres  avoir  adresse 
un  ultimatum  au  Gouvernement  royal  de  Belgique  tendant  k  exiger  le  passage  des 
forces  allemandes  par  le  territoire  beige,  en  violation  des  Traites  du  19  avril  1889, 
Egalement  slgneS  de  lui  et  de  la  susdite  Convention  de  La  Haye 

A  declar6  la  guerre  k  la  France  le  3  aout  1916,  k  18  heures  45. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  se  voit,  dans  ces  conditions,  oblige,  do  son 
A4«  de.recounr  k  la  force  des  armes. 


—  J61  — 

II  a,, en  consequence,  i'honneur  de  laire  savoir,  par  la  presente,  au  Gouvernement 

de que  I'etat  de  guerre  exrste  entre  la  France  et  TAUemagne  a  dater  du  3  aout 

1914,  18  h.  ^5. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  proteste  aupres  de  toutes  les  nations  civilis^es 
€t  specialement  aupres  des  Gouvernements  signataires  des  Conventions  et  Traites  sus 
rappeles,  contre  la  violation  par  TEmpire  allemand  de  ses  engagements  interna- 
tionaux;  il  fait  toutes  reserves  quant  aux  represailles  qu'il  pourrait  se  voir  amener  k 
exercer  contre  un  ennemi  aussi  peu  soucieux  de  la  parole  donnee. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique  qui  entend  observer  les  principes  du  droit  des 
gens,  se  conformera,  durant  les  hostilites  et  sous  reserve  de  reciprocite,  aux  disposi- 
tions des  Conventions  Internationales  signees  par  la  France ,  concernant  le  droit  de  la 
guerre  surierre  et  sur  mer. 

La  presente  notification,  faite  en  conformite  de  I'article  2  de  la  IIP  Convention  de 
LaHaye  du  18  octobre  1907,  relative  k  I'ouverture  des  hostilites,  et  renodse  k.  .  ,  .\ 

A  Paris,  le ./i  aout  1914,^  1 4  heures. 


r  158. 

Message  de  M.  Poincare,  President  de  la  Republique, 
a  la  seance  extraordinaire  du  Parlement,  le  ^  aout  19 iU, 

[Journal  officiel  du  5  aout  19 1 4.) 
(La  Chamhre  ecoute,  debout,  la  lecture  du  message.) 

"Messieurs  LES  Deputes, 

«La  France  vient  d'etre  Tobjet  dune  agression  brutale  et  premeditee,  qui  est  un 
insolent  defi  au  droit  des  gens.  Avant  qu'une  declaration  de  guerre  nous  eut  encore 
ete  adressee ,  avant  meme  que  I'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  eut  demands  ses  passe- 
ports,  notre  territoire  a  ete  viole.  L'Empire  d'Allemagne  n'a  fait  hier  soir  que  donner 
lardivement  le  nom  veritable  k  un  etat  de  fait  qu'il  avait  deja  cree. 

« Depuis  plus  de  quarante  ans,  les  Fran^ais,  dans  un  sincere  amour  deia  paix,  ont 
refoule  au  fond  de  leur  coeur  le  desir  des  reparations  legitimes. 

« lis  ont  donne  au  monde  I'ex^emple  d'une  grande  nation  qui ,  definitlvement 
relevee  de  la  defaite  par  la  volonte,  la  patience  et  le  travail,  n'a  us6  de  sa  force  re- 
nouvelee  et  rajeunie  que  dans  I'interet  du  progres  et  pour  le  bien  de  I'humanite. 

«  Depuis  qlie  I'ultimatum  de  I'Autriche  a  ouvert  une  crise  menagante  pour  I'Europe 
entiere ,  la  France  s'est  attachee  k  suivre  et  a  recommander  partout  une  politique  de 
prudence,  de  sagesse  et  de  moderation. 

«  On  ne  pent  lui  imputer  aucun  acte,  aucun  geste,  aucun  mot  qui  n'ait  ete  paci- 
fiqute  et  conciliant. 

«  A  I'heure  des  premiers  combats,  elle  a  le  droit  de  se  reridre  solennellement  cette 

Documents  diplomatiques.  —  Guerre  europ^enne.  9 1 


—  162  — 
justice,  (ju'elle  a  fait»  jusqu'au  demier  moment,  des  efforts  supreroes  pour  conjurer 
la  guerre  qui  vient  d*eclater  et  dont  I'Empire  d'AUemagne  supportera,  devant  i'his- 
toire,  Tecrasante  responsabilite.  [Applaudissements  unanimes  et  repetes.) 

« Au  lendemain  meme  du  jour  ou  nos  allies  et  nous,  nous  exprimions  publique-* 
ment  Tesperance  de  voir  se  poursuivre  pacifiquement  les  negociations  engagees  sous 
les  auspices  du  Cabinet  de  Londres,  I'Allemagne  a  declare  subitement  la  guerre  a  la 
Russie,  elle  a  envahi  le  territoire  du  Luxembourg,  elle  a  outrageusement  insulte 
la  noble  nation  beige  (Vifs  applaudissements  unanimes)^  notre  voisine  et  notre  amie, 
et  elle  a  essaye  de  nous  surprendre  traitreusement  en  pleine  conversation  diploma- 
tique. [Noaveaax  applaudissements  unanimes  ei  repetes. ) 

« Mais  la  France  veillait.  Aussi  attentive  <jue  pacifique,  elle  s'etait  preparee;  et  nos 
ennemis  vont  rencontrer  sur  leur  chemin  nos  vaillantes  troupes  de  couverture,  qui 
sont  a  leurs  postes  de  bataille  et  a  I'abri  desquelles  s'achevera  methodiquement  la 
mobilisation  de  toutes  nOs  forces  nationales. 

•  Notre  belle  et  co^irageuse  armee,  que  la  France  accompagne  aujourd'hui  de  sa 
pensee  maternelle  [Vifs  applaudissements),  s'est  levee  toute  fremissante  pour  de- 
fendre  I'honneur  du  drapeau  et  le  sol  de  la  patrie.  (Applaudissements  unanimes  et 
repetes. ) 

«  Le  President  de  la  Republique,  interprete  de  I'unanimite  du  pays,  exprime  a  nos 
troupes  de  terre  et  de  mer  I'admiration  et  la  confiance  de  tous  les  Frangais.  [Vifs 
applaudissements  prolonges.) 

•  Etroitement  unie  en  un  meme  sentiment,  la  Nation  perseverera  dans  le  sang-froid 
dont  elle  a  donne ,  depuis  fouverture  de  la  crise ,  la  preuve  quotidienne.  Elle  saura , 
comme  toujours,  concilier  les  plus  genereux  elans  et  les  ardeurs  les  plus  enthou- 
siastes  avec  cette  maitrise  de  soi  qui  est  le  signe  des  energies  durables  et  la  meilleure 
garantie  de  la  victoire.  [Applaudissements.) 

«  Dans  la  guerre  qui  s*engage ,  la  France  aura  pour  elle  le  Droit ,  dont  les  peuples , 
non  plus  que  les  individus,  ne  sauraient  impunement  meconnaitre  letemelle  puis- 
sance morale.  ( Vifs  applaudissements  unanimes. ) 

■  Elle  sera  heroiquement  defendue  par  tous  ses  fils,  dont  rien  ne  brisera  devant 
rennemi  Tunion  sacree  et  qui  sont  ajourd'hui  fraternellement  assembles  dans  une 
meme  indignation  contre  Tagresseur  et  dans  une  meme  foi  patriotique.  ( Vifs  applau- 
dissements prolonges  et  cris  de  :  vive  la  France.) 

•  Elle  est iidelement  secondee  par  la  Russie,  son  alliee  [Vifs  applaudissements  una- 
nimes) ;  elle  est  soutenue  par  la  loyale  amitie  de  TAngleterre.  ( Vifs  applaudissements 
unanimes.) 

a  Et  deja  de  tous  les  points  du  monde  civilise  viennent  a  elle  les  sympathies  et  les 
voeux.  Car  elle  represente  aujourd'hui,  une  fois  de  plus,  devant  I'univers,  la  liberte, 
la  justice  et  la  raison.  (Vifs  applaudissements  repetes.) 

«  Haut  les  coeurs  et  vive  la  France!  (Applaudissements  unanimes  et  prolonges.)  • 

Raymond  PoincaSe. 


—  163 


r  159. 

DiscouBs  prononce  par  M,  Bene  Viviani,  President  da  ConseiU 
a  la  Chambre  des  Deputes  le  k  aout  19 iH. 

[Journal  officiel  du  5  aout  19 1 4.) 

M.  Rene  Viviani,  President  da  Conseil.  Messieurs »  Tambassadeur  d'AUemagne  a 
quitte  hier  Paris,  apres  nous  avoir  notifie  Tetat  de  guerre. 

Le  Gouvernement  doit  au  Parlcment  le  recit  veridique  des  evenements  qui,  en 
moins  de  dix  jours,  ont  dechaine  la  guerre  europeenne  et  oblige  la  France  pacifique 
et  forte  a  defendre  sa  frontiere  conlre  une  agression  dont  la  soudainete  calculee  sou- 
ligne  I'odieuse  injustice. 

Gette  agression,  que  rien  n'excuse  et  qui  a  commence  avant  qu^aucune  declaration 
de.  guerre  nous  Teut  notifiee ,  est  le  dernier  acte  d'un  plan  dont  j'entends  affirmer^ 
devant  notre  democratie  et  devant  I'opinion  civilisee,  Torigine  et  le  but. 

A  la  suite  du  crime  abominable  qui  a  coute  la  vie  i  I'archiduc  herider  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie  et  a  la  duchesse  de  Hohenberg,  des  difficultes  se  sont  elevees  entre  le  cabi- 
net de  Vienne  et  le  cabinet  de  Belgrade. 

La  plupart  des  puissances  n'en  ont  ete  qu'officieusement  informees  jusqu'au  ven- 
dredi  2  4  juillet,  date  a  laquelle  les  ambassadeurs  d'Autriche-Hongrie  leur  ont  remis 
une  circulaire  que  la  presse  a  publiee. 

Cette  circulaire  avait  pour  objet  d'expliquer  et  de  justifier  un  ultimatum  adresse 
la  veille  au  soir  k  la  Serbie  par  le  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  a  Belgrade. 

Get  ultimatum,  en  affirmant  la  complicite  de  nombreux  sujets  et  associations 
serbes  dans  le  crime  de  Serajevo,  insinuait  que  les  autorites  officielles  serbes  elles- 
memes  n  y  elaient  pas  .etrangeres.  II  exigeait  pour  le  samedi  2  5  juillet  k  six  heures 
du  soir,  une  reponse  de  la  Serbie. 

Les  satisfactions  exigees,  ou  du  moins  plusieurs  d'entre  elles,  portaient  indiscuta- 
blement  atteinte  aux  droits  d'un  Etat  souverain.  Malgre  leur  caractere  excessif,  la 
Serbie,  le  2  5  juillet,  declara  sy  soumettre,  presque  sans  alicune  reserve. 

A  cette  soumission,  qui  constituait  pour  TAutriche-Hongrie  unsucces,  pour  la  paix 
europeenne  une  garantie,  les  conseils  de  la  France,  de  la  Russie  et  de  la  Grande-Bre- 
tagne,  adresses  a  Belgrade,  des  la  premiere  heure,  n  etaient  pas  etrangers. 

Ges  conseils  avaient  d'autant  plus  de  valeur  que  les  exigences  austro-hongroises 
avaient  ete  dissimulees  aux  chancelleries  de  la  Triple  Entente  k  qui,  dans  les  trois 
semaines  precedentes,  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  avait  donne  a  plusieurs  re- 
prises I'assurance  que  ses  revendications  seraient  extremement  moderees. 

C'est  done  avec  un  juste  etonnement  que  les  cabinets  de  Paris,  de  Saint-Peters- 
bourg  et  de  Londres  apprirent  le  2  6  juillet  que  le  ministre  d'Autriche  k  Belgrade, 
apres  un  examen  de  quelques  minutes ,  avait  declare  inacceptable  la  reponse  serbe  et 
rompu  les  relations  diplomatiques. 

Get  etonnement  s'aggravait  de  ce  fait  que,  des  le  vendredi  24,  Tambassadeur 
d'AUemagne  etait  venu  lire  au  ministre  fran^ais  des  affaires  etrangeres  une  note  ver- 


—  164  — 

bale  affirmant  que  le  conflit  auslro-serbe  devait  demeurer  localise ,  sans  intervention 
des  grandes  puissances ,  faute  de  quoi  on  en  pouvait  redouter  des  « consequences 
incalculables;).  Une  demarche  analogue  fut  faite  le  samedi  25  a  Londres  et  a  Saint- 
Petersbourg. 

Est-il  besoin ,  messieurs ,  de  vous  signaler  xombien  les  termes  mena^ants  employes 
par  I'ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  a  Paris  contrastaient  avec  les  sentiments  concilianls 
dont  les  puissances  de  la  Triple  Entente  venaient  de  fournir  la  preuve  par  les  conseils 
de  soumission  qu'elles  avaient  donnes  a  la  Serbie  ? 

Neanmoins,  sans  nous  arreter  au  caractere  anormal  de  la  demarche  allemande,  ' 
nous  ayons,  d'accord  avec  nos  allies  et  nos  amis,  immediatement  engage  une  action 
de  conciliation  en  invitant  TAllemagne  a  s'y  associer.         ' 

Nous  avons  eu^  des  la  premiere  heure ,  le  regret  de  constater  que  nos  dispositions 
et  nos  efforts  ne  rencontraient  a  Berlin  ^ucun  echo. 

Non  seulement  I'Allemagne  ne  paraissait  nullement  disposee  a  donner  k  I'Aulriche- 
Hongrie  les  conseils  amicaux  que  sa  situation  I'autorisait  a  formuler,  mais,  des  ce 
moment,  et  pljus  encore  dans  les  jours  suivanls,  elle  semblait  s'interposer  entre  le 
cabinet  de  Vienne  et  les  propositions  transactionnelles  emanant  des  autres  puissances. 

Le  mardi  28  juillet,  I'Autriche-Hongrie  declara  la  guerre  a  la  Serbie.  Cette  decla- 
ration de  guerre  aggravant,  a  trois  jours  de  distance,  I'etat  de  choses  cree 
par  la  rupture  des  relations  diplomatiques,  permetlait  de  croire  a  une  volontc  refle- 
chie  de  guerre,  k  un  programme  systematique  tendant  a  Tasservissement  de  la  Serbie. 

Ainsi  se  trouvait  mis  en  cause,  non  seulement  I'independance  d'un  peuple  vail- 
lant,  mais  Tequiiibre  des  Balkans,  inscrit  dans  le  Iraite  de  Bucarest  de  iqkS,  et  con- 
sacre  par  I'adhesion  morale  de  toutes  les  grandes  puissances. 

Cependant,  k  la  suggestion  du  Gouvernemenl  Britannique,  toujours  attache  de  la 
fagon  la  plus  ferme  au  maintien  de  la  paix  europeenne,  les  negociations  se  poursui- 
vaient  ou,  plus  exactement,  les  Puissances  de  la  Triple  Entente  essayaient  de  les 
poursuivre. 

De  ce  desir  commun  est  sortie  la  proposition  d'une  action  a  quatre.  Angleterre, 
France,  AUemagne,  Italie,  destinee,  en  assurant  a  I'Autriche  toutes  les  satisfactions 
legitimes,  k  menager  un  reglement  equitable  du  conflit. 

Le  raercredi  29,  le  Gouvernemenl  Russe,  constatant  lechec  persistant  de  ces  ten- 
ia tives,  et  en  presence  de  la  mobilisation  el  de  la  declaration  dc  guerre  aulrichiennes, 
redoutant  pour  la  Serbie  un  ecrasement  militaire,  decida,  k  litre  prevenlif,  la  mobi- 
lisation des  troupes  de  qualre  arrondisssements  mililaires,  c'est-a-dire  des  formations 
echelonn^es  le  long  de  la  frontiere  auslro-hongroise  exclusivement. 

Ce  faisanl,  il  prenait  soin  d'aviser  le  Gouvernemenl  aliemand  que  cette  *mesure , 
limilee  el  sans  caractere  offensif  a  Tegard  de  rAuiriche,  n'elait,   k  aucun  deijrfc, 

O  Til  O  ' 

dirigee  centre  I'Allemagne . 

Dans  une  conversation  avec  I'ambassadeui  de  Bussie,  a  Berlin,  le  Secretaire  d'Elat 
aliemand  aux  affaires  etrangeres  ne  faisail  point  difficulte  de  le  reconnailre. 

Par  contre,  lout  ce  que  lenlait  la  Grande-Brelagne,  avec  I'adhesion  de  la  Kussie 
el  I'appui  de  la  France,  pour  elabhr  le  contact  enlre  I'Autriche  el  la  Serbie  sous  le 


—   165  — 

patronage  moral  de  I'Europe,  se  heurtait,  a  Berlin,  a  un  parti  pris  negatif  dont  les 
depeches  diplomatiques  fournissent  la  preuve  peremptoire. 

C'etait  la  une  situation  troublante  et  qui  rendait  vraisemblable  I'existence  k  Berlin 
de  cerlaincs  arriere-pensees.  Quelques  heures  apres,  ces  hypotheses  et  ces  craintes- 
devaient  se  transformer  en  certitudes. 

En  effet,  I'attitude  negative  de  I'Allemagne  laisait  place  trente-six  heures  plus  tard 
a  des  initiatives  justement  alarmantes  :  le  3  i  juillet,  I'Allemagne,  en  proclamant  I'etat 
de «  danger  de  guerre  »,  coupait  les  communications  entre  elle  et  le  reste  del'Europe 
et  se  donnait  toute  liberte  de  pour-suivre  contre  la  France,  dans  un  secret  absolu, 
des  preparatifs  militaires  que  rien,  vous  I'avez  vu,  ne  pouvait  justifier. 

Depuis  plusieurs  jours  deja,  et  dans  des  conditions  difficiles  a  expliquer,  TAIle- 
magne  avait  prepare  le  passage  de  son  armee  du  pied  de  paix  au  pied  de  guerre. 

Des  le  2  5  juillet  au  matin,  c'est-a-dlre  avartt  meme  Texpiration  du  delai  assigne  a 
la  Serbie  par  I'Autriche,  elle  avait  consigne  les  garnisons  d'Alsace-Lorraine.  Le  meme 
jour,  elle  avait  mis  en  etat  d'armement  les  ouvrages  proches  de  la  frontiere.  Le  26, 
elle  avait  present  aux  chemins  de  fer  les  mesures  preparatoires  de  la  concentration. 
Le  27,  elle  avait  effectue  les  requisitions  et  mis  en  place  ses  troupes  de  couverlure. 
Le  28 ,  les  appels  individuels  de  reservisles  avaient  commence  et  les  elements  eloignes 
de  la  frontiere  en  avaient  ete  rapproches. 

Toutes  ces  mesures,  poursuivies  avec  une  methode  implaccable,  pouvaient-elles 
nous  laisser  des  doutes  sur  les  intentions  de  TAllemagne  ? 

Telle  etait  la  situation,  lorsque,  le  3i  juillet  au  soir,  le  Gouvernement  allemand, 
qui  depuis  le  2I1,  n'avait  parlicipe  par  aucun  acte  positif  aux  efforts  conciliants  de  la 
Triple  Entente,  adressa  au  Gouvernement  russe  un  ultimatum,  sous  pretexte  que  la 
Russie  avait  ordonne  la  mobilisation  generale  de  ses  armees,  et  il  exigea  dans  un 
delai  de  douze  heures  I'arret  de  cette  mobilisation. 

Celte  exigence,  d'autant  plus  blessante  dans  la  forme  que,  quelques  heures  plus 
tot,  I'empereur  Nicolas  II,  dans  un  geste  de  confiance  spontanee,  avait  demande  k 
I'empereur  d'Allemagne  sa  mediation,  se  produisait  au  moment  ou,  a  la  demande  de 
I'Angleterre  et  au  su  de  I'Allemagne,  le  Gouvernement  russe  acceptait  une  formule 
de  nature  a  preparer  un  reglement  amiable  du  conflil  austro-serbe  et  des  difficultes 
austro-russes  par  I'arret  simultane  des  operations  et  preparatifs  militaires. 

Le  meme  jour,  cette  demarche  inamicale  a  I'egard  de  la  Russie  se  doublait  d'acles 
neltement  hostiles  a  I'egard  de  la  France  :  rupture  des  communications  par  routes, 
voies  ferrees,  telegraphes  et  telephones,  saisie  des  locomotives  fran^aisesa  leur  arri- 
vee  a  la  frontiere,  placement  de  mitrailleuses  au  milieu  de  la  voie  ferree  qui  avait 
ete  coupee ,  concentration  de  troupes  a  cette  frontiere. 

Des  ce  moment,  il  ne  nous  etait  plus  permis  de  croire  a  la  sincerite  des  declarations 
pacifiques  que  le  representant  de  I'Allemagne  continuait  k  nous  prodiguer.  [Mou- 
vement. ) 

Nous  savions  qu'^  I'abri  de  I'etat  de  « danger  de  guerre*  proclame,  I'Allemagne 
mobilisait. 

Nous  apprenions  que  six  classes  de  reservistes  avaient  ete  appelees  et  que  les  trans- 
ports de  concentration  se  poursuivaient  pour  des  corps  d'armee  meme  stationnes  a 
une  notable  distance  de  la  frontiere. 


—  166  — 

A  mesure  que  ces  evenements  se  deroulaieni,  le  Gouvemement,  attentif  et  vigi- 
lant, prenait  de  jour  en  jour,  et  meme  d'heure  en  heure,  les  mesures  de  sauvegarde 
qu'imposait  la  situation;  la  mobilisation  generale  de  nos  armees  de  terre  et  de  mer 
etait  ordonnee. 

Le  meme  soir,  a  sept  heures  trente,  I'AUemagne,  sans  s*arreter  k  I'acceptation  par  ie 
cabinet  de  Saint-Petersbourg  de  la  proposition  anglaise  que  j'ai  rappelee  plus  baut, 
declarait  la  guerre  a  la  Russie. 

Le  lendemain,  dimancbe  2  aout,  sans  egard  a  I'extreme  moderation  de  la  France, 
en  contradiction  avec  les  declarations  pacifiques  de  I'ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a 
Paris,  au  mepfis  des  regies  du  droit  international,  les  troupes  allemandes  francliis- 
saient  en  trois  points  difierents  notre  frontiere. 

En  meme  temps,  en  violation  du  traite  de  1867,  ^  *  garanti  avec  la  signature  de 
la  Prusse  la  neulralite  du  Luxembourg,  elles  envahissaient  le  territoire  du  Grand- 
Ducbe,  motivant  ainsi  la  protestation  du  Gouvemement  luxembourgeois. 

Enfin  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  meme  etait  menacee  :  le  ministre  d'Allemagne 
remettait  le  2  aoiit  au  soir  au  Gouvemement  beige  un  ultimatum  I'invitant  a  faciliter 
en  Belgique  les  operations  militaires  contre  la  France,  sous  le  pretexte  mensonger 
que  la  neutralite  beige  etait  menacee  par  nous;  le  Gouvemement  beige  s'y  refusa, 
declarant  qu'il  etait  resolu  a  defendre  energiquement  sa  neutralite,  respectee  par  la 
France  et  garantie  par  les  traites,  en  particulier  par  le  roi  de  Prusse.  [Applaudisscments 
ananimes  et  prolonrjes.) 

i,  Depuis  lors,  messieurs,  les  agressions  se  sont  renouvelees,  multipliees  et  accen- 
tuees.  Sur  plus  de  quinze  points  notre  frontiere  a  ete  violee.  Des  coups  de  fusil  ont 
ete  tires  contre  nos  soldats  et  nos  douaniers.  II  y  a  eu  des  morts  et  des  blesses.  Hier,  un 
aviateur  militaire  allemand  a  lance  trois  bombes  sur  Lun^ville. 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne,  k  qui  nous  avons  communique  ces  faits,  ainsi  qua 
toutes  les  grandes  Puissances,  ne  les  a  pas  dementis  et  n  en  a  pas  exprime  de  regrets. 
Par  contre ,  il  est  venu  hier  soir  me  demander  ses  passeports  et  nous  notifier  Tetat  de 
guerre,  en  arguant,  contre  toute  verite,  d'actes  d'hostilite  commis  par  des  aviateurs 
fran^ais  en  territoire  allemand  dans  la  region  de  TEiffel  et  meme  sur  le  chemin  de 
fer  pres  de  Carlsruhe  et  pres  de  Nuremberg.  Voici  la  leltre  qu'il  m'a  remise  a  ce  sujet : 

«  Monsieur  le  PRESroENT, 

■  Les  autorites  administralives  et  militaires  allemandes  ont  constate  un  certain 
nombre  d'actes  d'hostilite  caracterisee  commis  sur  territoire  allemand  par  des  avia- 
teurs militaires  fran^ais.  Plusieurs  de  ces  derniers  ont  manifcstement  viole  la  neutra- 
lite de  la  Belgique  survolarit  le  territoire  de  ce  pays.  L'un  a  essay c  de  detruire  des 
constructions  pres  de  Wesel,  d'autres  ont  ete  aper^us  sur  la  region  de  rEiifel,  un 
autre  a  jete  des  bombes  sur  le  chemin  de  fer  pres  de  Karlsruhe  et  de  Nuremberg. 

a  Je  suis  charge  et  j'ai  I'honneur  de  faire  connaitre  k  Votre  Excellence  qu'cn  pre- 
sence de  ces  agressions,  I'Empire  allemand  se  considere  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la 
France  du  fait  dfe  cette  derniere  Puissance. 

•  J'ai  en  meme  temps  Thonneur  de  porter  a  la  connaissancc  de  Voire  Excellence 
que  les  autorites  allemandes  retiendront  les  navires  marchands  frangais  dans  despoil 


■^S 


—  167  — 
alleraands,  mais  qii'elles les  rel^cheront  si,  dans  Jes  quarante-huit  heures,  la  recipro- 
city complete  est  assuree. 

«  Ma  mission  diplomatique  ayant  ainsi  pris  fin,  il  ne  me  resle  plus  qu  a  prier  Votre 
Excellence  de  vouloir  bien  me  raunir  de  mes  passeports  et  de  prendre  les  mesures 
qu  elle  jugerait  utiles  pour  assurer  men  retour  en  AUemagne  *avec  le  personnel  de 
I'ambassade  ainsi  qu  avec  le  personnel  de  l<i  Legation  de  Baviere  et  du  Consulat  ge- 
neral d'AUemagne  k  Paris. 

« Veuillez  agreer,  monsieur  le  president,  Texpression  de  ma  tres  haute  considera- 
tion. 

«  Signe  :  Schoen.  » 

Ai-je  besoin,  messieurs,  d'insister  sur  I'absurdite  de  ces  pretextes  que  Ton  vou- 
<irait  presenter  comme  des  griefs?  A  aucun  moment,  aucun  aviateur  fran^ais  n'a 
penetre  en  Belgique,  aucun  aviateur  fran^ais  n'a  commis,  ni  en  Baviere,  ni  dans 
aucune  autre  partie  de  TAIlemagne,  aucun  acte  d'hostilite.  L'opinion  europeenne  a 
deja  fait  justice  de  ces  inventions  miserables.  ( Vifs  applaudisscmenis  nnanimes. ) 

Gontre  ces  attaques  qui  violent  toules  les  lois  de.  I'equite  €t  toutes  les  regies  du 
droit  public,  nous  avons,  des  maintenant,  pris  toutes  les  dispositions  necessaires; 
Texecution  sen  poursuit  avec  une  rigoureuse  melhode  et  un  absolu  sang-froid. 

La  mobilisation  de  I'armee  russe  se  continue  egalement  .avec  une  energie  remar- 
quable  et  un  enthousiasme  sans  restriction.  [La  Chambre  entiire  se  live.  —  Applau- 
dissemenls  nnanimes  et  prolonges.) 

L'armee  beige,  mobilisee  a  25o,ooo  hommes,  se  dispose  k  defendre  avec  une 
magnifique  ardeur  la  neutralite  et  findependance  de  son  pays.  [Nouveaax  applaudis- 
sements  vifs  et  unanimcs. ) 

La  flotte  anglaise  est  mobilisee  tout  entiere  et  I'ordre  a  ete  donne  de  mobiHser 
I'armee  de  terre.  [Toas  les  deputes  se  levent  et  applaadissent  longuement.) 

Des  1912,  des  pourparlers  avaient  eu  lieu  entre  les  Etats-Majors  anglais  et  fran- 
gais,  termines  par  un  echange  de  lettres  entre  Sir  Edward  Grey  et  M.  Paul  Cambon. 
Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  affaires  etrangeres  a  donne,  hier  soir,  k  la  Chambre  des 
communes,  communication  des  lettres  echangees,et  je  vais  avoir  rhonneur,  d'accord 
avec  le  Gouvernement  britannique ,  de  porter  k  votre  connaissance  le  contenu  de  ces 
deux  documents  : 


FOKEIGN  OFnCE, 

'  lAnidres,  le  21  oovembre  igif. 

aMoN    CHER    AmBASSADEUR, 

«  A  diiferentes  reprises,  aucoursdesdernieresannees,  les  Etats-Majors  militaires  et 
navals  de  la  France  et  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  oht  echange  leur  vues.  II  a  toujours  4td 
entendu  que  ces  echanges  de  vues  ne  portent  pas  atteinte  a  la  liberty  de  I'un  et  I'autre 
Gouvernement  de  decider  k  n'importe  quel  moment  dans  I'avenir  s'il  doit  ou  non  sou- 
tenir  I'autre  avec  ses  forces  armies.  Nous  avons  admis  que  des  echanges  de  vues  entre 


I 


—  168  — 
techniciens  ne  constituent  pas  et  ne  doivenl  pas  etre  regard^s  comme  constituant 
un  engagement  qui  oblige  Tun  ou  lautre  Gouvernement  A  intervenir  dans  une 
eventualite  qui  ne  s'est  pas  encore  presentee  et  qui  pent  ne  jamais  naitre.  Par 
exemple,  la  repartition  actuelle  des  flottes  fran9aises  et  anglaises  ne  repose  pas  sur 
un  engagement  de  collaborer  en  temps  de  guerre. 

« Vous  avez  cependant  fait  remarquer  que  si  Tun  ou  I'aulre  Gouvernement  avait 
de  graves  raisons  de  redouter  ime  attaque  de  la  part  d'uue  tierce  puissance  sans 
aucune provocation,  il  pourrait  etre  essentiel  de  savoir  si,  dans  cette  circonstance ,  il 
pourrait  compter  sur  I'assistance  militaire  de  I'autre  puissance. 

« J'accepte  que  si  I'un  ou  Tautre  gouvernement  a  de  graves  raisons  de  craindre 
une  attaque  sans  provocation  de  la  part  d'une  tierce  puissance,  ou  tout  autre  evene- 
ment  menaQant  pour  la  paix  generale ,  ce  gouvernement  deviait  examiner  immedia- 
tement  avec  I'autre  s'ils  ne  doivent  pas  agir  tons  deux  ensemble  pour  empecber 
Tagression  et  maintenir  la  paix  et,  dans  ce  cas,  recbercber  les  mesures  qu'ils  seraient 
disposes  a  prendre  en  commun.  Si  ces  mesures  comportaient  une  action  militaire, 
les  plans  des  Etats-Majors  generaux  seraient  aussitot  pris  en  consideration  et  les  deux 
Gouvernements  decideraient  alors  la  suite  qu  il  conviendrait  de  leur  donner. 

« Sincerement  votre, 

« Sign^  :  E.  Grey.  » 

A  cette  lettre,  k  la  date  du  2  3  novembre  1912,  notre  ambassadeur,  M.  Paul  Gam- 
bon,  repondait  : 

•  Londres,  le  23  novembre  1912. 
Cher  Sir  Edward. 

« Par  votre  lettre  en  date  d'bier,  2  2  novembre ,  vous  m'avez  rappele  que ,  dans 
ces  dernieres  annees,  les  autorites  militaires  et  navales  de  la  France  et  de  la  Grande- 
Bretagne  s'etaient  consultees  de  temps  en  temps;  qu  il  avait  toujours  ete  entendu  que 
ces  consultations  ne  restreignaient  pas  la  liberie,  pour  cbaque  Gouvernement,  de 
decider  dans  I'avenir  s'ils  se  preteraient  Tun  I'autre  le  concours  de  leurs  forces 
armees;  que,  de  part  et  d'autre,  ces  consultations  cntre  specialistes  n'etaient  et  ne 
devaienl  pas  etre  considerees  comme  des  engagements  obligeant  nos  Gouvernements 
a  agir  dans  certains  cas;  que  cependant  je  vous  avais  fait  observer  que,  si  I'un  ou 
I'autre  des  deux  Gouvernements  avait  de  graves,  raisons  d'apprehender  une  attaque 
non  provoquee  de  la  part  d'une  tierce  puissance,  il  deviendrait  essentiel  de  savoir 
s'il  pourrait  compter  sur  I'assistance  aj-mee  de  I'autre.' 

« Votre  lettre  repond  k  cette  observation  et  je  suis  autorise  i  vous  declarer  que, 
dans  le  cas  ou  I'un  de  nos  deux  Gouvernements  aurait  un  niolif  grave  d'apprehender 
soit  I'agression  d'une  tierce  puissance,  soit  quelque  evenement  mena^ant  pour  la  paix 
generale,  ce  Gouvernement  examinerait  immcdiatement  avec  I'autre  si  les  deux  Gou- 
vernements doivenl  agir  de  concert  en  vue  de  prevenir  I'agression  ou  de  sauvegarder 
la  paix.  Dans  ce  cas,  les  deux  Gouvernements  delibercraient  sur  les  mesures  qu'ils 
seraient  disposes  6  prendre  en  commun;  si  ces  mesures  comportaient  une  action,  les 


—  169  — 
deux  Gouvernemenls  prendraient  aussitot  en  consideration  les  plans  de  leUrs  etals- 
majors  et  decideraient  alors  de  la  suite  qui  devrait  etre  don  nee  a  ces  plans. 

« Sincerement  a  vous. 

« Signe  :  P.  Cambon.  » 

(  A  la  Qiambre  des  Communes,  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  etrangeres  a  parle 
de  la  France,  aux  applaudissements  des  deputes,  dans  des  termes  eleves  et  chaleu- 
reux,  et  son  langage  a  deja  profondement  retenti  dans  tous  les  coeurs  frangais.  [Vifs 
applaudissements  unanimes.)  Je  tiens,  au  nom  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique,  a 
remercier,  du  haut  de  la  tribune,  le  Gouvernement  anglais  de  la  cordialite  de  ses 
paroles  et  le  Parlement  fran^ais  s'associera  a  ce  sentiment.  ( Nouveaux  applaadissemenls 
prolonges  ct  unanimes. 

Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  etrangeres  a  fait,  notamment,  la  declaration  sui- 
vante  : 

« Dans  le  cas  ou  I'escadre  allemande  franchirait  le  detroit  ou  remonterait  la  mer 
du  Nord  pour  doubler  les  lies-Britanniques  dans  le  but  d'attaquer  les  cotes  fran^aises 
ou  la  marine  de  guerre  frangaise,  et  d'inquieter  la  marine  marchande  fran(,^aise,  I'es- 
cadre anglaise  interviendrait  pour  preter  k  la  marine  fran^aise  son  entiere  protec- 
tion, de  sorte  que,  des  ce  moment,  I'Angleterre  et  I'AUemagne  s^raient  en  etat  de 
guerre. » (Applaudissements  repetes  el  prolonges.) 

Des  maintenant,  la  flotte  anglaise  couvre  done  nos  cotes  du  Nord  et  de  I'Ouest 
contre  une  agression  allemande. 

Messieurs,  voila  les  fails.  Je  crois  que,  dans  leur  rigoureux  enchainement,  ils  suf- 
fisent  a  justifier  les  actes  du  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique.  Je  veux  cependant  de 
ce  recit  degager  la  conclusion,  donner  son  veritable  sens  k  Tagression  inouie  dont  la 
France  est  victime. 

Les  vainqueurs  de  1 870  ont  eu,  vous  le  savez,  k  diverses  reprises,  le  desir  de  re- 
doubler  les  coups  qu'ils  nous  avaient  portes.  En  1875,  la  guerre  destin^e  k  achever 
la  France  vaincue  n  a  ete  empechee  que  par  Tintervention  des  deux  Puissances  a  qui 
devaient  nous  unir  plus  tard  les  liens  de  I'alliance  et  de  I'amitie  [Applaudissements 
unanimes),  par  I'inlervention  de  la  Russie  et  par  celle  de  la  Grande-Bretagne.  (Tous 
les  deputes  se  levent  et  applaudisseni  longuement.) 

Depuis  lors,  la  Republique  fran^aise,  par  la  restauration  des  forces  nationales  et 
la  conclusion  d'accords  diplomatiques  invariablement  pratiques,  a  reussi  ase  liberer 
du  joug  qu'au  sein  meme  dela  paix,  Bismarck  avait  su  faire  peser  sur  I'Europe.. 

EUe  a  retabli  I'equilibre  europeen,  garant  de  la  liberie  et  de  la  dignite  de  chacun. 

Messieurs,  je  ne  sais  si  je  ne  m'abuse,  mais  ilm'apparait  que  cette  oeuvre  de  repa- 
ration pacifique,  d'affranchissement  et  de  dignite  defmitivement  scellee  en  1904  et 
1907  avec  le  concours  genial  du  roi  Edouard  VII  d'Angleterre  et  du  gouvernement 
de  IsiCouronne  i  Vifs  applaadissemcji Is),  c  est  cela  queTempire  allemand  veut  detruire 
aujourd'hui  par  un  audacieux  coup  de  force^, 

L'AHemagne  n'a  rien  k  nous  reprocher. 

Nous  avons  consenti  a  la  paix  un  sacrifice  sans  precedent  en  portant  un  delni- 

DoCDMENTS  DiPtOMATiQDES^  —  Cucrrc  curopecnne.  a 


v^?B 


—  170  — 
siecle  silencieux  a  nos  flancs  ia  hiessure  ouverte  par  elle.  ( Vifs  applaadissements  una" 


mmes. 


Nous  en  avons  consent!  d'autres  dans  lous  les  debats  que,  depuis  1904*  la  diplq- 
malie  imperiale  a  systematiquement  provoques  soit  au  Maroc,  soil  ailleurs,  aussi 
bien  eri  igoS  qu'en  1906,  en  1908  qu'en  1911. 

La  Russie,  elle  aussi,  a  fait  preuve  d'une  grande  moderation  lors  des  evenements 
de  1908,  comme  danslacrise  actuelle. 

Elle  a  observe  la  meme  moderation,  et  la  TripleJEntente  avec  elle  quand,  dans  la 
crise  orienlale  de  1912, 1'Autriche  etl'Allemagne  ont  formule»  soil  contre  laSerbie, 
soit  contre  la  Grece  des  exigences,  discutables  pourtant,  Tevenement  Ta  prouve. 

Inutiles  sacrifices,  steriles  transactions,  vains  efforts,  puisqu'aujourd'hui,  en 
pleine  action  de  conciliation,  nous  sommes,nos  allies  et  nous,  altaques  par  surprise. 
(Applaadissements  prolonges.) 

Nul  ne  pent  croire  de  bonne  foi  que  nous  sommes  les  agresseurs.  Vainement  Ton 
veut  troubler  les  principes  sacres  de  droit  et  de  liberte  qui  regissent  les  nations 
comme  les  individus  :  Tltalie,  dans  la  claire  conscience  du  genie  latin,  nous  a  notifie 
quelle  entendait  garder  la  neutrality.  ( Tons  les  deputes  se  levent  et  opplaudisseRi  kn- 
gucment.) 

Cette  decision  a  rencontre  dans  loutela  France  Teclio  de  la  joie  la  plus  sincere.  Je 
m'en  suis  fail  I'interprele  aupres  du  charge  d'affaires  d'ltalie  en  lui  disanl  combien  je 
me  felicitais  que  les  deux  soeurs  latines,  qui  ont  meme  origme  etmeme  ideal,  un 
passe  de  gloire  commun,  ne  se  trouvent  pas  opposees.  [Nouveaux  applandissements.) 

Ce  qu'on  attaque,  messieurs,  nousle  declarons  tres  haul,  c'est  cette  independance , 
cette  dignite,  cette  securite  que  la  Triple  Entente  a  reconquises  dans  Tequilibre  au 
service  de  la  paix. 

Ce  qu'on  attaque,  ce  sent  les. liberies  de  TEurope,  dont  la  France,  ses  alliees  et 
ses  amis  sont  fiers  d'etre  les  defenseurs.  [Vifs  applaadissements.) 

Ces  liberies,  nous  allons  les  defendre,  car  ce  sont  elles  qui  sont  en  cause  el  toutle 
reste  n'a  ete  que  pretextes. 

La  France,  injustement  provoquee,  na  pas  voulula  guerre,  elle  a  lout  fait  pour 
la  conjurer.  Puisqu'on  la  lui  impose,  elle  se  defendra  contre  I'Allemagne  et  contre 
toute  puissance  qui,  n'ayant  pas  encore  fait  connaitre  son  sentiment,  prendrait part 
aux  cotes  de  cette  demiere  au  conflit  entre  les  deux  pays.  (Tous  les  deputes  se  levent  et 
€,pp.laudissent. ) 

Un  peuple  libre  et  fori  qui  soutient  un  ideal  seculaire  el  s'unil  lout  enlier  pour  la 
sauvegarde  de  son  existence;  une  democratie  qui  asu  discipliner  son  effort  militaire 
etn'apas  craint.  Tan  passe,  d'en  alourdir  le  poids  pour  repondre  aujc  armemenls 
voisins;  une  nation  armee  iultanl  pour  sa  vie  propre  et  pour  Tindependance  de  I'JEu- 
rope,  voila  le  spectacle  que  nous  nous  honorons  d'offrir  aux  temoins  de  celte  lutle 
formidable  qui,  depuis  quelques  jours,  se  prepare  dans  le  calme  le  plus  methodique. 
Nous  sommes  sans  reproches.  Nous  serons  sans  peur.  ( Tom  les  deputes  se  levent  et  ap- 
plaudissent  lomjuement.) 

La  France  a  prouve  sonvent  dans  des  conditions  moins  favorables,  qu'elle  est  \e 


—   171   — 
plus  redoutable  adversaire  quand  eile  se  bat,  comme  c'est  le  cas  aujourd'hui,  pour  la 
liberie  et  pour  le  droit.  (Applaadissemenls.) 

En  vous  soumeltant  nos  actes,  a  vous.  Messieurs,  qui  etes  nos  juges,  nous  avon& 
pour  porter  le  poids  de  notre  lourde  responsabilite,  le  reconfort  d'une  conscience 
sans  trouble  et  la  certitude  du  devoir  accompli.  ( Toas  Ics  deputes  sc  tevent  et  ap- 
plaadissent  longaemenl. ) 

Rene  Viviani.  , 


—   173 


CHAPITRE  VII 

DfiCLARATION  DE  LA  TRIPLE  ENTENTE 

{&  SEPTEMBRE  1914) 


175  — 


DECLARATION. 


i 


M.  Delcasse,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres, 

a  MM.  les  Ambassadeurs  et  Ministres  de  France  a  I'etranger. 

Paris,  Ic  4  septembre  igiii 

La  declaration  suivante  a  ete  signee  ce  matin  au  Foreign  Office,  k  Londres. 

«  Les  soussignes,  diiment  autorises  par  leurs  gouvernements  respectifs  font  la 
declaration  suivante  : 

« Les  Gouvernements  britannique,  franqais  et  russe  s'engagent  mutuellement  a  ne 
pas  conclure  de  paix  separee  au  cours  de  la  presente  guerre. 

« Les  trois  gouvernements  conviennent  que,  lorsqu'il  y  aura  lieu  de  discuter  les 
termes  de  la  paix,  aucune  des  Puissances  alliees  ne  pourra  poser  des  conditions  de 
paix  sans  accord  prealable  avec  chacun  des  autres  allies. » 

Signe  :  Paul  Cambon. 

Comte  Benckendorff. 
Edward  Grey. 

Celte  declaration  sera  publiee  aujourd'hui. 

Delcasse 


177 


ANNEXES 


EXTRAITS 

DU  "LrVRE  BLEU**  (ANGLAIS),  DU  **LIVRE  ORIS"  (BELGE), 
DU   **UVRE  BLANC"   (AJbLEMAND),   DU   "LIVRE   ORANGE"   (RUSSE) 


DocTJMERTS  oiPLOMATiQDES.  —  GueiTe  europdeiine,  a3 


» 


179 


Annexe  I, 


Esctraits  du  « (uvre  bleu  a  Y^lattfa  k  U  ixisition  prise  p^  Id  GouV«m$mettt  dfiglais  &  I'^gard 
de  la  Russiei  de  rAllemagne  et  de  la  France  pendant  lea  pourparlers  <iui  ottt  pr^c^d 
la  guerre* 


r  6. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne  4  Saiiit-P^tersbourg» 
a  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Saint-Petersbourg,  24  jpiUet  i^iA. 

J'ai  recu  ce  matin  un  message  telephonique  de  M.  Sazonoff  m'informant  que  le  texle  de 
lultimatum  autrichien  venait  de  lui  parvenir. 

Son  Excellence  ajouta  quune  reponse  etait  exigde  dans  les  quarante-huit  heures  et  il-me- 
pria  de  venir  le  trouver  a  I'Ambassade  de  France  pour  discuter  raffaire.  car  la  d-marche 
autrichienne  voulait  dire  clairement  que  la  guerre  ^tait  imminente. 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  dit  que  la  conduite  de  rAutriche  ^tail  tout  a  la  fois 
jproYOcante  et  immorale ;  elle  n'aurait  jamais  agi  ainsi  a  moins  que  TAUemagne  n'ait  ete 
iprealablement  consultee;  quelques-unes  de  ses  demandes  etaient  tout  a  fait  impossibles  a 
accepter.  H  esperait  que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  ne  manquerait  pas  de  proclamer 
sa  solidarite  avec  la  Russie  el  la  France. 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  me  donna  a  entendre  que  la  France  remplirait,  si  cela  devenait 
n^cessaire,  toutes  les  obligations  que  lui  imposait  son  alliance  avec  la  Russie,  outre  qu'elle 
seconderait  fortement  la  Russie  dans  toutes  les  negociations  diplomatiques. 

J'ai  dit  que  je  vous  telegraphierais  un  rapport  complet  de  ce  que  leurs  Excellences' 
venaient  de  me  dire.  Je  ne  pouvais  pas,  naturellement,  parler  au  nom  da  Gouvernement  de 
Sa  Majesty ;  mais,  personnellement,  je  ne  voyais  aucune  raison  de  s'atlendre  a  une  declara->; 
tion  de  solidarity  de  la  part  du  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  qui  enirainerait  un  engagement 
absolu  de  sa  part  de  soutenir  la  Russie  et  la  France  par  la  force  des  armes.  ^Les  interetS 
directs  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  en  Serbic  etaient  nuls ,  et  une  guerre  en  faveur  de  ce  pays  ne 
serait  jamais  sanctionn^e  par  Topinion  publique  de  la  Grande-Bretagne.  A  ceci,  M.  SazonofF 
r^pondit  qu'il  ne  fallait  pas  que  nous  dubliiohs  que  la  question  gen^rale  europ^enne  etait 
impliquee,  la  question  de  la  Serbie  n'en  form  ant  qu'une  partie  et  que  la  Grande-Bretagne 
ne  pourrait  pas  en  fait  se  degager  des  problemes  maintenant  en  jeu. 

En  reponse  a  ces  remarques,  j'ai  fait  observer  que  je  comprenais,  de  ce  qu'il  disait,  que 
Son  Excellence  proposait  que  la  Grande-Bretagne  se  joignit  k  une  communication  qui  serait' 
faite  a  I'Autriche  a  I'effet  qu'une  intervention  active  par  elle  dans  les  affaires  interieures  de  la 
iSerbie  ne  pourrait  pas  elre  tolej?ee,  Mais  supposant  que  I'Autriche,  neanmoins,  allait, avoir 
^ecours  a  des  mesures  militaires  contre  la  Serbie  malgre  nos  representations ,  6tait-ce  I'inten- 
Won  du  Gouvernement  russe  de  declarer  de  suite  la  guerre  a  I'Autriche  ? 

M.  Sazonoff  dit  que  lul-m6me  pensait  que  tout  au  moins  la  mobilisation  russe  devait  dtre 
faite,  mais  qu'il  y  avait  un  Conseil  des  Ministres  cet  apres-midi  pour  examiner  la  question 
dans  toute  son  etendue.  Un  autre  Conseil,  preside  par  i'Empereur,  serait  tenu  probablement 
demain ,  quand  une  decision  serait  prise. 

s3. 


—  180  — 

Jai  dit  qu  il  me  paraissait  que  le  point  important  6tait  de  persuader  i'Autriche  d  etendre 
•la  iimite  de  temps,  et  que  la  premiere  qhose  a  faire  ^tait  de  faire  peser  sur  I'Autriche  une 
influence  ayant  ce  but  en  vue.  L'Ambassadeur  de  France,  cependant,  croyait  que,  ou 
TAutriche  avait  decide  d'agir  de  suite  ou  eile  blufTail.  Dans  n'importe  quel  cas,  notre  seule 
chance  d'eviter  la  guerre  etait  d'adopter  une  attitude  ferme  et  unie.  11  ne  pensait  pas  qu'il  y 
avait  le  tomps  de  donner  suite  a  ma  proposition.  La-dessus,  j'ai  dit  qu'il  me  semblait  desi- 
rable pour  nous  de  connaitre  exactement  jusqu'a  quel  point  la  Serbie  serait  disposee  a  aller 
pour  accepter  les  demandes  formulees  par  I'Aulriche  dans  sa  note.  M.  Sazonoffrepondit  qu'il 
faijait  d'abord  qu'il  consultat  ses  collegues  a  ce  sujet,  mais  que,  sans  cloute,  quelques-unes 
des  demandes  de  I'Autriche  pourraient  etre  acceptees  par  la  Serbie. 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  et  M.  Sazonoffconlinuerent  tous  deux  a  me  pressor  pour  une 
declaration  de  solidarite  complete  du  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  avec  les  Gouvernements 
francais  et  russe,  et  j'ai,  en  consequence,  dit  qu'il  me  semblait  possible  que  vpus  voudriez, 
peut-etre,  consentir  a  faire  de  fortes  representations  aux  deux  Gouvernements  allemand  et 
autrichien ,  faisant  valoir  aupres  d'eux  qu'une  attaque  sur  la  Serbie  par  rAutriche  mettrait  en 
danger  la  paix  entiere  de  I'Europe.  Peut-etre  pourriez-vous  trouver -moyen  de  leur  dire  qu'uhe 
telle  action  de  la  part  de  I'Autriche  amenerait  probablement  une  intervention  russe,  qui 
impliquerait  la  France  et  I'Aliemagne,  et  qu'il  serait  difficile  k  la  Grande-Bretagne  de  rester 
a  I'ecart  si  la  guerre  devenait  generale.  M.  Sazonoff  repondit  que  tot  ou  tard  nous  serious 
enlraines  a  la  guerre  si  elle  eclatait;  nous  aurions  rendu  la  guerre  plus  probable  si,  des  le 
debut,  nous  nefaisions  pas  cause  commune  avec  son  pays  et  avec  la  France;  en  tout  cas,  il 
esperait  que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  exprimerait  une  forte  reprobation  de  la  deci- 
sion prise  par  rAutriche. 

G.  Buchanan. 


r  87. 

Sir  Edward  Grey, 

k  Sir  F.  Bertie,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne  k  Paris. 

Foreign  Office,  29  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur, 

Apres  avoir  expose  i  M.Cambon  aujourd'hui  combien  la  situation  me  paraissait  grave,  je 
lui  ai  declare  que  j'avais  I'intenlion  de  dire  a  I'Ambassadeur  allemand  aujourd'hui  qu'il  ne  fal- 
lait  pas  qu'il  se  laissat  aller,  a  raison  du  ton  amical  de  nos  conversatious ,  a  un  sentiment  de 
fausse  certitude  que  nous  resterions  a  I'ecart  si  tous  les  efforts  pour  conserver  la  paix,  que  nous 
faisions  actuellement  en  commun  avec  I'Aliemagne ,  ^chouaient. 

Mais  j'ai  continue  en  disant  a  M.  Cambon  que  je  trouvais  n^cessaire  de  liii  dire  aussi  que 
I'opinion  publique  ici  envisageait  la  difficult^  acluelle  d'un  point  de  vue  tout  k  fait  different 
de  celui  qu'on  avait  adopts  pendant  la  difficulte  au  sujet  du  Maroc  il  y  a  quelques  annees. 
Dans  le  cas  du  Maroc,  il  s'agissait  d'uaconflit  dans  lequel  la  France  ^tait  la  principale  int6- 
ress^e  etou  il  paraissait  que  I'Aliemagne,  dans  un  effort  pour  ^eraser  la  France,  lui  cherchait 
querelle  a  Toccasioh  d'une  question  qui  formait  I'objet  d'une  convention  sp^ciale  entre  la 
France  et  nous-mfimes.  Dans  le  cas.acl^ei,  U  differend  «nlre  TAutriohe  et  la  Serbie  n'etait pas 


—  181  — 

un  cas  oil  nous  nous  sentions  appeles  h  jouer  un  role  actif.  MSme  si  la  question  airivait  k  se 
poser  entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Russie  ,  nous  ne  nous  sentirions  pas  appeles  a  y  jouer  un  r6le.  Ce 
serait  alors  une  question  de  suprematie  entre  le  Teuton  et  le  Slave  dans  les  Balkans  et  notre 
idee  .avail  toujours  et6  d'eviter  d'etre  entraines  dans  une  guerre  pour  une  question  balka- 
nique. 

Si  I'Allemagne  se  trouvait  entrainee  dans  la  lutte  et  si  par  suite  la  France  y  ^tait  5  son  tour 
impliquee,  nous  n'avions  pas  decide  ce  que  nous  ferions.  Ce  serait  un  cas  que  nous  aurions 
a  examiner.  La  France  aurait  ^te  alors  enlrainee  dans  une  querelle  qui  n'^tait  pas  la  sienne, 
mais  dans  laquelle ,  par  suite  de  son  alliance ,  son  honneur  et  ses  interets  Tobligeaiient  k  s'en-* 
gager.  Nous  etions  libres  d'engagements  et  nous  aurions  a  decider  ce  que  les  interets  britan- 
niques  exigeaient  que  nous  fissions.  J'estimais  qu'il  etait  necessaire  de  dire  cela,  parce  que, 
conime  il  le  savait,  nous  prenions  tomes  les  precautions  ausujel  de  notre  Flotte,  etquej'^tais 
sur  le  point  d'avertir  le  Prince  Licbnowski  de  ne  pas  compter  que  nous  restions  a  I'ecart;  mais 
il  ne  serait  pas  jusle  que  je  laisse  M.  Cambon  s'egarer  jusqu  a  supposer  que  ceci  voulait  dire 
que  nous  avions  decide  ce  que  nous  ferions  dans  une  evenlualite,  qui  comme  je  I'esp^rais 
|Cncore,  pouvait  ne  pas  se  presenter. 

M.  Cambon  n)'a  dit  que  j'avais  expose  la  situation  tres  clairement.  II  comprenait  que  je 
voulais  dire  que  dans  une  querelle  balkanique  et  dans  une  lutte  pour  la  suprematie  entre  le 
Teuton  et  le  Slave,  nous  ne  nous  sentirions  pas  appeles  a  intervenir;  mais  que  si  d'aulres 
questions  surgissaient  et  si  la  France  et  I'Allemagne  se  trouvaient  impliquees  de  telle  sorteque 
Ja  question  de  fhcgemonie  en  Europe  seposat,  nous  d^ciderions  alors  ce  qu'il  nous  serait  ne- 
cessaire de  faire.  II  a  paru  tout  a  fait  prepare  a  cette  declaration  et  n'y  fit  aiicune  objec- 
tion. 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  ajouta  que  I'opinion  fran9aise  6tait  calme  mais  decidee.  II  s'at- 
tendait  a  ce  que  I'Allemagne  demandat  que  la  France  restat  neutre  pendant  que  I'Allemagne 
attaquerait  la  Russie.  Cette  assurance  naturellement  la  France  ne  pouvait  pas  la  donner;elle 
etait  obligee  a  aider  la  Russie  si  la  Russie  6tait  attaquefe. 

E.  Gret. 


N''  88. 
Sir  Edward  Gbey, 

a  Sir  E.  GoscHEN,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne  a  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office ,  2  9  j uillet  1914. 
Monsieur, 

Apres  avoir  cause  cet  apres-tnidi  avec  1' Ambassadeur  allemand  au  sujet  de  la,  situation  eu- 
ropeenne ,  j'ai  dit  que'je  desirais  lui  dire,  dune  fa90n  tout  a  fait  particuliere  et  amicale, 
quelque  chose  que  j'avais  dans  I'esprit.  La  situation  ^tait  tres  grave.  Tant  qu'elle  se  limitait 
aux  questions  actuellement  posees ,  nous  n  avions  aucune  intention  d'inlervenir.  Mais  si  I'Al- 
iemagne  s  y  trouvait  engagde  et  ensuite  la  France ,  la  question  pourrait  ^tre  si  vaste  qu'elle 
impliquerait  tous"  les  interets  europ^ens;  el  je  ne  voulais  pas  qu'il fut  trompe  par  le  ton  ami- 
cal  de  notre  conversation  —  le^oi  per$ister^t.|  comme  je  Tesp^rais  —-  jusqua  croire  que 
nous  resterfons  k  Vacant, 


—  182  — 

II  a  dit  qu'il  comprenait  parfaitement ,  mais  il  a  demande  si  je  voulais  dire  que  nous  inter- 
viendrions  dans  certaines  circonstances. 

Je  r^pondis  que  je  ne  desirais  pas  dire  cela,  ni  quoi  que  ce  fut  qui  ressemblat  a  une  me- 
nace ou  k  un  essai  d'exercer  une  pression  en  declarant  que ,  si  ies  choses  allaient  plus  mal , 
nous  interviendrions.  II  ne  serait  pas  question  de  noire  intervention  si  TAllemagne  netaitpas 
impliquee,  ou  m^me  si  la  France  netail  pas  impliquee;  mais  nous  savions  fort  bien  que  si 
la  question  devenait  telle  que  nous  croyions  que  Ies  int^rets  britanniques  exigeaient  notre  in- 
tervention ,  il  faudrait  que  nous  intfervenions  imm^diatement,  et  que  la  decision  fut  tres  ra- 
pide,  exactement  comme  Ies  decisions  des  autres  puissances  auraient  a  letre.  J'esperais  que 
le  ton  amical  de  nos  conversations  continuerait  comme  a  present,  et  queje  pourrais  conser- 
verdes  rapports  aussi  etroits  avec  le Gouvernement  allemand  en  travaiUant  pour  la  pais.  Mais 
si  nous  6cbouions  dans  nos  efforts  pour  conserver  la  paix,  et  si  la  question  s'elargissait  de  fa- 
9on  a.  impliquer  pour  ainsi  diretous  Ies  interets  etirop6ens,  je  ne  voulais  pas  etre  expose  a 
aucun  reproche  de  sa  part,  que  le  ton  amical  de  toutes  nos  conversations  I'avait  egare,  lui 
ou  son  gouvernemenl,  a  supposer  que  nous  n'agirions  pas  au  reproche  que  s'il  n'avait  pas 
6t6  ainsi  ^gar6,  le  cours  des  6venements  aurait  pu  etre  different. 

L'Ambassadeur  allemand  n'a  fait  aucune  objection  a  ce  que  j  ai  dit ,  au  contraire ,  il  m'a 
dit  que  cela  s*accordait  avec  ce  qu  il  avait  deja  fait  savoir  k  Berlin  comme  sa  maniere  per- 
sonnelle  d'enyisager  la  sitilation. 


N'*  99. 

Sir  F.  Bertee,  Ambaasadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne,  k  Paris, 
a  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Paris,  3o  juillet  igiA. 

Le  President  de  la  R6publique  me  fait  savoir  que  le  Gouvernement  russe  a  et^  inform^ 
par  le  Gouvernement  allemand  que  I'Allemagne  mobiliserait  a  moins  que  la  Russie  n  arr^tat 
sa  mobilisation.  Mais  un  rapport  suppl^mentaire  recu  depuis  de  Saint-P^tersbourg  declare 
que  le  communique  allemand  avail  die  modifie  et  prenait  maintenant  la  forme  d'une 
demande  d'information  a  quelles  conditions  la  Russie  consentirait  a  ddmobiliser.  La  r^ponse 
donnde  est  quelle  consent  ile  faire  k  la  condition  que  I'Autriche-Hongrie  donne  I'assurance 
quelle  respectera  la  souverainetd  de  la  Serbie  et  soumettra  certaines  demandes  formulees 
dans  la  noleautricbienne,  et  non  acceptdes  par  la  Serbie  a  une  discussion  internationale. 

Le  President  est  d'avis  que  ces  conditions  ne  seront  pas  accept6es  par  rAutriche ;  il  est 
convaincu  que  la  paix  entre  Ies  Puissances  est  enlre  Ies  mains  de  la  Grande-Bretagne.  Si  le 
Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  annon9ait  que  I'Angleterre  viendi*ait  en  aide  k  la  France,  dans 
le  cas  dun  conflit  entre  la  France  et  TAllemagne,  resultant  des  differences  acluelles  enlre 
I'Autricbe  etla  Serbie,  il  ny  aurait  pas  de  guerr&,  car  I'Allemagne  modifierail  aussitot  son 
attitude. 

Je  luiai  expliqudcombien  il  serait  difficile  au  Gouvernement  deSa  Majesty  de  faire  une  telle 
declaration ,  mais  il  m'a  repondu  qu'il  maintenait  que  cela  serait  dans  I'interet  de  la  paix. 
La  France,  disait-il,  est  pacifique.  Elle  ne  desire  pas  la  guerre  et  tout  ce  qu'elle  a  fait  jusqu'^ 
present  est  de  se  prdprer  pour  une  mobilisation  afin  de  ne  pas  ^tre  prise  au  depourvu.  Le 
Gouvernement  fran9ais  tieodra  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  au  courant  de  tout  ce  qui  s& 


-  183  — 
{era  dans  ce  sens.  On  a  des  rensoignements  s^rieux  quia  Us  troupes  allemahdes  sont  concen- 
trees  dans  les  environs,  de  THiooville  et  de  Metz,  prates  h  la  giierre.  S'ii  y  avail  une  guerre 
gen^rale  sur  le  continent,  TAngleterre  y  serait  entralnee  pour  la  protection  de  ses  int^rfits 
vitaux.  Une  declaration  d^s  k  present  de  son  intention  de  soutenir  la  France,  dont  c'est  le 
desir  que  la  paix  soit  maitttenue,  emp^cherait  presque  cerlainement  rAIlemaghe  de  partit 
en  guerre. 

F«  Beatis. 


r  119. 
Sir  Ed.  Grey, 

k  Sir  Francis  Bertie/  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne,  k  Paris. 

Foreign-Office,  3i  juillet  1914. 

MONSIEDR, 

M.  Cambon  s'est  refere  aujourd'hui  k  un  tel6gramme  qui  avait  6td  montre  ce  matin  a 
Sir  Ar^hu^  Nicolson  qui  provenait  de  TAmbassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  et  qui  disait  que 
Tincertitude  concernant  notre  intervention  etait  I'^lemerit  encourageant  k  Berlin  et  que,:si 
nous  voulions  seulement  nous  declarer  definitivement  du  66te  de  la  Russie  et  de  la  Franbe, 
cela  d^ciderait  rattitude  allemande  eri  faveur  de  la  paix. 

J'ai  dit  qu'il  ^tait  tout  a  fait  injuste  de  supposer  que  nous  avions  laissd  rAHemagne  sous 
I'impression  que  nous  n'interviendrons  pas.  J'avais  refuse  des  ouvertures  pour  promettre  que 
nous  resterions  neutres.  Non  seulement  j'avais  refuse  de  dire  que  nous  resterions  neutres, 
mais  j'avais  ete  ce  matin  jusqu'i  dire  k  i' Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  que,  si  la  France  et 
I'Ailemagne  se  trouvaient  engag^es  dans  une  guerre,  nous  y  serions  entraines.  Cela,  bien 
entendu,  n'etait  pas  la  m^me  chose  que  de  prendre  un  engagement  avec  la  France,  ^et  j'ai 
dit  cela  a  M.  Cambon,  seulement  pour  montrer  que  nous  n'avions  pas  laiss^  I'AHemagne' 
sous  I'impression  que  nous  resterions  a  I'ecart. 

M.  Cambon  m'a  aiors  demande  ma  reponse  k  ce  qu'il  avait  dit  hier. 

J'ai  dit  que  nous  etions  arrives  a  la  conclusion,  dans  le  Cabinet  d'aujourd'hui,  que  nous 
ne  pouvions  donner  aucun  gage  en  ce  moment.  Bien  que  nous  ayons  a  exposer  notre  poli- 
tique devant  le  Parlement,  nous  ne  pouvions  pas  engager  le  Parlemenl  d'avance,  Jusqu'a 
present,  nous  ne  ressentions  pas,  et  I'opinion  publique  ne  ressentait  pas,  qu'aucun  traite  ni 
obligation  de  ce  pays  fussent  engages.  Des  developpements  ulterieurs  pourraient  modifier 
cette  situation  et  obliger  Je  Gouvernement  et  le  Parlement  k  consid^rer  qu'une  intervention 
etait  justifi^e.  La  protection  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  pourrait  etre,  je  ne  dirai  pas  un 
d^cisif ,  mais  un  important  facteur,  dans  la  determination  de  notre  attitude.  Que  nous  pro- 
posions  au  Parlement  d'intervenir  ou  de  ne  pas  intervenir  dans  une  guerre,  le  Parlement 
d^sirerait  savoir  comment  nous  etions  places  a  I'^gard  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique,  et  il  se 
pourrait  que  je  demande  et  a  la  France  et  k  I'Ailemagne  si  chacune  etait  disposee  a  prendre 
I'engagement  qu'elle  ne  serait  pas  la  premiere  a  violer  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique. 

M.  Cambon  a  renouveld  la  question  pour  savoir  si  nous  seconderions  la  France  au  cas  oili 
I'Ailemagne  I'attaquerait. 

J'ai  dit  que  je  pouvais  seulement  m'en  tenir  k  la  reponse  et  que,  au  point  oil  les  cboses  en 
sont  en  ce  moment ,  nous  ne  pouvions  prendre  aucun  engagement. 

M.  Cambon  a  fait  valoir  que  TAUemagne  avait,  depuis  le  commencement,  rejet6  les  pro- 


^  184  — 
positions  qui  auraient  peut-^tre  aimsn^  ia  paix.  li  ne  pouvait  p$is  6lre  dans  I'inter^t  de  I'An- 
gleterre  que  la  France  soit  ecrasee  par  TAIIemagne,  nous  serions  alors  dans  une  position 
trfes  amoindrie  vis-a-vis  de  i'AlIemagne.  En  1870,  nous  avions  commis  une  grande  faute  en 
permettant  un  accroissement  enorme  de  la  force  allemande ,  et  nous  r^peterions  raaintenant 
cette  faute.  II  m*a  demande  si  je  ne  pouvais  pas  soumettre  a  nouveau  cette  question  au 
Cabinet. 

JTai  dit  que  le  Cabinet  serait  certainement  convoque  aussit6t  qu'ii  y  aurait  de  nouveaux 
developpements ,  mais  quant  a  present,  la  seule  r^ponse  que  je  pouvais  donner  etait  que 
nous  nepouvions  prendre  aucun  engagement  d^finitif. 

E.  Grey. 


N"  148. 
Sir  Edward  Grey 

k  Sir  F.  Bertie  ,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne  a  Paris. 

Foreign  Office,  2  aout  1914. 

Apres  le  Conseil  de  Cabinet  de  ce  matin ,  j'ai  remis  a  M.  Carabon  la  note  suivante  : 

« Je  suis  autoris^  a  donner  I'assurance  que  si  ia  flotte  allemande  p^netre  dans  le  Pas-de- 
Calais  ou  dans  la  mer  da  Nord  pour  entreprendre  des  lioslilites  contre  les  cotes  ou  les 
bateaux  fran^ais,  la  flotte  anglaise  donnera  toute  la  protection  en  son  pouvoir. 

« Cette  assurance  est  nalurellement  soumise  a  I'approbation  du  Parlement  et  ne  doit  pas 
^tre  consider^e  comme  engageant  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  jusqu'^  ce  qu'une  telle 
action  se  produise  de  la  part  de  la  flotte  allemande. » 

J'ai  fait  remarquer  que  nous  avions  des  questions  extremement  graves  et  delicates  a  consi- 
d^rer  et  que  le  Gouvernement  ne  pouvait  s'engager  a  declarer  la  guerre  k  I'AlIemagne  si  la 
guerre  eclatait  demain  enire  la  France  et  I'Allemagnd,  mais  qu'il  etait  essentiel  que  le  Gou- 
vernement francais,  donl  la  flotte  etait  depuis  longtemps  concentric  dans  la  Mediterranee , 
sut  quelles  dispositions  prendre,  ia  cdte  septentrionale  etant  enliereirient  sans  defense.  II 
nous  a  done  paru  n^cessaire  de  lui  donner  cettte  assurance.  Cela  ne  nous  engage  pas  a 
declarer  la  guerre  a  rAllemagne,  a  moins  que  la  flotte  allemande  n'agisse  comme  il  est 
indiqu6  ci-dessus,  mais  cela  donne  a  la  France  une  s6curite  qui  lui  permettra  de  regler  la 
disposition  de  sa  flotte  mediterraneenne. 

M.  Cambon  m'a  interrog^  au  sujet  de  la  violation  du  Luxembourg.  Je  lui  ai  fait  part  de 
la  doctrine  etablie  sur  ce  point  en  1867  par  lord  Derby  et  lord  Clarendon. 

II  m'a  demands  ce  que  nous  dirions  en  cas  de  violation  de  la  neutralite  beige.  J'ai  repondu 
que  c'etait  la  une  aflaire  beaucoup  plus  importante  et  que  nous  examinions  quelle  declaration 
nous  ferions  demain  a  ce  sujet  au  Parlement,  cest-a-dire  si  nous  d^clarerions  que  la  violation 
de  la  neutralite  beige  est  un  00505  belli.  Je  lui  ai  rapport^  ce  qui  avait  ete  dit  sur  ce  point  k 
i' Ambassadeur  aliemand. 

E.  Grey. 


—   185  — 


Annexe  n**  H. 


Extraits  du  wLivre  bleu»  relatifs  aux  propositions  faites  par  le  Grouvernement  allem  and 
au  Gouvernement  anglais  pour  obtenir  la  neutrality  de  I'Angleterre. 


r  85. 


I 


Sir  E.  GoscHEN,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne  a  Berlin, 
k  Sir  Edward  Grey. 


Berlin ,  2  9  j  uillet  1 9 1 4- 

On  m'a  prie  d'aller  voir  le  Ghancelier  ce  soir.  Son  Excellence  venait  de  rentrer  de 
Potsdam. 

II  me  dit  que,  si  la  Russie  attaquait  I'Autriche,  il  craignait^qu'une  conflagration  eurpp^enne 
ne  devint  inevitable,  etant  donnees  les  obligations  quimposaita  I'Allemagne  son  alliance  avec 
I'Autriche,  malgre  les  efforts  quil  ne  cessait  de  faire  pour  le  maintien  de  la  paix. 

Ceci  dit,  il  continua  la  conversation  en  olFrant  une  forte  enchere  pour  s'assurer  la  neutra- 
lite  britannique.  II  me  dit  que,  selon  sa  conception  du  principe  essentiel  de  la  politique  bri- 
tannique,  la  Grande-Bretagne  ne  consentirait  jamais  a  se  tenir  a  1  ecart  de  facon  a  laisser 
^eraser  la  France  dans  un  conflit  qui  pourrait  avoir  lieu.  La ,  cependant ,  n'etait  pas  le  but 
de  lAUemagne.  Si  la  neutralite  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  etait  assui'ee,  son  Gouvernement  rece- 
vrait  toutes  les  assurances  que  le  Gouvernerrient  imperial  n'avait  pour  but  aucune  acquisition 
territoriale  aux  frais  de  la  France,  en  supposant  que  la  guerre  s'ensuivit  et  quelle  se  terminal 
a  I'avantage  de  I'Allemagne. 

J'ai  pose  k  Son  Excellence  une  question  au  sujet  des  colonies  francaises.  II  me  repondit 
qu  il  ne  pouvait  s'engager  d'une  maniere  semblable  k  cet  egard, 

Pour  la  Hollande,  Son  Excellence  me  dit  que,  tant  que  les  adversaires  de TAllemagne- res- 
pecteraient  I'integrit^  et  la  neutralite  des  Pays-Bas,  I'Allemagne  serait  pr^te  a  assurer  le 
Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  quelle  en  ferait  autant. 

Les  operations  que  I'Allemagne  pourrait  se  trouver  dans  la  necessite  d  entreprendre  en 
Belgique  dependraient  de  ce  que  ferait  ia  France ;  apres  la  guerre ,  I'integrite  de  la  Bel- 
gique  serait  respectee,  si  ce  pays  ne  se  rangeait  pas  contre  I'Allemagne. 

En  terminant,  Son  Excellence  me  d^clara  que,  depuis  lejour  ou  ii  devint  Ghancelier,  il 
avait  eu  pour  but,  ainsi  que  vous  le  saviez,  d'arriver  a  une  entente  avec  I'Angleterre;  il  espe- 
rait  que  qes  assurances  pourraient  devenir  la  base  de  1' entente  qui  lui  tenait  tant  a  coeur. 
II  pensait  a  une  entente  g^nerale  de  neutrality  entre  TAllemagne  et  I'Angleterre  ;  et ,  quoi-. 
qu'il  fut  encore  trop  tot  pour  en  discu'ter  les  details ,  I'assurance  de  la  neutralite  britannique 
dans  le  conflit  que  pourrait  peut-^tre  provoquer  ia  crise  actuelle  lui  permettrait  d'entrevoir 
la  realisation  de  son  d^sir. 

Son  Exceflepce  m'ayant  demand^  men  opiriioh  en  ce  qui  Goncerne  ia  maniere  dent  vous 
pocotiENTs  DiPLOMATiQDEs.  —  Guerw  «ttroj>4enne.  a  4 


—  186  — 

envisageriez  sa  demande,  je  lui  r^pondis  qua  mon  avis  3  ^tait  peu  probable  que,  dans  les 
circonstances  acluelles ,  vous  fussiez  dispose  a  vous  engager  dune  facon  quelconque  el  que 
vous  desireriez  garder  une  entiere  liberty  d'action. 

E.  GOSCHEN. 


r  101. 

Sir  Edward  Grey, 

h.  Sir  E.  GoscHEN,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne  a  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office,  3o  juillet  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  ne  peut  pas  accueillir  un  seul  instant  la  proposition  du 
Chancelier  de  s'engager  a  rester  neutre  dans  de  telles  conditions.  Ce  qu'il  nous  demande,  en 
effet,  c'est  de  nous  engager  a  rester  a  I'^cart,  en  attendant  qu'on  saisit  des  colonies  francaises 
et  que  la  France  fut  battue,  pourvu  que  rAUemagne  ne  prenne  pas  de  territoire  francais, 
exception  faite  des  colonies. 

Au  point  de  vue  materiel,  une  telle  propoisition  est  inacceptable ,  car  la  France,  sans 
qu'on  lui  enlevat  de  territoire  en  Europe ,  pourrait  ^tre  6crasee  au  point  de  perdre  sa  posi- 
tion de  grande  puissance  et  de  se  trouver  desormais  subordonnee  a  la  politique  allemande. 
En  g6n6ral ,  tout  ceci  k  part ,  ce  serait  une  honte  pour  nous  que  de  passer  ce  inarcb6  avec 
TAUemagne  aux  depens  dela  France,  une  honte  de  laqueUe  la  bonne  renommee  de  cepays 
ne  se  remettrail  jamais. 

Le  Chancelier  nous  demande  en  outre'  de  marchander  tontes  les  obligations  ou  int^rlts 
que  nous  pouvons  avoir  dans  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgiqae.  Nous  ne  saurions  en  aucune  facon 
accueilhr  ce  march6  non  plus. 

Ceci  dit,  il.n'est  pas  n^cessaire  d'examiner  si  la  perspective  dune  convention  g^n^rde  de 
neutralite  dans  I'avenir  entre  VAngletenre  et  TAllemagne  ofFrirait  des  avantages  positifs  suffi- 
sants  pour  nous  d^dommager  de  nous  6tre  lie  les  mains  aujourd'hui.  Nous  devons  conserver 
notre  enti^  liberty  d'agir  comme  les  circonstances  nous  paraitront  I'exiger  en  cas  d'un  d6ve- 
loppement  defavorable  et  regrettable  de  la  crise  actuelle,  tel  que  le  Chancelier  lepr^voit. 

Je  vous  prie  de  parler  au  Chancelier  dans  le  sens  susindiqu6  et  d'ajouter  tres  serieusement 
que  la  seuie  facon  de  maintenir  les  bonnes  relations  entre  I'Angleterre  et  TAliemagne  est 
qu'elles  continuant  a  coop6rer  au  maintien  de  la  paix  de  I'Europe.  Si  nous  obtenons  ce 
r^sultat,  les  relations  mutuelles  de  I'Allemagne  et  de  I'Angleterre  seront,  j'en  suis  convaincu, 
am^lior^es  et  renforcees  ipso  facto.  A  cet  effet,  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  traivaillera 
dans  ce  sens  avec  un  bon  voidoir  et  une  sincerite  entiers. 

Et  j'ajouterai  ceci :  Si  Ton  peut  conserver  la  paix  de  f  Europe  et  traverser  sans  accident  la 
crise  actuelle,  mon  effort  personnel  sera  de  prendre  linitiative  d'un  arrangement  auquel 
I'Allemagne  puisse  souscrlre  et  par  lequel  elle  pourra  6tre  assur^e  qu  aucune  politique  agres- 
sive  ou  hostile  ne  sera  poursuivle  centre  elle  ou  ses  allies  par  la  France ,  la  Russie  et  nous- 
mSmes,  soit  ensemble,  soit  s6par^ment.  J'ai  d^sir^  ceci  et  travailli  dans  ce  sens  autant  que 
je  fai  pu  pendant  la  derni^re  crise  balkanique,  et,  comme  TAilemagne  avait  un  but  sem- 
blable,  nos  relations  se  sont  sensiblement  am^lior^es.  Cette  id^e  a  6t6  jusqu^aujourd'hui 
trop  utopique  pour  faire  I'objet  de  propositions  d^finies,  mais  si  la  crise  actuelle,  beaucoup 
plus  aigue  que  toutes  celles  par  lesquelles  f  Europe  a  pass6  depuis  plusieurs  generations ,  est 


—  187  — 

traversee  sans  accident,  j'ai  Tespoir  que  le  soulagenient  et  la  reaction  qui  suivront  rendront 
possible  un  rapprochement  plus  precis  entre  les  Puissances  qu'il  n  a  iti  possible  jusqu'au- 
jourd'hui. 

E.  Grey. 


r  123. 
Sir  Edward  Grey, 

k  Sir  GoscHEN",  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Brelagne  k  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office,  i"aout  1914. 
Monsieur, 

J'ai  dil  k  I'Ambassadeur  allemand  aujourdliui  que  la  r^ponse  du  Gonvefnenoent  alle- 
mand  au  sujet  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  6tait  tres  regrettable,  car  cette  neutralite 
affecte  I'opinion  publique  en  Angleterre.  Si  TAilemagne  pouvait  donner  les  memes  assurances 
que  ia  France,  cela  contribuerait  dune  manierc  appreciable  a  diminuer  ici  I'inquietude  et 
la  tension  generales.  D'autre  part,  si  Tun  des  Belligerants  violaitla  neutredit^  de  la  Belgique 
pendant  que  I'autre  la  respectait ,  il  serait  tres  difficile  de  contenir  le  sentiment  piiblic  en 
Angleterre.  J'ai  dit  que  nous  avions  disout^  cette  question  auConseil  de  Cabinet  et  que,  etant 
autoris6  a  faire  cette  declaration,  je  lui  remettais  une  note  a  cet  efFet. 

II  ine  demanda  si,  au  cas  oil  I'Allemagne  promettrait  de  ne  pas  violer  la  neutralite  beige, 
nous  nous  engagerions  a  rester  neutres. 

J'ai  repondu  queje  ne  pouvais  pas  faire  de  promesses,  que  nos  mains  ^taient  encore 
libres  et  que  nous  etions  en  voie  de  considerer  quelle  serait  notre  attitude.  Tout  ce  que  je 
pouvais  dire,  cest  que  notre  attitude  serait  en  grande  partie  dict^e  par  I'opinion  publique 
en  Angleterre,  pour  qui  la  neutrality  beige  ayait  une  grande  importance.  Je  ne  pensais  pas 
pouvoir  donner  une  assurance  de  neutralite  sous  cette  seule  condition. 

L'Ambassadeur  me  pressa  de  formukr  les  conditions  moyemiant  lesquelles  nous  garde- 
rions  la  neutralite.  II  suggera  meme  que  I'Allemagne  pourrait  garantir  I'int^grit^  de  la  France 
et  de  ses  colonies. 

J'ai  repondu  que  j'etais  oblige  de  refuser  d6fmitivement  toute  promesse  de  rester  neutre 
dans  de  telles  conditions  et  que  je  ne  pouvais  que  repeter  qu'il  nous  falfait  garder  les  mainis 
libres.     ^ 

E.  Grey. 


—  188  — 


Annexe  n°  II  bis. 


Tentatives  allemandes  pour  obtenir,  sous  le  couvert  d'un  «malentendu»,  la  garantie  par 
TAngleterre  de  la  neutrality  de  la  France  dans  une  guerre  germano-russe. 

(Publication  officieuse  de  la  Gazette  de  VAUemagne  du  Nord,  20  aoiat  1914.) 


r  1. 


Le  Prince  Lichnowsky,  Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  a  Londres, 

a  M.  de  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Chancelier  de  i'Empire  d'Allemagne. 

Londres,  3i  juillet  191^. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  vient  de  m'appeler  au  telephone  et  m'a  demands  si  je  pensais  pouvoir 
declarer  que  nous  n  attaquerions  pas  la  France  si  la  France  restait  neutre  dans  une  guerre 
germano-russe.  J'ai  dit  que  je  pensais  pouvoir  assumer  la  responsabilite  de  cette  declaration. 

Lichnowsky. 


N°  2. 

TiiiGRAMME  de  VEmpereur  GuiUaume  an  Roi  George  V. 

^    Berlin,  i*'aodt  191  A. 

Je  viens  de  recevoir  la  communication  de  voire  Gouvemement  m'offrant  la  neutralite  de 
la  France  avec  la  garantie  de  la  Grande-Bretagne.  A  cette  offre  elait  li^e  la  question  de 
savoir  si ,  k  cette  condition ,  I'Allemagne  n'attaquerait  pas  la  France.  Pour  des  raisons 
techniques,  ma  mobilisation,  qui  a  i\i  ordonn6e  cet  apres-midi  sur  les  deux  fronts,  Est  et 
Quest,  doit  s'accomplir  selon  les  pr6paratifs  commences. 

Des  contre-ordres  ne  peuvent  etre  donnas  et  votre  t^l^gramme  est  malheureusement  venu 
Irop  tard.  Mais  si  la  France  offre  sa  n6utralite,  qui  sera  alors  garantie  par  la  flotte  et  I'arm^e 
anglaises,  je  m'abstiendrai  d'attaquer  la  France  et  j'emploierai  mes  troupes  ailleurs.  Je  sou- 
haite  que  la  France  ne  monlre  aucune  nervosity.  Les  troupes,  sur  ma  frontiere,  sont  en  ce 
moment  arrdtees  par  ordres  tel^graphiques  et  t^l^phoniques,  dans  leur  marche  en  avant  au 
dela  de  la  frontiere  fran9aise. 

GCILLADME. 


—  189  — 


N**  3. 


M.  de  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Chanceller  de  I'Empire, 

a  M.  le  Prihce  Lichnowsky,  Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  h  Ldndres. 

Berlin,  i"  aoiit  191 4. 

L'Allemagne  est  prete  a  acquiescer  aux  propositions  anglaises  si  I'Angleterre  garantit  avec 
ses  forces  militaires  et  navales  la  neutralite  fran^aise  dans  le  conflit  russo-allemand.  La 
mobilisation  allemande  s'est  effecluee  aujourd'hui,  en  r^ponse  aux  provocations  russes,  et 
avant  Tarrivee  des  propositions  anglaises.  Par  consequent ,  noire  concentration  a  la  frontiere 
francaise  ne  pent  etre  modifi^e.  Nous  garantissons  dailleurs  que,  d'iciaulundi  3  aovA,  a 
sept  heures  du  soir,  la  frontiere  francaise  ne  sera  pas  franchie  si  Tassentiment  de  I'Angleterro 
nous  est  parvenu  a  ce  moment. 

Bethmann-Hollweg. 


r  4. 

TiiEGRAMME  du  Roi  George  V  a  rEmperear  Gaillaume. 

Londres,  i**  aout  191  A. 

En  reponse  a  votre  telegramme  qui  vient  de  me  parvenir,  je  pense  qu'il  s'est  produit  un 
malentendu  a  propos  de  la  suggestion  qui  aurait  ete  faite  au  cours  dune  conversation  ami- 
cale  entre  le  prince  Lichnowsky  et  Sir  Edward  Grey,  ou  ils  discutaient  comment  un  conflit 
arme  entre  I'AHemagne  et  la  France  pourrait  etre  retarde  jusqu  a  ce  qu'on  ait  trouve  un 
moyen  d'entente  entre  rAutriche-Hongrie  et  la  Bussie.  Sir  Edward  Grey  verra  le  prince 
Lichnowsky  demain  matin  pour  determiner  qu'il  y  a  bien  eu  malentendu  de  la  part  de  ce 
dernier. 

George. 


r  5. 

Le  Prince  Lichnowsky,  Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  k Londres, 

a  M.  de  Bethmann-Hollweg,  Chancelier  de  TEmpire  d'AUemagne. 

Londres,  2  aoM  191^. 

Les  suggestions  de  Sir  Edward  Grey,  bashes  sur  le  d^sir  de  garder  la  neutralite,  de  la  part 
de  I'Angleterre,  orit  6te  faites  Sans  accord  pr^aiable  avec  la  France  et  ont  ^t^,  depuis,  aban- 
donnees  comme  filtiles. 

LiGBNOWS&T. 


i 


—  190  — 


Annexe  III. 


Extx^ts  dn  «Livre  Bleu»  relatifs  an  refits  de  I'Angleterre  d'admettre  le  point  de 
allemand  dans  la  question  de  la  violation  de  la  neutrality  beige. 


r  153. 

Sir  Edward  Grey, 

a  Sir  E.  Goschen,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagtie  a  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office,  4  aotlt  19 1 A. 

Le  Roi  des  Beiges  a  adresse  un  appel  a  S.  M.  le  Roi  en  vue  dune  intervention  diploma- 
tique en  faveur  de  la  Belgique  dans  les  termes  suivants  : 

«  Me  rappelant  les  nombreuses  preuves  d'amitie  de  Votre  Majest6  et  de  son  pr^decesseur, 
ainsi  que  llattitude  amicale  de  I'Angleterre  en  1870  et  le  temoignage  d'amitie  que  vous  venez 
de  nous  donner  encore,  je  fais  un  supreme  appel  a  I'intervention  diplomatique  du  Gouver- 
nement  de  Votre  Majeste  pour  la  sauvegarde  de  I'integrite  de  la  Belgique.  » 

Le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  est  egalement  informe  que  le  Gouvernement  allemand  a 
remis  au  Gouvernement  beige  une  note  proposant  ime  neutralite  amicale  permettant  le  libre 
passage  en  territoire  beige  et  s'engageant  a  maintenir  Imdependance  du  royaume  et  de  ses 
possessions  h  la  conclusion  de  la  paix;  au  cas  contraire,  la  Belgique  serait  trait6e  en  ennemie. 
Une  r^ponse  est  exigee  dans  un  d^lai  maximum  de  douzeheures. 

Nous  apprenons  aussi  que  la  Belgique  a  oppose  un  refus  forme!  k  ce  quelle  considere 
comme  une  violation  flagrante  de  la  loi  des  nations. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  est  oblige  de  protester  confre  cette  violation  d'un  traits 
que  r AUemagne  a  signe  aussi  bien  que  nous-m^mes ;  il  lui  faut  des  assurances  que  la  demande 
faite  a  la  Belgique  ne  sera  pas  suivie  d'effet  et  que  sa  neutralite  sera  respectee  par  I'Alle- 
magne.  Vous  demanderez  une  reponse  immediate. 

E.  Grey. 


N*'  155. 
Sir  Edward  Grey, 

k  Sir  F  ViLLiERS,  Ministre  de  Grande-Bretagne  k  Bruxelles. 

Foreign  Office,  4  aoAt  l^iA. 

Informez  le  Gouvernement  beige  que ,  si  I'Allemagne  exerce  une  pression  sur  lui  pour  le 
faire  se  departir  de  la  neutralite,  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  sattendra  k  ce  que  la  Bel- 
gique resiste  par  tous  les  moyens  en  son  pouvoir;  que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  I'aldera 
h  resister;  que,  dans  ce  cas,  le  Gouvernement  deSa  Majeste  est  pr^t  a  s'unir  a  la  Russie  et  k 
la  France,  s'il  y  a  lieu,  pour  offirir  immediatement  au  Gouvernement  beige  une  action 
commune  pour  resister  k  i'emploi  par  I'Allemagne  de  la  force  centre  la  Belgique  et  une 
garantie  pour  le  maintien  de  son  integrite  et  de  son  independance  dans  Vavenir. 

£.  Grey. 


I 


—  191  — 


NM57* 


Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  gtrangeres  d'Aflemagne, 

au  Prince  Lichnowsky,  Ambassadeur  d'AUemagne  k  Londres  (communique  par 
TArobassade  allemande,  4  aout). 

Berlin,  i  aoftt  1914. 

Priere  de  dissiper  tout  soupcon  qui  pourrdt  subsister  dans  I'esprit  du  Gouvemement  bri- 
tannique  au  sujet  de  nos  intentions. 

Repetez  positivement  Tassurance  formelle  que,  meme  en  cas  de  conflit  arme  avec  la  Bel 
gique,  I'AHemagne  ne  s'annexera  du  territoire  beige  sous  aucun  pretexte. 

La  sincerite  de  cette  declaration  estprouvee  parnotre  engagement  solennel  a  I'egard  de  la 
Hollande  de  respecter  strictement  sa  neutralite.  II  est  evident  qvie  noas  ne  poarrions  annexer 
profitahlement  du  territoire  beige  sans  nons  agrandir  en  meme  temps  anx  d^pens  de  la  Hollande. 

Faites  bien  comprendre  a  Sir  Edward  Grey  que  I'armee  allemande  ne  saurait  s'exposer  a 
une  attaque  francaise  par  la  Belgique,  attaque  qui  a  ete  envisagee  selon  des  informations 
absolument  sures. 

L'AUemagne  est  done  obligee  de  ne  pas  tenir  compte  dela  neutralite  beige:  c*est  pour  elie 
une  question  de  vie  ou  de  mort  de  prevenir  f  avance  d^  1  armee  frangaise. 

Jagow. 


Tf  159. 
Sir  Edward  Grey, 

a  Sir  E.  Goschen,  Ambassadeur  de  Grande-Bretagne  a  Berlin. 

Foreign  Oflfice,  4  aotit  1914. 

Nous  apprenons  que  I'AHemagne  a  adresse  une  note  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres 
beige,  declarant  que  le  Gouvemement  alleraand  serait  oblige  de  mettre  a  execution,  au  besoin 
par  la  force  des  armes,  des  mesures  considerees  comme  indispensables. 

Nous  sommes  egaiement  informes  quele  territoire  beige  a  ete  viole  a  Gemmerich. 

Dans  ces  conditions  et  etant  donne  que  i'AUemagne  a  refuse  de  nous  donner  au  sujet  de 
la  Belgique  les  m^mes  assurances  que  celles  que  nous  a  donnees  la  France  la  semaine  der- 
niere  en  reponse  a  notre  demande  laite  simultanement  a  Berlin  et  a  Paris,  il  nous  faut 
reiterei'  cette  demande  et  exiger  ime  reponse  satisfaisante,  ainsiqua  mon  t61egramrae  die  ce 
matin ,  qui  devra  etre  recue  avant  minuil  ce  soir. 

Sinon,  vous  demanderez  vos  passeports  et  vous  d^clarerez  que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa 
Majeste  se  voit  oblig^  de  prendre  toutes  les  mesures  en  son  pouvoir  pour  maintenir  la  neu- 
trality de  la  Belgique  et  le  respect  d'un  traits  auquel  I'AHemagne  a  souscrit  autant  que 
nous  nl^mes. 

E,  Gr£X. 


^  192  ~ 


N'  160. 


Sir  E.  GoscHEN, 

k  Sir  Edward  Gret. 

MONSIEUB. 


Londres,  8  aout  1914. 


Conform^inent  aiu  instructions  contenues  dans  votre  t616gramme  du  4  courant,  je  suis 
all6  voir  cet  apres-midi  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  et  lui  ai  demands,  au  nom  du  ,Gouvernem,ent  de 
Sa  Majesty  britannique,  si  le  Gouvernement  imperial  sabstiendrait  de  violer  la  neutrality 
dc  la  Belgique. 

M.  de  Jagow  a  r^pliqu^  tout  de  suite  qu'il  ^tait  facb6  d'avpir  a  dire  que  sa  r^ponse  de- 
vaitetre  :  «NQn  »,  6tant  donn^  que,  puisque  les  troupes  aliemandes  avaient  franchi  la  fron- 
tiere  ce  matin,  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique  se  trouvait  d  ores  et  deja  viol^e. 

M,  de  Jagow  s'est  ^tendu  a  nouveau  sur  les  raisons  qui  avaient  oblig^  le  Gouvernement 
imperial  k  prendre  cette  mesure  :  c'est  a  savoir  qu'il  leur  fallait  p6n6trer  en  France  par  la 
vpie  la  plus  rapide  et  la  plus  facile,  de  maniire  k  prendre  une  bonne  avance  dar>s  leurs 
operations  et  s'efForcer  de  frapper  quelque  coup  decisif  le  plus  tot  possible.  C'est  pour  nous, 
a-t-il  dit,  une  question  de  vie  ou  de  mort,  car,  si  nous  avions  pass6  par  la  route  pl,us  au 
Sud,  nous  n'aurionspu,  vu  le  petit  nombre  de  chemins  et  la  force  des  forteresses,  esperer 
passer  ^ans  rencontrer  une  opposition  formidable,  impliquant  une  grosse  perte  de  temps. 
Cetle  perte  de  temps  aurait  ^t^  autant  de  temps  gagnd  par  les  Russes  pour  amener  leurs 
troupes  sur  la  fronli^re  allemande.  Agir  avec  rapidit^,  voila,  a-t-il  ajoute,  le  raiaitre-atout  de 
TAHemagne;  celui  de  la  Russle  est  d'avoir  d'in^puisables  ressources  en  soldats. 

J'ai  fait  remarquer  k  M.  de  Jagow  que  ce  fait  accompli,  la  violation  de  la  frontiere beige , 
rendait,  comme  il  le  comprenait  facilement,  la  situation  excessivement  grave,  etje  lui  ai 
demands  s'il  n'6tait  pas  temps  encore  de  faire  un  pas  en  arri^re  et  d'eviter  la  possibilite  de 
consequences  que  lui  et  moi  d^plorerions.  II  a  r^pondu  que,  pour  les  raisons  qu'il  m'avait 
donn^es,  il  ^tait  maintenant  impossible  au  Gouvernement  allemand  de  faire  un  pas  en 
arri^re. 

Au  cours  de  rapres-midi,  j'ai  re9U  votre  nouveau  teidgramme  dela  mSme  date,  et,  ob6is- 
sant  aux  instructions  y  contenues,  me  suis  rendu  a  nouveau  au  Ministere  imperial  des 
AlFaires  ^trangeres,  011  j'ai  inform^  le  Secretaire  d'Etat.  qu'k  moins  que  le  Gouvernement 
imperial  piit  donner  ce  soir  ayant  minuitlassurance  de  ne  pas  pousser  plus  loin  sa  violation 
de  la  frontiere  beige  et  d'arr^ter  sa  marcbe,  j'avais  regu  des  iiistructions  pour  demander 
mes  p^^ssepo^ts  et  pour  informer  [1^  Gouvernement  imperial  que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa 
Majeste  britannique  prendrait  toutes  les  mesures  en  son  pouvoir  pour  maintenir  la  neulra- 
lite  de  la  Belgique  et  Tobservaljion  d'un  trait6  auquel  TAtlemagne  etait  autant  partie  que 
Iqi-mSme, 

M.  de  Jagow  a  r^pondu  qu'^  son  grand  regret  il  nepouvait  donner  aucune  reponse  autre 
que  celle  qu'il  m'avait  donn^e  plus  t6t  dans  la  journee,  c'est  k  savoir  que  la  s^curite  do 
I'Empire  rendait  absolument  necessalre  la  marche  des  troupes  imperiales  ii  travers  la  Bel-, 
glque.  J'ai  remis  a  Son  Excellence  un  resum6  ^crit  de  votre  teiegramme  et,  en  faisant 
remarquer  que  vous  indiquiez  minuit  comme  I'heure  k  laquelle  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa 
Majeste  britannique  s'attendrait  k  une  reponse,  lui  ai  demand^  si,  vu  les  consequences 
tcrriblesqui  suivraient  necessairement,  il  ne  serail  pas  possible,  m§me  au  dernier  moment,. 


—  193  — 
au  Gouvernement  imperial  de  reviser  sa  reponse.  H  m'a  repondu  que  quand  bien  mdme  le 
temps  accords  serait  de  vingt-quatre  heures  ou  davantage,  il  faliait  que  sa  reponse  restat 
la  meme.  J'ai  dit  que  dans  ce  cas  j'aurais  a  demander  mes  passeports. 

L'entrevue  dont  il  s'agit  a  eu  lieu  vers  sept  heures.  Au  cours  d'un  bref  entretien  qui  la 
suivit,  M.  de  Jagow  a  exprime  son  poignant  regret  de  voir  s'6crouler  toute  sa  politique  et 
celle  du  Chancelier,  qui  a  ete  de  devenir  amis  avec  la  Grande-Bretagne  et  ensuite,  par 
elle,  de  se  rapprocher  de  ia  France.  Je  lui  ai  dit  que  cetle  terminaison  soudaine  de  mon 
travail  a  Berlin  etait  pour  moi  aussi  une  cause  de  profond  regret  et  de  deconvenue;  mais 
qu'il  lui  failait  bien  comprendre  que  dans  les  circonstances  et  vu  nos  engagements,  il  eut 
ete  tout  a  fait  impossible  au  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majesty  britannique  d'agii'  autrement 
qu'il  n'avait  fait. 

J'ai  dit  ensuite  que  j'etais  d^sireux  d'aller  faire  visile  au  Chancelier,  car  ce  serait  peut-etre 
la  derniere  fois  que  j'aurais  I'occasion  de  le  voir.  II  m'a  pri6  de  le  faire.  J'ai  trouve  le 
Chancelier  tres  agit^.  Son  Excellence  a  commence  tout  de  siiite  une  harangue  qui  a  dure 
environ  vingt  minutes.  11  a  dit  que  la  mesure  prise  par  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste 
britannique  ^tait  terrible  au  dernier  point;  juste  pour  un  mot  —  «  neutralite  »,  un  mot  dont 
en  temps  de  guerre  on  n'a  si  souvent  tenu  aucun  compte,  —  juste  pour  un  chiffon  de 
papier  la  Grande-Bretagne  allait  faire  la  guerre  k  une  nation  k  elle  apparent^e,  qui  ne 
d^sirait  rien  tant  que  d'etre  son  amie.  Tous  ses  efforts  en  ce  Sens  ont,  a-t-il  continue,  et6 
rendus  inutiles  par  cette  derniere  et  terrible  mesure;  la  politique  k  laquelle,  comme  je  le 
savais,  il  s'etait  voue  depuis  son  arriv^e  au  pouvoir,  etait  tombee  comme  un  chateau  de 
cartes.  11  s'est  eerie  que  ce  que  nous  avons  fait  est  inconcevable;  c'est  comme  frapper  par 
derriere  un  homme  au  moment  oil  il  defend  sa  vie  contre  deux  assaillants.  II  tient  la 
Grande-Bretagne  pour  responsable  de  tous  les  terribles  ^venementsquipourrontse  produire. 
J'ai  proteste  avec  force  contre  cette  declaration  et  ai  dit  que,  de  meme  que  lui-meme  et 
M.  de  Jagow  desiraient  me  faire  comprendre  que  pour  des  raisons  strategiques ,  c'^tait  pour 
I'AHemagne  une  affaire  de  vie  ou  de  mort  d'avancer  a  travers  la  Belgique  et  de  violer  la 
neutralite  de  cette  derniere,  de  meme  je  d^sirais  qu'il  comprit  que  c'etait  pour  ainsi  dire 
une  affaire  de  « vie  ou  de  mort »  pour  Thonneur  de  la  Grande-Bretagne  que  de  tenir  I'en- 
gagement  solennel  pris  par  elle  de  faire  en  cas  d'attaque  tout  son  possible  pour  defendre  la 
neutralite  de  la  Belgique.  II  est,  ai-je  insisle,  tout  simplement  necessaire  de  tenir  ce  pacte 
solennel,  sans  quoi  quelle  confiance  n'importe  qui  pourrait-il  avoir  a  I'avenir  dans  les  en- 
gagements pris  par  la  Grande-Bretagne? 

Le  Chancelier  a  repris  :  «  Mais  a  quel  prix  ce  pacte  aura-t-il  ^t^  tenu  ?  Le  Gouvernement 
britannique  y  a-t-il  songe?  »  J'ai  insinue  h.  Son  Excellence,  avec  toute  la  clarte  qui  me  fut 
possible,  que  la  crainte  des  consequences  ne  pouvait  guere  etre  consideree  comme  une  excuse 
pour  la  rupture  d'engagements  solennels;  mais  Son  Excellence  etait  dans  un  tel  etat  d' exci- 
tation, il  etait  si  evidemment  d^monte  parla  nouvelle  de  notre  action  et  si  peu  dispose  a 
entendre  raison  que  je  m'abstins  de  jeter  de  I'huile  siir  le  feu  en  argumentant  davantage. 
Comme  je  prenais  conge  de  lui,  il  a  dit  que  le  coup  que  la  Grande-Bretagne  portait  a 
I'AUemagne  en  s'unissant  a  ses  ennemis  etait  d'aufant  plus  violent  que  presque  jusqu'au 
dernier  moment  lui  £t  son  Gouvernement  avaient  travaille  avec  nous  et  appuye  nos  efforts 
en  vue  du  maintien  de  la  paix  entre  I'Autriche  et  la  Russie.  Je  repondis  que  c'etait  bien  ce 
qu'il  y  avait  de  tragique  que  de  voir  deux  nations  tomber  en  garde  precisemeht  au  moment 
ou  les  rapports  entre  elles  se  trouvaient  plus  amicaux  et  plus  cordiaux  qu'ils  ne  I'avaient 
ete  depuis  des  annees.  J'ai  ajoute  que,  par  malheur,  nonobstant  nos  efforts  pour  sauvegarder 
la  paix  entre  la  Russie  et  I'Autriche,  la  guerre  s'etait  propagee  et  nous  avait  mis  face  a  face 
avec  une  position  qu'il  nous  etait  impossible  d'esquiver  si  nous  tenions  nos  engagements » 
Documents  diplomatiques.  —  Guerre  europecnne.  ai 


—  194  — 
sitaatioQ  qui  malheureusemeni  impUquait  separation  d  aveo  nos  anciens  coilaborateups.  Xai 
termini  en,  disant  qu'il  n  aurait  point  de  difficult^  a  comprendfe  que  personne  ne.  le  regretr 
tait  plus  que  moi-mSme. 

Apres  cette  entrevue  plutdt  p6nible ,  je  suis  rentr^  k  TAmbassade  et  ai  r^dige  un  compte 
rendu  tel^graphique  de  ce  qui  s  etait  passe.  Ce  t^i^gramme  a  ete  remis  au  bureau  de  t6U- 
graphe  central  de  Berlin,  un  peu  avant  9  heures  du  spir.  II  a  ete  accepte  par  iedit  bureau, 
mais  semble  n'a voir  jamais  6t6  transnais. 

Vers  9  heures  et  demie  du  soir,  ie  Sous-Secretaire  d'Etat,  M,  de  Zinamermann,  est  venu 
me  voir.  Apres  avoir  exprime  son  profond  regret  que  ies  rapports  officiels  et  personnels,  si 
cordiaux  entre  nous ,  fussent  sur  le  point  de  cesser,  il  me  demanda  incidemment  si  la 
demande  de  mes  passeports  6quivaudrait  k  une  declaration  de  guerre,  Je  lui  ai  dit  quune 
personne  faisant  aussi  notoirement  que  lui  autorit^  en  matiere  de  droit  international  devait 
savoir  aussi  bien  ou  mieux  que  moi  quelle  6tail  la  coutume  en  pareil  cas.  J'ai  ajoute  qu  il  y 
avail  des  exemples  nombreux  oh.  ia  rupture  des  rapports  diplomatiques  n  avait  point  6t6 
suiviede  guerre;  mais  que  dans  le  cas  aclael  il  avait  sans  doute  vu  d'apres  rues  instructions , 
dont  j'avais  donnS  un  r6sume  par  ecrit  kM-  de  Jagow,  que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste 
britannique  s'altendait  k  une  r6ponse  k  une  question  d^finie  ce  soir  avant  minuit  et  qu*^ 
d6faut  de  r^ponse  satisfaisante  Iedit  Gouvernement  se  verrait  forc6  de  prendre  Ies  mesui^es 
necessities  par  ses  engagements.  M.  de  Zimmermann  declara  que  cela  etait,  de  fait,  une 
declaration  de  guerre,  ^tant  donn6  quil  ^tait  de  toute  impossibility  pour  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  de  donner  ies  assurances  requises  ni  ce  soir,  ni  aucun  autre  soir. 

£.  GoscBEN. 


—   195  — 


Annexe  IV. 


Extraitfi  du  nlivre  Gris»  indiquant  les  conditions  dans  lesquelles  I'AIlemagne 
a  viole  la  neutrality  beige. 


r  2. 


Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres, 
aux  Ministres  du  Roi  a  Paris,  Berlin,  Vienne,  Londres  et  Saint-Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  24  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre  , 

Le  Gouvernement  duRoi  s'esl  demands  si,  dans  les  circonstances  actuelles,  il  n'y  aurait 
pas  lieu  dadresser  aux  Puissances,  qui  ont  garanti  son  independance  et  sa  neutrality,  une 
connmunicalion  destin^e  a  leur  confirmer  sa  resolution  de  remplir  les  devoirs  intern ationaux 
que  lui  imposent  les  trait^s  au  cas  ou.  une  guerre  viendrait  h  eclater  aux  fronti^res  de  la 
Belgique. 

H  a  et6  amene  a  la  conclusion  qu'une  telle  communication  serait  premaluree  k  I'heure 
presente  mais  que  les  evenements  poiirraient  se  precipiter  et  ne  point  lui  laisser  le  temps 
de  faire  parvenir,  au  moment  voulu,  les  instructions  opportunes  a  ses  repr^senlants  a 
letranger. 

Dans  cette  situation ,  j'ai  propose  au  Roi  et  a  mes  collegues  du  Cabinet ,  qui  se  sont  rallies 
a  ma  maciere  de  voir,  de  vous  donncr,  des  a  present,  des  indications  precises  sur  la 
demarche  que  vous  auriez.  a  faire  si  T^ventualite  d'une  guerre  franco-allemande  devenait 
plus  menaQante. 

Vous  trouverez,  sous  ce  pli,  une  lettre  signee,  mais  non  datee,  dont  vous  aurez  a  donner 
lecture  et  a  laisser  copie  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  si  les  circonstances  exigent 
cette  communication. 

Je  vous  indiquerai  par  telegramme  le  moment  d'agir. 

Le  telegramme  vous  sera  adresse  a  I'heure  oii  la  mobilisation  de  Tarm^e  beige  sera 
decretee,  si,  contrairement  a  notre  sincere  espoir,  et  aux  apparences  de  solution  pacifique, 
nos  renseignements  nous  amenaient  a  prendre  cette  mesure  extreme  de  precaution. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc, 

Davignon, 


Annexe  au  n'  2. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

La  situation  internationale  est  grave;  I'eventualite  d'un  conflit  entre  plusieurs  Puissances  ne 
peut  ^tre  ecartee  des  preoccupations  du  Gouvernement  du  Roi. 

La   Belgique  a  observe  avec  la  plus  scrupuleuse  exactitude  les  devoirs  d'Etat  neutre  que  lui 

aS. 


-—  196  -- 

imposent  les  traites  du  19  avril  1889.  Ces  devoirs,  elle  s'attachera  inebranlablement  A  les  remplir, 
quelles  que  soient  les  circonstances. 

Les  dispositions  amicales  des  Puissances  k  son  egard  ont  ^te  affirm^es  si  souvent  que  la  Belgique 
a  la  confiance  de  voir  son  territoire  demeurer  hora  de  toute  atteinte  si  des  hostilites  venaient  a  se 
produire  a  ses  frontieres. 

Toutes  les  mesures  necessaires  pour  assurer  Tobservation  de  sa  neutrality  n'en  ont  pas  moins 
6te  prises  par  le  Gouvernement  du  Roi.  L'armee  beige  est  mobilisee  et  se  porte  sur  les  positions 
strategiques  choisies  pour  assurer  la  defense  du  pays  et  le  respect  de  sa  neutrality.  Les  forts 
d'Anvers  et  de  la  Meuse  sont  en  etat  de  defense. 

II  est  a  peine  necessaire ,  Monsieur  le  Ministre ,  d'insister  sur  le  caractere  de  ces  mesures.  EUes 
n'ont  d'autre  but  que  de  mettre  la  Belgique  en  situation  de  remplir  ses  obligations  internationales; 
elles  ne  sont  et  n'ont  pu  etre  inspir^es,  cela  va  de  soi,  ni  par  ie  dessein  de  prendre  part  a  una 
lutte  armee  des  Puissances,  ni  par  un  sentiment  de  deGanorenvers  aucune  d'elles. 

Me  conformant  aux  ordres  requs,  j'ai  I'honneur  de  remettre  a  Votre  Excellence  une  copie  de  la 
declaration  du  Gouvernement  du  Roi  et  de  La  prier  de  bien  vouloir  en  prendre  acta. 

Une  communication  identique  a  et^  faite  aux  autres  Puissances  garantes  de  ia  neutralite  beige. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 


N''  8. 

Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangSres,  aupc  Ministres  da 
Roi  a  Berlin,  Paris,  Londres,  Vienne,  Saint -Petersbourg,  Rome,  La  Haye, 
Luxembourg. 

Bruxelies,  le  29  juiliet  i9i4> 

MONSIEDR  LE  MiNISTRE, 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  a  d^cid^  de  mettre  l'armee  sur  ie  pied  de  paix  renforc^. 

Cette  mesure  ne  doit  6tre  en  aucune  fa9on  confondue  avec  la  mobilisation. 

A  cause  da  peu  d'etendue  de  son  territoire ,  la  Belgique  tout  entiere  constitue  en  quelque 
sorte  une  zone  frontiere.  Son  arm^e,  sur  le  pied  de  paix  ordinaire,  ne  comporte  qu'une 
classe  de  milice  sous  les  armes.  Sur  le  pied  de  paix  renforce,  ses  divisions  d'arm6e  et  sa 
division  de  cavalerie,  grace  au  rappel  de  trois  classes  ont  des  effectifs  analogues  k  ceux  (des 
corps  entretenus  en  permanence  dans  les  zones  frontieres  des  Puissances  voisines. 

Ces  renseignements  vous  permettraient  de  r^pondre  aux  questions  qui  pourrslient  vous 
«tre  poshes. 


1 


Veuiliez  agreer,  etc 


Davignon. 


r  9. 

Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  eirangeres,  aux  Ministres  da 
Roi  a  Berlin ,  Paris  et  Londres. 

Bruxelies,  ie  3i  juiliet  1914. 
Monsieur  LE  Ministre, 

M.  le  Ministre  de  France  etant  venu  me  montrer  un  t616gramme  de  I'Agence  Havas, 
d^cr^tant  i'6tat  de  guerre  en  Ailemagne,  m'a  dit :  « Je  profile  de  cette  occasion  pour  vous 


—  197  — 
declarer  qu*aucune  incursion  des  troupes  frangaises  n'aura  lieu  en  Belgique,  inSme  si  des 
forces  importantes  6taient  mass^es  sur  ies  fronti^res  de  votre  pays.  La  France  ne  veut  pas 
avoir  la  responsabilit6  d'accomplir,  vis-k-vis  de  la  Belgique ,  le  premier  acle  d*hostilite.  Des 
instructions  dans  ce  sens  seront  donn^es  aux  autorit^s  franQaises.  » 

J'ai  remercie  M.  Klobukowski  de  sa  communication  et  j  ai  cru  devoir  lui  faire  remarquer 
que  nous  avions  toujours  eu  la  plus  grande  confiance  dans  la  loyaute  que  nos  deux  Etats 
voisins  mettraient  a  tenir  leurs  engagements  h  notre  6gard.  Nous  avons  aussi  tout  lieu  de 
croire  que  I'attitude  du  Gouvernement  allemand  sera  idenlique  k  celle  du  Gouvernement 
de  la  Republique  fran9aise. 

Veuiilez  agreer,  etc. 

Dayignon. 


r  11. 


LettAe  adressie  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  dtrangkres,  aux  Ministres  du 
Roi  a  Berlin,  Londres  et  Paris* 

Bruxelies ,  le  3 1  juiilet  1 9 1 4r 
MoNsiBUR  LE  Ministre, 

Le  Ministre  d'Angleterre  a  demands  a  me  voir  d'urgence  et  m'a  fait  la  communication 
suivante,  qu'il  souhaitait  etre  i  mdme  de  m'exposer  depuis  plusieurs  jours.  En  raison  de  la 
possibility  dune  guerre  europ6enne,  sir  Edward  Grey  a  demands  aux  Gouvernements  fran- 
9ais  et  allemand,  s6par6ment,  si  chacun  deux  4tait  pr^t  k  respecter  la  neutrality  de  la  Bel- 
gique pourvu  qu'aucune  Puissance  ne  la  viole. 

«  Vu  Ies  trait^s  qui  existent,  je  suis  cbarg6  d'informer  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  6trangeres 
de  Belgique  de  ce  qui  precede  et  de  dire  que  Sir  Edward  Grey  presume  que  la  Belgique  fera 
tout  son  possible  pour  maintenir  sa  neutrality  et  quelle  desire  et  s'attend  k  ce  que  Ies  autres 
Puissances  I'observent  et  la  maintiennenl. » 

Je  me  suis  empress^  de  remercier  Sir  Francis  Villiers  de  cette  communication  que  le 
Gouvernement  beige  appr^cie  particuli^rement  et  j'ai  ajout^  que  la  Grande-Bretagne  et  Ies 
autres  nations  garantes  de  notre  ind^pendance  pouvaient  6tre  assur^es  que  nous  ne  neglige- 
rions  aucun  effort  pour  maintenir  notre  neutralite,  et  que  nous  ^tions  convaincus  que  Ies 
autres  Puissances ,  vu  Ies  exoellents  rapports  d'amiti^  et  de  confiance,  que  nous  avions  tou- 
joiirs  entretenus  avec  elles^  observeraient  et  maintiendraient  cette  neutrality. 

Je  n'ai  pas  manqu6  d'affirmer  que  nos  forces  militaires ,  corisid^rablement  developp^es  k 
la  suite  de  notre  reorganisation  recente,  ^taient  a  m^me  de  nous  permettre  denous  d^fendre 
^ergiquement  en  cas  de  violation  de  noire  territoire* 

Au  cours  de  la  conversation  qui  a  suivi ,  3ir  Francis  m'a  paru  un  peu  surpris  de  la  rapidity 
avec  laquelie  nous  avions  d6cid6  la  mobilisation  de  notre  arm^e.  J'ai  fait  remarquer  que  Ies 
Pays-Bas  avaient  pris  une  resolution  identique  avant  nous  et  que  d'autre,  part  la  date  recente 
de  notre  nouveau  regime  militaire  et  Ies  mesures  transitoires  que  nous  avions  du  decider  k 
cette  occasion  nous  imposaient  des  mesures  urgentes  et  completes.  Nos  voisins  et  garants 
devaient  voir  dans  cette  resolution  le  d^sir  de  manifester  notr^  profonde  volonte  de  mainr 
tenir  nous-m^mes  notre  neutrality. 


—  198  — 
Sir  Francis  ma  pani  satisfait  de  ma  r^ponse  et  m'a  annonc^  que  son  Gouvernement 
atlendait  cette  reponse  pour  continuerles  n6gociations  avec  la  France  et  TAllemagne,  nego- 
ciations  dont  la  conclusion  me  serait  commmiiqu^e. 

Veuiilez  agreer,  etc.   ' 

Davignon. 


r  12. 


Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Minislre  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  aux  Ministres  da 
Roi  a  Berlin,  Londres  et  Paris. 

Bmxeiles,  le  3i  juiUet  1914. 
Monsieur  ie  Ministre, 

Ce  matin,  au  cours  dune  conversation  que  le  Secretaire  general  de  mon  departementa 
eue  avec  M.  de  Bulow,  il  a  explique  au  Ministre  d'Allemagne  la  portee  des  mesures  miii- 
taires  que  nous  avons  prises  et  lui  a  dit  qu'elles  6taieht  une  consequence  de  notre  volonte 
d'accomplir  nos  obligations  internationales,  qu'elles  n'impliquaient  en  aucune  fa9on  une  atti- 
tude de  defiance  envers  nos  voisins. 

Le  Secretaire  general  a  demands  ensuite  au  Ministre  d'Allemagne  s'il  avait  connaissance 
de  la  conversation  qu'il  avait  eue  avec  son  predecesseur,  M.  de  Flotow,  et  de  la  reponse  que 
le  Chancelier  de  I'Empire  avait  charge  ceiui-ci  de  lui  faire. 

Au  cours  de  la  polemique  soulevee  en  1911  par  le  depot  du  projet  hoilandais  concernant 
les  fortifications  de  Flessingue,  certains  journaux  avaient  affirme  qu'en  cas  de  guerre  franco- 
allemande,  notre  neutrality  serait  violee  par  i'Allemagne. 

Le  departement  des  Afifaires  ^trangeres  avait  suggere  i'idee  qu'une  declaration  faite  au 
Parlement  allemand  a  I'occasion  d'un  debat  sur  la  politique  etrangere  serait  de  nature  k 
apaiser  I'opinion  publique  et  a  calmer  ses  defiances,  si  regrettables  au  point  de  vue  des  rela- 
tions des  deux  pays. 

M.  de  Bethman-Holweg  fit  repondre  qu'il  avait  ^t^  tres  sensible  aux  sentiments  qui  avaient 
inspire  notre  demarche.  11  declarait  que  I'Allemagne  n'avait  pas  I'intention  de  violer  notre 
neutralite,  mais il estimait  qu'en  faisant  publiquement  une  declaration,  TAllemagne  affaibli- 
rait  sa  situation  militaire  vis-i-vis  de  la  France  qui,  rassuree  du  cot^  du  Nord,  porterait 
toutes  ses  forces  du  cot^  de  I'Est. 

Le  baron  ven  der  Der  Elst,  poursuivant,  dit  qu'il  comprenait  parfaitement  les  objections 
qu'av^dent  faites  M.  de  Bethman-Holweg  a  la  declaration  pubhque  sugg^r^e  et  il  rappela  que 
depuis  lors  en  igiS,  M.  de  Jagow  avait  fa\t,  ki  la  Commission  du  budget  du  Reichstag,  des 
declarations  rassurantes  quant  au  respect  de  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique. 

M.  de  Bulow  repondit  qu'il  etait  au  courant  de  la  conversation  avecM.  de  Flotow  et  qu'il 
etait  certain  que  les  sentiments  exprimes  a  cette  ^poque  n'avaient  pas  chang^. 

Veuiilez  agreer,  etc* 

Davignon. 


-^  199 


Annbxb  AUN*  12. 

Lettbe  adressie  par  le  MinisUe  du  Ibi  d.  Berlin  d  Af.  Davignm,  Ministre  des  Ajfairei 
etrangeres.  • 

Berlin  lea  mai  191$ 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  rhonneur  de  vou^  faire  connaitre,  d'apr^  Tofficieuse  Norddeatsche  Allgemeine  Zeitang,  les 
<lecIarations  faites  au  cours  de  la  seance  du  29  avril  de  la  Commission  du  budget  du  Reichstag , 
par  le  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  Etrang^res  et  le  Ministre  de  la  Guerre,  relativement  a  la  neu- 
traiite  de  la  Belgique. 

u  Un  membre  du  parti  sociai-d6mocrate  dit  : « En  Belgique  on  voit  avec  appreheasipn  s'approcher 
^lune  guerre  franco-allemande,  car  on  craint  que  TAllemagne  ne  respectera  pas  ia  neutralite  de  la 
«  Belgique ». 

.M.  de  Jagow,  Secretaire  d'Etat  aux  Affaires  etrangeres  r^pondit :  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique 
west  determinee  par  des  conventions  internationales  etTAllemagne  est  decidee  a  respecter  ces  con- 
«ventions. 

« Cette  declaration  ne  satisfit  pas  un  autre  membre  du  parti  social-democrate.  M.  de  Jagow 
rt  observa  qu'il  n'avait  rien  a  ajouter  aux  paroles  claii  es  qu'il  avait  prononcees  relativement  aux  rela- 
u  tions  de  TAllemagne  avec  la  Belgique. 

u  A  de  nouvelles  interrogations  d'un  membre  du  parti  social-democrate,  M.  de  Heeringen , 
« Ministre  de  la  Guerre,  repondit  :  la  Belgique  ne  joue  aucun  rdle  dans  la  justification  du  projet  de 
«  reorganisation  militaire  allemand ;  celui-ci  se  trouve  justifie  par  la  situation  en  Orient.  L'Alle- 
«  magne  ne  perdra  pas  de  vue  que  la  neutralite  beige  est  garantie  par  les  traites  internationaux  ». 

« Un  membre  du  parti  progressiste  ayant  encore  parle  de  la  Belgique,  M.  de  Jagow  fit  remarquer 
a  nouveau  que  sa  declaration  concernant  la  Belgique  etait  suffisamraenf  claire. » 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

Baron  Beybns. 


r  13. 

TiLEGRAMME    odressc    par  le  Comte  de   Lalaing,    Ministre   du   Roi  a  Londres,   a 
M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  dtrangeres. 

Londres,  1"  aoiit  191/i. 

L'Angleterre  a  demands  separement  k  la  France  et  k  i'Allemagne  si  eUes  respecteraient  ie 
territoire  de  la  Belgique  dans  le  cas  oii  leur  adversaire  ne  la  vioierait  pas.  On  attend  la 
reponse  dlemande.  La  France  a  accepte. 


rf  14. 


TiiEGRAMMB  adrcssepor  le  Baron  Beyens,  Ministre  du  Roiy  a  Berlin,  a  Af.  Davignon, 
Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Berlin,  i"  aodt  1914. 

J-i'Ambassadeur  d'Angleterre  a  et6  charge  de  demander  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres 
si,  en  cas  de  guerre,  I'Allemagne  respecterait  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique  et  le  Ministre  aurait 
dit  qu'il  ne  pent  pas  repondre  a  cette  question. 


200  — 


r  15. 

Lettre  adressee  par  M*  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  dtranghes,  auxMinistres  da  Roi 

a  Berlin,  Paris  et  Londres. 

Bruxelles,  i"  aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  rhonneur  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  le  Ministre  de  France  m'a  fait  verbalement  la  com- 
munication suivante  : 

R  Je  suis  autorise  a  declarer  qu'en  cas  de  conflit  international,  le  Gouvernement  de  la 
B6publique,  ainsi  qu'il  Ta  toujours  d6clar6,  respectera  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique.  Dans 
I'hypothese  oil  cette  neutrality  ne  serait  pas  respect^e  par  une  autre  puissance ,  le  Gouver- 
nement francais,  pour  assurer  sa  propre  defense,  pourrait  etre  amen6  a  modifier  son  atti- 
ti^de». 

J'ai  remerci^  son  Excellence  et  ai  ajout6  que,  de  notre  cdt6,  nous  avions  pris  sans  aucun 
retard  toutes  les  mesures  voulues  pour  faire  respecter  notre  independance  et  nos  frontieres. 

VeuiUez  agr^er,  etc, . . 

Davignon. 


K  19. 


Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangires ,  auxMinistres  da  Roi 
a  Paris,  Berlin,  Londres,  Vienne  et  Saint-Petersboarg. 

Bruxelles,  le  2  aoiit  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'avais  eu  soin  de  faire  avertir  par  M.  de  Bassompierre  le  Ministre  d'AlIemagne,  qu'un 
communique  de  M.  Klobukowski ,  Ministre  de  France,  a  la  presse  bruxelloise,  annoncerait 
la  declaration  formelle  que  ce  dernier  m'avait  laite  le  i*  aout.  Rencuntrant  M.  de  Bulow, 
ce  dernier  m'a  remerci6  de  cette  attention  et  a  ajout^  que,  jusqu'k  present,  il  n'avait  pas  et6 
charg^  de  nous  faire  une  communication  ofBcieile,  mais  que  nous  connaissions  son  opinion 
personnelle  sur  la  securite  avec  laquelie  nous  avions  le  droit  de  consid^rer  nos  voisins  de 
l^Est.  J'ai  imm^dialement  r^pondu  que  tout  ce  que  nous  connaissions  des  intentions  de 
ceux-ci,  intentions  indiqu^es  dans  les  multiples  entretiens  anterieurs,  ne  nous  permettait  pas 
de  douter  de  leur  parfaite  correction  vis-a-vis  de  la  Belgique ;  je  tenais  cependant  a  ajouter 
que  nous.altacherions  le  plus  grand  prix  a  ^tre  en  possession  d'une  declaration  formelle 
dont  la  nation  prendrait  connaissance  avec  joie  et  reconnaissance. 

VeuiUez  agr6er,  etc. . . 

Davignon. 


201 


r  20. 

Note  remise  le  2.  aout,  &  19  heures,  par  M.  de  Belom  Saleske,  Ministre  HAUemagne, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangires, 

Bruxeiles,,  2  aoAt  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  aUemand  a  re9u  des  nouveUes  sures  d  apres  lesquelles  les  forces  fran- 
^aises  auraient  I'mtention  de  marcher  sur  la  Mease  par  Givet  et  Namur.  Ces  nouvelles  ne 
laissent  aucun  doute  sur  i'intention  de  la  France  de  marcher  sur  TAUemagne  par  le  terri- 
toire  beige.  Le  Gouvernement  imperial  allemand  ne  peut  s'empecher  de  craindre  que  la 
Belgique,  malgr6  sa  meilleure  volont^,  ne  sera  pas  en  mesure  de  repousser  sans  secours 
une  marche  frangaise  dun  si  grand  d^veloppement.  Dans  ce  fait,  on  trouve|Une  certitude 
suffisante  d'une  menace  dirigee  contre  I'AUemagne. 

C'est  un  devoir  imperieux  de  conservation  pour  i'AJlemagne  de  prSvenir  cette  attaque  de 
fennemi. 

Le  Gouvernement  allemand  regretterait  tres  vivement  que  la  Belgique  regardat  comme 
un  acte  d'hostilit6  contre  elle  le  fait  que  les  mesures  des  ennemis  de  TAllemagne  I'obligent  de 
violer  de  son  c6t6  1^  territoire  beige. 

Afin  de  dissiper  tout  malentendu,  le  Gouvernement  allemand  declare  ce  qui  suit : 

L  L'AUemagne  n  a  en  vue  aucun  acte  d'hostilit6  contre  la  Belgique.  Si  la  Belgique 
consent,  dans  la  guerre  qui  va  commencer,  k  prendre  une  attitude  de  neutrality  amicale  vis- 
a-vis  de  rAUeifaagne,  le  Gouvernement  allemand  de  son  cote  s  engage,  au  moment  de  la 
paix,  a  garantir  le  royaume  et  ses  possessions  dans  toute  leur  etendue. 

IL  L'AUemagne  s engage,  sous  la  condition  ^noncle,  k  evacuerJe  tercitDire  beige  aussitot 
ia  paix  conclue. 

III.  Si  la  Belgique  observe  une  attitude  amicale,  I'AUemagne  est  pr^te,  d'accord  avec  les 
autorit^s  du  Gouvernement  beige  a  acheter  contre  argent  comptant  tout  ce  qui  est  n^cessaire 
k  ses  troupes  et  a  indemniser  pour  les  dommages  causes  en  Belgique. 

IV.  Si  la  Belgique  se  comporte  d'une  fa9on  hostile  contre  les  troupes  allemandes  et  partir 
culierement  fait  des  difficult^s  a  leur  marche  en  avant  par  une  opposition  de  fortifications 
de  la  Meuse  ou  par  des  destructions  de  routes ,  de  chemins  de  fer,  tunnels  ou  autres  ouvrages 
d'art,  I'Allemagne  sera  obligee  de  consid^rer  la  Belgique  en  ennemie. 

Dans  ce  cas,  I'Allemagne  ne  prendra  aucun  engagement  vis-a-vis  du  royaume,  mais  elle 
laissera  le  reglement  ult^rieur  des  rapports  des  deux  jfitats  Vun  vis-a-vis  de  I'autre  k  la 
decision  des  armes.  Le  Gouvernement  allemand  a  fespoir  justifi^  que  cette  eventuality  ne 
se  produira  pas  et  que  le  Gouvernement  beige  saura  prendre  les  mesures  appropri^es  pour 
I'emp^cher  de  se  produire.  Dans  ce  cas,  les  relations  d'amitid  qui  unlssent  ies  deux  Etats 
voisins  deviendront  plus  etroites  et  durables. 


DoccMENTs  MPLOMATiQBBs.  —  Guerre  earopeenoe. 


L 


—  202  — 


N"  22. 

^OTE  remise  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  itrangeres,  iiM,de  Below  Saleske, 

Ministre  ctAllemagne. 

Broxelles,  le  3  aoM  igiA  (7  heures  du  matin). 

Par  sa  note  du  a  aout  19 1 4,  le  Gouvemement  ailemand  a  fait  connaitre  que  d apres  des 
nouvelles  sures ,  les  forces  fran9aises  auraient  rintention  de  mardher  sur  la  Meuse  par  Givet 
et  Namur,  et  que  la  Beigique ,  maJgr6  sa  meiiieure  volonte ,  ne  serait  pas  en  etat  de  repousser 
sans  secours  une  marche  en  avant  des  troupes  francaises. 

Le  Gouvemement  ailemand  s'estimerait  dans  Tobligation  de  pr^venir  cette  attaqtie  et  de 
violer  le  territoire  beige.  Dans  ces  conditions,  I'Allemagne  propose  au  Gouvemement  du 
Roi  de  prendre  vis-^-vis  d'elle  une  attitude  amicale  et  s'engage  au  moment  de  la  paix  a 
garantir  I'int^grite  du  Royaume  et  de  ses  possessions  dans  toute  leur  etendue.  La  note  ajoute 
que  si  la  Beigique  fait  des  difficultes  k  la  marche  en  avant  des  troupes  allemandes,  I'Alle- 
magne sera  obligee  de  la  considerer  comme  ennemie  et  de  laisser  le  reglement  ulterieur  des 
deux  Etats  Tun  vis-^-vis  de  I'autre  a  la  decision  des  armes.  "* 

C^tte  note  a  provoque  chez  le  .Gouvemement  du  Roi  un  profond  et  douloureux  etonne^- 
jnent. 

Les  intentions  qu'elle  attribue  a  la  France  sont  en  contradiction  avec  les  declarations  for- 
melles  qui  nous  ont  6t6  faites  le  i*  aout,  au  nom  du  Gouvemement  de  la  R^publique. 

D'ailleurs  si  contrairement  a  notre  attente  une  violation  de  la  neutrality  beige  venait  h  etre 
commise  par  la  France,  la  Beigique  remplirait  tous  ses  devoirs  internationaux  et  son  armee 
opposerait  a  I'envabisseur  la  plus  vigoureuse  resistance. 

Les  traites  de  1839  confirm^s  par  les  traites  de  1870  consacrent  Imdependance  et  la 
neutralite  de  la  Beigique  sous  la  garantie  des  Puissances  et  notamment  du  Gouvemement  de 
Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  de  Prasse. 

La  Beigique  a  toujours  ^te  fidele  2i  ses  obligations  intemationales;  elles  a  accompli  ses 
devoirs  dans  un  esprit  de  loyale  impartiality ;  elle  n'a  neglige  aucuo  effort  pour  mainteriir 
ou  faire  respecter  sa  neutrality, 

L'atteinte  a  son  independance  dont  la  menace  du  Gouvemement  constituerait  une  fla- 
grante violation  du  droit  des  gens.  Aucah  iriter^t  strat^gique  ne  justifie  la  violatioli  du 
droit. 

Le  Gouvemement  beige  en  acceptant  les  propositions  qui  lui  iont  notifi^es  sacrifierait 
ITionneur  de  la  nation  en  meme  temps  qu'il  trahirait  ses  devoirs  vis-a-vis  de  I'Europe. 

Conscient  du  role  que  la  Beigique  joue  depuis  plus  de  quatre-vingts  ans  dans  la  civi- 
lisation du  monde,  il  se  refuse  k  croire'  que  I'independance  de  la  Beigique  ne  puisse  6tre 
conserv^e  qu*au  prix  de  la  violation  de  sa  neutralite. 

Si  cetespoir  ^tait  decu,le  Gouvemement  beige  est  fermement  d^cidd  a  repousser  par  tons 
les  moyens  en  son  pouvoir  toute  atteinle  a  son  droit, 

Davignon* 


—  203  — 


N**  27. 


Lettre  adressde  par  M,  de-  Below  Saleske,  Ministre  ^Allemagn$,  &  M,  Davignon^ 
Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  (L'originai  est  en  firancals). 

Bruxdles,  le  4  aodt  igiii  (6  heures  dumatin). 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J*ai  eti  charg^  et  j'ai  ITionneur  dmformer  Votre  Excdlencfe  que  par  suite  du  refus  oppose 
par  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majest6  le  Roi  aux  propositions  bien  intentionn^es  que  lui  avait 
soumises  le  Gouvernement  imperial,  celui-ci  se  verra,  h.  son  plus  vif  regret,  forc6  dex^cuter 
—7-  au  besoin  par  la  force  des  armes  —  les  mesures  de  sdcurite  expos^es  comme  indispea*; 
sables  vis-k-vis  des  menaces  j&*an9aises. 

Veuillez  agr^er,  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  les  assurances  de  ma  haute  consideration. 

von  Bfitow. 


r  28. 


Note  remise  par  Sir  Francis  H.  Villiers,  Ministre  d'Angleterre,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Bruxelles,  le  H  aoClt  igi^ 

Je  suis  charg^  d'informer  le  Gouvernement  beige  que  si  I'Allemagne  exerce  une  pression. 
dans  le  but  d'obliger  la  Belgique  a  abandonner  son  r61e  de  pays  neutre,  le  Gouvernement 
de  Sa  Majeste  britannique  s'attend  a  ce  que  la  Belgique  r^siste  par  tous  les  moyens 
possibles. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majest6  britannique,  dans  ce  cas,  est  pr^t  a  se  joindre  a  la  Russie 
et  h  la  France,  si  la  Belgique  le  desire,  pour  ofirir  au  Gouvernement  beige,  sans  delai,  une 
action  commune,  qui  aurait  comme  but  de  resister  aux  mesures  de  force  employees  par 
I'Allemagne  contre  la  Belgique  et  en  meme  temps  d'offrir  une  garantie  pour  maintenir  I'in- 
d^pendance  et  I'integrite  de  la  Belgique  dans  I'avenir. 

Sir  Francis  H.  Villiers. 


N°  30, 


TiiiGRAMM^  adresse  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangdres,  aux  Ministres 
dtt  Roi  a  Londres  et  k  Paris. 

Brnxelles,  le  4  aodt  1914. 

L'Etat-Major  fait  savoir  que  le  territoire  national  a  iih  viole  a  Gemmenich. 

Davignon. 

>6. 


204  — 


r  3i< 


Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  a  M.  de  Below 
Saleske,  Ministre  d'AUemagne. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aout  1914. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre  , 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  faire  savoir  k  Votre  Excellence  que  des  aujburd'hui  le  Gouvernement  du 
Roi  ne  saurait  plus  Lui  reconnaitre  de  caract^re  diplomatique  et  cesse  d'avoir  des  relations 
oflicielies  avec  Elle.  Votre  Excellence  trouvera  sous  ce  pli  ies  passeports  qui  sont  nedessaires 
^  son  depart  et  a  celui  du  personnel  de  la  Legation. 

Je  saisis,  etc. 

Davignon. 


r  35. 


Lettre  adressee  par  le  Ministre  de  Belgique  a  Berlin  a  M.  I)avignon,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  etrangeres. 

Berlin,  4  aout  1914. 

MONSIEDR  LE  MiNISTRE, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  faire  parvenir,  ci-apres  en  traduction ,  la  partie  du  discours  pro- 
nonc6  aujourd'hui  a  la  tribune  du  Reichstag  par  le  Chancelier  de  I'Empire  et  relative  k 
I'odieuse  violation  de  notre  neutrality  : 

« Nous  nous  trouvons  en  etat  de  legitime  defense  et  la  necessity  ne  connait  pas  de  lois. 

«Nos  troupes  ont  occup6  Luxembourg  H  ont,  peut-etre,  deja  penetre  en  Belgique.  Cela 
est  en  contradiction  avec  Ies  prescriptions  du  droit  des  gens.  La  France  a,  il  est  vrai,  declard 
4  Bruxelles  qu'elle  ^tait  r^solue  a  respecter  la  neutrality  de  la  Belgique  aussi  longtemps  que 
I'adversaire  la  respecterait.  Mais  nous  savions  que  la  France  se  tenait  prete  pour  envahir  la 
Belgique.  La  France  pouvait  attendre.  Nous,  pas.  Une  attaque  francaise  sur  notre  flaiic 
dans  la  region  du  Rhin  inferieur  aurait  pu  devenir  fatale.  C'est  ainsi  que  nous  avons  ^le 
forces  de  passer  outre  aux  protestations  justifiees  des  Gouvernements  Luxembourgeois  et 
Beige.  L'injustice  que  nous  commettons  de  cette  facon ,  nous  la  reparerons  des  que  notre 
but  mililaire  sera  alteint. 

«  A  celui  qui  est  mehac^  au  point  oil  nous  le  sommes  et  qui  lutte  pour  son  bien  supreme, 
il  nest  permis  que  de  songer  au  moyen  de  se  d^ager;  nous  nous  trouvons  cote  k  cote  avec 
VAutriche.  » 

II  est  i  remarquer  que  M.  de  Bethmann-Hollvveg  reconndit,  sans  le  moindre  detour,  que 
I'AUemagne  viole  le  droit  international  en  envahissant  le  territoire  beige  et  qu'elle  comraet 
une  injustice  k  tiotre  6gard.. 

Yeuillez  agr^er,  etc. 

Baron  Beyens. 


205  — 


r  39. 


Telegramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  du  Roi  a  Londres  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  etrangires. 

Londres,  A  aout  19 14. 

L'Angleterre  a  somm6  ce  malin  rAIIemagne  de  respecter  la  neutrality  beige.  L'ultiinatum 
dit  que,  vu  la  note  adressee  par  TAllemagne  a  la  Belgique,  menacant  cette  derniere  de  la 
force  des  armes  si  elle  s'oppose  au  passage  de  ses  troupes;  vu  la  violation  du  territoire  beige 
a  Gemmenich;  vu  le  fait  que  TAllemagne  a  refuse  de  donner  a  I'Angleterre  la  meme-assu- 
rance  que  celle  donnee  la  semaine  derniere  par  la  France,  TAngleterre  doit  demander  k 
nouveau  una  reponse  satisfaisante  au  sujet  du  respect  de  la  neutrality  beige  et  d'un  traite 
,dont  I'Allemagne  est  signataire  aussi  bien  qu'elle-m^me.  L'ultimatum  expire  k  minuit. 

En  consequence  de  rultimatum  de  I'Angleterre  a  I'Allemagne,  la  proposition  anglaise 
que  je  vous  ai  transraise  par  telegramme  est  annul^e  pour  le  moment. 

Gomte  m  Lalajng. 


r  40. 

Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  aux  Minislres  de 
Grande-Brelagne ,  de  France  et  de  Russie. 

Bruxelles,  le  4  aoiit  191^. 
Monsieur  leJMinistre, 

Le  Gouvernement  Beige  a  le  regret  de  devoir  annoncer  a  Votre  Excellence  que,  ce 
matin,  les  forces  armies  de  I'Allemagne  ont  p^netr^  sur  le  territoire  beige,  en  violation  des 
engagements  qui  ont  6t6  pris  par  traite. 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  est  fermement  decide  a  r^sister  par  tous  les  moyens  en  son 
pouvbir. 

La  Belgique  fait  appel  a  I'Angleterre,  a  la  France  et  k  la  Russie  pour  coop^rer,  comme 
garantes,  k  la  defense  de  son  territoire. 

II  y  aurait  une  action  concertee  et  commune  ayant  pour  but  de  resister  aux  mesures  de 
force  employees  par  I'Allemagne  contre  la  Belgique  et  en  meme  temps  de  garantir  le  main- 
tien  de  I'ind^pendance  et  de  i'int^grite  de  la  Belgique  dans  I'avenir. 

La  Belgique  est  heureuse  de  pouvoir  declarer  quelle  assumera  la  defense  des  places 
fortes. 

Je  saisis,  etc» 

Davignon. 


—  206 


N'*  41. 


TiLicRAMME  adressipar  le  Ministre  da  Roi  a  Londres,  a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  del 

Affaires  elrangires. 

Londres,  5  aoAt  19 1^. 

L'Allemagne  ayant  rejele  les  propositions  anglaises,  I'Ang^eterre  lui  a  d^ciar^  que  I'^tat  de 
guerre  existait  entre  les  deux  pays,  a  partir  de  onze  heures. 

Gomte  o£  Lalmng. 


Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^tranghes,  aux  Chefs  de  mis- 
sion dans  ious  les  pays  entretenant  avec  la  Belgique  des  rapports  diplomatiques. 

Bruxeiles,  le  5  aout  19 id. 
Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

Par  le  traite  du  18  avril  1 83 9,  la  Prusse,  la  France,  rAngleterre,  I'Autriche  et  la  Russia 
se  sont  declarecs  garantes  du  traite  conclu  le  m^me  jour  entre  S.  M.  le  roi  des  Beiges  et 
S.  M.  le  roi  des  Pays-Bas.  Ce  traits  porte  :  «La  Belgique  formera  un  Elat  independant  et 
perp^tuellement  neutre  ».  La  Belgique  a  rempli  toutes  ses  obligations  internationales ,  elle  a 
accompli  ses  devoirs  dans  un  esprit  de  loyale  iinpartialil^,  elle  n*a  n6glig6  aucun  effort  pour 
maintenir  et  faire  respecter  sa  neutralite. 

Aussi  est-ce  avec  une  penible  Amotion  que  le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  a  appris  que  les 
forces  armies  de  I'AHemagne,  puissance  garante  de  notre  neutrality  ont  p6n6tr6  sur  ieterri- 
toire  de  la  Belgique  en  violation  des  engagements  qui  ont  et6  pris  par  traits. 

n  est  de  notre  devoir  de  protester  avec  indignation  centre  un  attentat  au  droit  des  gens 
qu  aucun  acte  de  notre  part  n'a  pu  provoquer. 

Le  Gouvernement  du  Roi  est  fermement  ddcidd  a  repousser  par  tous  les  moyens  en  son 
pouvoir  I'atteinte  port^e  a  sa  neutrality  et  il  rappelle  qu'en  vertu  de  I'article  10  de  k  Con- 
vention de  La  Haye  de  1 907  concernant  les  droits  et  les  devoirs  des  Puissances  et  des  per- 
sonnes  neutres  en  cas  de  guerre  sur  terre  ne  peut  6tre  consid^re  comme  un  acte  hostile 
le  fait,  par  une  puissance  neutre,  de  repousser  mSme  par  la  force  les  atteintes  a  sa  neu- 
tralite. 

Vous  voudrez  bien  demander  d'urgence  audience  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  et 
donner  lecture  k  Son  Excellence  de  la  presente  lettre  dont  vous  lui  laisserez  copie.  Si  f  au- 
dience ne  pouvait  vous  ^tre  imm^diatement  accord^e,  vous  ferez  par  6crit  la  communica- 
tion dont  il  sagit.  * 

Veuiliez  agreer,  etc. 

Davignon. 


207 


rr  48. 

Communication  faite   le  5  ao6,f  par  Sir  Francis   Villiers,   Ministre  ctAngh^erre, 
a  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  elrangeres. 

Je  suis  charge  d'informer  le  Gouvemement  Beige  que  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majesty 
britannique  considere  Taction  commune  dans  le  but  de  r^sister  a  TAUemagne  comme  6tant 
en  vigueur  et  justifi^e  par  le  traits  de  1 889. . 


r  52. 

Lettre  adressee  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  dfis  Affaires  dirangires,  aax  Ministres  da 
Roi  a  Paris,  Londres  et  Saint-Petersbourg. 

Bruxelles,  le  5  aodt  I9i4> 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 

J'ai  I'honneuT  de  vous  faire  savoir  que  les  Minislres  de  France  et  de  Russie  ont  fait  ce 
matin  une  demarche  aupr^s  de  moi  pour  me  faire  connaitre  la  volonte  de  leurs  Gouverne- 
ments  de  repondre  k  notre  appel  et  de  coop^rer  avec  TAngleterre  a  la  defense  de  notre 
territoire. 

Veuillez  agreer,  etc. 

Davignon. 


N''  60. 

Telegramme  adresse  par  le  Ministre  da  Roi  a  La  Haye  a  M.  Davignon,,  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Strangeres. 

La  Haye,  le  9  aout  1,9 14« 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  6trangeres  m'a  prie  de  vous  transmettre  les  informations  suivantes 
parce  que  le  Ministre  d'Amerique  k  Bruxelles  s  y  refuse. 

La  forteresse  de  Liege  a  ^t^  prise  d'assaut  apres  une  defense  courageuse.  Le  Gouverne- 
ment Allemand  regrette  tres  profond^ment ,  que  par  suite  de  I'attitude  du  Gouvernement 
Beige  centre  I'Allemagne,  on  en  est  arriv^  a  des  rencontres  sanglantes.  L'Allemagne  ne  vient 
pas  en  ennemie  en  Belgique,  c'est  seulement  par  la  force  des  evenements  quelle  a  du,  a 
cause  des  mesures  militaires  de  la  France,  prendre  la  grave  determination  d'entrer  en 
Belgique  et  d'occuper  Li6ge  comme  point  d'appui  pour  ses  operations  militaires  uit^rieures. 
Apres  que  I'arm^e  beige  a ,  par  sa  resistance  heroique  contre  une  grande  superiorite ,  main- 
teny  I'honneur  de  ses  armes,  le  Gouvernement  Allemand  prie  le  Roi  des  Beiges  et  le  Gou- 
vemement Beige  deviter  a  la  Belgique  les  horreurs  vdterieures  de'la  guerre.  Le  Gouverne- 
ment est  prSt  a  tous  accords  avec  la  Belgique  qui  peuvent  se  concilier  avec  son  conflit  avec 


I 


^  208  — 
la  France.  L'Allemagne  assure  encore  solennellement  qti*eile  n'a  pas  Hntention  de  s'appro- 
prier  le  territoire  beige  et  que  cette  intention  est  loin  d  elle.  L'Allemagne  est  toujours  prMe 
a  evacuer  la  Belglque  aussitot  que  I'etat  de  guerre  le  lui  permettra. 

L'Ambassadeur  des  Etats-Unis  avait  prie  son  collegue  de  se  charger  de  cette  tentative  de 
mediation.  Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  a  accepte  sans  enlhousiasme  cette  mission. 
Je  m'en  suis  charge  pour  lui  faire  plaisir. 

Baron  Fallon. 


N°  71. 


I 


Telegram  ME  adresse  par  M.  Davignon,  Ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  a  M.  le  baron 
Fallon,  Ministre  du  Roi  a  La  Eaye. 

Bruxelles,  le  12  aoiit  19 14. 

Priere  de  remettre  le  t^legramme  suivant  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  : «  La  propo- 
sition que  nous  fait  le  Gouvernement  Allemand  reproduit  la  proposition  qui  avait  etE  for- 
mulee  dans  rultimatum  du  2  aout.  Fidele  k  ses  devoirs  internationaux,  la  Beigique  ne  peut 
que  r^it^rer  sa  r^ponse  a  cet  ultimatum,  d'autant  plus  que  depuis  le  3  aout  sa  neutralite 
a  ete  violee,  qu'une  guerre  douloureuse  a  ete  port^e  sur  son  territoire  et  que  les  garants  de 
sa  neutrality  ont  ioyalement  et  imm^diatement  r^pondu  k  son  appel. » 

Davignon. 


—  209  ~ 

Annexe  V. 

T^l^grammes  ^changte  entre  rEmperenr  GuUlatime  n  et  rEmpereur  lYicolas  n. 
(Extraits  du  Livre  Blanc  allemand) 


L'Empereur  Guillaume 

k  I'Empereur  Nicolas. 

28  juillet  1914  (10  h.  ii5  du  soir.) 

C'est  avec  la  plus  vive  inquietude  que  j'ai  appris  I'impression  qua  produite  dans  ton  Em- 
pire ,  ia  marche  en  avant  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  centre  la  Serbie.  L'agitation  sans  scrupule 
qui  se  poursuit  depuis  des  ann^es  en  Serbie,  a  conduit  au  mcnstrueux  attentat  dont  I'Ar- 
chiduc  Francois-Ferdinand  a  6t6  la  victime.  L'6tat  d'esprit  qui  a  amen6  les  Serbes  a  assassiner 
leur  propre  roi  et  son  dpouse  regne  encore  dans  ce  pays.  Sans  dopte  conviendras-tu  avec 
raoi  que  tous  deux,  toi  aussi  bien  que  moi,  nous  avons,  comme  tous  les  souverains,  un 
interet  commun  a  insister  pour  que  ceux  qui  sont  moralement  responsables  de  ce  terrible 
meuitre  recoivent  le  chatiment  qu'ils  m^ritent. 

D'autre  part,  je  ne  me  dissimule  aucunement  combien  il  est  difficile  pour  toi  et  ton  Gou- 
vernement  de  resister  aux  manifestations  de  i 'opinion  publique.  En  souvenir  de  la  cordiale 
amitie  qui  nous  lie  tous  deux  ^troitement  depuis  longtemps,  j'use  de  toute  men  influence 
pour  decider  I'Autricbe-Hongrie  a  en  venir  k  une  entente  loyale  et  satisfaisante  avec  la  Russie. 
Je  compte  bien  que  tu  me  secourras  dans  mes  efibrt*  tendant  a  ^carter  toutes  les  difficult^s 
qui  pourraient  encore  s  elever. 

Ton  ami  et  cousin  tr^s  sincere  et  d^vou^ 

Guillaume. 


n 

L'Empereur  Nicolas 

a  TEmpereur  Guillaume. 

Palais  de  Peterhof,  le  29  juillet  1914  (1  heure  apr^s-midi.) 

Je  suis  heureux  que  tu  sois  rentr6  en  Allemagne.  En  ce  moment  si  grave,  je  te  prie 
instamment  de  venir  a  mon  aide.  Une  guerre  honteuse  a  ^t^  declar^e  a  une  laible  nation ;  je 
partage  enli^rement  I'indignation ,  qui  est  immense  en  Russie. 

Je  pr^vois  que  tres  prochainement  je  ne  pourrai  plus  longtemps  resister  a  ia  pression  qui 
est  exerc6e  sur  moi  et  que  je  serai  force  de  prendre  des  mesures  qui  conduiront  a  la  guerre. 

Pour  pr^venir  le  malheur  que  serait  une  guerre  europ^enne,  je  te  prie,  au  nom  da 
notre  vieille  amiti6 ,  de  faire  tout  ce  qui  te  sera  possible  pour  empecher  ton  alli^e  d  aller 
trop  loin. 

Nicolas 


DocmoDiTS  piPLOMAnQOBs.  —  Guerre  europ^nne.. 


-  210  — 

m 


29  juillet  1914  (6  h.  3o  du  sofr.) 
L'Empereur  Guillaume 

a  I'Empereur  Nicolas. 

J'ai  recu  ton  telegramme  et  partage  ton  desir  de  maintenir  la  paix. 

Cependant,  je  ne  puis,  ainsi  que  je  le  disais  dans  mon  premier  telegramme,  considerer  la 
marche  en  avant  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  comme  « une  guerre  honteuse ».  L'Autriche-Hongrie 
sail  par  experience  qu'on  ne  peut  absolument  pas  se  fier  aux  promesses  de  la  Serbie  taut 
qu'elles  n'existent  que  sur  le  papier. 

A  mon  aVis ,  la  conduite  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  doit  6tre  consider^e  comme  une  tentative 
d'obtenir  toule  garantie  que  les  promesses  de  la  Serbie  seront  executees  aussi  en  fait.  La 
declaration  du  cabinet  autricbien  me  fortifie  dans  mon  opinion  que  rAutriche-Hongrie  ne 
vise  a  aucune  acquisition  territoriale  au  detriment  de  la  Serbie. 

Je  pense  done  qu  il  est  tres  possible  h.  la  Russie  de  pers^verer,  en  presence  de  la  guerre 
austro-serbe ,  dans  son  role  de  spectatrice,  sans  entrainer  I'Europe  dans  la  guerre  la  plus 
eflfroyabie  qu  elle  ait  jamais  vue. 

Je  crois  qu'une  entente  directe  entre  ton  Gouvernement  et  Vienne  est  possible  et  desirable 
attendu  que,  comme  je  te  I'ai  deji  telegraphic,  mon  Gouvernement  essaie  de  toutes  ses  forces 
de  la  favoriser. 

Naturellement  des  mesures  militaires  de  la  Russie,  que  fAutriche-Hongrie  pourrait  con- 
siderer comme  une  menace,  hateraient  une  calamite  que  tous  deux  nous  cherchons  a  eviter, 
et  rendrait  Cgalement  impossible  ma  mission  de  m^diateur  que  j'ai  acceptCe  avec  empres- 
sement  lorsque  tu  as  fait  appei  k  mon  amitiC  et  a  mon  aide. 

GuiLLAUME. 


IV 

L'Empereur  Guillatjme 

k  TEmpereur  Nicolas. 

3o  juillet  1914(1  heure  du  matin.) 

Mon  Ambassadeur  a  dt6  chargC  d'appeler  Tattention  de  ton  Gouvernement  sur  les  dangers 
et  les  graves  consequences  d  une  mobilisation ;  c  est  ce  que  je  t'avais  dit  dans  mon  dernier 
telegramme. 

L'Autriche-Hongrie  n'a  mobilise  qne  contre  la  Serbie  et  seulement  une  partie  de  son 
arrnee.  Si  la  Russie,  comme  cest  le  cas  d'apres  ton  telegramme  et  la  communication  de  ton 
Gouvernement,  mobilise  centre  i'Autriche-Hongrie,  la  mission  de  mCdiateur  que  tu  mas 
amicalement  confiee  et  qaej'ai  acceptee  sur  ton  instante  priere,  sera  compromise  sinon 
rendue  impossible. 

Tout  le  poids  dc  la  decision  k  prendre  p^se  actuellement  sur  tes  epaules ,  qui  auront  k 
supporter  la  responsabilit6  de  la  guerre  ou  de  la  paix. 

GOILLAUME. 


—  211  - 


V 

L'Empereur  Nicolas 

k  TEmpereur  Guillaume. 

PIterhof,  Te  3o  Jufllet  1914  ( i  h-  20  apr^midi.) 

Je  te  remeroie  cordialement  de  ta  prompte  reponse,  Jeavoie  aujourdlrai  soir  Taticiheff 
avec  meg  instructions.  Les  decisions  militaires  qui  sOQt  niises  maintenant  en  vigneur,  ont  6.i}h 
^te  prises  ii  y  a  cinq  jours  a  litre  de  defense  contre  les  preparatifs  de  i'Autriche. 

J'espere  de  tout  mon  coeur  que  ces  mesures  n'influeront  en  rien  sur  ton  role  de  m^diateur 
que  j  apprecie  grandement.  Nous  avons  besoin  de  ton  intervention  ^nergique  aupres  de 
I'Autriche ,  afin  quelle  arrive  k une  entente  avec  nous. 

Nicolas.  1 


VI 

L'Empereur  Nicolas 

a  I'Eiupereur  Guhxaume. 

3i  juillet  1914. 

Je  te  remercie  de  tout  coeur  de  ton  intention,  qui  iaisse  percer  une  lueur  d'espoir  que 
tout  se  terminera  encore  a  I'amiabie.  Techniquement,  il  est  impossible  de  suspendre  nos 
preparatifs  militaires  qui  ont  ete  necessites  par  la  mobilisation  de  i'Autriche. 

Nous  sommes  loin  de  d^sirer  la  guerre;  aussi  longtemps  que  dureront  les  pourpariers 
avec  I'Autriche!  au  sujet  de  la  Serbie,  mes  troupes  ne  se  livreront  a  aucun  acte  de  provoca- 
tion. Je  t'en  donne  ma  parole  d'honneur. 

J'ai  confiance  absolue  dans  la  grace  divine  et  souhaite  la  r^ussite  de  ton  intervention  k^ 
Vienne  pour  le  bien  de  nos  pays  et  ia  paix  de  TEurope. 

Bien  cordialement  a  toi. 

Nicolas. 


vn 

L'Empereur  Guillaume 

k  I'Empereur  Nicolas. 

3i  juillet  1914  {2  heures  apr^s<nidi). 

Sur  ton  appel  a  mon  amiti6  et  ta  priere  de  te  vetiir  en  aide ,  j'ai  ehtrepris  une  action 
mediatrice  entre  ton  Gouvemement  et  ie  Gouvernement  austro  hongrois. 

Pendant  que  cette  action  6tait  encore  en  cours,  tes  troupes  ont  ^t^  mobilis^es  contre  mon 
alii ee  i'Autriche- Hongric',  a  la  suite  de  quoi,  ainsi  que  je  te  I'ai  di]k  fait  savoir,  mon  inter- 
vention est  devenue  presque  illusoire.  Malgre  cela,  jel'ai  cohtlnu^e^ 

Je  recois  a  I'instant  des  nouvelles  dignes  de  foi  touchant  de  s6rieux  preparatifs  de  guerre 
egalement  sur  ma  fronti^re  orientale.  Ay  ant  a  repondre  de  la  s6curit6  de  mon  Empire,  je 
me  vois  force  de  prendre  les  memes  mesures  defensives. 

«7. 


—  212  — 

Je  suis  al]^  josqu  a  I'extreme  limite  du  possible  dans  mes  efforts  pour  maintenir  la  paix. 
Ce  n'est  pas  moi  qui  supporterai  la  responsabilitd  de  Taffreux  d^sastre  qui  menace  mainte- 
nant  tout  le  monde  civilise. 

En  ce  moment  encore  il  ne  tient  q\xk  toi  de  Temp^cher.  Personne  ne  menace  I'honneur 
et  la  puissance  de  la  Russie,  qui  eut  bien  pu  attendre  le  resullat  de  mon  intervention. 
L'amiti6  pour  toi  et  ton.  royaume,  qui  m'a  ete  transmise  par  mon  Grand-Pere  a  son  lit  de 
mort,  est  toujours  sacr^e  pour  moi,  et  j'ai  6t^  fidele  a  la  Russie  lorsqu'elie  s'est  trouv6e 
dans  le  malheur,  notamment  dans  ta  derniere  guerre.  Maintenant  encore  la  paix  de  I'Europe 
peut  elre  maintenue  par  toi,  si  la  Russie  se  decide  a  suspendreses  mesures  militaires  qui 
menacent  I'Allemagneet  TAulriche. 

GUILLADUE. 


1 


vni 

L'Empereur  Nicolas 

k  I'Empereur  Guillaume. 

i"  aout  1914  (2  heures  apr^s-midi). 

J'ai  recu  ton  tel^gramme,  je  comprends  que  tu  sois  oblige  de  mobiliser,  maisje  voudrais 
avoir  de  toi  la  m^me  garantie  que  je  t'ai  donnee,  a  savoir  que  ces  mesures  ne  signifient  pas 
la  guerre  et  que  nous  poursuivrons  nos  negociations  pour  le  bien  de  nos  deux  pays  et  la 
paix  generale  si  ch^re  k  nos  cceurs. 

Notre  longue  arhilie  ^prouvee  doit,  avec  I'aide  de  Dieu,  r^ussir  a  empScher  ces  effusions 
de  sang.  J  attends  avec  confiance  une  r^ponse  de  toi. 

Nicolas. 


IX 

L'Empereur  Guillaubie 
k  TEmpereur  Nicolas. 

Berlin,  i^aoAt  1914. 

Je  te  remercie  de  ton  t^l^gramme;  j'ai  indique  hier  k  ton  Gouvernement  le  seui  moyen 
par  lequel  la  guerre  pouvait  encore  6tre  6vit6e. 

Bien  que  jeusse  demande  une  r^ponse  pour  midi,  aucun  tdl^gramme  de  mon  Ambassa- 
deur  contenant  une  r^ponse  de  ton  Gouvernement  ne  m  est  encore  parvenu.  J'ai  done  6te 
contraint  de  mobiliser  mon  arm6e. 

Une  reponse  immediate,  claire  et  non  Equivoque,  de  ton  Gouvernement  est  le  seul 
moyen  de  conjurer  une  calamity  incommensurable.  Jusqu'i  ce  que  je  re9oive  cette  reponse, 
il  m'est  impossible,  k  mon  vif  regret,  d'aborder  le  sujet  de  ton  t616gramme.  Je  dois  te  de- 
mander  cat^goriquement  de  donner  sans  retard  I'ordre  k  tes  troupes  de  ne  porter  en  aucun 
cas  ia  moindre  atteinte  a  nos  froixtieres. 

Gcillaume. 


—  213  — 

Annexe  VL 
Extraits  du  «Livre  orange»  relatifs  4  la  d^laration  de  guerre  de  rAllemagne  &  la  Russle. 


r  76. 


Note  remise  par  I' Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  d.Saint-Petersboarg,   le   1"^  aout   191^, 
d7  h,  10  du  soir. 

Le  Gouvernement  imperial  s'est  efForce  des  les  debuts  de  la  crise  de  la  mener  a  une  solu- 
tion pacifique.  Se  rendant  a  un  desir  quilui  en  avait  6te  exprime  par  Sa  Majesle  rEmpereur 
de  Russie,  Sa  Majesty  I'Empereur  d'Allemagne,  d'accord  avec  I'Angleterre,  s'^tait  appliqu6  a 
accomplir  un  r61e  m^diateur  aupr^s  des  Cabinets  de  Vienne  et  de  Saint-P^tersbourg , 
lorsque  la  Russie,  sans  en  attendre  le  rdsultat,  proc^da  a  la  mobilisation  de  la  totalite  de  ses 
forces  de  terre  et  de  mer.  A  la  suite  de  cette  mesure  menaQante  motiv^e  par  aucun  presage 
militaire  de  la  part  de  TAllemagne,  I'Empire  allemand  s'est  trouve  vis-a-vis  d'un  danger  grave 
et  imminent.  Si  le  Gouvernement  imperial  eut  manqu6  de  parer  a  ce  peril,  il  aurait  com- 
promis'  la  s6curite  et  Texistence  meme  de  I'Allemagne.  Par  consequent  le  Gouvernement 
allemand  se  vit  forc6  de  s'adresser  au  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majestc  I'Empereur  de  Toutes 
les  Russies  en  insistant  sur  la  cessation  desdits  actes  militaires.  La  Russie  ayant  refus6  de 
faire  droit  a  (n'ayant  pas  cru  devoir  repondre  j«)<'^  cette  demande  et  ayanl  manifest^  par  ce 
refus  (cette  attitude)  que  son  action  elait  dirig^e  contrc  I'Allemagne,  j'ai  I'honneur,  d'ordre 
de  mon  Gouvernement,  de  faire  savoir  h  Votre  Excellence  ce  qui  suit : 

Sa  Majesty  I'Empereur  Mon  Auguste  Souverain  au  nom  de  I'Empire,  relevant  le  defi,  se 
considere  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la  Russie. 

Saiut-Petersbourg,  le  1 9  juillet/i "  aout  1914. 

F.  POURTALES. 


r  77. 


Communique  da  Ministre  des  Affaires  eirangires  concernant  les  evenements  des  derniers 
jours. 

Le  2  aout  19 14- 

Un  expose  defigurant  les  Evenements  des  derniers  jours  ayant  paru  dans  la  presse  etran- 
gere,  le  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  croit  de  son  devoir  de  publier  I'aper^u  suivant  des 
pourparlers  diplomatiques  pendant  le  temps  susvise. 

'*'  hei  mols  places  enlre  parentheses  se  trouvent  dans  Toriginal.  II  faut  supposer  que  deux  varlante» 
avaient  ete  pr^par^es  d'avance  et  que  par  erreur  elles  ont  ^t^  inser^es  toules  les  deux  dans  la  note. 


^  214  — 

Le  10-2  3  juHlet  a.  c.  le  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  a  Belgrade  presenta  au  Mmistre 
Presi(!ent  serbe  line  note  ou  le  Gouvernement  serbe  etait  accuse  d'avoir  favoris^  le  mouvG- 
ment  panseibe  qui  avail  abouti  a  I'assassinat  de  Theritier  du  trone  austro-hongrois.  En  conse- 
quence rAutriche-Hongric  demandait  an  Gouvernement  serbe  non  seulement  de  condamner 
sous  une  forme  solennelie  la  susdite  propagande,  nnais  aussi  de  prendre,  sous  le  controle  de 
rAutriclie-Hongrie ,  une  serie  de  mesures  tendanta  la  decouverte  du  complot,  a  la  punilion 
des  sujels  serbes  y  ayant  participe  el  a  ia  prevention  dans  I'avenir  de  lout  attentat  sur  le  sol 
du  Royaume.  Un  d61ni  de  quarante-huit  heures  fut  fixe  au  Gouvernement  serbe  pour  la 
reponse  a  la  susdite  note. 

Le  Gouvernement  imperial ,  auquel  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  a  Saint-Petersboui'g 
avail  communique  le  texte  de  la  note  dix-sept  heures  apres  sa  remise  a  Belgrade ,  ayant pris  con- 
naissance  des  demandes  y  contenues,  dut  s'apercevoir  que  quelques-unes  parmi  elles  etaient 
inexecutables  quant  au  fond ,  tandis  que  d'autres  etaient  presentees  sous  une  forme  incompa- 
tible avec  la  dignite  d'un  etat  independant.  Trouvant  inadmissibles  la  diminution  de  la 
dignite  de  la  Serbie,  conlenue  dans  ees  demandes,  ainsi  que  la  tendance  de  TAutriche- 
Hongrie  d'assurer  sa  preponderance  dans  les  Balkans  demon  tree  par  ces  memes  exigences, 
le  Gouvernement  russe  fit  observer  dans  la  forme  la  plus  amicale  i  I'Autriche-Hongrie  qu'il 
serait  desirable  de  soumettre  a  un  nouvei  examen  les  points  contenus  dans  la  note  austro- 
hongroise.  Le  Gouvernement  auslro-hongrois  ne  cnitpas  possible  de  consentir  a  une  discussion 
de  la  note.  L'action  moderatrice  des  autres  Puissances  k  Vienne  ne  fut  non  plus  couronneo 
de  succes. 

Malgre  que  la  Serbie  eiit  reprouve  le  crime  el  se  fiit  montree  prete  a  donner  satisfaction  a 
I'Autriche  dans  une  mesure  qui  depassat  les  provisions  non  seulement  de  la  Russie,  mais  aussi 
des  autros  Puissances,  le  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  k  Belgrade  jugea  la  reponse  serb* 
insuffisanle  el  quitta  cette  ville. 

Reconnaissant  le  caractere  exagere  des  demandes  presentees  par  TAutriche,  la  Russie 
avail  declare  encore  auparavant  qu'il  lui  serait  impossible  de  rester  indilferente ,  sans  se 
refuser  totitefois  a  employer  tous  ses  efiorts  pour  trouver  une  issue  pacifique  qui  fut  accep- 
table pour  TAutriche  el  menageat  son  amour-propre  de  grande  puissance.  En  meme  temps 
la  Russie  etablit  fermement  quelle  admettait  une  solution  pacifique  de  ia  question  seulement 
dans  une  mesure  qui  n'impliquerait  pas  la  diminution  de  la  dignite  de  la  Serbie  comme  Etat 
independant.  Malheureusement  tous  les  efforts  deployes  par  le  Gouvernement  imperial  dans 
cetle  direction  resterent  sans  effet.  Le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois,  apres  s'etre  derobo 
a  toute  intervention  conciliatrice  des  Puissances  dans  son  conflit  avec  la  Serbie ,  proceda  h 
la  mobilisation,  declara  ofTiciellement  la  guerre  k  la  Serbie,  el  le  jour  suivant,  Belgrade  fut 
bombardee.  Le  manifeste  qui  a  accompagn6  la  declaration  de  guerre  accuse  ouvertement  la 
Serbie  d'avoir  prepare  et  execute  le  crime  de  Sai'ajevo.  Une  pareille  accusation  d'un  crime  de 
droit  commun  lancee  contre  tout  un  peuple  et  toutun  Etat  attira  a  la  Serbie  par  son  inanite 
Ovidente  les  larges  sympathies  des  cercles  de  la  societe  europeenne. 

A  la  suite  de  cette  maniere  d'agir  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois,  malgrO  la  declara- 
tion de  la  Russie  quelle  ne  pourrait  rester  indifferente  au  sort  de  la  Serbie,  le  Gouveine- 
menl  imperial  jugea  necessairc  d'ordonner  la  mobilisation  des  circonscriptions  mililaires  de 
Kiew,  d'Odessa,  de  JMoscou  et  de  Kazan.  Une  telle  decision  s'imposait  parce  que  depuis  la 
date  de  la  remise  de  la  note  austro-hongroise  au  Gouvernement  serbe  et  les  premieres 
demarches,  de  la  Riusie  cinq  joiii's  s'Otaient  ecoules,  et  cependant  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne 
n'avait  fait  aucun  pas  pour  aller  au-devant  de  nos  efforts  pacifiques;.  au  contraire  la  mobili- 
sation de  la  moiti6  de  farmOe  austro-hongroise  avail  ete  decrOtOe. 

Le  GouvememieDX  allemand  fut  mis  au  com-ant  des  mesures  prises  jiar  la  Russie;  ii  lui 


—  215  — 
flit  en  in^me  temps  expliqu^  queiles  n'^taient  que  la  consequence  des  arniemenls  autri- 
chiens  et  nullement  dingoes  centre  I'AUemagne.  En  mime  temps,  ie  Gouverncment  imp^ 
rial  declara  que  la  Russie  etait  prdlc  ;\  continucr  hs  pourparlers  en  vue  d'une  solution  paci- 
fique  jdu  conflit,  soit  par  la  voie  de  n^gociations  direcles  avec  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne,  soit,  en 
auivant  la  proposition  de  la  Grande-Bretagne,  par  la  voie  d'une  Conference  des  quatre 
grandes  Puissances  nan  int^ressees  directement,.  voire  TAngleterre,  la  France,  I'AUemagne 
et  ritalie. 

Cependant  cette  tentative  de  la  Russie  ^choua  ^galement.  L'Autriche-Hongrie  declina  un 
echange  de  vues  ult^rieur  avec  nous,  et  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  se  d^roba  a  la  participation  h 
la  Conference  des  Puissances  projetee. 

Neanmoins,  la  Russie  ne  discontinua  pas  ses  efforts  en  faveiir  de  la  paix.  R^pondant  k  la 
question  de  rAHemagne,  a  queiles  conditions  nous  consentirions  encore  k  suspendre  nos 
armements,  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  ^trangeres  d^clara  que  c6s  conditions  seraient  la  recon- 
naissance par  I'Autriche-Hongrie  que  la  question  austro-serbe  avail  revetu  le  caractere  d'une 
question  europeenne,  et  la  declaration  de  cette  meme  Puissance  quelle  consentait  k  ne  pas 
insister  sur  des  demandes  incompatibles  avec  les  droits  souverains  de  la  Serbie. 

La  proposition  de  la  Russie  fut  jug^e  par  I'Allemagne  inacceptable  pour  TAutriche-Hon- 
grie.  Simultan^ment  on  re9ut  a  Saint -P^tersbourg  la  nouvelle  de  la  proclamation  de  la 
mobilisation  gen^rale  par  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

En  mime  temps  les  hostilit^s  continuaient  sur  le  territoire  serbe  et  Belgrade  fut  bom- 
bardee  derechef. 

L'insucces  de  nos  propositions  nous  obligea  d'elargir  les  mesures  de  precautions  mili^ 
taires. 

Le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  nous  ayant  adress6  une  question  a  ce  sujet,  il  lui  fut  r^pondu  que  la 
Russie  etait  forcee  de  commencer  ses  armements  pour  se  pr^munir  centre  toutes  eventua- 
liies. 

Tout  en  prenant  cette  niesure  de  precaution ,  la  Russie  n'en  discontinuait  pas  moins  de 
recherchdr  de  toutes  ses  forces  une  issue  de  cette  situation  et  declara  ^tre  prMe  k  accepter 
tout  moyen  de  solution  du  conflit  qui  comporterait  I'observation  des  conditions  posees  par 
nous. 

Malgre  cette  communication  conciliante ,  le  Gouvernement  allemand,  le  i8/3i  juillet, 
adressa  au  Gouvernement  russe  la  demande  d'avoir  a  suspendre  ses  mesures  militaires  a 
midi  du  19  juillet/i*  aoAt,  en  menacant,  dans  le  cas  contraire,  de  proceder  k  une  mobili- 
sation gen^rale. 

Le  lendemain,  19  juiUet/i*  aoiit,  I'Ambassadeur  d'AHemagne  transmit  au  Ministre  des 
Affaires  etrangeres,  au  nom  de  son  Gouvernement,  la  declaration  de  guerre. 

Sazonofp. 


r  78. 
Le  MiNiSTRfi  DES  Affaires  i^trang^ires 

aux  Representants  de  S.  M.  TEmpereur  k  i'etranger. , 

[telegram  ME.) 

SaintPetersbouTg,  le  20  juille^2  aoiHt  igid- 

11  est  abeolument  clair  que  I'Memagne  s'efforce  des  k  present  de  rejeter  sur  nous  la  res- 
ponsabilite  de  la  rupture.  Notre  mobilisation  a  ^te  provoqu^e  par  I'^norme  responsabilit^ 


--  216  — 
que  nous  aurions  assumee,  si  nous  navions  pas  pris  toutes  les  mesures  de  precaution  A  un 
moment  ou  I'Aulriche ,  se  bornant  k  des  pourparlers  d'un  caractere  dilatoire ,  bombardait 
Belgrade  et  procedait  k  une  mobilisation  gen^rale. 

Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur  s  etait  engagee  vis-a-vis  de  i'Empereur  d'AUemagne  par  sa  parole  a 
n'entreprendre  aucun  acta  agressif  tant  que  dureraient  les  pourparlers  avec  TAutriche.  Apres 
une  telle  garantie  et  apres  toutes  les  preuves  de  I'amour  de  ia  Russie  pour  la  paix,  I'Alle- 
magne  ne  pouvait  ni  n'avait  le  droit  de  douter  denotre  declaration,  que  nous  accepterions 
avec  joie  toute  issue  pacifique  compatible  avec  la  dignite  et  I'independance  de  la  Serbie.  Une 
autre  issue,  tout  en  ^tant  completement  incompatible  avec  notre  propre  dignite  aurait  cer- 
tainement  ^branle  lequilibre europ^en ,  en  assurant  Th^g^monie  de  I'Allemagne.  Ce  carac- 
tere europeen,  voire  mondial,  du  conflit  est  infiniment  plus  important  que  le  pretexte  qui 
la  cr6e.  Par  sa  decision  de  nous  declarer  la  guerre  a  un  moment  ou  se  poursuivaient  les 
n^gociations  entre  les  Puissances,  I'Allemagne  a  assum^  une  lourde  responsabiiite. 

Sazonofp. 


i)mf fc^riff  mi>  ZttmftMe 


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1* 


—     4     — . 

fonntcn  trir  unfctcm  55unbc8gcnoffcn  unfct  SinbcrftanbniS  mit  fcinct  (Sinfc^a^ung 
ber  ©ac^Iagc  gcbcii  unb  i^m  Dcr[i(f)ern,  ba^  einc  %ition,  bic  cr  fiir  notmcnbig 
l^icltc,  um  bet  gcgcn  ben  55cflanb  ber  TD^onard^ie  gcric^teten  53en)cgung 
in  Scrbicn  tin  Gnbe  511  macficn,  imfcrc  53ifligung  finbcn  ttjurbe.  5Bit  luarcu 
un§  §icr6ei  h)ot)[  bctru^t,  baj3  ein  etmaigcg  friegeri[(^c§  33orge^en  Cjlerreic^-UngarnS 
gcgen  8evDicn  SRii^laub  auf  ben  ^lan  bringcn  unb  un§  [}icrmit  uiiferer  5^unbc8« 
pflic^t  cntfprerf)cr.b  in  eincn  5^rieg  Demicfcfn  fonntc.  50ir  fonnten  abec  in  ber  Sr* 
fcnntnig  bet  oitafen  ^ntei^effen  Ojlcrvcic^'Ungarng,  bic  auf  bcm  Spicfc  flanben,  unferem 
Sunbeggcncjfen  n?cbcr  5U  cincr  mit  fcincr  SGurbc  nic^t  ju  cereinbarenbcn  9^acl^gie6igfeit 
ratcn  noc^  auc^  i^m  unferen  ^eij^anb  in  biefem  [d^rocrcn  5)^oinent  oerfagcn.  2Bir  fonnten 
bic§  um  fo  iccnigcr,  a[8  and)  unferc  ^ntercffen  burd^  bie  anbauernbc  fcrbifc^c  Su^t* 
atbcit  auf  ha^  enipfinblici^j^c  bebrof}t  tt)arcn.  Senn  e§  ben  8erbcn  mit  5RuJ3tanb§ 
unb  granfreic^g  ioiffe  noc^  tanger  geftattct  gcblieben  Ujarc,  ben  SScftanb  ber  ^Rac^bor* 
monarchic  ju  gefd^rbcn,  fo  miirbc  bic§  ben  offma^Uc^en  Sufammcnbruc^  £)jlerrcid)§ 
unb  eine  Untcrnjerfung  beS  gefaui ten  (S(an)entum§  unter  ruffifd^em  (33cptcr  jur  ^ofgc 
^aben,  moburc^  bie  ©tcUung  ber  germanifc^en  iRaffe  in  S^iitteleuropa  un^attbor 
h)urbc.  Gin  moraiifcf)  ge|d)ti>ac^tc§,  burc^  ba^  5^orbringcn  beg  ruffifc^cn  \panf(an)i8mu§  ju* 
fammenbrcc^cnbeg  Ofterrcic^  tcdre  fiir  un8  fcin  ^^unbeggcnoffc  mc^r,  mit  bcm  tt)ir  rec^ncn 
fonnten,  unb  auf  ben  mir  un§  Dcrlaffen  fonnten,  wie  njir  eg  angcfic^tg  ber  immcr 
brof}cnbcr  wcvbenben  .^altung  unferer  ofilic^en  unb  tt)eft(irf)en  SRac^barn  miiffcn. 
<ffiir  lichen  ba^er  Cftcrreic^  ooilig  freic  ^axib  in  fciuer  3lftion  gegcn  ©crbicn.  Sir 
l^abcn  an  ben  Sorbereitungen  ba^u  nid^t  teiigcnommcn. 

Cftcrreic^  ipd^ite  ben  ®eg,  in  einer  9iotc  ber  ferbifd)cn  JRegicrung  augfiii}r(ic^ 
ben  burc^  bic  Untcrfud^ung  beg  3)^orbcg  Don  (5araien)o  fcjtgejteUten  unmittcibaren 
3ufammcnl^ang  jraifc^en  bem  Wloxbt  unb  ber  t)on  ber  fcrbifc^en  SRegicrung  nic^t  nut 
gebu[beten,  fonbcvn  untcr|tii|tcn  gro^ferbifc^en  53en)cgung  barjufegcn  unb  Don  i§r  einc 
boUjldnbige  SlbflcUung  biefcg  ^rcibcng  fon)ic  ^cftrafung  ber  ©d^ulbigen  ju  forbern. 
©leic^jcitig  t)er(aiigtc6[lerrei!i)'Ungarn  o(g  (Marantic  fiir  bic  Duvd[)fii^ruug  beg  ^crfa^rcng 
^^  ^cilna^mc  fciner  Organc  an  ber  Kntctfuc^ung  auf  ferbifc^em  ©cbict  unb  befinitiuc 
^^^  Sluffofung  ber  gcgen  Ojterveir^'Ungarn  n)ii^lenbcn  gro^fcrbifrf^en  'Ceveine.  'Die  f.  u.  f. 
JRegicrung  flelltc  eine  ^-zx^  oon  48  ©tunben  jur  bebingungglofcn  5tnna^mc  i^rcr 
gorbcrungen.  2)ic  fcrbifc^e  9icgicrung  l^at  cinen  ^ag  nad^  Uberrcid[)ung  bet 
0|lcrTeidji[d)'Ungarifc^cn  5^otc  bic  SObbitifation  begonncn.  SUg  noc^  Slblauf  ber 
grift  bic  ferbifc^c  SRcgierung  eine  $lntrcort  ertciltc,  bic  jmor  in  cinigen  ^unftcn 
bic  SDiinfc^c  6ftcrrcid)'Ungarng  erfuttte,  im  njcfentlid^en  aber  bcutlid^  bag  S3e|lrebcn 
erfcnncn  tiep,  buret)  Serfd^leppung  unb  ncuc  Ser^anbiungcn  fid}  ben  gercd)tcn 
Jorberungcn  ber  IJJlonarc^ic  ju  cntjic^cn,  brac^  bicfc  bic  biplomatifd)en  Sejic^ungcn 
ju  (Scrbien  oSi,  otjnc  fid)  auf  mcitcrc  Scr^anbiungen  cinjutaffcn  obct  fid^ 
\)on  fcrbifc^cn  S3erfic^erungen  l;in[}alten  ju  taffcn,  bercn  SIBcrt  eg  genugfam  -—  ju 
fcincm  ©c^abcn  —  fcnnt. 

55on  biefem  Slngenblic!  an  befanb  ji(^  feftcrreic^  tatfdc^(ic^  im  ^ricggjuftdnbe 
mit  ©erbicn,  ben  c8  bonn  nod)  burc^  bic  offijicdc  ^rieggerftdrung  »om  28.  b.3)lt8, 
offentHr^  prottainiertc. 

53om  crflcn  Slnfang  beg  ^onfliftg  an  ^aben  n?ir  auf  bem-^tanbpunft  gejlanbcn, 
ba^  eg  fic^   ^ierbci   um   cine  '^Ingcfcgcni^cit  Ojtcrreic^g   ^nnbeltC;   bic  eg  affein  mU 


—    5    — 

©evbicn  jum  Slu8trag  ju  Bringcn  §a6cn  h)urbc.  5Bir  l^abcn  ba^cr  uufet  ganjcS 
Scflrebcn  bnrauf  geric{)tet,  ben  5lricg  ju  Tofatifieren  UHb  bie  nnbercn  3Jtdc^te  bauon 
311  iibcvjcugen,  ba^  Ofierreic^'Ungarn  in  berec^tigtct  5Rotn)cbr  unb  burcf)  bie  23er[}drtniffe 
gcjttjungen  fic^  $um  Sipped  an  bie  SBaffen  r}abc  entfc{)[icf,cn  mu|[en.  5Bit  l^obeu  nad)* 
briirflid^  ben  ©tanbpunft  uertretcn,  ba^  feiu  .^u(turf!aat  bn8  9vecf)t  ^abe,  in  biefcm 
^ampf  gegen  Unfultur  nnb  politifc^c  5>etbrec^ermoral  Oftcrrcic^  in  ben  5lrm  ju 
fallen  unb  bie  8er6en  i^rcr  gcvec^tcn  8trafc  ju  cnt3ic[}en.  3"  ^ic[eni  ©innc  ^aben 
n)it  unferc  S3crtrcter  im  2lu§lanb  inflruieit.  ^ 

®(eid)5eitig  tei(tc  bie  Ofterrcid}ifd)4lngarif(^c  JKcgierung  bcr  9\u[fif(^cn  mit,  ^^B^^^^^ 
ber  Pon  i^r  6ei  (Ecr6ien  unternommene  S>rf)fitt  (ebiglicf)  eine  bcfciifiDc  SJ^a^regct  gcgen«  ^^^n^ 
ubet  ben  [erbifc^en  5Bii^(eveicn  jum  3ie(c  ^q6c,  ba^  abcr  Oflericic^  ♦  Ungarn  notgc* 
brungen  ©nrantien  fiir  cin  meitere^  freunbfc^aftUdieS  SSer^alten  ®erbicn3  Hx 
SJionarc^ie  gcgcnuber  ocrlange.  G§  liege  ,£)j^etrei(^=Ungarn  gdnjlic^  fern,  ctoa  einc 
5?et|"(^ie6ung  ber  3)iac^tDer^Q[tni[[e  auf  bem  SSalfan  (}er6cijufiiljrcn.  3lnf  unfere  Gr* 
ffdrung,  ba^  bie  -Deutfc^e  9iegierung  bie  Cofalifierung  beg  ^onfliftS  miinfc^c  unb  et- 
jltebe,  iDurbe  fomo^t  Don  ber  granjofifc^en  qI§  ber  (Englifc^en  JRegicrung  einc  ffiir* 
fung  in  bem  glcic^en  6innc  jugcfagt.  ®ie[en  SSeftrebungen  gclang  e§  inbeffcn 
nic^t,  cine  ginmifc^ung  JRu^lanb§  in  bie  6fterveid}i[c^'fer6ifd}c  2lu§cinanber[e^ung  ju 
Pcr^inbern. 

T)ic  SRuffifc^c  ^Rcgierung  erlicfj  am  24.  ^uli  ein.  amt(id)e§  Communique,  njo* 
mdi)  Diu^tanb  unmoglirf)  in  bem  [evbifd)'6fterrcid)ifd;cn  5lonflift  inbifferent  bleiben 
fimnte.  ©q§  glcic^e  erflartc  ber  ru|"ft[c^e  9}^inijler  be§  Slugmdrtigcn,  ^err 
©affonom,  bem  Caiferfic^en  58ot[c^Qfter  ©rafen  <Pourta(eg.  Sim  !Rac^mittag 
be§  26.  3uli  lie^  bie  t  u.  f.  3Regierung  a6ermal§  burc^  i^rcu  ^otfd^after  in 
(St.  Petersburg  crfldren,  oa§  Ojlerreic^'Ungarn  feinerlei  gro6erung§pldne  ^abt 
unb  nur  enblic^  an  feineu  ©renjen  9lu^e  §a6en  tvoHc.  3'"  ^^^if^  ^^^  glcic^en 
^ageS  gclongten  inbc§  bcreit§  bie  crj^en  SJiclbungcn  iiber  ruffifc^e  3]Robi(mac^ungen  s^^^ 
nod)  Berlin.  SRoc^  am  26.  abenbg  njurben  bie  Caiferlic^en  SSotfc^after  in  Conbon, 
^ariS  unb  Petersburg  angemiefen,  6ei  ben  JRegierungen  Gnglanbg,  granfreic^§  unb 
Slu^lanbS  energi[c^  auf  bie  ©efa^r  biefer  ruffifc^cn  ^ERobiltfierungen  ^iujunjeifen. 
5Rac^bem  Ojlerreic^'Ungarn  JRu^lanb  offijietl  erlldrt  ^abc,  ba^'cS  feinen  tcrritorialen 
©erninn  in  (Serbien  anflrcbe,  liege  bie  (Entfc^eibung  ubcr  ben  SBettfrieben  au8' 
fc^lie^lic^  in  ^Petersburg.  9ioc^  am  gleic^cn  ^agc  h3urbe  ber  Caiferlic^c  ^otfc^aftcr* 
in  ©t.  Petersburg  angcmiefen,  ber  SRuffifc^cn  3Regierung  ju  erfldren: 

53orbereitcnbe  militdrifc^e  SOk^nal^men  5Ru|lanbS  merben  unS  ju 
©egenma^regetn  gtt)ingen,  bie  in  ber  S}^obilifierung  ber  Slrmee  befte^en 
miiffen.  "Die  ^^obilificrung  aber  bcbeutet  ben  Cricg.  ^a  unS  granfreid^S 
S3erpflid)tungen  gegeniiber  5Ru^tanb  befannt  ftnb,  njurbe  biefe  9}^obili» 
fierung  gegen  JRu^lanb  unb  ^ranfreic^  ^ugteic^  geric^tet  fein.  ffiir 
fonnen  nic^t  onne^mcn,  ba^  SRu^lanb  eincn  folc^en  europdifc^cn  Crieg 
entfejfeln  will.  ^a  Ojterrcic^ » Ungarn  ben  Sejtanb  beS  ferbifc^cn 
C6nigrcic^§  nic^t  antajlen  toitl,  fmb  ttjir  ber  Slnfidit,  ha^  SRu^lanb  cine 
abttjartenbe  ©teHung  einne^mcn  fann.  ®en  5Sun[c^  giiu^lanbS,  ben 
SSejlanb  -btS  ferbifc^en  Conigreid^S  nic^t  in  ^xa^i  jtellen  in  laffen,  iverben 
to.it  urn  fo  c^er  unterjlu^cn  fonncn;  atS  Ojlcrrcic^'Ungattt  biefen  53e|tattb 

2 


—    6    — 

gar  nid^t  in  ^ragc  jlefft.  (S8  mirb  leic^t  fein,  im  »citercn  Scrtauf  bet 
Slngctcgcn^cit  tie  Sofi§  cinet  Serjtaubigang  ju  finbcn. 

Sim  27.  3uli  erf  [arte  bcr  ruffifc^c  ^rieg§minij^er  ©fuc^omlinom  bcm  beutfd^cit 
©iititarottac^e  c^rcntoortUc^,  ta^  noc^  feine  S)^o6i(maci^ung8orbrc  ergangen  [ei.  6§ 
Itiirben  kbiglic^  SSorbereitungSniafregeln  gctrof[cn,  fein  ^fcrb  au§ge^o6cn,  fein  SRe* 
feroifl  eingcjogcn.  2Benn  Opcrreic^'Ungarn  bic  fcrbifc^c  ©rcnje  iiberfc^tcite,  wiirben  bic 
auf  Ojtcrreic^  geric^teten  S}^i(itatbejirfc  ^ien),  Obeffa,  tSRoSfau,  ^afan  mobilifiert.  Unter 
feinen  Umjldnben  bic  an  bet  beutfc^en  gront  liegenben:  Petersburg,  9Citna  unb 
SBarfd^QU.  5luf  bie  ^rage  beS  9Jiilitarattac^e8,  5U  n?elc^em  gn^ccfe  bie  SDlobit- 
mad^ung  gegen  Sbj^erreic^'Ungarn  erf olge,  autwortete  ber  ruffifd^e  ^rieg§mini|ler  mit  Slc^fel' 
jucfen  unb  bcm  i3in^ci§  Q"?  ^ie  T^i|)tomQten  T)er  n}U(itdrQttac^e  be^cic^nctc  barauf 
bie  SJ^obifmac^unggma^ual^men  gegen  Ojlcrreic^-Ungarn  a[§  and)  fiir  ^eutfc^[anb^6c^|l 
bebro^Cic^.  3"  ^^"  barauf  folgcnben  5:agen  fotgten  f\d)  bic  9kd)ric^tcn  iibcr  ruffifc^c 
S)iobilifierungen  in  fd^netTcm  ^empo.  Unter  bie[en  tt)aren  auc^  9tac^ric^ten' 
fiber  Sorbereitungen  nn  ber  beutfc^en  ©rcn^c,  fo  bie  23er§angung  be§  ^rieg§» 
jujtanbeS  fiber  ^on^no  unb  ber  Slbmarfc^  bcr  2Bar[(^auer  ©arnifon,  Serftdrfung  bet 
©arnifon  SltcjanbroiDO.  5lm  27.  ^uti  trofen  bie  erj^ert  5)lelbungcn  fiber  borbcrcitenbe 
SJ^a^nal^men  auc^  granfrcic§§  cin.  ©a8  14.  ^oxp^  bxad)  bie  9}ian6t)er  ah  unb 
fe^rtc  in  bic  ©arnifon  jurucf. 

^njttjifc^cn  jtnb  h)ir  bemfi^t  gcblieben,  burc^  nac^brucflid^jTe  Sinwirfung  nuf; 
tie  ^abinettc  cine  Sofolijierung  bc8  ^onfliftS  bur(^3u[e^en. 

Sim  26,  ^otte  ©ir  (Sbtuarb  ®re^  ben  ^orfc^lag  gemac^t,  bie  ©ifferen^en 
jtoifc^cn  6j^errei(^'Ungarn  unb  6erbien  ciner  unter  feinem  S3orfi|  tagcnben  S^onfercnj 
bet  53ot[c^after  ©eutfd)[anb8,  ^ranfreic^S  unb  3^^^^^"^  3"  unterbreitcn.  3"  ^i^f^ni 
^Jorfc^fag  ^aben  mit  erfldrt,  h)ir  fonnten  un8,  fo  fe^r  toil  feine  ^cnbenj  bittigtcn^ 
an  cinet  betartigen  ^onferen^  nic^t  beteiligcn,  ha  mx  Ojlerreic^  in  fciner  Slu8cinanbw*^ 
fe^ung  mit  8erbien  nic^t  Dot  ein  europdifcfje^  (Serid^t  jiticrcn  fonnten. 

f^ranftcic^  i^ai  bcm  SSorfd^lag  8ir  (Ebnjarb  ®rep  jugeftimmt,  et  ift  jeboc^ 
fc^lie|(ic^  baran  gefc^eitett,  ha^  Ojletteid^  fid^  i^m  gegenubet,  mt  t)Drau§jufe^en,  ab«| 
(e^nenb  oer^ielt. 

©ctreu  unferem  ©runbfa^,  ba^  cine  S3ermittelung8oftion  firf)  nic^t  auf  ben  febig*' 
lic^  cine  ojtcrrcic^ifc^-ungarifc^e  Slnge(egenE)cit  bnrflcKcnbcn  oj^erreicbifc^'fcrbifc^cn  ^on^ 
fiift,  fonbern  nur  auf  ha^  53cr^d(tnig  3n)i)d)cn  Oftcrreirb'Ungarn  unb  9iu^lanb  be3ie[)en 
fonnte,  [)aben  n)ir  unfere  5?emu()ungen  f ortgcfe|t,  cine  53er|tdnbigung  ^mifc^en  bicfen  beiben 
!!J?dd)ten  ^erbeijuffi^ren.  ffiir  f)aben  un8  abcr  and)  bereitgefunbcn,  nac^  Slblc^nung 
ber  ^onferenjibec  eincn  iceitcren  SSorfc^lag  ©ir  ©bmarb  ©re^§  nad)  5Cicn  ju  fiber* 
mitteln,  inbcm  er  anrcgt,  6fterrcid)»Ungarn  mod)tc  fic^  ent[d)(icj3en,  cntn}eber  bie  ferbifc^e 
Slntttjort  a[8  gcufigenb  ju  betrad)ten  ober  abcr  al8  ®runb(age  ffir  njeiterc  5?cfpred)ungcn. 
^ic  Oftctrcic^ifcb'ungarifc^e  !Kegicrimg  bat  unter  ooUer  ©firbigung  unferer  ocrmittelnben 
^dtigfcit  ju  biefcm  55orfc^lag  bemcrft,  ba^  er  nac^  Ciroffnung  ber  gcinbfcligfcitcn 
ju  fpdt  fommc. 

^ro|bcm  ^aben  xn'ix  unfere  53crmitte(ung8oerfuc^e  bi§  jum  flu^erj^cn  fovtgefc^t 
Unb  l^aben  in  5Bien  geraten,  jebc§  mit  ber  ©urbe  ber  9)ionarc^ie  toercinbarc  (Snt* 
gcgenfommen  ju  jcigen.     Ccibev  fiub  nttc  biefe  53crmittclung8aftioncn  oon  ben  mitt' 


—     7    — 

tarifd)cn  ^orbeteitungcn  9f?u^ranb§  uub  ^rauftci*^  u6frr)o{t  TOoifbcn.    5lm  29.3"^ 
f)at  bic  9iuffi[c6c  DJcgtcrung  in  Berlin  mntdc^  laitgetcilt,  ha^  fic  intx  Sltmcebcsitfe 
mobinficrt  §abc.     ©(cicbjeitig  trafen  wcitcrc  "JD^elbungen  u6er  fdjnclt  fortfc^rcitciibe 
mifitdrifc^c  55or6ercitungen  J^raufrcic^S  ju  ®affcr  unb  ju  Canbc  ein.  $hi  bcmfclbcn  ^agc  ^^^ 
^attc  bcr  Jiaiferlic^c  <8ot[c^aftet  in  Petersburg  ctue  Unterrebung  mit  bcm  ru[fi[d)eu  ^^ 
3}^iniftcr  bcS  2lu8n)artigcn,  iibcr  bic  er  tctcgrap^ifd^  ta^  golgcnbe  beric^tcte: 

»'t)cr  5Jiinif!cr  uerfuc^te  mic^  ju  liberrcbcn,  ba^  ic^  6ci  meiuer  JRcgicrung  bic 
^cifna^mc  an  cincr  S^onberfation  ju  oiercn  befiirtuorten  [otttc,  urn  Witttl  au8' 
finbig  ju  mac^en,  auf  freunb[c^aftnd)cm  5Bcge  Oflerrcic^-Ungarn  ^u  6crt)cgcn,  bie* 
jcnigen  ^orbcrungcn  aufjugebcn,  bie  bie  ©ouocranitdt  ©crbieng  antaflcn,  5"^  ^^^^i 
inbem  ic6  (ebig[id^  bie  SCiebcrgabe  bet  Unterrebung  jufagtc,  mid^  aiif  ben  ©tanb- 
punft  gcftedt,  baj)  mir,  nar^bem  9vu^(onb  fic^  ju  bent  Der^dngni§DolIen  ©c^rittc  bet 
9)bbi[mac§ung  ent[d}(o|fen  ijabt,  jebcr  ®ebanfenau§tau[c^  ^ieriiber  fcl^r  [c^tt)icrig,  tocnti 
nic^t  unmogtic^  erfc^eine.  ®a8  !Ku^[Qnb  jc^t  Don  un8  Sj^errcid^'Ungarn  geg^enubct 
oerfange,  fei  bagfelbc,  ma§  Oj^erreic^'Ungarn  ©erbien  gegcniiber  Dorgcnjorfcn  wcrbe:  eincn 
Singritf  in  ®out)erdnitdt3rec^te,  6flerrcic^»Ungarn  §abc  t)cr[proc^en,   burc^  (Srfldrung 

,feittc8  territoriaten  'Dcgintercffeinentg  $Rucffic§t  auf  rufjtfc^c  3ntcrcjfen  in  ne[}men,  ein 
grofcS  3"9'^f^^nb"'^  fciteng  cineg  fricgfu^rcnben  ©laatcg.^  SJlan  [otttc  ht^aib  hit 
'Doppetmonarc^ie  i§rc  $lnge(egcn^eit  mit  ©erbien  attcin  regc(n  Tajfen.  68  hjetbe 
bcim  gricbenSfc^lu^  immer  noc^  2^[t  fein,  auf  ©c^onung  ber  fcrbifc^en  ©ouberdnitdt 
jumcEjufommcn. 

©e^r  ernp:  ^abc  ic^  ^injugefiigt,   ba§  ougenbricflic^  bie  ganjc  •  aujlrofcrbifc^c 

-2lnge(egen§cit  ber  ©efal^r  einer  curopdifc^cn  ^nflagration  gegeuiiber  in  htn  Winter* 

jigrunb  trete,  unb  f)aht  mir  atte  9)^u^e  gegebcn,  bem  IDlinijlct  bic  ®i;6|e  bicfcr  ©efa^r 

■!l)or  5lugen  ju  fiil^ren. 

6§  iDar  nic^t  moglic^,  ©afonoto  Don  bem  ©ebanfen  abjuSringcn,  ba^.^crbicii . 
Don  9lu^(anb  |e|t  nic^t  im  ©tid^  gctoffcn.  njcrbcn  biirfc«. 

Sbenfaffg  am  29.  beric^tetc  ber  9)li(itdrattac^e  in  Petersburg  tefegrap^ifd^. 
uber  cine  Unterrebung  mit  bcm  ©eneraljlabSc^ef  ber  ruffifc^en  Slrmce: 

»Der  ®cnera[ftab8cE)ef  ^at  mid^  ju  fic^  bitten  Caffen  unb  mir  eroffnet,  ha^  iS: 
'Don,  ©einer  SJlaiejtdt  [oebcn  fomme.  (Sr  fei  Dom  ^rieggminijtcr  beauftragt  tt)orben;i; 
mir  noc^ma[§  ju  bejldtigen,  e§  fei  atteS  fo  gebtieben,  roie  e§  mir  Dor  jnjci .  S^agctt 
ber  ?D?ini|!er  mitgeteirt  ^abc.  6r  bot  mir  fc^riftlid}e  53ejtdtigung  an  unb:  gab  .mii;,. 
fein  Sl^renlwort  in  feierlld^fter  ^orm,  ha^  nirgenbS  einc  9)^obi[mac^ung,  h.f),  €in-* 
jie^uug  eineS  ein^igen  9Jiannc8  ober  ^ferbeS  big  jUr  ©tunbe,  3  U^r  nac§«  ' 
mittagg,  erfofgt  fei.  (Sr  fonne  ftcb  bafiir  fur  bic  3wfii"ft  ^W  Derbiirgcn,  abcr 
h?o^[  nac^brudtic^fl  befldtigcn,  ha^  in  ben  gronten,  bic  auf  unferc  ©renjen  ge* 
rid^tet  feinen,  Don  ©einer  9)laiejtdt  fcine  ?D^obiIificrung  gettjunfc^t  murbe.  €8 
ftnb  aber  ^ier  iibcr  crfotgtc  Sin^icl^ung  Don  SRefcrDiftcn  in  Dcrfc^icbencn  3:cileri 
beg  JRcic^g,  auc^  in  SBarfc^au  unb  in  SBitna,  Dielfad)c  9iac^ric^tcn  cingegangen.  3^ 
;§a6c  be8§a(b  bcm  ©cncral  Dorgc^altcn,  baf  ic^  burc^  bie  mir  Don  i^m.  gcmac^tca 
groffnungen  Dor  ein  5Rdtfc(  gejtetlt  fei.  Sluf  OffijicrSparotc  crtoibcrtc  cr  mir  jeboc^. 
ba^  folc^c  9lac^ric^ten  unric^tig  fcicn,  e8  mogc  §ic  unb  ba  aO[cnfatt8  ein  fa(fc|ct 
iSllarm  Doxlicgen. 


—  g  — 

3ci^  ntup  ha^  ©cfprac^  in  5ln6ctracl^t  bcr  ^ofitiDcn,  jo^lrelc^cli,  u6ct  ctfofgtt 
©injie^ungeti  uorlicgcnbeu  9Jacl^ricl^tcn  alg  cinen  5>erfut^  Bctrac^tcn,  un8  u6er  ben 
Umfan^  bet  big^crigen  SRapna^mcn  ivTCjufu^ren  «; 

■Da  bic  9Ru[ft[c^c  9tegierung  auf  bic  berfc^iebenen  Slnfragen  ubct  bie  ©runbc 
i§i*er  brof)enben  ^altung  bc^  ofteren  baraiif  §intt)ic§,  ha^  6flerreic^>llngaru  noc^  feinc 
^on&erfatiou  in  Petersburg  bcgonncn  f)abt,  cr^ielt  ber  6[terveid)i[c^'Ungavi[c§c  53ot[c^aftcr 
in  Petersburg  om  29.  3uli  ^wf  unferc  5lnregung  bie  ffieifung,  mit  §errn  ©af)onoiD 
bie  ^ontjerfation  ju  beginnen.  ®raf  ©^aparp  ij^  crmdc^tigt  morbcu;  bie  burti^  ben 
53eginn  ,be§  ^riegS^uJtanbeg  allcrbingg  iiber^olte  Dtote  an  ©erbicn  bcm  ruffifd^en- 
9)iinifier  gegenuber  ju  erlduteni  unb  jebc  Slnregung  entgegen3unc[)men,  bie  t)on 
rufjifd^et  ©eite  auS  noc^  meiter  crfolgeu  fottte,  fonjie  mit  ©affonoto  aHe  birctt  bie 
■  5jlcrreic^i(^'ruffi[c^cn  Se^ief^ungen  tongierenbcn  <}ragen  311  6efpred)en. 

©clutter  an  8cE)u(ter  mit  Sugfanb  ^aben  n)it  uuauggefc^t  an  bet  ^etmitte* 
fung§a!tion  fortgearbeitet  unb  jeben  S3ot[c^[ag  in  3Cien  unterj^ii|t,  toon  bem  tt)it  bic 
9)J6glic^fcit  einet  ftieblid^eu  Cofung  be§  5!on|lift§  er^otfcn  ju  fonncn  gfaubtcn. 
Sir  l^oben  noc^  am  30.  cinen  engdfi-fien  33orfc^(ag  nad^  Sien  njeitergegeben,  bet 
ol§  SajtS  bet  SBet^anblungen  auffteUte,  ^fterteic^'Ungarn  [oHe  nac^  erfotgtem  din* 
matfc^  in  (Setbien  bott  feinc  53ebingungcn  biftieten.  3Cit  mu^tcn  anne^men,  ha^ 
SRu^Ianb  biefe  S3ofi§  afjeptiercn  teurbc. 

Sa()teub  in  bet  ^^it  ^om  29.  biS  Bl.^ufi  bicfc  unfete  ^Scmii^ungen  urn 
Setmitteiung,  toon  bet  englifc^en  Diplomatic  untctf^u^t,  mit  ftei^cnbet  Dtinglid^feit 
fottgefu^rt  wurben,  famen  immet  crneute  unb  fid)  ^dufcnbc  5)^e(bungeu  ubet  tuj'fifc^e 
!S^o6i(ifietung§mn§nal^men.  ^ruppenanfammtungen  an  bet  oftptcupfcfien  ©rcnjc,  bie 
SSet^angung  beg  ^tiegg3uj!anbeg  iibet  famtlic^e  n^ic^tigen  ^[d^e  bet  tuffifc^cn  ffiefl' 
gtenje  He^en  fcinen  3^cifel  nie^t  batan,  ba^  bie  tuf|i[d)e  3J?o6i(ijietung  and)  gegen 
un§  in  toollem  ©ange  wat,  n?d^renb  gleic^^eitig  unfctem  53ertrctet  in  ^ctetSburg 
aHc  bctattigen  9)k^tcgcln  etncut  c^rcnnjortQc^  abgeteugnet  njutben.  ^lod)  c^e 
bic  2C>ienct  ^Intnjott  auf  ben  te^ten  englifc^.beutfi-^cn  33etmitte[ung8Dotfc|[ag,  bcjfen 
^enbcnj  unb  ©tunblagc  in  ^etetgbutg  bcfannt  genjefen  fein  mu^tCj.  in  Settin 
einttcffen  fonnte,  otbnctc  JKu^lanb  bie  affgemeinc  5)b6i[marf)ung  an.  3"  ^^^  gteid^en 
^agen  fanb  jujifc^en  8einet  9J^ajejtdt  bem  i^aifet  unb  ^onig  unb  bem  %aitn 
9^ifo(aug  ein  ^ctegtammmec^fcr  jlatt,  in  bem  ©cine  2)^a)cj^dt  ben  2^xm  ouf  htn 
4ih^i^'  bto^enbcn  (E^ataftet  bet  tuffifd)cn  9J^obi(mac^ung  unb  bie  gottbauct  feinet  eigencn 
toetmittedibcn  ^dtigfeit  aufmetffam  mac^tc. 

Sim  31.  3"^i  tic^tetc  bet  '^ai  an  ©cine  QJlajeftdt  ben  ^aifet  foigenbeS 
^elegtamm : 

»3c^  feanfe  Dit  toon  ^ctjcn  fiit  Deinc  53etmitt(ung,  bic  cine  ipoffnung  aufleuc^ten 
ia^i,  ha^  boc^  noc^  atteS  ftieblic^  enben  fonnte.  (£g  ijt  tcc^nifc^  unmoglid;,  unfete 
militdtifc^cn  53orbercitungen  einjuftelten,  bie  burc^  6petreid^§  SJlobilifietung  notwenbig 
getootben  fmb.  2Cit  fmb  n?eit  batoon  entfetnt,  cinen  ^tieg  ju  tt)unfc§en.  .©olangc 
itoic  bic  5Jet^anbrungen  mit  Oj^etteid^  iibet  ©ctbien  anbauetn,  hjctben  meine  ^tuppen 
feinc  ^ctaugfotbetnbc  Slftion  untetne^mcn.  3^  9^^^  ®i^  *"c^"  feietUc^eg  2Cott  batauf. 
^d)  Dctttauc  mit  allet  ^raft  auf  ©otteg  Qinabe  unb  i)offe  auf  ben  (£tfoIg  Deiner 
93etmittlung  in  SBieu   fiit  bic  ®o(}lfa^tt  unferet  Cdnbet  unb  ben  ^^ticben  SutopaS. 

Dcin  Dit  ^ctjlic^  etgcbencr 
9^ico(aug.< 


—     9     — 

5JJit  bicfcm  ^c(cgramm  bc8  '^axm  frcujtc  [i(t  [olgcubcg  c6cn[all^  (jm  31.  ^\i\\ 
urn  2- U^r  p.m.  abgefanbteg  ^cfegramm  (Seiner 'l^^ajejltat  be8  i^nifevS: 

»Sluf  ^cincn  5lppe(l  on  5}Jeinc  ^reunbfc^nft  uub  T)eiuc  55itte  urn  5}ieluc  ."oilfc 
§a6e  icE)  eine  S3crmitte(ung8afHon  5ix)i[rf)cu  ©cincr  unb  bcr  6fieiTcic^il'd)'llngnrifif>cii 
$Regicrung  aufgenommcn.  2Ba[)rcnb  biefe  ?lfticii  im  @angc  tuar,  fiiib  T^einc  ^vuppcu 
gegen  ba§  mir  Dcrbunbete  Oj^crreid)4lngavn  mobilifiert  morben,  luobuvc^,  trie  3^)  *55i^ 
[d^on  mitgeteid  ^abe,  5]^cinc  53ermittc[ung  bcina^c  ittuforifc^  gcmad)t  luovbeii  i[l. 
3:ro|5bem  [)abe  5<f)  fi^  fottgefe|t.  9hinme^v  erl^artc  ^"^  jtiUcrlnffigc  9kcbvic^ten  liDcv 
ernp:e  ^triegSOorbereitungcn  and)  an  Wlmm  ojllic^en  ©rcnje.  ^ie  53erantwortiiug 
fur  bic  (Siid)erf)eit  9}icineg  9fieid}eg  jmingt  !!)iid)  ^u  befenfiDcn  ©cgenma^rcgeln.  ^"^ 
bin  mit  tO^cinen  ^emii^ungen  urn  bic  (Sr[)aftung  be§  5Be(tfriebcn8  bi3  an  bic  aufjcrfle 
©renjc  bc§  moglid^en  gegangcti.  D^ic^t  3<i)  ttagc  bie  ^^erantmortuug  fiir  ba§  Unt)ei(, 
ha^  je|t  ber  ganjcn  jiDilifierten  5Bc(t  bro^t.  5Roc^  in  bicfcm  Jtugcnblictc  liegt  eg  in 
Dcincr  5>anb,  eg  ab^^umenben.  9^iemanb  bcbro^t  bic  d^rc  unb  3)^ad)t  JRufjfanbg, 
bag  n.'io^l  auf  ben  (Svfotg  5)^cincr  S3eriuitte[ung  ^citte  n^artcn  fonnen.  T)ic  "iD^it 
t)on  SD^einem  ©vo^Datet  auf  bent  ^otcnbettc  uberfotninenc  J^reunbfc^aft  fiir  T)ic^ 
unb  ^cin  9fieic^  ijl  Wiz  intmcr  ^eilig  genjcfcn,  unb  ^d)  i)abt  treu  ju  $Ru§[anb 
gef^anben,  n)enn  c§  in  fc^merct  S3ebrdngni§  n^ar,  befonbetS  in  fcinem  lc|ten 
^riegc.  ^er  ^mht  (Europag  fann  t)on  ^ir  nod)  je^t  erl)a(tcn  roerbcn,  menn  SRu|» 
(anb  fid^  cntfd}(ie(3t,  bic  niititdrifd^cn  5Jia^na§men  einjujUellcn,  bic  Deutfc^tanb  unb 
6fterrcid)'llngartt  bebro^cn. « 

'^od)  c^c  bieg  ^ctegramnt  feinc  Scjlimntung  crreicfitc,  n^at  bic  bereitg  am  53ot' 
mittag  bcgfclbcn  ^ageg  angcorbnete,  offenfic^tlic^  gegcn  ung  gcric^tctc,  9Kobi(iftcvung 
bcr  gcfamtcn  rufftfd^en  Streitfrdftc  in  Dollem  ®ange,  ^a8  ^etegramm  beg  '^aitn 
aber  loar  um  2  H§r  nad^mittagg  aufgegcbcn. 

S^ac^  "iBcfanntttierben  ber  ruffifd)en  ®cfamtntobi(ifation  in  53er(in  cr^ictt  am 
?Rad^mittag  beg  31.  3"^^  ^^^  ^aifer(id)c  5?Dtfd)after  in  ^ctcrgburg  ben  S3efe[)( 
SRuffifd^en  3Rcgierung  gu  eroffncn,  ^eutfd^lanb  l^abc  a[g  ®cgenma§regel  gegcn  bic  aff* 
gcincine  ^JJiobilifierung  ber  ruffifcbcn  Slrmec  unb  <}(ottc  ben  ^ricggjujlanb  tjcrfiinbct, 
bem  bic  ^Jlobitifation  fo[gcn  miiffe,  njcnn  JKu^fanb  nic^t  binncn  12  ©tunben  feinc 
mifitdrifc^en  9}^a§na^tnen  gegen  ^cutfc^lanb  unb  6[lerreid)»Ungarn  cinfteUe  unb  ^cutfc^* 
(anb  bat)on  in  ^enntnig  fc^e. 

©leic^jcitig  n>urbc  ber  ^aifcrlir^c  5?otfc^after  in  ^arig  angcwicfen,  t)on  bcr 
gran36fifc^cn  JHegierung  binncn  18  8tunben  cine  (Srfldruiig  ju  t^crfangcn,  ob  fic  in 
eincm  ruffifc^>beutfd)en  ^riegc  neutral  blciben  tt)offc. 

©ic  9?ufftfc^c  JRcgicrung  f)at  burc^  il^rc  bic  ©ic^er^cit  beg  9lcic^g  gcfd^rbcnbc 
9J^obi(maci^ung  bic  mii^famc  SScrmittetunggarbcit  bcr  europdifc^cn  ®taatgfan3(cicn  furj 
t)or  bem  Srfotge  jerfc^tagcn.  ©ie  SJiobilifierunggma^regcln,  fiber  bercn  ^rnfl  bcr 
SRuffifc^cn  SKegicrung  oon  Slnfang  an  feinc  gtocifet  gcfaffen  tDurbcn,  in  SScrbinbuitg 
ihit  i^rer  fortgefe|tcn  Slblcugnung  ^eigcn  flar,  ba^  $Ru0[onb  ben  ^ricg  iDoCtc. 

^Dcr  ^aiferlic^c  ^Sotfc^after  in  ^etergburg  i)ai  bic  i^m  aufgctragenc  5)^ittci(ung 
an  Qtxxn  (Safonon)  am  31.  ^^ili  utn  12  ll^r  nad^tg  gemad)t. 

(£inc  5lntaiort  ber  3Ruffifc^en  JRcgicrung  ^ierauf  f)at  ung  nic  crrcic^t. 

2  8tunben  nad)  Slbtauf  ber  in  biefer  3}Jittcilung  gcjleUten  (^jrijl  l^at  bcr  '^aXu 
an  j8cinc  tDlajcjldt  ben  ^aifcr  telcgrap^icrt: 

3 


—     10 


^ 


•^di)  ^aht  <Dciu  3:cfegramm  cr^aftcn,  tc6  ucrflc^c,  ba^  <Du  gcjtpuitgcn  6i|l, 
ino6i(  ju  madden,  abet  ic^  moc^tc  Don  ^ir  biefe(6c  ©arantie  f)abtn,  bic  ic^  ^it  gc* 
•geBcit  ^abc,  ndintic^,  ha^  bicfc  9)k§na^incn  nicf)t  ^ricg  6cbcutcn  unb  ba^  mir  fort* 
fa^rcn  njcrben,  ju  ucrf)nnbe[n,  jum  §cUc  unfcrct  bciben  Cdnbcr  unb  be§  allgemcincn 
griebcng,  bcr  unfcrcn  ^crjcn  fo  tcuer  ifl.  Unferer  tangbcn)a[)rten  3reunb[c[)aft  mu^ 
c§  mit  ®otte§  ipiffc  flcfinQ^";  ^lutDcrgicpcn  ju  »er§inbcrn.  Ciringcnb  enoattc  ic^ 
DoH  SJertraucn  ^cinc  Slntn^ort* 

§icrauf  ^at  ©cine  SJiajefldt  bet  ^aifcr  geautn?ortct: 

^'^dcf  hank  ^ir  fur  ^cin  ^cCcgtamm,  ic^  f)abt  "Deincr  3Rcgictung  gcflctn 
ben  ®eg  angegcben,  burc^  ben  attein  noc^  bcr  ^ricg  Dcrmicben  n?erben  fann.  06' 
tt)o^[  id)  urn.  einc  Slntroott  fiir  Beute  mittag  erfud^t  f)attt,  f)at  m'xd)  6i8  jc|t  noc^  fein 
3^c(egramm  3}ieine§  53ot[d)after§  mit  cincc  5lntroort  Deinet  5Regierung  crreid^t.  3"^ 
bin  ba^ct  gc^iuungen  toorbcn,  meinc  5lrmec  ju  mobilifiercn.  Sine  fofortigc  ftatc  unb 
unmi^oerftdnblic^e  Slntwort  Reiner  JRegictung  ijl  bet  cinjigc  SDeg,  urn  enb(o[c8  (g(enb 
ju  uetmeiben.  5^i§  ic^  bicfc  5lntn30tt  er^altcn  ^abe,  bin  ic^  ju  meiner  23ettubnig  hic^t 
in  bcr  Cage,  au^  ben  ©cgcnflanb  T'cincS  ^cfegtammS  ein3ugc^en.  "^d)  mu^  ouf  ha^ 
etnjlcfie  bon  <Dit  Dcrfangen,  baf  ^u  unoetjug(irf)  ^einen  ^tuppen  ben  53efe^[  gibjl, 
untet  feinen  Umfldnbcn  and)  nut  bic  leifeflc  53ct(e^ung  unfcici  ©tenjen  ju  bege^en.« 

©a  bic  SRu^tonb  gcflcCtc  O^ijl  »ct|ltirf)cn  tt)ar,  o^nc  ba|  cine  Slntmott 
.Quf  unfete  5lnftagc  eingegangen  tt)dtc,  f)at  (Seine  S)kiej^dt  bet  ^aifet  unb  ^onig 
am  1 .  Slugujl  urn  5  U^t  p.  m.  bic  3)Jobitmac^ung  bc§  gefamten  bcutfd^en  ^ttu^ 
unb  bet  ^aifctlic^en  tJJiatine  befo^Un.  ^et  ^oifcrlic^c  SSotfd^after  in  ^Petersburg 
\:)aik  injnjifc^en  ben  5lu[trag  er§o[ten,  faffs  bie  JRuffifc^c  3f?cgictung  tnnet^atb  feet 
il^t  ge|tcllten  ^^rifl  feine  beftiebigenbc  Slntttiott  ettciten  rcutbc,  i^t  ju  etfldten,  ha^ 
tok  md)  9lbre^nung  unfetet  gotb^tung  un8  a(8  im  ^tieggjuflanb  bcfinblid^  bettac^tcn. 
(E§e  jcboc^  cine  3)^elbung  iibet  bic  5lu8fu^tung  bic[e8  51ufttage8  cinlief,  ubetfd^tittcn 
ruffifc^e  2;ruppcn,  unb  jwar  [c^on  am  9kc^mittag  be§  l.SIugujl,  a[fo  bcgfclbcn  ^ad)* 
mittagS,  an  bcm  bag  eben  ertt)d^ntc  ^cfegramm  bc8  '^axtn  abgcfanbt  tear,  unfete 
©renjc  unb  tucften  auf  beutfd^cm  ©cbiet  Dot. 

ioiermit  i}at  SRu^tanb  ben  5hieg  gcgen  un8  bcgonncn. 

3njn)ifc^cn  ^atte  bcr  iVaifcrlidjc  Sotfc^aftet  in  ^ati§  bie  il^m  befo^lcnc  Sin* 
ftage  an  bag  ftanjofifc^c  ^abinett  am  31.  ^u^i  «»«  7  U^t  nac^mittagg  gcj^eUti 

^et  ftanjojifc^e  5}iinijletptdfibcnt  f^at  batauf  am  1.  Slugufl  urn  1  U^t  nad^ 
mittagg  cine  jrocibeutige  unb  unbeftiebigenbe  Slntmott  cttci(t,  bic  ubet  bie  ©teCung' 
na[)mc  (^ranftcic^g  fein  f[ateg  ^BiJb  gibt,  ba  et  jic^  batauf  befc^rdnfte,  jU  ctftdtcn, 
(}tanftcic^  routbc  bag  tun,  mag  feinc  3"^f^f|[f«  i^ni-  gebotcn. ,  ®cnige  ©tunben 
batauf,  urn  5  U^t  nac^mittagg,  mutbe  bie  3Jtobilifietung  bet  gefamten  ftanjofifc^cn 
?ltmee  unb  glotte  angeotbnet. 

Sim  3Kotgen  beg  ndc^jlen  $ageg  etoffncte  gtanftcic^  bie  Jcinbfcligfeitw,:^ 

Slbgefc^loffcn  am  2.  Slugujl  mittog^. 


11  — 


Xloviibeutfd^c  ^Ugemeine  3dfuncf. 

25.  Suit  1914» 

t>ic  note  (Dtlerreict)'i(n^arn0  art  Serbien. 

S3ctan,  ben  24.  ^uti, 

©cr  ojlcrrcic^ifd^'ungarifc^c    ©cfanbtc   in   Sclgrab    ubcrrcic^tc   gejletn    a6enb 

6  U^r   bet   ferbi[c^en   SHcgictung   einc   5Jer6a-htote    mit    bcu   gotbcrungcn    bet 

oflcrreic^ifc^'UngaTifc^cn  5Regietung.  •  ^n  bet  9iotc   mrb   bic  Slnttuort   6i8 

©onnabenb,    ben   25.  3uli/    6  U^t  abenbg,   oertangt.  —  <Bk  f)at  fofgcnbcn 

Sim  81.  Wlati  1909  bat  ber  ^oniglic^  ©crbifcbe  ©cfanbte  am  ©iener  ^ofe 
tm,  Sluftrage  [eincr  JRegierung  bet  ^ai[ertic^eii  unb  ^oniglic^en  JRegierung  fofgenbc 
(Srfldrung  abgcgeben:  »®cr6ien  anctfcnnt,  bQ§.  e§  burc§  bic  in  53o8nien  gefc^affcnc 
^atfac^c  in  [einen  SRcc^ten  nic^t  beru^rt  tourbc,  unb  bo^  e8  fic^  bemgcma^  ben  (£nt« 
fd^tic^ungcn  onpaffen  h)itb,  mlcS^t  bit  3Jlac^te  in' bejug  auf  Slrtifcl  25  beg  23er(iner 
S3ertrag§  treffen  metben.  ^nbm  ©erbien  ben  SHatfc^ldgcn  bet  ©rofmac^te  ^otge 
leij^et,  tjcrpflic^tet  eg  fic^,  bie  ioattuhg  beg  ^rotej^eg  unb  beg  Siberjianbeg,  bie  eg 
^infic^tlic^  ber  Slnncjion  feit  tjergangencm  Oftobet  eingenommcn  ^at,  aufjugeben,  unb 
toerpflid^tet  fic^  ferner,  bic  JRid^tung  feinct  gcgemDdrtigcn  ^olitiE  gcgenuber  Oj^erreic^* 
Ungarn  ju  dnbern  unb  fiinftig^in  mit  biefem  le^teren  auf  bcm  ^u^e  freuubnad^baf 
(ic^er  53e3ie§ungen  ju  Icben. 

'Die  ©cfc^ic^te  ber  te|ten  '^af^xt  nun,  unb  ingbcfonbcrc  ber  [cbmetjlic^en 
©reigniffe  be§  28.  ^^tti?  ^aben  bag  58or^anbcn[ein  eincr  [uboerfioen  53cmegung  in 
©crbien  ermiefen,  beren  gi^l  eg  ijl,  oon  ber  ojlcrreic^ifc^'Ungarifc^cn  5J?onarc§ic  gc 
U?ijfc  ^ei{c  i^rcg  ©cbietg  logjutrcnnen.  Diefe  53cn)egung,  bie  unter  ben  Slugen  bet 
[crbifc^cn  JRegierung  entflanb,  ^at  in  ber  go(ge  jenfeitg  beg  ©ebietg  beg  ^onigreic^g 
burc^  Slftc  beg  3:crrorigmug,  burd^  cine  SRci^c  toon  Slttcntatcn  unb  burd^  9Jiorbe' 
SlugbrucE  gcfunben. 

ffieit  cntfernt,  bie  in  ber  erfldrung  Dom  31.  ^ax^  1909  cnt[)a(tencn  formctten 
Serpflic^tungctt  ju  crfutten,  ^at  bic  5^6nig[i(^  ©erbifc^c  JRegierung  nic^tg  getan,  um 
biefe  SetDcgung  gu  unterbruden.  ©ic  bulbctc  bag  Dcrbrec^crifc^c  3;reiben  ber  Dcr* 
fc^icbencn  gegen  bic  ID^onarc^ic  gerif^teten  "iBercinc  unb  SSereinigungen,  bic  jugcllofc 
Sprad^c  ber  ^rcjfc,  bie  55erl^crrli(^ung  ber  Ur^eber  Don  Slttcntatcn,  bic  ^cilna^me 
Don.  Offijicren  unb  Seamten  an  fubocrjiDcn  Uratricben,  fic  bulbctf  cine  ungefunbe 
^ropaganba  im  offcntlic^ctt  llnteni(^t  unb  bulbctc  fc^lic^tic^  aHe  9Jlanifcj!ationenf 
toclc^c  bic  fcrbifd^c  53eD6lferung  jum  ^af{t  gcgcn  bic  9)lonarc^ic  unb  jur  SSerac^tung 
i^rcr  ©nrid^tungcn  Dcrlciten  fonnten. 

©iefe  ©ulbung,  ber  jid^  bic  ^oniglid^  ©crbifc^e  JRcgicrung '  fc^ulbig  mac^tc, 
f)at  noc^  in  jenem  SJlomcnt  angebauert,  in  bcm  bie  (Ereignijfe  beg  28.  3"W  ^^ 
gaujcn  ®clt  bie  grauen^aften  golgcn  folc^ct  C)ulbung  jcigten. 

3* 


—     12     — 

6g  cr^efft  nu§  ben  5lu§[agcn  unb  ©cjldnbnijfcn  bcr  ocrbtcc^crifc^cn  Ur^cbct 
bc8  Slttentatg  toom  28.  3^i"i/  ^^^  ^^^  '^^^^^  ^o"  ©crajehjo  in  53c(grab  auggc^ccft 
iDurbc,  ba^  bic  5Jiorber  bic  SBaffen  unb  53Dm6cn,  init  benen  fie  auggcj^attct  toaxtUf 
Don  fcr6ifc^cn  Offljiercn  unb  53camtcn  cr^ictten,  bie  bet  9iarcbna  Obbrana  nnge« 
fiorten,  unb  ha^  fd)HeJ5lid)  bie  Seforbetung  bcr  58cv6rcc^er  unb  beren  Soften  nad) 
58ognicn  Don  (eitenben  [erbifc^en  ©renjorgancn   oeranj^altet  unb  burc^gefii^rt  rourbc. 

^ic  angcfu^rten  Srgcbniffe  bcr  Unkrfuc^ung  geftatten  e.8  bcr  t.  unb  t  9le« 
gicrung  nic^t,  noc^  Idngcr  bie  §altung  smvartcubcr  Cangmut  ju  beobac^ten,  bie  fte 
burcf)  3a[)re  jencn  ^rcibereicn  gcgenubcr  cingcnommcn  ^aik,  bie  i[)rcn  5)^itte(punft 
in  53c(grab  ^nben  unb  oon  ha  auf  bic  ®c6ictc  bcr  !0^onarci^ie  iibcrtragcn  werben. 
<Dicfe  grgcbniffc  (cgen  ber  f.  unb  f.  9iegierung  oielmc^r  bie  ^fi'id^t  ouf,  Umtriebcn 
ein  Snbc  ju  bcrcitcu,  bie  cine  bcj^dnbigc  53cbroi)ung  fur  bic  JKu^e  bcr  3)bnarc^ic  bilbcn. 

Urn  bicfen  ^n^cif  ju  crrcid}cn,  fic^t  f\d)  bit  t.  unb  t.  Slegicrung  gcjttjungcn, 
con  htt  [erbifc^cn  JRcgicrung  cine  offijictU  55erfic^ctung  jii  oerUngen,  ba^ 
fie  bie  gegen  6|lerrci(^4ingarn  gcric^tctc  ^ropaganba  Derurtcift,  ha^ 
f)t\^t  bic  ©ciamt^cit  bcr  53cj^rcbungen,  beren  (Snbjicl  t§  \^,  Don  ber  5}ionQrd}ic 
®cbiete  logjurofcn,  bic  i[)r  angcE)6ren,  unb  bQ§  fie  fic^  Derpf(id)tet,  bicje  Dcr* 
Bred^erifc^c  unb  terroriftifc^e  ^^ropaganba  mit  alien  9!Ritteln  3U  untcr* 
brucEcn. 

Urn  bicfen  S3erpfiid)tungcn  cinen  fcicrlid)en  (E^araftcr  ju  geben,  tt)irb  bie 
^oniglic^  ©crbifd^e  SRcgicrung  auf  ber  crj^en  ©cite  i[)rc§  offijicHeu  Organ§  Dom 
26./13.  3"^^  nad)fD[gcnbc  6rf(drung  Dcroffentlid^en : 

'T)ie  ^oniglid^  ©crbifc^e  SRcgicrung  oerurtciit  bic  gcgcn  Ofterrcid^'Ungarn 
geric^tetc  ^ropaganba,  ha^  §ci^t  bie  @cfanit[)eit  jener  53eftrcbungcn,  beren  '^id  eS 
ifl,  Don  bcr  o|^crrcic^ifd)'ungari[c^en  5}ionardnc  ©cbicte  (ogjutrcnncn,  bie  it)r  angc- 
^orcn,  unb  fic  bcbauert  aufric^tig|^  bic  grauen[)aftcn  ^^olgcn  biefer  Dcrbrcd)crifc^en 
^anblungen. 

T)ie  ^oniglid)  8erbifc^e  JRegierung  bcbauert,  baJ3  fcrbifc^e  Cffijicrc  unb  53camte 
an  bcr  Dorgenannten  ^ropaganba  tciigcnommcn  unb  bamit  bic  frcunbnad)barlici^cn 
53e3ic^ungcn  gcfd^rbct  [jaben,  bic  ju  Dfiegeu  fic^  bie  ^ionig[id}e  SRcgicrung  burc^  i^rc 
erfiarung  Dom  31.  3)?dr3  1909  fcicrac^jl  Dcrpflic^tet  f)atk. 

^ic  ^6niglid)e  JRegicrung,  bie  jcben  ©cbanfcn  ober  jcben  '23erfuc^  einct  6in« 
mifc^ung  in  bie  ©cfc^irfc  bcr  53ctt)0^ncr  n)a§  immet  eineS  ^ei(c3  6flcrreic^'llngarn§ 
mi^biUigt  unb  juriicflDcift,  crad^tet  e8  fiir  i^re  ''Pflid)t,  bic  Offijicre  unb  Scamten. 
unb  bie  gcfamtc  S?eD6(fcrung  beg  ^onigrcic^g  gan3  augbriidlid)  aufmcrffani  3U 
madden,,  baf  fie  funftigl^in  mit  du|erflcr  Strenge  gcgcn  jene  '^Pcrfoncn  Dorgcl^en 
tt)itb;  bie  fic^  berartiger  ioAnbtungen  fd^uibig  macbcn  foCten,  ^anbiungcn,  benen, 
Dorjubeugcn  unb  bic  ju  untcrbrurfcn  fic  aHe  Stnflrengungen  mac^en  trirb.* 

•Diefc  (5rfldtung  njirb  g(cid)3eitig  jur  ^enntnig  bcr  5lDnig(idE)en  ?lrmcc  burd^ 
eincn  3;agcgbefc^l  8cinct  S)^aicfldt  beg  ^onigg  gebrad^t  unb  in  bem  offijicttcn  Organ 
ber  Sltmce  Dcroffcntiid^t  njcrben. 

Die  ^oniglic^  (Serbifd}c  5Rcgierung  oerpflic^tct  fid^  iibcrbieg, 

1.  jcbc  ^ubiifation  ju  untcrbruden,  bie  jum  ^a^  unb  ^ur  5Jerad)tung  ber 
Slonarc^ie  aufrcijt  unb  beren  allgcmcinc  ^cubcnj  gegen  bic  territoriaie  ^Ktcgritdt 
bet  (e^teren  geric^tet  ifl, 


^    13    — 

2.  [ofott  mit  bcr  $lufI5fiing  be5  T>cvcing'*9^arobnn  Obtnaiin-  uor5ucjc()cu,  bcffcn 
^efamtc  ^propaganbainittct  ju  fonfi^^^iciv.i  unb  in  bcr[c(6cu  Scifc  gcgcii  Me  anbcvcii 
?Oercinc  uiib  S3crcinigungcn  in  ^erbien  ciii^ufd^veitcu,  bic  [iif)  mit  bcv  "IT^ropaj-^nnba. 
gegen  6jierrcid)'Ungarn  bcfc^af tigcn.  ^ic  .^onignd}c  a^cgicrung  iwirb  bic  iiotigcii 
!Dkprcgchi  treffen,  bamlt  bie  aufgcloflcn  Sercine  nic[}t  etira  .  iJ^re  ^dtrgfeit  unter 
anbcrcm  9iamen  ober  in  anberev  ^orm  f ortfc^en, 

3.  o^nc  Serjug  aii§  bem  offcntlic^en  llntevrid)t  in  ©evbien,  [oiDof;!  \m^  bcu 
Cc^rforpet  nl§  duc^  bie  Ce^rmittct  betrifft,  alleS  ju  befeitigeii,  tDa§  bo^u  bicnt  obcr 
biencn  fonnte,  bie  ^rppaganba  gegen  Oj^erreicb-llngarn  ^u  nd^ren, 

4.  au§  bem  5)?ilitdrbienft  linb  ber  SSerlDattung  im  nflgemeinen  aCc  Offijierc 
unb  53eamtc  ju  entferncn,  bie  ber  ^ropaganba  gegen  Oflcrreid}'Ungarn  fi-§nlbig  finb, 
unb  beren  SRamen  nnter  9Jiittci(uug  be§  gegen  fie  toortiegenben  9)^Qtcrin(§  ber  ^5uig» 
lichen  5Regierung  befanntjugeben,  ftd^  bie  !.  unb  t  Stegierung  uorbct)d(t, 

5.  einjutDiHigen,  ba^  in  8erbien  Organe  ber  f.  unb  t,  JKegicrung  bci  bet 
Unterbrudung  ber  gegen  bie  territoriate  .3ntegritdt  ber  S)ionavd)ic  gcrid)teten  ful>* 
ocrfiDcn  33elocgung  mitloirfcn, 

6.  eine  gerid)tHd)e  Unterfuc^ung  gegen  jene  ^eifne[}mer  be8  ^omplottS  Dom. 
28.  3uni  einjuleiten,  bic  fid)  auf  ferbi[d)em  3:erritoiium  befinben. 

Son  ber  t  u.  f.  9{egicrung  ^ierju  belegiette  Organe  njerbcn  on  ben  bcjiig* 
lic^ctt  (^r^ebungen  tei(ne[}men, 

7.  mit  aQer  Se[cf)(eunigung  bie  53erf)a[tung  be§  9)kior§  SSoja  ^anffofic  unb- 
;einc8  genjiffen  SJiitan  GiganoDic,  ferbifc^cn  ©taat§beamtcn,  oorjuneljnicn,  luetc^e  butd^ 
bic  Srgcbnifjc  ber  Untcrfud^ung  fompromittiert  fmb, 

8.  buxd^  toirffamc  3}ta^nQ^men  bie  ^ei(na()me  ber  [erbifdien  Sef)6rben  an  bem 
6ittfd)muggeln  Don  Saffcn  unb  Gjplofujforpcrn  iiber  bie  ©ren^e  ju  uer^inbcrn, 

jenc  Organe  be§  ©ren^bienfte^  »on  <Bd)abai}  unb  Cojnica,  bic  ben  Ur^cbeni 
bc&  Serbred^en§  uon  ©crajenjo  bci  bem  Ubertritt  iiber  bic  ©rcn^e  bc()i(f(ici^  waxtrif 
laui  bem  ^ienjte  ^u  cntlajfen  unb  jlrengc  ju  befttafen, 

9.  ber  f.  u.  f.  !Rcgierung  Sluffldrungcn  jn  geben  uber  bic  nid)t  ju  rer^t* 
[fcrtigenben  5iu^erungen  ()oj)er  ferbifd^cr  guttf^iondre  in  (Berbien-  unb  bem  2lu§tanbC| 
Ibie  i^rer  offijieHen  >3tc(Iung  ungcac^tet  nic^t  ge36gert  ^aben,  fic^  nac^  bem  Sltt«ntat 
;»om^8.  3«ni  in  ^nteroiem^  in  fcinbtic^er  2Bei[c  gegen  Oftcrreii^^Ungarn  au^^ufprccben, 

10.  bie  f.  u.  t  $Regicrung  o^uc  ^Ser^ug  Don  ber  ©urc^fu^rung  ber  in  ben 
toorigctt  '•^unftcn  ^ufammengefaften  9J^a{3na^men  5U  Derjldnbigen. 

<Dic  f.  u.  f.  !Rcgierung  erttjartet  bie  Slntmort  ber  ^6nig[id)en  9^cgiernng 
fpdtejkng  bi§  @onnabcnb,  ben  25.  b.  SDJtg.,  um  6  U§r  noc^mittagS. 

(Sine  3)^emoire  iiber  bie  (Ergebniffe  ber  Unter[uct)ung  Don  ©erajenjo,  fomeit  fic 
fid^  auf  bic  in  ^unft  7  unb  8  genannten  ^^unftiondrc  be5ic[)en,  ift  biefcr  9^otc  bci* 
gefd)[DJfen. 

Scilagc.  ^k  bci  bem  ©cric^t  in  ©croiemo  gegen  ben  ©abrito  ^rincip  unb 
©cnojfen  mcgen  be§  am  28.  ^mi  b.  %  begangenen  Sieuc^elmorbeS  bc3ie[}unggn)ei[c 
wcgcn  9)ilitf(^ulb  ^icran  anpngigc  ©trafuntcrfud^ung  f)at  big[)cr  ju  folgcuben  ^cfl* 
flellungen  gcfii^rt: 

1.  ^er  ^lan^.  ben.  (Sr^^erjog  granj  gerbirtanb  tod^rcnb  fcinc§  SlufentCjaltcg 
in  Serajewo  ju  crmorben,  tDurbc  in  SBclgrab  Don  ©abrito  ^rincip,  ^Icbeljfo  ©abrinoDic, 

4 


—     14    ^ 

cincm  gctoiffcn  Wilan  SigonoDic  unb  ^^tiffo  ©rabej  unter  Sci^Ufc  bc8  tJJlQJorS  ^Soja 
2:anffDfic  au§gc[)ccft. 

2.  ^ic  fcd[)§  53om6cn  unb  »icr  53roh)ningpijlo[cn,  bcrcn  fid^  bic  33eT?bre(^cr  a(^ 
ffierfjcugc  bcbicntcn,  tourbcm  bcm  ^rincip,  ©abrinooic  unb  ©rabcj  in  Sclgrab  toon 
eincm  gcmiffcn  TOiilan  Siganobic  unb  bcm  !D^a|or  SSojo  ^anffojic  »crf(f>afft  unb  ubcrgcben.' 

3.  1)16  53om6en  fmb  io^nbgranatcn,  bic  bcm  5Baffenbcpot  bcr  fcrbifd^en  Slrmec 
in  ^agujcDac  cntjtammcn. 

4.  Urn  ha^  ©clingcn  bc§  5lttcntnt§  ju  fic^crir,  untcrnjieS  !9h(an  (EiganoDtc  bcu' 
^rittcip,  bcu  ©abrinouic  unb  ®xxibq  in  ber  io«"b^a6ung  bcr  ©rnuatcn  unb  ga&  in 
cinem  ^S^albc  nebcn  bcm  ©c^icpfctbc  »on  2;opf(^ibcr  bcm  ^rincip  unb  ©rabcj  Untcr* 
rid^t  tm  8c^icpen  mit  Sron^ningpiftolcn, 

5.  Um  bcm  ^rincip,  ©abrinooic  unb  ©rabc^  ben  lUcrgang  fiber  bic  6o2ini[c^'' 
[jcrjcgolDinifcbc  ©tenjc  unb  bic  6in[c6muggc(ung  i[)rer  SBaffcn  ju  crmoglicficn,  tt)urbc 
cin  ganjcg  ge§cimc§  ^rangportf^flcm  burd)  (SiganoDic  organificrt.  ^tx  ^intritt  bcr 
53cr6rcc^cr  [amt  i^rcn  ©off en  nac^  So§nicn  unb  bcr  i^cr^egoioiua  ujurbc  Don  ben 
©rcnji^auptrcutcn  t)on  ©cl^aba|  (3?abc  ^opouic)  unb  eD3nica  fomic  con  ben  gott* 
organen  9iubiDoj  ©rbic  Don  Cojnica  mit  Sci[)ilfe  mcl^rcrcr  onbercr  ^erfoucn  burd^* 
gefu^rt. 


Xlovifbmtfd?c  2lUc(emeine  deitrxng. 

29.  Suit  1914» 

(5tterreict)=^ngarn  nnb  bic  ferbif4>e  XTote. 

SBicn,  27. 3uli.  1)ic  9lote  bcr  ^oniglic^  6er6ifc^cn  JRcgicrung  Dom  12./25.  Juli 
!9l4  (autet  in  bcutfc^cr  flbcrfc^ung  wic  folgt: 

Die  ^oniglic^c  JKcgicrung  ^at  bic  9)iitteilung  bcr  f.  unb  f.  JRegierung  com 
10.  b.  5)i.  er^attcn  unb  ijl  ubcrjcugt,  baji  i[)rc  ^IntlDort  jebeS  5}ii^Dcrfianbni§  jcrftreucn 
toirb,  hai  bie  freunbnad^bnrUd^en  S3c3ic[)ungcn  jn)ifrf)en  bcr  ojlerrcic^ifdEicn  3)iouard^it 
unb  bem  5?6nigrcicfe  ©erbicn  ju  ftoren  bro^t 

Die  ^oniglid^c  JRegierung  ijl  fic^  bemu^t,  bo^  ber  groJ3en  9^QC^6armonorc^ie 
gcgeuuber  6ei  tcincm  SlnCa^  jcnc  ^rotcflc  cmeucrt  tourben,  bic  [cincrjcit  fomo^l  in 
bet  @fup[ci^tina  a(3  and)  in  grflaruitgen  unb  }OQ»l>fungen  ber  Dcrantmortlic^cn  S^cr- 
treter  bc§  8taatcg  jum  Slu8brucf  gcbrac^t  wurbch  unb  bic  burrb  bie  Grfldrung  ber 
fctbifc^cn  SRcgicrung  Dom  18.  tKarj  1909  i^ren  Slbfc^fu^  gefunben  tjaben,  fon}ic 
toeiter,  ba^  [eit  jener  S^it  mcber  Don  ben  Dcrfc^icbcnen  cinanbcr  folgcnbcn  Sicgierungcn 
fcc8  ^6nigrcic^3  nod^  Don  bcrcn  Organen  bcr  5Jcrfu(^  untcrnommen  iDurbe,  ben  in 
S3o8nien  unb  bcr  ^cr3egotDinQ  gefd)affcflen  politifc^cn  unb  red}tlic^cn  9ufla»b  ju  anbcrn. 
Die  ^oniglic^c  JKegierung  jleCt  fefl,  ha^  bie  f.  unb  f.  3iegicrung  in  biefer  SRic^tung 
fcincrlci  5?orflcffung  cri^oben  ^at,  obgefe^cn  Don  bcm  J^qUc  cine§  Cc^rbud^cS,  ^injic^t- 
tic^  beffen  bic  f.  unb  f.  SRcgicrung  cine  Dollfommcn  befricbigenbe  ?lufE(drung  crl^altcn. 
§at.  ©erbien  i)at  n?d^renb  ber  Dauer  ber  53Q[fQnfri[c  in  ^a^lreidicn  gdaen  SciDcifc 
fur  feinc  pojififtifc^e  unb  gcmdgigtc  ^oUtif  gelicfcrt,  unb  c3  ijt  nur  (Berbien  unb  ben 
Opfern,  bie  eg  au§[c^(ic^[id)  im  ^ntcreffc  beg  europdifc^en  griebeug  gebrac^t  ^ot,  ju 
banfcn;  »enn  bic(er  gricbc  er^altcn  geblicben  ijl. 


—    15    — 

^aju  Bcmcrft  bie  Ojlcrrcic^ifc^.Ungarifc^e  JRccjictun^: 

^ie^oniglic^  ®erbifc^c  9^egicrung  bcfc^tanft  fic^  bavauf,  fcjljiiflcHcn,  ba&  fcifi 
tl6ga6c  bex  eillarung  uom  18.  Wlati  1909  Don  [citcu  bcr  6i:t&i0cu  JKccvicruuflj 
unb  i[}vcr  Organc  fein  2)crfuc[)  jur  flnbcvung  ber  ©tertuug  '^o§nicn§  uiib  t>£C  j^erjc" 
QOiDina  untcruommen  luurbe. 

^omit  »ctf(^ic6t  fic  in  6cimi§t  midfuvlic^cr  Seifc  bie  ©vuubragcn  unfcrct 
<DcniQtc^c,  ba  toir  md}t  bie  toauptuug  aufgejlcUt  ^abcn,  bo^  jic  unb  i^rt  Organc 
in  biefcr  SRi(|tung  offijiett  irgcnb  cttoag  untcruommen  fatten. 

Unfer  ©raDomen  gel^t  otelme^r  bd^in,  ba^  fie  c§  trolj  bcv  in  bcr  jitierteiv 
•fefe  ubcrnwmmencn  35crp[lic^tungen  unterlaffen  ijai,  bie  gcgeu  bie  territorialc  3"^^* 
gxitdt  bw  !ERonarci^ic  gcrid^tete  53emcgung  ju  uutcrbriicfeu. 

3^rc  S3erp[Iic^tung   6e[tanb  d([o  barin,   bie  ganjc  JRic^tung  i^rcr  ^olitif  ju 

dnbern  unb  3ur  oj^erreic^i[cb'ungari[c^en  9)?onarr^ie  in  tin   frcunbnad)bar(i(^e§  ^ct' 

Joltni§  ju  tretcn,  nic^t  blo§  bie  Suge^ortgfeit  ^oSnieng  jur  9)?onarf^ie  offijiea  uic^t 

anjutajlem 

<Dte  9lote  6erbien§  fd^rt  bann  fort: 

^ie  ^ouigQc^e  SRegicrung  fann  nic^t  fiir  tuf erungen  prioaten  Si^araftcrS  bct»' 

auth?0Ti[ic^  gcmad^t .  werben,   toie  eg  ^^itungSortifel   unb   bie  frieblid^c  Slrbeit  oon 

©efedfc^aften   fmb,   Slu^erungen,   bie   faji   in   aacn   Odnbern   gauj   gctoo^nlic^c   (ix» 

fd^eftiungen  ftnb,   unb   bie   fic^  im   aCgemeinen   ber  jlaatlic^en  ^outrolle   entjic^en^ 

Die§  urn  fo  toenigcr,  al§  bie  ^oniglic^e  Dicgierung  bei  ber  Cofung  ciner  ganjcn  5Rei§c 

toon  (^agen,  bie  3n)ifcf)en  6erbien  unb  Ofierrcic^'Ungarn  nufgctaud^t  toarcn,  gro§e8 

(EntgegenEommcn  bettjiefen   [jat,   rtjoburd^  e8   i^r  geCungen  ift,   beren  gtoferen  ^ei^ 

jugunflcn  be8  gortfc^ritt§  ber  beiben  SRad)barldnber  ju  lofcn. 

Slnmerfung  ber  f.  unb  f.  SRegierung: 
$)ic  Set)auptung  bcr  ^oniglic^  ©erbifc^cn  JRegierung,  ba^  bie  tu^erungen  bcri 
^reffe  unb  bie  ^dtigfeit  oon  53ereinen  prioatcn  (S^arafter  f)abtn  unb  fid^  ber  \taair 
lichen  ^ontrolle  ent^ie^en,  ftcl^t  in  oottcm  Siberfpruc^e  ju  ben  (Sinric^tungen  mobernet 
©taaten,  fe(bjl  ber  frei^citUrf)j^eu  .JRic^tung  auf  bcm  ©ebiete  be§  ^rep-  unb  ^ercin8« 
red[}t§,  ba^  einen  offcntlic^'rcd^tlic^en  (E^arafter  §at  unb  ^reffc  fonjie  Sereine  ber 
jtaatlic^cn  Slufftd}t  untcrfieat.  UbrigenS  fc^en  ouc^  bie  fcrbifc^en  (Sinric^tungen  eine 
folc^e  Slufjic^t  t)or.  'Der  gcgen  bie  ©erbifc^e  $Kegierung  er^obene  33orrourf  ge§t  eben 
ba^in,  baJ3  fie  e§  gdn^lic^  untcrlaffen  \)at,  i^re  ^reffe  unb  i^re  5Sereine  ju  beauf* 
jic^tigen,  beren  Sivfung  im  monacc^iefeinblic^en  <Sinne  fie  fannte. 

T)ie  5RDte  Serbien§  fd^rt  fort: 
<Die  ^oniglic^e  SRegierung  mar  bt^\)alb  buxd}  bie  S3e^auptungcn,  ba^  Slnge^orige' 
'SerbienS  an  ber  SSorbereitung  beg  in  ©erajettjo  oeriibtcn  Slttentatg  teilgenommen: 
fatten,  fc^mcr^lid^  uberrafcbt.  ©ie  ^atte  ernjortet,  ^ur  3)^itn)irfung  bei  ben  ^lai^' 
forfc^ungen  uber  biefeg  SSerbrcd^en  eingelaben  ju  loerben,  unb  tt?ar  bereit,  urn  i^te 
Dottfommenc  ^orreft^eit  burc^  5:aten  ju  bcmeifen,  gcgen  atte  ^erfonen  Dorjugel^cn;; 
^infic^tlic^  meld^er  i§r  9)littei[ungen  jugefommen  wdren. 

Slnmerfung  ber  f.  unb  f.-  SHegicrung: 
<Dicfc  Sebauptung  ijt  unrid)tig.    ©ie  ©erbifc^e  JRcgierung  h?ar  ubcr  ben  gcgen 
gona  bejlimmte  ^erfoncn  befte^enben  «8erbac^t  genau  unterric^tet   unb   nic^t  nur  in 


—     16     — 

ber  ?agc,  fonbcra  oud^  nad)  i^rcn  intctncn  ®cfc|cn    Dcr^flic^tet,  ganj  fpontan  gt' 
^cbungcn  cinjulcitcn.     <pic  ^Qt  in  bicfct  SRic^tung  gar  nic^tS  untcrnommen. 

g^otc  ©ct6icn8: 
T^cn  ©unfc^cn  bet  !.  unb  f.  JRcgierung  entfptcd^cnb  ifl  bic  ^oniglic^e 
?Rcgictung  fomit  bcrcit,  bcm  ©cric^t  o[)nc  JKucffic^t  auf  8tcUung  unb  JRang  jcbcn 
ferbifc^cn  ®tant§ange[)Dtigcn  pi  ubcrgeben,  fiir  bcffcn  ^eitna^me  an  bcm  Serajcnjoer 
ICcrbrcc^cn  i^r  Scipcife  gclicfert  mcrben  fofltcn.  ©ic  Derpflicl^tct  fic^  insbcfonberc 
auf  bcr  erflen  ©cite  bc§  2lmt§b(att§  Dom  13/26.  3uli  folgcnbc  Gnuntiation  ju 
tjcroffcntUcbcn :  ^ic  ^oniglic^  ©crbifc^c  9\cgierung  Dcruttcilt  jcbc  ^ropaganbo,  bie 
gcgcn  Opcrreic^'Ungarn  geric^tct  fcin  fotttc,  b.  6.  bic  ©efamt^eit  bet  53ejlrebungen, 
bie  in  (c^tct  Cinie  auf  bic  CoSrei^ung  einjclner  ©ebietc  oon  bcr  ojlcrrcic^ifd^- 
ungarlfd^cu  5Jtonarc^ic  ob^iclen,  unb  fie  bcbauert  aufric^tig  bie  traurigen  %6iQtn 
biefcr  Derbrcc^erifc^en  SJtac^enfd)aften. 

Slnmcrfung  ber  f.  unb  f.  9iegicrung: 

Unfcte  Ootbening  lautetc:  »<Die  ^oniglic^  ©crbifc^e  JKegierung  Dcturtcilt  bic 
gcgcn  ^jicttcic^'llngam  gcrid^tetc  ^ropaganba. . .« 

<t)ic  t»on  bcr  5\onignd^  ©erbifc^cn  SRcgicrung  »orgenommenc  Sinberung  bcr 
Don  ung  geforbcrtcn  Grfldrung  h)iD[  [agcn,  ba^  cine  fotd^c  gcgcn  Operrcic^ '  Ungarn 
geric^tcte  ^ropaganbd  nic^t  bcflc^t,  ober  ba^  i^r  cine  fold^c  nic^t  bcfannt  ijt.  ^icfc 
gotmcf  ifl  unaufric^tig  unb  ^inter^dttig,  ba  fic^  bie  ©crbifc^c  JRcgieruiig  bamit  fiir 
fpater  bic  Slugfluc^t  rcfevDiert,  fie  ^dttc  bic  bcrjcit  bcfie^cnbe  ^ropaganba  burc^  bicfe 
©rfldrung  nic^t  begoDouicrt  unb  nic^t  al§  monarc^icfcinblic^  ancrfannt,  troraug  jic 
hjcitcr  abieitcn  fonntc,  ba§  fic  jur  Uiitcrbriicfung  ciner  bcr  jc^igcn  ^ropaganba 
g[cic^cn  nic^t  Dcrpflid^tct  fci. 

?Rotc  SctbicnS: 

1)ic  ^onigiic^c  5Rcgicrung  bcboucrt,  ba§  laut  bcr  SJlittcilung  bcr  f.  unb  f. 
9?cgicrung  genjiffe  fcrbifc^c  Offijicrc  unb  (^unftiondrc  an  bcr  cben  genanntcu  ^ro* 
paganba  mitgc»irft,  unb  bo^  bicfe  bamit  bic  freunbnac^6ar[irf}en  5^e5ic[)ungen  gc« 
fd^rbct  ^dttcn,  ju  bercn  Scobac^tung  fic^  bie  ^onigiic^c  JRcgierung  burc^  bic 
ertidrung  tjom  31.3Jldrj  1909  feicrtic^  Dcrpflic^tct  ^attc. 

Die  JRegicrung  .  .  .  .«  glcic^fautcnb  mit  bcm  geforbcrtcn  ^ejtc. 

Slnmcrfung  ber  f.  unb  f.  JKcgicrung: 

Die  con  un8  geforbcrte  f^otmuUcrung  (autcte:  »X)ie  ^onigHc^c  JRcgicrung 
bcboucrt,   bo^  fcrbifc^e  Offijiere  unb  gunftiondrc  ....  mitgemirft  ^obcn  .  ,  .  .« 

^iud)  mit  bicfct  gormulicrung  unb  bcm  mcitcvcu  Seifa^  »(aut  bcr  SJiit- 
teilung  bcr  f.  unb  f.  JKcgicrung*  oerfoigt  bie  c®rbifd)c  JRcgicrung  ben  bereitS  obcn 
angebeutcten  3*^^^/  f^^  fu^  bic  3"fw"ft  frcic  Qanh  ju  toa^rcn. 

SRote  OerbicnS: 

^ic  ^oniglic^c  JRcgierung  Dcrpflic^tct  fic^  meitcr 

1.  Slnid^iic^  bc8  ndc^jlcn  orbnungSmd^igcn  3"[<i"imcntritt§  bcr  ©fupfcf)tina 
in  bag  <Pre^gcfc|  cine  53cftimmung  cinjufc^aitcn,  monac^  bic  ?lufreijung  jum  .f^ajfc 
unb  jut  SScrac^tung  gcgcn  bic  9)bnarc^ie  foiuie  jcbc  ^ubtifation  ftrcngflcnS  6cf!raft 
miirbc,  bercn  aCgemcinc  ^cubcnj  gc^en  bic  territorialc  ^ntegritdt  Oflcrteic^'UngarnS 
geric^tct  ijl. 


--    17    — 

^ic  \jcvpflirf)tet  f\d),  an(d^(ic§  ber  bemnarf)}!:  crforgcubcn  3\coifiott  bcr  23ct« 
faffung  in  ben  5lrtifel  XXII  beg  53crfaf[ung89efc|e8  tincn  3nfa|  aufjunc^men,  htc 
Ut  ^onfi§fation  bcrartiger  ^ublifationcn  gcjlattet,  waS  nad)  ben  fkrcn  SScj^immungcn 
bcS  2lrti£ct§  XXII  bcr  ^onjlitution  bcr^eit  unmogtic^  ijl. 

Slnmetfung  bcr  f.  unb  t  SRcgierung: 

Sir  fatten  geforbcrt: 

»1.  3ebe  ^IDuBlifation  3u  untcrbrucfcn,  bie  jum  ipaffe  unb  ^ur  Scrac^tung^ 
ber  TD^onarc^ie  aufvcist  unb  beren  ^cnbenj  gcgen  bic  territoriafc  3"tcgritdt  bcr 
SJionarc^ic  gcrid^tct  i|i.« 

2Bir  njotltcn  alfo  bic  Scrpflic^tung  ©crbicnS  ^crbcifii^ren,  bafiiv  ju  [orgcn, 
ba^  bcrartigc  ^rc^angriffc  in  ^infunft  uhtcrblcibcuj  n)ir  ttjiinfc^tcu.  a(fo  eincn  6c* 
jlimntten  Grfolg  auf  bicfcm  ®c6iete  fic^crgcj^cllt  ju  ttjijfen. 

©tatt  bcffcn  bictet  ung  ©crbicn  bic  erlajfung  gcroijfcr  ®cfc|c  on,  toclc^c  aU 
Wxitd  ju  bicfcm  (Erfolgc  bicnen  foUcn,  unb  jmar: 

a)  (Sin  ®cfc|,  n?omit  bie  fraglic^cn  monarc^icfeinblic^cn  ^rcfdu§crungcn  fu6' 
jcftiD  bcflraft  n^erben  follen,  n^ag  ung  gang  g[eic^gu[tig  ijl,  urn  fo  me^r,  alg  befanntcr* 
ma§cn  bic  fu6jeftiDc  SScrfolgung  toon  ^rc|be(iftcn  Su^crjl  feltcn  moglic^  ift,  unb  bci 
cincr  cntfprcc^cnb  (ojcn  Sc^anbtung  cincg  f eleven  ®efc|eg  and)  bic  tt)cmgcn  gaCc 
bicfcr  5lrt  nic^t  jur  Scflrafung  fommcn  tDiirbcn/  a[fo  cin  SSorfc^tag,  bcr  unfcrcr 
gorbcvung  in  fcincr  ffieifc  cntgcgenfommt,  ba^cr  ung  nid^t  bic  gcringjlc  ©arantic  fur 
ben  t)on  ung  gch?iinfct)tcn  Srfolg  bietctj 

b)  ein  SRac^tragggefel  ^u  SlrtifcC  XXII  bcr  ^onj^itution,  ha^  bic  ^onfigfation 
gcjtattet  njfirbc  —  cin  53orf(^lag,  bcr  ung  glcid^faffg  nic^t  befricbigcn  fann,  ha  bcr 
53efianb  cincg  folc^en  ®efc|cg  in  6cr6icn  ung  nic^tg  nu^t,  fonbcm  nur  bic  Scr* 
pflic^tung  ber  5Regicrung,  eg  aucf)  an3utt5cnbcn,  ttjag  ung  aber  nic^t  tocrfproc^cn  mirb. 

©iefe  53Drfc^ldgc  fmb  alfo  Dottfommcn  unbcfricbigenb  —  bicg  urn  fo  me^r, 
alg  ftc  avid)  in  bcr  !!Ric^tung  cbafto  fmb,  ba^  ung  nic^t  gcfagt  mirb,  inncr^alb  rocfd^cr 
^rift  biefc  ®cfc|c  crloffcn  ttjiirben,  unb  ba|  im  ^attc  bcr  Sl6le§nung  bcr  ®cfc^cg. 
toorlagcn  burc^  bie  ©fupfc^tina  —  toon  bcr  cDcntucttcn  €)cmiffion  bcr  SRcgicrung  ab* 
gefc^cn  —  alleg  beim  olten  blicbc. 

9latc  ©crbicng: 
2.  <t)ic  5Rrgicrung  bcft^t  fcincrlci  Setocifc  bafiir  unb  ouc^  bic  9lotc  bcr  t 
unb  t.  SRcgierung  ticfert  i^r  fcinc  fotc^cn,  ba§  bcr  SSercin  »5Rarobna  Obbrana*  unb 
anberc  d^nlic^c  ®cfcafc^aftcn  big  jum  ^cutigcrt  2;agc  burc^  cincg  i^rct  SJlitglicbct 
irgcnbn)e[c^e  oerbrec^cvifc^cn  ^anbhingen  bicfcr  Slrt  bcgangcn  l^dttcn.  ^Uc^tgbejlomcnigcr 
juirb  bic  ^oniglic^c  SRcgicrung  bic  gorbcrung  bcr  f.  unb  t  9f?cgicrung  onnc^mcn 
unb  bic  ©cfellfc^aft  ^gkrobna  Obbranai  foioic  jcbc  ®cfcafc^aft,  bic  gcgen  6flcrrcic^» 
Ungdm  mxUn  fotttc,  auflofcn. 

Slnmerfung  bcr  f.  uttb  t  JRcgicrung: 
^ie  monarcbicfcinblic^c  ^ropagonba   bcr  »9larobna  Obbrana*    unb  bcr  i^r 
affiUcrtcn  SScreinc  crfuUt  in  ©crbien  bag  gaujc  bffentlicbc  Ccbcn,  eg  ijl  ba^cr  cine 
ganj  un^ulaffige  SUcfcrtoc,  wcnn  bic  fcrbifc^  Oicgierung  bc^auptcty  ha^  i^r  bariibw 
nic^tg  bcfannt  ijl. 

6 


—     18     — 

©anj  abgcfc^cn  bauon  ijl  bic  t)on  uuS  aufgcftctttc  gotbcrung  nic§t  jUt  ©anjc 
erfiiat,  ba  toir  ubetbicS  octlangt  ^abcn: 

bie  ^ropaganbamittel  bicfcr  ©cfettfc^aftcn  ju  f onfigjiercn  / 
bie  9icu6ilbun0  bet  aufgdojlen  ®c[ettfc^aftcn  untcr  anbetcm  9kmen  unb 
in  nnbeter  ©cjlatt  ju  Dct^inbern. 
3n  bicfcn  beibcn  SRic^tungen  fc^iccigt  ba§  Scrgrabet  ^abinctt  ooUfommcn,  fo 
bof  un8  awd)  butd^  bic  gegebcnc  ^albc  S^f^Q^  ^fi"^  ©arantic  ba[ur  gcbotcn  i^,  bo^ 
bcm    3:m6cn    bet   monatc^icfcinbUc^cn    Slffojiationcn,    inSbefonbcrc    bet    »5Rarobna 
Db6rano«,  burd^  bcren  Sluflofung  befinitiD  ein  6nbc  bercitct  marc. 

?Rotc  @crbicn§: 

3.  Oic  ^onigrid^  ®cr6ifcf)c  JRcgicrung  ocrpflic^tet  fid)  o^nc  SSctjug  ou8  bcm 
fiffentlic^cn  Untcrtid^t  in  ©crbien  atteS  au§5ufd^ciben,  h)a8  bic  gegcn  Sjlcrrcid^'Ungatn 
geric^tctc  ^ropaganba  fSrbcrn  fonntc,  fall8  i^r  bic  t  unb  t  Slegicrung  totfac^Uc^c 
Scmcifc  flit  bicfc  ^topaganbo  licfcrt. 

Slnmcrfung  bcr  t  unb  t  SRcgictung: 

Slud^  in  bicfcm  %a\lt  ocrlangt  bic  fctbifc^c  SRcgicrung  ct|l  S3cn)ci[c  bafiir, 
bo^  tm  offcntlic^cn  Untcrric^tc  @crbicn§  cine  monarc^iefcinblid^c  ^ropaganba  gctricbcn 
njirb,  tud^renb  fic  boc^  toijfcn  mu^,  ba^  bic  bci  ben  ferbifc^cn  ©c^ulen  cingefii^xten 
Ccl^rbuc^er  in  bicfcr  SRic^tung  ju  beonpanbcnbcn  ©toff  cnt^altcn,  unb  ba^  cin  grower 
3;ci(  bcr  fcrbifc^cn  Cc§rct  im  Cagcr  bcr  »9^Qrobno  Obbrana*  unb  bcr  i^r  afplicrtcn 
SScreinc  ftc§t. 

flbrigcnS  f^at  bic  6crbi[c^c  SRegierung  aud^  ^icr  cincn  ^cil  unfcrcr  ^urberungcn 
nid^t  fo  crfuClt,  n)ic  njir  c8  Dcrlangt  ^abcn,  inbcm  fic  in  i^rcm  2;c5tc  ben  Don  un8 
getoiinfc^tcn  53cifa|  »fott)0^l  ma8  ben  Ce^rforper,  al§  auc^  n)a8  bic  Cc^rmittct  aW' 
6e[angt«,  toegliel,  —  cin  53cifa|,  hjcic^cr  ganj  ffar  jcigt,  mo  bic  monarc^iefclnbHc^c 
^ropaganba  in  bcr  ferbifd^en  ©d^ulc  ju  fuc^cn  i|l. 

SfJote  ©erbienS: 

4.  5!)ic  ^oniglic^c  SRcgicrung  ijl  and)  bercit,  |ene  Offijicre  unb  Scamten  au8 
bcm  9?^iiitdr«  unb  giDilbienfl  ju  entiajfen,  ^inpc^tlic^  meic^cr  burc^  geric^tlic^e  Untcr' 
fuc^ung  fcftgejlcllt  mirb,  ba^  fic  fic^  ioonblungcn  gegcn  bic  tcrritorialc  ^"tegritdt 
bcr  !Konarc^ie  ^aben  jufcf)ulbcn  tommen  (ojfcn|  fie  crtoartet,  ba^  i§r  bic  t  unb  t 
Slcgierung  jmedfg  GinUitung  be8  S3erfa^rcn8  bic  Xiamen  bicfcr  Offl^icrc  unb  Seamten 
unb  bie  ^^tfad^cn  mittcilt,  toclc^c  bcnfclbcn  jur  Cap  gclcgt  tocrbcn. 

Slnmcrfung  bcr  t  unb  t  JRcgicrung: 
3nbcm  bie  ^oniglic^  ©erbifc^c  JRcgierung  bic  Suf^flc  bcr  (Sntiaffung  bcr  frog* 
lichen  Dffijicre  unb  ^camten  au§  bcm  SKilitdr*  unb  3i^if^if"j^  Q"  ^e«  Umftanb 
fnupft,  ha^  biefc  ^erfoncn  burc^  cin  ©cric^tsocrfa^ren  fc^ulbig  befunben  merben,  fc^rdnft 
fic  i^re  gufage  auf  jene  ^^aUt  cin,  in  bencn  bicfcn  ^erfonen  cin  ftrafgcfc^lic^  ju 
a^nbenbeg  ^elift  jur  Cajt  licgt.  <Da  mir  aber  bic  entfernung  jener  Offijicrc  unb 
Scomten  oertangcn,  bic  monard^icfcinblic^c  ^ropaganba  betrcibcn,  ioaS  \a  im  allgcmcincn 
in  6erbicn  fcin  geric^tlic^  jlrafbarcr  ^atbepanb  i|t,  erfc^cinen  unferc  gorbcrungen 
and)  in  bicfcm  ^unftc  nic^t  erfiiUt. 


—     19     — 

5lote  bet  ^oniglic^  ©ct6ifc^en  5Rcgicrung: 

5.  ^ic  ^onigticfcc  SRcgierung  mu^  bcfcnnen,  ha^  jic  jic^  iiber  ben  (Sinn  unb 
bic  ^ragn^eitc  jeneg  23egcl^rcng  bet  t  unb  t  SRegicrung  nid^t  DoHe*  9?ed)cnfd[)aft 
gebcn  fann,  toefc^eg  ba^in  gc^t,  ba§  bic  ^oniglic^  ©er6ifd}c  JRcgicrung  fic^  berpflic^tcn 
foff,  auf  i^rcn  ©ebieten  bic  SDlitoirfung  oon  Organen  bet  f.  f.  JRegicrung  3U3U' 
[ajfcn,  boc^  erflart  fic,  ba^  fic  jebc  3}tittt}irfung  onjunefjmcn  bereit  njarc,  n)clc^c  htn 
®runb[d|en  be§  23olferrcd[)tg  unb  be§  ©trafprojeffcg  foroic  ben  freunbna(f)6Qr[id^en 
55ejic^ungen  cntfprcd^en  njurbc. 

Slnmerfung  bet  f.  unb  f.  JRegtcrung: 
^it  biefcr  grage  f)at  ba^  attgemeinc  SSolferred^t  cBcnfowenig  drna^  ju  tun 
tt)ic  bog  6trafpro3e|re(^t:  gg  ^anbelt  fid^  urn  einc  Slngefcgen^eit  rein  jlaatSpolijci' 
lid^er  Dhtur,  bic  im  2Bege  einet  Befonbcren  53ercin6atung  ju  lofen  ijt.  ^ic  Dtcfetuc 
@cr5ien§  ijl  bn^cr  unoerftanblic^  unb  rodre  6ei  i^rcr  bagen  allgemcincn  gorm  gecignct, 
ju  unuberbriictbarcn  ®c^tt)icrigfeiten  6ei  2l6[(f)lup  be§  3U  tteffenben  5l6fommcnS 
ju  ful^ten. 

?Rote  bcr  ^oniglic^  ®er6ifc^cn  SRcgierung: 

6.  ^ic  ^oniglic^c  !Kegictung  p(t  eg  fe[bftt)erjtdnb(ic^  fiir  i^re  ^jiic^t,  gegen 
affc  jcnc  ^erfoncn  einc  Untcrfuc^ung  cinjufeitcn,  bic  an  bem  ^omplott  »om 
15./28.  3«nt  beteifigt  n^aren  ober  Beteiligt  genjefcn  fein  foffen  unb  bic  fid)  Quf 
i^rcm  ©cbiete  bcfinbcn.  SfBa8  bic  !5Jlitmirfung  Don  l^icrju  fpe^ied  belegicrten  Organen 
bcr  f.  unb  f.  JRegierung  an  biefcr  Unterfud^ung  anbcJangt,  [0  fann  fic  einc  [o(c^c 
nid^t  anne^men,  ba  bie§  einc  S3er[e^ung  bcr  33erfa[[ung  unb  bc§  ©trafprojc^gefelcS 
n)are.  ^Doc^  fonntc  ben  ojlerreit^ifc^'Ungarifd^cn  Organen  in  cinjcfncn  gotten  5)^ittei[ung 
t)on  ben  Srge6nif[cn  bcr  Unterfud^ung  gemad^t  luerben. 

Slnmcrfung  bcr  f.  unb  f.  SfJcgicrung: 
llnfcr    5^erfangcn    n?ar    ganj    f(ar    unb    nic^t    mi^jubeuten.     ffiir    6ege[}rten 

1.  Sintcitung  einer  gerid^tlid^cn  Untcrfuc^ung  gegen  bic  ^cilne^mer  be§  5^omplott§, 

2.  ^ei(na[)me  bon  t  unb  f.  Organen  an  ben  ()ierauf  Bcjiiglic^en  (Srfjebungcn 
(SRec^crc^c  im  ©cgenfa|  3U  enquete  judiciaire),  3.  e8  ijl  un8  nic^t  bcigcfatten, 
t  unb  f.  Organc  an  bem  ferbifc^en  ®eric^t§oerfal)rcn  tcirne^mcn  ju  la[|en:  ©ic 
fottten  nur  an  ben  poli^eilic^en  <8orer[)cbungeu  mitwirfen,  mi<^t  ha^  33Ratcria[  fiir 
bie  Untcrfuc^ung  l^crbcijufd^affen  unb  fid^cr^ujleden  fatten. 

Senn  bic  8erbifc§e  SRcgicrung  ung  ^icr  mi^Dcrjlc^t,  fo  tut  ftc  bie§  bctou^^ 
benn  bet  Unterfd^icb  jn^ifd^cn  enquete  judiciaire  unb  ben  cinfad^en  SRed^erd^en  muf 
i^t  getdufig  fein. 

<Da  fic  fic^  jcbct  ^ontrottc  beg  cinjufcitcnbcn  23erfa^rcng  ju  eiitjie^en  njiinfc^te, 
bag  bei  forreftcr  ^urd^fu^rung  ^od^jl  unern)unfd)te  Grgcbniffe  fur  fic  (iefcrn  n^urbc, 
unb  ha  fie  feine  ioonbE>abc  befi|t,  in  ptaufibfer  SCeifc  bie  SBitroirfung  unfcrcr 
Orgone  an  bem  polijcilic^cn  Scrfa^ren  abjule^nen  (5lna(ogien  fur  folc^c  polijcitic^cn 
3ntcrt)cntioncn  bcjlef)en  in  grower  3)^engc),  i}at  fie  fic^  auf  einen  8tanbpunft  begeben, 
ber  i^ret  Slbtc^ung  ben  ©c^ein  bet  53ercd^tigung  gcben  unb  unferem  ^erlangcn  ben 
8tempel  bcr  Unerfuttbarfcit  aufbriiden  foU. 


—    20     — 

Vlott  bet  ®cr6if(^cn  JRegicrung: 

7.  ^ie  ^onigfid^c  9legierung  f)at  noc^  am  Slbcnb  bc8  ^ageS,  nn  bem  i^t  bie 
!^ote  3ufam,  bie  23et^aftung  be8  SJiajorS  53oigIar  ^anfofic  Dcrfiigt.  5Ba8  abet  ben 
Wlilan  Siganoctc  anbefangt,  bet  eiit  Slngc^ottgct  bet  ofletteid^ifc^-uugartfc^eu  Wlori' 
Qtc^ic  ifl,  unb  bet  big  jum  15.  3uni  (Q^^  Slfpitaut)  bei  bet  6i[en6a^nbiteftion  bt' 
bienjlct  njat,  fo  fonnte  biefet  bi§^et  nic^t  auggefotfc^t  tuetben,  m^alb  ein  ©tecfbtief 
gegen  ii^n  etfaffcn  toutbe. 

T)ie  t  unb  f.  9f?egietung  tt)itb  gebeten,  jnjccfg  ^Durd^fiil^tung  bet  Untetfud^ung 
fobolb  a[§  mogHc^  bie  bcfie^enben  53etbacl^t§gtuubc  unb  bie  bei  bet  Untctfuc^ung  in 
©etajenjo  gefammeften  @ci^ulbben)ei[e  in  bet  be^cic^neten  ^^otm  befannt^ugeben. 

Slnntetfung  bet  !.  unb  f.  JRegictung: 
^iefc  5lntn)otl:  ifl  §intetf)a[tig.  6igano»ic  ging  (out  bet  toon  un8  bctanra^ten 
9lac^fotfc^ung  btei  2:age  nac^  bem  5lttentat,  aU  bcfannt  xoniht,  ha^  (Eiganobic  an 
bem  ^omplotte  beteiiigt  toat,  auf  Utlaub  unb  begab  jic^  im  Slufttag  bet  ^*o[ijei» 
ptdfeftut  in  S3efgtab  noc^  SRibati.  68  ift  a[\o  junac^jl  unti(f)tig,  ba^  Siganooic  fd^on 
am  15./28.  3uni  au3  bem  fetbifc^en  <5taat§bienjt  fd^ieb.  ioift:ju  fommt,  bo^  bcr 
^oHjeiptafcft  Don  SSefgtob,  bet  bie  5lbtei[e  be§  Siganobic  felbjl  oetanta^t  f)at  unb 
bet  tou^te,  mo  biefet  fid^  auf^ielt,  in  einem  3"tci^^i*^  etfldtte,  ein  23^ann  namenS 
Mian  giganotoic  csijlictc  in  ^elgtab  nic^t. 

g^ote  bet  8etbifd)cn  JRcgietung: 

8.  ©ie  6etbi[c^e  5Rcgictung  mitb  bie  bejlei)cnben  SJiapnatjmen  gegen  bie  Untet' 
btucfung  bc§  6cbmugge{n§  Don  ffiaffen  unb  (Jjplofiojloffen  octfc^dtfen  unb  ctmcitctn. 

(Sg  ijt  fc(bftDftjlanblirf),  baf  fie  fofott  eine  llntetfud()ung  einieiten  unb  jene 
SSeamtcn  bc§  ®tenjbienfle§  in  bet  Cinie  Sabnc-^ojuica  jlvcng  bejltrafen  mitb,  bie 
i^te  ^fli(f)t  Detle^t  unb  bie  llr[}ebet  bes  SSetbiec^cng  bie  ©ren^c  [}a6en  iibetfc^rciten  (affen. 

9i  ^ie  ^oniglic^c  JRegictung  ift  getn  bereit,  (^ttldtungen  libct  bie  5iu§etungcn 
ju  gcben,  meicbe  i^te  5^eamten  in  ©etbien  unb  im  Slu§fanb  nac^  bem  3lttentat  in 
3nteroicmg  gemac^t  ^aBen  unb  bie  nad^  hex  5Bc§auptung  bet  f.  unb  t  9f?egierung 
bet  SJionarc^ie  feinbfelig  morcn,  fobalb  bie  f.  unb  f.  JRcgierung  bie  ^UHm  biefet 
tlugfii^tungcn  bejeic^nct  unb  bcmicfen  §aben  mitb,  ba^  biefc  flu^etungen  Don  bm 
betteffenben  ^unftiondven  tatfdc^lirf)  gemac^t  morbcn  fmb.  Die  5!onig(i(^c  JRegietung 
mitb  felbjl  6otge  tragcn,  bie  notigeu  Semcife  unb  lUetfii^tunggmittel  ^ietfut  ju 
fammetn. 

Slnmetfung  bet  f.  unb  f.  JRegictung: 

15et  ^oniglic^  Sctbifc^cn  JRegietung  miiffcn  bie  bejiiglid^cn  ^ntetoiemS  ganj 
genau  bcfninit  fein.  Senn  fie  Don  bn  t.  unb  f.  JRegierung  Detlangt,  ba^  biefe 
i^t  nCerfei  <Cctai(g  ubet  bicfe  3ntetDien>§  (iefcte  unb  fi(^  eine  formlic^c  Untctfuc^ung 
l^ietubet  Dotbe^dU,  ^cigt  fie,  ba^  fie  auc^  bie  ^^otbcning  nic^t  ctnjltic^  etfuflen  mifl. 

^Xoit  bet  <Setbifc^en  SRegietung: 
10.    ©ic  ^oniglidie  JRegictung  mirb,    fofetn  bie§   nic^t  fc^on  in  biefet  9lotc 
£efc^el)en  ifl,  bie  f.  unb  f.  9Regietung  Don  bet  ^utc^fii^tung  bet  in  ben  Dotflc^enben 
^unften  cnt^altcnen  ^a^na^meu  in  5^enntni§  fe^en,    fobalb  cine  biefet  SjRoftegeln 
pngeotbnct  unb  butc^gcfu^tt  mitb. 


—   lii   — 

<C)ie  ^onigftc^  6et6ifc^e  SRegierung  gfauBt,.  ha^  c8  im  gcmctnfamen  3"*^^^!!^ 
fiegt,  bte  Cofung  bicfcr.  $lnge(cgcn^ctt  nic^t  ju  uBcrjlurjcu  unb  ift  balder,  falls  fic^ 
bic  f.  unb  t  Diegicrung  burc^  bicfc  Slntroort  nic^t  fur  bcfticbigt  crac^ten  fotttc, 
ttjic  immer  bercit,  cine  fneb(id)c  Cofung  anjunc^mcn,  fci  c8  burc^  llBcrtragung  bcr 
entfc^cibung  biefcr  ^^ragc  an  ba8  3"t^^nationa(e  ©crlc^t  im  ^aa^,  fei  c8  burc^ 
flbcrtajfung  ber  Sntfc^cibung  an  bic  ©to^mac^tc,  h)eld)c  an  ber  SluSarbcitung  bet 
Don  ber  (gcrbifc^cn  SRcgicrung  am  18./31.  SMrj  1909  abgcgcbcncn  €rf(a.tung  init» 
geteitft  ^aben.  —  ©c^lu^  bet  5Rotc. 


Zn&  dem  d|!etrci4>ifct>*un0atif4>en  Material 

ffiien^  27.  3"li-  ^^^  in  ber  ojltetteid^ifc^'Ungatifc^cn  gipfurornotc  an  bic 
flugtoartigen  Sotfc^aften  in  Slngctegen^cit  b'eS  fcrbifc^en  ^onjiift§  crroa^nte  <Doffier 
toitb  ^eutc  betoffcnttid^t. 

.Jn  biefcm  S}lcmoirc  tt)irb  barauf  l^ingcttjicfcn,  ha^  bit  t)on  6etbicn  au8» 
fitgangene  Semcgung,  bic  fic^  jum  gielc  gcfe^t  l^at,  bic  fubHc^cn  ^citc  6flctreid^' 
UngornS  t»on  ber  SJlonarc^ie  iogjureipen,  urn  jie  mit  6er6icn  ju  ciner  jtaatiic^cn 
Cin^eit  3U  ocrbinbcn,  hjcit  jururfgreiff.  ©icfe  in  i^rcn  (Snbjiefcn  jietS  gfeid^bleibenbe 
unb  nur  in  i^ren  S)iitte[n  unb  an  ^ntcnptot  toed^felnbe  ^ropaganba  erreic^te  jur 
3cit  ber  Slnnejiongfrifc  i^ren  ^o^epunft  unb  trat  bamaf§  offen  mit  i^rcn  ^cnbenjen 
^er»or.  SBa^renb  cinerfeitS  bie .  gefamtc  ferbifc^e  ^reffc  jum  ^ampfc  gcgen  bie 
tWonarc^ic  aufricf,  bifbcten  fid)  —  Don  anbcrcn^ropaganbamittcfn  abgcfcl^en  — 
^Ijfojiationen,  bic  biefe  ^dmpfc  Dorberciteten,  untcr  bencn  bic  9^arobna  Obbrana 
an  Scbcutung  ^croorrogtc.  Slug  cinem  rcDolutionaren  ^omitce  ^erDorgcgangcn,  fon« 
jlituiertc  fic§  biefe  dom  53elgiabct  Slugnjdrttgen  §lmtc  Dollig  ab^dngige  Organifation 
untcr  Ccitung  Don  ©taat§niduncrn  unb  Offi3icrcn,  baruntec  bem  ©encral  ^anfobic 
unb  bem  c^emaligcn  9}?inificr  3^«noDic.  Sluc§  S^ajor  Oja  ^anfoDic  unb  SJittan 
^ribiceDic  ge^oren  ju  bicfen  ©runbern.  bicfcr  Serein  f)aitt  fid)  bie  53ilbung  unb 
Slu§riijtung  Don  ^^reifc^aren  fiir  ben  bcDor|!el^cnbcn  ^xicg  gegen  bie  ojl  ertcid^ifd^-unga' 
rifd}e  3)?onarc^ic  jum  '^itiz  gefe^t.  3"  ciner  bem  3)lemoire  angefugten  5lnlage  »Dirb 
ein  Slugjug  au8  bem  Dom  SentralauSfc^up  bet  9larobna  Obbrana  §erau§gcgebcnen 
53ercin8organc  gleic^en  9^amen§  Deroffcntlicbt,  njorin  in  me^rcren  Slrtifcln  bic  ^attg* 
feit  unb  Sielc  bicfeS  53ercin8  au§fu^rlic^  bargelcgt  merben.  (£§  l)ei^t  barin,  bo^ 
ju  ber  Si^uptaufgabc  ber  5Ravobnc  Obbrana  bic  Serbinbung  mit  i^reii  na^cn  unb 
fernercn  Sriibern  jenfeitS  ber  ©ren^e  unb  unferen  iibrigcn  gi^unben  in  ber  5Celt  gc^oren. 

fcflerrcic^  ijl  a(8  trjlcr  unb  gro^ter  ^cinb  Bcaeid^nct.  SBic  bie 
Slarobna  Obbrana  bie  5lotmcnbigfcit  be8  ^ampfeS  mit  ^ftcrrcid^  prebigt,  prcbigt  fie 
eine  ^clligc  ©a^r^eit  unferer  nationalcn  Cage.  "Dag  6c§lu§fapite[  cnt^dlt  einen 
apca  an  bie  JRcgicrung  unb  ba8  Solf  ecrbien8, .  f^  mit  alien  SKittcln  fur  ben 
5^ampf  Dorjubcreiten,  ben  bic  Slnnc^ion  Dorangejeigt  §ot. 

^a8  SJicmoirc  fc^ilbert  nad)  ciner  5lu8fagc  einc8  Don  ber  9^arobna  Obbrona 
angeiDorbencn  ^omitatfc^i8  bie  bamaligc  ^dtigfeit  ber  9iarobna  Obbrana, 
bie  cine  Don  jmci  ^Quptlcutcn,  barunter  Q:anfoDic,  geleitctc  ©c^ulc  jur  2lu8» 
l&ilbu'ng  Don  SBanben  untcr^iclt^  ©c^ulcuy  njclc^e  Don  ©cncral  3anfoDic  unb  Doa 

6 


—    5i2    — 

ioou^tmann  Wlitan  ^riBicctotc  rcgclma^ig  infpijicrt  tourbcn,  Scitet  tourbeh  bie 
^oinitatf(f)i§  im  ©d^ie^cn  unb  SombentDcrfcn,  im  ?Dlincn[cgcn,  ©prcngcn 
t)on  Gifcnbal^nbriicfcn  ufm.  untetric^tet.  9iac^  ber  fcicrli(f)cn  (Erflarung  bcr  ©ctbi' 
fc^en  SRegicrung  torn  '^a^u  1909  fc^ien  auc^  ba^  6nbe  biefer  Organifation  gc' 
fommen  ju  fcin.  ©'ie[c  Grnjartungcn  f)ahtn  f\d)  abcr  nid)t  nur  nid)t  erfiiUt,  fonbcrn 
bic  ^Propaganba  tcmhe  burc^  bic  fcrbi[c^c  ^rcjye  fortgcfc^t.  ^Da§  S)^emoire  fii^rt 
al8  Scifplel  bic  Slit  unb  SBeifc  an,  mie  ba§  Slttentat  gcgen  ben  bo§nifc^cn  Canbe§' 
d^cf  23aTc[anin  publtjijlifc^  certocrtct  tt»urbe,  inbcm  bet  5lttentdtcr  al§  [erbi[cf)er 
S^ational^clb  gcfeiert  unb  fcinc  %at  Dcr^errdc^t  wurbc.  '^kit  Slattcr  n)urbcn  md)t 
nut  in  Serbien  berbrcitct,  fonbern  au6)  auf  Wo^Iorganificrtcn  Sc^leic^mcgcn  in  bie 
Wlomxdi)k  cingefcE)muggclt. 

Untcr  bcr  gleic^en  Ccitung  tt)ic  bci  i^ter  ©runbung  wurbe  bie  9iftrobna  Dbbtano 
ncuerlic^  bet  3^"^^<i^punft  ^^^^^  Slgitation,  teelc^er  ber  v3c^u|cnbunb  mit 
762  SScreinen,  cin  8o!o(bunb  mit  3  500  SJiitgliebctn  unb  oerfc^iebenc 
dnberc  SSereinc  ongc^orten. 

3m  5^[cibe  cincS  ^u[tutuerein8  ouftretcnb,  bem  nur  bie  geij^ige  unb  bic 
forperlic^e  Gntioicfetung  bcr  53eD5lfcrung  ©crblen§  fon^ic  bcren  matcrieCe  ^roftigung 
am  ^erjen  (iegt,  ent^iiUt  bic  Dkrobna  Obbrana  i^r  uja^reS  reorganifiertcg  ^ro« 
gramm  in  botjiticrtcm  SluSjug  au8  i^rem  SSereinSorgon,  in  ttietci^em  »bic  ^eiiige 
2Ba^r^eit«  geprcbigt  wirb,  ba^  c8  cine  unerld^lic^c  5^otn3enbigfeit  ifl,  gcgcn 
Sflcrrcid^,  fcincn  erjicn  gr6§ten  O^i^b,  biefcn  2lusrottung§fampf  mit 
®ett}e^r  unb  ^anonc  ju  fii^ren,  unb  ha^  SSolf  mit  alien  -D^itteln  auf  ben 
^ampf  ootjubereitcn,  jur  53efreiung  ber  unterft>orfenen  ©ebicte,  in  benen  tjietc 
!D?iUioncn  untcrjoc^tcr  Sriiber  fc^mad)ten.  1)ic  in  bem  2)^cmolre  jitierten  5lufrufc 
unb  JKcben  d^nlic^en  (i^araftcr§  beleuc^teu  bie  Dicifeitige  auSivartige  5;dtigfeit  bcr 
9^arobna  Obbrana  unb  i^rcr  affiliertcn  SScrcine,  bie  in  Sortragsrcifen,  in  ber  ^eil* 
na^mc  an  T^cfien  con  bo8ni[c^en  l^ereinen,  bci  bcnen  offcn  SJ^itglieber  [iir  bic 
crrod^nte  ferbifc^e  53ereinigung  gcmorben  njurben,  bcftel^t.  ©egcnn?drtig  ift  noc^  bie 
Unterfuc^ung  bariiber  im  3uge,  ba§  bie  8ofolDcrcinc  (BerbicnS  analoge  SScrcinignngen 
ber  3}^onar(^ic  bejlimmten,  jic^  mit  i^nen  in  cinem  bigger  gc^eim  gc^altenen  33cr« 
6anbe  3U  Dcreinigen.  ^urd^  53ertrauen8mdnner  unb  3)^i[fiondrc  iDutbc  bie  Sluf* 
toicgelung  in  bie  ^reife  Grnjoc^fener  unb  ber  urtcilgfofen  3"9^'^b  gebracf)t.  ©0 
tt)urbcn  Don  Wlilan  ^ribiceh)itfc^  e^cmalige  ioonbeboffijicre  unb  ein  ©enbarmcrie* 
tcutnant  jum  SSertaffen  bc8  ^eereSbienjleS  in  ber  9)ionarc^ie  untcr  bcbenflid^en  Um* 
jtdnbcn  oerleitet.  3"  ^^n  ©cf)uren  ber  Ce^rerbi(bung§anjlaltcn  njurbc  cine  meit* 
ge^enbe  5lgitation  entmicfett.  ^er  gemiinfc^te  ^ricg  gegen  bie  9)^Dnord)ie  murbe 
militdtifc^  aucf)  infoferu  Dorbercitet,  al^  ferbif(f)e  Gmipre  im  gatte  be§  Slu§bruc[)8 
ber  geinbfeligfeiten  mit  ber  S^i^f^orung  Don  2iran8portmitteln  u[n).,  ber  5lnfad}ung 
toon  SRctooltcn  unb  ^onifen  betraut  njurben.  5lIIe3  bie3  h?irb  in  eirter  befonberen 
Scilage  betegt. 

'Dag  9J?emoire  [c^itbert  ferncr  ben  3"ffln^^^"^o"9  S^Jifcfien  bie[er  3:dtigfeit 
ber  9larobna  Obbrana  unb  ben  affitiierten  Organifationen  mit  ben  Stttentaten  gcgcn 
ben  i^oniglic^cn  ^ommiffdr  in  Slgram  (Euoaj  im  3"^^  1912,  bem  Slttcntat  Don 
©ojcic  in  Slgram  1913  gcgen  ©fcrlcq  unb  bem  mi^gtiirften  ^tUntat  (£c^d[er8  am 
20.  ^a'x  im  Slgramcr  3:l^eater.    Sg  Derbrcitct  fic^  ^ierauf  iibcr  ben  gufammen^ang 


—     23     — 

l)c§  5lttcntat8  ouf  ben  ^^ronfolgct  unb  bcffcn  ©cma^Iin,  uDct  bic  Slrt; 
Xoit  [xd)  bic  3""9^"  f^o"  '"  ^^'^  ©d[)ufc  an  bent  ©ebonfcn  bet  9^Qrobna  Obbrana 
Dcrgiftcten  unb  xo'it  fic^  ble  5lttcntdtct  mit  5i[fe  Don  ^tibiccmic  unb  ©acic  bic 
5Bcrf^cuge  ju  bcm  Slttcntat  Deifd^apcn,  njobci  ins6c[onbcrc  bic  SRoUc  beg  !S)laior8 
Xanfofic  bargelegt  n)itb,  bcr  bie  9Jlorbn)affcn  liefcrte,  n.ne  and)  bic  SRoHc  cinc3 
gcn)if[en  (Eiganocic,  eine§  geiuefcncn  5^omitat[c§i  unb  jc^igen  Seamten  bcr  ferbifc^cu 
(Eifenba^nbircftion  53elgrab,  bet  fc^on  1909  aU  Sogling  bet  Sanbenfd^ulc  bet 
batnaligcn  5Ratobna  Obbrana  auftauc^te.  gernct  njitb  bic  Slrt  bargelcgt,  n^ic  53omben 
unb  SBaffcn  un6cmev!t  iiad)  S3o§iiicn  eingc[c^mugge(t  ttjutben,  bie  feinen  ^njcifcl 
borubct  Id^t,  ha^  bie§  ein  toot)!  Dorbcreitetet  unb  fur  bic  ge^cimnigoollcn  '^totdt 
bet  9iarobna  oft  begangenet  @c^(cic^n)eg  n^at. 

Sine  Scitngc  ent^att  eincn  SluS^ug  au§  ben  Slftcn  bc§  ^rei8gcrid[)tg  in  ©ctajenjo 
uber  bie  Untctfud)ung  be§  5lttentat8  gcgen  ben  ©r^f)erjog  granj  ^^erbinanb  unb 
beffen  ©emal^lin.  ©anad^  fmb  ^rincip,  SabrinoDic,  ®ta6e3,  (ErupiJoDic  unb  ^apooic 
gejldnbig,  in  ©emcinfc^aft  mit  bcm  fliic^tigcn  SJic^mebbofic  ein  5^ont|)[ott  jut 
Srmorbung  beg  Sr^^erjogg  gcbiibct  unb  i^n  3U  biefem  3tt>c(fe  aufgclaucrt  ju  l^abcn. 
(iabrinoDic  ift  geftdnbig,  bic  Sombc  getoorfen  unb  ®abri(o  ^rincip  ha^  Slttentat  mit  bet 
SBro^ningpiflole  auSgefiifirt  ju  l^aben.  Seibe  5;dter  gaben  3U,  bei  ber  SSetiibung  bcr  %at 
bie  5l6fic^t  beg  9)^orbe8  gc^abt  ju  ^abcn.  ©ic  meitereu  ^cilc  bcr  Slniogc  crl^aiten  n)eitctc 
Slngabcn  bcr  Sefc^ulbigten  Dor  bem  Untcrfud^unggric^ter  iiber  Sntj^c^ung  beg  ^omplottg, 
ioerfunft  bcr  23omben;  teeic^c  fabrifmdjjig  ^crgc|icO[t  ftjurbcn,  fiit  militdrifc^c  3tt}ccEc 
bcjlimmt  tt)aren  unb  i^rcr  Originalpadung  md)  aug  bem  ferbifc^en  SCaffcntager  aug 
^ragujcDQC  jtammtcn.  Snblic^  gibt  bie  Scilage  Slugfunft  uber  ben  ^rangport  bet  brci 
Slttentdter  unb  ber  SBaffen  Don  ©erbien  nad)  ^ognien.  Slug  bcm  toeiteren  geugenprotofoK 
crgibt  fic^,  ha^  ein  Slngc^origcr  ber  9}?onard^ie  einigc  ^agc  Dor  bcm  Stttentat  bem 
oftcrrcid^ifc^'ungarifc^en  ^onfufat  in  53eigrab  9}ie(bung  Don  ber  33ermutung  erftotten  njoUte, 
ha^  ein  ^ian  jur^Scrilbung  beg  Slttcntatg  gcgcn  ben  grj^er^og  h)d^renb  beffen  Slnttjcfcn^cit 
in  Sognien  bej^el}e.  1)iefer  Wlann  fott  nun  burd)  .53e(graber  ^olijeiorgane,  mcld^e 
i^n  immittcibar  Dor  Sctreten  beg  ^onfulatg  aug  nic^tigen  ©riinbcn  Dcr^aftctcn,  an 
ber  ©rjlottung  bcr  5)icibung  Dcri^inbert  njorben  fein.  fficiter  ge^e  aug  bem  3f"9^"' 
protofoil  §erDor,  ba^  bie  bctveffcnben  ^olijciorgane  Don  bcm  gepianten  ?lttcntat 
^enntnig  gel^abt  ^dtten.  ^a  biefe  Slngabcn  nod^  nid^t  nad^gepriift  fmb,  fann 
iibet  beren  (Sti(i}^a[tigfcit  Dorldufig  nod)  fein  Urteif  abgegcben  njcrben.  3"  ^^^ 
S3ei(agc  jum  tD^cmoire  §ci^t  eg:  S3or  bem  (Smpfanggfaai  beg  ferbifcfien  ^ri^gg* 
minij^criumg  befinben  fic^  an  bet  5Canb  Diet  aHcgorifc^e  53i(bcr,  Don  bcnen  brci 
T)ar|iteffuiigen  ferbifc^er  ^rieggcrfo(ge  fmb,  n^d^renb  bag  Dicrte  bic  33ern)irf(ic^ung 
bcr  monard^iefcinb[icf)cn  ^enbenjen  ©erbicng  Dcrfinnbitbtid^t.  IJibcr  ciner  5?anbfrf)aft, 
bic  teilg  ©ebirgc  (Sognien),  tei(g  ©bene  (©ubungarn),  barjlcttt,  gc[)t  bic  "^oxa,  bic 
5Jiorgcnrote  ber  ferbifd^en  ^offnungcn,  auf.  ^m  SSorbcrgmnbc  jtc^t  cine  bch)affnctc 
^rauengejlalt,  auf  beren  ©c^ilbc  bic  9iamcn  aller  »nod^  ju  befrcicnben  ^roDin^cn*: 
S3ognicn,  ^txit^oto'inai  5Boin)obina,  ©^rmien,  <Daimatien  ufm.  jic^cn. 


—    24    — 


^cr DRcic^gfanjler  oil  bic  ^dfcrttc^cn  Sotfd^affcr  in  ^nrig,  bonbon,  6t.^efcc8' 
Burg  tjom  23.  3uli  1914; 

^ic  53er5ffcnt(icf)utigcn  bcr  Ofterrcid^ifi^'Ungarifci^cn  JRegici'ung  u6er  bic  Umftdnbc, 
untcr  benen  haB  'Hitttntat  aiif  ben  o|!crrcid^ifc^en  X^roufoCger  unb  feinc  @ema[)Hn 
ftattgefunbcn  l^at,  ent^iillen  offcn  bic  '^kUf  bic  firf)  bic  gro§[cibifc^c  ^ropaganba 
gcfep  [)at,  unb  bic  Witki,  bercn  fie  fic^  jur  ^Scrmirflic^ung  bcr[e[6en  bebicnt.  Slud[> 
ittuf[en  butc^  bie  bcfonnt  gcgebcncn  ^at[acf)cn  bie  [c|ten  glucifel  baru6er  fdbiuinben, 
ha^  ha^  5lftion83entrum  bet  S3e{ltc6ungen,  bic  auf  Coglofung  bcr  [ubf(atoi[dben  ^ro* 
D^injcn  Don  bcr  oftcrreic^ifd^'Ungarifc^cn  5Jtonarrf)ic  unb  bercn  ISercinigung  mit  bcm 
tfcrbifc^cn  5?onigreic^  ^inau8laufcn,  in  Sefgrab  ju  fur^cn  ifl,  unb  bort  jum  minbcjlcn 
iinit  bcr  5?onni»cnj  Don  5lngc§origen  ber  JRcgierung  unb  Slrmec  [cine  2;atigteit  entfaltct 

3)ic  ferbifd)cn  ^rcibercien  ge^cn  au[  cine  (angc  JRcil^c  Don  3a^^cn  juriicf.  3^ 
j^cfonbcrg  ma'rfnnter  ^orm  hat  ber  gvo^ferbifc^c  S^auDiniSmuS  iDo^renb  ber  6o8' 
[nifc^cn  ^ri[i§  in  bic  Srfd^einung.  9iur  ber  njcitgc^cnbcn  ©cibjlBc^crrfc^ung  unb 
pia^igung  ber  5perueic^i[rf)'Ungarifcl^en  JKcgicrung  unb  bcm  cnergifd}cn  Sinfc^rciten 
'5)er  @ro|mdc^tc  loar  e3  jujufrfjreiben,  n^enn  bie  "iproDofotioncn,  njeld^en  Ofterreid^* 
f^ngarn  in  biefcr  3^^*  Don  fciten  (Berbicng  au8gc[e^t  "max,  nir^t  jum  ^onfliftc 
^fii^rtcn.  1)it  ^uf\d)txm^  funftigen  5Bo^rDerl^a(tcn§,  bic  bic  ©evbi[d)c  JRcgicrnng 
il)amo(3  gegcben  ^ot,  ^at  fie  nic^t  einge^alten.  Untcr  htn  Slugcn^  juni  minbejlen- 
anter  flidfc^melgenber  <t)u(bung  bc8  amtfic^en  8crbicn8,  f)ot  bie  gro^[crbi[rf)c  ^ro* 
i:}3ngQnba  injrt)i[(f)cn  fortgc[c|t  on  5lu£Sbe^nung  unb  3"tcnfitat  jugenommcn;  ouf  if)r 
l^onto  ifl  bag  jungjlc  33erbrcci^en  ju  fc^en,  bcffen  ^^dben  nadb  l^ctgrab  fu[)ren.  6g 
il^ot  fxdf  in  unjnjcibcutigcr  Seifc  funbgctnn,  ba^  eg  tt)ebcr  mit  ber  ffiurbc  nod^  mit 
htx  <Selb|ler^a(tung  ber  ofterrelc^ifcfj'Ungarifc^en  SJlonnrc^ic  Dcreinbar  fcin  n)iirbe,  bcm 
5J;reibcn  jcnfeitg  bcr  ®rcn^c  norf;  Idnger  tatcnToS  ju^ufel^cn,  burc^  bag  bic  ©irf)erl^cit 
unb  bic  3»^f9^**^t  i^i^f^  ©ebietc  bauernb  bebroI)t  mirb  55ci  biefcr  @arf)[age  fonnen 
i)(ii  S3orge^cn  foiric  bie  l^orbcrnngcn  bcr  6)lerrcirf)ifd^-ungorifd^en  S^itegicrung  nur  ofg 
gered^tfcrtigt  angcfe^en  njcrben.  5^ro^bem  frf)(ie§t  bic  ipattung,  bic  bic  offeiitlid^c 
9)icinung  foivo^t  a(g  aurf;>  bic  Sfiegicrung  in  ©erbien  in  tester  '^t'lt  eingenommcii  [)at, 
bic  ^cfurd)tung  nic^r  aug/  ha^  bie  <Serbifc^e  Diegicrung  eg  ab(e[)nen  iDirb,  bicfen 
i^orbcrungcn  ju  entfprcd)cn,  unb  ba^  jlc  fid^  ju  ciner  proDofatorifc^en  ^altung 
•Ojterreid^  Ungarn  gegeniiber-  l^inrcipcn  Td^t.  (B  iDurbc  ber  C)flerreic^vfd^'UngQrifd)en 
'JKegicrung,  loiK  fic  nid^t  auf  iC)rc  6tellung  otg  ©rofmar^t  cnbgiUtig  5^erjid)t  [etftcn, 
iiid^tg  anbereg  iibrigbleibcn,  a(g  \i)xt  ^orbcrungen  bci  bcr  @crbifd)en  5Rcgierung  burdE) 
einen  flarfcn  Drucf  unb  notigcnfallg  untcr  bcr  grgreifung  mititdrifc^er  9]Ra^na[)mcn 
burd^^ufc^en,  iDobci  i^r  bie  Sa^t  ber  Witkl  iiberraffcn  blciben  mu^. 

(£n).  nfu)  bccl^rc  ic^  mid)  ju  erfuc^cn,  f.c^  in  Dovflet)enbem  Sinne  (bcm  bcr* 
^eitigen  53crtretcr  beg  .^crrn  53iDiani)  (Sit  (Sbmarb  ®rcp)  (Scrrn  ©afanoiu)  gegen< 
iibcr  augjufprcd^cn  unb  bubci.inSbcfonberc  bcr  ?lnfc^auuug  nac^briuf(ic^  Slugbrud  ^^u 
Dcrlci^cU;  t>a^  eg  \\d)  in  ber  Dorlic^cnbcn  ^ragc  urn  einc  (cbiglic^  ^mifc^eii  Oj^erreicb' 


--     25     ~ 

Ungarn  unb  (SctSicn  jum  2lu8trag  ju  bringcnbe.  Slnger^gcn^cit  ^anbefe,  bic  ouf  Ut. 
Beibcit  biteft  ^^cteitigtcn  ju  Bcfc^ranfcn  ha^  ernjlc  23c|trcbcn  bet  9}ta(^te  fcin  muffe. 
5Bir  h)un[i^en  bringcnb  bic  l?ofa(ificrung  bc8  ^onfliftg,  iPciC  jcbc§  ©ingtcifcn  einet 
anbereu  9)k(^t  infofgc  ber  »er[c^icbenert  58unbnig»crpfiic^tungcn  unabfe^bare^onfcqucnjcn 
nad)  fic^  ^ie^en  tt?urbc. 

eincm  gefdlligcu  tclegra^.'^^ifc^cn  ^cric^t  xibtx  ben  S3crtauf  3^}^^^  Untevvebung 
werbe  i($  mit  3"tfi^c[ic  cntgcgcn[e§cn. 


mutate  Z. 


t>cv  Xeic|>0tan?ler  an  i)ie  23ttn&C0regieruttcten, 


X>erfrauti<:^!  Scrtin,  ben  28.  ^uU  1914. 

(£uer  pp.  tDoCen  ber  9^cgicruiig,  bei  bet  (Bit  bcgraubigt  ftnb",  fpfgenbe  Wit*' 
teitung  madden: 

?lngefid)tg  ber  ^atfarf)en,  bic  bie  6ficrrcirf)ifci^«llngarifci^c  JRegierung  in  i^rec 
9^Dte  an  bie  6erbifd[)c  ^Regievung  befauntgegeben  i)ai,  miiffen  bie  [e|ten  3^eif«t  bariibct 
[d^njlnben,  ba^  ba§  5lttentdt,  bem  ber  ofterreid^ifc^'ungarifd^e  ^^ronfotgcr  unb  feinc 
@emaf)Itn  gum  Opfer  gefaHcn  jinb,  in  ©erbien  jum  minbej^en  mit  ber  ^onniDcng. 
Don  2tngcl)origen  ber  <Ser6i[c^en  5Rcgierung  unb  Slrinec  tjorbcrcitet  ivorben  ift.  63  ijl 
cin  <Probuft  ber  gro^[erbifd^en  Seprebungen,  bie  feit  ciner  9Rei[)e  Don  3a^ren  cine 
OueCe  bauernber  53eunvu^igungen  fiir  bic  Ojlcrreid^ifd^^^Ungarifc^e  S)lonarrf)ie  unb  fiir 
ganj-  Suropa  gen^orben  jinb. 

^n  .befonberg  marfanter  gorm  trat  ber  gro^fcrbifc^c  SC^auoinigmuS  n)dt)rcnb 
ber  bognifc^en  5^riftg  in  bic  6r[d)cinung.  9hir  ber  loeitgc^cnben  8c(bj^6e[}crr[d)ung 
unb  3)^d^igung  ber  6jlerreic^ifc^4lngari[d)cn  SHcgicrung  unb  bem  encrgi[d)en  (Sin* 
fc^rciten  ber  ®rDf3mdd}tc  h)ar  eg  jujufd^reibcn,  locnn  bie  ^roDofationcn,  toelc^cn 
Oftcrreic^'Ungarn  in  biefer  geit  oon  feitcn  ©crbicng  auggcfc|t  roar,  nid)t  jum  .^on« 
fliftc  fii^rtcn.  I^ic  gufic^cTung  fiinftigcn  ffio^locr^altcng^  bic  bie  ©erbifc^c  JHegicrung 
bama(g  gcgeben  f^at,  i^ai  fie  nic^t  cingel^altcn.  Unter  bzii  Slugen,  jum  minbcfien 
unter  |^i((fd)tt)cigenber  ^ulbung'  beg  amttid^en  (Serbieng,  §at  bic  gro^fcrbifc^c  ^ropa« 
ganba  injttiifc^cn  fortgc[c|t  an  Slugbe§nung  unb  3"tcn|itdt  jugenommen.  dg  ttjiirbe 
ttjcbcr  mit  ber  ffiiirbc  noc^  mit  i^rem  SKccbt  ouf  (Selbflcr^altung  oereinbar  fein, 
iDotttc  bic  6ftcrreid)ifc^>UngaiH[c^e  SRcgicrung  bem  ^reiben  jenfeitg  ber  ®rcn3C  noc^- 
(dngcr  tatcnfog  3u[e[)en,  burd)  bag  bic  ©ic^cr^eit  unb  bic  3"^f9i^itdt  i^rer  ©cbictc 
bauernb  bcbro^t  njirb.  ^ci  biefer  <Sad^[agc  miiffen  bag  Sorgefien  fon?ic  bic  (jorbe* 
tungcn  ber  Ofterreic^ifc^Ungarifc^cn  !Rcgierung  a(g  gcrec^tfcrtigt  angcfe^cn  n)erben. 

7 


—     26     — 

<Die  §lntiDort  bet  ©crbifc^cn  Siegierung  auf  bie  ^orbcrungen,  mld)t  bic  fejlcr* 
rcic^ifc^'ungaiifc^c  3Regierung  am  23.  b.  SDitS.  burc^  il^rcn  Scttrcter  in  Sefgrab  .^at 
peHen  (affcn,  lajjt  inbeffcn  crfcnncn,  ba^  bic  ma^gebcnben  ^aftoren  in  8er6icn  nid^t 
gcfonncn  [inb,  it)rc  bigi^crigc  ^oUtif  unb  ogitntorifc^e  Xatigfeit  aufjugcben.  <Dcr 
Opcrvcic^ifc^'Ungarifc^cn  Stegiciung  mirb  bcninad^,  mil  fic  nic^t  auf  i^rc  ©tcllung 
a[3  ©rofjmac^t  enbgiiitig  iBerjic^t  (cijltcn,  nic^tg  anbcreS  fibrig  bicibcn,  a(8  i^rc  gorbc» 
Tungcn  burcf)  eincn  j^arfcn  ©rucE  unb  notigenfaQg  unter  bet  ©rgveifung  mintati[(f)et 
tD^a^na^mcn  butd)ju[e^cn. 

gin^clnc  tuffifc^e  Stimmcn  bettoc^ten  c8  alg  fel6ftDerfldnb(ic^e§  JRcd^t  unb  alg 
bic  ?(ufgabc  JHu^ianbg,  in  bcni  ^onflittc  3mi[d)cn  Ofterteic^'Ungatn  unb  ©ctbien  aftiD 
flit  Scrbien  ^attei  ju  ctgteifen.  giit  bic  qu3  cincm  foic^en  ©cf)tittc  5Ku|[anbg 
te[u(tietenbc  cutopdifc^c  .'Ronflagtation  gfaubt  bic  !i!Ron}oie  SBtemia  fogat  ^cutfc^lanb 
»etantn)ort(i(^  inad)en  ju  butfcn,  fofcrn  c8  nic^t  6fletrcid)>Ungarn  jum  9tad)gebcn 
toctanla^t  ^ie  tuffifc^c  ^rejfc  ficttt  §icrmit  bie  Set^dltniffc  auf  ben  ^opf.  DHd^t 
Ofletteic^'llngatn  \)at  ben  ^onflift  mit  (Sevbien  ^crootgctufen,  fonbetn  (Serbicn  ijl 
c8  gcn^efcn,  ba^  burc^  cine  ffrupc((o[c  Segunftigung  gtoBferbifc^ct  Slfpirationen  auc^ 
in  3:ci(en  bet  6jletreici^i[d)'ungati[c^en  SDionaid^ic  bicfc  [clbjt  in  i[)tet  Gjijlenj  ge* 
fd^tbet  unb  3"l^fli^^c  Qcfi^afffn  ^^^i  ^^^  fc^lie^lic^  in  bet  ftcDei^aften  %at  Don 
©ctajeroo  i^tcn  $lu8btuct  gcfunbcn  §a6cn.  ®enn  5Ku^(anb  in  biefem  5^onflifte  fiit 
©ctbicn  cinttetcn  ju  miiffen  glaubt,  fo  ijl  bag  an  fic^  gcn3i^  cin  giiteg  JRcc^t.  68 
mu|  fic^  abet  batiibet  flat  fcin,  ba^  c§  bamit  bic  fetbifc^en  53cfltcbungen  auf  llntct« 
l^o^iung  bet  Gjijlcn^bebingungen  bet  ofletteid^ifd^'Ungatifc^cn  'iT^onatdjie  ju  ben  feinigen 
madjt,  unb  ba^  c8  aCfein  bie  33etantwortung  bafiit  ttdgt,  toenn  au8  bem  oftetteid^ifci^' 
fctbifc^cn  Qanbti,  ben  aHe  iibtigcn  ©to^nidd)tc  ju  lofalifictcn  n)unfd)en,  ein  eutopd- 
ifd^ct  ^tieg  cntpe^t.  ^iefe  53etanttt}ottung  SRu|(anb8  licgt  Hat  jutagc  unb  h)iegt 
urn  fo  fd)n}etCT,  al8  ®taf  53etc^to(b  JHu^lanb  offi^icd  erftdrt  \)a\,  e8  bcabjld^tigc 
ivebet  fcrbifc^c  ®ebiet8tei(e  ju  etujctbcn  nocb  ben  5^ejlonb  be8  fcrbifc^en  ^6nigteic^8 
anjutaflen,  fonbetn  tootte  (cbiglic^  9iu()e  Dot  ben  feine  G^ijlenj  gefd^tbcnben  fetbifc^en 
Umttiebeu  ^abcn. 

^ic  fioltung  bet  ^aifetiic^cn  SRcgietung  in  biefet  ^tage  ifl  bcutlic^  botgc- 
3eid)net.  ©ic  uon  ben  ^anflaiDiflen  gegen  6(lettcic^'Ungatn  betttebene  §igitation 
ctfltebt  in  intern  6nbjie(,  mittc(8  bet  3^'f^^"^*"f^""9  ^^^  T)onaumonatd)ie  bie 
©ptengung  obet  8c^tt)d(f)ung  be8  <Dteibunbe8  unb  in  i^tet  ^oigcmitfnng  cine  oodige 
3folictung  bc8  ©eutfc^en  9icic^8.  Unfet  cigenfle8  ^^^^^i^fff^  ^^\^  ""^  bcmnac^  an 
bie  8eitc  6fletteid)'Ungotn8.  Die  ^flid^t,  6utopa  toenn  itgcnb  mogtid}  Dot  cinem' 
allgcnicincn  5^iicge  ju  bemai)ten,  weifl  un8  g(eid)3eitig  batauf^in,  biejenigen  Se- 
jltebungcn  ju  unterflii^cn,  bie  auf  bie  Cofalifierung  be8  5^onflift8  [^injielcn,  getten 
ben  9iid)t(inien  betjenigen  "ipolitit,  bie  toit  fcit  nunme(}t  44  ^o^ten  im  3"tetef[e 
bet  $luftec^tct^a(tung  be8  eutopdifc^en  f}tieben8  mit  (5tfo(g  butc^gefii^tt  §aben. 
©ottte  inbe8  ipiebet  Gt^offen  butc^  cin  Gingteifen  SRu^lanb8  bet  Stanbtjevb  eine 
6tn?citetung  etfa^ten,  fo  hJiitbcn  n?it  gctreu  unfetet  53unbc8pflic^t  mit  bet  ganjcn 
Wlaifi  be8  9Reid)8  bie  9kd)batmonatc^ie  ju  untcrj^ii^en  ^abcn.  5Rut  gc^mungen 
njetben  roit  jum  ©d^mette  greifcn,  bann  abet  in  bem  tu^igen  S3ett)u^tfcin,  ba^  mit 
aw  bem  Unveil  feine  ©ctiulb  ttagen,  ba8  ein  ^tieg  iibct  Gutopa8  536lfct  btingen  mii^tc. 


—    27     — 

Cetectramm  be^  Kaifcrli4>en  ^otf4>aftcr0  in  5Pien 
an  &en  Xei4)0fan?ler  t>om  24.  0uli  1914. 

©raf  53erc^to(b  l^dt  l^cutc  ben  $Ru[fifc^cn  ®efc§aft§tragct  511  fid^  gcbetcn,  urn 
i^m  cingcf)eiib  iinb  freuubfc^aftlic^  ben  ©tanbpuutt  Ojlerrcic^'UngarnS  Setbicn  gcgcn^ 
iibct  augeiudnbei-^ufelcn  9^ac5  5Rcfapituliening  bcr  ()i[li)tifc^cu  6iitluicfc[iing  bcr 
fcl^ten  3a^rc  bctontc  er,  baf  bic  9)^onarci^ic  nic^t  baraii  bcnfc,  ©crbieii  gegeniibct 
erobernb  aufjutretcn.  Oflcrrcid^-Hngarn  ircrbc  fcin  fcrbifd)eg  ^evvitortum  beniifprurf}cn. 
(!g  f^aik  ftricft  baran  fe|^,  ba^  bcr  ©cbritt  nut  cine  bcfinitiDc  S}?a^regcl  gcgcniibcv 
ben  ferbifc^en  5Bu^[ereien  jum  ^\tk  [)abc.  5Rotgebrungcn  miiffc  Ofterrcid^'Ungarn  ©avantieu 
fiir  ein  rocitereS  frcunbfd^aftlid^eS  23er[)a[ten  ©crblcnS  bet  5)^onavcl^ic  gcgeniibcr  Dcr^ 
(angen.  S§  liege  iC}m  fern,  cine  53cr[c^iebung  bcr  5J^acl^tDcr[)a[tni[fc  im  Saltan  ^cv* 
beifii^ren  ju  njoHen.  <Der  ©cfc^aftgtragcr,  ber  noc^  feinc  5Bcifungcn  aug  ^cterSbuvg 
Ijattt,  l^at  bie  5lu8fu^rungen  beS  ?SJiinifter8  ad  referendum  gcnommen  mit  bet 
3ufage,  fic  fofort  ©afanolD  ^u  untcrbrciten. 


TcUQvamm  bc^  Haifevlid^en  15otfd;>aftev^  in  Peterebutcf 
an  ben  Kei4>etan?ler  t>om  24.  Juli  1914. 

©en  3n^a(t  t)c8  erlajfcS  592'  l^abe  ic^  foeben  in  ciner  (angen  Unterrcbung 
mit  ©afanoh)  eingcr}enb  Dcrmertet.  'Der  9}lini|lcr  crging  fic^  gegen  Oj^crrcic^-Ungarn 
in  ma§(o[en  ?lnflagen  unb  ttjar  fe^r  crrcgt.  2luf  ba8  bcjlimmtcftc  erf  [arte  er:  ba^ 
bie  fcrbi[d)'bj!crrcic^i[c^c  Diffcrcnj  jraifc^cn  ben  SSctciligtcn  oUcin  ouggctragcn  njcrbc, 
fonne  Stu^lanb  nnmoglic^  jutaffen. 


3Mafle  5> 

t)er  'Kaifexlid?c  :»otf4>after  in  pctcv^bmg 
an  &m  Xeic^0tan?ler. 

Zcie^vamm  uotn  26.  3uU  1914. 

'£)ti  Oj^crreic^ifc^'Ungorifc^e  55ot[c^after  §attc  [)eutc  nad^mittag  cine  (angcre 
Unterrcbung  mit  ©afanoh).  Seibc  SetciUgte  fatten,  trie  fic  mir  nac^^cr  fagten, 
eincn  bcfriebigcnben  einbrucf.  <Die  55crfic^erung  be8  5Bot[c^after8,  ha^  ^jlerrcic^' 
Ungarn  feinc  grobcrunggplane  l^aBc  unb  nur  cnblic^  an  fcinen  ©rcnjen  JRu^c  ^aikn 
Xoo\itj  ^at  ben  9)?inijtct  fic^tlic^  bcru^igt. 

7* 


^    29    •-» 

Cekgramm  be&  2{aiferli4)m  15otfd;>aftct^  in  Petersburg 
an  t>en  Xei4>0fan?ler  t>om  25.  0uli  J9)4. 

S)^clbun3  fiir  6.  9Jt.  Don  ©cncrat  oon  (E^cHuS.  3^  ^raSnoeragcr  iDurbcn 
f)cute  bic  2:ru))pcnu6ungen  ptollic^  a6ge6rocE)cn,  unb  bic  jReglmcntcr  fe^ren  in  i^rc 
©arnifonen  fofort  juriicf.  'Die  SJlanooer  fmb  aBgcfogt  n)orbcn.  ^Dic  ^ricgSfc^uter 
icutbcn  [}eutc  flatt  im  y^txb^  ju  Offi.^icrcn  beforbevt.  JJbet  haB  53orgel^en  CJtcrrcic^S 
^crtfc^t  im  ^anptquartict  gro^c  Slnfrcgung.  3^)  '^^^^  ^f"  (Sinbrucf,  boj}  attc  SSot* 
bctcitungcn  fiir  bic  9)b6i(mac^ung  gcgcn  Oj!erteic^  gctroffcn  Jverben. 


^elegrantm  i>c^  Kaiferli4>en  15otfd?aftcve^  in  Petersburg 
an  ben  Xei4>0fan?ler  t>om  26.  Juli  1914. 

^ct  IS^ilitarattac^c  bittct  urn  flbermittcfung  nad^jlcl^enber  !D^c(bung  an  ben 
©cncratftab : 

3f^  §artc  eg  fur  f4er,  baB  fiir  ^\m  unb  Dbeffa  bie  SJlobiimoci^ung  befofjCcn 
ttjorben  ift.  ^ei  5Qar[c^au  unb  3]Rogfau  ijl  bieS  frogiic^  unb  6ci  htw  anbercu  n?ol^t 
norf)  nic^t  bcr  (^att.  

^Telegramm  &e0  5Caiferlict>en  3{onfulaf6t>ertt>efer0  in 
Hovono  an  ben  Xei4>stan?ler  t>om  27.  Juli  1914. 

3n  S^oreno  .^rieggjuflaiib  evflort. 


^elegramm  J^ee  'Kaiferlict>en  6efan&ten  in  Hem 
an  ben  Xeic^sfan^ler  vom  27.0ulil914. 

erfnf)rf  juDcrtaffig,  bojj  fvanj6[i[c^e8  XIV.  S^orpg  SJianovcr  abbrad^. 


—    29    — 

3Ittrage  10, 

Teiegvamm  bcB  Xeic|)0fan?ler0  an  J)en  T^aifetiid^m 
23otfc|)after  in  Conbon. 

Dringenb.  26.  JuU  19J4. 

0|!en:cic6'Ungain  §at  in  ^etcr86urg  offijieH  unb  fcicrlic^  crflort,  bo^  c8 
fcinen  tcrritoriarcn  ©ctoinn  in  ©crbicn  6ea6fic^tigt,  ben  S3cf!anb  .bc8  ^onigreic^S 
nic^t  antajlten,  fonbern  nur  JRu^c  [c^ajfen  toottc.  9lac^  [)iet  cingcgangcncn  ^ady 
rid^tcn  fte§t  in  SRuptanb  Sinbcxufung  mc§rcrct  SRcfcrDijUcn'^Q^tgonge  unmittelbat 
bcDor,  tDa§  ciner  9)lD6i(ifterung  quc^  gcgcn  un8  glcic^fommcn.  njutbc.  fficnn  fic^  bicfc 
9iad)tic^ten  bctoa^r^citen,  fo  toerbcn  tt)it  gcgcn  unfcrn  SBunfc^  ju  ©cgcnma^rcgcln 
gcjtDungcn.  Sluc^  ^cutc  noc^  gc^t  unfcr  ©ttcben  ba^in,  ben  ^onflift  ju  (ofalificrcn 
nnb  ben  curopdifc^cn  gricben  ju  cr^alten.  Sir  bitten  ba^ct  in  bicfcm  ©innc  in 
Petersburg  mit  aUcm  9iac^brucf  ju  teirfen. 


STelecframm  be^  Kcid^&tan^tcvfd  an  ben  Haiievlid^m 
15otf(i?aftcv  in  Paria.    X>om  26.  Onli  i9H. 

9kc^bcm  Ojtcrreic^'llngarn  JRu^ronb  offijieU  crftart  ^ot,  ba^  e8  feinen  tcrritorialcn 
©ctuinn  bcabfid^tigc,  ben  53ejtonb  beS  ^onigreic^g  nic^t  Qntojten  tooUt,  iiegt  bie 
Sntfc^eibung,  06  ein  europaifc^cr  ^rieg  entjle^en  foil,  nur  6cl  9lu^lanb,  ba^  bie 
gefamte  53cranttt>oitung  ju  tragcn  l^at.  Sir  oertrauen  auf  ^^ranfreii^,  mit  bem  roir 
un8  in  bem  Sunfc^e  um  bie  Sr^altung  bc8  europdifc^en  griebenS  ein8  tt>iffen, 
bo^  eg  in  Petersburg  feinen  (Sinflu^  in  beru^igenbcm  ^Sinne  gettenb  madden  toirb. 


glttlage  10  b. 

^elegramm  &C0  Xcic^efan^kr^  an  ben  Haifexlid^en 
15otf<i^aftet  in  Petevidbms  vom  26.  Juli  1914- 

?Roci^bem  6|terreic^  fein  tcrritorialeg  ^egintcreffement  feierlid^  erfldrt  f)at, 
ru^t  bie  33erantn)ortung  fiir  cine  etjcntuclle  ©torung  bc8  europdifc^en  ^icbeng 
burd)  cine  ruffifc^e  3"ter»ention  attein  auf  ?lufelflnb.  Sir  toertrauen  immer  noc^ 
barauf,  ta^  5Ru^lonb  !eine  ©c^ritte  unterne^men  toirb;  bie  ben  europdifc^en  grieben 
ernftlicl)  gefdl^rben  wurben. 


—     30     — 

C^elegramm  bad  Kaiferlic^en  15otf(i?afteve  in  Petereburcf 
an  if  en  Xei4)ef  angler  vom  27.  3uli  1914. 

SD^ilitdrattad^c  mefbet  uber  -(Sefptad^  mit  ^rieg§miniflet: 

©afanon?  ^a6e  biefen  Ie|tcrcn  gebcten,  mic^  iiber  bic  Cage  aufjuflarcn.  ^et 
^ticggminiflcr  ^at  mit  fein  S^rentoort  barauf  gcgeben,  ba^  nod)  fcine  9Jiibilmac^ung§. 
otbre  crgangcn  fci.  G8  mutbcn  Icbiglic^  oorlaufig  33or6crcitung8ma^nal^men  gctroffcn, 
abcr  c§  fei  fein  SHefcroijt  cingcjogen  unb  fein  ^[crb  augge^obcn.  5Cenn  Ojlerrcic^ 
bic  fcrbifc^c  ©rcn^c  uberfc^tcitcn  njcrbe,  fo  toerbcn  biejcnigcn  3)ii(itar6e3irEe,  bic  auf 
Cjicrrcic^  gcric^tet  jinb,  ^ictt),  Obef|a,  9]Ro§fau,  ^afan,  mobilifiert  iDcrben.  T)icicnigcn 
an  bet  beutfc^en  gront,  SBatfc^au,  5Bi(na,  ^ctcrgbutg  untcr  fcincn  Umfldubcn.  Wlan 
tounfc^c  ben  grieben  mit  ^cutfd^lanb  bringcnb.  2luf  meinc  gragc  nac^  bcm  Sttjccfe 
bet  5Jio6itmac^ung  gcgen  Oflctteic^  etfolgtc  2lc^fe(jucfcn,  unb  eg  njutbe  auf  bie  ^i))Io' 
matic  ^ingcmicfen.  ^d)  fagtc  bem  5Jiinij^et,  baf  man  bic  ftcunbfc^afttic^en  $lbfic^ten 
6ei  ung  n?utbige,  obet  auc^  bic  attcin  gcgen  Oflcttcic^  gctic^tetc  2Jiobi(mac^ung  al§ 
fc^t  bcbto^lid^  anfe^cn  ttjctbc. 


gtittagc  la. 

^degramm  ftee  Xeic|>0tan?ler0  an  ben  Kaiferlict>en 
25otfc^after  in  Conbon  vom  27.0uli  1914. 

Soil  einem  SSotfc^rag  ©ir  ©bmatb  ©tcp'g,  einc  ^onfetcnj  in  Gonbon  ju  Dieten 
abju^oUen,  i|l  ^icr  bisect  nic^tg  befannt.  68  ijl  fut  ung  unmoglicfe,  unfeten  Sunbeg^ 
genoffcn  in  fcinct  2lugeinanbcr[e|ung  mit  ©ctbien  Dot  cin  eutopaift^eg  ©ctic^t  ju. 
jic^cn,  Unfetc  53ctmitte(unggtatigtcit  mu^  fic^  auf  bic  ©cfa^t  eincg  oflcttcic^ifc^' 
ruffifc^cn  ^onjiifteg  bcfc^tdnfcn. 


glitrage  13. 

Celegramm  dee  Xeic|)0fan?ler0  an  i>en  Haifevlid^en 
15otfd?aftev  in  Condon  vom  25.  Onli  1914. 

T)ie  con  ©it  Gbmatb  &xt\)  jttjifc^cn  6ftcttcic^ifc^'[erbi[c^cm  unb  6|letteic6ifcl^' 
tu[fi[d)em  ^onflitte  gemac^te  Untetfc^cibung  ttifft  ooUfommen  ju.  2Bit  njollcn  cben* 
fowcnig  loie  (Englanb  ung  in  etj^eten  cinmifc^cn,  unb  nac^  n)ie  Dot  octtteten  mx  ben 


—    31     — 

€tanbpunft,  ha^  bicfc  ^xa^t  baburc^  fofalificrt  Bteibcn  imij},  ba^  otte  !Diac^tc  fid) 
ber  (Sinmifc^ung  tntijaikn.  (Eg  ifl  beS^nlb  imfcrc  briugenbc  §ot[nung,  bn{5  Shijjfnnb 
fic^  eine§  jcben  oftben  6ingrip  cnlf)a[tcn  tDivb,  iin  "BcttjuBtfciu  [cincr  55evnntivorhing 
unb  be§  grn|!c§  bcr  (Situation.  SBir  fiiib,  falls  ein  5[tcrrcirf)i[c^'Vu[fi[rf)cr  Stvcit 
entf^el^cn  fofltc,  bcreit,  oor&e^attlic^  unfercr  bcfannteu  53unbni§pflicE)teu,  5n)i[cl)en  Shij}- 
lanb  unb  Ojlerrcic^  mit  ben  nnberen  ©ro^mdc^tcn  jufamuien  cine  SSermittlung  cin* 
treten  ju  lajfen. 


C^elegramm  ftee  Kcid^^tan^Uve  an  ben  Haifevlid^cn 
15otfd?aftcv  in  pctcv^bmg  t)om  28.  Juli  1914. 

Sit  bcmii^en  unS  unauggc[e|t,  Sim  ju  oerantaffcn,  in  Petersburg  2^td  unb 
Hmfang  be§  ofterreic^ifc^en  5?orge[)en8  in  ©erbien  in  einer  unan[ec^tborcn  unb  ^offent* 
[id)  Sflujjianb  befriebigenbeu  Sei[e  flarjulegen.  Micron  anbert  auc^  bie  in3n)i[c^cn  cr* 
folgte  ^riegSerfldrung  nic^tS. 


ZekQvamm  bc^  Xeic|)0tan?ler0  an  &en  HaifetUd^en 
23otf4)after  in  Conbon  vom  27.  3nli  1914. 

2Bir  l^aben  bic  SetmittcrungSaftion  in  SBien  in  bcm  »on  ©ir  (Sbnjatb  ©ret) 
gcnjiinfc^ten  ©inne  fofort  cingeleitet.  llberbieS  ^abcn  njir  ®raf  Serc^tolb  auc^  ben 
Sunfc^  beS  5cvrn  ©afanon?  Quf  birefte  SluSfprac^c  mit  Sien  mitgeteitt. 


TdcQvamm  be&  2{aiferlicJ>en  Sotfc|)after0  in  5Pien  an 
ben  Xeic|>0tan?ler  vom  28.  Juli  1914. 

®raf  Serc^tolb  bitkt  mid),  (guerer  ©jjctleuj  feinen  i)er6inblid)en  T)anf  fur 
S)^itteilung  beS  cnglifd)en  SermittelungSDorfc^lagS  ju  fagen.  Sr  bemerft  jeboc^  baju, 
ta^  md)  ©roffnung  ber  geinbfeligfeiten  fcitenS  ©erbienS  unb  nac^  ber  in^roifd^wi 
crfolgten  ^ricgSerflarung  er  ben  (Sdiritt  ^ngfanbg  alS  berfpatet  anfe^en  muffe, 


—    32    — 

Zde^amm  i)e0  Xeic|)0tan?ter£>  an  ben  HaifctUd^m 
Hotfd^aftct  in  Pavi^  vom  29.  Oniu 

©ic  un8  u6ct  franjojifc^e  ^ricgSoorBcreitungcn  jugc^cnben  5Rac^ric^tcn  mc^rcn 
fic^  oon  ©tunbc  3U  ©tunbe.  3<^  ^^^tc  bieg  6ei  bcr  i5ran36fifc^en  Sicgicrung  jur 
©prad^c  ju  bringen  unb  fic  einbringlic^jl  barauf  ^itijutocifcn,  bo^  un8  berartigc 
SRafno^men  ju  ©d^u^ma^regetn  jhjingen  njurben.  ©it  ttJiirbcn  ^rieg§gefa^r  profta* 
mieren  mujfcn,  unb  tomn  bic8  aud^  tioc^  fcinc  (Sinbcriifungen  unb  noc^  nid^t 
SJlobitiftcrung  ^ebcute,  fo  njurbc  babutc^  immcr^in  hit  8pannung  cr^o^t  n^crben. 
tffiir  ^ojften  fortgcfc^t  noc|  auf  (Sr^altung  bc8  gricbcnS. 


^elegftamm  &C0  5JtilMrbet)oUtnd4)ttc(ten  in*  St.  peters* 
burof  an  S.  ill.  ben  Haifev  vom  30.  Juli. 

®c|!etn  fagtc  mir  (^iirji  Stroube|fi,  noc^bcm  cr  toeranlap  §otte,  bog  (Suet 
SB^ojel^Qt  ^elegtamm  on  ^aifet  ?RifolQu8  fofort  ubermittclt  hjiitbc:  ®ott(ob,  ba^  cin 
^clcgtomm  3^«8  ^ai[ct&  gefommcn  ijt.  (£t  fagte  mit  nun  foebcn,  baS  Stclcgtomm 
l^dttc  ouf  ben  ^Qifet  tiefen  Ginbtucf  gemac^t,  abet  ha  blc  5Jio6i(i|ietung  gegcn 
Ojlctteic^  beteitS  befo^lcn  genjcfcu  unb  ©afonoro  ©cine  9)^ajeflat  tuo^l  baoon  uber* 
jeugt  f)attt,  ha^  c8  ni(^t  me^t  moglit^  fei,  jutucfjunjeic^en,  fo  fonnc  ©einc  !!)^ojcj^dt 
.teibet  ntd^tS  mcl^t  anbctn.  3^*^  1^9*^  ^W  batauf,  bic  ©d^ulb  an  ben  unabfe^botcn 
^olgen  ttagc  bic  ftii^jeitige  3Jiobi(ifietung  gcgen  ha^  boc^  nut  in  eincn  tofalcn  ^ticg 
mit  ©etbicri  Dcrmicfclte  ^jlettcic^-Ungarn,  bcnn  ^cutfc^lanbg  5(nttt)ott  botauf  [ci  tt)o^C 
flat  unb  bic  33ctanttt}ottung  fielc  auf  5Ru^[anb,  n)clrf)C§  6petrcic^'Ungatn§  3uprf)erung, 
ba§  e8  tcttitotiafc  Gtn?ct6ungcn  in  ©crbicn  in  fcinet  5Bcife  bcabfic^tige,  ignoricrt 
l^abc.  6ftettcic^'Ungatn  §a6e  gegcn  ©ctbicn  unb  nirf)t  gcgen  JHu^lanb  mobilifiett, 
unb  jum  fofottigcn  Singteifcn  fei  fcin  ®tunb  fut  9Ru|(anb.  3<^  f"9t^  ^^^  toeiteten 
j^inju,  ba^  man  in  <Dcut[c^(anb  bic  JRebcnSatt  SRu^(onb8  >n)it  fSnnen  unfcrc  Stiibct 
in  ©ctbicn  nic^t  im  ©tic^  (affcn«  nac^  bem  futc^tbatcn  53ct6tc(^en  »ou  ©ctajcmo 
nic^t  mc§t  octjlc^e.  3'^  W^  ^^^  fd}nc^lid^,  et  mogc,  toenn  ©cutfc^ianbg  ©tteitmad^t 
mobilijictt  hjctbc,  fic^  nit^t  njunbetn. 


—     33    — 

gfttlage  19. 

^clegramm  ^ee  Xei4)0fan?ler0  an  bm  %aifcvlid?cn 
:&otfMftev  in  Xom  vom  dh  Juli  1914. 

^ortge[e|t  ijt  Don  un8  3VuifcI)en  JRuplanb  unb  5flcri'cicl^'Utigarn  fowo^r  burc^ 
bireEten  1)epe[f^einvec§[e[  ©elncr  3)^Qiej^dt  be8  ^aiferS  mit  ©eincr  9)taj[cjidt  bcm  ^Q^'C" 
aU  and)  im  55enc[)mcn  mit  6it  Gbiuarb  ®rc^  tjermitteft  iDOvbcu.  ^urc^  bic  3]RobUi« 
fictung  $Hu^(anb§  jinb  jebod)  alle  unferc  Semii^ungen  fe^t  crfc^mctt,  toenn  nic^t 
unmogfid)  gemac^t.  ^tD|  beru^igenber  53erfic^ctungen  ttifft  5Kup[anb  affen  un8  ju* 
gegangcnen  9kc^tid}ten  §ufo(ge  fo  n)eitger)enbc  9)^apna^mcn  aiic^  gcgcn  un§,  baf3  bie 
Sage  immer  bebro^lic^cr  mtb. 


I.  Seine  iRajeftdt  an  ben  3aven. 

28.  3ua  10-45  p.m. 

S)lit  bet  gr5pten  53eunru[)igung  ^otc  ic^  oon  bcm  (Sinbrucf,  ben  Oflcrreic^'Ungarng 
53orgel^en  gcgen  ©erbien  in  ^einem  Sicic^c  l^eri)orruft.  ^ic  ffrupeUofc  §lgitation, 
bie  feit  ^^^^en  in  ©erbien  getrieBcn  toorben  ijt,  §at  ju  bem  emporcnben  S3er6tec^ett 
gcfii^rt,  beffen  Opfer  (Etjl^erjog  ^ranj  ^erbinanb  gettjorben  ift.  3)et  ®t\%  bcr 
bic  ©ctbcn  i^ren  cigencn  ^onig  unb  [cine  ©ema^lin  morben  tiep,  ^ctrfc^t  §cutc 
nod^  in  jencm  Canbc.  gnjcifcUog  n^irj^  ^u  mit  mit  barin  ubcrcinjlimmen,  ha^  tt)ir 
beibc,  T!u  unb  ic^  fowo^f,  al§  dk  ©ouDevdnc  ein  gcmcinfame§  3"*f^^P  boTan 
l^abcn,  barauf  ju  bcfte^cn,  ba^  offe  bicienigen,  bic  fur  ben  fc^eu^lic^en  9}lorb  mo» 
Tatifrf)  l?etantn)ort[ic^  fmb,  i^re  berbicntc  ©ttafc  erlcibcn. 

2lnbcrcrfcit§  ubctfe^e  ic^  feinc8n)eg§,  n)ic  fd)micrig  c8  fiir  €5ic^  unb  ©cine 
5Rcgierung  ift,  ben  ©tromungcn  bcr  offenttic^cn  SJ^cinung  cntgcgcn^utrctcn.  Singebenf 
bcr  rjcrjlic^cn  grcunbfc^aft,  bic  unS  beibc  feit  (anger  geit  mit  feftcm  Sanb  t)cr« 
binbet,  fe|e  ic^  ba^cr  mcinen  gan^en  Sinfluf  ein,  um  Oj^crrcid^'Ungarn  ba^u  ju  beftimmcn, 
einc  offcne  unb  bcfriebigenbe  SScrj^dnbi^ung  mit  SRuptanb  anjuftreben.  3'^  §offe  ju* 
bcrfic^ttic^,  ha^  ©u  mid^  in  meinen  Scmii^ungen,  atle  ©d^njicrigfeiten,  bic  noc^  cnt* 
fle^cnfonnen,  ju  befeitigcn,  unter|tu|cn  mirft. 

©ein  fe^r  aufric^tigcr  unb  ergcbencr  ^^^^""^  W"^  Setter 

gcj.  SBil^etm. 


—     34     — 

II.  Der  3ar  an  Seine  ^aje^dt 

^etcrS^off.  ^ftlaig,  29.  ^uJi  1  p.  m. 
3c^  Bin  crfreut,  ba^  'Du  jurucE  in  <Deutfcf)fanb  b'\%  3"  ^icfem  [o  ern|len 
5lugen6(icE  6ittc  id^  <£)ici^  inj^aubig  mir  ju  l^elfcn.  (Ein  fc^mo^lid^er  ^ricg  ijl  an 
eiu  fd}tt)ac^eg  Canb  titlaxt  ^Dorbcn,  bie  (Sntriifiung  l^icriiber,  bie  ic^  uonig  tcile,  ift 
in  SRulJfanb  ungel^euct.  3*^  f^^^  t)orau§,  ba^  id)  fe§r  bolb  bem  ^tucf,  bcr  ouf 
mid)  an§geu5t  n^irb,  nid^t  me^r  ttjerbe  tt)ibcrfte^cn  fbnncn  unb  gejiDungen  fcin  njerbc, 
9?k^regc(n  ^u  crgrcifen,  bie  jum  ^ricgc  fii^ren  njcrtcn.  Urn  einem  Ungd'icf,  toie  eg 
ciii  eufopai[(f}ev  ^rieg  fcin  njutbe,  uor^ubcugen,  fcitte  ic^  ©ic^  im  SRomen  unferet 
alten  i5^cw"^[c^«ft/  attfS  ©it  moglic^e  3U  tun,  urn  ©eincn  Sunbc§genoffcn  booon 
juriicfju^altcn,  ju  tocit  ju  gc^cn. 

gej.  9lifo{auS. 


III.  Seine  XRajetldf  an  ben  daven. 

29.  3ult  6.30  r.  m. 

3cl^  ^o6c  Dein  ^elcgramm  er^atten  unb  teifc  'Dcinen  5Bun[(^  nad)  gr^oltung 
be§  griebeng.  3^^''^  ^o""  i<^  —  ^ic  ic^  ^it  in  mcinem  erficn  ^clegramm  fagtc 
—  Sflerrcic^'Ungamg  Sorge^cn  nid^t  aU  ^fc^mci^lic^en  ^rieg*  bctrac^ten.  6j^errcic§« 
Ungarn  tt)ci{3  aug  (Erfa^rung,  ba^  ©erbieng  Cerfprcc^ungen,  mcnn  fie  nur  auf  bem 
"iPapier  fte^en,  gdn^lic^  unjUDcrlaffig  fmb.  !0^einer  ?lnfic^t  nad)  ijt  6flctreicE)'Ungarng 
Sorge^cn  olg  ein  Serfuc^  ju  betroc^ten,  DoDle  ©arontic  bafur  ju  er^atten,  ba^  ©erbieng 
55erfprcd)ungcn  auc^  h?itf(id^  in  bie  %at  umge[e|t  mibtn.  ^n  bie[er  2lnfid)t  njerbe 
ic^  beflaift  burc^  bie  Srfldrung  beg  ojlcrreic^ifc^en  ^abinettg,  ba^  fejtcrreic^'Ungarn 
feine  tertitorialcn  Grobcrungen  auf  ^ojten  ©erbieng  bcabfic^tige.  3^^  "^^i"^  ba^cr, 
ta^  eg  fur  JHufitanb  burc^aug  moglic^  ijt,  bem  oj^erreic^ifc^'fcrbifc^cn  ^rieg  gegenubct 
in  bet  3RoD[c  beg  ^wf^^^werg  ju  oer^orren,  o^ne  ©uropo  in  btn  fc^redtic^flcn  ^ricg 
l^ineinju^ie^en,  ben  eg  jemafg  erlebt  i)at  3^  glaube,  ba^  eine  birefte  Serjidnbigung. 
jmifd^en  Reiner  JRegicrung  unb  2Qien  moglic^  unb  njiinfc^engnjert  ij^,  eine  SSerj^dnbi* 
gung,  bie  —  luic  ic^  ©ir  fcf)on  teUgrap^icrte  —  meine  SRegicrung  mit  aHcn 
Kraften  ju  forbcvn  bcmii^t  ift.  SRatiirlic^  n)iivbcn  militdrifc^e  5}Ja^nn^men  JKup* 
(anbg,  njclc^c  6jlerreic^'Ungarn  a(g  ©ro^ung  auffaffen  tonnte,  ein  UngriicE  6efd)(eunigcn, 
bag  luir  bcibe  ju  oermeibcn  n^unfd^en,  unb  miirben  anc^  meine  ©tcCung  a(g  Ser* 
mittler,  bie  ic^  —  auf  dcinen  Sipped  pn  meine  ^^reunbfc^aft  unb  §i(fe  —  bereit* 
tt)iUig  angcnommcn  ^abC;  untergrabcn. 

gc3.  Sil^elm. 


—     35    — 

IV.  Seine  XTTajeflat  an  ^en  3aren. 

30.  3un  1  a.  m. 
SJIctn  Sotfc^after  ift  angctDiefen,  ^etnc  SRegicrung  ouf  bic  ©cfa^rcn  itnb 
[d^rDeten  ^onfequenjcn  eincr  3)^o6iUfotion  j^in^utoeif en  /  hai  gfeid^c  §a6c  ic^  *Dit  in 
rncinem  le|ten  ^elcgtamm  ge[agt.  fejlcvTeid^-Hngaru  ^at  nur  gcgen  ©crbien  mo6i(i» 
jiert,  unb  jttjar  nur  eincn  ^eit  fcinet  §lrnice.  fficnn  5Rup(anb,  xok  e8  ic|t  noc^ 
Deiner  unb  Reiner  SRcgierung  5]^ittci[ung  ber  ^^att  ifl;  gegcn  6|lcrreic^'Ungatn  mo6i( 
mac^t,  fo  mixb  bic  SctmitttcrtoQc,  mit  ber  ^Du  mif^  in  freunbfc^aftlic^cr  5Deife 
6ctrautcft  unb  bic  id^  auf  5)cinc  auSbtiicflic^e  53ittc  angcnominen  ^abc,  gcfa^rbct, 
roenn  nid^t  unmogfid^  gcmoc^t.  'Die  ganjc  <Bd)\r)txt  ber  Sntfd^eibung  ru^t  je^t  ouf 
Deinen  ©c^ultern,  fic  I^a5en  bie  SSerantoortung  fur  !Rricg  obcr  griebcn  ju  tragcn. 

gcj.  Sit^cfm 

V.  Der  3ar  an  Seine  TTtajeftdt. 

^ctcrH  ^cn  30.  3ua  1914,  U  20  p.m. 
3d^  bantc  T)ir  oon  Serpen  fur  1)cine  rafc^c  Slntrcort.  3^^  cntfenbc  ^cutc 
5t6enb  ^ati[[)ejf  mit  3n|^i^"^tion.  ©ie  je^t  in  ^raft  tretenbcn  mifitarifc^en  Wla^* 
na^mcn  fmb  fc^on  toor  5  ^agcn  befc^loffen  toorbcn,  unb  3rt)ar  au^  ©runben  ber  Set* 
teibigung  gcgen  bic  Sorbercitungen  ^j!erreid^3.  3<^  ^'^ff^  ^^^  %^W^  6«3en,  ba^ 
biefc  3)^a^nQ^men  in  feiner  SBeifc  ^cinc  ©tcttnng  aU  53ermitt(cr  6ceinflu|yen  werbcn, 
bic  3d^  fc^r  f)odi)  anfc^lagc.  5Bir  braud^cn  "Deincn  jlarEcn  <Drucf  auf  6ftcrrcid^, 
bamit  eg  ju  cincr  SScrjlanbigung  mit  un8  fommt. 

5^ico(au8. 


^elegramm  J^ee  Xeict)0tan?let0  an  &en  Kaiferlic^en 
Sotf4)after  in  Petersburg  vom  3J.  Juli  1914.  t)ringen&. 

^ro^  noc^  fc^tt)c6enber  S3ermittcrung§Der^anblungcn  unb  ohYoof)[  toix  fclbjl 
bis  jur  ©tunbc  feincrlci  9)^obilmac§ung8maBna^meu  getroffen  ^abcn,  ^at  5Ru^lan6 
gan^e  ?(rmec  unb  f^fottc,  alfo  and)  gegcn  un§,  mobiliftert.  <Durd^  btefe  ruffifd^cn 
SJiapna^men  fmb  n)ir  gcjwungcn  hjorbcn,  3ur  ©ic^erung  bc§  SReic^g  bic  bro^enbc 
5^rieg§gcfQ^r  auSjufprcc^en,  bic  noc^  nic^t  9)Jobilifierung  bebcutct.  ^ic  SJlbbirificrung 
mu(3  aber  folgen,  fa[l§  nic^t  5Ru^(anb  binncn  jnjolf  ©tunben  jebc  ^ricgSmo^na^me 
gcgen  un8  unb  Ofterrcic^^Ungom  cinjteat  unb  ung  ^icruber  bcflimmte  grflatung 
abgibt.  Sitte  bic8  fofort  5>txm  ©ojonoto  mittcilen  unb  (Stunbc  bet  Slittcilung 
bra^tcn. 


—     36     — 

'^ckQvamm  ba^  Xei4)0fan?ler0  an  J)en  1{aiferli4)m 
23otf4>after  in  pavie  vom  3K  Onli  1914,    J)rinc(en&- 

JRu^fanb  ^at  tro|  unfctcr  nod^  fc^meBcnben  Scrmittcrunggaftion  unb  obttjo^t 
n)it  felbj^  .fcinerici  SJlobifmac^unggmapna^mcn  gctroffcn  ^abcn,  3)^o6Umac^ung  fetncr 
gcfamtcn  5Irmec  unb  ^^totte,  alfo  nuc^  gcgcu  unS;  tjcrfiigt.  S!Bit  ^aben  batnuf 
bro^cnbcn  ^ricgg^ujlanb  crfldrt,  bcm  !D^obi[mQc^ung  folgen  mufj,  faUS  nic^t  5Ruf (anb 
binncn  12  ©timbcu  atte  ^ricg§maJ3iia§mcn  gcgen  uni  unb  6|tcrrcic^  clnf!eD[c.  ^ic 
2)lo6i(mQcbung  bcbeutct  unDcrmeibfic^  ^rieg  53ittc  franjoftfc^c  3Regicrung  fragcn, 
d6  jic  in  cittern  ru[fifc^-bcut[c^ctt  ^tiegc  ticutral  blciben  ttjid.  2lntn)ort  tnuf  binncti 
18  ©tutibcn  crfotgen.  ©ofort  ©tunbc  bet  gcficttten  Slnftagc  bro^ten.  ©ro^tc  (Ei(e 
gebotctt. 


STelecframm  t)ee  Xeic|)6fart?ler0  an  ben  Tiaifetlid^cn 
23offct>after  in  petereburcf  t>om  K  Ttuguft  12^^  p.  m. 

T>vinsenb. 

j^qDS  bie  JRuffifc^e  JRegierung  fcinc  befriebigenbe  Slntttjort  auf  unfere  gorberung 
trteilt,  fo  ivoHen  (Sucre  ©jcKcnj  i^r  ^eutc  ttad)tnittag8  5  Ul^t  (tttittcrcuropdifc^c  '^tii) 
forgcnbc  Grffarung  ubcrrcic^cn: 

Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  s'est  efforce  des  les  debuts  de  la  crise  de 
la  mener  a  une  solution  pacifique.  Se  rendant  a  un  desir  que  lui  en  avait 
ete  exprime  par  Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur  de  Russie,  Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur 
d'Allemagne  d'accord  avec  I'Angleterre  etait  applique  a  accomplir  un  r61e 
mediateur  aupres  des  Cabinets  de  Vienne  et  de  St.  Petersbourg,  lorsque  la 
Russie,  sans  en  attendre  le  resultat,  proceda  a  la  mobilisation  de  la  totalite 
de  ses  forces  de  terre  et  de  mer- 

A  la  suite  de  cette  mesure  menacante  motivee  par  aucun  preparatif 
militaire  de  la  part  de  I'AUemagne,  I'Empire  Allemand  se  trouva  vis-a-vis 
d'un  danger  grave  et  imminent.  Si  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  eut  manque 
de  parer  k  ce  peril  11  aurait  compromis  la  securite  et  I'existence  m6me  de 
I'Allemagne.  Par  consequent  le  Gouvernement  Allemand  se  vit  force  de 
s'adresser  au  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur  de  toutes  les  Russies 
en  sistant  sur  la  cessation  des  dits  actes  militaires.  La  Russie  ayant  refuse 
de  faire  droit  a  cette  demande  et  ayant  manifeste  par  ce  refus,  que  son  action 


—    37    — 

etait  dirigee  centre  TAlleinagne,  j'ai  Thonneur  d'ordre  de  mon  Gouveme- 
ment  de  faire  savoir  a  Votre  Excellence  ce  qui  suit: 

Sa  Majeste  I'Empereur,  mon  auguste  Souverain,  au  nom  de  TEmpire 
releve  le  defi  et  Se  considere  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la  Russie. 

Sittc  eingang  unb  ^eitpunft  bet  Slu8fu§rung  biefer  3nfttuftion  nac^  ruf jtfd^er 
5cit  bringenb  bra^tcn. 

Sittc  3§te  ^ajfc  forbem*  unb  ©d^u^  unb  ©efc^aftc  Slmerifanifd^cr  Sotfc^aft 
ubergebcn. 


?^kcframm  ^e0  Haifctlid^cn  Hotfd^aftcv^  in  parte  an 
i>en  Xeict>0fan?kr  t>om  K  2tugutl  1  >t^r  5  ixiin,  nm. 

?luf  mcinc  njiebcr^ofte  bcjlimmte  ^ragc,  06  3^^"f^^i<^  ii"  S^ttc  cinc3  beutfd^' 
rufflfc^cn  ^riege§  neutral  bfcibe,  txtiattt  bet  9)iinijler^)rafibent  mix,  ha^  granfteid^ 
ha^  tun  njcrbe,  nja?  feine  ^ntcreffcn  ii^m  ge^otcn. 


©tilin/  gfbtuctt  in  in  iRrit^«6ru(Jrtfi 
3309.     U.    Ilia. 


10 


[Crown  Copyright  jReserved* 

GREAT   BRITAIN 


AND    THE 


EUROPEAN   CRISIS. 


CORRESPONDENCE,  AND  STATEMENTS 
IN  PARLIAMENT,  TOGETHER  WITH  AN 
INTRODUCTORY  NARRATIVE  OF  EVENTS. 


LONDON: 

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1914. 

Price  One  Penny, 


CONTENTS. 


Introductory  Narrative  of  Events  

Table  of  Contents  of  Correspondence  laid  before 
Parliament 

List  of  Principal  Persons  mentioned  in  the  Corre- 
spondence,   showing   their    official    positions 

Part    I. — Correspondence  laid  before  Parliament 
Part  II. — Speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons: — 

(1)  Sir  Edward  Grey  (August  3,  1914). 

(2)  Sir  Edward  Grey  (August  3,   1914). 

(3)  Mr.  Asquith  (August  4,   1914) 

(4)  Mr.  Asquith  (August  5,   1914) 

(5)  Mr.  Asquith  (August  6,  1914) 


Page 

iii. 

xi. 

xxvi. 
1 

89 
97 

97 
98 
98 


INTRODUCTORY  NARRA.TIVE  OF  EVENTS. 


(1.) 

On  the  23rd  June,  1914,  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  nephew  of  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  Heir  to  the  Throne,  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Army, 
left  Vienna  to  attend  army  manoeuvres  in  the  Province  of  Bosnia.  On  Sunday, 
the  28th,  he  visited  Sarajevo,  the  capital  of  the  province,  and  made  a  progress 
through  the  town  accompanied  by  his  wife,  the  Duchess  of  Hohenberg.  While 
passing  through  the  streets  their  automobile  was  fired  on  by  an  assassin.  Both 
the  Archduke  and  Duchess  were  killed. 

No  crime  has  ever  aroused  deeper  or  more  general  horror  throughout 
Europe ;  none  has  ever  been  less  justified.  Sympathy  for  Austria  was  universal. 
Both  the  Governments  and  the  public  opinion  of  Europe  were  ready  to  support 
her  in  any  measures,  however  severe,  which  she  might  think  it  necessary  to 
take  for  the  punishment  of  the  murderer  and  his  accomplices. 

It  immediately  appeared,  from  the  reports  of  our  representatives  abroad, 
that  the  press  and  public  opinion  of  Austria-Hungary  attributed  much  of  the 
responsibility  for  the  crime  to  the  Servian  Government,  which  was  said  to  have 
encouraged  a  revolutionary  movement  amongst  the  Serb  populations  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina. 

That  there  had  for  many  years  been  a  strong  Serb  nationalist  movement  in 
these  two  provinces  there  is  no  doubt.  This  movement  in  an  earlier  form  had 
swept  the  provinces,  then  part  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  into  the  insurrection 
against  the  Turkish  Government  in  the  seventies  of  last  century,  culminating 
in  the  war  of  1877-8  between  Russia  and  Turkey.  It  had  continued  when 
Austria  took  over  the  administration  of  the  provinces  under  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  in  1878.  Austria  then  pledged  her  word  to  Turkey  that  her  occupation 
should  not  ''  detract  from  the  rights  of  sovereignty  of  His  Majesty  the  Sultan 
over  these  provinces."  Thirty  years  later,  however,  in  1908,  she  suddenly  pro- 
claimed their  annexation  to  her  Empire.  On  the  7th  October  of  that  year,  the 
annexation  was  celebrated  in  Sarajevo  by  the  firing  of  salutes  and  ringing  of 
cathedral  bells,  amid  scenes  of  official  rejoicing  and  popular  apathy.  Servian 
nationalist  feeling  immediately  asserted  itself,  and  the  Servian  Government 
protested  to  the  Powers  against  the  annexation  as  a  "deep  injury  done  to  the 
feelings,  interests,  and  rights  of  the  Servian  people."  Servia's  attitude, 
coupled  with  the  resentment  felt  by  Russia  and  certain  other  Great  Powers, 
nearly  brought  about  a  European  war ;  but  after  six  months  of  extreme  tension 
she  was  induced  to  make  a  declaration  abandoning  her  protest  and  promising 
to  live  on  good  terms  with  Austria.  Her  nationalist  aspirations  still  continued, 
however,  and  were  strengthened  by  her  successes  in  the  Balkan  wars  of  1912-13 
—successes  which  were  compromised  by  Austria's  opposition  to  her  territorial 
expansion.     As  Servia  grew,  Austrian  suspicion  of  her  designs  deepened. 

(2.) 

In  the  light  of  this  history  the  storm  of  anti-Servian  feeling  which  swept 
Austria-Hungary  after  the  Sarajevo  murders  is  easily  understood.  It  was  a 
feeling  based  on  patriotism  and  loyalty.  Europe  was  disposed  to  excuse  its 
exaggerations  and  to  sympathise  with  its  motives. 

But  the  dangers  to  European  peace  which  it  involved  were  inimcdiately 
evident  from  the  reports  wliich  reached  the  Government  in  London.  Anti-Serb 
riots  took  place  at  Sarajevo  and  Agram.  The  members  of  the  Serb  party  in 
the  Provincial  Council  of  Croatia  were  assailed  by  their  colleagues  with  cries 
of  "Servian  assassins."  Mobs  in  Vienna  threatened  the  Servian  Legation. 
The  Austrian  press,  almost  without  exception,  used  the  most  unbridled  lan- 
guage, and  called  for  the  condign  punishment  of  Servia.     There  were  signs 

a2 


IV 

that  the  popular  resentment  was  shared,  and  perhaps  encouraged,  by  the 
Austrian  Government.  Both  the  British  and  also  the  German  Government 
knew  that  the  peace  might  be  disturbed. 

In  view  of  these  reports,  it  naturally  became  incumbent  on  disinterested 
Powers  to  exercise  what  influence  they  possessed  in  a  direction  which  would 
reconcile  justice  with  peace.  Unfortunately,  though  the  attitude  of  public 
opinion  in  Austria,  and,  to  a  less  degree,  also  in  Germany,  was  plain,  the  inten- 
tions of  the  Austrian  Government  remained  almost  equally  obscure.  The 
Austrian  Foreign  Ofl&ce  maintained  an  attitude  of  reticence  towards  the  British 
and  Russian  Ambassadors.  On  the  7th  July  the  Government  were  careful  to 
make  a  public  announcement  that  a  joint  meeting  of  the  Cabinets  of  Austria 
and  Hungary,  which  had  just  taken  place,  was  only  concerned  with  the  question 
of  dom.estic  measures  to  repress  the  Pan-Serb  propaganda  in  Bosnia.  On  the 
Sth  July  the  Minister-President  of  Hungary  made,  on  the  whole,  a  pacific 
speech  in  the  Hungarian  Parliament,  defending  the  loyalty  of  the  majority  of 
the  Serb  subjects  of  the  Empire.  On  the  11th  July  the  Servian  Minister  at 
Vienna  had  no  reason  to  anticipate  a  threatening  communication  from  the 
Austrian  Government,  and  as  late  as  the  22nd  July,  the  day  before  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  was  delivered  at  Belgrade,  the  Minister-President  of  Hungary  stated 
in  Parliament  that  the  situation  did  not  warrant  the  opinion  that  a  serious 
turn  of  events  was  necessary  or  even  probable. 

His  Majesty's  Government  had  therefore  largely  to  fall  back  on  conjecture. 
It  was  known  that  the  situation  might  become  serious,  but  it  was  also  known 
that  Servia  had  made  professions  of  readiness  to  accept  any  demands  com- 
patible with  the  sovereignty  of  an  independent  State.  It  was  known  that  the 
opinion  of  the  Russian  and  French — and  also  of  the  German — Governments  was 
that  the  Servian  Government  was  not  itself  to  blame  for  the  crime,  but  that 
Servia  must  be  ready  to  investigate  and  put  an  end  to  the  propaganda  which 
had  apparently  led  to  it,  and  which  was  -said  to  have  originated  in  part  on  Ser- 
vian soil.  Sir  E.  Grey  advised  Servia  to  show  herself  moderate  and  conciliatory. 
He  promised  the  German  Ambassador  to  use  his  influence  with  the  Russian 
Government  in  the  same  direction.  More  could  not  be  done,  for  no  actual 
evidence  had  yet  been  furnished  that  Servian  territory  had  in  fact  been  made 
the  base'  for  revolutionary  operations.  It  was  only  knoAvn  that  a  court-martial 
had  been  set  up  at  Sarajevo,  the  proceedings  before  which  were  secret.  The 
Servian  Government  stated  that  they  were  only  waiting  for  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment to  communicate  the  evidence  thus  collected  before  setting  their  own  investi- 
gations on  foot.  The  Servian  Government  also  stated  that  both  the  assassins 
implicated  were  Austrian  subjects,  and  that  on  a  previous  occasion  the  Austrian 
Government  had  informed  the  Servian  Government,  in  reply  to  enquiries,  that 
one  of  these  men  was  harmless  and  was  under  their  protection.  It  was  remem- 
bered that  Austria  had  tried  on  previous  occasions  to  fasten  guilt  on  the  Ser- 
vian Government  by  means  of  police  evidence  brought  forward  in  Austrian 
courts,  and  had  failed.  It  was  therefore  assumed  on  all  sides  that,  before 
Austria  took  any  action,  she  would  disclose  to  the  public  her  case  against 
Servia.  When  Sir  E.  Grey  said  this  to  the  German  Ambassador  on  the  20th 
July,  the  latter  replied  that  he  certainly  assumed  that  Austria  would  act  upon 
some  case  that  would  be  known ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment did  not  receive  any  statement  of  the  evidence  on  which  Austria  had 
founded  her  ultimatum  till  the  7th  August. 

It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  wait.  The  situation  was  as  clear  as  it  could 
be  made  till  Austria  would  consent  to  throw  off  her  reticence.  There  was 
nothing  doubtful  in  the  general  international  situation,  no  incalculable  element 
which  Austria  could  not  take  into  full  consideration.  Whatever  she  did,  she 
would  know  accurately  the  consequences  of  her  action.  The  Triple  Alliance 
and  the  Triple  Entente  remained  as  they  had  always  been.  We  had  been  quite 
recently  assured  tliat  no  new  secret  element  had  been  introduced  into  the  former, 
and  Sir  E.  Grey  had  stated  emphatically  in  Parliament  on  the  11th  June  that 
the  latter  had  remained  unchanged  so  far  as  we  were  concerned.  Russia's 
interest  in  the  Balkans  was  well  known.  As  late  as  the  23rd  IMay  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  reaffirmed  in  the  Duma  the  policy  of  the 
"Balkans  for  the  Balkans,"  and  it  was  known  that  any  attack  on  a  Balkan 
State  by  any  great  European  Power  would  be  regarded  as  a  menace  to  that 
policy.  If  Servia  was,  as  the  Austrian  Ambassador  said  to  Sir  E.  Grey  on  the 
29th  July,  "  regarded  as  being  in  the  Austrian  sphere  of  influence  "  j  if  Servia 


was  to  be  humiliated;  then  assuredly  Russia  could  not  remain  indifferent.  It 
was  not  a  question  of  the  policy  of  Russian  statesmen  at  St.  Petersburgh,  but 
of  the  deep  hereditary  feeling  for  the  Balkan  populations  bred  in  the  Russian 
people  by  more  than  two  centuries  of  development.  These  things  had  been,  as 
Sir  E.  Grey  said  to  Parliament  in  March,  1913,  in  discussing  the  Balkan  war, 
"a  commonplace  in  European  diplomacy  in  the  past."  They  were  the  facts  of 
the  European  situation,  the  products  of  years  of  development,  tested  and 
retested  during  the  last  decade.  Patient  work  might  change  them,  but  the 
product  of  years  could  not  be  pushed  aside  in  a  day. 

(3.) 

Yet  two  days  were  as  much  as  Austria  decided  to  allow  for  the  task.  On 
the  23rd  July  she  showed  her  hand.  She  delivered  an  ultimatum  at  Belgrade 
and  required  an  answer  in  forty-eight  hours.  She  made  ten  demands,  directed 
towards  the  elimination  from  Servian  national  life  of  everything  which  was 
hostile  to  Austria.  These  demands  involved  the  suppression  of  newspapers  and 
literature,  the  suppression  of  nationalist  societies,  a  reorganisation  of  the 
Government  schools,  the  dismissal  of  officers  from  the  army,  the  participation 
of  Austrian  officials  in  judicial  proceedings  in  Servia,  the  arrest  of  two  specified 
men,  the  prevention  of  all  traffic  in  arms  across  the  frontier,  a  full  explanation 
of  unti- Austrian  utterances,  and  immediate  notification  of  the  enforcement  of 
these  measures.  In  addition,  the  Servian  Government  was  to  publish  on  the 
front  page  of  the  "  Official  Journal  "  a  prescribed  statement,  which  amounted 
to  iv  full  recantation  of  her  alleged  errors,  and  a  promise  of  amendment.  A 
very  brief  summary  was  annexed  to  the  ultimatum,  giving  the  bare  findings  of 
the  secret  trial  at  Sarajevo,  with  no  corroborative  evidence.  No  independent 
nation  had  ever  been  called  on  to  accept  a  greater  humiliation. 

Between  the  delivery  of  this  ultimatum  and  the  declaration  of  war  between 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  there  was  an  interval  of  only  twelve  days.  In  the 
whirl  of  negotiations  which  now  followed,  there  was  no  time  to  draw  breath  and 
ponder.  At  the  outset,  therefore,  it  may  be  well  to  explain  definitely  the 
British  attitude  towards  the  Austrian  ultimatum. 

Austria  was  under  provocation.  She  had  to  complain  of  a  dangerous  popular 
movement  against  her  government.  What  evidence  she  might  have  against  the 
Servian  Government  no  one  in  Europe  then  knew.  Great  Britain  had  no 
interest  in  the  Balkans,  except  one.  She  desired  the  consolidation  and  pro- 
gressive government  of  the  Balkan  States;  she  desired,  in  the  words  recently 
used  by  tTie  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  before  the  Duma,  that  "the 
Balkan  Governments  should  recognise  that,  in  the  matter  of  strengthening  a 
State,  the  acquisition  of  territory  is  insufficient;  the  devotion  and  confidence 
of  the  new  citizens  must  be  enlisted."  The  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia 
did  not  necessarily  affect  that  interest;  it  was  a  dispute  between  two  Govern- 
ments with  which  Great  Britain  had  nothing  to  do.  Sir  E.  Grey,  therefore, 
consistently  stated  that  he  had  no  concern  in  that  dispute;  that  he  had  no  title 
to  intervene  between  Austria  and  Servia;  that  he  would  express  no  opinion  on 
the  merits  of  the  ultimatum.  But  there  was  the  other  side.  If  the  dispute 
affected  the  interests  of  Russia,  then  the  peace  of  Europe  was  at  stake;  and, 
from  the  first.  Sir  E.  Grey  told  the  Austrian  Government  that  ho  did  not  see 
how  Russia,  interested  as  she  was  in  Servia,  could  take  any  but  a  most  serious 
view  of  such  a  formidable  document  ias  the  ultimatum.  The  peace  of  Europe 
must  be  maintained,  and  it  could  only  be  maintained,  as  Mr.  Asquith  had  said 
to  Parliament  in  March,  1913,  in  discussing  the  Balkan  crisis,  by  a  "spirit  of 
forbearance,  patience,  and  self-sacrifice  "—by  a  "loyal  spirit  of  give  and  take 
on  the  part  of  the  Great  Powers  directly  concerned.""  It  was  as  the  agent  of  this 
spirit  of  conciliation  alone  that  Great  Britain  intervened  in  the  European  crisis. 

(4.) 

On  the  23rd  July  the  Austrian  Ambassador  told  Sir  E.  Grey  that  an  ulti- 
matum was  being  handed  to  Servia.  For  the  first  time  Sir  E.  Grey  heard  that 
"there  would  be  something  in  the  nature  of  a  time  limit."  He  immediately 
expressed  his  grave  alarm.  Next  morning  the  text  of  the  ultimatum  was 
handed  to  him,  and  he  learnt  that  the  time  limit  was  forty-eight  hours.     He 


confessed  to  the  German  Ambassador  that,  as  no  time  had  been  left  for  delibera- 
tion, he  felt  helpless.  There  was  no  time  to  advise  Russia  or  to  influence 
Servia. 

At  this  critical  moment  everything  depended  on  Germany.  As  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  a  little  later,  "the  key  of  the  situation  was 
to  be  found  in  Berlin."  What  was  Germany's  attitude?  Privately,  the 
German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  expressed  his  doubts  as  to  the  ultimatum  ; 
officially,  the  German  Government  called  it  *' equitable  and  moderate,"  and 
said  that  they  "desired  urgently  the  localisation  of  the  conflict."  Everyone 
desired  that ;,  but  it  was  no  time  for  phrases.  The  same  morning  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  summoned  the  French  and  British  Ambassa- 
dors in  St.  Petersburgh,  had  said  that  Austria's  step  meant  imminent  war, 
and  had  asked  for  the  support  of  Great  Britain  and  France.  The  French 
Ambassador  had  pledged  the  support  of  France,  as  was  well  known  to  be  in- 
evitable under  the  terms  of  her  alliance.  The  next  morning  the  Russian 
Government  stated  publicly  that  Russia  could  not  remain  indifferent  to  the 
Austro-Servian  conflict.  The  next  evening  troops  in  Vienna  had  to  be  called 
out  to  guard  the  Russian  Embassy  from  hostile  crowds.  "  Localisation  "  was 
a  good  phrase,  but  we  had  to  deal  with  facts.  Austria  had  surprised  Europe, 
and  with  surprise  had  come  universal  alarm. 

During  these  forty-eight  hours  Great  Britain  made  three  attempts  at  peace. 
Before  all  things,  the  time-limit  of  the  ultimatum  had  to  be  extended.  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  urged  this  at  Vienna.  Great  Britain  urged  Germany  to 
join  in  pt^ssing  the  Austrian  Government.  All  that  Berlin  consented  to  do  was 
to  "  pass  on  "  the  message  to  Vienna. 

Secondly,  Sir  E.  Grey  urged  that  Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  and 
Italy  should  work  together  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  in  favour  of  con- 
ciliation.    Italy  assented;    France  assented;    Russia  declared  herself  ready j 
Germany  said  she  had  no  objection,  "if  relations  between  Austria  and  Russia' 
became  threatening." 

Thirdly,  the  Russian,  French,  and  British  representatives  at  Belgrade  were 
instructed  to  advise  Servia  to  go  as  far  as  possible  to  meet  Austria. 

But  it  was  too  late.  The  time-limit,  which  Austria  would  not  extend,  had 
expired ;  and  after  all  Servia  did  not  need  advice.  On  the  afternoon  of 
Saturday,  the  25th,  she  returned  to  Austria  a  reply  which  amounted  to  an 
acceptance  of  all  Austria's  demands,  subject  on  certain  points  to  the  delays 
necessary  for  passing  new  laws  and  amending  her  Constitution,  and  subject 
to  an  explanation  by  Austria-Hungary  of  her  precise  wishes  with  regard  to 
the  participation  of  Austro-Hungarian  officials  in  Servian  judicial  proceedings. 
The  reply  went  far  beyond  anything  which  any  Power — Germany  not  excepted 
— had  ever  thought  probable.  But  the  same  day  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  reported  that  the  tone  of  the  Austrian  press  left  the  impression  that 
a  settlement  was  not  desired,  and  he  later  reported  that  the  impression  left  on 
his  mind  was  that  the  Austrian  note  was  so  drawn  up  as  to  make  war  inevitable. 
In  spite  of  the  conciliatory  nature  of  Servia's  reply,  the  Austrian  Minister  left 
Belgrade  the  same  evening,  and  Servia  ordered  a  general  mobilisation. 

But  an  outline  of  the  Servian  reply  had  been  communicated  to  Sir  E.  Grey 
an  hour  or  two  before  it  was  delivered.  He  immediately  expressed  to  Germany 
the  hope  that  she  would  urge  Austria  to  accept  it.  Berlin  again  contented 
itself  with  "  passing  on  "  the  expression  of  Sir  E.  Grey's  hope  to  Vienna  through 
the  German  Ambassador  there.  The  fate  of  the  message  so  passed  on  may  bo 
guessed  from  the  fact  that  the  German  Ambassador  told  the  British  Ambassador 
directly  afterwards  that  Seryia  had  only  made  a  pretence  of  giving  way,  and 
that  her  concessions  were  all  a  shanL 

(5.) 

During  the  next  four  days,  26th  to  29th  July,  there  was  only  One  question 
"before  Europe — how  could  Russia  and  Austria  be  brought  to  an /agreement? 
It  was  evident  that  Russia  did  not  believe  that  Austria  would,  or  could,  stop 
short  of  the  absolute  ruin  of  the  Servian  State,  if  she  once  actually  attacked 
it.  Here  again,  the  question  was  not  merely  one  of  Government  policy ;  the 
popular  sentiment  of  two  great  nations  was  involved.  Austria  indeed  pro- 
fessed, no  doubt  with  perfect  honesty,  that  she  would  take  no  territory  from 
Servia.     But  the  Austrian  Ministers  were  being  borne  along  on  a  wave  of 


vii; 

violent  popular  enthusiasm,  Tliey  said  themselves  that  they  would  bo  swept 
from  power  if  they  did  not  follow  the  popular  desire  for  a  conflict  with  Servia. 
Would  this  popular  enthusiasm  be  content  with  any  mere  punitive  expedition 
against  the  enemy?  Surely  not.  Russia,  therefore,  openly  said  that  sho 
would  have  to  intervene  if  Servia  were  attacked;  but  she  promised  Austria 
on  the  27th  that  sho  would  use  all  her  influence  at  Belgrade  to  induce  the 
Servian  Government  to  give  satisfaction  to  Austria,  and  only  asked  Austria 
to  delay  hostilities  in  order  to  give  time  for  deliberation.  Austria  refused, 
saying  it  was  too  late.  Sho  declared  war  on  Servia  on  the  28tli.  Russia 
ordered  a  partial  mobilisation  on  the  29th. 

But  meanwhile  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  proposed  that  the  German,  Italian, 
and  French  Ambassadors  should  meet  him  in  London,  to  discuss  the  best  means 
towards  a  settlement.  Italy  and  France  at  once  accepted;  Russia  said  sho 
was  ready  to  stand  aside;  but  Germany' refused.  She  did  not  like  what  she 
called  "a  court  of  arbitration,"  and  proposed  instead  direct  negotiations 
between  Russia  and  Austria.  These  negotiations  actually  began,  as  we  have 
seen  in  the  last  paragraph,  but  they  were  cut  short  by  the  Austrian  declaration 
of  war  against  Servia.  Austria  then  apparently  considered  that  the  moment 
for  such  negotiations  was  passed.  She  had,  moreover,  refused  to  discuss  the 
Servian  reply  in  any  way,  and  it  was  difficult  to  see,  after  that  refusal,  what 
Russia  could  negotiate  with  her  about.  Russia,  therefore,  fell  back  on  Sir  E. 
Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference  of  Ambassadors  in  London,  which  she  had 
originally  expressed  her  readiness  to  accept.  The  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Aff'airs  urged  Sir  E.  Grey  to  induce  Germany  to  indicate  in  what  way  she  would 
consent  to  work  for  a  settlement. 

This  bring!5  the  narrative  of  events  down  to  Wednesday,  the  29th  July. 
Russia  was  mobilising  partially  in  her  southern  provinces.  Austrian  troops 
wet"o  bombarding  Belgrade.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  better  news  was  coming 
from  Berlin.  Up  to  the  28th  at  least,  both  Germany  and  Austria  had  seemed 
unwilling  to  admit  that  the  situation  was  really  serious;  Russia,  it  was  said, 
was  unprepared,  and  France  was  in  no  condition  to  go  to  war.  Germany  had 
said,  in  reply  to  Sir  E.  Grey's  repeated  advances,  that  she  did  not  like  to  make 
representations  to  Vienna  for  fear  of  stiffening  Austria's  attitude.  But  on  the 
evening  of  the  28th  the  German  Chancellor  assured  the  British  Ambassador 
that  he  was  trying  to  mediate  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg!!.  On  the  strength 
of  this  assurance  and  similar  assurances  made  by  the  German  Ambassador  in 
London  on  the  29t]i,  Sir  E.  Grey  telegraphed  to  Berlin  once  more,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  request  of  the  Russian  Government,  urging  the  German  Govern- 
ment, if  they  did  not  like  the  idea  of  the  Ambassadors'  conference  in  the  form 
he  had  suggested  it,  to  suggest  any  other  form  they  pleased.  "Mediation,"  he 
said,  "  was  ready  to  come  into  operation  by  any  method  that  Germany  thought 
possible  if  only  Germany  would  press  the  button  in  the  interests  of  peace." 
The  telegram  was  despatched  at  about  4  o'clock  oYi  the  evening  of  the  29th. 

(6.) 

This  appeal  was  followed  almost  immediately  by  a  strange  response.  About 
midnight,  a  telegram  arrived  at  the  Foreign  Ofi&ce  from  His  Majesty's.  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin.  The  German  Chancellor  had  sent  for  him  late  at  night.  He 
had  asked  if  Great  Britain  would  promise  to  remain  neutral  in  a  war,  provided 
Germany  did  not  touch  Holland  and  took  nothing  from  Franco  but  her  colonies. 
He  refused  to  give  any  undertaking  that  Germany  would  not  invade  Belgium, 
but  he  promised  that,  if  Belgium  remained  passive,  no  territory  would  be  taken 
from  her. 

Sir  E.  Grey's  answer  was  a  peremptory  refusal,  but  he  added  an  exhortation 
and  an  offer.  The  business  of  Europe  was  to  work  for  peace.  That  was  the 
only  question  with  which  Great  Britain  was  concerned.  If  Germany  would 
prove  by  her  actions  now  that  she  desired  peace,  Gseat  Britain  would  warmly 
welcome  a  future  agreement  with  hei-  whereby  the  whole  weight  of  the  two 
nations  would  be  thrown  permanently  into  the  scale  of  peace  in  years  to  come. 

For  the  next  two  days  peace  proposals  and  negotiations  continued,  s(fmo 
initiated  and  all  supported  by  Great  Britain.  There  remained  a  spark  of  hope. 
But  from  the  British  point  of  view  the  face  of  Europe  henceforward  was 
changed.  On  the  29th  July  the  only  conflict  in  progress  had  been  on  tho 
frontiers  of  Servia  and  Austria ;  the  only  fear  of  further  war  had  lain  in  the 


Vlll 

relations  of  Russia  and  Austria.  Germany's  declarations  were  pacific ;  Russia 
had  said  she  desired  nothing  but  a  period  of  peace  to  allow  for  her  internal 
development ;  France  would  not  fight  except  to  help  her  ally.  There  had 
seemed  no  insuperable  difliculty  in  keeping  the  peace ;  it  was  only  a  question 
of  allaying  the  mutual  suspicion  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.  But 
now  a  new  element  of  danger  had  been  introduced.  Great  Britain  now  knew 
that  Gei  many  was  contemplating  an  attack  on  France.  She  knew  more.  The 
independence  of  the  Low  Countries  had  for  centuries  been  considered  as  one 
of  the  strongest  means  of  securing  the  peace  of  Europe.  Their  position  and 
the  nature  of  the  country  rendered  them"  the  natural  battlefield  of  Northern 
Europe.  If  it  was  made  impossible  for  a  Great  Power  to  invade  thein,  war 
would  become  increasingly  diii;calt  and  dangerous.  With  the  growth  of  the 
idea  of  a  fixed  system  of  \nternational  law  foundt^d  on  treaties,  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  had  been  devised  as  a  permanent  safeguard  to  this  end.  As  such, 
it  had  been  consecrated  by  two  international  treaties  signed  by  all  the  Powers, 
and  recognised  by  two  generations  of  statesmen.  Now,  when  the  peace  of 
Europe  was  our  one  object,  it  was  found  that  Germany  was  preparing  to  tear 
out  the  main  rivet  of  that  peace. 

Germany's  position  must  be  understood.  She  had  fulfilled  her  treaty  obliga- 
tions in  the  pnst ;  her  action  now  vwa«  not  wanton.  Belgium  was  of  supremo 
military  importance  in  a  war  with  France ;  if  such  a  war  occurred,  it  would  be 
one  of  life  and  death  ;- Germany  feared  that,  if  she  did  not  occupy  Belgium, 
France  might  do  so.  In  face  of  this  siLspioon,  there  was  only  one  thing  to  do> 
The  nejitrality  of  Belgium  had  not  been  devised  as  n  pretext  for  wars,  but  to 
prevent  the  outbreak  of  wars.  The  Powers  must  reaffirm  Belgian  neutrality  iu 
order  to  prevent  the  war  now  threatened.  Tbe  Bntisb  Government,  therefore, 
on  Friday,  the  31st  July,  ask^d  the  German  and  French  Governments  for  an 
fingag§nient  to  respect  Belgium's  neutrality,  and  the  Belgian  Got-ernment  for 
an  engngement  to  uphold  it.  France  gave  the  necessary  engagement  the  same 
day;  Belgium  gave  it  the  day  after;  Germany  returned  no  reply.  Hence- 
forward there  could  be  no  doubt  of  Gorman  designs. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  30th  and  31st  negotiations  continned  between  Russia  and 
Austria.  On  the  29th  Gerniany  had  suggested  to  Austria  that  she  "should  s;top 
as  soon  ^  her  troops  had  occupied  Belgrade.  Late  on  the  same  night  Russia 
ofi'ered  to  stop  all  military  preparations,  if  Austria  would  recognise  that  the 
conflict  with  Seryia  had  become  a  question  of  general  European  interest,  and 
would  eliminate  from  her  nitimotum  the  points  which  involved  a  violation  of 
the  sovereignty  of  Servia-  As  the  result  of  this  offer,  Russia  wa«  able  t^  inform 
His  Majesty's  Government  on  the  31st  that  Austria  had  at  last  agreed  to  do 
the  very  thing  she  had  refused  to  do  in  the  first  days  of  the  crjsis,  namely,  to 
discuss  the  whole  question  of  her  ultimatum  to  Servfa.  Russia  asked  the  British 
Government  to  assume  the  <li ruction  of  these  discussions.  For  a  few  hours 
there  seemed  to  be  a  hope  of  peace. 

(7.) 

At  this  moment,  on  Friday,  the  31st,  Germany  suddenly  despatched  an 
ultimatum  to  Russia,  demanding  that  she  should  countermand  her  mobilisation 
within  twelve  hours.  Every  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  natural  nervous- 
ness which,  as  history  has  repeatedly  shown,  overtakes  nations  when  mobilisa- 
tion is  under  way.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that,  according  to  the  information 
in  the  possession  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  mobilisation  had' not  at  the 
time  proceeded  as  far  in  Russia  as  in  Germany,  although  general  mobilisation 
was  not  publicly  proclaim.ed  in  Germany  »till  the  next  day,  the  1st  August. 
France  also  began  to  mobilise  on  that  day.  The  German  Secretary  of  State 
refused  to  discuss  a  last  proposal  from  Sir  E.  Grey  for  joint  action  with  Ger- 
many, France,  and  Italy  until  Russia's  reply  sho"uld  be  received,  and  in  the 
afternoon  the  Gorman  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  presented  a  declaration 
of  Av-ar..  Yet  on  this  same  day,  Saturday,  the  1st,  Russia  assured  Great  Britain 
that  she  would  on  no  account'  commence  hostilities  if  the  Germans  did  not  cross 
the  frontier,  and  France  declared  that  her  troops  would  be  kept  6  miles  from 
her  frontier  so  as  to  prevent  a  colhsion.  This  was  the  situation  when  very  early 
on  Sunday  morning,  the  2nd  August,  German  troops  invaded  Luxemburg,  a 
small  independent  State  whose  neutrality  had  heen  guaranteed  by  all  the  Powers 


IX 

with  the  same  object  as  the  similar  guarantee  of  Belgium.     The  die  was  cast. 
War  between  Germany,  Russia,  and  France  had  become  inevitable. 

Only  one  question  now  remained  for  this  country.  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment failed  in  their  attempts  to  secure  a  general  peace.  Should  they  now 
remain  neutral?  The  grounds  on  which  that  question  was  decided  are  clearly 
set  forth  in  the  statements  of  Sir  E.  Grey  and  Mr.  Asquith  in  Parliament, 
which  are  cpntained  in  this  volume,*  and  no  additional  explanations  are  needed 
here.  But  one  fact  may  be  emphasised.  From  the  24th  July,  when  Russia 
first  asked  for  British  support,  to  the  2nd  August,  when  a  conditional  promise 
of  naval  assistance  was  given  to  France,  Sir  E.  Grey  had  consistently  declined 
to  give  any  promise  of  support  to  either  of  our  present  allies.  He  maintained 
that  the  position  of  Great  Britain  was  that  of  a  disinterested  party  whose 
influence  for  peace  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  would  be  enhanced  by  the .  knowledge 
that  we  were  not  committed  absolutely  to  either  side  in  the  existing  dispute.  He 
refused  to  believe  that  the  best  road  to  European  peace  lay  through  a  show  of 
force.  We  took  no  mobilisation  measures  except  to  keep  our  fleet  assembled, 
and  we  confined  ourselves  to  indicating  clearly  to  Austria  on. the  27th  July,  and 
to  Germany  on  the  29th  July,  that  we  could  not  engage  to  remain  neutral  if  a 
European  conflagration  took  place.  We  gave  no  pledge  to  our  present  allies, 
but  to  Germany  we  gave  three  times— on  the  30th  July,  the  31st  July,  and  the 
1st  August— a  clear  warning  of  the  eflFect  which  would  be  produced  on  our  atti- 
tude and  on  the  sentiment  of  the  British  people  by  a  violation  of  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium. 

After  Germany's  declaration  of  war  on  Russia  on  the  afternoon  of  the  1st, 
the  Tsar  telegraphed  to  His  Majesty  the  King  as' follows:  "In  this  solemn  hour 
I  wish  to  assure  you  once  more  that  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  avert  war." 
It  is  right  to  say  that  His  Majesty's  Government  believe  this'  to  be  a  true  state- 
ment of  the  attitude  both  of  Russia  and  France  throughout  this  crisis.  On  the 
other  hand,  with  every  wish  to  be  fair  and  just,  it  will  be  admitted  that  the 
response  of  Germany  and  Austria  gave  no  evidence  of  a  sincere  desire  to  save  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

Foreign  Office,  Sept,  28,  1914. 

*  See  Part  II. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

OF 

CORRESPONDENCE  LAID  BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT, 


NOTE. 

(1)  Documents  Nos^  1-159  have  been  published  as  a  White  Paper, 
Miscellaneous  No.  6  (1914)  [Gd.  7467]. 

(2)  Document    No.  160    has    been    published    ais    a    White    Paper, 
Miscellaneous  No.  8  (1914)  [Gd.  7445]. 

(3)  Document    No.  161    has    been    published    as    a    White    Paper, 
Miscellaneous  No.  10  (1914)  £Gd.  7596], 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


No. 


10 


11 


12 


Name. 


To  Sir  H.  Rumbold 


Sir  H.  Rumbold     ... 
(Telegraphic] 


To  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen 


Communicated  by 
Austro  -  Hungarian 
Ambassador 

To  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  G.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Mr,      Crackanthorpe 
(Telegraphic) 


German    Ambassador 


To  Sir  F.  Berti©     ... 


To  Sir  H.   Rumbold 
(Telegraphic) 


To      Mr.      Crackan- 
thorpe 

(Telegraphic) 


Date. 


Subject. 


1914. 
July  20 


S2 


23 


2i 


24 


24 


24 


24 


24 


24 


24 


24 


Conversation  .with  German  Ambassador  r6sp6cting 
disquieting  situation  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Servia.  Sir  E.  Grey  assumes  that  Austria-Hungary 
will  publish  her  case  against  Servia  before  taking 
any  action,  and  thus  facilitate  Russia  counselling 
moderation  at  Belgrade     

Attitude  of  German  Government.  Secrctary^of  State 
prefers  not  to  interfere,  and  considers  that  Austria- 
Hungary  has  shown  great  forbearance  towards 
Servia  in  the  past 

Conversation  with  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador'  re- 
specting note  to  be  sent  to  Servian  Government. 
Objections  urged  to  insertion  of  time-limit.  Dangers 
of  European  conflagration  ,. 

vText  of  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Servia         


Austro-Hungarian  note  to  S6rvia;  Conversation  with 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador.  Sir  E.  Grey  de- 
precates Austrian  demands  as  inconsistent  with 
maintenance  of  Servian  independent  sovereignty  ... 

Conversation  with  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  respecting  results  of  M.  Poincare's  visit  to 
St.  Petersburgh.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and 
French  Ambassador  urged  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  should  proclaim  solidarity  with  them. 
Former  hoped  in  any  case  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment would  express  strong  reprobation  of  Austro- 
Hungarian   action      

Views  of  Russian  Charge  d'Affaircs  on  situation  as 
expressed  to  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs     

Servian  Prime  Minister  hopes  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  will  use  influence  in  moderating  Austro- 
Hungarian   demands  

Views  of  German  Government  on  situation.  .  German 
Government  defend  attitude  of  Austria-Hungary 
towards  Servia,  and  consider  matter  concerns  those 
States  alone     

Conversation  with  French  Ambassador  respecting 
Austro-Hungarian  note  and  possibility  of  mediation 
by  the  four  Powers 

Conversation  with  German  Ambassador,  who  justified 
Austro-Hungarian  action  and  demands,  and  urged 
localisation  of  conflict.  Question  of  using  influence 
at  St.  Petersburgh  and  Vienna  in  favour  of  modera- 
tion. Ambassador  says  Servian  reply  must  not  bo 
a  nroro  negative        

Suggests  lines  of  Servian  reply  to  Austria-Hungary. 
To  consult  with  Russian  and  French  colleagues  as 
to  giving  advice  to  Servian  Government.  Favour- 
able reply  should  be  given  on  as  many  points  as 
possible  


TABLB  OP  CONTENTS. 


Xiii 


■13    Commiuiicafced         by 
I     BuBsian     Ambafisa- 
dor 


14 


15 


16 


17 


24 


25 


26 


To  Sir  ,F,  Bertie     .,. 

Sir  G.    Buchanan 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  F.  Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Sir  G.   Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  H.  Rumbald      ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  R.   Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  M.  de  Bunse-n  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Mr.     Crackanthorpe 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  G.   Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  H.  Rumbold 

(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen 
(Telegraphic) 


1914 
July  25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


25 


Russian  Ambassador  at  Viennar  instructed  to  request 
extension  of  time-limit  allowed  to  Servia,  and  to 
urge  that  Austria-Hungary  should  inform  Powers 
of  basis  of  accusations  against  Servia.  Recommends 
similar  instructions  to  His  Majesty's  Ambassador  ... 

Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  has  stated  that  step 
taken  at  Belgrade  was  not  an  ultimatum.  Austro-' 
Hungarian  Government  did  not  threaten  actual  mili- 
tary operations.  To  infojrm  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs •. .>i 

French  Government  have  given  Servia  advice  similar 
to  that  advocated  by  His  Majesty's  Government  (see 
No.    12)  .,..        ...        ...        ... 

Acting  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  suggests 
that  moderating  advice  be  given  at  Vienna  as  well 
as   at   Belgrade ; 

Russian  Government  consider^  that,  in  view  of  early 
expiry  of  time-limit,  it  is  too  late  to  counsel  modera- 
tion at  Belgrade  Russia  prepared  to  stand  aside  if 
mediation  of  four  Powers  is  accepted.  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  urges  that  Great  Britain  should 
act  with  FFance  and  Russia.  Situation  will  be  des- 
perate unless  Germany  can  restrain  Austria-Hungary 

German  Secretary  of  State  adrnits  intention  of  Austria- 
Hungary  to  take  military  action  against  Servia. 
His  Excellency  considers  crisis  might  be  localised. 
He  disclaims  all  previous  knowledge  of  terms  of 
Austro-Hungarian   note      

Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  says  Austria- 
Hungary  will  only  be  satisfied  with  unconditional 
acceptance  of  her  note       

Austro-Hungarian  press  comments  sliow  that  Servian 
surrender  is  neither  expected  nor  desired.  Austro- 
Hungarian  Minister  will  leave  Belgrade  failing  un- 
conditional acceptance  of  note  by  6  P.M.  to-day     ... 

Brief  summary  of  projected  Servian  'reply 

Russian  and  French  representatives  still  without  in- 
structions. In  view  of  this  and  of  proposed  con- 
ciliatory Servian  reply  he  has  abstained  from 
advising  Servian  Government.  Probable  that  Russia 
has  already  urged  utmost  moderation  on  Servian 
Government     ;        

Departure  of  Austro-Hungarian  Minister.  Govern- 
ment has  left  for  Nish  with  diplomatic  representa- 
tives         

Refers  to  No.  6.  Approves  statement  as  to  attitude 
of  His  Majesty's  (government.  Latter  cannot  do 
more,  but  are  anxious  to  ^prevpnr  war.  Suggests 
that  four  other  Powers  should  mediate  at  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburgh  if  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia 
mobilise.      German  co-operation   essential      

Conversation  with  German  Ambassador  respecting 
questionfor  mediation  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia.     Ambassador  thinks  Austria  might  accept  it 

Russian  communication  to  Austria-Hungary,  asking 
for  an  extension^  of  time  limit  of  ultimatum  to 
Servia,  and  enquiring  data  on  which  Austria  bases 
her  demands.  He  should  support  his  Russian 
colleague 


XIV 


I^ABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 


Name. 


Date, 


Subject. 


To  Sir  F.  Bettie      ... 
„    Sir  H.  Rumboid 
;,    Sir  -G.  Buchanan 


ToBivl^ 


Eoda 


To      Mr.      Grackan- 
tliorpe 


Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 

Sir  H,  Rumboid     ... 
^Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Sir  R.  Rodd 

(Telegraphic] 


To  Sir  F.  Bertie     ... 

,)    Sir    H.   Rumboid 

„    Sir  R.  Rodd      ... 

(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  F.  Bertie 


Sir  R.  Rodd 


Communicated         by 
Servian  Minister 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 

Sir  F.  Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  E.  Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
July  25 


25 


25 


25 


26 


26 


26 


26 


26 


23 


27 


26 


27 


27 


27 


Has  informed  German  Ambassador  of  projected  Ser- 
vian reply  (see  No.  21),  and  expressed  hope  that 
Germany  will  influence  Austria-Hungary  to  receive 
it  favourably   ... 

Has  informed  Italian  Ambassador  of  statements  madd 
to  German  Ambassador  (see  No.  25).  His  Excel* 
lency  states  that  Italy  is  anxious  to  see.  war  avoided 

Conversation  with  Servian  Minister.  Although  ready 
to  meet  any^  reasonable  demands  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  Servian  Government  could  not  agree  to 
abandon  certain  political  ideals  ... 

Servian  reply  considered  unsatisf'actofy.  War  regarded 
as  imminent     ...        .«        ...        

Reports  conversation  with  German  Ambassador. 
Latter  considers  that  Russia  will  remain  inactive  ... 

Reports  sudden  return  of  Emperor  to  Berlin.  German 
Under-Secretary  of  State  of  opinion  that  Russia 
will  not  move  unless  Servian  territory  is  annexed  ... 

German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  instructed  to  pass  on 
to  AuStro-Hungarian  Government  hope  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  that  they  will  take  favourable 
view  of  Servian  reply.  German  Government  cannot 
go  beyond  this  

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  welcomes  proposal  for 
conference,  and  Italian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  will 
be   instructed    accordingly  - 

To  ascertain  whether  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  will 
agree  to  a  conference  in  London,  and  to  ask  that 
French,  German,  and  Italian  representatives  at 
Vienna,  St.  Petersburgh,  and  Belgrade  should 
urge  on  Tespective  Governments  that,  pending  deci- 
sion, all  active  military  operations  should  be  sijs- 
pended "       

It  is  important  to  know  if  France  will  agree  to  sug- 
gestion that  the  four  Powers  should  urge  moderation 
at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh 

Conversation  with  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  considers  gravity  of  situation  lies  in  conviction 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  that  their 
prestige  is  involved 

Text  of  Servian  reply  to  Austro-Hungarian  note     ... 


Conversation  with  Russian  Ambassador.  Russian 
Government  will  not  press  for  more  time.  Russia 
cannot  possibly  remain  indifferent  if  Servia  is 
attacked  

Considers  that  Austria-Hungary  is  fully  determined 
on  war  with  Servia  

Freiich  Government  accept  proposals  respecting  con- 
ference. Necessary  instructions  sent  to  French  repre- 
sentatives at  Berlin,  Belgrade,  Vienna,  and  St. 
Petersburgh      

German  Secretary  of  State  is  opposed  to  British  pro- 
posal for  a  conference.  In  favour  of  direct  exchange 
of  views  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.  Ger- 
many's position  in  the  event  of  Russian  mobilisation. 
Secretary  of  State  more  hopeful  


TABLE  OP   CONTENTS. 


XV 


44 


45 


4G 


47 


48 


$5 


Sir  G.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  E.  Goschen.., 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  G.  Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  M,  de  Buasen 


To  Sir  R.  Rodd      ... 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
Sir  F.  Bertie 

French     Ambassador 


Communicated  by 
Russian  Ambassa- 
dor 


»»  »t 


Sir  G.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
July  27 


27 


27 


27 


28 


27 


Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs'  conversation 
with  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  respecting  note 
to  Servia.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  thinks  that 
Entente  Po^yers  should  present  solid  front  to 
Germany 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  decided  to 
propose  direct  conversation  between  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburgh      

German  Ambassador  informed  that  Sir  E.  Grey  desires 
to  keep  in  touch  with  Germany  so  long  as  the  latter 
works  for  peace.  Germany  should  urge  moderation 
at  Vienna.  Servian  reply  might  form  basis  for  dis- 
cussion     

Russian^  Ambassador  informed  of  British  attitude. 
Question  whether  Russia  would  .  take  action  if 
Austria-Hungary  agreed  not  to  annex  Servian 
territory  

Conversation  with  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador, 
who  reviewed  Servian  question  at  length.  Sir  E. 
Grey  expressed  surprise  at  Austrian  attitude  towards 
Servian  reply,  which  seems  already  to  involve  deep 
humiliation  of  Servia.  British  fleet  will  be  kept 
assembled,  but  this  is  no  more  than  proof  of  anxiety 
felt  in  coimtry 

Conversation  with  Italian  Ambassador,  who  agrees  in 
proposal  for  conference.  His  Excellency  will  recom- 
mend to  (German  Government  that  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Russia,  and  Servia  should  suspend  military 
operations  pending-  conference     ,        

Text  of  declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hungary  against 
Servia      

French  Government  agree  to  proposals  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  for  conference  between  the 
four  Powers  in  London     

French  Government  in  favour  of  British  proposal  ifor 
conference,  and  are  ready  to  send  instructions 
accordingly 

Communicates  telegram  from  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  to  the  effect  that  Russian  GJovern- 
mcnt  are  in  favour  of  British  proposal  for  confer- 
ence, failing  commencement  of  direct  Austro-Rus- 
sian  conversations 

Communicates  telegram  received  from  Russian  Minis- 
tor  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  effect  that  German  Govern- 
ment appear  to  have  taken  no  measures  to  induce 
Austria-Hungary  to  modify  attitude  towards  Servia, 
and  suggesting  His  Majesty's  Government  approach- 
ing the  Gorman  Government.  Key  of  the  situation 
really  at  Berlin         

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  will  use  all  his 
influence  at  Belgrade  to  induce  Servia  to  give,  satis- 
faction to  Austria,  but  Servian  territorial  integrity 
must  be  guaranteed  and  sovereign  rights  be  re- 
spected. He  has  proposed  direct  conversations  with 
Austria,  ^  but  would  be  perfectly  ready  to  stand 
aside  if  idea  of  conference  accepted     


tvi 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Subject. 


^♦i    Sir  M.  de  Bunsen 

(Telegraphic) 


B7 
58 
59 

60 

61 
62 

♦53 
64 

65 
€6 
67 

68 


Sir  R.  Rodd 

,  (Telegraphic) 


Sir  F.   Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Sir  E.  Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  m.  as  Bunsen  ... 

(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Sir  R.  Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Mr.    Crackanthorpo... 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 

To  Sir  E.  Gcschen... 
(Teiegraphic) 


1914. 

July  27 


27 


(Telegraphic) 


Reports  conversation  between  Russian  Ambassador 
and  Austro-Hungarian  Under-Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  Russia  will  be  unable  to  localise 
war.  Russia  will  restrain  Servia  as  long  as  possible, 
in  oi'dor  to  give  time  for  a  settlement.  Russian  Am- 
bassador urged  that  conversations  should  be  con- 
tinued at  St.  Petcrsburgh 

Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs*  views  as  to  con- 
ference and  suspension  of  hostilities.^  Possibility  of 
Servia  accepting  Austrian  note  in  its  entirety  on 
recommendation  of  four  Powers ., 

Has  communicated  substance  of  No.  46  to  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  is  confident  that  Sir  E. 
Grey's  observations  to  German  Ambassador  will 
tend  towards  peace ...        

Has  communicated  No.  47  to  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  who  fully  appreciates  standpoint  of  His 
Majesty's  Government.  'German  Ambassadov  has 
informed  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  Austria- 
Hungary  would  respect  integrity  of  Servia,  but  gave 
no  assurance  respecting  her  independence     ...      "  ... 

Refer.g  to  No.  43.  German  Secretary  of  State  has 
used  similar  language  to  French  and  Italian  Ambas- 
sadors. Agrees  with  his  two  colleagues  in  thinking 
that  German  Government  object  only  to  form  of 
proposal  respecting  conference.  Suggests  Hcrr  von 
Jagow  might  himself  bo  induced  to  suggest  lines 
of  co-operation  


28  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  states  that  Austria  cannot 
delay  proceedings  against  Servia,  and  would  decline 
any  negotiations  on  basis  of  Servian  reply.  Nothing 
could  now  prevent  conflict         


28 


28 


28 


28 


28 


28 


28 


28 


28 


Conversation  with  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  who  says  that  war  will  bo  declared 
to-day,  and  that  no  mediation  could  bo  accepted. 
Has  appealed  to  him  to  place  peace  of  Europe  first 
and  quarrel  with  Servia  second 

Has  informed  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of 
substance  of  No.  27.  He  is  telegraphing  similar 
instructions  to  Berlin  and  Vienna        

Informs  _  of  conversation  between  Servian  Charge 
d'Affaires  and  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs^ 
Servia  might  still  accept  whole  Austrian  note  if 
certain  explanations  were  given  her.  Such  e.xplana- 
tions  should  bo  given  to  the  Powers,  who  should 
then  advise  Servia  to  accept  without  conditions     ... 

Has  urged  greatest  moderation  on  Servian  Govern- 
ment pending  result  of  efforts  for  peaceful  solution 

Declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hungary  against 
Servia      '.        

Refers  to  No.  43.  Proposed  confcrcnco  would  not 
be  arbitration,  but  private  and  informal  discirssion 
to  find  a  settlement.  Agrees  that  direct  con- 
versations between  St.  Petcrsburgh  and  Vienna 
would  be  preferable  

Ready  to  propose  that  German  Secretary  of  State 
should  suggest  method  of  mediation  by  four  Powers. 
Will  keep  the  idea  in  reserve  till  result  of  Austro- 
Russian  conversations  is  seen     39 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS. 


69 


To  Sir  G.   Buchanan 
(Tekgraphic) 


70  Communicated  by 
Count  Bencken- 
dorff 


75 


76 


77 


78 


79 


Sir  E.   Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir   G.    Buchanan    ... 
(Telegraphic) 


S'ir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Sir  E.  Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
July  28 


29 


(Telegraphic) 


Tq  Sir  E.  Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  G.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


28 


28 


28 


23 


29 


29 


29 


29 


29 


Refers  to  No.  55.  Expresses  satisfaction  at  prospect  of 
direct  Austro-Russian  conversations.  Enquires  fur- 
ther as  to  proposed  action  at  Belgrade    '     

Communicates  text  of  two  telegrams  from  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  the  effect  that  Rus- 
sian Government  will  announce  partial  mobilisation 
on  the  29th  July;  that.  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  has  not  been  recalled;  and  thaib  mediation 
by  His  Majesty's  Government  is  most  urgent 

Conversation  with  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  ex- 
pressed anxiety  to  work  in  concert  with  England. 
Reasons  for  German  refusal  to  support  proposed  con- 
ference. As  Russia  had  mobilised,  he  could  no 
longer  urge  moderation  at  Vienna.  General  opinion 
at  Berlin  that  Russia  is  unprepared  for  war 

Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  grateful  for  Sir 
E.  Grey's  language  to  Gei-man  Ambassador  (see 
No.  46).  If.  Austria  crossed  Servian  frontier  Russia 
would  mobilise.  Has  informed  German  Ambassador 
that  Germany  should  use  her  inftuence  at  Vienna  ... 

Informs  of  Austrian  declaration  of  war  against  Servia 


Russian  Ambassador  states  that  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  have  declined  Russian  Government's 
suggestion  of  direct  discussion  between  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Austrian  Ambas- 
sador at  St.  Petersburgh.  Russian  Ambassador  con- 
siders conference  in  London  of  less  interested  Powers 
the   only   solution      

Chancellor  states  it  is  too  late  to  act  on  British  sug- 
gestion that  Servian  reply  might  form  basis  of  dis- 
cussion. German  Government  had  informed  Aus- 
trian Government  that  they  quite  «nderstood  that 
latter  could  not  rest  satisfied  unless  guaranteed  that 
demands  on  Servia  should  be  carried  out  in  their 
entirety.  Austrian  Government  had  been  advised 
to  say  openly  that  hostilities  had  that  exclusive 
object      

German  Secretary  of  State  states  that  any  appearance 
of  pressing  moderation  on  Austria  would  probably 
precipitate  matters.  His  Excellency  is  troubled  by 
reports  of  military  measures  in  Russia  and  Franco 

Refers  to  No.  75.  Much  appreciates  language  of  Chan- 
cellor, and  will  be  very  grateful  if  he  can  save  the 
peace  of  Europe.  This  country  will  continue  to  make 
every  effort  in  that  direction     

Partial  Russian  mobilisation  ordered.  Has  communi- 
cated substance  of  No.  68  to  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  Mobilisation  only  directed  against  Austria. 
As  Austria  has  definitely^  declined  direct  conversa- 
tions, Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  will  suggest  to 
German  Ambassador  return  to  idea  of  conference. 
Views  of  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  Italian 
proposals  (see  Nos.  57  and  69).  German  Ambassador 
says  his  Government  are  continuing  to  exert  friendly 
influence  at  Vienna 

French  and  Italian  Ambassadors  agree  that  no  steps 
can  now  be  taken  to  stop  war  with  Servia.  ^  Italian 
Ambassador  thinks  that  Russia  might  remain  quiet 
if  Austro-Hungarian  Government  gave  binding 
engagement  to  Europe  not  to  acquire  Servian  terri- 
tory or  destroy  independence  of  Servia 


39 


40 


40. 
41 


41 


41 


42 


42 


42 


43 


SVUl 


TABLE  OP  CONTENTS. 


80    Sir  R.  Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 


81 


82 


84 


85 


87 


90 


To  Sir  R.  Rodd      ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Mr.  Beaumont 

(Telegraphic) 


Mr.  Crack enthorpe... 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  E.  Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir   E.   Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  R.-  Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 


To  3ir  F.  Bertie    .. 


1914. 
July  29 


29 


To  Sir  E.  Goschen. 


■*•  •• 


29 


29 


29 


29 


29 


29 


29 


29 


Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  suggests  that 
German  Secretary  of  State  might  propose  formula, 
and  that  this  might  be  concomitant  with  direct 
Austro-Russian   conversations      

Understands  that  Austria  will  not  accept  any  form 
of  mediation  bet\yeen  Austria  and  Servia.  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  should  speak  at  Berlin 
and   Vienna      

Designs  of  Austria  likely  to  extend  considerably 
beyond  the  sanjak  and  the  punitive  occupation  of 
Servian  territory.  Expected  assistance  for  Austrian 
army  from  Mussulman  population  in  Servia 

Has  been  asked  by  Servian  Prime  Minister  to  convey 
his  thanks  for  statement  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  the  27th  July      

German  Ambassador  states  that  Chancellor  is  endea- 
vouring to  mediate  between  Austria  and  Russia.  His 
Majesty's  Government  urge  that  Germany  should 
suggest  some  method  by  which  the  four  Powers 
could  preserve  the  peace  between  Austria  and  Russia 

German  Secretary  of  State  offers  that  in  return  for 
British  neutrality  German  Government  would  give 
every  assurance  that  they  would  make  no  territorial 
acquisitions  at  thq  expense  of  France.  He  was 
.unable  to  give  similar  assurance  as  regards  French 
colonies.  If  neutrality  of  Holland  were  respected  by 
Germany's  adversaries,  Germany  would  give^  assur- 
ances to  do  likewise.  Operations  of  Germany  in  Bel- 
gium depend  oh  action  of  France,  but  at  end  of  war 
Belgian  integrity  would  be  respected  if  she  had  not 
sided  against  Germany        

In  view  of  partial  Russian  mobilisation,  Italian  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs  thinks  moment  is  passed  for 
further  discussions  on  basis  of  Servian  note.  His 
utmost  hope  is  that  Germany  will  influence  Vienna 
to  prevent  or  moderate  any  further  Austrian 
demands  on  Servia .  ... 

Conversation  with  French  Ambassador  respecting 
policy  of  His  Majesty's  Government.  Has  told  M. 
Cambon  of  intention  to  warn  German  Ambassador 
that  His  Majesty's  Government  will  not  necessarily 
stand  aside  if  efforts  for  peace  fail.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  present  case  is  different  from  that  of 
Morocco  a  few  years  back,  and  if  France  becomes 
involved  His  Majesty's  Government,  who  are  free 
from  engagements,  will  have  to  decide  on  their 
attitude  in  the  light  of  British  interests        

Conversation  with  German  Ambassador.  Austro- 
Hungarian  declaration  of  war  having  rendered  direct 
conversation  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh 
impossible,  it  is  most  important,  in  the  event  of 
German  Chancellor  failing  in  his  efforts  at  media- 
tion, that  Germany  should  propose  some  method 
of  co-operation  between  the  four  Powers     


Has    warned    German  ^  Ambassador    ojf   iDossibility 
British  intervention  in  certain , eventualities  ... 


of 


Has  communicated  to  German  Ambassador  text  of 
Italian  proposals  and  of  reply  returned  thereto  (see 
Nob.  64  and  &1).    Discussion  of  question  of  mediation 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Name. 


Date. 


Subject. 


91 


92 


93 


To  Sir  M.  de  Bilnsen 


To  Sir  R.  Rodd 


Communicated  by 
Count  Bencken- 
dorff 


1914. 
July  29 


29 


94 


95 


m 


97 


Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Sir  G.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  E,   Gosohen     -... 
(Telegraphic) 


99 


Sip  F.  Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 


80 


29 


30 


30 


80 


Conversation  with  Austro-Hungarian  ^  Ambassador, 
who  attempted  to  justify  attitude  of  his  Government 
in  spite  of  readiness  of  Powers  to  assist  in  obtaining 
•satisfaction  from  Scrvia     

Conversation  with  Italian  Ambassador.  Italian  Govern- 
ment suggest  that  German  objections  to  mediation 
might  be  met  by  some  change  in  procedure 

Communicates  telegraphic  correspondence  between 
himself,  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  Russian  Ambassador*  at  Vienna.  (1)  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  have  been  urged  by 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  bo  moderate 
towards  Servia;  (2)  negotiations  with  German 
Government  through  Russian  Ambassa,dor  at 
Berlin;  (3)  Atistro-Hungarian  Government  decline 
direct  conversations  with  Russian  Government 

In  present  temper  of  Austria-Hungary,  irrevocable 
steps  may  be  taken  unless  Germany  with  the  other 
three  Powers  can  mediate  at  once.  Russian  Ambas- 
sador fears  effect  on  Russian  opinion  if  serious 
engagement  takes  place  before  agreement  is  reached. 
Reports  interviews  between  the  Russian  and  French 
Ambassadors  and  the  German  Ambassador    ... 

Conversation  with  Russian  Ambassador.  Russia  could 
not  see  Servia  crushed,  but  would  acquiesce  in  mea- 
sures that  would  safeguard  Austria-Hungary's  Slav 
provinces  from  further  hostile  propaganda.  Extreme 
anti-Servian  and  anti-Russian  sentiments  of  German 
Ambassador  to  whom  text  of  Austro-Hungarian 
note  was  probably  known  beforehand  

Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has 
informed  Russian  Ambassador  that,  as  Russia 
had  mobilised,  Austria  must  do  likewise.  No  threat 
meant.  No  objection  to  direct  Austro-Hungarian 
conversations  being  continued  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
Russian  Ambassador  more  hopeful        

German  Ambassador  has  informed  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  that  his  Government  would 
guarantee  that  Austria  should  respect  Servian  in- 
tegrity. Russia  could  not,  however,  agree  to  vas- 
salage of  Servia  to  Austria.  Formula  of  conditions 
subject  to  which  Russia  would  stop  military  pre- 
parations  

German  Government  .have  asked  Austrian  Govern- 
ment whether  they  would  accept  mediation  on  basis 
of  occupation  of  Belgrade  by  Austrian  troops  and 
issue  of  conditions  from  there.  Gould  His  Majesty's 
Government  induce  Russia  to  agree  to  above  basis 
for  ^n  arrangement?  German  Secretary  of  State 
says  that  Russian  mobilisation  has  increased  diffi- 
culties of  situation.  German  Government  have 
made  no  special  military  preparations  

Conversation  with  President  of  the  "Republic  regard- 
ing German  communication  to  St.  Petersburgh  as 
to  Russian  mobilisation.  Russia  constants  to  demo- 
bilise subject  to  assurance  from  Austria  to  respect 
sovereignty  of  Servia  and  submit  certain  point,  in 
the  Austrian  note  to  international  discussion.  Peace 
depended  on  attitude  of  His  Majesty's  Government. 
Pacific  attitude  of  France.  A  British  declaration  to 
support  France  would  prevent  Germany  going  to 
war.    Explained  difficulty  of  such  a  declaration 


XX 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS. 


100 


101 


102 


103 


Sir  R.  Rodd 

(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  E.  Goschen 
(Telegraphic) 


10-1 


105 


106 


107 


IOh 


109 


110 


(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  G.   Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  F.  B«rtie     ... 

(Telegraphic) 


**  »> 


•Sir  R.  Rorld 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir   E.  Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


>»     . »» 


(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  G.   Buchanan 
(Telegraphic) 


1914 
July  30 


30 


30 


30 


30 


30 


80 


SO 


31 


31 


31 


German  Ambassador  at  Rome  thinks  Germany  Could 
prevent  Austria  from  making  exorbitant  dohiands 
if  Servia  would  submit  on  occupation  of  Belgrade  ... 

Replies  to  No.  85.  His  Majesty's  Government  cannot 
entertain  German  proposals  to  secure  British  neu- 
trality. For  many  reasons  sudi  a  bargain  with  Ger- 
many at  the  expense  of  Franco  would  be  a  disgrace 
to  Great  Britain.  His  Majesty's  Government  cannot 
bargain  away  her  obligations  regarding  Belgian 
neutrality.  His  Majesty's  Government  must  pre- 
serve full  freedom  of  action.  Best  way  of  main- 
taining good  relations  with  Great  Britain  is  for 
Germany  to  work  with  her  for  the  preservation 
of    peace  ; 

Has  warned  German  Ambassador  that  Germany  must 
not  count  on  Great  Britain  standing  aside  in  all 
circumstances •.. 

German  Ambassador  states  that  German  Government 
would  advise  Austria  not  to  advance  beyond  Bel- 
grade and  adjoining  territories,  whilst  Powers  urged 
Servia  to  give  satisfaction  sufficient  to  placate 
Austria.  Earnest  hope  that  this  may  bo  agreed  to. 
Suggests  change  in  the  formula  proposed  by  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  (see  No.  97)  in  order, 
to  meet  existing  situation 

To  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  telegram 
to  Sir  G.  Buchanan  (see  No  103).  Trusts  that 
French  Ambassador  at  St.  Potersburgh  will  be  able 
to  induce  Russian  Government  not  to  precipi- 
tate a  crisis     

Conversation  with  French  Ambassador  respecting  atti- 
tude of  Great  Britain  in  event  of  conflict  between 
France  and  Germany ;  encloses  copies  of  notes  ex- 
changed ^vith  French  Ambassador  in  1912,  and  dis- 
cusses their  scope.     Cabinet  to  meet  to-morrow     ... 

Austria  has  declined  to  continue  direct  conversations 
with  Russia.  Germany  believed  to  be  more  dis- 
posed to  g_ivo  conciliatory  advice  at  Vienna  owing 
to  likelihosd  of  British  support  for  Russia  and 
France.  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  is  in 
favour  of  working  with  His  Majesty's  Government 
oven  if  idea  of  discussions  betwceii  four  Powers 
is  impossible 

Has  asked  German  Secretary  of  State  if  he  can  sug- 
gest any  course  of  action.  Latter  replied  that  he' 
was  in  communication  with  Vienna  to  save  time. 
ChancoUor  was  ''pressing  the  button"  at  Vienna 
to  utmost  of  his  power,  and  feared  ho  had  perhaps 
gone  too  far 

German  Chancellor  states  that  owing  to  Russian 
mobilisation  Germany  cannot  remain  quiet.  These 
proceedings  had  come  just  when  the  Czar  had  ap- 
pealed to  the  Empeix>r  and  when  the  hitter  was 
about  to  mediate  at  Vienna        

Reports  having  read  to  Chancellor  reply  of  His 
Majesty's  Government  to  his  appeal  for  British 
neutrality  (seo  No.  101).  Chancellor  desires  time 
to  reflect  on  it  

German  Ambassador  states  that  Austro-Russian  con- 
versations have  been  resumed  at  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburgh.  German  Ambassador  has  asked  that 
Russia  should  suspend  military  preparations  in  mean- 
while.      Has    informed    his    Excellency    that    His 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


XXI 


111 


112 


113 


To  Sir  E.  Goechen... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir   E.   Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  G.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


114    To  Sir  F.   Bertie     ... 
Sir  E.   Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 


115 


116 


117 


118 


119 


120 


121 


1914 


July  31 


To  Sir.  F.  Villiers  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  E.  Bertie     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  F.   Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  F.  Bertie 


Sir:  Gr.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir   E.   Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


31 


31 


31 


31 


31 


31 


31 


31 


31 


31 


Majesty's  Government  cannot  ask  Russia  to  do  this 
unless  Austria  consents  to  limit  advance  of  her  troops 
into  Servieu  Expresses  satisfaction  at  i-esumption  of 
conversations  

If  settlement  cannot  be  reached  by  direct  Austro- 
Russian  conversations,  suggests  that  four  Powers 
should  undertake  to  obtain  full  satisfaction  of  Aus- 
trian demands  from  Servia,  provided  latter's 
sovereignty  and  integrity  remain  intact.  Has  in- 
formed German  Ambassador  that  if  Austria  and  Ger- 
many could  bring  forward  any  fair  proposal,  His 
Majesty's  Government  would  support  it  strongly 
at  Paris  and  St.  Petersburgh     

German  Government  are  about  to  proclaim  . "  Kriegs- 
gefahr,"  to  be  followed  by  immediate  mobilisation. 
Germany  preparing  for  all  emergencies 

Russian  general  mobilisation  ordered,  ovying  to 
Austro-Hungarian  movements  of  troops  against  her. 
Germany  also  making  military  preparations.  Russia 
cannot  allow 'Germany  to  get  a  start 

Enquires  whether  France  and  Germany  will  engage 
to  respect  neutrality  of  Belgium  


To  inform  Belgium  Government  of  No.  114.  Sir  E. 
Grey  assumes  that  Belgium  will  do  her  utmost  to 
maintain  her  neutrality     

French  Ambassador  informed  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  cannot  undertake  definite  pledge  to 
intervene  in  war,  but  that  situation  will  be  recon- 
sidered in  presence  of  any  new  development 

Informs  of  German  ultimatum  to  Russia.  German 
Ambassador  demands  answer  from  French  Govern- 
ment by  1  P.M.  to-morrow  aS  to  French  attitude    ... 

Under-Secretary  of  State  says  that  mobilisation  was 
not  necessarily  a  hostile  act.  Austria-Hungary  re- 
sents Russian  intervention  on  behalf  of  Servia.  Rus- 
sian Ambassador  states  that  his  Government  have 
advised  Servian  compliance  with  Austrian  demands 
so  far  as  compatible  with  independence         

Has  denied  to  French  Ambassador  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  had  given  German  Government  the 
impression  that  they  would  remain  neutral.  .  His 
Majesty's  Government  could  not,  however,  at  the 
present  moment  giye  France  any  pledge,  though  fur- 
ther developments  might  justify  intervention 

New  formula  proposed  by  Russian  Government.  Rus- 
sian Government  will  maintain  waiting  attitude  if 
Austria  agrees  to  stop  advance  of  her  troops  and 
to  allow  consideration  by  Great  Powers  of  satisfac- 
tion to  be  given  by  Servia  to  Austria-Hungary  with- 
out prejudice  to  her  independence.  ^  Czar  has  under- 
taken that  no  Russian  soldier  will  cross  frontier 
so  long  as  conversation  with  Austria,  continues 

German  Government  appreciate  Sir  E.  Grey's  efforts 
to, maintain  peace,  but  cannot  consider  any  pro- 
posal pending  Russian  reply  to  ultimatum  presented 
by  Germany  relating  to  Russian,  mobilisation , 


xxu 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Subject. 


122 

123 

.124 
125 

126 

127 
128 

129 

130 

131 

m 


Sir  E.   Gosohen 

(Tekgraphio) 


To  Sir  E.  Gosohen... 


Sir  F.   Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


it  >f  ••• 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  ... 
(Telegraphic) 

Sir  F.  Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 


Luxemburg    Minister 
of  State 


To  Sir  E.  Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


r> i» 


1914 
July  31 


Aug.  1 

July  31 
31 

Aug,  1 

1 

1 


tu 


(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


Sir  P.  Bertie 

(Telegraphic) 


Belgian  neutrality.  Refers  to  No.  114.  Secretary  of 
State  cannot  reply  to  British  request  until  he  has 
consulted  Emperor  and  Chancellor.  '  He  doubts, 
however,  whether  Gei-man  Government  can  "give 
any  ansver.  German  Government  alleges  commis- 
sion of  hostile  acts  by  Belgium 

Conversation  with  German  Ambassador  respecting  the 
possible  effect  on  British  public  opinion  of  any 
violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Any  pro- 
mise that  His  Majesty's  Government  should  stand 
aside  definitely  refused        ...        » 

German  ultimatum  to  Russia.  French  Government 
anxious  to  know  at  once  attitude  of  His  Majesty's 
Government      

NeutrS-lity  of  Belgium  (see  No.  114).  French  Govern- 
ment are  resolved  to  respect  neutrality  of  Belgium 
unless  compelled  to  act  otherwise  by  reason  of 
violation  at  the  hands  of  another  Power        

German  AmbassaxJor  has  been  informed  that  French 
Government  fail  to  understand  reason  for  Gei-man 
communication  respecting  attitude  of  France  in  the 
event  of  a  Russo-German  war  (see  No.  117)  Ger- 
man Ambassador  will  see  Mmister  for  Foreign 
AGPairs  in  the  evening        

Mpbilisation  of  Austrian  army  and  fleet        


Belgian  neutrality.  Refers  to  No.  115.  Belgium  ex- 
pects Powers  to  observe  and  uphold  her  neutrality, 
which  she  intends  to  maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her 
power      

German  Government  have  informed  Luxemburg  that 
the  German  military  measures  in  that  country 
do  not  constitute  a  hostile  act.  but  are  only  to  insure 
against  attack  from   France         

British  merchant  ships  have  been  detained  at  Ham- 
burg To  request  immediate  release  Points  out 
deplorable  effefct  on  British  public  opinion  if  deten- 
tion   continued  

Russian  Government  report  readiness  of  Austria  to 
di.scuss  with  Russia  and  to  accept  basis  of  mediation 
not  open  to  obiections  raised  in  regard  to  original 
Russian  formula  (see  No  97>  Hopes  that  German 
Government  may  be  able  to  make  use  of  Russian 
communication  m  order  to  avoid  tension     

Russia  consents  to  British  formula  for  basis  of  media- 
tion (see  No.   103)     

Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  has  informed  Russian 
Government  that  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
are  ready  to  discuss  substance  of  Austrian  ultimatum 
to  Seryia.  Russian  Government  hope  that  these 
discussions  will  take  place  in  London  with  partici- 

Sation   of   Great   Powers,    and   that  His   Majesty's 
rovernment  will  assume  direction  of  then\ 

Conversation  with  President  of  Republic.  German 
Government  are  trying  to  saddle  Russia  with  the 
responsibility  for  present  situation.  President  jus- 
tifies Russian  action.  Germany  is  practically  mobi- 
lising, so  France  must  also.  French  troops  are  kept 
10  kilom.  from  frontier,  whereas  Germans  have  made 
incursions  into  French  territory.  French  Govern- 
ment do  not  yet  despair  of  possibility  of  avoiding  war 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS. 


XXUl 


No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Subject. 


135 


13G 


137 


138 


130 


1-10 


141 


142 
143 

.144 


To  Sir  G.   Buchanan 
iTele  graphic) 


Sir  F.   Bcirtie 

(Telegrapliic) 


To  Sir  M.  de  Bunseoi 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir   E.   Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  G.  Buchanan     ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  F.   Bea-tie 

(Tel^raphic) 


Sir  M.  do  Bun6e.n  ... 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  E.  Gosohe-n 

(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
Aug.  1 


Has  received  reliable  information  that  Austria-Hun- 
gary has  informed  German  Government  that  she 
would  accept  Sir  E.   Grey's  proposal  for  mediation 


bet\ 


Austria-Hungary    and 


;ervia. 


Military 


action  would  continue  against  Servia  for  present, 
but  Russian  mobilisation  and  Austro-Hungarian 
counter  measures  would  cease.  He  chould  inform 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs         

General  mobilisation  in  France  ordered  owing  to  Ger- 
man military  measures.  French  troops  have  left  a 
zone  of  10  kilom.  between  them  and  the  frontier    ... 

Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  has  given  assurance 
that  Austrians  will  respect  territorial  integrity 
of  Servia,  and  will  not  occupy  sanjak.  Austria  has 
not  "banged  the  door"  on  further  conversations 
with   Russia       

Conversation  with  German  Secretary  of  State.  Ger- 
man Government  have  ordered  mobilisation.  Ab- 
sence of   reply   to   German   ultimatum  must  be   re- 


garded as  creating  a  state  of  war, 
ment  will  be  so  inform.ed 


Russian  Govcrn- 


Unsatisfactory  result  of  discussions  between  German 
and  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassadors  with  the  Czar 
and  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  respectively. 
Russian  Miiiister  for  Foreign  Affairs  says  that  • 
Austrian  domination  of  Servia  would  vitally  affect 
Russia,  and  that  he  is  weary  of  his  ceaseless  efforts 
to  avoid  war.  Action  of  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment and  German  preparations  have  forced  Rus- 
sian Government  to  order  mobilisation,  and  mobi- 
lisation of  Germany  has  created  desperate  situation. 
M.  Sazonof  v.ould  adhere  to  formula  contained  in 
No.  120,  if  its  acceptance  could  be  secured  before 
the  Germans  cross  frontier.  In  no  case  will  Russia 
commence  hostilities.  Fear  of  general  conflagration 
in   the  Balkans  

French  Minister  for  War  has  impressed  on  British 
military  attache  that  only  way  of  securing  peace 
v/as  for  Great  Britain  to  take  military  action.  Minis- 
ter cf  War  maintains  that  France  has,  by  w'ith- 
dra\>'ing  from  frontier,  given  proof  of  her  desire  to 
abstain  from  any  provocative  act         

Conversation  with  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna 
respecting  German  ultimatum  to  Russia.  His  Ex- 
cellency thinks  that  German  Government  desired 
war  from  the  first.  Explains  nature  of  Russian 
mobilisation,  and  says  that  Russia  had  no  intention 
of  attacking  Austria.  French  Ambassador  to  speak 
earnestly  to  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Anxiety  us  to  attitude  of  Great  Britain  

General  mobilisation  of  German  army  and  navy 


Detention  of  British  steamers.  German  Secretary  of 
State  has  promised  to  send  ordei-s  to  release  steamers 
without    delay  

German  Secretary  of  State  says  that,  owing  to  certain 
Russian  troops  having  crossed  frontier,  Germany 
and  Russia  arc  in  a  state  of  war         


XXIV 


TABLE   OP   CONTENTS. 


No. 


Name. 


Date. 


Subject. 


145 

.116 
147 

US 
149 

150 
151 

162 
153 


15t 


155 


15G 
167 

158 


Sir  E.  Goschen 

(Telegraphic) 


Sir  F.  VilHers 

(Telegraphic) 

Luxemburg    Minister 
of  State 

(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  F.  Bertie    ... 
(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  E.  Goschen.. 
(Telegraphic) 


Sir  E.  Goschen 

(Telegraphic] 

Sir  F.  Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  F.  Bertie    ... 


To  Sir  E.   Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 


1914. 
Aug.  2 


Sir  F.  Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 


To  Sir  F.  Villiers  .. 


To  Sir  E.   Goschen... 
(Telegraphic) 

Communicated  by 
German  Ambassa- 
dor 

(Telegraphic) 

Sir   F.   Villiers 

(Telegraphic) 


Orders  sent  last  night  to  allow  British  ships  detained 
in  Hamburg  to  proceed.  This  as  a  special  favour 
to  His  Majesty's  Government.  Reason  of  detention 
was  that  mines  were  being  laid  and  other  pre- 
cautions  taken  

Belgian  Government  confirms  report  that  German 
force  has  entered  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg     ... 

Acts  of  German  troops  in  Luxemburg  territory  are 
manifestly  contrary  to  the  neutrality  of  the  Grand 
Duchy  guaranteed  by  Treaty  of  London  of  1867. 
Protest  has  been  made  to  the  German  representa- 
tives at  Luxemburg  and  also  to  German  Secretary 
of  State  

Assurance  given  to  French  Ambassador  respecting 
protection  by  British  fleet  of  P'rench  coasts  or  ship- 
ping subject  to  consent  of  Pai'liament.  Question 
of  despatch  of  British  force  to  assist  France.  Effect 
of  violation  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgian  neutrality  ... 

Detention  of  British  steamers.  Sugar  unloaded  by 
force  from  British  vessels  at  Hamburg  and  detained. 
Should  inform  Secretary  of  State  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  trust  that  order  already  sent  for  release 
of  British  vessels  covers  also  release  of  cargoes  (see 
No.   143) ... 

Detention  of  British  steamers.  Refers  to  No.  149.  No 
information   available  

French  Government  have  offered  five  army  corps  to 
Belgian  Government.  Belgian  Government  reply 
that  whilst  sincerely  grateful  they  do  not-  propose 
to  appeal  to  the  guarantco  of  the  Powers,  and  wiU 
decide  later  on  their  action         

Communication  of  French  Ambassador  to  effect  that 
Italy  does  not  consider  casus  fccderis  has  arisen     ... 

Belgian  neutrality.  His  Majesty's  Government  have 
been  informed  that  German  Government  have  pro- 
posed to  Belgium  friendly  neutrality  entailing  free 
passage  through  Belgian  territory,  and  of  German 
threat  in  case  of  refusal.  Belgian  .Government  have 
declined  offer.  Should  ask  for  immediate  assurance 
from  German  Government  that  they  will  not  pro- 
ceed with  threat  or  violate  Belgian  territory 

Belgian  neutrality  (see  No.  153).  In  view  of  Belgian 
reply,  German  Government  have  threatened  to  carry 
out  their  proposals  by  force        

To  inform  Belgian  Government  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  expect  that  thoy  will  resist  attempt  to 
infringe  their  neutrality.  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment prepared  to  join  with  Russia  and  France  in 
assisting  Belgian  Government  to  resist  German 
aggression  and  to  guarantee  independence  and  in- 
tegrity in  future  years      

To  demand  immediate  release  of  British  ships 
detained  in  German  ports 

Assurance  that  Germany  will  in  no  case  annex  Belgian 
territory.  Germany  forced  to  disregard  Belgian 
neutrality  owing  to  knowledge  of  French  plans     ... 


German  troops  have  entered  Belgian  territory, 
summoned  to  surrender     , 


Liego 


TABLE  OF    CONTENTS. 


IXV 


^o. 


Name. 


Date. 


Subject. 


159 


160 


161 


To  Six  E.   Goach^'in... 
(Tolegrapbic) 


Sir  E.   Goschea 


Sir  M.  de  Buufiran  ... 


1914. 
Aug.  4 


Sept.  1 


Belgian  neutrality  threatened  by  Germany.  Unless 
Gorman  Government  prepared  to  give  assurance  by 
12  midnight  to  respect  neutrality  of  Belgium.  His 
Majesty's  Ambassador  is  to  ask  for  passports  and 
to'  say  that  His  Majesty's  Government  fee)  bound 
to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  their 
treaty  obligations 

Reports  final  negotiations  at  Berlin.  Records  depar- 
ture from  Berlin  and  journey  to  England     

Reviews  negotiations  with  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment at  Vionna,  and  incidents  upon  rupture  of 
diplomatic  negotiations.  Reports  departure  from 
Vienna  upon  declaration  of  war  % ... 


77 


77 


81 


XXVI 


LIST  OF  PRINCIPAL  PERSONS  MENTIONED  IN  THE   COR. 
RESPONDENCE,  SHOWING  THEIR  OFFICIAL  POSITIONS. 


GREAT  BRITAIN/ 

Secretanj  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs        ...  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
Permanent    Under  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreif/n  Affairs       ...  ..  .  Sir  A.  Nicolson. 

French  Ambassador Monsieur  Paul  Catnbon. 

liussian  Ambassador Count  Benckendorff. 

Monsieur    de     Etter     {Counsellor 
Einhas^'j'). 

German  Ambassador   .  Prince  Lichnowsky. 

Austro-HiingariaJi  Ambasmdor       ...         ...  Count  Mcusdorff. 

Belgian  3Iinister        Count  Lalaing, 

Servian  Minister         Monsieur  Boschkovitch. 


of 


FRANCE. 

Prfsldentoftheltepuhlio     

Prenident  of  the  Council  and  Minister  for 

Foreign  Affairs        

Minister  of  Jiistice  and  Acting  Minister  for 

Foreign  Affairs       

British  Ambassador 

Russian  Ambassador  ... 
German  Ambassador  ... 
A  u&trian  A  m  bassador 


Monsieur  Poincare. 

Monsieur  Viviani. 

Monsieur  Bienvenu-Martin. 
Sir  Francis  Bertie. 
Monsieur  Isvolsky. 
Baron  von  Sclioen. 
Count  Seczsen, 


RUSSIA. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
British  Ambassador   ... 

French  A  m  bassador 

German  A m bassa dor  ... 
Austro-Hungdrian  Ambassador 

GERMANY. 

Imperial  Chancellor 

Secret ary  of  State       

Under  Secretary  rf  State 
British  Ambassxdjr 


Raissian  Ambassador 

French  Ambassador    ... 
Austro-  JIangarian  A  mbassadoT 


..  Monsieur  Sazonof. 
,..  Sir  George  Buchanan. 
,..  Monsieur  Paloolofjue. 
...  Count  Pourtales. 
,..  Count  Szup^ry. 


,.  Dr.  von  Betlimann-HoUweg, 
..  Herr  von  Jagow. 
..  Herr  von  Zimmermann. 
,.  Sir  Edward  Goschen. 

Sir    Horace    Kumbold    {CoitnseUci* 
Embassy). 
..  Monsieur  Swerbeiev. 
..  iVEonsienr  Jules  Cambon. 
,.  Count  S^ogycny. 


of 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs        ...  Count  Berchtold. 
Under   Secretaries    of    State   for  Foreign  f  Baron  Macchio. 

Affairs  , {  Count  Forgach 

British  Ambassador Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen. 

French  Ambis-^adcr   ...         ...         ...         ...  IMonsieur  Dumaino. 

Russian  Ambas  ador Monsieur  Schebeko. 

German  Ambassador Herr  von  Tschirscky, 


ITALY. 

M-nisterfor  Foreign  Affairs. 
British  Ambassador  ... 

BELGIUM. 

British  Minister 


..  Marquis  di  Pan  Giuliano* 
..  Sir  Rennell  Rodd. 


...  Sir  Francis  Villiers. 


8ERYIA. 

Prime  Minister 
British  Minister 

^intrO'Hungarian  Minister 


Monsieur  Pashitch. 

Mr.  des  Graz. 

Mr.  Crackanthorpe  {First  Secretary), 

Baron  Gieel. 


PART   I 


COERESPONDENCE    LAID    BEFORE 
PARLIAMENT. 


No.  1. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  H,  Rumhold^  British  Charge  d^A^aires  at  Berlin, 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  20,  1914. 

I  ASKED  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  if  he  had  any  news  of  what 
was  going  on  in  Vienna  with  regard  to  Servia. 

He  said  that  he  had  not,  but  Austria  was  certainly  going  to.  take  some 
step,  and  he  regarded  the  situation  as  very  uncomfortable. 

I  said  that  I  had  not  heard  anything  recently,  except  that  Count 
Berchtold,*  in  speaking  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  had 
deprecated  the  suggestion  that  the  situation  was  grave,  but  had  said  that 
it  should  be  cleared  up. 

The  German  Ambassador  said  that  it  would  be  a  very  desirable  thing 
if  Russia  could  act  as  a  mediator  with  regard  to  Servia. 

I  said  that  I  assumed  that  the  Austrian  Government  would  not  do 
anything  until  they  had  first  disclosed  to  the  public  their  case  against 
Servia,  founded  presumably  upon  what  they  had  discovered  at  the  trial. 

The  Ambassador  said  that  he  certainly  assumed  tha't  they  would  act 
upon  some  case  that  would  be  known. 

I  said  that  this  would  make  it  easier  for  others,  such  as  Russia,  to  counsel 
moderation  in  Belgrade.  In  fact,  the  more  Austria  could  keep  her  demand 
within  reasonable  limits,  and  the  stronger  the  jilstification  she  could  produce 
for  making  any  demand,  the  more  chance  there  would  be  of  smoothing  things 
over.  I  hated  the  idea  of  a  war  between  any  of  the  Great  Powers,  and  that 
any  of  them  should  be  dragged  into  a  war  by  Servia  would  be  detestable. 

The  Ambassador  agreed  wholeheartedly  in  this  sentiment. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 
*  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

No.  2. 

Sir  H.  Rwmhold,  BriUsh  Charge  d'AffoAjres  at  Be7'Un,  to 

Sir  Bdward  Grey. — (deceived  July  22.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  22,  1914. 

Last  night  I  met  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  the  forthcoming 
Austrian  demarche  at  Belgrade  was  alluded  to  by  his  Excellency  in  the 
conversation  that  ensued.  His  Excellency  was  evidently  of  opinion  that  tl^is 
step  on  Austria's  part  would  have  been  made  ere  this.  He  insisted  that 
question  at  issue  was  one  for  settlement  between  Servia  and  Austria  alone,  and 
that  there  should  be  no  interference  from  outside  in  the  discussipns  between 
those  two  countries.  He  had  therefore  considered  it  inadvisable  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  should  be  approached  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment on  the  matter.  He  had,  however,  on  several  occasions,  in  conve'rsation 
v.'ith  the  Servian  Minister,  emphasised  the  extreme  importance  that  Austro- 
Servian  relations  should  be  put  on  a  proper  footing. 

Finally,  his  Excellency  observed  to  me  that  for  a  long  time  past  the  attitude 
adopted  towards  Servia  by  Austria  bad,  in  his  opinion,  been  one  of  great 
forbearance. 


No.  3. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen^  Britdsh  Ambassador  at  Yierma. 

Sir,  Formgn  Office,  July  23,  1914. 

CoTJNt  *  Mensdorff*  told  me  to-day  that  he  would  be  able  to-morrow 
morning  to  let  me  have  officially  the  communication  that  he  understood  was 
being  made  to  Servia  to-day  by  Austria.  He  then  explained  privately  what 
the  nature  of  the  demand  would  be.  As  he  told  me  that  the  facts  would  all 
be  set  out  in  the  paper  that  he  would  give  me  to-morrow,  it  is  unnecessary 
to  record  them  now.  I  gathered  that  they  would  include  proof  of  the  com- 
plicity of  some  Servian  officials  in  the  plot  to  murder  the  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand,  and  a  long  list  of  demands  consequently  made  by  Austria  on  Servia. 

As  regards  all  this,  I  said  that  it  was  not  a  matter  on  which  I  would  make 
any  comment  until  I  received  an  official  communication,  and  it  seemed  to  me 
probably  a  matter  on  which  I  should  not  be  able  to  make  any  comment  at 
first  sight. 

But,  when  Count  Mensdorff  told  me  that  he  supposed  there  would  be 
something  in  the  nature  of  a  time-limit,  which  was  in  effect  akin  to  an 
ultimatum,  I  said  that  I  regretted  this  very  much.  To  begin  with  a  time- 
limit  might  inflame  opinion  in  Russia,  and  it  would  make  it  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  to  give  more  time,  even  if  after  a  few  days  it  appeared  that  by 
giving  more  time  there  would  be  a  prospect  of  securing  a  peaceful  settlement 
and  getting  a  satisfactory  reply  from  Servia,  I  admitted  that,  if  there  was 
no  time-:limit,  the  proceedings  might  be  unduly  protracted,  but  I  urged  that 
a  time-limit  could  always  be  introduced  afterwards ;  that  if  the  demands  were 
made  without  a  time-limit  in  the  first  instance,  Russian  public  opinion  might 
bo  less  excited,  after  a  week  it  might  have  cooled  down,  and  if  the  Austrian 
case  was  very  strong  it  might  be  apparent  that  the  Russian  Government 
would  be  in  a  position  to  use  their  influence  in  favour  of  a  satisfactory  reply 
from  Servia.  A  time-limit  was  generally  a  thing  to  be  used  only  in  the  last 
resort,  after  other  means  had  been  tried  and  failed. 

Count  Mensdorff  said  that  if  Servia,  in  the  interval  that  had  elapsed  since 
the  murder  of  the  Archduke,  had  voluntarily  instituted  an  enquiry  on  her 
own  territory,  all  this  might  have  been  avoided.  In  1909,  Servia  had  said 
in  a  note  that  she  intended  to  live  on  terms  of  good  neighbourhood  with 
Austria;  but  she  had  never  kept  her  promise,  she  had  stirred  up  agitation 
the  object  of  which  was  to  disintegrate  Austria,  and  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
for  Austria  to  protect  herself. 

I  said  that  I  would  not  comment  upon  or  criticise  what  Count  Mensdorff 
had  told  me  this  afternoon,  but  I  could  not  help  dwelling  upon  the  awful 
consequences  involved  in  the  situation.  Great  apprehension  had  been 
expressed  to  me,  not  specially  by  M.  Cambon  and  Count  Benckendorff,  but 
also  by  others,  as  to  what  might  happen,  and  it  had  been  represented  to  me 
that  it  would  be  very  desirable  that  those  who  had  influence  in  St.  Petersburgli 
should  use  it  on  behalf  of  patience  and  moderation.  I  had  replied  that  the 
amount  of  influence  that  could  be  used  in  this  sense  would  depend  upon  how 
reasonable  were  the  Austrian  demands  and  how  strong  the  justification  that 
Austria  might  have  discovered  for  making  her  demands.  The  possible 
consequences  of  the  present  situation  were  terrible.  If  as  many  as  four  Great 
Powers  of  Europe — let  us  say,  Austria,  France,  Russia,  and  Germany — were 
engaged  in  war,  it  seemed  to  me  that  it  must  involve  the  expenditure  of  so 
vast  a  sum  of  money,  and  such  an  interference  with  trade,  that  a  war  would 
be  accompanied  or  followed  by  a  complete  collapse  of  European  credit  and 
industry.  In  these  days,  in  great  industrial  States,  this  would  mean  a  state 
of  things  worse  than  that  of  1848,  and,  irrespective  of  who  were  victors  in 
the  war,  many  things  might  be  completely  swept  away. 

Count  Mensdorff  did  not  demur  to  this  statement  of  the  possible  con- 
sequences of  the  present  situation,  but  he  said  that  all  would  depend  upon 
Russia. 

I  made  the  remark  that,  in  a  time  of  difficulties  such  as  this,  it  was  just 
as  true  to  say  that  it  required  two  to  keep  the  peace  as  it  was  to  say, 
ordinarily,  that  it  took  two  to  make  a  quarrel.  I  hoped  very  much  that,  if 
there  were  difficulties,  Austria  arid  Russia  would  be  able  in  the  first  instance 
to  discuss  them  directly  with  each  other. 

*  Aiistro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 


Count  Mensdorff  said  tliat  h(^  hoped  this  would  be  possible,  but  he  was 
under  the  impression  that  the  attitude  in  St.  Petersburgh  had  not  been  very 
favourable  recently.  I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 


No.  4. 

Cov/nt  Berchtcldj  AustHam  Mimster  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count  Mensdorff ^ 

Austrimi  Ambassador  in  London. — {Qormriv/mcated  hy  Couni  Mensdorff^ 
July  24,  19U.) 


Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
s'est  vu  oblige  d'adresser  jeudi  le  23  de 
ce  mois,  par  I'entremise  du  Ministre 
Imperial  et  Royal  a  Belgrade,  la  not6 
suivante  au  Gouvernement  Royal  de 
Sorbie : 

"Le  31  mars,  1909,  le  Ministre  de 
Serbie  a  Vienne  a  fait,  d'ordre  de  son 
Gouvernement,  au  Gouvernement  Im- 
perial et  Royal  la  declaration  sui- 
vante :— 

"  *  La  Serbie  reconnait  qu^elle  n'a 
pas  ete  atteinto  dans  ses  droits 
par  le  fait  accompli  cree  en  Bosnie- 
Herzegovine  et  qu'elle  se  confor- 
mera  par  consequent  a  telle  de- 
cision que  les  Puissances  prendront 
par  rapport  a  I'article  25  du  Traite  de 
Berlin.  Se  rendant  aux  conseils  des 
Grandes  Puissances,  la  Serbie  s'engage 
des  a  present  a  abandonner  I'attitude 
de  protestation  et  d'opposition  qu'elle 
a  observee  a  I'egard  de  1' annexion  de- 
puis  I'automne  dernier,  et  elle  s'en- 
gage, en  outre,  a  changer  le  cours  de 
sa  politique  actuelle  envers  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  pour  vivre  desormais  aveo 
cette  derniere  sur  le  pied  d'un  bon 
voisinage.' 

"  Or,  I'histoire  des  d^rnieres  annees, 
;et  notamment  les  evenements  dour 
jloureux  du  28  juin,  ont  demontre 
il'existence  en  Serbie  d'un  mouvement 
jsubversif  dont  le  but  est  de  detacher 
de  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise  cer- 
taines  parties  de  ses  territoires.  Ce 
mouvement,  qui  a  pris  jour  sous  les 
yeux  du  Gouvernement  serbe,  est 
arrive  a  se  manifcster  au  dela  du  terri- 
toire  du  royaume  par  des  actes  de  ter- 
roisme,  par  unc  serie  d' attentats  et 
par  des  meurtres. 

"Lg  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe,  loin 
de  satisfaire  aux  engagements  formels 
contenus  dans  la  declaration  du  31 
mars,  1909,  n'a  rien  fait  pour  sup- 
primer  ce  mouvement:  il  a  tolere 
I'activite  criminelle  des  differentes 
societes  et  affiliations  dirigees  centre 
la  Monarchie,  le  langage  effrene  de  la 
presse,  la  glorification  des  auteurs 
d'attentats,  la  participation  d'officiers 
et  de  fonctionnaires   dans  les  agisse- 


(Translation.) 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
felt  compelled  to  address  the  following 
note  to  the  Servian  Government  on 
the  23rd  July,  through  the  medium  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  at  Bel- 
grade : — 

"On  the  31st  March,  1909,  the 
Servian  Minister  in  Vienna,  on  the  in- 
structions of  the  Servian  Government, 
made  the  following  declaration  to  tho 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government : — 

" '  Servia  recognises  that  the  fait 
accompli  regarding  Bosnia  has  not 
aflected  her  rights,  and  consequently 
she  will  conform  to  the  decisions  that 
the  Powers  may  take  in  conformity 
with  article  25  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 
In  deference  to  the  advice  of  the  Great 
Powers,  Servia  undertakes  to  re- 
nounce from  now  onwards  the  attitude 
of  protest  and  opposition  which  she 
has  adopted  with  regard  to  the  annexa- 
tion since  last  autumn.  She  under- 
takes, moreover,  to  modify  the  direc- 
tion of  her  policy  with  regard  to 
Austria-Hungary  and  to  live  in  future 
on  good  neighbourly  terms  with  the 
latter.' 

"The  history  of  recent  years,  and  in 
particular  the  painful  events  of  the 
28th  June  last,  have  shown  the  exist- 
ence of  a  subversive  movement  with 
the  object  of  detaching  a  part  of  the 
territories  of  Austria-Hungary  from 
the  Monarchy.  The  movement,  which 
had  its  birth  under  the  eye  of  the 
Servian  Government,  has  gone  so  far 
as  to  make  itself  manifest  on  both 
sides  of-  the  Servian  frontier  in  the 
shape  of  acts  of  terrorism  and  a  series 
of  outrages  and  murders. 

"  Far  from  carrying  out  the  formal 
undertakings  contained  in  the  declara- 
tion of  the  31st  March,  1909,  the 
Royal  Servian  Government  has  done 
nothing  to  repress  these  movements. 
It  has  permitted  the  criminal  machina- 
tions of  various  societies  and  associa- 
tions directed  against  the  Monarchj'^, 
and  has  tolerated  unrestrained  lan- 
guage on  the  part  of  the  press,  the 
glorification    of    the    perpetrators    ot 


ments  subversifs,  ime  propaganda  nlal- 
saine  dans  Tinstruction  publique,  tolere 
enfin  toutes  les  manifestations  qui 
pouvaient  induire  la  population  serbe 
a  la  haine  de  la  Monarehie  et  au  mepris 
d6  ^es  institutions. 


"Cette  tolerance  coupable  du  6ou- 
vernement  Royal  de  Serbie  n'avait  pas 
cesse  au  moment  ou  les  evenements  du 
28  juin  dernier  en  ont  demontre  au 
monde  en  tier  les  consequences  funestes, 

"II  resulte  des  depositions  et  aveux 
des  auteurs  criminels  de  I'attentat  dn 
28  juin  que  le  meurtre  de  Sarajevo  a 
ete  trame  a  Belgrade,  que  les  armes  et 
explosifs  dont  les  meurtriers  se  trou- 
vaient  etre  munis  leur  ont  ete  donnes 
par  des  officiers  et  fonctionnaires 
serbes  faisant  partie  de  la  *  Narodna 
Odbrana,'  et  enfin  que  le  passage  en 
Bosnie  des  criminels  et  de  leurs  armes 
a  ete  organise  et  eflfectues  par  des  chefs 
du  service-frontiere  serbe. 

"Les  resultats  mentionnes  de  I'in- 
struction  ne  permettent  pas  au  Gou- 
vernement  Imperial  et  Royal  de  pour- 
suivrc  plus  longtemps  I'attitude  de 
longanimite  expectative  qu'il  avait 
observee  pendant  des  annees  vis-a-vis 
des  agissements  concentres  a  Belgrade 
et  propages  de  la  sur  les  territoires  de 
la  Monarchic;  ces  resultats  lui  im- 
posent  au  contraire  le  devoir  de  mettre 
fin  a  des  menees  qui  forment  une 
menace  perpetuelle  pour  la  tranquillite 
de  la  Monarchic. 

"C'est  pour  atteindre  ce  but  que  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  se 
voit  oblige  de  demander  au  Gouverne- 
ment serbe  I'enonciation  officielle  qu'il 
condamne  la  propagande  dirigee  centre 
la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise,  c'est- 
a-dire  I'ensemble  des  tendances  qui 
aspirent  en  dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de 
la  Monarchic  des  territoires  qui  en 
font  partie,  et  qu'il  s' engage  a  sup- 
primer,  par  tous  les  moyens,  cette  pro- 
pagande criminelle  et  terroriste. 

"Afin  de  donner  un  caractere  solen- 
nel  a  cet  engagement,  le  Gouverne- 
ment Royal  de  Serbie  fera  publier  a  la 
premiere  page  du  '  Journal  oflficiel '  en 
date  du  13/26  juillet  renonciation  sui- 
vante :— 


outrages,  an^  the  participation  ol 
officers  and  functionaries  in  subversive! 
agitation.  It  has  permitted  an  xini 
wholesome  propaganda  in  public  in-* 
struction,  in  short,  it  has  permitted  all 
manifestations  of  a  nature  to  incite 
the  Servian  population  to  hatred  of  the 
Monarchy  and  contempt  of  its  institu^ 
tions. 

"This  culpable  tolerance  of  the  Royal 
Servian  Government  had  not  ceased  at 
the  moment  when  the  events  of  the 
28th  June  last  proved  its  fatal  conse* 
quences  to  the  whole  world. 

"It  results  from  the  depositions  and 
confessions  of  the  criminal  perpetra- 
toi*s  of  the  outrage  of  the  28th  June 
that  the  Serajevo  assassinations  were 
planned  in  Belgrade ;  that  the  arms 
and  explosives  with  which  the  mur- 
derers were  provided  had  ]jeen  given 
to  them  by  Servian  officers  and  func- 
tionaries belonging  to  the  Narodna 
Odbrana;  and  finally,  that  the  passage 
into  Bosnia  of  the  criminals  and  their 
arms  was  organised  and  effected  by  the 
chiefs  of  the  Servian  frontier  service. 

"  The  above-mentioned  results  of  the 
magisterial  investigation  do  not  permit 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to 
pursue  any  longer  the  attitude  of  ex- 
pectant forbearance  which  they  have 
maintained  for  years  in  face  of  the 
machinations  hatched  in  Belgrade,  and 
thence  propagated  in  the  territories  of 
the  Monarchy.  The  results,  on  the 
contrary,  impose  on  them  the  duty  of 
putting  an  end  to  the  intrigues  which 
form  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  tran- 
quillity of  the  Monarchy^. 

"To  achieve  this  end  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  see  themselves 
compelled  to  demand  from  the  Royal 
Servian  Government  a  formal  assurance 
that  they  condemn  this  dangerous  propa- 
ganda against  the  Monarchy ;  in  other 
words,  the  whole  series  of  tendencies, 
the  ultimate  aim  of  which  is  to  detach 
from  the  Monarchy  territories  belong- 
ing to  it,  and  that  they  undertake  to 
suppress  by  every  means  this  criminal 
and  terrorist  propaganda. 

"  In  order  to  give  a  formal  character 
to  this  undertaking  the  Royal  Servian 
Government  shall  publish  on  the  front 
page  of  their  '  Official  Journal  '  of  the 
13/26  July  the  following  declaration  :— 


"  *  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  de 
Serbie  condamne  la  propagande  dirigee 
centre  I'Autriche-Hongrie,  c'est-a-dire 
I'ensemble  des  tendances  qui  aspirent 
en  dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la 
Monarehie  austro-hongroise  des  terri- 
toires qui  en  font, partie,  et  il  deplore 


"  *  The  Royal  Government  of  Servia 
condemn  the  propaganda  directed 
against  Austria-Hungary  —  i.e.,  the 
general  tendency  of  which  the  final  aim 
is  to  detach  from  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy  territories  belonging 
to  it,  and  they  sincerely  deplore  the 


sincerement  les  consequences  funestca 
de  ces  agissements  criminels. 

"*Le  Gouvernement  Royal  regrette 
quo  des  ofliciers  et  fonctionnaires 
serbes  aient  participe  k  la  propagande 
susmentionnee  et  compromis  par  la  les 
relations  de  bon  voisinage  auquel  le 
Gouvernement  Royal  s'etait  solennelle- 
jnent  engage  par  sa  declaration  du  31 
mars,  1909. 

"  '  Le  Gouvernement  Royal,  qui  des- 
approuve  et  repudie  toute  idee  ou  ten- 
tative d'immixtion  dans  les  destinees 
des  habitants  de  quelque  partie  de 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  con- 
Bide  re  de  son  devoir  d'avertir  formelle- 
ment  les  officiers,  les  fonctionnaires  et 
toute  la  population  du  royaume  que 
dorenavant  il  procedera  avec  la  der- 
niere  rigueur  centre  les  personnes  qui 
se  rendraient  coupables  de  pareils 
agissements  qu'il  mettra  tous  ses  efforts 
a  prevenir  et  a  reprimer.' 

"  Cette  enonciation  sera  portee  simul- 
tanement  a  la  connaissance  de  I'Armee 
Royale  par  un  ordre  du  jour  de  Sa 
Majeste  le  Roi  et  sera  publiee  dans  le 
*  Bulletin  officiel '  de  I'armee. 

"Le  Gouvernement  Royal  serbe  s'en- 
gage  en  outre : 

"1°  a  supprimer  toute  publication 
qui  excite  a  la  haine  et  au  mepris  de 
la  Monarchic  et  dont  la  tendance 
generale  est  dirigee  centre  son  inte- 
grite  territoriale ; 

"2°  a  dissoudre  iramediatement  la 
societe  dite  '  Narodna  Odbrana,'  a  con- 
fisquer  tous  ses  moyens  de  propagande, 
et  a  proceder  de  la  meme  maniere 
centre  les  autres  societes  et  aflSliations 
en  Serbie  qui  s'adonnent  a  la  propa- 
gande centre  la  Monarchic  austro-hon- 
groise;  le  Gouvernement  Royal  pren- 
dra  les  mesures  necessaires  pour  que  les 
societes  dissoutes  ne  puissent  pas  con- 
tinuer  leur  activite  sous  un  autre  nom 
et  sous  une  autre  forme ; 

"3°  a  eliminer  sans  delai  de  I'instruc- 
tion  publique  en  Serbie,  tant  en  ce  qui 
concerne  le  corpa  enseignant  que  les 
moyens  d'instruction,  tout  ce  qui  sert 
ou  pourrait  servir  a  fomenter  la  propa- 
gande centre  I'Autriche-Hongrie ; 

"4°  a  eloigner  du  service  militaire 
et  de  1' administration  en  general  tous 
les  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  coupables 
de  la  propagande  centre  la  Monarchic 
austro-hongroise  et  dont  le  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  se  reserve  de 
communiquer  les  noms  et  les  faits  au 
Gouvernement  Royal ; 


fatal  consequences  of  these  criminal 
proceedings. 

"  '  The  Royal  Government  regret  that 
Servian  ofl&cers  and  functionaries  parti- 
cipated in  the  above-mentioned  propa- 
ganda and  thus  compromised  the  good 
neighbourly  relations  to  which  the 
Royal  Government  were  solemnly 
pledged  by  their  declaration  of  the  31st 
March,  1909. 

" '  The  Royal  Government,  who  dis-^ 
approve  and  repudiate  all  idea  of  inter- 
fering or  attempting  to  interfere  with 
the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants  of  any 
part  whatsoever  of  Austria-Hungary, 
consider  it  their  duty  formally  to  warn 
officers  and  functionaries,  and  the 
whole  population  of  the  kingdom,  that 
henceforward  they  will  proceed  with 
the  utmost  rigour  against  persons  who 
may  be  guilty  of  such  machinations, 
which  they  will  use  all  their  efforts  to 
anticipate  and  suppress.' 

"This  declaration  shall  simulta- 
neously be  communicated  to  the  Royal 
army  as  an  order  of  the  day  by  His 
Majesty  the  King  and  shall  be  pub- 
lished in  the  '  Official  Bulletin '  of  the 
Army. 

"The  Royal  Servian  Government 
further  undertake : 

"1.  To  suppress  any  _  publication 
which  incites  to  hatred  and  contempt 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy 
and  the  general  tendency  of  which  is 
directed  against  its  territorial  in- 
tegrity ; 

"2.  To  dissolve  immediately  the 
society  styled  '  Narodna  Odbrana,'  to 
confiscate  all  its  means  of  propaganda, 
and  to  proceed  in  the  same  manner 
against  other  societies  and  their 
branches  in  Servia  which  engage  in 
propaganda  against  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy.  The  Royal  Govern- 
ment shall  take  the  necessary  measures 
to  prevent  the  societies  dissolved  from 
continuing  their  activity  under  another 
name  and  form ; 

"  3.  To  eliminate  without  delay  from 
public  instruction  in  Servia,  both  as 
regards  the  teaching  body  and- also  as 
regards  the  methods  of  instruction, 
everything  that  serves,  or  might  serve, 
to  foment  the  propaganda  against 
Austria-Hungary  j 

"4.  To  remove  from  the  military 
service,  and  from  the  administration 
in  general,  all  officers  and  function- 
aries guilty  of  propaganda  against  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  whose 
names  and  deeds  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government  reserve  to  them- 
selves the  right  of  communicating  to 
the  Royal  Government ; 


I 


"5"  a  accepter  la  collaboration  en 
Serbia  des  organes  du  Gouvernemcnt 
Imperial  et  Koyal  dans  la  suppression 
du  mouvement  subversif  dirige  contra 
rintegrite  tcrritoriala  da  la  Monarchie ; 

"6°  a  ouvrir  iinc  enquote  jiidiciaire 
centre  les  partisans  du  complot  du  28 
juin  se  trouyant  sur  territoire  serbe; 

"des  organes,  delegues  par  le  Gou- 
vcrnoment  Imperial  et  Royal,  pren- 
dront  part  aux  recherches  y  relatives ; 

"7°  a  proceder  d'urgence  a  I'arresta- 
tion  du  Commandant  Voija  Tankosic  et 
du  nomme  Milan  Ciganovic,  employe  de 
I'Etat  serbe,  compromia  par  les  resuU 
tats  de  I'instruction  de  Sarajevo ; 


"8°  a  empechcr,  par  des  mesures 
eflBcaces,  le  concours  des  autorites 
serbes  dans  le  trafic  illicitc  d'armes  et 
d'explosifs  a  travers  la  frontiere ; 

"a  licencier  et  punir  severement  les 
fonctionnaires  du  service-frontiere  de 
Schabatz  et  de  Loznica  coupables 
d'avoir  aide  les  auteurs  du  crime  do 
Sarajevo  en  leur  facilitant  le  passage 
de  la  frontiere ; 

"9°  a  donner  au  Gouvernemcnt  Im- 
perial ct  Royal  des  explications  sur  les 
propos  injustifiables  de  hauts  fonctipn- 
naires  serbes  tant  en  Serbie  qu'a 
I'etranger,  qui,  malgre  leur  position 
officielle,  n'ont  pas  hesite  apres  I'atten- 
tat  du  28  juin  de  s'exprimer  dans  des 
interviews  d'une.  maniere  hostile  en- 
vers  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise ; 
enfin 

"10°  d'avertir,  sans  retard,  le  Gou- 
vernemcnt Imperial  et  Royal  de  I'exe- 
cution  des  mesures  comprises  dans  les 
points  precedents. 

"  Le  Gouvernemcnt  Imperial  et  Royal 
attend  la  reponsc  du  Gouvernement 
Royal  au  plus  tard  jusqu'au  samedi, 
25  de  ce  mois,  a  G  heures  du  soir. 

"Un  memoire  concernant  les  resul- 
tats  do  I'instruction  de  Sarajevo  a 
regard  des  ionctionnaires  mentionnes 
aux  points  7  et  B  efet  annexe  a  cette 
note." 

J'ai  I'honneur  d'invitcr  votre  Excel- 
lence de  vouloir  porter  le  contenu  de 
■cette  note  a  la  connaissance  du  Gou- 
vernemcnt •  aupres  duquel  vous  etes 
.accredite,  en  accompagnant  cette  com- 
munication du  commentaire  que  voici : 

Le  31  mars,  1909,  le  Gouvernement 
Royal  serbe  a  adrcsse  a  I'Autrichc- 
Hongrie  la  declaration  dont  le  texte  est 
reproduit  ci-dessus. 

Le  lendemain  meme  de  cette  declara- 
tion la  Serbie  s'est  engagee  dans  une 
politique  tendant  a  inspirer  des  idees 


"5.  To  accept  the  collaboration  m 
Scrvia  of  representatives  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  for  the  sup- 
pression of  the  subversive  movement 
directed  against  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  the  Monarchy ; 

"6.  To  take  judicial  proceedings 
against  accessories  to  the  plot  of  tho 
28th  June  who  are  on  Servian  terri- 
tory ;  delegates  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  .Govenunent  will  take  part  in 
the  investigation  relating  thereto ; 

"7.  To  proceed  without  delay  to 
the  arrest  of.  Major  Voija  Tankositch 
and  of  the  individual  named  Milan 
Ciganovitch,  a  Servian  State  employe, 
who  have  been  compromised  by  the 
results  of  the  magisterial  enquiry  at 
Sarajevo ; 

"8.  To  prevent  by  effective  measures 
the  co-operation  of  the  Servian  autho- 
rities in  the  illicit  traffic  in  arms  and 
explosives  across  the  frontier,  to  dis- 
miss and  punish  severely  the  officials 
of  the  frontier  service  at  Schabatz  and 
Loznica  guilty  of  having  assisted  the 
perpetrators  of  the  Serajevo  crime  by 
facilitating  their  passage  across  the 
frontier ; 

"9.  To  furnish  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  with  explanations 
regarding  the  unjustifiable  utterances 
of  high  Servian  officials,  both  in  Scrvia 
and  abroad,  who,  notwithstanding 
their  official  position,  have  not  hesi- 
tated since  the  crime  of  the  28th  Juno 
to  express  themselves  in  interviews  in 
terms  of  hostility  to  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government ;   and,  finally, 

"10.  To  notify  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  without  delay  of 
the  execution  of  tho  measures  com- 
prised under  the  preceding  heads. 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment expect  the  reply  of  the  Royal 
Government  at  the  latest  by  G  o'clock 
on  Saturday  evening,  the  25th  July. 

"A  memorandum  dealing  with  the 
results  of  the  magisterial  enquiry  at 
Serajevo  with  regard  to  the  officials 
mentioned  under  heads  (7)  and  (8)  is 
attached  to  this  note." 

I  have  the  honour  to  request  your 
Excellency  to  bring  the  contents  of 
this  note  to  the  knowledge  of  tho 
Government  to  which  you  are 
accredited,  accompanying  your  com- 
munication with  the  following  obser- 
vations :  — 

On  the  31st  March,  1909,  the  Royal 
Servian  Government  addressed  to 
Austria-Hungary  the  declaration  of 
which  the  text  is  reproduced  above. 

On  the  very  day  after  this  declara- 
tion Scrvia  embarked  on  a  policy  of 
instilling  revolutionary  ideas  into  tho 


subversives  aux  ressortissants  serbes  de 
la  MonarcKie  aiistro-hongroise  et  a  pre- 
parer ainsi  la  separation  des  territoires 
austfo  -  hongrois,  limitrophes  a  la 
Serbie. 

La  Serbie  devint'  le  foyer  d'lmo  agi- 
tation criminello. 

Des  societes  et  affiliations  ne  tar- 
derent  pas  a  se  former  qui,  soit  ouyer- 
tement,  soit  clandestinement>  etaient 
destinees  a  creer  des  desordres  sur  le 
territoire  austro-hongrois.  Ces  societes 
et  affiliations  comptent  parmi  leurs 
membres  des  generaux  et  des  diplo- 
mates,  des  fonctionnairfes  d'Etat  et  des 
juges,  bref  les  sommites  du  monde 
officiel  et  inofficiel  du  royaume. 

Lo  journalisme  serbe  est  presque  en- 
tierement  au  service  de  cetto  propa- 
gande,  dirigee  contro  TAutriche-Hon- 
grie,  et  pas  un  jour  ne  passe  sans  quo 
les  organes  de  la  presse  serbe  n'excitent 
leurs  lecteurs  a  la  haine  et  au  niepris 
de  la  Monarchie  voisine  ou  a  des  atten- 
tats diriges  plus  ou  moins  ouvertement 
centre  sa  surete  et  son  integrite. 

Un  grand  nombre  d'agents  est  appele 
h  soutenir  par  tous  les  moyens  I'agita- 
tion.  centre  rAutriche-Hongrie  et  a  cor- 
rompro  dans  les  provinces  limitrophes 
la  jeunesse  de  ces  pays. 

L'esprit  conspirateur  des  politiciens 
serbes,  esprit  dent  les  annales  du 
royaume  portent  les  sanglantes  em^ 
preintes,  a  subi  une  recrudescence  de- 
puis  la  derniere  crise  balkanique;  des 
individus  ayant  fait  partie  des  bandes 
jusque-la  occupees  en  Macedoine  sent 
venus  se  mettre  a  la  disposition  de  la 
propagande  terreriste  contre  1' Autriche- 
Hongrie. 

En  presence  de  ces  agissements, 
auxquels  rAutriche-Hongrie  est  ex- 
posee  depuis  de^  annees,  le  Geuverne- 
ment  de  la  Serbie  n'a  pas  cru  devoir 
prendre  la  moindre  mesure.  C'est 
ainsi  quo  le  Gouvernement  serbe  a 
manque  au.  devoir  que  lui  imposait  la 
declaration  solennelle  du  31  mars, 
1909,  et  c'est  ainsi  qu'il  s'est  mis  en 
contradiction  avec  la  volonte  de 
I'Europe  et  avec  I'engagement  qu'il 
avait  pris  vis-a-vis  de  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie. 

La  longanimite  du  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal  a  I'egard  de  I'atti- 
tude  provocjitrice  de  la  Serbie  etait 
inspireo  du  desinteressement  territorial 
do  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise  et  de 
I'espoir  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe 
finirait  tout  de  meme  par  apprecier  a 
sa  juste  valeur  I'amitie  de  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie.  En  observant  une  attitude 
bienveillante  pour  les  interets  poli- 
tiques  de  la  Serbie,  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial    et    Royal    esperait    que    le 


Serb  subjects  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  and  so  preparing  for  the 
separation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
territory  on  the  Servian  frontier. 

Servia  became  the  centre  •  of  a 
criminal  agitation. 

No  time  was  lost  lii  the  formation 
of  societies  and  groups,  whose  object 
either  avowed  or  secret,  was  the 
creation  of  disorders  on  Austro-Hun- 
garian territory.  These  societies  and 
groups  count  among  their  members 
generals  and  diplomatists,  Government 
officials  and  judges— in  short,  men  at 
tho  top  of  official  and  unofficial  society 
in  the  kingdom. 

Servian  journalism  is  almost  entirely 
at  the  service  of  this  propaganda, 
which  is  directed  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary, and  not  a  day  passes  without 
tho  organs  of  the  Servian  press  stirring 
up  their  readers  to  hatred  or  contempt 
for  tho  neighbouring  Monarchy,  or  to 
outrages  directed  more  or  less  openly 
against  its  security  and  integrity. 

A  large  number  of  agents  are  em- 
ployed in  carrying  on.  by  every  means 
the  agitation  against  Austria-Hungary 
and  corrupting  the  youth  in  the  fron- 
tier provinces. 

Since  the  recent  Balkan  crisis  there 
has  been  a  recrudescence  of  the  spirit 
of  conspiracy  inherent  in  Servian 
politicians,  which  has  left  such  san- 
guinary imprints  on  the  history  of  the 
kingdom ;  individuals  belonging  for- 
merly to  bands  employed  in  Macedonia 
have  come  to  place  themselves  at  the 
disposal  of  the  terrorist  propaganda 
against  Austria-Hungary. 

In  the  presence  of  these  doings,  to 
which  Austria-Hungary  has  been  ex- 
posed for  years,  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment have  not  thought  it  incumbent 
on  them  to  take  the  slightest  step. 
The  Servian  Government  have  thus 
failed  in  the  duty  imposed  on  them  by 
the  solemn  declaration  of  the  31st 
March,  1909,  and  acted  in  opposition 
to  the  will  of  Europe  and  the  under- 
taking given  to  Austria-Hungary. 

The  patience  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  in  the  face  of  the 
provocative  attitude  of  Servia  was  in- 
spired by  the  territorial  disinterested- 
ness of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy and  the  hope  that  the  Servian 
Government  would  end  in  spite  of 
everything  by  appreciating  Austria- 
Hungary's  friendship  at  its  true  value. 
By  observing  a  benevolent  attitude  to- 
wards the  political  interests  of  Servia, 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 


8 


royaume  se  deciderait  fmalement  h 
suivre  de  son  cote  une  ligne  de  con- 
duite  analogue.  L'Autriche-Hongrie 
s  attendait  surtout  a  une  pareille  evo- 
lution dans  les  ideas  politiques  en 
Serbie,  lorsque,  apres  les  evenements 
de  I'annee  1912,  le  Gouvernement  Im- 
perial et  Royal  rendit  possible,  par  une 
attitude  desinteressee  et  sans  rancune, 
Tagrandissement  si  considerable  de  la 
Serbie. 

Cette  bienveillance  manifestee   par 
;  I'Autriche-Hongrie  a  I'egard  de  I'Etat 
JToisin  n'a  cependant  aucunement  mo- 
'  difie  les  precedes  du  royaume,  qui  a 
continue  a  tolerer  sur  son  territoire 
une  propagande,  dont  les  funestes  con- 
sequences   se    sent    manifestees     au 
monde  entier  le  28  juin  dernier,  jour 
ou  I'heritier  presomptif  de  la  Monarchic 
et  son  illustre  epouse  devinrent  les  vic- 
times  d'un  complot  trame  a  Belgrade. 

En  presence  de  cet  etat  de  choses  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  a  du 
se  decider  a  entreprendre  de  nou- 
velles  et  pressantes  demarches  a  Bel- 
grade afin  d'amener  le  Gouvernement 
serbe  a  arreter  le  mouvement  incen- 
diaire  mena9ant  la  surete  et  I'integrit^ 
de  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise. 

Le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
est  persuade  qu'en  entreprenant  cette 
demarche  il  se  trouve  en  plein  accord 
avec  les  sentiments  de  toutes  les 
nations  civilisees,  qui  ne  sauraient  ad- 
mettre  que  le  regicide  devint  une  arme 
dont  on  puisse  se  servir  impunement 
dans  la  lutte  politique,  et  que  la 
paix  europeenne  fut  continuellement 
troublee  par  les  agissements  partant 
do  Belgrade. 

C'est  a  I'appui  de  ce  qui  precede  que 
le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal 
tient  a  la  disposition  du  Gouvernement 
Royal  de  Grande-Bretagne  un  dossier 
elucidant  les  menees  serbes  et  les  rap- 
ports existant  entre  ces  menees  et  le 
meurtre  du  28  juin. 

Une  communication  identique  est 
adressee  aux  reprcsentants  Imperiaux 
et  Royaux  aupres  des  autres  Puis- 
sances signataires. 

Vous  etes  autorise  de  laisser'  une 
copie  de  cette  depeche  entre  les  mains 
de  M.  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
geres. 

Vienne,  le  24  juillet,  1914. 


hoped  that  the  kingdom  would  finally 
decide  to  follow  an  analogous  line  of 
conduct  on  its  own  side.  In  particu- 
lar, Austria-Hungary  expected  a  de- 
velopment of  this  kind  in  the  political 
ideas  of  Servia,  when,  after  the  events 
of  1912,  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government,  by  its  disinterested  and 
ungrudging  attitude,  made  such  a  con- 
siderable aggrandisement  of  Servia 
possible. 

The  benevolence  which  Austria-Hun- 
gary showed  towards  the  neighbouring 
State  had  no  restraining  effect  on  tho 
proceedings  of  the  kingdom,  which 
continued  to  tolerate  on  its  territory 
a  propaganda  of  which  the  fatal  con- 
sequences were  demonstrated  to  the 
whole  world  on  the  28th  June  last, 
when  the  Heir  Presumptive  to  the 
Monarchy  and  his  illustrious  consort 
fell  yictims  to  a  plot  hatched  at  Bel- 
grade. 

In  the  presence  of  this  state  of 
things  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  have  felt  compelled  to 
take  new  and  urgent  steps  at  Belgrade 
with  a  view  to  inducing  the  Servian 
Government  to  stop  the  incendiary 
movement  that  is  threatening  tho 
security  and  integrity  of  the  Austro* 
Hungarian  Monarchy. 

The  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment are  convinced  that  in  taking  this 
step  they  will  find  themselves  in  full 
agreement  with  the  sentiments  of  all 
civilised  nations,  who  cannot  permit 
regicide  to  become  a  weapon  that  can 
be  employed  with  impunity  in  political 
strife,  and  the  peace  of  Europe  to  bO 
continually  disturbed  by  movements 
emanating  from  Belgrade. 

In  support  of  the  above  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government  hold  at  the 
disposal  of  the  British  Government  a 
dossier  elucidating  the  Servian  in- 
trigues, and  the  connection  between 
these  intrigues  and  the  murder  of  the 
28th  June. 

An  identical  communication  has  been 
addressed  to  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
representatives  accredited  to  the  other 
signatory  Powers. 

You  are  authorised  to  leave  a  copy 
of  this  despatch  in  the  hands  of  tho 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

Vienna,  Juhj  24,  1914. 


Annexe. 

L'instruction  criminelle  ouverte  par 

le  Tribunal  de  Sarajevo  centre  Gavrilo 

Princip  et  consorts  du  chef  d'assassinat 

et  de  complicite  y  relative— crime  com- 


Annex. 

The  criminal  enquiry  opened  by  the 
Court  of  Serajevo  against  Gavrilo 
Princip  and  his  accessories  in  and 
before  the  act  of  assassination  com- 


9 


mis  par  eux  le  28  juin  dernier— a  jus- 
qu'ici  abouti  aiix  constations  sui- 
vantes: 

1°.  Le  complot  ayant  pour  but 
d'assassiner,  lors  de  son  sejour  a  Sara- 
jevo, de  I'Archiduc  Fran9ois-Ferdi- 
nand  fut  forme  a  Belgrade  par  Gavrilo 
Princip,  Nedeljko  Oabrinovic  le 
nomme  Milan  Ciganovic  et  Trifko 
Grabez,  avec  le  concours  du  comman- 
dant Voija  Tankosi6. 

2°.  Les  six  bombes  et  les  quatre  pis- 
tolets  Browning  avec  munition,  moyen- 
nant  lesquels  les  malfaiteurs  ont  com- 
mis  I'attentat,  furent  livres  a  Bel- 
grade a  Princip,  Cabrinovic.  et  Grabez 
par  lo  nomme  Milan  Ciganovic  et  le 
commandant  Voija  Tankosic. 

3^.  Les  bombes  sont  des  grenades  a 
la  main  provenant  du  depot  d'armes  do 
I'armee  serbe  a  fCragujeva<5 

4°.  Pour  assurer  la  reussite  de  I'at- 
tentat,  Ciganovic  enseigna  a  Princip, 
Cabrinovic  et  Grabez  la  mani^ro  der  se 
servir  des  grenades  et  donna,  dans  un 
foret  pres  du  champ  de  tir  a  Topschider, 
des  le9oris  de  tir  avec  pistolets  Brown- 
ing a  Princip  et  Grabez. 

5*^.  Pour  re'ndre  possible  a  Princip, 
Cabrinovio  et  Grabez  de  passer  la  fron- 
tiere  de  Bosnie-Herzegovine  et  d'y  in- 
troduire  clandestinement  leur  contre- 
bando  d'armes,  iin  systems  de  trans- 
port secret  fut  organise  par  Ciganovic. 

D'apres  cette  organisation  I'intro- 
duction  en  Bosnie-Herzegovine  des 
malfaiteurs  et  de  leurs  armes  fut 
operee  par  les  capitaines-frontieres  de 
Chabac  (Rade  Popovic)  et  de  Loznica 
ainsi  que  par  le  douanier  Rudivoj 
Grbic  de  Loznica  avec  le  concours  de 
divers  particuliers. 


mitted  by  them  on  the  28th  Juno  last; 
has  up  to  the  present  led  to  the  follow- 
ing conclusions:  — 

1.  The  plot,  having  as  its  object  the 
assassination  of  the  Archduke  Francis 
Ferdinand  at  the  time  of  his  visit  to 
Serajevo,  was  formed  at  Belgrade  by 
Gavrilo  Princip*  Nedeljko  Cabrinovic, 
one  Milan  Ciganovic,  and  Trifko 
Grabez,  with  the  assistance  of  Com- 
mander  Voija  Tankosic. 

2.  The  six  bombs  and  the  four 
Browning  pistols  and  ammunition 
with  which  the  guilty  parties  com- 
mitted the  act  were  delivered  to 
Princip,  ('cabrinovic  and  Grabe'2.  by 
the  man  Milan  6iganovi6  and  Com- 
mander  Voija  Tankosi6  at  Belgrade. 

3.  The  bombs  are  hand-grenades 
coming  from  the  arms  depot  of  tho 
Servian  Army  at  Kragujevac. 

4.  In  order  to  ensure  the  succesis  of 
the  act,  Ciganovic  taught  Princip, 
Cabrinovic,  and  Grabez  how  to  use  the 
bombs,  and  gave  lessons  m  firing 
Browning  pistols  to  Princip  dnd 
Grabez  in  a  forest  near  the  shooting 
ground  at  Topschider. 

5.  To  enable  Princip,  Cabrinovic, 
and  Grabe2  to  cross  the  frontier  of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  smuggle  in 
their  contraband  of  arms  secretly,  a 
secret  system  of  transport  was  orga- 
nised by  Ciganovic. 

By  this  arrangement  the  introduc- 
tion into  Bosnia-Herzegovina  of  crimi- 
nals and  their  arms  was  effected  by. 
the  officials  controlling  the  frontiers  at 
Chabac  (Eade  Popovic)  and  Loznica,' 
as  well  as  by  the  customs  officer 
Eudivoj  Grbic,  of  Loznica,  with  the 
assistance  of  various  individuals. 


No.  5. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  Bv/nsen^  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

Note  addressed  to  Servia,  together  with  an  explanation  of  the  reasons 
leading  up  to  it,  has  been  communicated  to  me  by  Count  Mensdorff.*. 

In  the  ensuing  conversation  with  his  Excellency,  I  remarked  that  it  seemed 
to  me  a  matter  for  great  regret  that  a  time  limit,  and  such  a  short  one  at 
that,  had  been  insisted  upon  at  ^this  stage  of  the  proceedings.  The  murder 
of  the  Archduke  and  some  of  the  circumstances  respecting  Servia  quoted  in 
the  note  aroused  sympathy  with  Austria,  as  was  but'  natural,  but  at  the  same 
time  I  had  never  before  seen  one  State  address  to  ahother  independent  State 
a  document  of  so  formidable  a  character.  Demand  No.  5  would  be  hardly 
consistent  with  the  maintenance  of  Servia's  independent  sovereignty  if  it 
were  to  mean,  as  it  seemed  that  it  might,  that  Austria-Hungary  was  to  be 
invested  with  a  right  to  appoint  officials  who  would  have  authority  within  the 
frontiers  of  Servia. 

I  added  that  I  felt  great  apprehension,  and  that  I  should  concern  myself- 
with  the  matter  simply  and  solely  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  peace  of 
Europe.  The  merits  of  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  were  not  the 
concern  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  ahd  such  comments  as  I  had  made  above 
v/ere  not  made  in  order  to  discuss  those  merits, 

*  Austro-Hungarkn   Ambassador   ia   London.  2  2 


10 


I  ended  by  saying  that  doubtless  we  should  enter  into  an  exchange  of  views 
with  other  Powers,  and  that  I  must  await  their  views  as  to  what  could 
done  to  mitigate  the  difficulties  of  the  situation. 

Count  Mensdorff*  replied  that  the  present  situation  might  never  have 
arisen  if  Servia  had  held  out  a  hand  after  the  murder  of  the  Archduke ; 
Servia  had,  however,  shown  no  sign  of  sympathy  or  help,  though  some  weeks 
had  already  elapsed  since  the  murder ;  a  time  limit,  said  his  Excellency,  Avas 
essential,  owing  to  the  x^rocrastination  on  Servia's  part. 

I  said  that  if  Servia  had  procrastinated  in  replying,  a  time  limit  could 
have  been  introduced  later ;  but,  as  things  now  stood,  the  terms  of  the  Servian 
reply  had  been  dictated  by  Austria,  who  had  -not  been  content  to  limit  herself 
to  a  demand  for  a  reply  within  a  limit  of  forty-eight  hours  from  its 
presentation./' 

*  Austro-Huagarian  Ambassador  in  London. 


No.  6. 

Sir  G,  Buchanan,  Bntish  AmhassadoQ"  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edioard 
Chrey^ — (Becdved  Jtdy  24.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  24,  1914. 

I  HAD  a  telephone  message  this  morning  from  M.  Sazonof*  to  the  effect  that 
/the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  had  just  -reached  him 

His  Excellency  added  that  a  reply  within  forty-eight  hours  was  demanded, 
fRnd'  he  begged  me  1o  meet  him  at  the  French  Embassy  to  discuss  matters,  as 
Austrian  step  clearly  meant  that  waf  was  imminent. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Austria's  conduct  was  both  provoca- 
tive and  immoral ;  she  would  never  have  taken  such  action  unless  Germany 
had  first  been  consulted ;  some  of  her  demands  were  quite  impossible  of 
acceptance.  He  hoped  that  His  Majesty's  Government  would  not  fail  to 
proclaim  their  solidarity  with  Russia  and  France. 

The  French  Ambassador  gave  me  to  understand  that  France  would  fulfil  all 
the  obligations  entailed  by  her  alliance  with  Russia,  if  necessity  arose,  besides, 
supporting  Russia  strongly  in  any  diplomatic  negotiations. 

I  said  that  I  would  telegraph  a  full  report  to  you  of  what  their  Excellencies 
}iad  just  said  to  .me.  I  could  not,  of  course,  speak  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty's 
Government,  but  personally  I  saw  no  reason  to  expect  any  declaration  of 
solidarity  from  His  Majesty's  Government  that  would  entail  an  unconditional 
.engagement  on  their  part  to  support  Russia  and  France  by  force  of  arms. 
Direct  British  interests  in  Servia  were  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf  of  that  country 
would  never  be  sanctioned  by  British  public  opinion.  To  this  M.  Sazonof 
replied  that  we  must  not  forget  that  the  general  European  question  was 
involved,  the  Servian  question  being  but  a  part  of  the  former,  and  that  Great 
Britain  could  not  afford  to  efface  herself  from  the  problems  now  at  issue 

In  reply  to  these  remarks,  I  observed  that  I  gathered  from  Avhat  he  said 
that  his  Excellency  was  suggesting  that  Great  Britain  should  join  in  making 
a  communication  tp  Austria  to  the  effect  that  active  intervention  by  her  in 
the  internal  affairs  of  Servia  could  not  be  tolerated.  But  supposing  Austria 
nevertheless  proceeded  to  embark  on  military  measures  against  Servia  in  spite 
of  our  representations,  was  it  the  intention  of  the  Russian  Government  forth- 
with to  declare  v.ar  on  Austria ? 

M.  Sazonof*  said  that  he  himself  thought  that  Russian  mobilisation  would 
at  any  rate  have  to  be  carried  out ;  but  a  council  of  Ministers  was  being  held 
this  afternoon  to  consider  the  whole  question.  A  further  council  would  be 
held,  probably  to-morrow,  at  which  the  Emperor  would  preside,  when  a  decision 
would  be  come  to 

I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  that  the  important  point  was  to  induce  Austria 
'to  extend  the  time  limit,  and  that  the  first  thing  to  do  was  to  bring  an  influence 
to  bear  on  Austria  with  that  tsnd  in  view;  Freiich  Ambassador,  however, 
thought  that  either  Austria  had  made  up  her  mind  to  act  at  once  or  that  she 
was  bluffing.  Whichever  it  might  be,  our  only  chance  of  averting  war  was  for 
lis  to  adopt  a  firm  and  united  attitude.  He  did  not  think  there  was  time  to 
carry  out  my  suggestion.  Thereupon  I  said  that  it  seemed  to  mo  desirable 
that  we  should  know  just  how  far  Servia  was  prepared  to  go  to  meet  the 

*  Russian  Minister-  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


1 

ws    1 
bo    1 


11 

demands  formulated  by  Austria  in  her  note.  M.  Sazonof  replied  that  he  must 
first  consult  his  colleagues  on  this  point,  but  that  doubtless  some  of  the 
Austrian  demands  could  be  accepted  by  Servia. 

French  Ambassador  and  M.  Sazonof  both  continued  to  press  me  for  a 
declaration  of  complete  solidarity  of  His  Majesty's  Government  with  French 
and  Eussian  Governments,  and  I  therefore  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  possible 
•that  you  might  perhaps  be  willing  fo  make  strong  representations  to  both 
German  and  Austrian  Governments,  urging  upon  them  that  an  attack  by 
Austria  upon  Servia  would  endanger  the  whole  peace  of  Europe.  Perhaps  you 
might  see  your  way  to  saying  to  them  that  such  action  on  the  part  of  Austria 
would  probably  mean  Russian  intervention,  which  would  involve  France  and 
Germany,  and  that  it  would  be  difficult  for  Great  Britain  to  keep  out  if  the 
war  were  to  become  general.  M.  Sazonof  answered  that  we  would  sooner  or 
later  be  dragged  into  war  if  it  did  break  out ;  we  should  have  rendered  war 
more  likely  if  we  did  not  from  the  outset  make  common  cause  with  his  country 
and  with  France;  at  any  rate,  he  hoped  His  Majesty's  Government  would' 
express  strong  reprobation  of  action  taken  by  Austria. 

,  President  of  French  Republic  and  President  of  the  Council  cannot  reach 
France,  on  their  return  from  Russia,  for  four  or  five  days,  and  it  looks  as 
though  Austria  purposely  chose  this  moment  to  present  their  ultimatum. 

It  seems  to  me,  from  the  language  held  by  French  Ambassador,  that,  even 
if  we  decline  to  join  them,  France  and  Russia  are  determined  to  make  a  strong 
stand. 

No.  7. 

Sir  M.  de  JBwisen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna^  to  Sir  Edward 

Grey. — {Received  July  2i.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna^  Jtihj  24,  1914. 

Before  departing  on  leave  of  absence,  I  was  assured  by  Russian  Ambassador 
that  any  action  taken  by  Austria  to  humiliate  Servia  could  not  leave  Russia 
indifferent.   ^ 

Russian  Cliarge  d'Affaires  was  received  this  morning  by  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  said  to  him,  as  his  own  personal  view>  that  Austrian. not© 
was  drawn  up  in  a  form  rendering  it  impossible  of  acceptance  as  it  stood,  and 
.  that  it  was  both  unusual  and  peremptory  in  its  terms.  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  replied  that  Austrian  Minister  was  under  instructions  to  leave  Bel- 
grade unless  Austrian  demands  were  accepted  integrally  by  4  r.M.,  to-iiiorrow. 
His  Excellency  added  that  Dual  Monarchy  felt  that  its  very  existence  was  at 
stake ;  and  that  the  step  taken  had  caused  great  satisfaction  throughout  the 
country.  He  did  not  think  that  objections  to  what  had  been  done  could  be 
raised  by  any  Power. 

No.  8. 

Mr.  Cracka/nthorpej  British  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Belgrade^  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey. — {^Received  July  24.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  24,  1914. 

Austrian  demands  are  considered  absolutely  unacceptable  by  Servian 
Government,  who  earnestly  trust  that  His  Majesty's  Government  may  see  their 
way  to  induce  Austrian  Government  to  moderate  them. 

This  request  was  conveyed  to  me  by  Servian  Prime  Minister,  who  returned 
early  this  morning  to  Belgrade.  His  Excellency  is  dejected,  and  is  clearly 
very  anxious  as  to  developments  that  may  arise. 


No.  9. 

JSfote  communicated  by  German  Ambassador*,  July  24, '19 14. 

The  publications  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  concerning  the 
bircumstances  under  which  X\>:q  assassination  of  the  Austrian  heir  presumptive 
and  bfs  consort  has  taken  place  disclose  unmistakably  the  aims  which  the 
Great  Servian  propaganda  has  set  itself,  and  the  means  it  employs  to  realise 
ihem. "  The  facts  now  made  known  must  also  do  away  with  the  last  dqubts 


12 

that  the  centre  of  activity  of  all  those  tendencies  which  are  directed  towards 
the  detachment  of  the  Southern  Slav  provinces  from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  and  their  incorporation  into  the  Servian  Kingdom  is  to  be  found 
in  Belgrade,  and  is  at  work  there  with  at  least  the  connivance  of  members 
of  Government  and  army. 

The  Servian  intrigues  have  been  going  on  for  many  years.  In  an  especially 
marked  form  the  Great  Servian  chauvinism  manifested  itself  during  the 
Bosnian  crisis.  It  was  only  owing  to  the  far-reaching  self-restraint  and 
moderation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  and  to  the  energetic  inter- 
ference of  the  Great  Powers  that  the  Servian  provocations  to  which  Austria- 
Hungary  was  then  exposed  did  not  lead  to  a  conflict.  The  assurance  of  good 
conduct  in  future  which  was  given  by  the  Servian  Government  at  that  time 
has  not  been  kept.  Under  the  eyes,  at  least  with  the  tacit  permission  of 
official  Servia,  the  Great  Servian  propaganda  has  continuously  increased  in 
extension  and  intensity ;  to  its  account  must  be  set  the  recent  crime,  the 
threads  of  which  lead  to  Belgrade.  It'  has  become  clearly  evident  that  it 
^'ould  not  be  consistent  either  with  the  dignity  or  with  the  self-preservation 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  still  longer  to  remain  inactive  in  face  of 
this  movement  on  the  other  side  of  the  trontler,  by  "which  the  security  and  the 
integrity  of  her  territories  are  constantly  menaced.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, the  course  of  procedure  and  demands  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  can  only  be  regarded  as  equitable  and  moderate.  In  spite  of  that, 
the  attitude  which  public  opinion  as  well  as  the  Government  in  Servia  have 
recently  adopted  does  not  exclude  the. apprehension  that  the  Servian  Govern- 
ment might  refuse  to  comply  with  those  demands,  and  might  allow  themselves 
to  be  carried  away  into  a  provocative  attitude  against  Austria-Hungary.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  Government,  if  it  does  not  wish  .  definitely  to  abandon 
Austria's  position  as  a  Great  Power,  would  then  have  no  choice  but  to  obtain 
the  fulfilment  of  their  demands  from  the  Servian  Government  by  strong 
pressure  and,  if  necessary,  by  using  military  measures,  the  choice  of  the  means 
having  to  be  left  to  them. 

The  Imperial  Government  want  to  emphasise  their  opinion  that  in  the 
present  case  there  is  only  question  of  a  matter  to  be  settled  exclusively  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  that  the  Great  Powers  ought  seriously  to 
endeavour  to  reserve  it  to  those  two  immediately  concerned.  The  Imperial 
Government  desire  urgently  the  localisation  of  the  conflict,  because  every 
interference  of  another  Power  would,  owing  to  the  different  treaty  obligations, 
be  followed  by  incalculable  consequences. 


No.  10. 
Sir  Edijcard  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie^  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

After  telling  M.  Cambon*  to-day  of  the  Austrian  communication  to  Servia, 
which  I  had  received  this  morning,  and  of  the  comment  1  had  made  to  Count 
Mensdorflt  upon  it  yesterday,  I  told  M.  Cambon  that  this  afternoon  I  was  to 
see  the  German  Ambassador,  who  some  days  ago  had  asked  me  privately  to 
exercise  moderating  influence  in  St.  Petersburgh.  I  would  say  to  the  Ambas- 
sador that,  of  course,  if  the  presentation  of  this  ultimatum  to  Servia  did  not' 
lead  to  trouble  between  Austria  and  Russia,  we  need  not  concern  ourselves  about 
it ;  but,  if  Russia  took  the  view  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum.,  which  it  seemed  to 
me  that  any  Power  interested  m  Servia  would  take,  I  should  be  quite  powerless, 
in  face  of  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum,  to  exercise  any  moderating  influence. 
I  would  say  that  I  thought  the  only*  chance  of  any  mediating  or  moderating 
influence  being  exercised  was  that  Germany,  France,  Italy,  and  ourselves, 
who  had  not  direct  interests  in  Servia,  should  act  together  for*  the  sake  of 
peace,  simultaneously  in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.. 

M.  CamboTi  said  that,  if  there  was  a  chance  of  mediation  by  the  four  Powers, 
he  had  no  doubt  that  his  Government  T\'ould  be  glad  to  join  in  it;  but  he 
pointed  out  that  we  could  not  say  anything  in  St.  Petersburgh  till  Russia  had 
expressed  some  opinion  or  taken  some  action.  But,  when  two  days  were  over, 
Austria  would  march  into  Servia,  for  the  Servians  could  not  possibly  accept, 
*  French  Ambassador  in  London. 
t  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 


13 

the  Austrian  demand.  Russia  would  be  compelled  by  her  public  opinion  to 
take  action  as  soon  as  Austria  attacked  Servia,  and  therefore,  once  the 
Aiistrians  had  attacked  Servia,  it  would  be  too  late  for  any  mediation. 

I  said  that  I  had  not  contemplated  anything  being  said  in  St.  Petersburgh 
until  after  it  was  clear  that  there  must  be  trouble  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
I  had  thought  that  if  Austria  did  move  into  Servia,  and  Russia  then  mobilised, 
it  would  bo  possible  for  the  four  Powers  to  urge  Austria  to  stop  her  advance, 
and  Russia  also  to  stop  hersy  pending  mediation.  But  it  would  be  essential 
for  any  chance  of  success  for  such  a  step  that  Germ.any  should  partioipato 
in  it. 

M.  Cambon  said  that  it  would  be  too  late  after  Austria  had  once  moved 
agains^t  Servia.  Tho  important  thing  was  to  gain  time  by  mediation  in  Vienna. 
The  best  chance  of  this  being  accepted  woukl  be  that  Germany  should  propose 
it  to  the  other  Powers. 

I  said  that  by  this  he  meant  a  mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia. 

He  replied  that  it  was  so. 

I  said  that  I  would  talk  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  on  tho 
subject. 

I  am,  &c. 

E.  GREY. 

No.  11. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  /Sir  11.  Buinbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

German  Ambassador '  has  communicated  to  me  the  view  of  the  German 
Government  about  the  Austrian  demand  in  Servia.  I  understand  the  German 
Government  is  making  the  same  communication  to  tho  Powers. 

I  said  that  if  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  did  not  lead  to  trouble 
between  Austria  and  Russia  I  had  no  concern  with  it ;  I  had  heard  nothing  yet 
from  St.  Petersburgh,  but  I  was  very  apprehensive  of  tho  view  Russia  would 
take  of  the  situation.  I  reminded  tho  German  Ambassador  that  some  d^ys 
ago  he  had  expressed  a  personal  hope  that  if  need  arose  I  would  endeavolir 
to  exercise  moderating  influence  at  St.  Petersburgh,  but  now  I  said  that,  in 
view  of  the  extraordinarily  stifF  character  of  the  Austrian  note,  the  shortness 
of  the  time  allowed,  and  the  wide  scope  of  the  demands  upon  Servia,  I  felt 
quite  helpless  as  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  and  I  did  not  believe  any  Power 
could  exercii*^  influence  alone. 

The  only  chance  I  xjould  see  of  mediating  or  moderating  influence  being, 
effective,  was  that  the  four  Powers,  Germany,  Italy,  France,  and  ourselves, 
should  work  together  simultaneously  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  in  favour 
of  moderation  in  tho  event  of  tlie  relations  between  Austria  and  Russia  becom- 
ing threatening. 

The  immediate  danger  was  that  in  a  few  hours  Austria  might  march  into 
Servia  and  Russian  Slav  opinion  demand  that  Russia  should  march  to  help' 
Servia ;  it  would  bo  very  desirable  to  get  Austria  not  to  precipitate  military 
action  and  so  to  gain  more  time.  But  none  of  us  could  influence  Austria  in  this 
direction  unless  Germany  would  propose  and  participate  in  such  action  at 
Vienna.     You  should  inform  Secretary  of  State. 

Prince  Lichnowsky*  said  that  Austria  might  be  expected  to  move  when  the 
time  limit  expired  unless  Servia  could  give  unconditional  acceptance  of 
Austrian  demands  in  tofo.  Speaking  privately,  his  Excellency  suggested  that 
a  negative  reply  must  in  no  case  be  returned  by  Servia ;  a  reply  favourable 
on  some  points  must  be  sent  at  once,  so  that  an  excuse  against  immediate 
action  might  be  afforded  to  Austria. 

■••  German  Ambassador  in  London. 

No.  12. 
Sir  Edicard  Grey  to  Mr.  Crackardhorpej  British  Cluv(jt   d' Affaires  at 

Btlfjrade. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  24,  1914. 

Servia  ought  to  promise  that,  if  it  is  proved  that  Servian  officials,  however 
subordinate  they  may  be,  were  accomplices  in  tho  murder  of.  the  Archduke  at 


14 


Serajevo,  she  will  give  Austria  the  fullest  satisfaction.  She  certainly  ought 
to  express  concern  and  regret.  For  the  rest,  Servian  Government  must  reply 
to  Austrian  demands  a??  they  consider  best  in  Servian  interests. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  military  action  by  Austria  when  time  limit 
expires  can  be  averted  by  anything  but  unconditional  acceptance  of  her  de- 
mands, but  only  chance  appears  to  lie  in  avoiding  an  absolute  refusal  and 
replying  favourably  to  as  many  points  as  the  time  limit  allows. 

Servian  Minister  here  has  begged  that  His  Majesty's  Government  will- 
express  their  views,  but  T  cannot  undertake  responsibility  of  saying  more  than 
I  have  said  above,  and  I  do  not  like  to  say  even  that  without  knowing  what 
is  being  said  at  Belgrade  by  French  and  Russian.  Governments.  You  should 
therefore  consult  your  French  and  Russian  colleagues  as  to  repeating  what  my 
views  are,  as  .expressed  above,  to  Servian  Government. 

I  have  urged  upon  German  Ambassador  that  Austria  should  not  precipitate 
military  action. 


No.  13. 
Note  communicated  by  Russian  Ambassador,  .Tnbf  25. 

(Translation.) 


M;-  Sazonof  telegraphic  au  Charge 
d' Affaires  de  Russie  a  Vionne  en  date 
dull  (24)  juillet,  1914: 

"La  communication  du  "Gouverne- 
ment  austro-hongrois  aux  Puissances 
le  lendemain  de  la  presentation  de 
r ultimatum  a  Belgrade  ne  laisse  aux 
Puissances  qu'un  dtlai  tout  a  tait  in- 
^uffisant  pour  entreprendre  quoi  qu'il 
Boit  d'utile  pour  I'aplanissement  des 
complications  surgies. 

"Pour  prevcnir  les  consequences  in- 
calculables  et  egalement  nefast*^^  pour 
toutes  les  Puissances  qui  peuvent 
suivre  le  mode  d'action  du  Gouverne- 
ment  austro-hongrois,  il  nous  parait 
indispensable  qu'avant  tout  le  delai 
donne  a  la  Serbie  pour  repondre  soit 
prolonge.  L'Autriche-Hongn^.  se  de- 
clarant disposee  a  informer  le?^  Puis- 
sances des  donnees  de  I'enqnete  sur 
lesquelles  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  base  ses  accusations,  devrait 
leur  donner  egalement  le  temps  de  s'en 
rendre  compte. 

"En  ce  cas,  si  les  Puissances;  se  con- 
vainquaient  du  bien-fonde  de  oprtames 
des  exigences  autrichiennes,  elles  se 
trouveraient  en  mcsure  de  fairo  par- 
venir  au  Gouvernem.ent  serbe  des  con- 
seils  en  consequence. 

"  Un  ref  us  de  prolonger  le  terme  de 
i'ultimatum  priverait  de  toute  portee 
la  demarche  du  Gouvernement  austro- 
hongrois  aupres  des  Puissances  et  se 
trouvcrait  en  contradiction  avec  les 
bases  meme  des  relations  interna- 
tional es. 

"Le  Prince  Koudachef  est  charge  de 
communiquer  ce  qui  precede  au  Cabi- 
net de  Vienne." 

M.  Sazonof  espere  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment de  Sa  Majeste  britanniquc  ad- 


M.  Sazonof  telegraphs  to  the 
Russian  Charge  d  Affaires  at  Vienna 
on  the  Uth  (24th^  Ti.ly.  1914- 

The  communication  made  by 
Austria- Hungary  to  the  Powers  the 
day  after  the  presentation  of  the 
ultimatum  at  Belgrade  I^.aves  a  period 
to  the  Pnwors  which  is  quite  insuffi- 
cient to  enable  them  to  take  any  «4teps 
which  might  help  to  smooth  away  the 
difficulties  that    have  arisen. 

"In  order  to  pr^vpnt  the  conse- 
quences, equally  incalculable  and  fatal 
to  all  the  Power**,  which  may  result 
from  the  course  of  action  followed  by 
the  Austro-Hunganan  Government,  it 
seems  to  us  to  be  above  all  essential 
that  the  period  allowed  for  the 
Servian  reply  should  be  extended. 
Austria- Hungary,  having  declared 
her  readiness  to  inform  the  Powers  of 
the  results  of  the  enquiry  upon 
which  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment bnse  their  accusations,  should 
eqna^ly  si  How  them  sufficient  time  to 
studv  them. 

"  In  this  CH.se.  if  the  Powers  were 
convinced  that  certain  of  the  Austrian 
demands  were  well  founded,  they 
would  be  in  a  position  to  offer  advice 
to  the  Servian  Government. 

"A  refusal  to  prolong  the  term  of 
the  ultimatum  would  render  nugatory 
the  proposals  made  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  to  the  Powers, 
and  would  be  in  contradiction  to  the 
very  bases  of  international  I'elations. 

"Prince  Kudachef  is  instructed  to 
communicate  the  above  to  the  Cabinet 
at  Vienna.'' 

M.  Sazonof  hopes  that  His  Britannic 
Majesty's  Government  will  adhere  to 


15 

herera  au  point  de  vue  expose,  et  il  the  point  of  view  set  forth  above,  and 

exprime  I'espoir  que  Sir  Edward  Grey  he  trusts  that  Sir  E.  Grey  will  see  his 

voudra     biei>     munir     TAmbassadeur  way  to  furnish  similar  instructions  to 

d'Angleterre  a   Vienne   d'instructions  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
conformes. 

No.  14. 

/SVr  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie^  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  and  to 

Sir  G,  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St,  Peter sburgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914. 

Austrian  Ambassador  has  been  "authorised  to  explain  to  me  that  the  step 
taken  at  Belgrade  was  not  an  ultimatum,  but  a  demarche  with  a  time  limit, 
and  that  if  the  Austrian  demands  were  not  complied  with  within  the  time  limit 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  break  off  diplomatic  relations  and 
begin  military  preparations,  not  operations. 

In  case  Austro-Hungarian  Government  have  not  given  the  same  informa- 
tion at  Paris  (St,  Petersburgh),  you  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
as  soon  as  possible ;  it  makes  the  immediate  situation  rather  less  acute. 

No.  15. 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{RfXiived'July  26.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  25,  1914. 

I  LEARN  from  the  Acting  Political  Director  that  the  French  Government 
have  not  yet  received  the  explanation  from  the  Austrian  Governmeijt  con- 
tained in  your  telegram  of  to-day.*  They  have,  however,  through  the  Sebvian 
Minister  here,  given  similar  advice  to  Servia  as  was  contained  in  your  telegram 
to  Belgrade  of  yesterday.t 

*  See  No.  U.  f  See  No.  12. 

No.  16. 
Sir  F.  Berlie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  July  25.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  25,  1914. 

Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  no  suggestions  to  make  except  that 
moderating  advice  might  be  given  at  Vienna  as  well  as  Belgrade.  Ho  hopes 
that  the  Servian  Government's  answer  to  the  Austrian  ultimatum  will  be 
sufficiently  favourable  to  obviate  extreme  measures  being  taken  by  the  Austrian 
Government.  He  says,  however,  that  there  would  be  a  revolution  in  Servia 
if  she  were  to  accept  the  Austrian  demands  in  their  entirety. 

No.  17. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan^  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 

^rey, — -{Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  25,  1914. 

I  SAW  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this  morning,  and  communicated 
to  his  Excellency  the  substance  of  your  telegram  of  to-day  to  Paris,*  and  this 
afternoon  I  discussed  witli  him  the  communication  which  the  French  Ambassa- 
dor suggested  should  be  made  to  the  Servian  Government,  as  recorded  in  your 
telegram  of  yesterday  to  Belgrade. t 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said,  as  regards  the  former,  that  tho 
explanations  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador  did  not  quite  correspond  with  tho 
information  which  had  reached  him  from  German  quarters.  As  regards  the 
latter,  both  his  Excellency  and  the  French  Ambassador  agreed  that  it  is  too 
late  to  make  such  a  communication,  as  the  time  limit  expires  this  evening. 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Servia  was  quite  ready  to  do  as 
you  had  suggested  and  to  punish  those  proved  to  be  guilty,  but  that  no  inde- 
pendent State  could  be  expected  to  accept  the  political  demands  which  had 
been  put  forward.     The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  thought,  .from  a  conversa- 

*  See  No,  14.  +  See  No.  12. 


16 

tion  which  he  had  with  the  Servian  Minister  yesterday,  that,  in  the  event^ 
of  the  Austrians  attacking  Servia,'  the  Servian  Qovernment  would  abandon 
Belgrade,  and  withdrauj:  their  forces  into  the  interior,  while  they  would  at  the 
B&mo  time  appeal  to  the  Powers  to  help  them.  His  Excellendy  was  in  favour 
of  their  making  this  appeal.  He  would  like  to  see  the  question  placed  on  an 
international  footing,  as  the  obligations  taken  by  Servia  in  1908,  to  which 
reference  is  made  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  were  given  not  to  Austria,  but 
to  the  Powers. 

If  Servia  should  appeal  to  the  Powers,  Russia  would  be  quite  ready  tq 
stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the  hands  of  England,  France,  Germany, 
and  Italy.  It  was  possible,  in  his  opinion,  that  Servia  might  propose  to  submit 
the  question  to  arbitration. 

On  my  expressing  the  earnest  hope  that  Russia  would  not  precipitate  war 
by  mobilising  until  you  had  had  time  to  use  j^our  influence  in  favour  of  peace, 
his  Excellency  assured  me  that  Russia  had  no  aggressive  intentions,  and  she 
would  take  fio  action  until  it  was  forced  upon  her.  Austria's  action  was  in 
reality  directed  against  Russia.  She  aimed  at  overthrowing  the  present  statiLS 
quo  in  the  Balkans,  and  establishing  her  OAvn  hegemony  there.  He  did  not 
believe  that  Germany  really,  wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  .was  decided  by 
purs.  If  we  took  our  stand  firmly  with  France  and  Russia  there  would  be  no, 
war.  If  we  failed  them  now,  rivers  of  blood  would  flow,  and  we  would  in  the 
end  be  dragged  into  war. 

I  said  that  England  could  play  the  role  of  mediator  at  Berlin  and  Vienna 
to  better  purpose  as  friend  who,  if  her  eounsels  of  moderation  were  disregarded, 
might  one  day  be  converted  into  an  ally,  than  if  she  were  to  declare  herself 
Russia's  ally  at  once.  His  Excellency  said  that  unfortunately  Germany  was 
convinced  that  she  could  count  upon  our  neutrality. 

I  said  all  I  could  to  impress  prudence  on  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  warned  him  that  if  Russia  mobilised,  Germany  would  not  be  content  with 
mere  mobilisation,  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry  out  hers,  but  would  probably 
declare  war  at  once.  His  Excellency  replied  that  Russia  could  not  allow 
Austria  to  crush  Servia  and  become  the  predominant  Power  in  the  Balkans, 
End,  if  she  feels  secure  of  the  support  of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks  of 
war.  He  assured  me  once  more  that  he  did  not  wish  to  precipitate  a  conflipt, 
but  that  unless  Germany  could  restrain  Austria  I  could  regard  the  situation  as 
desperate. 

No.  18. 
Sii'  H,  Rumholdj  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin^  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. — {Received  July  25.) 
^Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  25,  1914. 

Your  telegram  of  the  24th  July*  acted  on. 

Secreti^ry  of  State  says  that  on  receipt  of  a  telegram  at  10  this  morning 
from  German  Ambassador  at  London,  he  immediately  instructed  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  pass  on  to  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
your  suggestion  for  an  extension  of  time  limit,  and  to  speak  to  his  Excellency 
about  it.  Unfortunately  it  appeared  from  press  that  Count  Berchtoldt  is  at 
Ischl,  and  Secretary  of  State  thought  that  in  these  circumstances  there  would 
be  delay  and  difficulty  in  getting  time  limit  extended.  Secretary  of  State 
said  tliat  lie  did  not  know  what  Austria-Hungary  had  ready  on  the  spot,  but 
he  admitted  quite  freely  that  Austro-Hungarian  Government  wished  to  give 
the  Servians  a  lesson,  and  that  they  meant  to  take  military  action.  He  also 
.admitted  that  Servian  Goternment  could  not  swallow  certain  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  demands. 

Secretary  of  State  said  that  a  reassuring  feature  of  situation  was  that 
Count  Berciitold  had  sent  for  Russian  representative  at  Vienna  and  had  told 
him  that  Austria-Hungary  had  no  intention  of  seizing  Servian  territory.  This 
step  should,  in  his  opinion,  exercise  a  calming  influence  at  St.  Petersburgh. 
I  asked  whether  it  was  not  to  be  feared  that,  in  taking  military  action  against 
Servia.  Austria  would  dangerously  excite  public  opinion  in  Russia.  He  said 
he  thought  not.  Ho  remained  of  opinion  that  crisis  could  be  localised.  I 
said  that  telegrams  from  Russia  in  this  morning's  papers  did  not  look  very 
reassuring,  but  he  maintained  his  optimistic  view  '^ith  regard  to  Russia.     He 

*  Sec  No.  11.  t  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


17 

said  that  he  had  given  the  Russian  Government  to  understand  that  last  thing 
Germany  wanted  was  a  general  war,  and  he  would  do  all  in  his  power  to 
prevent  such  a  calamity.  If  the  relations  between  Austria  and  Russia  beca«me 
threatening,  he  was  quite  ready  to  fall  in  with  your  suggestion  as  to  the^four 
Powers  working  in  favour  of  moderation  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

Secretary  of  State  confessed  privately  that  he  thought  the  note  left  much' 
to  be  desired  as  a  diplomatic  document.  He  repeated  very  earnestly  that, 
though  he  had  been  accused  of  knowing  all  about  the  contents  of  that  note, 
he  had  in  fact  had  no  such  knowledge. 

No.  19. 

/SVr  A*,  liodd,  Briiish  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Svr  Edivard  Gr&y. — 

(heceived  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  7?ome,  JvXy  25,  1914. 

I  SAW  the  Secretary-General  this  m.orning  and  found  that  he  knew  of  tho 
suggestion  that  France,  Italy,  Germany,  and  ourselves  should  work  at  Vienna 
and  St.  Petersburgh  in  favour  of  moderation,  if  the  relations  between  Austria 
and  Servia  become  menacing. 

In  his  opinion  Austria  will  only  be  restrained  by  the  unconditional  accept- 
ance by  tho  Servian  Government  of  her  note.  There  is  reliable  information 
that  Austria  intends  to  seize  the  Salonica  Railway.  • 

No.  20. 
ISir  M.  de  Bunsen,  Bi'itish  Amhass'idor  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. — {Received  July  25.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  25,  1914. 

Language  of  press  this  morning  leaves  the  impression  that  the  surrender ' 
of  Servia  is  neither  expected  nor  really  desired.     It   is  officially  announced 
that  the  Austrian  Minister  is  instructed  to  leave  Belgrade  with  staff  pf  legation 
failing  unconditional  acceptance  of  note  at  6  p.m.  to-day. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  goes  to  Ischl  to-day  to  communicate  personally 
to  the  Emperor  Servian  reply  when  it  comes. 

No.  21. 

Mr,  Crackanthoiye,  British  Charge  d* Affaires  at  Belgrade^  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey, — {Received  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  '  Bplgrade,  Jvly  25,  1914. 

The  Council  of  Ministers  is  now  drawing  up  their  reply  to  the  Austrian 
note.  I  am  informed  by  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  that 
it  will  be  most  conciliatory  and  will  meet  the  Austrian  demands  in  as  large  a 
measure  as  is  possible. 

The  following  is  a  brief  summary  of  the  projected  reply:  — 

The  Servian  Government  consent  to  tho  publication  oi,a  declaration  in  the 
'"Official  Gazette."  The  ten  points  are  accepted  with  reservations.  Serviau 
Government  declare  themselves  ready  to  agree  to  a  mixed  commission  of 
enquiry  so  long  as  the  appointment  of  the  commission  can  be  shown  to  be  in 
accordance  with  international  usage.  They  consent  to  dismiss  and  prosecute 
those  officers  who  can  be  clearly  proved  to  be  guilty,  and  they  have  already 
arrested  tho  officer  referred  to  in  the  Austrian  note.  They  are  prepared  to 
suppress  the  Narodna  Odbrana. 

The  Servian  Government  consider  that,  unless  the  Austrian  Government 
'want  war  at  any  cost,  they  cannot  but  be  content  with  the  full  satisfaction 
offered  in  the  Servian  reply. 

No.  22. 

Mr.  CrachantJior'pe]  British  Chan^ge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade^  to 
Sir  Edivard  Grey.—  {Recemed  July  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  25,  1914. 

I  HAVE  seen  the  new  French  Minister,  who  has  just  arrived  from  Con- 
stantinople, and  m^y  Russian  colleague,  and  informed  them  of  your  views.    \ 

They  have  not  yet  received  instruoiions  from  their  Governments,  and  itx 


18 

fiew  of  this  and  of  the  proposed  conciliatory  terms  of  the  Servian  reply,  1 
nave  up  tq  now  abstained  from  offering  advice  to  the  Servian  Government. 

I  think  it  is  highly  probable  that  the  Russian  Government  have  already 
urged  the  utmost  moderation  on  the  Servian  Government. 

i>Io.  23. 

M?'.  Crachanthorpey  British  Charge  cC Affaires  at  Belgrade^  to 
!bir  Edivard  Grey, — {Received  Jxdy  25.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Belgrade,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Austrian  Minister  left  at  6.30. 

The  Government  nave  left  for  Nish,  where  the  Skuptchina*  will  meet  on 
lilonday.  I  am  leaving  with  my  other  colleagues,  but  the  vice-consul  is 
remaining  in  charge  of  the  archives. 

*  The  Servian  Parliament. 

No.  24. 

Sir  Edicard  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at 
St.  Feiei'sburgh, 
(Telegraphic.)  -  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914. 

You  spoke  quite  rightly  in  very  difficult  circumstances  as  to  the  attitude 
cf  His  Majesty's  Government.  I  entirely  approve  what  you  said,  as  reported 
in  your  telegram  of  yesterday,*  and  I  cannot  promise  more  on  behalf  of  the 
Government. 

I  do  not  consider  that  public  opinion  here  would  or  ought  to  sanction  our 
going  to  war  over  a  Servian  quarrel.  If,  however,  war  does  take  place,  the 
development  of  other  issues  may  draw  us  into  it,  and  I  am  therefore  anxious 
to  prevent  it. 

The  sudden,  brusque,  and  peremptory  character  of  the  Austrian  demarche 
makes  it  almost  inevitable  that  in  a  very  short  time  both  Russia  and  Austria 
will  have  mobilised  against  each  other.  In  this  event,  the  only  chance  of 
peace,  in  my  opinion,  is  for  the  other  four  Powers  to  join  in  asking  the  Austrian 
and -Russian  Governments  not  to  cross  the  frontier,  and  to  give  time  for  the 
four  Powers  acting  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg!!  to  try  and  arrange  matters. 
If  Germany  will  adopt  this  view,  I  feel  strongly  that.  France  and  ourselves 
should  act  upon  it.     Italy  would  no  doubt  gladly  co-operate. 

No  diplomatic  intervention  or  mediation  would  be  tolerated  by  either  Russia 
or  Austria  unless  it  was  clearly  impartial  and  included  the  allies  or  friends 
of  both.     The  co-operation  of  Germany  would,  therefore,  be  essential. 

*  See  No.  6. 

No.  25. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  H.  Rwnhold,  British  Charge  dJ Affaires  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Austrian  Ambassador  has  been  authorised  to  inform  me  that  the 
Austrian  method  of  procedure  on  expiry  of  the  time,  limit  would  be  to  break 
off  diplomatic  relations  and  commence  military  preparations,  but  not  military 
operations.  In  informing  the  German  Ambassador  of  this,  I  said  that  it  inter- 
posed a  stage  of  mobilisation  before  the  frontier  was  actually  crossed,  which 
I  had  urged  yesterday  should  be  delayed.  Apparently  we  should  now  soon 
1)0  face  to  face  with  the  mobilisation  of  Austria  and  Russia.  The  only  chance 
of  peace,  if  this  did  happen,  would  be  for  Germany,  France,  Russia,  and 
ourselves  to  keep  together,  and  to  join  in  asking  Austria  and  Russia  not  to 
cross  the  frontier  till  we  had  liad  time  to  try  and  arrange  matters  between 
them. 

The  German  Ambassador  read  me  a  telegram  from  the  German  Foreign 
Office  saying  that  his  Gavernment  had  not  known  beforehand,  and  had  had 
no  more  than  other  Powers  to  do  with  the  stiff  terms  of  the  Austrian  note 
to  Servia,  but  once  she*  had  launched  that  note,  Austria  could  not  draw  back. 
Prince  Lio'inojvsky*  said,  however,  that  if  what  I  contemplated  was  mediation 

Ocrman  Ambassador  in  London. 


19 

betwoen  Austria  and  Russia,  Austria  might  be  able  with  dignity  to  accept  it^ 
He  expressed  himself  as  personally  favonrablo  to  this  suggestion. 

I  concurred  in  his  observation,  and  said  that  I  felt  I  had  no  titld  to  inter- 
vene between  Austria  and  Servia,  but  as  soon  as  the  question  became  one  as 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  the  peace  of  Europe  was  affected,  in  which  we 
must  all  take  a  hand 

I  impressed  upon  the  Ambassador  that,  in  the  event  of  Russian  and 
Austrian  mobilisation,  the  participation  of  Germany  would  be  essential  to  any 
diplomatic  action  for  peace.  Alone  Ave  could  do  nothing.  The  French  Govern- 
ment were  travelling  at  the  moment,  and  I  had  had  no  time  to  consult  them, 
and  could  not  therefore  be  sure  of  their  views,  but  I  was  prepared,  if  tho 
German  Government  agreed  with  my  suggestion,  to  tell  the  French  Govern- 
ment that  I  thought  it  the  right  thing  to  act  upon  it. 


No.  2G. 
Sw  Eckum-d  Grey  to  Sw  M.  de  Bvmse/ii,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office  July  25,  1914. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  has  communicated  to  me  the  following  telegram 
which  his  Government  have  sent  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  with 
instructions  to  communicate  it  to  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs:  — 

''The  delay  given  to  Servia  for  a  reply  is  so  limited  that  the  Powers  are 
prevented  from  taking  any  steps  to  avert  the  complications  which  are 
threatening.  The  Russian  Government  trust  that  the  Austrian  Government 
will  prolong  the  time  limit,  and  as  the  latter  have  declared  their  willingness 
to  inform  the  Powers  of  the  data  on  which  they  have  based  their  demands  on 
Servia,  the  Russian  Government  hope  that  these  particulars  will  be  furnished 
in  order  that  the  Powers  may  examine  the  matter.  If  they  k>und  that  some 
of  the  Austrian  requests  were  well  founded,  they  would  be  in  a  position  to 
advise  the  Servian  Government  accordingly.  If  the  Austrian  Government  were 
indisposed  to  prolong  the  time  limit,  not  only  would  they  be  acting  against 
international  ethics,  but  they  would  deprive  their  communication  to  the 
Powers  of  any  i)ractical  meaning." 

You  may  support  in  general  terms  the  step  taken  by  your  Russian 
colleague. 

Since  the  telegram  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  was  sent,  it  has 
been  a  relief  to  liear  that  the  steps,  which  the  Austrian  Government  were 
taking  were  to  be  limited  for  the  moment  to  the  rupture  of  relations  and  to 
military  preparations,  and  not  operations.  I  trust,  therefore,  that  if  tho 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  consider  it  too  late  to  prolong  the  time  limit, 
they  will  at  any  rate  give  time  in  the  sense  and  for  the  reasons  desired  by 
Russia  before  taking  any  irretrievable  steps. 


No.  27. 

JSvr  EdAoa/rd  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  Biitish  Ambassador  at  PariSy  Sir  II. 
Rimibold,  British  Charge  dAffaires  at  Berlin,  and  Sir  G.  Buchanan, 
British  jlmhassador  at  St.  Fetershurgh. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office.  July  25,  1914. 

I  HAVE  communicated  to  German  Ambassador  the  forecast  of  vthe  Servian 
reply  contained  in  Mr.  Crackanthorpe's  telegra;m  of  to-day.*  I  have  said  that, 
if  Servian  reply,  when  received  at  Vienna,  corresponds  to  this  forecast,  I  hope 
tho  German  Government  will  feel  able  to  influence  the  Austrian  Government 
to  take  a  favourable  view  of  it. 

•  See  No.  21. 


No.  28. 
[Nil.] 


I 


20 

No.  29. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Rodd,  BHtish  Ambassador  at  Rome.      ( 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  came  to  see  me  to-day.  I  told  him  in  general  terms 
what  I  had  said  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning. 

The  Italian  Ambassador  cordially  approved  of  this.  He  jnade  no  secret  of- 
the  fact  that  Italy  was  most  desirous  to  see  war  avoided. 

I  am,  &c. 

E.  GREY. 

No.  30. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Mr.  Crackanthorpe,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at 

Belgrade. 
Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  25,  1914. 

The  Servian  Minister  called  on  the  23rd  instant  and  spoke  to  Sir  A.  Nicolson^ 
on  the  present  strained  relations  between  Servia  and  Austria-Hungary. 

He  said  that  his  Government  were  most  anxious  and  disquieted.  They 
were  perfectly  ready  to  me^t  any  reasonable  demands  of  Austria-Hungary  so 
long  as  such  demands  were  kept  on  the  "terrain  juridique."  If  the  results  of 
the  enquiry  at  Sarajevo — an  enquiry  conducted  with  so  much  mystery  and 
secrecy — disclosed  the  fact  that  there  were  any  individuals  conspiring  or 
organising  plots  on  Servian  territory,  the  Servian  Government  would  be  quite 
ready  to  take  the  necessary  steps  ^  give  satisfaction;  but  if  Austria  trans- 
ported the  question  on  to  the  political  ground,  and  said  that  Servian  policy, 
being  inconvenient  to  her,  must  undergo  a  radical  change,  and  that  Servia  must 
abandon  cci-tain  political  ideals,  no  independent  State  would,  or  could,  submit 
to  such  dictation. 

He  mentioned  that  both  the  assassins  of  the  Archduke  were  Austrian 
subjects — Bosniaks ;  that  one  of  them  had  been  in  Servia,  and  that  the  Servian 
authorities,  considering  him  suspect  and  dangerous,  had  desired  to  expel  him> 
but  on  applying  to  the  Austrian  autht)rities  found  that  the  latter  protected 
him,  and  said  that  he  was  an  innocent  and  harmless  individual. 

Sir  A.  Nicolson,^on  being  asked  by  M.  Boschkovitcht  his  opinion  on  the 
whole  question,  observed  that  there  were  no  data  on  which  to  base  one,  though 
it  was  to  be  hoped  that  the  Servian  Government  would  endeavour  to  meet  the^ 
Austrian  demands  in  a  conciliatory  and  moderate  spirit. 

I   am,   &c. 
^       ,  E.  GREY. 

*  British  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
t  Servian  Minister  in  London. 

No.  31. 

Sir  M.  de  Buns'-.n^  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.-^  ^ 

{Received  July  26.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  25,  1914. 

Servian  reply  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  demands  is  not  considered  satis- 
factory, and  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  has  left  Belgrade.  War  is  thought 
to  be  imminent. 

No.  32. 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen^  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna ^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey* — * 

{Received  July  26.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  26,  1914. 

According  to  confident  belief  of  German  Ambassador,  Russia  will  keep 
quiet  during  chastisement  of  Servia,  which  Austria-Hungary  is  resolved  to 
inflict,  having  received  assurances  that  no  Servian  territory  will  be  annexed 
by  Austria-Hungary.  In  reply  to  my  question  whether  Russian  Government 
might  not  be  compelled  by  public  opinion  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  kindred 
nationality,  ho  said  that  everything  depended  on  the  personality  of  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  could  resist  easily,  if  he  chose,  the  pressure 
of  a  few  newspapers.  He  pointed  out  that  the  days  of  Pan-Slav  agitation  in 
Russia  were  over  and  that  Moscow  was  perfectly  quiet.    The  Russian  Minister 


21 

for  Foreign  Affairs  would  not,  his  Excellency  thought,  be  so  imprudent  as  to 
take  a  step  which  wourd  probably  result  in  many  frontier  questions  in  which 
Russia  is  interested,  such  as  Swedish,  Polish,  Ruthene,  Roumanigin,  and  Persian 
questions  being  brought  into  tho  melting-pot.  France,  too,  was  not  at  all  in  a 
condition  for  facing  a  war. 

I  replied  that  matters  had,  I  thought,  been  made  a  little  difficult  for  other 
Powers  by  the  tone  of  Austro-Hungarian  Government's  ultimatum  to  Servia. 
One  naturally  sympathised  with  many  of  the  requirements  of  the  ultimatum, 
if  only  the  manner  of  expressing  them  had  been  more  temperate.  It  was, 
however,  impossible,  according  to  the  German  Ambassador,  to  speak  effectively 
in  any  other  way  to  Servia.  Servia  was  about  to  receive  a  lesson  which  she 
required ;  the  quarrel,  however,  ought  not  to  be  extended  in  any  way  to  foreign 
countries.  He  doubted  Russia,  who  had  no  right  to  assume  a  protectorate  over 
Servia,  acting  as  if  she  made  any  such  claim.  As  for  Germany  she  knew  very 
well  what  she  was  about  in  backing  up  Austria-Hungary  in  this  matter. 

The  German  Ambassador  had  heard  of  a  letter  addressed  by  you  yesterday 
to  the  German  Ambassador  in  London  in  which  you  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
Servian  concessions  would  be  regarded  as  satisfactory.  Ho  asked  whether  I 
had  been  informed  that  a  pretence  of  giving  way  at  the  last  moment  had  been 
made  by  the  Servian  Government.  I  had,  I  said,  heard  that  on  practically 
every  point  Servia  had  been  willing  to  give  in.  His  Excellency  replied  that 
Servian  concessions  were  all  a  sham.  Servia  proved  that  she  well  knew  that 
they  were  insufficient  to  satisfy  the  legitimate  demands  of  Austria-Hungary 
by  the  fact  that  before  making  her  offer  she  had  ordered  mobilisation  and 
retirement  of  Government  from  Belgrade. 

No.  33. 

Sir  H.  Bumhold,  British  Charge  cV Affaires  at  Berlin^  to  Sir  Edivard 
Grey. — [Received  Jidij  2G.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  26,  1914. 

Emperor  returns  suddenly  to-night,  and  Under-Secretary  of  State  says  that 
Foreign  Office  regret  this  step,  which  was  taken  on  His  Majesty's  own  initiative. 
They  fear  that  His  Majesty's  sudden  return  may  cause  speculation  and  excite- 
ment. Under-Secretary  of  State  likewise  told  me  that  German  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburgh  had  reported  that,  in  conversation  with  Russian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  latter  had  said  that  if  Austria  annexed  bits  of  Servian  territory 
Russia  would  not  remain  indifferent.  Under-Secretary  of  State  drew  conclusion 
that  Russia  would  not  act  if  Austria  did  not  annex  territory. 


No.  34. 

Sir  H.  Rumbold,  British  Charge  d^ Affaires  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. — {Received  July  26.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  26,  1914. 

Under-Secretary  of  State  has  just  telephoned  to  me  to  say  that  German 
Ambassador  at  Vienna  has  been  instructed  to  pass  on  to  Austro-Hunf^arian 
Government  your  hopes  that  they  may  take  a  favourable  view  of  Servian'^reply 
if  it  corresponds  to  the  forecast  contained  in  Belgrade  telegram  of  25th  JuW.* 
Under-Secretary  of  State  considers  very  fact  of  their  making  this  communi- 
cation to  Austro-Hungarian  Government  implies  that  they  associate  themselvefi 
to  a  certain  extent  with  your  hope.  German  Governm.ent  do  not  see  their  way 
to  going  beyond  this. 

*  See  No.  21. 


No.  35. 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

{Received  July  26.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Borne,  July  26,  1914. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  welcomes  your  proposal  for  a  conference,  and 
will  instruct  Italian  Ambassador  to-night  accordingly.' 

xiustrian  Ambassador  has  informed  Italian  Government  this  evening  that 
Minister  in  Belgrade  had  been  recalled,  but  that  this  did  not  imply  declaration 
of  war. 


22 

No.  36. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F,  Bertie,  'British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Sir  IT, 
Rumbold,  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Berlin,  and  Sir  R.  Rodd,  British 
Ambassador  at  Rome. 

(Telegraphic.)  Forcig)i  Office,  Jidy  26,  1914. 

Would  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  be  disposed  to  instruct  Ambassador  here 
to  join  with  representatives  of  France,  Italy,  and  Germany,  and  myself  to  meet 
here  in  conference  immediately  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  an  issue  which 
would  prevent  complications?  You  should  ask -Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
whether  he  would  do  this.  If  so,  when  bringing  the  above  suggestion  to  the 
notice  of  tlio  Governments  to  whicli  they  are  accredited,  representatives  at 
Belgrade,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh  should  be  authorised  to  request  that  all 
active  military  operations  should  be  suspended  pending  results  of  conference. 

No.  37. 
Sir  EdiLKird  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  26,  1914. 

Berlin  telegram  of  25tli  July.* 

It  is  important  to  know  if  France  will  agree  to  suggested  action  by  the  four 
Powers  if  necessary. 

*  Sec  No.  18. 

No.  38. 

Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey. — 
[Received  Jidy  27.) 

Sir,  Rome,  July  23,  1914. 

I  FATHER  that  the  Italian  Government  have  been  made  cognisant  of  the 
terms  of  the  communication  which  will  be  addressed  to  Servia.  Secretary- 
General,  whom  I  saw  this  morning  at  tlie' Italian  Foreign  Office,  took  the 
view  that  the  gravity  of  the  situation  lay  in  the  conviction  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  their  prestige,  after 
the  many  disillusions  which  the  turn  of  events  in  the  Balkans  has  occasioned, 
to  score,  a  definite  success. 

I  have,  &c. 

RENNELL   RODD 

No.  39. 

Reply  of  Servian  Government  to  Aitstro-Hungarian  Xote. — {Communicated 
by  the  Servian  Minister,  July  27.) 

(Translation.) 
Le  Gouvernenicnt  Royal  serbe  a  The  Royal  Servian  Government 
rccu  la  communication  du  Gouvcrne-  have  received  the  communication  of 
ment  Imperial  et  Royal  du  *10  de.  co  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
mois  et  il  est  persuade  que  sa  reponse  of  the  10th  instant,*  and  are  con- 
eloignera  tout  malcntendu  qui  menace  vinced  that  their  reply  v\'ill  remove 
de  gater  les  bons  rapports  de  voisinage  any  misunderstanding  which  may 
cntre  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise  et  threaten  to  impair  the  good  ncigh- 
lo  Iloyaurac  de  Serbie.  bonrly  rclatiouij  between  the  Austro- 

Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the  King- 
dom of  Servia. 
Le   Gouvernement    Royal    conscient  Conscious  of  the  fact  that  the  pro- 

que  les  protestations  qui  ont  apparu  tests  which  were  made  botii  from  the 
tant  de  la  tribune  de  la  Skoupchtina  tribune  of  the  national  Skuptchinat 
nationale  que  dans  les  declarations  et  and  in  the  declarations  and  actions  of 
le.s  actes  des  representants  respon-  the  responsible  representatives  of  the 
sables  de  I'fitat,  protestations  qui  State — protests  which  were  cut  short 
furent  coupees  court  par  les  declara-  by  the  declarations  made  by  the 
tions  du  Gouvernement  serbe,  faites  le  Servian  Government  on  the  18th* 
*18  mars,  1909,  ne  se  sent  plus  renou-  March,  1909— have  not  been  renewed 
*  Old  style.  f  The  Servian  Parliament. 


velees  vis-a-vis  de  la  grande  Monarchic 
voisine  en  aucune  occasion  et  que,  de- 
piiis  ce  temps,  aiitant  de  la  part  des 
Couvernements  Royaiix  qui  se  sont 
succede  que  de  la  part  de  leurs  or- 
gancs,  aucune  tentative  n'a  ete  faite 
dans  Ic  but  de  changer  I'etat  de  choses 
politique  et  juridique  cree  en  Bosnie  et 
Hcrzegovine,  le  Gouvernement  Royal 
constate  que  sous  cc  rapport  le  Gou- 
vernement Imperial  et  Royal  n'a  fait 
aucune  representation,  sauf  en  ce  qui 
concerno  un  livre  scolaire,  et  au  sujet 
de  laquelle  le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  a  rc^u  une  explication  en- 
tieroment  satisfaisantc.  La  Serbic  a 
de  nombreuses  fois  donne  des  preuves 
de  sa  politique  .pacifique  et  moderee 
pendant  la  duree  de  la  crise  balkanique, 
et  c'cst  grace  a  la  Serbie  et^au  sacrifice 
qu'ello  a  fait  dans  Finteret  excliisif  de 
la  paix  europeenne  que  cette  paix  a 
ete  preservee.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal 
no  pout  pas  etre  rendu  responsable 
pour  les  manifestations  d'un  caractere 
prive,  telles  que  les  articles  des  jour- 
naux  et  le  travail  paisible  des  societes, 
manifestations  qui  se  produisent  dans 
prcsque  tous  les  pays  comme  une  chose 
ordinaire  et  qui  echappent,  en  regie 
generale,  au  controle  officiel,  d'autant 
moins  que  le  Gouvernement  Royal,  lors 
de  la  solution  de  toute  une  serie  de 
questions  qui  se  sont  presentees  entre 
la  Serbie  et  I'Autriche-Hongrie,  a 
montre  une  grande  prevenance  et  a  re- 
ussi,  de  cette  fa9on,  a  en  regler  le  plus 
grand  nombre  au  profit  du  progres  des 
deux  pays  voisins. 

C'est  pourquoi  le  Gouvernement 
Royal  a  ete  peniblement  surpris  par  les 
affirmations,  d'apres  lesquclles  des  per- 
sonnes  du  Royaumc  de  Serbie  auraient 
participe  a  la  preparation  de  I'attentat 
commis  a  Sarajevo;  il  s'attendait  a  ce 
qu'il  soit  invite  a  collaborer  a  la  re- 
cherche de  tout  ce  qui  se  rapporte  a  ce 
crime,  et  il  etait  pret,  pour  prouver 
son  cntiere  correction,  a  agir  contre 
toutcs  les  personnes  a  I'egard  des- 
quelles  des  communications  lui  seraient 
faiteS,  se  rendant-  done  au  desir  du 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal,  est 
dispose  a  remettre  au  Tribunal  tout 
sujct  serbe,  sans  egard  a  sa  situation 
et  a  son  rang,  jjour  la  complicite  du- 
quel,  dans  le  crime  de  Sarajevo,  des 
preuves  lui  seraient  foutnies,  et  spe- 
cialement,  il  s'engage  a  faire  publier  a 
la  premiere  page  du  "Journal  officiel  " 
en  date  du  13  (26)  juillet,  renonciation 
suivante: 


"Le  Gouvernement  Royal  de  Serbie 


on  any  occasion  as  regards  the  great 
neighbouring  Monarchy,  and  that  no 
attempt  has  been  made  since  that 
time,  either  by  the  successive  Royal 
Governments  or  by  their  organs,  to 
change  the  political  and  legal  state  of 
affairs  created  in  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, the  Royal  Government  draw 
attention  to  the  fact  that  in  this  con- 
nection the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  have  made  no  representa- 
tion except  one  concerning  a  school 
book,  and  that  on  that  occasion  the 
Imperial  and  Roj'al  Government  re- 
ceived an  entirely  satisfactory  explana- 
tion.. Servia  has  several  times  given 
proofs  of  her  pacific  and  moderate 
policy  during  the  Balkan  crisis,  and  it 
is  thanks  to  Servia  and  to  the  sacrifice 
that  she  has  made  in  the  exclusive 
interest  of  European  peace  that  that 
peace  has  been  preserved.  The  Royal 
Government  cannot  be  held  responsible 
for  manifestations  of  a  private  charac- 
ter, such  as  articles  in  the  press  and 
the  peaceable  work  of  societies— mani- 
■festations  which  take  place  in  nearly 
all  countries  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
events,  and  which,  as  a  general  rule, 
escape  official  control.  The  Royal 
Government  are  all  the  less  respon- 
sible, in  view  of  the  fact  that  at  the 
time  of  the  solution  of  a  series  of  ques- 
tions which  arose  between  Servia  and 
Austria-Hungary  they  gave  proof  of  a 
great  readiness  to  oblige,  and  thus 
succeeded  in  settling  the  majority  of 
these  questions  to  the  advantage  of 
the  two  neighbouring  countries. 

For  these  reas6ns  the  Royal  Govern- 
ment have  been  pained  and  surprised 
at  the  statements,  according  to  which 
members  of  the  Kingdom  of  Servia  are 
supposed*  to  have  participated  in  the 
preparations  for  the  crime  committed 
at  Serajevo ;  the  Royal  Government 
expected  to  be  invited  to  collaborate  in 
an  investigation  of  all  that  concerns 
this  crime,  and  they  were  ready,  in 
order  to  prove  the  entire  correctness 
of  their  attitude,  to  take  measures 
against  any  persons  concerning  whom 
representations  were  made  to  them. 
Palling  in,  therefore,  with  the  desire 
of  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment, they  are  prepared  to  hand  over'- 
for  trial  any  Servian  subject,  without 
regard  to  his  situation  or  rank,  of 
whose  complicity  in  the  crime  of  Sera- 
jevo proofs  are  forthcoming,  and  more 
especially  they  undertake  to  cause  to 
be  published  on  the  first  page  of  the 
"Journal  officiel,"  on  the  date  of  the 
13th  (26th)  July,  the  following  declara- 
tion :  — 

"The  Royal  Government  of    Servia 


24 


condamne  toute  propagande  qui  serait 
dirigee  centre  FAutriche-Hongrie,  c'est- 
a-dire  Tensemble  des  tendances  qui 
aspirent  en  dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la 
Monarchic  austro-hongroise  des  terri- 
toires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  il  deplore 
sincerement  les  consequences  funestes 
de  ces  agissements  criminels.  Le  Gou- 
vernement  Royal  regrette  que  certains 
officiers  en  fonctionnaires  serbes  aient 
participe,  d'apres  la  communication  du 
Gouvernement  Royal  et  Imperial,  a  la 
propagande  susmcntionnee,  et  compro- 
mis  par  la  les  relations  de  bon  voisi- 
nage  aiixquelles  le  Gouvernement 
Royal  serbe  etait  solennellement  en- 
gage par  sa  declaration  du  31  mars, 
1909,*  qui  desapprouve  et  repiidie 
toute  idee  ou  tentative  d'une  immix- 
tion  dans  les  destinees  des  habitants  de 
quelque  partie  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie 
que  se  soit,  considere  de  son  devoir 
d'avertir  formellement  les  officiers  et 
fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  population 
du  royaume  que,  dor^enavant  il  proce- 
dera  avec  la  derniere  rigueur  centre  les 
personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables 
de  pareils  agissements,  qu'il  mettra 
tons  ses  efforts  a  prevenir  et  a  re- 
primer." 

Cette  enonciation  sera  portee  a  la 
connaissance  de  I'armee  Roy  ale  par  un 
ordre  du  jour,  au  nom  de  Sa  Majeste 
lo  Roi,  par  Son  Altesse  Royale  le 
Prince  heritier  Alexandre,  .et  sera 
publie  dans  le  prochain  bulletin  officiel 
de  I'armee. 

Le  Gouvernement  Royal  s'engage  en 
outre : 

1.  D'introduire  dans  la  premiere  con- 
vocation reguliere  de  la  Skoupchtinat 
une  disijosition  dans  la  loi  de  la  presse, 
par  laquello  sera  punie  de  la  maniere 
la  plus  severe  la  provocation  a  la  haine 
et  au  mepris  de  la  Monarchic  austro- 
hongroise,  ainsi  quo  centre  toute  publi- 
cation dent  la  tendance  generale  serait 
dirigee  centre  I'integrite  territoriale  de 
I'Autriche-Hongrie.  II  se  charge,  lors 
de  la  revision  de  la  Constitution,  qui 
.est  prochaine,  a  faire  introduire  dans 
I'article  22  de  la  Constitution  un 
ame.ndement  de  telle  sorte  que  les 
publications  ci-dessus  puissent  etre 
confisquees,  cc  qui  actiiellement  aux 
termes  categeriques  de  I'article  22  de 
la  Constitution  est  impossible. 

2.  Le  Gouvernement  ne  possede  au- 
cjine  preuve  et  la  note  du  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  ne  lui  en  four- 
nit   non   plus   aucune   que    la   societe 


condemn  all  propaganda  which  may  be 
directed  against  Austria-Hungary, 
that  is  to  say,  all  such  tendencies  as 
aim  at  ultimately  detaching  from  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  terri- 
tories which  form  part  thereof,  and 
they  sincerely  deplore  the  baneful 
consequences  of  these  criminal  move- 
ments. The  Royal  Government  regret 
that,  according  to  the  communication 
from  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment, certain  Servian  oflficers  and 
officials  sliould  have  taken  part  in  the 
above-mentioned  propaganda,  and  thus 
compromised  the  good  neighbourly  re- 
lations to  which  the  Royal  Servian 
Government  was  solemnly  engaged  by 
the  declaration  of  the  31st  March, 
1909,*  which  declaration  disapproves 
and  repudiates  all  idea  or  attempt  at 
interference  with  the  destiny  of  the 
inhabitants  of  any  part  whatsoever  of 
Austria-Hungary,  and  they  consider  it 
their  duty  formally  to  warn  the 
officers,  officials,  and  entire  population 
of  the  kingdom  that  henceforth  they 
will  take  the  most  rigorous  steps 
against  all  such  persons  as  are  guilty  of 
such  acts,  to  prevent  and  to  repress 
which  they  will  use  their  utmost 
endeavour." 

This  declaration  will  bo  brought  to 
the  knowledge  of  the  Royal  Army  in 
an  order  of  the  day,  in  the  name  of 
His  IMa.jesty  the  King,  by  his  Royal 
Highness  the  Crown  Prince  Alex- 
ander, and  will  be  published  in  the 
next   official   army   bulletin. 

The  Reyal  Government  further 
undertake : — 

1.  To  introduce  at  the  first  regular 
convocation  of  the  Skuptchinat  a 
provision  into  the  press  law  providing 
for  the  most  severe  punishment  of  in- 
citement to  hatred  or  contempt  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  for 
taking  action  against  any  publication 
the  general  tendency  of  which  is 
directed  against  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  Austria-rfungary.  The 
Government  engage  at  the  approach- 
ing revision  of  the  Constitution  to 
cause  an  amendment  to  be  introduced 
into  article  22  of  the  Constitution  of 
such  a  nature  that  such  publication 
may  be  confiscated,  a  proceeding  at 
present  impossible  under  the  categori- 
cal terms  of  article  22  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. 

2.  The  Government  possess  no 
proof,  nor  does  the  note  of  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government  furnish 
them   with   any,   that  the    "  Narodna 


*  New  style. 


t  The  Scrvi;in  Parliament. 


25 


"Narodna  Oditrana  "  et  aiitres  soeietes 
similaires  aient  commis,  jiisqu'a  ce  jour 
quelques  actes  criminols  de  ce  genre, 
par  le  fait  d'un  de  leurs  membres. 
Neaiinioins,  Je  Gouvernoment  Royal 
acceptera  la  deiiiaiido  dii  Gouvernc- 
ment  Imperial  et  Royal  et  dissoiidra 
la  societe  "Narodna  Od))rana  "  et  tonte 
autre  societe  qui  a;;irnit  contre 
rAiitriche-Hon;[;rie. 

3.  Le  Gouvernement  lloyal  serbe 
s'engngo  a  eliminer  sans  delais  de  I'in- 
strnction  publique  en  Serbie  tout  ce 
qui  sert  ou  pourrait  servir  a  fomenter 
la  propagande  contre  I'Autiiche-Hon- 
grie,  quand  le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  lloyal  lui  fournira  des  faits  et  des 
preuves  de  cette  propagande. 

4.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  accepte 
de  meme  a  eloigner  du  service  mili- 
tairo  ceux  pour  qui  I'enquete  judi- 
ciaire  aura  prouve  qu'ils  sent  coupables 
d'actes  diriges  contre  I'integrite  du 
territoire  de  la  Monarchie  austro-hon- 
groise,  et  il  attend  que  le.  Gouverne- 
ment Imperial  et  Royal  lui  com- 
munique ulterieurement  les  noms  et  les 
faits  de  ces  officiers  et  fonctionnaires 
aux  iins  de  la  procedure  qui. doit  s'en- 
suivre. 

5.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  doit 
avouer  qu'il  ne  se  rend  pas  clairemcnt 
compto  du  sens  et  de  la  -portee  de  la 
demande  du  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  que  la  Serbie  s'engage  a  accepter 
sur  son  territoire  la  collaboration  des 
organes  du  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal,  mais  il  declare  qu'il  admettra  la 
collaboration  qui  repondrait  aux.  prin- 
cipes  du  droit  international  et  a  la 
procedure  criminelle  ainsi  qu'aux  bons 
I'apports  do  voisinage. 

G.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal,  cela  va 
de  soi,  considere  de  son  devoir  d'ouvrir 
une  cnquetc  contie  tons  ceux  qui  sont 
ou^  qui,  event uellement,  auraient  cte 
meles  au  complot  du  15*  juin,  et  qui 
se  trouveraient  sur  le  territoire  du 
royaume.  Quant  a  la  participation  a 
cette  enquete  des  agents  ou  autoj-ites 
austro-liongrois  qui  seraient  delegues  a 
cet  effet  par  Ic  Gouvernement  Imperial 
ot  Royal,  le  Gouvernement  Royal  ne 
pent  pas  I'accepter,  car  ce  serait  une 
violation  do  la  Constitution  et  de  la  loi 
sur  la  proce'dure  criminelle;  cependant 
dans  des  cas  concrets  des  communica- 
tions sur  les  resultats  do  I'instruction 


Odbrana  "  and  other  similar  societies 
have  committed  up  to  the  present  any 
criminal  act  of  this  nature  through  the 
proceedings  of  any  of  their  members. 
Nevertheless,  the  Royal  Government 
will  accept  the  demand  of  the  Imperial 
and  Royal  Government,  and  will  dis- 
solve the  "Narodna  Odbrana"  Society 
and  every  other  society  which  may  be 
directing  its  efforts  against  Austria- 
Hungary. 

3.  The  Royal  Servian  Government 
undertake  to  remove  without  delay 
from  their  public  educational  estab- 
lishments in  Servia  all  that  serves  or 
could  serve  to  foment  jpropaganda 
against  Austria-Hungary,"  whenever 
the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government 
furnish  them  with  facts  and  proofs  of 
this  propaganda. 

4.  The  Royal  Government  also 
agree  to  remove  from  military  service 
all  such  persons  as  the  judicial  enquiry 
may  have  proved  to  be  guilty  of  acts 
directed  against  the  integrity  of  the 
territory  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  and  they  expect  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government  to  com- 
municate to  them  at  a  later  date  the 
names  and  the  acts  of  these  officers 
and  officials  for  the  purposes  of  the 
proceedings  which  are  to  be  -taken 
against  them. 

5.  The  Royal  Government  must 
confess  that  they  do  not  clearly  grasp 
the  meaning  or  the  scope  of  the  de- 
mand made  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  that  Servia  shall  under- 
take to  accept  the  collaboration  of  the 
organs  of  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government  upon  their  territory,  but 
they  declare  that  they  will  admit  such 
collaboration  as  agrees  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  international  law,  Avith  crimi- 
nal procedure,  and  with  good  neigh- 
bourly relations. 

6.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the 
Royal  Government  consider  it  their 
duty  to  open  an  enquiry  against  all 
such  persons  as  are,  or  eventually  may 
be,  implicated  in  the  plot  of  the  15th* 
June,  and  who  happen  to  be  within  the 
t<3rritory  of  the  kingdom.  '  As  regards 
the  participation  in  this  enquiry  of 
Austro-JIungarian  agents  or  authori- 
ties appointed  for  this  purpose  by  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government,  the 
Royal  Government  cannot  accept  such 
an  arrangement,  as  it  would  be  a  viola- 
tion of  the  Constitution  and  of  the 
law.  of  criminal  procedure;  neverthe- 
less, in  concrete  casses  communications 


*  Old  style. 


26 


en   question   pourraient  etre  dennees 
aux  agents  austro-hongrois. 

7.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  a  fait 
proceder,  des  le  soir  meme  de  la  remise 
de  la  note,  a  I'arrestation  du  Com- 
mandant Voislav  Tankossitch.  Quant 
a  Milan  Ziganovitch,  qui  est  sujet  de 
la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise  et  qui 
jusqu'au  15*  juin  etait  employe 
(comme  aspirant)  a  la  direction  des 
chemins  de  fer,  il  n'a  pas  pu  encore 
etre  arrete. 

Le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  est 
prie  de  vouloir  bien,  dans  la  forme  ac- 
coutumee,  faire  connaitre  le  plus  tot 
possible,  les  presomptions  de  culpabilite 
ainsi  que  les  preuves  eventuelles  de 
leur  culpabilite  qui  ont  ete  recueillies 
jusqu'a  ce  jour  par  I'enquete  a  Sara- 
jevo, aux  fins  d'enquete  ulterieure. 

8.  Le  Gouvernement  serbe^  renfor- 
cera  et  etendra  les  mesurea  prises  pour 
empecher  le  trafic  illicite  d'armes  et 
d'explosifs  a  travers  la  frontiere.  II 
va  de  soi  qu'il  ordonnera  de  suite  une 
enquete  et  punira  severement  les  fonc- 
tionnaire^  des  frontiores  sur  la  ligne 
Schabatz-Loznitza  qui  ont  manque  a 
lours  devoirs  et  laisse  passer  les  au- 
teurs  du  crime  de  Sarajevo. 

9.  Le  Gouvernement  Royal  donnera 
vofontiers  des  explications  sur  •  les 
propos  que  ses  fonctionnaires,  tant  en 
Serbie  qu'a  I'etranger,  ont  eu  apres 
Tattentat  dans  des  entrevues  et  qui, 
d'apres  I'aflSrmation  du  Gouvernement 
Imperial  et  Royal,  ont  ete  hostiles 
envers  la  Monarchie,  des  que  le  Gou- 
vernement Imperial  et  Royal  lui  aura 
communique  les  passage^s  en  question  de 
ces  propos,  et  des  qu'il  aura  demontre 
que  Jes  propos  employes  ont,  en  effet, 
ete  ten  us  par  lesdits  fonctionnaires, 
quoique  le  Gouvernement  Royal  lui- 
meme  aura  soin  de  recueillir  des 
preuves  et  convictions. 

10.  Le  Qouverneraent  Royal  infor- 
mora  le  Gouvernement  Imperial  et 
Royal  de  I'execution  des  mesures  com- 
prises dans  les  points  precedents  en 
tant  que  cela  n'a  pas  ete  deja  fait  par 
la,  pvesento  note,  aussitot  que  chaque 
mcsuro  aura  ete  ordonnce  et  ex^cutse. 

Dans  lo  cas  oii  le  Gouvernpment  Im- 
perial et  Royal  ne  serait  pas  satisfait 
de  cctt©  reponse,  le  Gouvernement 
serbe,  considerant  qu'il  est  de  Tin- 
t^ret  commun  de  ne  pas  precipiter  la 
solution  de  cette  question,  est  pret 
comme    toujours    d'accepter    une    en- 


.  as  to  the  results  of  the  investigation 
in  question  might  be  given  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  agents. 

7.  The  Royal  Government  pro- 
ceeded, on  the  very  evening  of  the 
delivery  of  the  note,  to  -arrest -Com- 
mandant Voislav  Tankossitch.  As  re- 
gards Milan  Ziganovitch,  who  is  a 
subject  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  and  who  up  to  the  15th* 
June  was  employed  (on  probation)  by 
the  directorate  of  railways,  it  has  not 
yet  been  possible  to  arrest  him. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
are  requested  to  be  so  good  as  to 
supply  as  soon  as  possible,  in  the  cus- 
tomary form,  the  presumptive  evi- 
dence of  guilt,  as  well  as  the  eventual 
proofs  of  guilt  which  have  been  col- 
lected up  to  the  present,  at  the  enquiry 
at  Serajevo  for  the  purposes  of  the 
later  enquiry.. 

8.  The  Servian  Government  will 
reinforce  and  extend  the  measures 
which  have  been  taken  for  preventing 
the  illicit  traflBc  df  arms  and  explosives 
across  the  frontier.  It  goes  without 
sao^ing  that  they  will  immediately 
order  an  enquiry  and  will  severely 
punish  the  frontier  officials  on  the 
Sohabatz-Loznitza  line  who  have  failed 
in  their  duty  and  allowed  the  authors 
of  the  crime  of  Serajevo  to  pass. 

9.  The  Royal  »  Government  will 
gladly  give  explanations  of  the  re- 
marks made  by  thpir  officials,  whether 
in  Servia  or  abroad,  in  interviews 
after  the  crime  which  according  tp 
the  statement  of  the  Imperial  and 
Roval  Government  were  hostile  to- 
wards the  Monarchy,  as  soon  as  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  have 
communicated  to  them  the  passages  in 
question  in  these  remarks,  and  as  soon 
as  they  have  shown  that  the  remarks 
were  actually  made  by  the  Said  officials, 
although  the  Royal  Government  will 
it^ielf  take  steps  to  collect  evidence 
and  proofs. 

10.  The  Royal  Government  will  in- 
form the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment of  the  execution  of  the  measures 
comprised  under  the  above  heads,  in 
so  far  as  this  has  not  already  been 
done  by  the.  present  note,  as  Soon  as 
each  measure  has  been  ordered  and 
carried  out 

If  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment are  not  satisfied  with  this  reply, 
the  Servian  Government,  considering 
that  it  is  not  to  the  common  interest  to 
precipitate  the  solution  of  this  ques- 
tion, are  ready,  as  always,  to  accept  a 
pacific  understanding,  either  by  refer- 


Old  Stylo. 


27   ' 

tente  pacifique,  soit  en  remeftarit  cette  ring  this  question  to  the  decision  of 

question  a  la  decision  du  Tribunal  in-,  the    International    Tribunal    of    The 

ternational    de    La    Haye,    soit    aux  Hague;  or  to  the  Great  Powers  which 

Grandes  Puissances  qui  ont  pris  part  a  took  part  in  the  drawing  up  of    tho 

I'elaboration  de  la  declaration  que  le  declaration     made     by     the     Servian 

Gouvernement  serbe  a  faite  le  18  (31)  Government  on  the  18th  (31st)  March, 

mars,  1909.  1909. 

Belgrade,  le  12  (25)  juillet,  1914.  Belgrade,  July  12  (25),  1914. 

No.  40. 
Sir  M.  de  JBunsen^  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  G^^ey. — 

\Receivei  July  27.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  26,  1914. 

RUSSIAN  Ambassador  just  returned  from  leave  thinks  that  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government  are  determined  on  war,  and  that  it  is  impossible  for  Russia 
to  remain  indifferent.  He  does  not  propose  to  press  for  more  time  in  the 
sense  of  your  telegram  of  tho  25th  instant*  (last  paragraph). 

When  the  repetition  of  your  telegram  of  the  26th  instant  to  Parist  arrived, 
I  had  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors  both  with  me.  They  expressed 
great  satisfaction  with  its  contents,  which  I  communicated  to  them.  They 
doubted,  however,  whether  the  principle  of  Russia  .being  an  interested  party 
entitled  to  have  a  say  in  the  settlement  of  a  purely  Austro-Servian  dispute 
would  be  accepted  by  either  the  Austro-Hungarian  or  the  German  Government. 
Instructions  were  also  given  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  to  support  tho 
request  of  the  Russian  Government  that  the  time  limit  should  be  postponed. 
They  arrived,  however,  too  late  for  aAy  useful  action  to  be  taken. 
*  See  No.  26.  t  See  No.  36. 

No.  41. 

Sir  M,  de  Bunsen,  British  -Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 

{Received  July  27.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  27,  1914. 

I  HAVE  had  conversations  with  all  my  colleagues  representing  the  Great 
Powers.  Tlie  impression  left  on  my  mind  is  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  note 
was  so  drawn  up  as  to  make  war  inevitable ;  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  are  fully  resolved  to  have  war  with  Servia ;  that  they  consider 
their  position  as  a  Great  Power  to  be  at  stake ;  and  that  until  punishment 
has  been  administered  to  Servia  it  is  unlikely  that  they  will  listen  to  proposals 
of  mediation.  This  country  has  gone  wild  with  joy  at  the  prospect  of  war  with 
Servia,  and  its  postponement  or  prevention  "would  undoubtedly  be  a  great 
disappointment. 

I  propose,  subject  to  any  special  directions  you  desire  to  send  me,  to  express 
to  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  the  hope  of  His  Majesty's 
Government  that  it  may  yet  be  possible  to  avoid  war,  and  to  ask  his  Excellency 
whether  he  cannot  suggest  a  way  out  even  now. 

No.  42. 

Sir  F,  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(Received  July  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  27,  1914. 

YOUR  proposal,  as  stated  in  your  two  telegrams  of  yesterday,*  is  accepted 
by  the  French  Government.  French  Ambassador  in  London,  who  returns  there 
this  evening,  has  been  instructed  accordingly.  Instructions  have  been  sent 
to  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  concert  with  his  British  colleague 
as  to  the  advisability  of  their  speaking  jointly  to  the  German  Government. 
Necessary  instructions  have  also  been  sent  to  the  French  representatives  at 
Belgrade,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburgh,  but  until  it  is  known  that  the  Germans 
have  spoken  at  Vienna  with  some  success,  it  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  be  dangerous  for  the  French,  Russian,  and  British! 
Ambassadors  to  do  so. 

•  Nos.  36  and  37. 


28 

No.  43. 

Sir  E,  Goschen^  Bntish  Amhassadw  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  JvXy  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  BtTMn,  July  27,  1914. 

YOUR  telegram  of  26th  July.* 

Secretary  of  State  says  that  conference  you  suggest  would  practically 
amount  to  a  court  of  arbitration  and  could  not,  in  his  opinion,  be  called 
together  except  at  the  request  of  Austria  and  Russia.  He  could  not  therefore 
fall  in  with  your  suggestion,  desirous  though  he  was  to  co-operate  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace.  I  said  I  was  sure  that  your  idea  had  nothing  to  do 
with  arbitration,  biit  meant  that  representatives  of  the.  four  nations  not 
direetly  interested  should  discuss  and  suggest  means  for  avoiding  a  dangerous 
situation.  He  maintained,  however,  that  such  a  conference  as  you  proposed 
was  not  practicable.  He  added  that  news  he  had  just  received  from  St. 
Petersburgh  showed  that  there  was  an  intention  on  the  part  of  M.  de  Sazonoft 
to  exchjinge  views  with  Count  Berchtold.if  He  thought  that  this  method  of 
procedure  might  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result,  and  that  it  would  be  be^,  before 
doing  anything  else,  to  await  outcome  of  the  exchange  of  views  between  the 
Austrian  and  Russian  Governments. 

In  the  course  of  a  short  conversation  Secretary  of  State  said  that  as  yet 
Austria  was  only  partially  mobilising,  but  that  if  Russia  mobilised  against  Ger- 
many latter,  would  have  to  follow  suit.  I  asked  him  what  he  meant  by 
"mobilising  against  Germany."  He  said  that  if  Russia  only  mobilised  in  south  ' 
Germany  would  not  mobilise,  but  if  she  mobilised  in  north,  Germany  would 
have  to  do  so  too,  and  Russian  system  of  mobilisation  was  so  complicated  that 
it  misht  be  difficult  exactly  to  locate  hpf  mobilisation.  Germany  would  there- 
fore have  to  be  very  careful  not  to  be  taken  by  surprise. 

Finally,  Secretary  of  State  said  that  news-  from  St.  Petersburgh  had  caused 
him  to  take  more  hopeful  view  of  the  general  situation. 

*  See  No.  36, 

t  Russian   Minister    for    Foreign    Affairs. 

t  Austro-Hungarian    Minieter    for    Foreign    Affairs. 

No.  44. 

Sir  O,  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 

Grey. — {^Received  Jvly  27.) 

(Telegraphic)  ^i.  Petershvrgh\  July  27,  1914. 

AUSTRIAN  Ambassador  tried,  in  a  long  conversation  which  he  had  yesterday 
with  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  explain  away  objectionable  features 
of  the  recent  action  takdn  by  .the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  pointed  out  that,  althongh  he  perfectly  understood  Austria's 
motives,  the  ultimatum  had  been  so  drafted  that  it  could  not  possibly  be 
accepted  as  a  whole  by  the  Servian  Government.  Although  the  demands  were 
reasonable  enough  in  some  cases,  others  not  only  could  not  possibly  be  put 
into  immediate. execution  seeing  that  they  entailed  revision  of  existing  Servian 
laws,  bub  were,  moreover,  incompatible  with  Servia's  dignity  as  an  independent 
State.  It  would  be  useless  for  Russia  to  offer  her  good  offices  at  Belgrade, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  she  was  the  object  of  such  suspicion  in  Austria.  In 
order,  however,  to  put  an  end  to  tne  present  tension,  he  thought  that  England 
and  Italy  might  be  willing  to  coUaboratP  vvith  Austria.  The  Austrian  Ambas- 
sador undertook  to  communicate  his  Excellency's  remarks-  to  his  Government. 
On  thr;  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  questioning  me,  1  told  him  that  I  had 
correctly  defined  the  attitude  of  Hij  Majesty's  Gover-nment  in  my  conversation 
with  him,  which  I  reported  in  my  telegram  of  the  24th  instant.*  I  added  that 
you  could  not  promise  to  do  anything  more,  and  that  his  Excellency  was 
mistaken  if  ho  believed  that  the  cause  of  peace  could  be  promoted  by  our 
telling  the  German  Government  that  they  would  have  to  deal  with  us  as  well] 
as  with  Russia  and  France  if  they  supported  Austria  by  force  of  arms.  Their 
attitude  would  merely  be  stiffened  by  such  a  menace,  and  we  could  only  induce 
her  to  use  her  influence  at  Vienna  to  avert  war  by  approaching  her  in  the 
capa'^ity  of  a  friend  who  was  anxious  to  preserve  peace.  His  Excellency  must 
not,  if  our  efforts  were  to  be  successful,  do  anything  to  precipitate  a  conflict. 

^SoqNo.'6. 


29 

In  these  circumstances  I  trusted  that  the  Russian  Government  would  defer 
mobilisation  ukase  for  as  long  as  possible,  and  that  troops  would  not  be  allowed 
to  cross  the  frontier  even  when  it  was  issued. 

In  reply  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  told  me  that  until  the  issue  of 
the  Imperial  ukase  no  effective  steps  towards  mobilisation  could  bo  taken,  and 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  profit  by  delay  in  order  to  complete 
her  military  preparations  if  it  was  deferred  too  long. 

No.  45. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petershurgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. — [Received  July  27.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  VetcrsburgK  July  27,  1914. 

SINCE  my  conversation  with  the  Minister  for.  Foreign  Affairs,  as  reported 
in  my  telegram  of  to-day,-^  I  understand  that  his  Excellency  has  proposed 
that  the  modifications  to  be  introduced  into  Austrian  demands  should  be  the 
subject  of  direct  conversation  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh. 

*  Sco  No.   4*. 

No.  46. 
Sir  Edicard  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin: 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  27,  1914. 

GERMAN  Ambassador  has  informed  me  that  German  Government  accept  in 
principle  mediation  between  Austria  and  Russia  by  the  four  Powers,  reserving, 
of  -course,  their  right  as  an  ally  to  help  Austria  if  attacked.  He  has  also 
been  instructed  to  request  me  to  use  influence  in  St.  Petersburgh  to  localise 
the  war  and  to  keep  up  the  peace  of  Europe. 

I  have  replied  that  the  Servian  reply  went  farther  than  could  have  been 
expected  to  m.eet  the  Austrian  demands.  German  Secretary  of  State  has  him- 
self said  that  there  were  some  things  in  the  Austrian  note  that  Servia  could 
hardly  be  expected  to  accept.  I  assumed  that  Servian  reply  could  not  have 
gone  as  far  as  it  did  unless  Russia  had  exercised  conciliatory  influence  at 
Belgrade,  and  it  was  really  at  Vienna  that  moderating  influence  was  now 
required.  If  Austria  put  the  Servian  reply  aside  as  being  worth  nothing  and 
marched  into  Servia,  it  meant  that  she  was  determined  to  crush  Servia  at  all 
costs,  being  reckles§  of  the  consequences  that  might  be  involved.  Servian  reply 
should  at  least  be  treated  as  a  basis  for  discussion  and  pause.  I  said  German 
Government  should  urge  this  at  Vienna. 

I  recalled  what  German  Government  had  said  as  to  the  gravity  of  the 
situation  if  the  war  could  not  be  localised,  and  observed  that  if  Germany 
assisted  Austria  against  Russia  it  would  be  because,  without  any  reference  to 
the  merits  of  the  dispute,  Germany  could  not  afford  to  see  Austria  crushed. 
Just  so  other  issues  might  be  raised  that  would  supersede  the  dispute  between 
Austria  and  Servia,  and  would  bring  other  Powers  in,  and  the  war  would  be 
the  biggest  ever  known ;  but  as  long  as  Germany  would  work  to  keep  the  peace. 
I  would  keep  closely  in  touch.  I  repeated  that  after  the  Servian  reply  it  was 
at  Vienna  that  some  moderation  must  be  urged. 

No.  47. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanom,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh, 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  27,  1914. 

SEE  my  telegram  of  to-day  to  Sir  E.  Goschen.* 

I  have  been  told  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  in  German  and  Austrian 
circles  impression,  prevails  that  in  any  event  we  would  stand  aside.  His 
Excellency  deplored  the  effect  that  such  an  impression  must  produce. 

This  impression  ought,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  to  be  dispelled  by  the  orders 
we  have  given  to  the  First  Fleet,  which  is  concentrated,  as  it  happens,  at 
Portland,  not  to  disperse  for  manoeuvre  leave.  But  I  explained  to  the  Russian 
Ambassador  that  my  reference  to  it  must  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  anything^ 
more  than  diplomatic  action  was  promised. 

"We  bear  from  German  and  Austrian  sources  that  they  believe  Russia  will 

*  Soo  No.  46. 


30 

take  no  action  so  long  as  Austria  agrees  not  to  take  Servian  territory.  I 
pointed  this  out,  and  added  that  it  would  be  absurd  if  we  were  to  appear  more 
Servian  than  the  Russians  in  our  dealings  with  the  German  and  Austrian 
Governments. 

No.  48. 
jSir  E.  Grey  to  Sir  M.  de  BimseUj  BrUish  Ainhassador  at  Vienna. 

Sir,  ForelgM  Office,  July  27,  1914. 

COUNT  MENSDORFF".  told  me  by  instruction  to-day  that  the  Scrviaa' 
Government  had  not  accepted  the  demands  which  the  Austrian  Government 
were  obliged  to  address  to  them  in  order  to  secure  permanently  the  most  vital 
Austrian  interests.  Servia  showed  that  she  did  not  intend  to  abandon  her 
subversive  aims,  tending  towards  continuous  disorder  in  the  Austrian  frontier 
territories  and  their  final  disruption  from  the  Austrian  ^ilonarchy.  Very 
reluctantly,  and  against  their  wish,  the  Austrian  Government  were  compelled  to 
take  more  severe  measures  to  enforce  a  fundamental  change  in  the  attitude  of 
enmity  pursued  up  to  now  by  Servia.  As  the  British  Government  knew,  the 
Austrian  Government  had  for  many  years  endeavoured  to  find  a  way  to  get  on 
with  their  turbulent  neighbour,  though  tiiis  had  been  made  very  difficult  for 
them  by  the  continuous  provocations  of  Servia.  The  Scrajevo  murder  had 
made  clear  to  everyone  what  appalli'ng  consequences  the  Servian  propaganda 
had  already  produced  and  what  a  permanent  threat  to  Austria  it  involved. 
We  would  understand  that  the  Austrian  Government  must  consider  that  the 
moment  had  arrived  to  obtain,  by  means  of  the  strongest  pressure,  guarantees 
for  the  definite  suppression,  of  the  Servian  aspirations  and  for  the  security  of 
peace  and  order  on  the  south-eastern  frontier  of  Austria.  As  the  peaceable 
means  to  this  effect  were  exhausted,  the  Austrian  Government  must  at  last 
appeal  to  force.  They  had  not  taken  this  decision  without  reluctance.  Their 
action,  which  had  no  sort  oi  aggressive  tendency,  could  not  be  represented 
otherwise  than  as  an  act  of  self-defence.  Also  they  thought  that  they  would 
serve  a  European  interest  if  they  prevented  Servia  from  being  henceforth  an 
element  of  general  unrest  such  as  she  had  been  for  the  last  ten  years.  The  high 
sense  of  justice  of  the  British  nation  and  of  British  statesmen  could  not  blame 
the  Austrian  Governm.ent  if  the  latter  defended  by  the  sword  what  was  theirs, 
and  cleared  up  their  position  with  a  country  whose  hostile  policy  had  forced 
upon  them  for  years  measures  so  costly  as  to  have  gravely  injured  Austrian 
national  prosperity.  Finally,  the  Austrian  Government,-  confiding  in  their 
amicable  relations  with  us,  felt  that  they  could  count  on  our  sympathy  in  a 
fight  that  was  forced  on  them,  and  on  our  assistance  in  localising  the  fight,  if 
necessary. 

Count  Mcnsdorff  added  on  his  own  account  that, '  as  long  as  Servia  was 
confronted  with  Turkey,  Austria  never  took  very  severe  measures  because  of 
her  adherence  to  the  policy  of  the  free  development  of  the  Balkan  States.  Now 
that  Servia  had  doubled  her  territory  and  population  without  any  Austrian 
interference,  the  repression  of  Servian  subversive  aims  was  a  matter  of  self- 
defence  and  self-preservation  on  Austria's  part.  He  reiterated  that  Austria 
had  no  intention  of  taking  Servian  territory  or  aggressive  designs  against 
Servian  territory. 

I  said  that  I  could  not  understand  the  construction  put  by  the  Austrian 
Government  upon  the  Servian  reply,  and  I  told  Count  Mensdorff  the  substance 
of  the  conversation  that  I  had  had  with  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning 
about  that  reply. 

Count  Mensdorff  admitted  that,  on  paper,  the  Servian  reply  might  seem  to 
be  satisfactory  ;  but  the  Servians  had  refused  the  one  tiling — the  co-operation  of 
Austrian  officials  and  police — which  would  be  a  real  guarantee  that  in  practice 
the  Servians  would  not  carry  on  their  subversive  campaign  against  Austria. 

I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  as  if  the  Austrian  Government  believed  that, 
even  after  the  Servian  reply,  they  could  make  war  upon  Servia  anyhow,  without 
risk  of  bringing  Russia  into  the  dispute.  If  they  could  make  war  on  Servia  an  J 
at  the  same  time  satisfy  Russia,  well  and  good;  but,  if  not,  the  consequences 
would  be  incalculable.  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  I  quoted  this  phrase  from  an 
expression  of  the  views  of  the  German  Government.  I  feared  that  it  would  be 
expected  in  St.  Petersburgh  that  the  Servian  reply  would  diminish  the  tension, 

*  Austro-Hungarian   Ambassador   in   London. 


31 

and  now,  when  Russia  found  that  there  was  increased  tension,  the  situation 
would  become  increasingly  serious.  Already  the  eftect  on  Europe  was  one  of 
anxiety.  I  pointed  out  that  our  fleet  was  to  have  dispersed  to-day,  but  we  had 
felt  unable  to  let  it  disperse.  We  should  not  think  of  calling  up  reserves  at 
this  moment,  and  there  was  no  menace  in  what  we  had  done  about  our  fleet; 
but,  owing  to  the  possibility  of  a  European  conflagration,  it  was  impossible 
for  us  to  disperse  our  forces  at  this  moment.  I  gave  this  as  ah  illustration  of 
the  anxiety  that  was  felt.  It  seemed  to  mc  that  the  Servian  reply  alreadj 
involved  the  greatest  humiliation  to  Servia  that  I  had  ever  seen  a  country 
undergo,  and  it  was  very  disappointing  to  me  that  the. reply  was  treated  by 
the  Austrian  Government  as  if  it  v/cre  as  unsatisfactory  as  a  blank  negative. 

I  am,  &c. 

E.   GREY. 

No.  49. 

Sir  Edivard  Grey  to  Sir  R  Rodd^  British  Ambassador  at  Rome. 

Sir,^  Foreign  Office,  July  27,  1914. 

THE  Italian  Ambassador  informed  Sir  A.  Nicolson*  to-day  that  the  Italian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  agreed  entirely  with  my  proposal  for  a  conference 
of  four  to  be  hold  in  London. 

As  regards  the  question  of  asking  Russia,  Anstria-Hungary,  and  Servia  to 
suspend  military  operations  pending  the  result  o?  the  oonfcronco,  the  Marquis 
di  San  Giulianot  would  recommend  the  suggestion  warmly  to  the  German 
Government,  and  would  enquire  what  procedure  they  would  propose  should  be 
followed  at  Vienna. 

I  am,  &c. 

E.   GREY. 
*  British  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
t  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

No.  50. 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen^  British  Atnhassador  at  Vienna^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 
{Received  July  31.) 

Sir,  Vifana,  July  28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  the  t«xt  of  the  Austro 
Hungarian  note  announcing  the  declaration  of  war  against  Servia. 

I  have,  &c. 

MAURICE  DE  BUNSEN. 


Enclosure  in  No.  50, 
Copy  of  Note  verbale,  dated  Vienna^  July  28,  1914. 

(Translation.) 

POUR  mctti'o  fin  aux  menees  sub-  IN  order  to    brmg  to    an  end   the 

Tcrsives  partant  de    Belgrade  et   diri-  subversive   intrigues  originating   from 

gees   rontre   Tintegiite   territoriale  de  13iel2radG  and  aimed  at  the  territorial 

la  iMonarrhie  austro-hongroise,  le  Gou-  intf'gnty     of     the     Austro-Hnnganan 

vprnement  Imperial  <^t  Royal  a  fait  par-  Monarchy,    the     Inippnal     and    Royal 

vohir  a  la  date  du  23  juillet,  1914,  au  Govpirwropnt     has     d»^hvpred     to     the 

Gouvernement    Royal    de    Seihie    rine  Royal     Servism     Government   a   note, 

note  dans  laquelle  se  trou^ait  fornndee  dated   luly  23,  1914,  in  which  a  series 

une  serio  de  demandes  pour  I'arcppta-  of  demands  were  formulated,  for  the 

lion  desqnelles  im   delai  de  quarante-  acceptanr'e  of  which  a  dMny  of  forty- 

buit  heures  a  ete  acoord^  au  Gouverne-  ci.^ht  honrs   has   been  granted   to  the 

ment  Royal.     Le  Gouvernement  Royal  Royal  Government.    The  Royal  Servian 

d(,^  Scrbie  n'ayant  pas  repondu  a  ce'tte  Government  not  having  answered  this 

note    d'une    maniere    satisfaisante,    le  note   in    a    satisfactory     manner,    the 

Gouvernement    Imperial    et    Royal    se  Imperial    and    Royal   Government  are 

trouve  dnns  la  necessite  de  pourvoir  lui-  themselves   compelled     to   see   to    the 

meme  a  la  sauvegarde  de  ses  droits  et  satee^uarding  of  their    rights  and  in- 

interets  et  do  recourir  a  cet  effet  a  la  terests,  and,  with  this  object,  to  have 

force  des  armes.  recourse  to  force  of  arms. 

L'Autriche  -  Hongrie,      qui      vient  Austria-Hungary,  who  has  just   ad- 


32 


d'adresser  a  la  Serbie  une  declara- 
tion formelle  conformement  a  Tarticle 
1'''"  de  la  convention  du  18  octobre, 
1907,  relative  a  I'oiiverture  des  hos- 
tilites,  se  considore  des  lors  en  etat  de 
guerre  avec  la  Serbie. 

En  portant  co  qui  precede  a  la  con- 
naissanco  do  I'Ambassade  Royale  de 
Grande-Bretagne  le  Minister©  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres  a  Thonneur  de 
declarer  que  I'Autriclie-Hongrie  se 
conformera  au  cours  des  liostiiites,  sous 
la  reserve  d'un  precede  analogue  de  la 
part  de  la  Serbie,  aux  stipulations  des 
conventions  de  La  Hayo  du  18  octobre, 
1907,  ainsi  qu'a  celles  de  la  Declaration 
de  Londres  du  26  fevrier,  1909. 

L'Ambassado  est  price  de  vouloir  bien 
comranniquer,  d'urgence,  la  presente 
notification  a  son  Gouvernement. 


dressed  to  Servia  a  formal  doclaraiiou^ 
in  conformity  with  article  1  of  the  con- 
yention  of  the  18th  October,  1907,  rela- 
tive to  the  opening  of  hostilities,  con- 
siders herself  henceforward  in  a  state 
of  war  with  Servia. 

In  bringing  the  above  to  notice  of 
His  Britannic  Majesty's  Embassy,  the 
Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  lias  the 
honour  to  declare  that  Austria- 
Hungary  will  act  during  the  hostilities 
in  conformity  with  the  terms  ot  tlio 
Conventions  of  The  Hague  of  the  18tli 
October,  1907,  as  also  with  those  of 
the  Declaration  of  London  of  the  28th 
February,  1909,  provided  an  analogous 
procedure  is  adopted  by  Servia. 

The  embassy  is  requested  to  be  so 
good  as  to  communicate  the  present 
notification  as  soon  as  po:?siblc  to  the' 
British  Government. 


No.  51. 

Sir  F.  BerVky  BHt/ish  Ambassador  at  PariSy  to  Sin"  Echoanl  Grey. — 
[Received  Juhj  28.) 
Sir,  Faris,  JuJ/y  27,  1914.. 

I  HAVE  tho  honour  to  transmit  to  you  herewith  copy  of  a  memorandum  from 
the  acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  as  to  the  steps  to  bo  takcii  to  prevent  an 
outbreak  of  hostilities  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia. 

I  have,  &c. 

FRANCIS   BERTIE. 

Enclosure  in  No.   51. 
I^ote  communicated  to  Sir  F.  Bertie  by  M.  Bienvenu-Martia, 

(Translation.) 


PAR  uno  note  en  date  du  25  de  ce 
mois,    son    Excellence    TAmbassadeur 


d'Angleterrc  a  fait  connaitre  au  Gou- 
vernement de  la  Republique  que, 
d'apres  Sir  Edward  Grey,  la  seule 
manicre  d'assurer,  si  c'etait  possible, 
1'3  maintien  de  la  paix  dans  lo  cas  ou 
les  rapports  cntro  la  Ru.ssie  et  I'Au- 
triche  deviendraient  plus  tendus  serait 
uno  demarche  commune  a  Vienne  et  a 
Saint-Petersbourg  des  reprcsentants 
de  rAngleterrc,  do  la  France,  do 
rAllemagne  et  de  I'ltalio  en  Autriche 
et  en  Russie;  et  il  a  cxprime  le  desir 
de  savoir  si  le  Gouvernement  do  la  Re- 
publique etait  dispose  a  accucillir 
favorablement  cette  suggestion. 

Le  Ministre  dos  Affaires  £lran. 
gercs  par  interim  a  I'hcnneur  de  faire 
connaitre  a  son  Excellence  Sir  Francisj 
Bertie  qu'il  a  invite  M.  Jules  Cambon* 
a  se  concerter  avfc  I'Ambassadeur 
d'Augleterro  en  Allemagne  et  a  ap- 
puyer  la  demarche  qu'ils  jugeront  op- 
portune de  faire  auprcs  du  Cabinet  de 
Berlin. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Repiiblique 

*  French  Ambassador,  in  Berlin. 


IN  a  note  of  the  2oth  of  this  month, 
his  Excellency  tho  British  Ambassador 
informed  the  Government  of  tho 
Republic  that,  in  Sir  E.  Grey's 
opinion,  the  only  pos.siblo  way  of 
assuring  the  maintenance  of  pcaco  in 
case  of  the  relations  between  Russia  j 
and  Austria  becoming  more  strained' 
would  be  if  the  representatives  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  Germany,  and 
Italy  in  Austria  and  Russia  were  to 
take  joint  action  at  Vienna  and  at] 
St.  Petersburg!! ;  and  he  expressed  the 
wish  to  know  if  the  Government  of 
the  Republic  were  disi)oscd  to  welcome 
such  a  suggestion. 


The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs] 
ad  inierim  has  the  honour  to  inform' 
his  Excellency  Sir  F.  Bertie  that  ho 
has  requested  M.  Jules  Cambon""  to 
concert  with  the  British  Ambassador 
in  Germany  and  to  support  any  repre- 
sentation which  they  may  consider  it 
advisable  to  make  to  tho  Berlin 
Cabinet. 

In  accordance  with  the  desire  ox- 


33 


a,  d' autre  part,  confornaement  au  desir 
exprime  par  le  Gouvcrnemeiit  britan- 
nique  et  que  son  Excellence  Sir  Francis 
Bertie  lui  a  transmis  par  une  note  en 
date  du  26  de  ce  mois,  autorise  M. 
Paul  Cambon*  a  prendre  part  a  la  re- 
union proposee  par  Sir  Edward  Grey 
pour  rechercher  avec  lui  et  les  Ambas- 
Badeurs  d'Allemagne  et  d'ltalie  a 
Londres,  les  moyens  de  resoudre  les 
difficultes  actuelles. 

Lc  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique 
est  pret  egalement  a  donncr  aux 
agents  f ran9ais  a  Petersbourg,  a  Vienne 
et  a  Belgrade  des  instructions  pour 
qu'ils  obticnnent  des  Gouvernements 
russe,  autrichien  et  serbe  do  s'abstenir 
de  toute  operation  militaire  active  en 
attendant  les  resultats  de  cette  confer- 
ence. II  estime  toutefois  que  les 
chances  de  succes  de  la  proposition  de 
Sir  Edward  Grey  reposent  essentielle- 
mont  sur  Taction  que  Berlin  serait  dis- 
posee  a  Vienne  [sic].  Une  demarche 
alipres  du  Gouvernement  austro-h6n- 
grois  pour  amener  la  suspension  des 
operations  militaires  parait  vouee  a 
I'echec  si  Tinflueuce  de  I'AUemagne  lie 
s'est  pas  exercee  au  prealable  sur  le 
Cabinet  de  Vienne. 

Le  Garde  des  Sceaux,  President  du 
Conseil  et  >Iinistre  des  Affaires  £tran- 
geres  par  interim,  saisit  cette  occasion 
de  irenouveler,  &c. 


Paris,  U  27  juilkt,  1914. 


pressed  by  the  British  Government 
and  conveyed  to  them  by  Sir  F.  Bertie 
in  his  note  of  the  26th  ot  this  month, 
the  Government  of-the  Republic  have 
also  authorised  M.  Taul  Cambon*  to 
take  part  in  the  conference  which  Sir 
E.  Grey  has  proposed  with  a  view  to 
discovering  in  consultation  with  him- 
self and  the  German  and  Italian 
Ambassadors  in  London  a  means  of 
settling  the  present  difficulties. 

The  Government  of  the  Republic 
is  likewise  ready  to  instruct  the  French 
representatives  at  St.  Petersburgh, 
Vienna,  and  Belgrade  to  induce  the 
Russian,  Austrian,  and  Servian  Gov- 
ernments to  abstain  from  all  active 
military  opei^ations  pending  the  results 
of  this  conference.  He  considers,  how- 
ever, that  the  chance  of  Sir  E.  Grey's 
proposal  being  successful  depends 
essentially  on  the  action  which  the 
Berlin  Government  would  be  willing 
to  take  at  Vienna.  Representations 
made  to  the  Austrian-Hungarian 
Government  for  the  purpose  of  bring- 
ing about  a  suspension  of  military- 
operations  would  seem  bound  to  fail 
unless  the  German  Government  do  not 
beforehand  exercise  their  inflaence  on 
the  Vienna  Cabinet. 

The  President  of  the  Council  ad, 
interim  takes  the  opportunity,  «&c. 


Paris,  July  27,  1914. 


French  Ambassador  in.  London. 


No.  52. 
I^ote  communicated  by  French  Embassy,  July  28,  1914. 

(Translation.) 


LE  Gouvernement  de  la  Republique 
accepte  la  proposition  de  Sir  Edward 
Grey  relative  a  une  intervention  do  la 
Grande-Bretagne,  de  la  France,  de 
TAlleraagne  et  de  I'ltalie  en  vue  d'eyi- 
ter  les  operations  militaires  actives  sur 
les  frontieres  autrichiennes,  russes  et 
serbes;  il  a  autorise  M.  P.  Cambon*  a 
prendre  part  aux  deliberations  de  la 
reunion  a  quatre,  qui  doit  se  tenir  a 
Londres. 

L'Ambassadeur  de  France  a  Berlin  a 
recu  pour  instructions,  apres  s'etre 
conccrte  avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Angle- 
tene  a  Berlin,  d'appuyer  la  demarche 
de  ce  dernier  dans  la  forme  et  la 
mesure  qui  seraient  Jugees  opportunes. 

M.  Vivianit  est  pret  a  envoyer  aux 
representants  fran9ais  a  Vienne,  Saint- 


THE  Government  of  the  Republic 
accept  Sir  Edward  Grey's  proposal  in 
regard  to  intervention  by  Great 
Britain,  France,  Germany,  and  Ital^ 
with  a  view  to  avoiding  active  mili- 
tary operations  on  the  frontiers  of 
Austria,  Russia,  and  Servia ;  and  they 
have  authorised  M.  P.  Cainbon*  to 
take  part  in  the  deliberations  of  the 
four  representatives  at  the  meeting 
which  is  to  be  held  in  London. 

The  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin 
has  received  instructions  to  consult 
first  the'  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin, 
and  then  to  support  the  action  taken 
by  the  latter  in  such  manner  and 
degree  as  may  be  considered  appro- 
priate. 

M.  Vivianit  is  ready  to  send  to  the 
representatives  of  France  in  Vienna, 


*  French  Ambassador  in  London. 

t  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


3i 


Petersbourg  et  Belgrade  des  instruc- 
tions dans  le  sens  suggere  par  le  Gou- 
vernoment  britanniqiie. 

Ambassade  de  France,  LondreSy 
le  27  niillct,  1914. 


St.  PetersUurgh,  and  Belgrade  instruc- 
tions in  the  sense  suggested  by  the 
British  Government. 

French  Embassy ,  July  27,  1914. 


No.  53. 


M,  Sazonoff  RuLssian  Mmister  for  Foi^eign  Affairs,  to  Count  Benckendmff, 


Russian  Ambassador  in  London. 
July  28.) 

Saint-Fetersbourgy 
le  14  (27)  juillet,  1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

L'AMBASSADEUR  d'Angleterre  est 
venu  s'informer  si  nous  jugeons  utile 
quo  I'Angleterre  prenne  I'initiative  de 
convoquer  a  Londres  une  conference 
des  representants  de  TAngleterre,  la 
France,  rAllemagne  et  I'ltalie,  pour 
etudier  une  issue  a  la  situation 
actuelle. 

J'ai  repondu  a  I'Ambassadeur  que 
j'ai  entame  des  pourparlers  avec  TAm- 
bassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie,  en  con- 
ditions que  i'espere  favorables.  Pour- 
tant  je  n'ai  pas  encore  re9u  de  reponse 
h,  la  proposition  que  j'ai  faite  d'une  re- 
vision de  la  note  entre  les  deux 
Cabinets. 

Si  des  explications  directes  avec  le 
Cabinet  de  Vienne  se  trouvaient  ir- 
realisables,  je  suis  pret  a  accepter  la 
proposition  anglaise,  ou  toute  autre  de 
nature  a  resoudre  favorablement  le 
conflit. 

Je  voudrais  pourtant  ecarter  des 
aujourd'hui  un  malentendu  qui  pour- 
rait  surgir  de  la  reponse  donnee  par  le 
Ministre  de  la  Justice  fran9ais  ^  I'Am- 
bassadeur  d'Allemagne,  concernant  des 
conseils  de  moderation  a  donner  au 
Cabinet  Imperial. 


-( Communicated  hy  Count  Benchend&tff^ 

(Translation.) 

>Sf.  Fetershurgh, 
(Telegraphic.)  July  27,  1914. 

THE  British  Ambassador  came  to 
ascertain  whether  we  think  it  desirab'o 
that  Great  Britain  should  take  tlio 
initiative  in  convoking  a  conference  in 
London  of  the  representatives,  of 
JEngland,  France,  Germany,  and- Italy 
to  examine  the  possibility  of  a  way  out 
of  the  present  situation. 

I  replied  to  the  Ambassador  that  I 
have  begun  conversations  with  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  under 
conditions  which,  I  hope,  may  be 
favourable.  I  have  not,  however,  re- 
ceived as  yet  any  reply  to  the  proposal 
made  by  me  for  revising  the  note  be- 
tween the  two  Cabinets. 

If  direct  explanations  with  the 
Vienna  Cabinet  were  to  prove  impos- 
sible, I  am  ready  to  accept  the  British 
proposal,  or  any  other  proposal  of  a 
kind  that  would  bring  about  a 
favourable  solution  of  the  conflict. 

I  wish,  however,  to  put  an  end  from 
this  day  forth  to  a  misunderstanding 
which  might  arise  from  the  answer' 
given  by  the  French  Minister  of 
Justice  to  the  German  Ambassador, 
regarding  counsels  of  moderation  to  bo! 
given  to  the  Imperial  Cabinet. 


No.  54. 


M,  Sazonof  Russicm  Minister  for   Foreign  Affairs,  to   Coimt  Benckendorff, 
Russian  Ambassador  in  London.— {Communicated  hy  Coimt  Benckendorff\ , 
July  28,  1914.) 


Baini'Feiersbourg, 
le  15  (28)  Quillet,  1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

MES  entretiens  avec  I'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne  confirmeiit  mon  impres- 
sion que  I'Allemagne  est  plutot  favor- 
able a  I'intransigeance  de  I'Autriche. 

Le  Cabinet  de  Berlin,  qui  aurait  pu 
arreter  tout  le  developpement  de  la 
crise,  parait  n'exercer  aucune  action 
sur  soil  alliee. 

L'Ambassadeur  trouve  insufiisante  la 
reponse  de  la  Serl)ic. 


(Translation.) 

<S'L  Fcfersburgli , 
(Telegraphic.)       July  15  (28),  1914. 

MY  interviews  with  the  German 
Ambassador  confirm  my  impression" 
that  Germany  is,  if  anything;  in' 
favour  of  the  unconjpromising  attitude 
adopted  by  Austria. 

The  Berlin  Cabinet,  who  could  have 
prevented  the  whole  of  this  crisis | 
d.eveloplng,  appear  to  bo  exerting  nok 
influence  on  their  ally.      _. 

Thg  Ambassador  considers  that  the 
Servian  reply  is  insufficient.. 


35 

Cette   attitude   allemande   est   tout  This  attitude  of  the  German  Govern- 

particulierement  alarmante.  ^  merit  is  most  alarming. 

II  me  semble  que  mieux  que  toute  It  seems  to  me  that  England  is  in 

(autre  Puissance  I'Angleterre  serait  en  a  better  position  than  any  other  Power 

mesure    de    tenter    encore    d'agir    a  to  make  another  attempt  at  Berlin  to 

Berlin  pour  engager  le  Gouvernement  induce   the    German    Government  to 

allemand  a  I'action  necessaire.     C'est  take  the  necessary  action.    There  is  no 

a  Berlin  qu'indubitablement  se  trouve  doubt  that  the  key  of  the  situation  is 

la  clef  de  la  situation.  to  be  found  at  Berlin. 

No.  55. 

tSir   G.   Bibchana7iy   British   Ambassador  at  St,  Peter sburgh^  to  Sir  Edward 

Grey. — {Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Fetershurghy  July  27,  1914. 

WITH  reference  to  my  telegram  of  yesterday,*  I  saw  the  Minister  for; 
Foreign  Affairs  this  afternoon  and  found  him  very  conciliatory  and  morej 
optimistic.  , 

He  would,  he  said,  use  all  his  influence  at  Belgrade  to  induce  the  Servian 
Government  to  go  as  far  as  possible  in  giving  satisfaction  to  Austria,  but  her 
territorial  integrity  must  be  guaranteed  and  her  rights  as  a  sovereign  State 
respected,  so  that  she  should  not  become  Austria's  vassal.  He  did  not  know 
whether  Austria  would  accept  friendly  exchange  of  views  which  he  had  pro- 
posed, but,  if  she  did,  he  wished  to  keep  in  close  contact  with  the  other  Powers 
throughout  the  conversations  that  would  ensue. 

He  again  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  obligations  undertaken  by  Servia 
in  1908,  alluded  to  in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  were  given  to  the  Powers. 

I  asked. if  he  had  heard  of  your  proposal  with  regard  to  conference  of  the 
four  Powers,  and  on  his  replying  in  the  affirmative,  I  told  him  confidentially 
of  your  instructions  to  me,  and  enquired  whether  instead  of  such  a  conference 
he  would  prefer  a  direct  exchange  of  views,  which  he  had  proposed.  The 
German  Ambassador,  to  whom  I  had  Just  spoken,  had  expressed  his  personal 
opinion  that  a  direct  exchange  of  views  would  be  more  agreeable  to  Austria- 
Hungary. 

His  Excellency  said  he  was  perfectly  ready  to  stand  aside  if  the  Powers 
accepted  the  proposal  for  a  conference,  but  he  trusted  that  you  would  keep 
in  touch  with  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  the  event  of  its  taking  place. 

*  See  No.  44. 

No.  56. 
Sir  31.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 

[Received  July  28.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna^  July  27,  1914. 

THE  Russian  Ambassador  had  to-day  a  long  and  earnest  conversation  with 
Baron  Macchio,  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs.  He  told 
him  that,  having  just  come  back  from  St.  Petersburgh,  he  was  well  acquainted 
with  the  views  of  the  Russian  Government  and  the  state  of  Russian  jjublic 
opinion.  He  could  assure  him  that  if  actual  war  broke  out  with  Servia  it 
would  be  impossible  to  localise  it,  for  Russia  was  not  prepared  to  give  way 
again,  as  she  had  done  on  previous  occasions,  and  especially  during  the 
annexation  crisis  of  1909.  He  earnestly  hoped  that  something  would  be  done 
before  Servia  was  actually  invaded.  Baron  Macchio  replied  that  this  would 
now  be  difficult,  as  a  skirmish  had  already  taken  place  on  the  Danube,  in 
which  the  Servians  had  been  the  aggressors.  The  Russian  Ambassador  said 
that  he  would  do  all  he  could  to  keep  the  Servians  quiet  pending  any  discus- 
sions that  might  yet  take  place,  and  he  told  me  that  he  would  advise  his 
Government  to  induce  the  Servian  Government  to  avoid  any  conflict  as  long 
as  possible,  and  to  fall  back  before  an  Austrian  advance.  Time  so  gained 
should  suffice  to  enable  a  settlement  to  be  reached.  Ho  had  just  heard  of  a 
satisfactory  conversation  which  the. Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had 
yesterday  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh.  The  former  had 
agreed  that  much  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note  to  Servia  had  been  perfectly 
reasonable,  and  in  fact  tlioy  had  practically  reached  an  understanding  as  icy 


36 

the  guarantees  which  Servia  might  reasonably  be  asked  to  give  to  Austria- 
Hungary  for  her  future  good  behaviour.  The  Kugsian  Ambassador  urged  that 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  should  be  furnished  with  full 
powers  to  continue  discussion  with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  was  very  willing  to  advise  Servia  to  yield  all  that  could  be  fairly 
asked  of  her  as  an  independent  Power.  Baron  Macchio  promised  to  submit 
this  suggestion  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

No.  57. 

Sir  7?.  JRoddj  British  Ambassador  at  Home,  to  Sir  Edioard  Grey. — 

{Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Eomc,  J-u^i/ 27,  1914. 

MINISTER  for  Foreign  Affairs  greatly  doubts  whether  Germany  will  be 
.willing  to  invite  Austria  to  suspend  military  action  pending  the  conference, 
but  he  had  hopes  that  military  action  may  be  practically  deferred  by  the  fact 
of  the  conference  meeting  at  once.  As  at  present  informed,  he  sees  no  possi- 
bility of  Austria  receding  from  any  point  laid  down  in  her  note  to  Servia, 
but, he  believes  that  if  Servia  will  even  now  accept  it  Austria  will  be  satisfied, 
and  if  she  had  reason  to  think  that  such  will  be  the  advice  of  the  Powers, 
Austria  may  defer  action.  Servia  may  be  induced  to  accept  note  in  its  entirety 
on  the  advice  of  the  four  Powers  invited  to  the  conference,  and  this  would 
enable  her  to  say  that  she  had  yielded  to  Europe  and  not- to  Austria-Hungary 
alone. 

Telegrams  from  Vienna  to  the  press  here  stating  that  Austria  is  favourably 
impressed  with  the  declarations  of  the  Italian  Government  have,  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  assures  me,  no  foundation.  He  said  he  has  expressed  no 
opinion  to  Austria  with  regard  to  the  note.  He  assured  me  both  -before  and 
after  communication  of  the  note,  and  again  to-day,  that  Austrian  Government 
have  given  him  assurances  that  they  demand  no  territorial  sacrifices  from 
Servia. 

No.  58. 

Sir  F'.  Bertie f  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  E&ward  Grey,—- 
{Received  July  28.) 
(Tolegraphic.)  Taris,  July  28,  1914. 

1  CX)MMUNIOATED  to  the  Acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this  after- 
noon the  substance  of  your  conversation  with  the  German  Ambassador,  recor^ied 
in  your  telegram*  to  Berlin  of  the  27th  July. 

His  Excellency  is  grateful  for  the  communication.  He  said  that  it  confirms 
yhat  he  had  heard  of  your  attitude,  and  he  feels  confident  that  your  observa- 
tions to  the  German  Ambassador  aviII  have  a  good  effect  in  the  interest  of 
peace. 

*  So.0  No.  46. 

No.  59. 

Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edicard  Grey. — 
{Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  -paris,  July  28,  1914. 

I  INFORMED  the  Acting  Mini.ster  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  of  your 
conversation  with  the  Russian  Ambassador,  as  recorded  in  your  telegram  of 
yesterday*  to  St.  Petersburgh. 

H6  is  grateful  for  the  communication,  and  quite  appreciates  the  impossi- 
bility for  His  Majesty's  Government  to  declare  themselves  "  solidaires  "  with 
Russia  on  a  question  between  Austria  and  Servia,  which  in  its  present  condi- 
tion is  not  one  affecting  England.  He  also  sees  that  you  cannot  take  up  an 
attitude  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  more  Servian  than  that  attributed  in  German 
and  Austrian  sources  to  the  Russian  Government. 

German  Ambassador  has  stated  that  Austria  would  respect  the  integrity 
of  Servia,  but  when  asked  wlicther  her  independence  also  would  be  respected, 
he  gave  no  assurance. 

*  Sec  No.  47. 


87 

No,  60. 

Sir  E.  Goschen^  JBritdsh  Ambassador  at  JBerUn,  to  Sir  Edioard  Grey, — 

{Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  28,  1914. 

SECRETARY  of  State  spoke  yesterday  in  the  same  sense  as  that  reported 
in  my  telegram  of  yesterday^  to  my  French  and  Italian  colleagues  respecting 
your  proposal.  I  discussed  with  my  two  colleagues  this  morning  his  reply, 
and  we  found  that,  while  refusing  the  proposed  conference,  he  had  said  to  all 
of  us  that  nevertheless  he  desired  to  work  with  us  for-  the  maintenance  of 
general  peace.  We  therefore  deduced  that  if  he  is  sincere  in  this  wish  he 
can  only  be  objecting  to  the  form  of  your  proposal.  Perhaps  he  himself  could 
be  induced  to  suggest  lines  on  which  he  would  find  it  possible  to  work  with  us. 

*  See  No.  43, 


No.  61. 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 

(Received  July  28.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Viefina,  July  28,  1914. 

I  SAW  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this  morning. 

His  Excellency  declared  that  Austria-Hungary  cannot  delay  warlike  pro- 
ceedings against  Servia,  and  would  have  to  decline  any  suggestion  of  negotia- 
tions on  basis  of  Servian  reply. 

Prestige  of  Dual  Monarchy  was  engaged,  and  nothing  could  now  prevent 
conflict. 


No.  62. 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen^  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 

(Received  July  28.) 

(Telegraphic)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

I  SPOKE  to  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day  in  the  sense  of  your  tele- 
gram of  27th  July*  to  Berlin.  I  avoided  the  word  "mediation,"  but  said 
that,  as  mentioned  in  your  Bpeech,t  which  he  had  just  read  to  me,  you  had 
hopes  that  conversations  in  London  between  the  four  Powers  less  interested 
might  yet  lead  to  an  arrangement  which  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would 
accept  as  satisfactory  and  as  rendering  actual  hostilities  unnecessary.  I  added 
that  you  had  regarded  Servian  reply  as  having  gone  far  to  meet  just  demands 
of  Austria-Hungary ;  that  you  thought  it  constituted  a  fair  basis  of  discussion 
during  which  warlike  operations  might  remain  in  abeyance,  and  that  Austrian 
Ambassador  in  Berlin  was  speaking  in  this  sense.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
said  quietly,  but  firmly,  that  no  discussion  could  be  accepted  on  basis  of 
Servian  note ;  that  war  would  be  declared  to-day,  and  that  well-known  pacific 
character  of  Emperor,  as  well  as,  he  might  add,  his  own,  might  be  accepted 
as  a  guarantee  that  war  was  both  just  and  inevitable.  This  was  a  matter 
that  must  be  settled  directly  between  the  two  parties  immediately  concerned. 
I  said  that  you  would  hear  with  regret  that  hostilities  could  not  now  be 
arrested,  as  you  feared  that  they  might  lead  to  complications  threatening  the 
peace  of  Europe. 

In  taking  leave  of  his  Excellencyy  I  begged  him  to  believe  that,  if  in  the 
course  of  present  grave  crisis  our  point  of  view  should  sometimes  differ  from 
his,  this  would  arise,  not  from  want  of  sympathy  with  the  many  just  complaints 
which  .Austria-Hungary  had  against  Servia,  but  ifrom  the  fact  that,  whereas 
Austria-Hungary  pu£  first  her  quarrel  with  Servia,  you  were  anxious  in  the  first 
instance  for  peace  of  Europe.  I  trusted  this  larger  aspect  of  the  question 
would  appeal  with  equal  force  to  his  Excellency.  He  said  he  had  it  also  in 
mind,  but  thought  that  Russia  ought  not  to  oppose  operations  like  those 
impending,  which  did  not  aim  at  territorial  aggrandisement  and  which  could  no 
longer  be  postponed. 

*  See  No.  46. 

t  "Hansard,"  Vol.  65,  No.  107,  Columns  931,  932,  933. 


38 

No.  63. 
Sir  i?.  JRoddy  British  Ambassador  at  JRome,  to  Sw  Edward  Ch^ey,*^ 
{Eeceiv.d  July  28.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Borne,  Juhj  28,  1914. 

YOUR  telegram  of  25th  July  to  Paris.* 

I  have  communicated  substance  to  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who. 
immediately  telegraphed  in  precisely  similar  terms  to  Berlin  and  Vienna, 

*  See  No.  27. 

No.  64. 

Svr  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sin'  Ednjoa/rd  Orey,^^ 
(Recei/ved  July  28.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Borne,  JuVj  28,  1914. 

AT  the  request  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  I  submit  the  following 
to  you  :  — 

In  a  long  conversation  this  morning  Servian  Charge  d' Affaires  had  said  he 
thought  that  if  some  explanations  were  given  regarding  mode  in  which  Austrian 
agents  would  require  to  intervene  under  article  5  and  article  6,  Servia  might 
still  accept  the  whole  Austrian  note. 

As  it  was  not  to  be  anticipated  that  Austria  would  give  such  explanations  to 
Servia,  they  might  be  given  to  Powers  engaged  in  discussions,  who  might  then 
advise  Servia  to  accept  without  conditions. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Government  had  in  the  meantime  published  a  long 
official  explanation  of  grounds  on  which  Servian  reply  was  considered  inade-' 
quate.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  considered  many  points  besides  explanation 
— ^such  as  slight  verbal  difference  in  sentence  regarding  renunciation  of  propa- 
ganda— quite  childish,  but  there  was  a  passage  which  might  prove  useful  in 
facilitating  such  a  course  as  was  considered  practicable  by  the  Servian  Charge 
d'Affaires.  It  was  stated  that  co-operation  of  Austrian  agents  in  Servia  was 
to  be  only  in  investigation,  not  in  judicial  or  administrative  measures.  Servia 
was  said  to  have  wilfully  misinterpreted  this.  He  thought,  therefore,  that 
ground  might  be  cleared  here. 

I  only  reproduce  from  memory,  as  I  had  not  yet  received  text  of  Austrian 
declaration. 

Minister  impressed  upon  me,  above  all,  his  anxiety  for  the  immediate 
beginning  of  discussion.  A  wide  general  latitude  to  accept  at  once  every  point 
or  suggestion  on  which  he  could  be  in  agreement  with  ourselves  and  Germany 
had  been  given  to  Italian  Ambassador. 

No.  65. 
Mr,  GrackantJhorpe,  Bntish  Cha/rge  d'Affaires  at  Bdyrade,  to 
Si/r  Edwa/rd  Grey. — {Recei/ved  Jid/y  28.) 
(Telegraphic.)  iV^js/i,  Juhj  28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  urged  on  the  Servian  Government  the  greatest  moderation  pending 
efforts  being  made  towards  a  peaceful  solution. 

Two  Servian  steamers  fired  on  and  damaged,  and  two  Servian  merchant- 
vessels  have  been  captured  by  a  Hungarian  monitor  at  Orsova. 

No.  66. 

Mr.  CracTcanthorpe,  British  Cha/rge  d^Affai/res  at  Belgrade,  to 
Si/r  Edward  Grey. — [Received  July  28.) 
(Telegraphic.)  '      Nish,  Juhj  28,  1914. 

TELEGRAM  received  here  that  war  declared  by  Austria. 

No.  67. 

Sir  Ed/wa/rd  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen^  Brit/ish  Ambassadoo'  at  BerUn. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  28,  1914. 

EXPLANATION  given  in  your  telegram  of  the  27th  July*  of  what  was  my 
idea  in  proposing  a  conference  is  quite  right.     It  would  not  be  an  arbitration, 

*  See-  No.   43. 


S9 

but  a  private  and  informal  discussion  to  ascertain  what  suggestion  could  bo 
made  tor  a  settlement.  No  suggestion  would  be  put  forward  that  had  not 
previously  been  ascertained  to  be  acceptable  to  Austria  and  Russia,  with  whom 
the  mediating  Powers  could  easily  *  keep  in  touch  through  their  respective 
allies. 

But  as  long  as  there  is  a  prospect  of  a  direct  exchange  of  views  between 
Austria  and  itussia,  I  would  suspend  every  other  suggestion,  as  I  entirely  agree 
that  it  is  the  most  preferable  method  of  all., 

I  understand  that  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  proposed 
a  friendly  exchange  of  views  to 'the  Austrian  GoVernmeilt,  and,  if  the  latter 
accepts,  it  will  no  doubt  relieve  the  tension  and  make  the  situation  less  critical. 

It  is  very  satisfactory  to  hear  from  the  German  Ambassador  here  that  the 
German  Government  have  taken  action  at  Vienna  in  the  sense  of  the  conversa- 
|tion  recorded  in  my  telegram  of  yesterday  to  you.* 

*  See  No.  46. 

No.  68. 

Sij"  Edward  Grey  t&  Sir  E.  GoscheUy  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  28,  1914. 

GERMAN  Government,  having  accepted  principle:  of  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Russia  by  the  four  Powers,  if  necessary,  I  am  ready  to  propose 
that  the  German  Secretary  of  State  should  suggest  the  lines  on  which  this 
principle  should  be  applied.  I  v/ill,  however,  keep  the  idea  in  reserve  until  we 
see  how  the  conversations  between  Austria  and  Russia  progress. 

No.  69. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh! 
(Telegraphic.)  .  Foreign  Office,  July  28,  1914. 

IT  is  most  satisfactory  that  there  is  a  prospect  of  direct  exchange  of  views 
between  the  Russian  and  Austrian  Governments,  as  reported  in  your  teleeram 
of  the  27th  July.^  ^  ^ 

I  am  ready  to  put  forward  any  practical  proposal  that  would  facilitate  this, 
but  I.  am  not  quite  clear  as  to  what  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
proposes  the  Ministers  at  Belgrade  should  do.'  Could  he  not  first  mention  in 
an  exchange  of  views  with  Austria  his  willingness  to  co-operate  in  some  such 
scheme?    It  might  then  take  more  concrete  sh^pe. 

*  See  No.  55. 

No.  70. 

Telegrams  communicated  by  Count  Benc^cendorff,  liussian  Amhassaior  in 
Londoii,  Jioly  29,  1914:. 


(1.)  Telegram  from  M.  Sazonof  to  Russian  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  dated 

July  28,  1914. 

IN  consequence  of  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria  against  Servia,  the 
Imperial  Government  will  announce  to-morrow  (29th)  the  mobilisation-  in-  the 
military  circonscriptions  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow,  and  Kazan.  Please  inform 
German  Government,  confirming  the  absence  in  Russia  of  any  aggressive  inten- 
tion against  Germany. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  has  not  been  recalled  from  his  post. 

(2)  Telegram  to  Count  BencTcendorff.'-' 

The  Austrian  declaration  of  war  clearly  puts  an  end  to  the  idea  of  direct 
communications  between  Austria  and  Russia.  Action  by  London  Cabinet  in 
order  to  set  on  foot  mediation  with  a  view  to  suspension  of  military  operations 
of  Austria  against  Servia  is  now  most  urgent. 

Unless  military  operations  are  stopped,  mediation  would  only  allow  matters 
to  drag  on  and  give  Austria  time  to  crush  Servia. 

*  Rcissian  Ambassador  in   London. 


40 

No.  71. 
Sir  E,  Goschenj  BritisJi  Ambassador  at  Berlin^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey*-^ 

(Received  July  29.)  ' 
(Telegraphic.)  Berhn,  July  28,  1914. 

AT  invitation  of  Imperial  Chancellor,  I  called  upon  his  Excellency  this 
evening.  He  said  that  he  wished  me  to  tell  you  that  he  was  most  anxious  that 
Germany  should  work  together  with  England  for  maintenance  of  general  peace, 
as  they  had  done  successfully  in  the  last  European  crisis,..  He  had  not  been 
nble  to  accept  your  proposal  for  a  conference  of  representatives  of  the  Great 
Powers,  because  he  did  not  think  that  it  would  be  effective,  and  because  such 
Si  conference  would  in  his  opinion  have  had  appearance  of  an  "  Areopagus  " 
consisting  of  two  Powers  of  each  group  sitting  in  judgment  upon  the  two 
remaining  Powers;  but  his  inability  to  accept  the  proposed  conference  must  not 
be  regarded  as  militating  against  his  strong  desire  for  effective  co-operation. 
You  could  be  assured  that  he  was  doing  his  very  best  both  at  Vienna  and 
'St.  Petersburgh  to  get  the  two  Governments  to  discuss  the  situation  diTectly 
with  each  other  and  in  a  friendly  way.  He  had  great  hopes  that  such  discussions 
would  take  place  and  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result,  but  if  the  news  were  true 
which  he  had  just  read  in  the  papers,  that  Russia  had  mobilised  fourteen  army 
corps  in  the  south,  he  thought  situation  was  very  serious,  and  he  himself  would 
be  in  a  very  difficult  pQsition,  as  in  these  circumstances  it  would  be  out  of  his 
power  to  continue  to  preach  moderation  at  Vienna.  He  added  that  Austria, 
who  as  yet  was  only  partially  mobilising,  would  have  to  take  similar  measures, 
and  if  war  were  to  result,  Russia  would*  be  entirely  responsible.  I  ventured 
to  say  that  if  Austria  refused  to  take  any  notice  of  Servian  note,  which,  to  my 
mind,  gave  way  in  nearly  every  point  demanded  by  Austria,  and  which  in  any 
casc-bfrered  a  basis  for  discussion,  surely  a  certain  portion  of  responsibility 
wouldtcst  with  her.  His  Excellency  said  that  he  did  not  wish  to  discuss  Servian 
note/iKut  that  Austria's  standpoint,  and  in  this  he  agreed,  was  that  her  quarrel 
with  Servia  was  a  purely  Austrian  concern  with  which  Russia  had  nothing  to 
do.  He  reiterated  his  desire  to  co-operate  with  England  and  his  intention  to 
do  his  utmost  to  maintain  general  peace.  "A  war  between  the  Great  Powers 
must  be  avoided  "  were  his  last  words. 

Austrian  colleague  said  to  me  to-day  that  a  general  war  was  most  unlikely, 
as  Russia  neither  wanted  nor  was  in  a  position  to  make  war.  I  think  that  that 
opinion  is  shared  by/many  people  here. 

No.  72. 

Sir  G»  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. -^{Received  July  2^.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  rctersburgh,  July  28,  1914. 

MlNlSl'ER  for  Foreign  Affairs  begged  me  to  thank  y^n  for  the  language 
you  had  held  to  .the  German  Ambassador,  as  reported  in  your  telegram*  to 
Berlin,  substance  of  which  I  communicated  to  his  Excellency,  He  took  a 
pessimistic  view  of  the  situation,  having  received  the  same  disquieting  news 
from  Vienna  as  had  reached  His  Majesty's  Government,  I  said  it  was  important 
that  we  should  know  the  real  intentions  of  the  Imperial  Government,  and  asked 
him  whether  he  would  be  satished  with  the  assurances  which  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  had,  I  understood,  been  instructed  to  give  in  respect  of  Servia'e 
integrity  and  independence.  I  added  that  I  was  sure  any  arrangement  for  avert- 
ing a  European  war  would  be  welcomed  "by  His  Majesty's  Government,  In  reply 
iiis  Excellency  stated  that  if  Servia  were  attacked  Russia  would  not  be  satisfied 
with  any  engagement  which  Austria  might  take  on  these  two  points,  and  that 
order  for  mobilisation  against  Austria  would  be  issued  on  the  day  that  Austria 
crossed  Servian  frontier 

I  told  the  German  Ambassador,  who  appealed  to  me  to  give  moderating 
.counsels  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  that  from  the  beginning  I  had 
■not  ceased  to  do  so,  and  that  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  should  now 
in  his  turn  use  his  restraining  influence.  I  made  it  clear  to  his  Excellency 
that,  Russia  being  thoroughly  in  earnest,  a  general  war  could  not  be  averted  if 
Servia  were  attacked  by  Austria. 

*  Se«  No.  46. 


41 

As  regards  the  suggestion  of  conference,  the  Ambassadoi-  had  received  no 
instructions,  and  before  acting  with  me  the  French  and  Italian  Aniba^^^adors 
are  still  waiting  for  their  final  instructions. 


No.  73. 
Sir  M.  djC  Bunsp.n^  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey.  — 

{Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  note  verbale  from  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs,  stating 
that,  the  Servian  Government  not  having  replied  to  note  of  23rd  July*  in  a 
satisfactory  manner,  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  is  compelled  itself  to 
provide  for  protection  of  its  rights,  and  to  have  recourse  for  that  object  to 
force  of  arms.  Austria-Hungary  has  addressed  to  Servia  formal  declaration 
according  to  article  1  of  convention  of  18th  October,  1907,  relative  to  opening 
of  hostilities,  and  considers  herself  from  to-day  in  state  of  war  with  Servia. 
Austria-Hungary  will  conform,  provided  Servia  does  so,  to  stipulations  of 
Hague  conventions  of  18th  October,  1907,  and  to  Declaration  of  London  of  2Gth 
February,  1909 

*  Sc€  No.  4. 


No.  74. 

Sr  M.    de  Bimserit  British  Ambassador-  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 

(R^c&tved  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  28,  lyl4. 

I  AM  informed  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  the  Russian  Government's 
suggestion  has  been  declined  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  The 
suggestion  was  to  the  effect  that  the  means  of  settling  the  Austro-Servian 
conflict  should  be  discussed  directly  between  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  and  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  who  should  be 
authorised  accordingly. 

The  .Russiaii'  Anioassador  thinks  that  a  conference  in  London  of  the  less 
interested  Powers,  such  as  you  have  proposed,  offers  now  the  only  prospect  of 
preserving  peace  of  Europe,  and  he  is  sure  that  the  Russian  Government  will 
acquiesce  willingly  in  your  proposal.  So  long  as  opposing  armies  have  not 
actually 'come  in  contact,  all  hope  need  not  be  abandoned. 


No.  75. 

^Sir  E.  Goschjen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. -^ 

{Iteceived  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  29,  1914. 

I  WAS  sent  for  again  to-day  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  told  me  that 
he  regretted  to  state  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  to  whom  he  had 
at  once  communicated  your  opinion,  had  answered  that  events  had  marched  too 
rapidly  and  that  it  was  therefore  too  late  to  act  upon  your  suggestion  that  the 
Servian  reply  miglit  form  the  basis  of  discussion.  His  Excellency  had,  on 
receiving  their  reply,  despatched  a  message  to  Vienna,  in  whicli  he  explained 
that,  although  a  certain  desire  had,  in  his  opinion,  been  shown  in  the  Servian 
reply  to  meet  the  demands  of  Austria,  he  understood  entirely  that,  without 
some  sure  guarantees  that  Servia  would  carry  out  in  tlieir  entirety  the  demands 
made  upon  her,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  could  not  rest  satisfied  in 
view  of  their  past  experience.  He  had  then  gone  on  to  say  that  the  hostilities 
which  were  about  to  be  undertaken  against  Servia  had  presumably  the  exclusive 
object  of  securing  such  guarantees,  seeing  that  the  Austrian  Government 
already  assured  the  Russian  Government  that  they  had  no  territorial  designs. 

He  advised  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  should  this  view  be  correct, 
to  speak  openly  in  this  sense.  The  holding  of  such  language  would,  he  hoped, 
eliminate  all  possible   misunderstandings. 

As  yet,  he  told  me,  he  had  not  received  a  reply  from  Vienna. 

From  the  fact  that  he  had  gone  so  far  in  the  matter  of  giving  advice  at 

o2 


42 

Vienna,  his  Excellency  hoped  that  you  would  realise,  that  he  -was  sincerely 
doing  all  in  his  power  to  prevent  danger  of.  European  complications., 

The  fact  of  his  communicating  this  information  to  you  was  a  proof  of  the 
confidence  which  he  felt  in  you  and  evidence  of  his  anxiety  that  you  should 
know  he  was  doing  his  best  to  support  your  efforts  in  the  cause  of  general 
peace,  efforts  which  he  sincerely  appreciated. 

No.  76. 

Sir  E.  GoscheTij  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 

(Received  Julu  29.) 

(Telegi^aphic.)  JBcWm,  Juhj  29,  1914. 

I  FOUND  Secretary  of  State  very  depressed  to-day.  He  reminded  me  that 
he  had  told  me  the  other  day  that  he  had  to  be  very  careful  in  giving  advice  to 
Austria,  as  any  idea  that  they  were  being  pressed  would  be'  likely  to  cause 
them  to  precipitate  matters  and  present  a  fait  accompli.  This  had,  in  fact,  now 
happened,  and  he  was  not  sure  that  his  commufiication  of  your  suggestion  that 
Servia's  reply  offered  a  basis  for  discussion  had  not  hastened  declaration  of 
war.  Ho  was  much  troubled  by  reports  of  mobilisation  in  Russia,  and  of  certain 
military  measures,  which  he  did  not  specify,  being  taken  in  France.  He  subse- 
quently spoke  of  these  measures  to  my  French  colleague,  who  informed  him 
that  French  Government  had  done  nothing  more  than  the  German  Government 
had  done,  namely,  recalled  ofl&cers  on  leave.  His  Excellency  denied  German 
Government  had  done  this,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  true.  My  French 
colleague  said  to  Under-Secretary  of  State,  in  course  of  conversation^  that  it 
seemed  to  him  that  when  Austria  had  entered  Servia,  and  so  satisfied  her 
military  prestige,  the  moment  might  then  be  favourable  for  four  disinterested 
Powers  to  discuss  situation  and  come  forward  with  suggestions  for  preventing 
graver  complications.  Under-Secretary  of  State  seemed  to  think  idea  worthy 
of  consideration,  as  he  rephed  that  would  be  a  different  matter  from  conference 
proposed  by  you. 

Russian  Ambassador  returned  to-day,  and  has  informed  Imperial  Govern- 
ment that  Russia  is  mobilising  in  four  southern  governments. 


No.  77. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

I  MUCH  appreciate  the  language  of  Chancellor,  as  reported  in  your  telegram 
of  to-day.*  His  Excellency  may  rely  upon  it  that  this  country  will  continue,  as 
heretofore,  to  strain  every  effort  to  secure  peace  and  to  avert  the  calamity  we 
all  fear.  If  he  can  induce  Austria  to  satisfy  Russia  and  to  abstain  from  going 
so  far  as  to  come  into  collision  with  her,  we  shall  all  join  in  deep  gratitude  to 
his  Excellency  for  having  saved  the  peace  of  Europe. 

•  Se«  No.  75. 

No.  78. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersbunjh,  to  Sir  Ed0ard 
Grey. —  (Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Feterslurgh,  July  29,  1914. 

PARTIAL  mobilisation  was  ordered  to-day. 

I  communicated  the  substance  of  your  telegram  of  the  28th  instant*  to 
Bcrhn  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  accordance  with  your  instructions, 
and  informed  him  confidentially  of  remarks  as  to  mobilisation  which  the  German 
Secretary  of  State  had  made  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin.  This  had 
already  reached  his  Excellency  from  another  source.  The  mobilisation,  he 
explained,  would  only  be  directed  against  Austria. 

Austrian  Government  had  now  definitely  declined  direct  conversation 
between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.  The  ^Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said 
he  bad  proposed  such  an  exchange  of  views  on  advice  of  German  Ambassador. 
He  proposed,  when  informing  German  Ambassador  of  this  rofusal  of  Austria's, 

*  S€c  No.  67. 


43 

to  urge  that  a  return  should  be  made  to  your  propofial  for  a  confcrenco  of 
four  Ambassadors,  or,  at  all  events,  for  an  exchange  of  views  between  the 
three  Ambassadors  less  directly  interested,  yourself,  and  also  the  -Austrian 
Ambassador  if  you  thought  it  advisable.  Any  arrangement  approved  by  France 
and  England  would  be  acceptable  to  him,  and  he  did  not  care  what  form  such 
conversations  took.  No  time  was  to  be  lost,  and  the  only  way  to  avert  war 
was  for  you  to  succeed  in  arriving,  by  means  of  conversations  with  Ambassadors 
either  collectively  or  individually,  at  some  formula  v/hich  Austria  could  be 
induced  to  accept.  Throughout  Russian  Government  had  been  perfectly  frank 
and  conciliatory,  and  had  done  all  in  their  power  to  maintain  peace.  If  their 
efforts  to  maintain  peace  failed,  he  trusted  that  it  would  be  realised  by  the 
British  public  that  it  was  not  the  fault  of  the  Russian  Government. 

I  asked  him  whether  he  would  raise  objections  if  the  suggestion  made  in 
Rome  telegram  of  the  27th  July,*  which  I  mentioned  to  him,  were  carried  out. 
In^  reply  his  Excellency  said  that  he  would  agree  to  anything  arranged  by  the 
four  Powers  provided  it  was  acceptable  to  Servia  ;  he  could  not,  he  said,  be 
more  Servian  than  Servia.  Some  supplementary  statement  or  explanations 
would,  however,  have  to  be  made  in  order  to  tone  down  the  sharpness  of  the 
ultimatum. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  proposal  referred  to  in  your  telegram 
of  the  28th  instantt  was  one  of  secondary  importance.  Under  altered  cir- 
cumstances of  situation  he  did  not  attach  weight  to  it.  Further,  the  Gormaii 
Ambassador  had  informed  his  Excellency,  so  the  latter  told  me,  that  his 
Government  were  continuing  at  Vienna  to  exert  friendly  influence.  I  fear 
that  the  German  Ambassador  v.'ill  not  help  to  smooth  matters  over,  if  he  uses 
to  his  own  Government  the  same  language  as  he  did  to  me  to-day  He  accused 
the  Russian  Government  of  endangering  the  peace  of  Europe  by  their  mobilisa- 
tion, and  said,  when  I  referred  to  all  that  had  been  recently  done  by  Austria, 
that  ho  could  not  discuss  such  matters.  I  called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that 
Austrian  consuls  had  warned  all  Austrian  subjects  liable  to  military  service 
to  join  the  colours,  that  Austria  had  already  partially  mobilised,  and  had  now 
declared  war  on  Servia.  From  what  had  passed  during  the  Balkan  crisis  she 
knew  that  this  act  was  one  which  it  was  impossible  without  humiliation  for 
Russia  to  submit  to.  Had  not  Russia  by  mobilising  shown  that  she  was  in 
earnest,  Austria  w^ould  have  traded  on  Russia's  desire  for  peace,  and  would 
have  believed  that  she  could  go  to  any  lengths.  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
had  given  me  to  understand  that  Russia  would  not  precipitate  war  by  crossing- 
frontier  immediately,  and  a  week  or  more  would,  in  any  case,  elapse  before 
mobilisation  was  completed.  In  order  to  find  an  issue  out  of  a  dangerous 
situation  it  was  necessary  that  we  should  in  the  meanwhile  all  work  together 
*  Sco  No.  57.  t  Soe  No.   69. 


No.  79 

♦Si?'  M  dc  Jhinsen,  BHtish  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edicard  Grey. 

{Ecceived  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vmnna,  July  29,  1914. 

THERE  is  at  present  no  step  which  we  could  usefully  take  to  stop  war  with 
Servia,  to  which  Austro-Hungarian  Government  are  now  fully  committed  by 
the  Emperor's  appeal  to  his  people  which  has  been  published  this  morning, 
and  by  the  declaration  of  war.  French  and  Italian  Ambassadors  agree  witli 
me  in  this  view.  If  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  convert  into 
a  binding  engagement  to  Europe  the  declaration  which  has  been  made  at  St 
Petcrsburgh  to  the  effect  that  she  desires  neither  to  destroy  the  indopendenco 
of  Servia  nor  to  acquire  Servian  territory,  the  Italian  Ambassador  thinks  tliat 
Russia  might  bo  induced  to  remain  quiet.  This,  however,  the  Italian  Ambas- 
«adov  is  convinced  the  Austrian  Government  would  refuse  to  do. 


I 


u 

No.  80. 

Sir  R,  Hoddf  British  Ambassador  at  Bonier  to  Sir  Edicard  Grey. — 
{Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Borne,  July  29,  1914. 

IN  your  telegram  of  the  27th  instant*  to  Berlin,  German  Ambassador  was 
reported  €o  have  accepted  in  principle  the  idea  of  a  conference.  This  is  in 
contradiction  with  the  telegram  of  the  27th  instantt  from  Berlin. 

Information  received  by  the  Italian  Government  from  Berlin  shows  that 
German  view  is  correctly  represented  in  Sir  E.  Goschen's  telegram  of  the 
27th  July,t  but  what  creates  difficulty  is  rather  the^  "conference,"  so  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  understands,  than  the  principle.  He  is  going  to 
urge,  in  a  telegram  which  he  is  sending  to  Berlin  to-night,  adherence  to  the 
idea  of  an  exchange  of  views  in  London.  He  suggests  that  the  German  Secre- 
tary of  State  might  propose  a  formula  acceptable  to  his  Government.  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  is  of  opinion  that  this  exchange  of  views  would  keep  the 
door  open  if  direct  communication  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh  fails 
ta  have  any  result.  He  thinks  that  this  exchange  of  views  might  be  con- 
comitant with  such  direct  communication. 

The  German  Government  are  also  being  informed  that  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment would  not  be  pardoned  by  public  opinion  here  unless  they  had  taken 
every  possible  step  so  as  to  avoid  war.  He  is  urging  that  the  German  Govern- 
ment must  lend  their  co-operation  in  this. 

He  added  that  there  seemed  to  be  a  difficulty  in  making  Germany  helieve 
that  Russia  was  in  earnest.  As  Germany,  however,  was  really  anxious  for 
good  relations  with  ourselves,  if  she  believed  that  Great  Britain  would  act 
with  Russia  and  France  he  thought  it  would  have  a  great  effect. 

Even  should  it  prove  impossible  to  induce  Germany  to  take  part,  he  would 
till  advocate  that  England  and  Italy,  each  as  representing  one  group,  should 
continue  to  exchange  views. 

*  See  No.   46.  t  See  No.   43. 


No.  81. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Rodd,  British  Ambassador  at  Rome, 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

"WITH  reference  to  "your  telegram  of  yesterday.* 

It  is  impossible  for  me  to  initiate  discussions  with  Ambassadors  here,  as  I 
understand  from  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  Austria  will  not 
accept  any  discussion  on  basis  of  Servian  note,  and  the  inference  of  all  I  have 
heard  from  Vienna  and  Berlin  is  that  Austria  will  not  accept  any  form  of 
mediation  by  the  Powers  as  between  Austria  and  Servia.  Italian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  must  therefore  speak  at  Berlin  and  Vienna.  I  shall  be  glad 
if  a  favourable  reception  is  given  to  any  suggestions  he  can  make  there. 

*  See  No.  64. 


No.  82. 

Mr.  Beauraonty  British  Charge  d Affaires  at  Constantinople,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey.—  (Received  July  29.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Constantinople,  July  29,    1914. 

I  UNDERSTAND  that  the  designs  of  Austria  may  extend  considerably 
beyond  the  sanjak  and  a  punitive  occupation  of  Servian  territory.  I  gathered 
this  from  a  remark  let  fall  by  the  Austrian  Ambassador  here,  who  spoke  of 
the  deplorable  economic  situation  of  Salonica  under  Greek  administration  and 
of  the  assistance  on  which  the  Austrian  army  could  count  from  Mussulman 
population  discontented  with  Serbian  rule. 


45 

No.  83. 

Mr  Crackanthorpe^  British  Charge  d' Affaires  at  Belgrade^  to  Sir  Edward 

Grey. — {Received  Jidy  29.) 

(Telo-raphic.)  Nisli,  July  29,  1914. 

[  HAVE  been  requested  by  Prime  Minister  to  convey  to  you  expression 
of  his  deep  gratitude  for  the  statement  which  you  made  on  the  27th  instant 
in  the  House  of  Commons 


No.  8-1. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E  Gcschen,  British  Amhassadoo'  at  Berlin. 

(Telegrapiiic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

THE  German  Ambassador  has  been  instructed  by  the  German  Chancellor 
to  inform  me  that  he  is  endeavouring  to  mediate  between  Vienna  and  St. 
Petersburgh,  and  ho  hopes  with  good  success.  Austria  and  Russia  seem  to 
be  in  constant  touch,  and  he  is  endeavouring  to  make  Vienna  explain  in  a 
satisfactory  form  at  St.  Petersburgh  the  scope  and  extension  of  Austrian  pro- 
ceedings in  Servia.  I  told  the  German  Ambassador  that  an  agreement  arrived 
at  direct  between  Austria  and  Russia  would  be  the  best  possible  solution.  I 
would  press  no  proposal  as  long  as  there  was  a  prospect  of  that,  but  my 
information  this  morning  was  that  the  Austrian  Government  have  declined 
the  suggestion  of  the  Russian  Government  that. the  Austrian  Ambassador  at 
St.  Petersburgh  should  be  authorised  to  discuss  directly  with  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  the  means  of  settling  the  Austro-Servian  conflict. 
The  press  correspondents  at  St,  Petersburgh  had  been  told  that  Russian 
Government  would  mobilise.  The  German  Government  had  said  that  they 
were  favourable  in  principle  to  mediation  between  Russia  and  Austria  if 
necessary.  They  seemed  to  think  the  particular  method  of  conference,  con- 
sultation or  discussion,  or  even  conversations  d  quatre  in  London  too  formal 
A  method.  I  urged  that  the  German  Government  should  suggest  any  method 
by  which  the  influence  of  the  four  Powers  could  be  used  together  to  prevent 
war  between  Austria  and  Russia.  France  agreed,  Italy  agreed.  The  whole 
idea  of  mediation  or  mediating  influence  \yas  ready  to  be  put  into  operation 
by  any  method  that  Germany  could  suggest  if  mine  was  not  acceptable.  In 
fact  mediation  was  ready  to  come  into  operation, by  any  method  that  Germany 
thought  possible  if  only  Germany  would  "  press  the  button  "  in  the  interests  of 
peace. 


No.  85. 

Sir  E,  GoscheUf  British  Arahassador  at  Berlin^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  July  29.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  29,  1914. 

I  WAS  asked  to  call  upon  the  Chancellor  to-night.  His  Excellency  had 
just  returned  from  Potsdam. 

He  said  that  should  Austria  be  attacked  by  Russia  a  European  conflagra- 
tion might,  he  feared,  become  inevitable,  owing  to  Germany's  obligations  as 
Austria's  ally,  in  spite  of  his  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace.  He  then 
proceeded  to  make  the  following  strong  bid  for  British  neutrality.  He  said 
that  it  was  clear,  so  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge  the  main  principle  which 
governed  British  policy,  that  Great  Britain  would  never  stand  by  and  allow 
France  to  be  crushed  in  any  conflict  there  might  be.  That,  however,  was  not 
the  object  at  which  Germany  aimed.  Provided  that  neutrality  of  Gref.t 
Britain  were  certain,  every  assurance  would  be  given  to  the  British  Govern- 
ment that  the  Imperial  Government  aimed  at  no  territorial  acquisitions  at 
the  expense  of  France  should  they  prove  victorious  in  any  war  that  might 
ensue. 

I  questioned  his  Excellency  about  the  French  colonies,  and  he  said  that 
he  was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking  in  that  respect.  As  regards 
Holland,  however,  his  Excellency  said  that  so  long  ^s  Germany's  adversaries 
respected  the  integrity  and  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany  was  ready 
to  give  His  Majesty's  Government  an  assurance  that  the  would  do  likewise'. 


It  depended  upon  the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany  might  be 
forced  to  enter  upon  in  Belgium,  but  when  the  war  was  over,  Belgian  integrity 
would  be  respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany^ 

His  Excellency  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since  he  had  been  Chancellor 
the  object  of  his  policy  had  been,  as  you  were  aware,  to  bring  about  an 
understanding  with  England;  he  trusted  that  these  assurances  might. form 
the  basis  of  that  understanding  which  he  so  much  desired.  He  had  in  mind 
a  general  neutrality  agreement  betAveen  England  and  Germany,  though  it 
was  of  course  at  the  present  moment  too  early  to  discuss  details,  and  an 
assurance  of  British  neatrality  in  the  conflict  which  present  crisis  might 
possibly  produce,  would  enable  him  to  look  forward  to  realisation  of  his  desire. 

In  reply  to  his  Excellency's  enquiry  how'  I  thought  his  request  would  appeal 
to  you,  I  said  that  1  did  not  think  it  probable  that  at  this  stage  of  events -you 
would  care  to  bind  yourself  to  any  course  of  action  and  that  I  was  of  opinion 
that  you  would  desire  to  retain  full  liberty. 

Our  conversation  upon  this  subject  having  come  to  an  end,  I  communicated 
the  contents  of  your  telegram  of  to-day^  to  his  Excellency,  who  expressed  his 
best  thanks  to  you. 

*  Se€  No.  77. 


No.  86. 
Sir  R,  Roddy  British  Ambassador  at  Rome^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,— 
.(Received  J%dy  29.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  29,  1914. 

MINISTER  for  Foreign  Affairs  thinks  that  moment  is  past  for  any  further 
discussions  on  basis  of  Servian  note,  in  view  of  communication  made  to-day 
by  Russia  at  Berlin  regarding  partial  mobilisation.  The  utmost  he  now  hopes 
for  is  that  Germany  may  use  her  influence  at  Vienna  to  prevent  or  moderate 
any  further  demands  on  Serviai. 


No.  87. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie f  Biitish  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 
Sir, 

AFTER  telling  M.  Cambon*-  to-day  how  grave  the  situation  seemed  to  be, 
I  told  him  tht\t  1  meant  to  tell  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  that  he  must 
not  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  into  any  sense  of  false 
security  that  wo  should  stand  aside  if  all  the  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace, 
which  we  were  now  making  in  common  with  Germany,  failed.  But  I  went 
on  to  say  to  M.  Cambon^  that  I  thought  it  necessary  to  tell  him  also  that 
public  opinion  here  approached  the  present  difficulty  from  a  quite  different 
point  of  view  from  that  taken  during  the  difficulty  as  to  Morocco  a  few  years 
ago.  In  the  case  of  Morocco  the  dispute  was  one  in  which  France  was 
primarily  interested,  and  in  which  it  appeared  that  Germany,  in  an  att*empt 
to  crush  France,  was  fastening  a  quarrel  on  France  on  a  question  that  was  the 
subject  of  a  special  agreement  between  Franco  and  us.  In  the  present  case 
the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  was  not  one  in  which  we  felt  called 
to  take  a  hand.  Even  if  the  question  became  one  between  Austria  and 
Russia  we  should  not  feel  called  upon  to  take  a  hand  in  it.  It  would  then  be 
a  question  of  the  supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav — a  struggle  for  supremacy  in 
the  Balkans ;  and  our  idea  had  always  been  to  avoid  being  drawn  into  a  war 
over  a  Balkan  question.  If  Germany  became  involved  and  France  became 
involved,  we  had  not  made  up  our  minds  what  we  should  do ;  it  was  a  case 
that  wo  should  have  to  consider.  France  would  then  have  been  drawn  into 
a  quarrel  which  was  not  hers,  but  in  which,  owing  to  her  alliance,  her  honour 
and  interest  obliged  her  to  engage.  We  were  free  from  engagements,  and 
we  should  have  to  decide  what  British  interests  required  us  to  do.  I  thought 
it  necessary  to  say  that,  because,  as  he  knew,  wo  were  taking  all  precautions 
with  regard  to  our  fleet,  and  I  was  about  to  warn  Prince  Idchnowskyt  not 

*  French  Ambassador  in  London, 
t  German  Ambassador  in  London. 


47 

to  count  on  our  standing  aside,  but  it  would  not  be  fair  that  I  should  let 
M.  Cambon  be  misled  into  supposing  that  this  meant  that  we  had  decided  what 
to  do  in  a  contingency  that  I  still  hoped  might  not  arise. 

M.  Cambon  said  that  I  had  explained  the  situation  very  clearly.  He 
understood  it  to  be  that  in  a  Balkan  quarrel,  and  in  a  struggle  for  supremacy 
between  Teuton  and  Slav  we  should  not  feel  called  to  intervene ;  should  other 
issue?  be  raised,  and  Germany  and  France  become  involved,  so  that  the 
question  became  one  of  the  hegemony  of  Europe,  we  should  then  decide  what 
it  was  necessary  for  us  to  do.  He  seemed  quite  prepared  for  this  announce- 
ment, and  made  no  criticism  upon  it. 

He  said  French  opinion  was  calm,  but  decided.  He  anticipated  a  demand 
from  Germany  that  France  Avould  be  neutral  Avhile  Germany  attacked  Russia. 
This  assurance  France,  of  course,  could  not  give;  she  was  bound  to  help 
Russia  if  Russia  was  attacked. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 


No.  88. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen^  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 
Sir, 

I  TOLD  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  of  the  information  that  I 
had  received,  that  Russia  had  informed  Germany  respecting  her  mobilisation. 
I  also  told  him  of  the  communication  made  by  Count  Benckendorff,*  that 
the  Austrian. declaration  of  war  manifestly  rendered  vain  any  direct  conversa- 
tions between  Russia  and  Austria.  I  said  that  the  hope  built  upon  those 
direct  conversations  by  the  German  Government  yesterday  had  disappeared 
to-day.  To-day  the  German  Chancellor  was  working  in  the  interest  of  media- 
tion in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh.  If  he  succeeded,  well  and  good.  If  not, 
it  was  more  important  than  ever  that  Germany  should  take  up  what  I  had 
suggested  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning,  and  propose  some  method 
by  which  the  four  Powers  should  be  able  to  work  together  to  keep  the  peace 
of  Europe.  I  pointed  out,  however,  that  the  Russian  Government,  while 
desirous  of  mediation,  regarded  it  as  a  condition  that  the  military  operations 
against  Servia  should  be  siispended,  as  otherwise  a  mediation  would  only 
drag  on  matters,  and  give  Austria  time  to  crush  Servia.  It  was,  of  course,  too 
late  for  all  military  operations  against  Servia  to  be  suspended.  In  a  short 
time,  I  supposed,  the  Austrian  forces  would  be  in  Belgrade,  and  in  occupation 
of  some  Servian  territory.  BuU  even  then  it  might  be  possible  to  bring  some 
mediation  into  existence,  if  Austria,  while  saying  that  she  must  hold  the 
occupied  territory  until  she  had  complete  satisfaction  from  Servia,  stated 
that  she  would  not  advance  further,  pending  an  effort  of  the  Powers  to 
mediate  between  her  and  Russia. 

The  German  Ambassador  said  that  he  had  already  telegraphed  to  Berlin 
what  I  had  said  to  him  this  morning. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 
*  Russian   Ambassador   in   London. 


No.  89. 

Sir  Edward  GreiJ  to  Sir  E.  GoscheUj  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 
Sir, 

AFTER  speaking  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  about  the 
'European  situation-,  I  said  that  I  wished  to  say  to  him,  in  a  quite  private  and 
friendly  way,  something  that  was  on  my  mind.  The  situation  was  very  grave. 
While  it  was  restricted  to  the  issues  at  present  actually  involved  we  had  no 
thought  of  interfering  in  -it.  But  if  Germany  became  involved  in  it,  and 
then  France,  the  issue  might  be  so  great  that  it  would  involve  all  European 
interests;   and  I  did  not  wish  him  to  be  misled  by  the  friendly  tone  of  our 


4a 


lid    I 


conversation— which  I  hoped  would  continue— into  thinking  that  we  should 
stand  aside. 

He  said  that  he  quite  understood  this,  but  he  asked  whether  I  meant  that 
we  should,   under 'certain  circumstances,   intervene? 

I  replied  that  I  did  not  wish  to  say  that,  or  to  use  anything  that  was  like 
a-  threat  or  an  attempt  to  apply  pressure  by  saying  that,  if  things  became 
worse,  we  should  intervene.  There  v.ould  be  no  question  of  our  intervening 
if  Germany  was  not  involved,  or  even  if  France  was  not  involved.  But  we 
knew  very  well,  that  if  the  issue  did  become  such  that  we  thought  British 
interests  required  us  to  intervene,  we  must  intervene  at  once,  and  the  decision 
would  have  to  be  very  rapid,  just  as  the  decisions  of  other  Powers  had  to  be. 
I  hoped  that  the  friendly  tone  of  our  conversations  would  continue  as  at 
present,  and  that  I  should  be  abld  to  keep  as  closely  in  touch  with  the  German 
Government  in  working  for  peace.  But  if  we  failed  in  our  efforts  to  keep 
the  peace,  and  if  the  issue  spread  so  that  it  involved  practically  every  European 
interest,  I  did  not  wish  to  be  open  to  any  reproach  from  him  that  the  friendly 
tone  of  all  our  conversations  had  misled  him  or  his  Government  into  supposing 
that  we  should  not  take  action,  and  to  the  reproach  that,  if  they  had  not  been 
so  misled,  the  course  of  things  might  have  been  different.  ♦ 

The  (German  Ambassador  took  no  exception  to  what  I  had  said  ;  indeed, 
he  told  me  that  it  accorded  with  what  he  had  already  given  in  Berlin  as  his 
view  of  the  situation. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 

No.  90. 
Sir  Edvjard  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

IN  addition  to  what  passed  with  the  German  Ambassador  this  morning, 
as  recorded  in  my  telegram  of  the  29th  July*  to  your  Excellency,  I  gave  the 
Ambassador  a  copy  of  Sir  Rennell  Rodd'st  telegram  of  the  28th  Julyt  and  of 
my  reply  to  it.§  I  said  I  had  begun  to  doubt  whether  even  a  complete 
acceptance  of  the  Austrian  demands  by  Servia  would  now  satisfy  Austria.  But 
there  appeared,  from  what  the  Marquis  di  San  GiulianolF  had  said,  to  be  a 
method  by  which,  if  the  Powers  were  allowed  to  have~any  say  in  the  matter, 
they  might  bring  about  complete  satisfaction  for  Austria,  if  only  the  latter 
Vould  give  them  an  opportunity.  I  could,  however,  make  no  proposal,  for  the 
leasons  I  have  given  in  my  telegram  to  you,  and  could  only  give  what  the 
Italian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  said  to  the  German  Ambassador  for 
information,  as  long  as  it  was  understood  that  Austria  would  accept  no  discus- 
sion with  the  Powers  over  her  dispute  with  Servia.  As  to  mediation  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  I  said  it  could  not  take  the  form  simply  of  urging  Russia 
to  stand  on  one  side  while  Austria  had  a  free  hand  to  go  to  any  length 
she  pleased.  That  would  not  bo  mediation,  it  would  simply  be 
putting  pressure  upon  Russia  in  the  interests  of  Austria.  The  German 
Ambassador,  said  the  view  of  the  German  Government  was  that  Austria  could 
not  by  force  be  humiliated,  and  could  not  abdicate  her  position  as  a  Great 
Power.  I  said  I  entirely  agreed,  but  it  was  not  a  question  of  humiliating 
Austria,  it  was  a  question  of  how  far  Austria  meant  to  push  fhQ  humiliation 
of  others.  There  must,  of  course,  be  some  humiliation  of  Servia,  but  Austria 
might  press  things  so  far  as  to  involve  the  humiliation  of  Russia. 

The  German  Ambassador  said  that  Austria  would  not  take  Servian  terri- 
tory, as  to  which  I  observed  that,  by  taking  territory  while  leaving  nominal 
Servian  independence,  Austria  might  turn  Servia  practically  into  a  vassal 
State    and  this  would  affect  the  whole  position  of  Russia  in  the  Balkans. 

I  observed  that  when  there  was  danger  of  European  conflict  it  was  impos- 
sible to  say  who  would  not  be  drawn  into  it.  Even  the  Netherlands  apparently 
were  taking  precautions. 

The  German  Ambassador  said  emphatically  that  some  means  must  be  found 
of  preserving  the  peace  of  Europe. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 

*  Sco  No.   84.  t  British   Ambassador   in  Rome.     ^  X  Soe   No.    64. 

§  See  No.  81.  ^  Italian  Minister  for  Foreign   Affairs. 


49 

No.  91. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  if.  de  Bunsen,  Britisli  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
Sir,  Fore  gn  Office,  July  29,  1914. 

THE  Austrian  Ambassador  tofd  me  to-day  he  had  ready  a  long  memo- 
randum, which  he  proposed  to  leave,  and  wiiich  he  said  gave  an  account  of 
the  conduct  of  Servia  towards  Austria,  and  an  explanation  of  how  necessary 
the  Austrian  action  was. 

I  said  that  1  did  not  wish  to  discuss  the  merits  of  the  question  between 
Austria  and  Servia.  The  news  to-day  seemed  to  me  very  bad  for  the  peace  of 
Europe  The  Powers  were  not  allowed  to  help  in  getting  satisfaction  for 
Austria,  which  they  might  get  if  they  were  given  an  opportunity,  and  European 
peace   was  at  stake. 

Count  Mensdorif*  said  that  the  war  with  Servia  must  proceed.  Austria 
couid  not  continue  to  be  exposed  to  the  necessity  of  mobilising  again  and 
again,  as  she  had  been  obliged  to  do  in  recent  years.  She  had  no  idea  of 
territorial  aggrandisement,  and  all  she  wished  was  to  make  sure  that  her 
interests  v/ere  safeguarded. 

I  said  that  it  would  be  quite  possible,  v/ithout  nominally  interfering  with  the 
independence  of  Servia  or  taking  away  any  of  her  territory,  to  turn  her  into  a 
sort  of  vassal  State. 

Count  Mensdorff*  deprecated  this. 

In  reply  to  some  further  remarks  of  mine,  as  to  the  effect  that  the  Austrian 
action  might  haye  upon  the  Russian  position  in  the  Balkans,  he  said  that, 
before  the  Balkan  war,  Servia  had  always  been  regarded  as  being  in  the 
Austrian  sphere  of  influence. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 
*  Aiistro-H vulgarian   Ambassador   in  London. 


No.  92. 

Sir^  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  R.  Eodd^  British  Ambassador  at  Roms, 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,.  July  29,  1914. 

THE  Italian  Ambassador  made  to  me  to-day  a  communication  from  the 
Marquis  di  San  Giuliano*  suggesting  that  the  German  objections  to  the  media- 
tion of  the  four  Powers,  a  mediation  that  was  strongly  favoured  by  Italy, 
might  be  removed  by  some  change  in  the  form  of  procedure. 

1  said  that  I  had  already  anticipated  this  by  asking  the  German  Govern- 
ment, to  suggest  any  form  of  procedure  under  which  the  idea  of  mediation 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  already  accepted  by  the  German  Government  in 
principle,  could  be  'applied. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 
*  Italian  Minlst-er  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


No.  93. 

Telegrams  communicated  by  Count  Benckendorff,  Russian  Ambassador'  in 
London,  July  30,  1914. 

(1.) 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  M.  Sazonofr' 

ViennCi  (Translation.) 

le  15  (28)  juillet,  1914.  Vienna,  July  15  (28),  1914. 

(Telegraphique.)  (Telegraphic.) 

J'AI  entretenu  awjourd'hui  le  Comte         I     SPOKE     to     Count     Berchtoldf 

Berchtoldt   dans  le  sens  des   instruc-  to-day  in  the  sense  of  your  Excellency's 

tions   de  votre  Excellence.     Je  lui  fis  instructions.    I  brought  to  his  notice, 

*  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

■f  Aufitro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


50 


observer,  en  termes  les  plus  amicaux, 
combien  il  etait  desirable  de  trouver 
line  solution  qui,  en  consolidant  les 
bons  rapports  entre  I'Autriche-Hongrie 
et  la  Russie,  donnerait  a  la  Monarchie 
austro-hongroise  des  garanties  serieuses 
I)our  ses  rapports  futurs  avec  la 
Serbic. 

J'attirais  I'attention  du  Comto 
Berchtold*  sur  tous  les  dangers  pour  la 
paix  de  I'Europe,  qu'entrainerait  un 
conflit  arme  entrc  PAutriche-Hongrie 
et  la  Serbie. 

Le  Comte  Berchtold*  me  repondit 
qu'il  se  rendait  parfaitement  compte 
d^i  serieux  de  la  situation  et  des  avan- 
tages  d'une  franche  explication  avec 
le  Cabinet  de  Saint-Petersbourg.  II 
me  dit  que  d*un  autre  cote  le  Gou- 
vernement  austro-hongrois,  qui  ne 
s'etait  decide  que  tres  mal  volontiers 
aux  mesures  energiques  qu'il  avait 
prises  centre  la  Serbie,  ne  pouvait  plus 
ni  reculer,  ni  entrer  en  discussion  au- 
cune  des  termes  de  la  note  austro- 
hongroise. 

Le  Comte  Berchtold*  ajouta  que  la 
crisc  etait  devenue  si  aigue,  et  que  I'ex- 
citation  de  Topinion  publique  avait  at- 
teint  tel  degre,  que  le  Gouvernement, 
le  Toulait-il,  ne  pouvait  plus  y  consen- 
tir,-  d'aiitant  moins,  me  dit-il,  quo  la 
reponse  meme  de  la  Serbie  donne  la 
preuve  du  manque  de  sincerite  de  ses 
promesses  pour  Tavenir. 


in  the  most  friendlj'  manner,  how  de- 
sirable it  was  to  find  a  solution  which, 
while  consolidating  good  relations  be- 
tween Austria-Hungary  and  Russia, 
would  give  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy  genuine  guarantees  for  its 
future  relations  with  Servia. 

I  drew  Count  Berchtold's*  atten- 
tion to  all  the  dangers  to  the  peace  of 
Europe  which  would  bo  involved  by  an 
armed  conflict  between  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Servia. 

Count  Berchtold"  replied  that  he  was 
well  aware  of  the  gravity  of  the  situa- 
tion and  of  the  advantages  of  a  frank 
explanation  with  the  St.  Petcrsburgh 
Cabinet.  He  told  me  that,  on  tho 
other  hand,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government,  who  had  only  decided 
much  against  their  will  on  the  ener- 
getic measures  which  they  had  taken 
against  Servia,  could  no  longer  recede, 
nor  enter  into  any  discussion  about  the 
terms  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  note. 

Count  Berclitold*  added  that  the 
crisis  had  become  so  acute,  and  that 
public  opinion  had  risen  to  such  a  pitch 
of  excitement,  that  the  Government, 
even  if  they  wished  it,  could  no  longer 
consent  to  such  a  course.  This  was 
all  the  more  impossible,  he  said,  inas- 
much as  the  Servian  reply  itself  fur- 
nished proof  o^f  the  insincerity  of 
Servia's  promises  for  the  future. 


^  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


(2.) 

M.  Sazono/j  Hiissian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count  Benchendorff^ 

Russian  Ambassador  in  London. 


Saint-Fetershourg, 
U  16  (29)  juiUet,  1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagrte  m'in- 
forme,  au  nom  du  Chancelier,  que 
rAllemagnc  n'a  pas  cesse  d'exercer  a 
Viennc  ime  influence  moderatrice  et 
qu'elle  continuera  cette  action  mem© 
apres  la  declaration  de  guerre. 
Jusqu'a  ce  matin  il  n'y  avait  aucunc 
nouvclle  que  les  armees  autrichiennes 
aiont  franchi  la  frontiere  serbe.  J'ai 
prie  I'Ambassadeur  de-  transmettre  au 
Chancelier  mes  remcrciements  pour  la 
teneur  amicale  de  cette  communica- 
tion. Jo  I'aiinforme  des  mesures  mili- 
taires  prises  par  la  Russie,  dont  au- 
cune,  lui  dis-je,  n'etait  dirigee  centre 
rAllomagne;  j'ajoutais  qu'elles  ne  pre- 
jugeaient  pas  non  plus  des  mesures 
agressivcs  centre   rAutriche-Hongrie, 


tSt.  Pctershurgh, 
July  16  (29),  1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

THE  Gernian  Ambassador  informs 
me,  in  the  name  of  the  Chancellor,  that 
Germany  .has  not  ceased  to  exercise  a 
moderating  influence  at  Vienna,  and 
that  she  Avill  continue  to  do  so  even 
after  the  declaration  of  war.  Up  to 
this  morning  there  had  been  no  news 
that  the  Austrian  army  has  crossed 
the  Servian  frontier.  I  have  begged 
the  Ambassador  to  express  my  thanks 
to  the  Chancellor  for  the  friendly 
tenour  of  this  communication.  I  have 
informed  him  of  the  military  measures 
taken  by  Russia,  none  of  which,  I  told 
him,  were  directed  against  Germany; 
I  added  that  neither  should  they  be 
taken  as  aggressive  measures  against 
Austria-Hungary,     their     explanation 


51 


ces  mesures  s'expliqiiant  par  la  mobili- 
sation de  la  plus  grande  partie  do 
I'armee  austro-hongroise. 

L'Ambassadeur  se  pronon9ant  en 
fiVveiir  d'explications  directes  avec  le 
Cabinet  dc  Vienne  et  nous,  je  repon- 
dis  que  j*y  etais  tout  dispose,  pour  pen 
que  les  conseils  du  Cabinet  de  Berlin 
dont  il  parlait  trouvent  echo  a  Vienne. 


En  menie  temps  je  signalais  que  nous 
etions  tout  disposes  a  accepter  le  projet 
d'une  conference  des  quatre  Puis- 
sances, un  projet  auquel,  paraissait-il, 
I'Allemagne  ne  sympathisait  pas  en- 
tieremcnt. 

Je  dis  qu€f,  dans  mon  opinion,  le 
meilleur  moyen  pour  mettre  a  profit 
tous  les  moyens  propres  a  produire  une 
solution  pacifique,  consisterait  en  unc 
action  parallele  des  pourparlers  d'une 
conference  a  quatre  de  I'Allemagne,  de 
la  France,  de  rAngloterre  et  de 
ritalic  et  d'un  contact  direct  entre 
I'Autricbe-Hongrie  et  la  Russie,  a 
I'instar  a  peu  pres  de  ce  qui  avait  eu 
lieu  aux  inoments  les  plus  critiques  de 
la  crise  de  Fan  dernier. 

Je  dis  a  I'Ambassadeur  qu'apres  les 
concessions  faites  par  la  Serbie,  un  ter- 
rain de  compromis  pour  les  questions 
restees  puvertes  ne  serait  pas  tres  diffi- 
cile a  trouver,  a  condition  toutefois  de 
quelque  bonne  volonte  de  la  part  de 
I'Autriche  et  a  condition  que  toutes  les 
Puissances  usent  de  toute  leur  in- 
fluence dans  un  sens  de  conciliation. 


being  the  mobilisation  of  the  greatet 
part  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army. 

The  Ambassador  said  that  he  was  in 
favour  of  direct  explanations  between 
the  Austrian  (Bovernment  and  our- 
selves, and  I  replied  that  I,  too,  was 
quite  willing,  provided  that  the  advice 
of  the  Gorman  Government,  to  which 
he  had  referred,  found  an  echo  xit 
Vienna. 

1  said  at  the  same  time  that  wo  were 
quite  ready  to  accept  the  proposal  for 
a  conference  of  the  four  Powers,  a  pro- 
posal with  which,  apparently,  Ger- 
many was  not  in  entire  sympathy. 

I  told  him  that,  in  my  opinion,  the 
best  manner  of  turning  to  account  the 
most  suitable  methods  of  finding  a 
peacofur  solution  would  be  by  arrang- 
ing for  parallel  discussions  to  be  car- 
ried on  by  a  coufercnce  of  the  four 
Powers— Germany,  France,  England, 
and  Italy— and  by  a  direct  exchange 
of  views  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia  on  much  tlio  same  lines  as 
occurred  during  the  most  critical 
moments  of  last  year's  crisis. 

T  told  the  Ambassador  that,  after 
the  concessions  which  had  been  made 
by  Servia,  it  should  not  be  very  diffi- 
cult to  find  a  compromise  to  settle  the 
other  questions  which  remained  out- 
standing, provided  that  Austria 
showed  some  good- will  and  that  all  the 
Powers  used  tlioir  entire  influence  in 
the  direction  of  conciliation. 


(3.) 

M*  Sazonofy  Russian  Mimster  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  Count  Benckendorff^ 

Russian  Ambassador  in  London. 


Saint-Fetershourg, 
le  16  (29)  juiild,  1914. 
(Telegraphique.) 

Lors  de  mon  entretien  avec  I'Ambas- 
sadeur d'Allemagne,  dont  traite  mon 
telegramme  precedent,  je  n'avais  pas 
encore  re9u  le  telegramme  du  15  (28) 
juilletdeM.  Schebeko.* 

Le  contenu  do  ce  telegramme  consti- 
tue  un  refus  du  Cabinet  de  Vienne  dc 
proceder  a  un  echange  d'idees  direct 
avec  le  Gouvernement  Imperial. 

Des  lors,  il  ne  nous  reste  plus  qu'a 
nous  en  remettre  entierement  au,  Gou- 
vernement britannique  pour  I'initia- 
tive  des  demarches  qu^ljugora- utile 
de  provoquer. 


St,  Petershurghf 
July  16  (29),  1914. 
(Telegraphic.) 

AT  the  time  of  my  interview  with 
the  German  Ambassador,  dealt  with, 
in  my  preceding  telegram,  I  had  not 
yet  received  M.  Srh^beko's*  telegram 
of  the  15th  (28th)  July. 

The  contents  of  this  telegram  con- 
stitute a  refusal  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet 
to  agree  to  a  direct  exchange  of  views 
with  the  Imperial  Government. 

From  now  on,  nothing  remains  for 
us  to  do  but  to  rely  entirely  on  the 
British  Government  to  take  the  initia- 
tive in  any  steps  which  they  may 
consider  advisable. 


*  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 


52 

No.  94. 
Sir  M.  de  Bunsen^  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  fo  Sir  Edward  Grey»-^ 

{Received  Jidy  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  29,  1914. 

I  LEARN  that  mobilisation  of  Russian  corps  destined  to  carry  out  opera- 
tions on  Austrian  frpntier  has  been  ordered.  My  informant  is  Russian 
Ambassador.  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  here  has  realised,  though  somewhat 
Ic^te  in  the  day,  that  Russia  will  not  remain  indifferent  in  present  crisis.  I 
believe  that  the  news  of  Russian  mobilisation  will  not  be  a  suj-prise  to  the 
Ministry,  but  so  far  it  is  not  generally  known  in  Vienna  this  evening.  Unless 
mediation,  which  German  Government  declared  themselves  ready  to  offer  in 
concert  with  three  other  Great  Powers  not  immediately  interested  in  the  Austro- 
Servian  dispute,  be  brought  to  bear  forthwith,  irrevocable  steps  may  be  taken 
in  present  temper  of  this  country.  German  Ambassador  feigns  surprise  that 
Servian  affairs  should  be  of  such  interest  to  Russia.  Both  my  Russian  and 
Fi'Onch  colleagues  have  spoken  to  him  to-day.  Russian  Ambassador  expressed 
the  hope  that  it  might  still  be  possible  to  arrange  matters,  and  explained  that 
it  was  impossible  for  Russia  to  do  otherwise  than  take  an  interest  in  the 
present  dispute.  Russia,  he  said,  had  done  what  she  could  already  at  Belgrade 
to  induce  Servian  Government  to  meet  principal  Austrian  demands  in  a  favour- 
able spirit;  if  approached  in  a  proper  .manner,  he  thought  she  would  probably 
go  still  further  in  this  direction.  But  she  was  justly  offended  at  having  been 
completely  ignored,  and  she  could  not  consent  to  be  excluded  from  the  settle- 
ment. German  Ambassador  said  that  if  proposals  were  put  forward  which 
opened  any  prospect  of  possible  acceptance  by  both  sides,  he  personally  thought 
that  Germany  might  consent  to  act  as  mediator  in  concert  with  the  three 
other  Powers. 

I  gather  from  what. Russian  Ambassador  said  to  me  that  he  is  much  afraid 
of  the  effect  that  any  serious  engagement  may  have  upon  Russian  public 
opinion.  I  gathered,  however,  that  Russia  would  go  a  long  way  to  riieet 
Austrian  demands  on  Servia. 


No.  95. 
Sir  M,  de  Binisen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 

(Received  Jvly  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,,  July  30,  1914. 

RUSSIAN  Ambassador  hopes  that  Russian  mobilisation  will  be  regarded  by 
Austria  as  what  it  is,  viz.,  a  clear  intimation  that  Russia  must  be  consulted 
regarding  the  fate  of  Servia,  but  he  does  not  know  how  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment are  taking  it.  He  says  that  Russia  must  have  an  assurance  that  Servia 
will  not  be  crushed,  but  she  would  understand  that  Austria-Hungary  is  com- 
pelled to  exact  from  Servia  measures  which  will  secure  her  Slav  provinces  from 
the  continuance  of  Ipiostile  propaganda  from  Servian  territory. 

The  French  Ambassador  hears  from  Berlin  that  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  is  instructed  to  speak  seriously  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
against  acting  in  a  manner  calculated  to  provoke  a  European  war. 

Unfortunately  the  German  Ambassador  is  himself  so  identified  with  extreme 
anti-Russian  and  aiiti-Scrvian  feeling  prevalent  in  Vienna  that  he  is  unlikely  to 
plead  the  caus5  of  peace  with  entire  sincerity. 

Although  I  am  not  able  to  verify  it,  I  have  private  information  that  tho 
German  Ambassador  knew  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatunuto  Servia  before 
it  was  despatched  and  telegraphed  it  to  the  Gerjnan  EmperoT.  I  know  from 
tho  German  Ambassador  himself  that  he  endbrses  every  line  of  it. 

No.  96. 

Sir  M.  de  Bunaen^  Bntiah  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  io  Sir  Edward  Grey,-^ 

(Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  30,  1914. 

THE  Russian  Ambassador  gave  the  French  Ambassador  and  myself  this 
afternoon  at  the  French  Embassy,  where  I  happened  to  be,  an  account  of  his 


53 

interview  with  the  Minister  for-  Foreign  Affairs,  which  he  said  was.  quite 
friendly.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  told  him  that  as  Russia  had 
mobilised,  Austria  must,  of  course,  do  the  same.  This,  however,  should  not 
be  regarded  as  a  threat,  but  merely  as  the  adoption  of  military  precautions 
similar  to  those  which  had  been  taken  across  the  frontier.  He  said  he  had 
no  objection  to  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  continuing  their  conversations,  although  he 
did  not  say  that  they  could  be  resumed  on  the  basis  ot  the  Servian  reply. 

On  the  whole,  the  Russian  Ambassador  is  not  dissatisfied.  He  had  begun  to 
make  his  preparations  for  his  departure  on  the  strength  of  a  rumour  that 
Austria  would  declare  war  in  reply  to  mobilisation.  He  now  hopes  that  some- 
thing may  yet  be  done  to  prevent  war  with  Austria. 


No.  97. 
JSir  G.  Buchanan^  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey. — {Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  30,  1914. 

FRENCH  Ambassador  and  I  visited  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this 
morning.  His  ^Excellency  said  that  German  Ambassador  had  told  him  yesterday 
afternoon  that  German  Government  were  willing  to  guarantee  that  Servian 
integrity  would  be  respected  by  Austria.  To  this  he  had  replied  that  this 
might  be  so,  but  nevertheless  Servia  would  become, an  Austrian  vassal,  just  as, 
in  similar  circumstances,  Bokhara  had  become  a  Russian  vassal.  There  would 
be  a  revolution  in  Russia  if  she  were  to  tolerate  such  a  state  of  affairs. 

M.  Sazonof*  told  us  that  absolute  proof  was  in  possession  of  Russian 
Government  that  Germany  was  making  military  and  naval  preparations  against 
Russia — more  particularly  in  the  direction  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland. 

German  Ambassador  had  a  second  interview  with  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  2  a.m.,  when  former  completely  broke  down  on  seeing  that  war  was 
inevitable.  He  appealed  to  M.  Sazonof*  to  make  some  suggestion  which  he 
could  telegraph  to  German  Government  as  a  last  hope.  M.  Sazonof*  accord- 
ingly drew  up  and  handed  to  German  Ambassador  a  formula  in  French,  of 
ivhich  following  is  translation  ;  — 

"If  Austria,  recognising  that  her  conflict  with  Servia  has  assumed  character 
of  question  of  European  interest,  declares  herself  ready  to  eliminate  from  her- 
ultimatum  points  which  violate  principle  of  sovereignty  of  Servia,  Russia 
engages  to  stop  all  military  preparations." 

Preparations  for  general  mobilisation  will  be  proceeded  with  if  this  proposal 
is  rejected  by  Austria,  and  inevitable  result  will  be  a  European  war.  Excite- 
ment here  has  reached  such  a  pitch  that,  if  Austria  refuses  to  make  a  concession, 
Russia  cannot  hold  back,  and  now  that  she  knows  that  Germany  is  arming,  she 
can  hardly  postpone,  for  strategical  reasoiis,  converting  partial  into  general 
mobilisation. 

•  Russian  Minister  for  For^eign  Affairs. 


No.  98. 

Sir  E.  GoscheUf  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 

[Received  July  30.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  30,  'l914. 

SECRETARY. of  State  informs  me  that  immediately  on  receipt  of  Prince 
Lichnowsky's*  telegram  recording  his  last  conversation  with  you  ho  asked 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  whether  they  would  be  willing  to  accept  media- 
tion on  basis  of  occupation  by  Austiian  troops  of  Belgrade  or  some  other  point 
and  issue  their  conditions  from  here.  He  has  up  till  now  received  no  reply,  but 
he  fears  Rlissian  mobilisation  against  Austria  will  have  increased  difficulties,  as 
AustriarHungary,  who  has  as  yet  only  mobilised  against  Servia,  will  probably 
find  it  necessary  also  against  Russia.  Secretary  of  State  says  if  you  can  succeed 
in  getting  Russia  to  agree  to  above  basis  for  an  arrangement  and  in  persuading 
her  in  the  meantime  to  take  no  steps  which  might  be  regarded  as  an  act  of 

*  Gorman  Ambassador  in  London. 


54 


I 


aggression  against  Austria  he  still  sees  some  chance  that  European  peace  may 
be  preserved. 

He  begged  me  to  impress  on  you  difficulty  of  Germany's  position  in  view 
of  Russian  mobilisation  and  military  measures  which  he  hears  are  being  taken 
in  France.  Beyond  recall  of  officers  on  leave — a  measure  which  had  been 
officially  taken  after,  and  not  before,  visit  of  French  ambassador  yesterday- 
Imperial  Government  had  done  nothing  special  in  way  of  military  preparations- 
Something,  however,  would  have  soon  to  be  done,  for  it  might  be  too  late,  and 
when  they  mobilised  they  would  have  to  mobilise  on  three  sides.  He  regretted 
this,  as  he  knew  France  did  not  desire  war,  but  it  would  be  a  military  necessity. 

His  Excellency  added  that  telegram*  received  from  Prince  Lichnowskyt 
last  night  contains  matter  which  he  had  heard  with  regret,  but  not  exactly 
with  surprise,  and  at  all  events  he  thoroughly  appreciated  frankness  and  loyalty 
with  which  you  had  spoken. 

He  also  told  me  that  this  telegram  had  only  reached  Berlin  very  late  last 
night;  had  it  been  received  earher  Chancellor  would,  of  course,  not  have 
spoken  to  me  in  the  way  he  had  done. 

*  See  No.   102.  t  German  Ambassador   in   London. 


No.  99. 

Sir  F.  Bertie y  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edioard  Grey. — 
{Rec'dved  July  30.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Faris,  July  30,  1914. 

PRESIDENT  of  the  Republic  tells  me  that  the  Russian  Government  have 
been  informed  by  the  German  Government  that  unless  Russia  stops  her 
mobilisation  Germany  would  mobilise.  But  a  further  report,  since  received 
from  St.  Petersburgh,  states  that  the  German  communication  had  been  modi- 
fied, and  was  now  a  request  to  be  informed  on  what  conditions  Russia  would 
consent  to  demobilisation.  The  answer  given  is  that  she  agrees  to  do  so  on 
condition  that  Austria-Hungary  gives  an  assurance  that  she  will  respect  the 
sovereignty  of  Servia  and  submit  certain  of  the  demands  of  the  Austrian  note, 
which  Servia  has  not  accepted,  to  an  international  discussion. 

President  thinks  that  these  conditions  will  not  be  accepted  by  Austria. 
He  is  convinced  that  peace  between  the  Powers  is  in  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain.  If  His  Majesty's  Government  announced  that  England  would  come  to 
the  aid  of  France  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  France  and  Germany  as  a 
result  of  the  present  differences  between  Austria  and  Servia,  there  would  be 
no  war,  for  Germany  would  at  once  modify  her  attitude. 

I  explained  to  him  how  difficult  it  would  bo  for  His  Majesty's  Government 
to  make  such  an  announcement,  but  he  said  that  he  must  maintain  that  it  would 
be  in  the  interests  of  peace.  France,  he  said,  is  pacific.  She  does  not  desire 
war,  and  all  that  she  has  done  at  present  is  to  make  preparations  for  mobHisa- 
tion  so  as  not  to  be  taken  unawares.  The  French  Government  will  keep  His 
Majesty's  Government  informed  of  everything  that  may  be  done  in  that  way. 
They  have  reliable  information  that  the  German  troops  are  concentrated  round 
Thionville  and  Metz  ready  for  war.  If  there  were  a  general  war  on  the  Con- 
tinent it  would  inevitably  draw  England  into  it  for  the  protection  of  her  vital 
interests.  A  declaration  now  of  her  intention  to  support  France,  whose  desire 
it  is  that  peace  should  be  maintained,  would  almost  certainly  prevent  Germany 
from  going  to  war. 

No.  100. 

Sir  R.  lioddj  British  Ambassador  at  Roine^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(Received  Jidy  30.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Rome,  July  30,  1914. 

GERMAN  Ambassador  told  me  last  night  that  he  thought  Germany  would 
be  able  to  prevent  Austria  from  making  any  exorbitant  demands  if  Servia 
could  be  induced  to  submit,  and  to  ask  for  peace  early,  say,  as  soon  as  the 
occupation  of  Belgrade  had  been  accomplished. 

I  made  to  his  Excellency  the  personal  suggestion  that  some  formula  might 
be  devised  by  Germany  which  might  be  acceptable  for  an  exchange  of  views. 

I  see,  however,  that  you  have  already  made  this  suggestion. 


55 

No.  101. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen^  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

YOUR  telegram  of  29th  July.* 

His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain  the  Chancellor's 
proposal  that  they  should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while  French  colonies 
are  taken  and  France  is  beaten  so  long  as  Germany  does  not  take  French 
territory  as  distinct  from  the  colonies. 

From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is  unacceptable,  for  France, 
without  further'  territory  in  Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crushed 
as  to  lose  her  position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  become  subordinate  to  German 
policy. 

Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this 
bargain  with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the 
good  name  of  this  country  would  never  recover. 

The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away  whatever  obligation 
or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could  not 
entertain  that  bargain  either. 

Having  said  so  much  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine  whether  the  prospect  of 
a  future  general  neutrality  agreement  between  England  and  Germany  offered 
positive  advantages  sufficient  to  compensate  us  for  tying  our  hands  now.  We 
must  preserve  our  full  freedom  to  act  as  circumstances  may  seem  to  us  to  require 
in  any  such  unfavourable  and  regrettable  development  of  the  present  crisis  as 
the  Chancellor  contemplates. 

You  should  speak  to  tlie  Chancellor  in  the  above  sense,  and  add  most 
earnestly  that  the  one  way  of  maintaining  the  good  relations  between  England 
and  Germany  is  tliat  they  should  continue  to  work  together  to  preserve  the 
peace  of  Europe ;  if  we  succeed  in  this  object,  the  mutual  relations  of  Germany 
and  England  will,  I  believe,  be  ipso  facto  improved  and  strengthened.  For  that 
object  His  Majesty's  Government  will  work  in  that  way  with  all  sincerity  and 
good-will. 

And  I  will  say  this :  If  the  pence  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and  the  present 
crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavour  will  be  to  promote  some  arrangement 
to  which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured  that  no 
aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pursued  against  her  or  her  allies  by 
France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately.  I  have  desired  this  and 
worked  for  it,  as  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis,  and,  Germany 
havihg  a  corresponding  object,  6ur  relations  sensibly  improved.  The  idea  has 
hitherto  been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if  this 
present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through 
for  generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction 
wiiich  will  follow  may  malvo  possible  some  more  definite  rapprochement  between 
the  Powers  than  has  boon  possible  hitherto. 

■'  Soc  No.  85. 

No.  102. 
Sir  Echvard  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  A^nbassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telcgiapliic.)  Fo.eign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

I  HAVE  warned  Piince  Liclniowsky*  that  Germany  must  not  count  upon 
our  standing  aside  in  all  circumstances.     This  is  doubtless  the  substance  of  the 
telegram  from  Prince  Liclmov.sky^  to  German  Chancellor,  to  which  reference 
is  made  in  th.e  last  Uvo  paragraphs  of  your  telegram  of  30th  July.f 
*  German  Ambiissador  in  London.  f  See  No.  98. 

x\o.  103. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G,  Bach^nan-,  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburyh. 

(Telegraphic.)  ^  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

GERMAN  Ambassador  informs  me  that  German  Government  would 
endeavour  to  influence  Austria,  after  taking  Belgrade  and  Servian  territory  in 
region  of  frontier,  to  promise  not  to  advance  further,  while  Powers  endeavoured 


56 


I 


•I 


to  arrange  that  Servia  should  give  satisfaction  sufficient  to  pacify  Austria. 
Territory  occupied  would  of  course  be  evacuated  when  Austria  was  satisfied. 
I  suggested  this  yesterday  as  a  possible  relief  to  the  situation,  and,  if  it  can 
be  obtained,  I  would  earnestly  hope  that  it  might  be  agreed  to  suspend  further  : 
military  preparations  on  all  sides. 

Russian  Ambassador  has  told  me  of  condition  laid  down  by  M.  Sazonof,* 
as  quoted  in  your  telegram  of  the  30th  Jul^,t  and  fears  it  cannot  be  modified ; 
but  if  Austrian  advance  were  stopped  after  occupation  of  Belgrade,  I  think 
Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs'  formula  might  be  changed  to  read  that 
the  Powers  would  examine  how  Servia  could  fully  satisfy  Austria  without 
impairing  Servian  soviereign  rights  or  independence. 

If  Austria,  having  occupied  Belgrade  and  neighbouring  Servian  territory, 
declares  herself  ready,  in  the  interest  of  European  peace,  to  cease  her  advance 
and  to  discuss  how  a  complete  settlement  can  be  arrived  at,  I  hope  that  Russia 
would  also  consent  to  discussion  and  suspension  of  further  military  prepara 
tions,  provided  that  other  Powers  did  the  same. 

It  is  a  slender  chance  of  preserving  peace,  but  the  only  one  I  can  suggest 
if  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  can  come  to  no  agreement  at  Berlin. 
You  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

*  Russian  Minister  for  Foreigii  Affairs.  +  See  No.  97. 


No.  104. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F,  Bertie j  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  30,  1914. 

YOU  should  inform  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  my  telegram  to  Sir 
G.  Buchanan*  of  to-day,t  and  say  that  I  know  that  he  has  been  urging  Russia 
not  to  precipitate  a  crisis.     I  hope  he  may  be  able  to  support  this  last  sugges- 
tion at  St.  Petersburgh. 

*  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Peteirsburgih.  t  See   No.  103. 


No.  105. 
Sir  Edvmrd  Grey  to  Sir  F,  Bertie^  British  Ambassador  at  Paris, 

Sir,  Foreign  Office^  July  30,  1914. 

M.  CAMBON*  reminded  me  to-day  of  the  letter  I  had  written  to  him 
two  years  ago,  in  which  we  agreed  that,  if  the  peace  of  Europe  was  seriously 
threatened,  we  would  discuss  what  we  were  prepared  to  do.  I  enclose  for 
convenience  of  reference  copies  of  the  letter  in  question  and  of  M.  Cambon's 
reply.  He  said  that  the  peace  of  Europe  was  never  more  seriously  threatened 
than  it  was  now.  He  did  not  wish  to  ask  me  to  say  directly  that  w'e  would 
intervene,  but  he  would  like  me  to  say  what  we  should  do  if  certain  circum- 
stances arose.  The  particular  hypothesis  he  had  in  mind  was  an  aggression 
by  Germany  on  France.  He  gave  me  a  paper,  of  which  a  copy  is  also  enclosed, 
showing  that  the  German  military  preparations  were  more  advanced  and  more 
on  the  offensive  upon  the  frontier  than  anything  France  had  yet  done.  He 
anticipated  that  the  aggression  would  take  the  form  of  either  a  demand  tha^ 
France  should  cease  her  preparations,  or  a  demand  that  she  should  engage 
to  remain  neutral  if  there  was  war  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Neither 
of  these  things  could  France  admit, 

I  said  that  the  Cabinet  was  to  meet  to-morrow  morning,  and  I  would  seo 
him  again  to-morrow  afternoon. 

I  am,  &c.. 

E.  GREY. 
•  French  Ambassador  in  London. 


Enclosure  1  in  No.  105. 
Sir  Edioard  Grey  to  M.  CamboUy  French  Ambassador  in  London* 
My  dear  Ambassador,  Foreign  Office,  November  22,  1912. 

FROM  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  British  naval  and 
military  experts  have   consulted   together.    It  has   always   been   understood 


57 

that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Government  to 
decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to  assist  the  other  by  armed  force. 
We  have  agreed  that  consultation  between  experts  is  not,  and  ought  not  to 
be  regarded  as,  an  engagement  that  commits  either  Government  to  action  in 
a  contingency  that  has  not  arisen  and  may  never  arise.  The  disposition,  for 
instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets  respectively  at  the  present  moment 
is  not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operate  in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave 
reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  it  might  become 
essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon  the  armed 
assistance  of  the  other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  xinpro- 
voked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  something  that  threatened  the  general 
peace,  it  should  immediately  discuss  with  the  other  whether  both  Govern- 
ments should  act  together  to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve  peace,  and, 
if  so,  what  measures  they  would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common.  If  these 
measures  involved  action,  the  plans  of  the  General  Staffs  would  at  once  bo 
taken  into  consideration,  and  the  Governments  would  then  decide  what  effect 
should  be  given  to  them. 

Yours,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 


Enclosure  2  in  No.  105. 


M,  Camhon,  French  Ambassador 

L* Ambassade  dc  France, 
Londres, 
ce  23  novcmbre,  1912. 
Cher  Sir  Edward, 

PAR  votre  lettre  en  date  d'hier,  22 
novembre,  vous  m'avez  rappele  que, 
dans  ces  dernieres  annees,  les  autorites 
militaires  et  navales  de  la  France  et  de 
la  Grande-Bretagne  s'etaient  consul- 
tees  de  temps  en  temps ;  qu'il  avait  tou- 
jours  ete  entendu  quo  ces  consulta- 
tions ne  restreignaient  pas  la  liberte, 
pour  chaque  Gouvernement,  de  decider 
dans  I'avenir  s'ils  se  preteraient  I'un 
I'autre  le  concours  de  leurs  forces 
arrnees ;  -.que,  de  part  et  d'autre, 
ces  consultations  entre  specialistes 
n'etaient  et  ne  devaient  pas  etre  con- 
sid^rees  comme  des  engagements  obli- 
geant  nos  Gouvernements  a  agir  dans 
certains  cas;  que  cependant  je  vous 
avais  fait  observer  que,  si  I'un  ou 
I'autre  des  deux  Gouvernements  avait 
dc  graves  raisons  d'apprehender  une 
attaque  non  provoquec  de  la  part  d'une 
tierce  Puissance,  il  deviendrait  essen- 
tiel  de  savoir  s'il  pourrait  compter  sur 
I'assistance  armee  de  I'autre. 

Votre  lettre  repond  a  cette  observa- 
tion, et  je  suis  autorise  a  vous  declarer 
que,  dans  le  cas  ou  I'un  de  nos  deux 
Gouvernements  aurait  un  motif  grave 
d'apprehender  soit  I'agression  d'une 
tierce  puissance,  soit  quelque  evene- 
ment  mena9ant  pour  la  paix  generale, 
ce  Gouvernement  examinerait  immedia- 
temcnt  avec  I'autre  si  les  deux  Gou- 
vernements doivent  agir  de  concert  en 
vue  de  prevenir  I'agression  ou  de 
sauvegarder  la  paix.     Dans  ce  cas,  les 


in  London f  to  Sir  Edioard  Grey. 
(Translation.) 
French  Fmbassy,  London ^ 
November  23,  1912. 
Dear  Sir  Edward, 

YOU  reminded  me  in  your  letter  of 
yesterday,  22nd  November,  that  during 
the  last  few  years  the  military  and 
naval  authorities  of  France  and  Great 
Britain  had  consulted  with  each  other 
from  time  to  time ;  that  it  had  always 
been  understood  that  these  consulta- 
tions should  not  restrict  the  liberty  of 
either  Government  to  decide  in  the 
future  whether  they  should  lend  each 
other  the  support  of  their  armed 
forces ;  that,  on  either  side,  these  con- 
sultations between  experts  were  not 
and  should  not  be  considered  as 
engagements  binding  our  Governments 
to  take  action  in  certain  eventuali- 
ties ;  that,  however,  I  had  remarked 
to  you  that,  if  one  or  other  of  the  two 
Governments  had  grave  reasons  to  fear 
an  unprovoked  attack  on  the  part  of  a 
third  Power,  it  would  become  essential 
to  know  whether  it  could  count  on  the 
armed  support  of  the  other. 

Your  letter  answers  that  point,  and 
I  am  authorised  to  state  that,  in  the 
event  of  one  of  our  two  Governments 
having  grave  reasons  to  fear  either  an 
act  of  aggression  from  a  third  Power, 
or  some  event  threatening  the  general 
peace,  that  Government  would  imme- 
diately examine  with  the  other  the 
question  whether  both  Governments 
should  act  together  in  order  to  prevent 
the  act  of  aggression  or  preserve  peace. 
If  so,  the  two  Governments  would  de- 


5'3 


1 


deux  Goiivcrnements  delibereraient  siir 
les  mcsures^qirils  seraient  disposes  a 
prendre  en  commun;  si  ces  mesures 
comportaient  ime  action,  les  deux  Gou- 
vernements  prendraient  aussitot  en 
consideration  les  plans  de  leiirs  etats 
majors  et  decideraient  alors  de  la  suite 
<iui  devrait  etre  donnee  a  ces  plans 
Votre  sincerement  devone, 

PAUL  CAMBON. 


liberate  as  to  the  measures  -which  they 
would  be  prepared  to  take  in  common^ 
if  those  measures  involved  .action,  the 
two  Governments  woidd  take  into  im- 
mediate consideration  the  plans  of 
their  general  staffs  and  would  then  de- 
cide as  to  the  effect  to  be  given  to 
those  plans. 

Yours,  &c., 

PAUL  CAMBON. 


Enclosure  3  in  No.  105. 
French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to  M.  CamVon,  French  Amhcissador 

in  London. 


L'AEMliE  allemande  a  Bes  avant- 
postes  sur  nos  bornes-f  rontieres,  hier ; 
par  deux  fois  des  patrouilles  alle- 
mandes  ont  penetre  sur  notro  terri- 
toire.  Nos  avant-postes  sont  en  re- 
traite  a  10  kilom.  en  arriere  de  la  fron- 
tiere.  Les  populations  ainsi  abandon- 
nees  a  I'attaque  de  I'armee  adverse 
protestent ;  mais  le  Gouvernement  tient 
a  montrer  a  1' opinion  publique  et  au 
Gouvernement  britannique  que  I'agres- 
seur  no  sera  en  aucun  cas  la  France. 
Tout  le  16®  Corps  de.Metz  renforce  par 
une  partie  du  8«  venu  do  Treves  et  de 
Cologne  occupe  la  f  rontiere  de  Metz  au 
Luxembourg.  Le  15®  Corps  d'Armee 
de  Strasbourg  a  serre  sur  la  frontiere. 
Sous  menace  d'etre  fusilles  les  Al- 
saciens-Lorrains  des  pays  annexes-  ne 
peuvent  pas  passer  la  frontiere;  des 
reservistes  par  dizaines  de  milliers 
sont  rappeles  en  Allemagne;  c'est  le 
dernier  stade  avant  la  mobilisation: 
or,  nous  n'avons  rappele  aucun  reser- 
viste: 

Comme  vous  le  voyez,  TAllemagne 
I'a  fait.  J'ajoute  que  toutes  nos  in- 
formations concordent  pour  montrer 
que  les  preparatifs  allemands  ont  coni- 
mfence  samedi,*  le  jour  meme  de  la 
remise  de  la  note  autrichienne. 

Ces  elements,  ajoutes  a  ceux  contenus 
dans  mon  telegramme  d'hier,  vous  per- 
mettent  de  faire  la  preuve  au  Gou- 
vernement britannique  de  la  volonte 
pacifique  de  I'un  et  des  intentions 
agressives  de  I'autre. 


(Translation.) 

THE  German  Army  had  its  advance- 
posts  on  our  frontiers  yesterday ; 
German  patrols  twice  penetrated  on 
to  our  territory.  Our  advance-posts 
are  withdrawn  to  a  distance  of  10 
kilom.  from  the  frontier.  The  local 
population  is  protesting  against  being 
thus  abandoned  to  the  attack  of  the 
enemy's  army,  but  the  Government 
wishes  to  make  it  clear  to  public 
opinion  and  to  the  British  Government 
that  in  no  case  will  France  be  the 
aggressor.  The  whole  16th  corps  from 
Metz,  reinforced  by  a  part  of  the  8th 
from  Treves  apd  Cologne,  is  occupying 
the  frontier  at  Metz  on  the  Luxemburg 
side.  The  15th  ,  army  corps  from 
Strassburg  has  closed  up  on  the  frontier. 
The  inhabitants  of  Alsace-Lorraine  are 
prevented  by  the  threat  of  being  shot 
from  crossing  the  frontier.  Reservists 
have  been  called  back  to  Germany  by 
tens  of  thousands.  This  is  the  last  stage 
before  mobilisation,  whereas  we  have 
not  called  back  a  single  reservist. 

As  you  see,  Germany  has  done  so. 
I  would  add  that  all  my  information 
goes  to  show  that  the  German  prepara- 
tions began  on  Saturday,*  the  very 
day  on  which  the  Austrian  note  was 
handed  in. 

These  facts,  added  to  j>hose  contained 
in  my  telegram  of  yesterday,  will 
enable  you  to  prove  to  the  British 
Government  the  pacific  intentions  of 
the  one  party  and  the  aggressive  in- 
tentions of  the  other. 


*  Sic: in  original.  The  actual  date  of  th^  preseoitafcibn  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum 
wad,  in  fact,  Thursday,  July  23.  The  Servian  reply  was  da^ed  Saturday,  July  25,  and 
^it  is  clearly  to  the  latter  dooumeoit  that  refereaioe   is  intended. 


No.  106. 
Sir  E.  Roddy  British  Ambassador  at  Rome,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 
{Received.  July  31.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Borne,  July  30,  1914. 

I  LEARNT  from  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  who  sent  for  me  this 
evening,  that  the  Austrian  Government  had  declined  to  continue  the  direct 


59 

exchange  of  views  with  the  Kussian  Government.  But  he  had  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  Germany  was  now  disposed  to, give  more  conciliatory  advice  to 
Austria,  as  she  seemed  convinced  that  we  should  act  with  France  and  Russia, 
and  was  most  anxious  to  avoid  issue  with  us. 

He  said  he  was  telegraphing  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  to  ask 
the  German  Government  to  suggest  that  the  idea  of  an  exchange  of  views 
between  the  four  Powers  should  be  resumed  in  any  form  which  Austria  would 
consider  acceptable.  It  seemed  to  him  that  Germany  might  invite  Austria 
to  state  exactly  the  terms  which  she  would  demiind  from  Servia,  and  give  a 
guarantee  that  she  would  neither  deprive  her  of  independence  nor  annex 
territory.  It  would  be  useless  to  ask  for  anything  less  than  was  contained 
in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  and  Germany  would  support  no  proposal  that 
might  imply  non-success  for  Austria.  We  might,  on  the  other  hand,  ascertain 
from  Russia  what  she  would  accept,  and,  once  we  knew  the  standpoints  of 
these  two  countries,  discussions  could  be  commenced  at  once.  There  was  still 
time  so  long  as  Austria  had  received  no  check.  He  in  any  case  was  in  favour 
of  continuing  an  exchange  of  views  with  His  Majesty's  Government  if  the  idea 
of  discussions  between  the  four  Powers  was  impossible. 


No.  107. 

Sir  E,  Goschen^  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
(Received  Judy  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin^  July  30,  1914. 

I  DO  not  know  whether  you  have  received  a  reply  from  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  the  communication*  which  you  made  to  them  through  the  German 
Ambassador  in  London  asking  whether  they  could  suggest  any  method  by  which 
the  four  Powers  could  use  their  mediating  influence  between  Russia,  and 
Austria.'  I  was  informed  last  night  that  they  had  not  had  time  to  send  an  answer 
yet.  To-day,  in  reply  to  an  enquiry  from  the  French  Ambassador  as  tc 
whether  the  Imperial  Government  had  proposed  any  course  of  action,  the 
Secretary  of  State  said  that  he  had  felt  that  time  would  be  saved  by  com- 
municating with  Vienna  direct,  and  that  he  had  asked  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  what  would  satisfy  them.  No  answer  had,  however,  yet  been 
returned. 

The  Chancellor  told  me  last  night  that  he  was  "pressing  the  button  " 
as  hard  as  he  could,  and  that  he  was  not  sure  whether  he  had  not  gone 
so  far  in  urging  moderation  at  Vienna  that  matters  had  been  precipitated 
rather  than  otherwise. 

*  See  No.  84. 


No.  108. 

Sir  E,  Goschen^  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin^  to  Sir  Edtcard  Grey. — 
(Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  July  31,  1914. 

CHANCELLOR  informs  me  that  his  efforts  to  preach  peace  and  modera- 
tion at  Vienna  have  been  seriously  handicapped  by  the  Russian  mobilisation 
against  Austria.  He  has  done  everything  possible  to  attain  his  object  at 
Vienna,  perhaps  even  rather  more  than  was  altogether  palatable  at  the  Ball- 
platz.  He  could  not,  however,  leave  his  country  defenceless  while  time  was 
being  utilised  by  other  Powers ;  and  if,  as  he  learns  is-  the  case,  military 
measures  are  now  being  taken  by  Russia  against  Germany  also,  it  would 
be  ipipossible  for  him  to  remain  quiet.  He  wished  to  tell  me  that  it  was  quite 
possible  that  in  a  very  short  time,  to-day  perhaps,  the  German  Government 
would  take  some  very  serious  step;  he  was,  in  fact,  just  on  the  point  of  going 
to  have  an   audience  with  the  Emperor. 

His  Excejlency  added  that  the  news  of  the  active  preparations  on  the  Russor 
German  frontier  had  reached  him  just  when  the  Czar  had  appealed  to  the 
lEmpefor,  in  the  name  of  their  old  friendship,  to  mediate  at  Vienna,  and  when 
the  Emperor  was  actually  conforming  to  £hat  request. 


60 

No.  109. 
Sir  E.  GoscJieriy  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(^Received  July  31.) 

(Telegraphic.)  BerlinyJuXy  ^l,  191^. 

I  READ  to  the  Chancellor  this  morning  your  answer  to  Iiis  appeal  .for 
British  neutrality  in  the  event  of  war,  as  contained  in  your  telegram  of 
yesterday ."*  His  Excellency  was  so  taken  up  with  the  news  of  the  Russian 
measures  along  the  frontier,  referred  to  in  my  immediately  preceding  telegram, 
that  he  received  your  communication  without  comment.  He  asked  me  to  let, 
him  have  the  message  that  I  had  just  read  to  him  as  a  memorandum,  as  he 
would  like  to  reflect  upon  it  before  giving  an  a,nswer,  and  his  mind;  was  so  full 
of  grave  matters  that  he  could  not  be  certain  of  remembering  all  its  points.  I 
therefore  handed  to  him  the  text  of  your  message  on  the  understanding  that 
it  should  be  regarded  merely  as  a  record  of  conversation,  and  not  as  an  official 
document. 

His  Excellency  agreed. 

*  See  No.  101. 


No.  110, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador' at  St.  Petersburgh, 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

I  LEARN  from  the  German  Ambassador  that,  as  a  result  of  suggestions  by 
the  German  Government,  a  conversation  has  taken  place  at  Vienna  between 
the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  Russian  Ambassador.  The 
Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  has  also  been  instructed  that  he 
may  converse  with  the  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  that  he  should 
give  explanations  about  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia,  and  discuss  sug- 
gestions and  any  questions  directly  affecting  A ustro- Russian  relations.  If  the 
Russian  Government  object  to  the  Anstrians  mobilising  eight  army  corps, 
it  might  be  pointed  out  that  this  is  not  too  great  a  number  against  400,000 
Servians. 

The  German  Ambassador  asked  me  to  urge  the  Russian  Government  to 
show  goodwill  in  the  discussions  and  to  suspend  their  military  preparations. 

It  is  with  great  satisfaction  that  I  have  learnt  that  discussions  are  being 
resumed  between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  you  should  express  this  to  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  tell  him  that  I  earnestly  hope  he  will  encourage 
them. 

I  informed  the  German  Ambassador  that,  as  regards  military  preparations,  I 
did  not  see  how  Russia  could  be  urged  to  suspend  them  unless  some  limit  were 
put  by  Austria  to  the  advance  of  her  troops  into  Servia. 


No.  111. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E,  Goschen,  British  Arabassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

1  liOPE  that  the  convei-sations  which  are  now  proceeding  between  Austria 
and  Russia  may  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result.  The  stumbling-block  hitherto 
has  been  Austrian  mistrust  of  Servian  assurances,  and  Russian  mistrust  of 
Austrian  intentions  with  regard  to  the  independence  and  integrity  of  Servia. 
It  has  occurred  to  me  that,  in  the  event  of  this  mistrust  preventing  a  solution 
being  found  by  Vieiana  and  St.  Petersburgh,  Germany  might  sound  Vienna, 
and  I  would  undertake  to  sound  St.  Petersburgh,  whether  it  i\'ould  be  poss'ble 
for  the  four  disinterested  Powers  to  offer  to  Austria  that  they  would  under- 
take to  see  that  she  obtained  full  satisfaction  of  her  demands  on  Servia,  provided 
that  they  did  not  impair  Servian  sovereignty  and  the  integrity  of  Servian 
territory.  As  your  Excellency  is  aware,  Austria  has  already  declared  her 
willingness  to  respect  them.  Russia  might  be  informed  by  the  four  Powers 
that  they  would  undertake  to  prevent  Austrian  demands  going  the  length  of 
impairing- Servian  sovereignty  and  integrity.  All  Powers  would  of  course 
iuispond  further  military  operations  or  preparations. 

You  may  sound  the  Secretary  of  State  about  this  proposal. 


61 

I  said  to  German  Ambassador  this  morning  that  if  Germany  could  get  any 
'reasonable  proposal  put  forward  which  made  it  clear  that  Germany  and  Austria 
were  striving  to  preserve  European  p^ace,  and  that  Russia  and  France  would 
be  unreasonable,  if  they  rejected  it,  I  would  support  it  at  St.  Petersburgh  and- 
Paris,  and  go  the  length  of  saying  that  if  Russia  and  France  would  not  accept 
it  His  Majesty's  Government  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  conse- 
quences ;•  but,  otherwise,  I  told  German  Ambassador  that  if  Fra"fice  became 
involved  we  should  be  drawn  in. 

You  can  add  this  when  sounding  Chancellor  or  Secretary  of  State  as  to 
proposal  above. 


No.  112. 

Sii'  E,  GoscheUj  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Eduo'xrd  Grey. — 
[Received  July  31.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Bciiih,  July  31,-1914. 

ACCORDING  to  information  just  received  by  German  Government  from 
their  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  whole.  Russian  army  and  fleet  are  being 
mobilised.  Chancellor  tells  me  that  "  Kriegsgefahr  "*  will  bo  proclaimed  at  once 
by  German  Government,  as  it  <;an  only  be  against  Germany  that  Russian 
general  mobilisation  is  directed.  Mobilisation  would  follow  almost  immediately. 
His  Excellency'added  in  explanation,  that  "  Kriegsgefahr  "*  signified  the  taking 
of  certain  precautionary  measures  consequent  upon  strained  relations  Avith  a 
foreign  country. 

This  news  from  St.  Petersburgh,  added  his  Excellency,  seemed  to  him  to 
put  an  end  to  all  hope  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  crisis.  Germany  must 
Certainly  prepare  for  all  emergencies 

I  asked  him  whether  he  could  not  still  put  pressure  on  the  authorities  at 
Vienna  to  do  something  in  general  interests  to  reassure  Russia  and  to  show 
themselves  disposed  to  continue  discussions  on  a  friendly  basis.  He  replied 
that  last  night  he  had  begged  Austria  to  reply  to  your  last  proposal,  and  that 
he  had  received  a  reply  to  the  effect  that  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
would  take  wishes  of  the  Emperor  this  morning  in  the  matter. 

*  "Imminence  of  War." 


No.  113. 

ISir  G.  Buchanan^  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburyhf  to  Sir  Eduxird 
Grey. —  [Received  July  31.) 

<;Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburgh,  July  ai,  1914. 

IT  has  been  decided  to  issue  orders  for  general  mobilisation. 

This  decision  was  taken  in  consequence  of  report  received  from  Russian 
Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the  effect  that  Austria  is  determined  not  to  yield  to 
intervention  of  Powers,  and  that  she.  is  r.ioving  troops  against  Russia  as  well 
as  n  gainst  Servia. 

Russia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  is  making  active  military 
preparations,  and  she  cannot  afford  to  let  her  get  a  start. 


No.  114. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  PariSf  anX 
Sir  E.  Goschev^  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 

(Telegraphic.;  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

I  STILL  trust  that  situation  is  not  irretrievable,  but  in  view  of  prospect  of 
mobilisation  in-  Germany  it  becomes  essential  to  His  Majesty's  Government, 
in  view  of  existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  French  (German)  Government  aro 
prepared  to  engage  to  respect  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  no  other  Power 
violates  it. 

A  similar  request  is  being  addressed  to  German  (French)  Government.  It 
is  important  to  have  an  early  answer. 


62 

No.  115. 
Sir  Edward  Grei/  to  Sir  F,  Villisrs,  British  Minister  at  Brussels. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914, 

IN  view  of  existing  treaties,  you  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

that,  in  consideration  of  the  possibility  of  a  European  war,  I  have  asked  French 

and  German  Governments  whether  each  is  prepared  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 

Belgium  provided  it  is  violated  by  no  other  Power. 

You  should  say  that  I  assume  that  the  Belgian  Government  will  maintain 

to  the  utmost  of  their  power  their  neutrality,  which  I  desire  and  expect  other 

Powers  to  uphold  and  observe^ 

You  should  inform  the  Belgian  Government  that  an  early  reply  is  desired. 


No.  116. 
Sir  Edward  Grfiy  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

I  HAVE  received  your  telegram  of  yesterday's  date.* 

Nobody  here  feels  that  in  this  dispute,' so  far  as  it  has  yet  gone,  British 
treaties  or  obligations  are  involved.  Feeling  is  quite  different  from  what  it 
was  during  the  Morocco  question.  That  crisis  involved  a  dispute  directjy 
involving  France,  whereas  in  this  case  France  is  being  drawn  into  a  dispute 
which  is  not  hers. 

I  believe  it  to  be  quite  untrue  that  our  attitude  has  been  a  decisive  factor 
in  situation.     German  Government  do  not  expect  our  neutrality. 

We  cannot  undertake  a  definite  pledge  to  intervene  in  a  war.  I  have  so 
told  the  French  Ambassador,  who  has  urged  His  Majesty's  Government  to 
reconsider  this  decision. 

I  have  told  him  that  we  should  not  be  justified  in  giving  any  pledge  at  the 
present  moment,  but  that  we  will  certainly  consider  the  situation  again  directly 
there  is  a  new  development. 

*  See  No.  99. 


No.  117. 

Sir  F!' Bertie,  British  Ambassador  ut  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(Peceived  Jvly  31.) 

(Telegraphic.) .  Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

AT  7  o'clock  this  evening  I  wa£<  sent  for  by  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
When  I  arrived  the  German  Ambaj-sador  was  leaving  his  Excellency. 

German  Ambassador  had  informed  his  Excellency  that,  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  orders  had  been  given  for  the  total  mobilisation  of  Russian  army  and  fleet, 
German  Government  have  in  an  ultimatum  which  they  have  addressed  to  the 
Russian  Government  required  that  Russian  forces  should  be  demobilised. 

The  German  Government  will  consider  it  necessary  to  order  the  total 
mobilisation  of  the  German  army  on  the  Russian  and  French  frontiers  if  within 
twelve  hours  the  Russian  Government  do  not  give  an  undertaking  to  comply 
with  German  demand. 

Thb  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  asks  me  to  communicate  this  to  you,  and 
enquires  what,  in  these  circumstances,  will  be  the  attitude  of  England. 

German  Ambassador  could  not  say  when  the  twelve  hours  terminates.  He  is 
going  to  call  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-morrow  (Saturday)  at  1  p.m. 
in  order  to  receive  the  French  Government's  answer  as  to  the  attitude  they  will 
adopt  in  the  cir cum. stances. 

He  intimated  the  possibility  of  his  requiring  his  passports. 

I  am  inforiiied  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  he  is  not  aware  of  any 
general  mobilisation  of  the  Russian  forces  having  taken  place. 


,63 

No.  118. 

Sir  M.  de  Buneen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 

{Received  July  Z\.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  July  31,  19X4. 

I  AM  informed  by  Count  Forgach,  Under-Secretary  of  State,  that  although 
Austria  was  compelled  to  respond  to  Russian  mobilisation,  which  he  deplored, 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  London  has  received  instructions  to  inform  you 
that  mobilisation  was  not  to  bo  regarded  as  a  necessarily  hostile  act  on  either 
side.  Telegrams  were  being  exchanged  between  the  Emperpr  of  Russia  and 
the  German^  Emperor,  and  conversations  were  proceeding  between  Austrian 
Ambassador  a,t  St.  Petersburgh  and  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  A 
general  war  might,  he  seriously  hoped,  be  staved  off  by  these  efforts.  On  my 
expressing  my  feaf  that  Germany  would  mobilise,  he  said  that  Germany  must 
do  something,  in  his  opinion,  to  secure  her  position.  As  regards  Russian 
intervention  on  behalf  of  Servia,  Austria-Hungary  found  't  difficult  to  recognise 
such  a  claim.  I  caviled  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  during  the  discussion  of 
the  Albanian  frontier  at  the  London  Conference  of  Ambassadors  the  Russian 
Government  had  stood  behind  Servia,  and  that  a  compromise  between  the  viiews 
of  Russia  and  Austria- Hungary  resulted  with  accepted  frontier  line.  Although 
iie  spoke  in  a  conciliatory  tone,  and  did  not  regard  the  situation  as  de^sperate,. 
I  could  not  get  from  him  any  suggv-stion  for  a  similar  compromise  in  the 
present  casd.  Count  Forgach  is  going  this  afternoon  to  see  the  Russian 
Ambassador,  whom  T  have  informed  of  the  above  conversation. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  has  explained  that  Russia  has  no  desire  to  interfere 
unduly  with  Servia ;  that,  as  compared  with  the  late  Russian  Minister,  the 
present  Minister  at  Belgrade  is  a  man  of  very  moderate^  views ;  and  that,  as 
regards  Austrian  demands,  Russia  had  counselled  Servia  to  yield  to.  them  as 
far  as  she  possibly  could  without  sacrificing  her  independence.  His  Excellency 
is  exerting  himself  strongly  in  the  interests  of  peace. 


No.  119. 
Sir  Edward  Qrey  to  Sir  F,  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris* 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  July  31,  1914. 

M.  CAMBON*  referred  to-day  to  a  telegram  that  had  been  shown  to  Su 
Arthur  Nicolsonf  this  morning  from  the  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  saying 
that  it  was  the  uncertainty  with  regard  to  whether  we  would  intervene  which 
was  the  encouraging  element  in  Berlin,  and  that,  if  we  would  only  declare 
definitely  on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France,  it  would  decide  the  German  attitude 
in  favour  of  peace. 

I  said  that  it  was  quite  wrong  to  suppose  that  we  had  left  Germany  under 
the  impression  that  we  would  not  intervene.  I  had  refused  overtures  to  promisd 
that  we  should  remain  neutral.  I  had  not  only  definitely  declined  to  say  that 
we  would  remain  neutral,  I  had  even  gone  so  far  this  morning  as  to  say  bo  the 
German  Ambassador  that,  if  France  and  Germany  beoarae  involved  in  war.  we 
should  be  drawn  into  it.  That,  of  course,  wyis  not  th«  same  thing  a«  taking 
an  engagement  to  France,  and  I  told  M.  Cambon  of  n  only  to  show  that  we 
had  not  left  Germany  under  the  impression  that  we  would  stand  aside. 

M.  Camboil  then  asked  me  for  my  reply  to  what  he  had  said  ypsterday. 

I  said  that  we  had  come  to  the  conclusion,  in  the  Cabinet  to-day,  that  we 
could  not  give  any  pledge  at  the  present  time.  Though  wp  should  have  to  put 
our  policy  before  Parliament,  we  could  not  pledge  Parliament  in  advance.  Up 
to  the  present  moment,  we  did  not  feel,  and  public  opinion  did  not  feel,  that 
any  treati'es  or  obligations  of  this  country  were  involved.  Further  develop- 
ments might  alter  this  situation  and  cause  the  Government  and  Parliament  to 
take,  the  view  that  mtervention  was  justified.  The  preservation  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  might  be,  I  would  not  say  a  decisive,  but  an  important  factor,  in 
determining  our  attitude.  Whether  we  proposed  to  Parliament  to  intervene 
or  not  to  intervene  in  a  war,  Parliament  would  wish  to  know  how  we  stood 
with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium;  and  it  might  be  that  I  should  ask 

*  French    Ambassador   in   London. 

t  British  Under  Secretary  of  State  fox  Foreign  Affairs. 


64 

both  France  and  Germany  whether  each  was  prepared  to  undertake  an  engage- 
ment that  she  would  not  be  the  first  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

M.  Cambon  repeated  his  question  whether  we  would  help  Trance  if  Germany 
made  an  attack  on  her. 

I  said  that  I  could  only  adhere  to  the  answer  that,  as  far  as  things  had  gone 
at  present,  we  could  not  take  any  engagement. 

M.  Cambon  urged  that  Germany  had  from  the  beginning  rejected  proposals 
that  might  have  niiide  for  peace.  It  could  not  be  to  England's  interest  thiat 
France  should  be  crushed  by  Germany.  We  should  then  be  in  a  very  diminished 
position  with  regard  to  Germany.  In  1870  wc  had  made  a  great  mistake  in 
allowing  an  enormous  increase  of  German  strength,  and  we  should  now  be 
repeating  the  mistake.  He  asked  me  whether  I  could  not  submit  his  question 
to  the  Cabinet  again. 

I  said  that  the  Cabinet  would  certainly  be  summoned  as  soon  as  there  was 
some  new  development,  but  at  the  present  moment  the  only  -answer  I  could 
give  was  that  wo  could  not  undertake  any  definite  engagement. 

I  am,  (Src, 

E.  GREY. 


No.  120. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan,  British  Ambassador'  at  St.  Peter sburgh,  to  Sir  Edivard 
Grey. —  {Rtctived  A^cgnst  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  6'f.  Petcrsburgh,  July  31,  1Q14. 

MINISTER  for  Foreign  AiTairs  sent  for  mo  and  French  Ambassador  and 
asked  us  to  telegraph  to  our  respective  Governments  subjoined  formula  as  best 
calculated  to  amalgamate  proposal  made  by  you  in  your  telegram  of  30th  July* 
with  formula  recorded  in  my  telegram  of  30th  July.t  He  trusted  it  would 
meet  with  your  approval :  — 

"  Si  TAutricho  consentira  a  arreter  marche  des  sea  troupes  sur  le  territoire 
serbe,  si,  reconnaissant  que  le  conflit  austro-serbe  a  assume  le  caractere  d'une 
question  d'interet  europeen,  elle  admet  que  les  Grandes  Puissances  examinent 
la  satisfaction  que  la  Serbic  pourrait  accorder  au  Gouvernement  d'Autriche- 
Hongric  sans  laisser  porter  atteinte  a  ses  droits  d'£tat  souverain  et  a  son 
indepoudance,  la  Russie  s'engage  a  conserver  son  attitude  expectante."t 

His  Excellency  then  alluded  to  the  telegram  sent  to  German  Emperor 
by  Emperor  of  Russia  in  reply  to  the  former's  telegram.  He  said  that  Emperor 
Nicholas  had  begun  by  thanking  Emperor  William  for  his  telegram  and  for 
the  hopes  of  peaceful  solution  which  it  held  out.  His  Majesty  had  then 
proceeded  to  assure  Emperor  William  that  no  intention  whatever  of  an  aggres- 
sive character  was  concealed  behind  Russian  military  preparations.  So  long 
as  conversation  with  Austria  continued,  His  Imperial  Majesty  undertook  that 
not  a  single  man  should  be  moved  across  the  frontier  ;  ii  was,  however,  of  course 
impossible,  for  reasons  cxi>lained,  to  stop  a  mobilisation  which  was  already 
in  progress. 

M.  Sazonof§  said  that  undoubtedly  there  would  bo  better  prospect  of  a 
peaceful  solution  if  the  suggested  conversation  were  to  take  i>lace  in  London, 
where  the  atmosphere  was  far  more  favourable,  and  he  therefore  hoped  that 
you  Avould  see  your  way  to  agreeing  to  this. 

His  Excellency  ended  by  expressing  his  deep  gratitude  to  His  Majesty's 
Government,  who  had  done  so  much  to  save  the  situation.  It  would  be  largely 
due  to  them  if  war  were  prevented.  The  Emperor,  the  Russian  Government, 
and  the  Russian  people  would  never  forget  the  firm  attitude  adopted  by 
Great  Britain. 

*  Sec  No.   103. '  f  See  No.   97 

t  Tkanslation.— "If  Austria  will  agree  to  check  the  advance,  of  her  troops  on 
Servian  territory;  if,  recognising  thafe  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  has 
assumed  a  character  of  European  interest,  she  will  allow  the  Great  Powers  to  look 
into  the  matter  and  determine  whs-ther  Servia  could  satisfy  the  Aastro-Hungariaa 
Government  without  impairing  her  rights  as  a  sovereign  State  or  hor  indepondenco, 
Russia  will  undertake  to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude." 

§  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


65 

No.  121. 
Sir  E.  Goscherif  British  Ambassador  at  .Berlin^  to  Sir  Edioard  Grey, — 
{Received,  Avz/iosi  1.) 
(TeJegraphic.)  Berliriy  July  31,  1914. 

'YOUR  telegram  of  31st  July.* 

I  spent  an  hour  witn  Secretary  of  State  .urging  liim  most  earnestly  to 
accept  your  proposal  and  make  another  effort  to  prevent  terrible  catastropho 
of  a  European  war. 

Ho  expressed  himself  very  sympathetically  towards  your ,  proposal,  and 
appreciated  your  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace,  but  said  it  was  impos- 
sible for  the  Imperial  Government  to  consider  any  proposal  until  they  had 
received  an  answer  from  Russia  to  their  communication  of  to-day;  this  com- 
munication, which  he  admitted  had  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  being  that, 
unless  Russia  could  inform  the  Imperial  Government  within  twelve  hours  that 
she  would  immediat^jly  countermand  her  mobilisation  against  Germany  and 
Austria,  Germany  would  be  obliged  on  her  side  to  mobilise  at  once. 

I  asked  his  Excellency  why  they  had  made  their  demand  even  more  difficult 
for  Russia  to  accept  by  asking  them  to  demobilise  m  south  as  well.  ,  He 
replied  that  it  was  in  order  to  prevent  Russia  from  saying  all  her  mobilisation 
was  only  directed  against  Austria.  ^ 

His  Excellency  said  that  if  the  answer  from  Russia  was  satisfactory  he 
thought  personally  that  your  proposal  merited  favourable  consideration',  and 
in  any  case  he  would  lay  it  before  the  Emperor  and  Chancellor,  but  he 
repeated  that  it  was  no  use  discussing  it  until  the  Russian  Government  had 
sent  in  their  answer  to  the  German  demand. 

He  again  assured  me  that  both  the  Emperor  William,  at  the  request  of  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  ana  the  German  Foreign  Office  had  even  up  till  last  night 
been  urging  Austria  to  show  willingness  to  continue  discussions — and  tele- 
graphic and  telephonic  communications  from  Vienna  had  been  of  a  promising 
nature — but  Russia's  niobilisation  had  spoilt  everything. 

♦  Sco  No.  111. 


No.  122. 

Sir  E.  Gosckeriy  British  Aviihassador  at  Berlin^  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 
{Received  August  1.) 
<Telegraphic.)  Bprliuy  July  31,  1914. 

-NEUTRALITY  of  Belgium,  referred  to  in  your  telegram  of  31st  July  to 
Sir  F.  Bertie.* 

I  have  seen  Secretary  of  State,  who  informs  me  that  ho  must  consult  the 
Bmperor  and  the  Chancellor  before  he  could  possibly  answer,  J  gathered  from, 
what  he  said  that  he  thought  any  reply  they  might  give  could  not  but  disclose 
a  certain  amount  of  their  plan  of  campaign  in  the  event  oi  war  ensuing, 
and  ho  Was  thereforo  very  doubtful  whether  they  would  return  any  answer 
at  all.     His  Excellency,   nevertheless,  took   note  of  your   request. 

It  appears  from  what  he  said  that  German  Government  consider  that 
certain  hostile  acts  have  already  been  committed  by  Belgium.  As  an  instance 
of  this,  he  alleged  that  a  consignment  of  corn  for  Germany  had  been  placed 
under  an  embargo  already. 

I  hope  to  see  his  Excellency  to-morrow  again  to  discuss  the  matter  further, 
but  the  prospect  of  obtaining  a  definite  answer  seems  to  me  remote. 

In  speaking  to.  md  to-day  the  Chancellor  made  it  clear  that  Germany 
would  in  any  case  desire  to  know  the  reply  returned  to  you  by  tho  Frjench 
Government. 

*  See  No.  114. 

No.  123. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Sir,  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

I'  TOLD  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  that  tho  reply*  of  tho  German 
Government  with  regard  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  a  matter  of  very 

*  See  No.  122. 


66 

great  regret,  because  the  neutrality. of  Belgium  affected  feeling  in  this  country. 
If  Germany  could  ^oe  her  way  to  give  the  same  assurance  as  that  which  had 
been  given  by  Franco  it  would  matoi:ially  contribute  to  relievo  anxiety  and 
tension  here.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  by  one  combatant  while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  ex- 
tremely dijfficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this  country.  I  said  that  we  had 
been  discussing  this  question  ftt  a  Cabinet  meeting,  and  as  I-  was-atithorised 
to  tell  him  this  I  gave  him  a  memorandum  of  it. 

lie  asked  me  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgium 
neutrality  we  would  engage  to  remain  neutral. 

I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that ;  our  hands  wore  still  free,  and  we  were 
considering  what  our  attitude  should  be.  All  I  could  say  was  that  our  attitude 
would  be  determined  largely  by  public  opinion  here,  and  that  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  would  appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion  here.  I  did  not  think 
that  we  could  give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition  alono. 

The  Ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could  not  formulate  conditions 
on  which  we  would  remain  neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of 
France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed. 

I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to  remain  neutral 
on  similar  terms,  .and  I  could  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our  hands  free. 

I  am,  &c., 

E.  GREY. 


No.  124. 

Sir  F.  Bertie f  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  (h'ey.. — 
(Received  August  1.) 

^Telegraphic.)  Taris,  July  31,  1914. 

ON  the  receipt  at  8.30  to-night  of  your  telegram  of  this  afternoon,*  I  sent 
a  message  to  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  requesting  to  see  him.  Ho  received 
me  at  10.30  to-night  at  the  Elysee,  where  a  Cabinet  Council  v.as  being  held. 
He  took  a  note  of  the  enquiry  as  to  the  respecting  by  France  of  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium  which  you  instructed  me  to  make. 

He  told  me  that  a  communication  had  been  mad«  to  you  by  the  German 
Ambassador  in  London  of  the  intention  of  .Germany  to  order  a  general  mobili- 
sation of  her  army  if  Russia  do  not  demobilise  at  once.  He  is  urgently  anxious 
as  to  what  the  attitude  of  England  will  bo  in  the  circumstances,  and  begs 
an  ans)ver  may  be  made  by  His  Majesty's  Government  at  the  earliest  moment 
possible. 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  also  told  me  that  the  German  Embassy  is 
packing  up. 

*  Se-e  No.  114. 


No.  125. 

Sir  F.  BertiCf  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  Aif-giist  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  July  31,  1914. 

MY  immediately  preceding  telegram.* 

Political  Director  has  brought  me  the  reply  of  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  to  your  enquiry  respecting  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  It  is  as 
follows : — 

French  Government  are  resolved  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and 
it  would  only  bo  in  the  event  of  some  other  Power  violating- that  neutrality 
that  France  might  find  herself  under  the  necessity,  in  order  to  assure  defence 
of  her  own  .security,  to  act  otherwise.  This  assurance  has  been  given  severiil 
times.  President  of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of  the  Belgian.s, 
and  the  French-  Minister  at  Brussels  has  spontaneously  renewed  the  assurance 
to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day. 

*  Sco  No.  124. 


67 

No.  126. 

Sir  F,  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  PaHs,  to  Sir  Edioard  Greij.-^^ 

{Eeceivsd  August  1  ) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  1,  1914. 

I  HAVE  had  conversation  with  the  Political  Director,  who  states  that  the 
German  Ambassador  was  informed,  on  calling  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign 
Affairs  this  morning,  that  the  French  Government  failed  to  comprehend  the 
reason  which  prompted  his  communication  of  yesterday  evening.  It  was 
pointed  out  to  his  Excellency  that  general  mobilisation  in  Russia  had  not 
been  ordered  until  after  Austria  had  decreed  a  general  mobilisation,  and  that 
the  Russian  Government  were  ready  to  demobilise  if  all  Powers  did  likewise. 
It  seemed  strange  to  the  French  Government  that  in  view  of  this  and  of  the 
fact  that  Russia  and  Austria  were  ready  to  converse,  the  German  GoYernmeut 
should  have  at  that  moment  presented  an  ultimatum  at  St.  Petersburgh 
requiring  immediate  demobilisation  by  Russia.  There  were  no  diifererices  at 
issue  between  France  and  Germany,  but  the  German  Ambassador  had  made 
a  menacing  communication  to  the  French  Government  and  had  requested 
an  answer  the  next  day,  intimating  that  he  would  have  to  break  off  relations 
and  leave  Paris  if  the  reply  were  not  satisfactory.  The  Ambassador  was  in- 
formed that  the  French  Government  considered  that  this  was  an  extraordinary 
proceeding. 

The  German  Ambassador,  who  is  to  see  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
again  this  evening,  said  nothing  about  demanding  his  passports,  but  he  stated 
that  he  had  packed  up. 


No.  127. 

Sir  M,  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  Augtust  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  ^  Vienna,  August  1,  1914. 

GENERAL  mobilisation  of  army  and  fleet. 


No.  128. 

Sir  F,  Villiers,  BHtish  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 
{Received  Augicst  1 .) 

(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  1,  1914. 

BELGIAN  neutrality. 

The  instructions  conveyed  in  your  telegram  of  yesterday*  have  been  acted 
upon. 

Belgium  expects  and  desires  that  other  l^ov/ers  will  observe  and  uphold 
her  neutrality,  which  she  intends  to  maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her  power. 
In  so  informing  me,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that,  in  the  event  of 
the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  their  territory,  they  believed  that  they  were 
in  a  position  to  defend  themselves  against  intrusion.  The  relations  between 
Belgium  and  her  neighbours  were  excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  suspect 
their  intentions;  but  he  thought  it  well,  nevertheless,  to  be  prepared  against 
emergencies. 

*  Seo  No.  115. 


No.  129. 
Minister  of  State,  Luxemburg,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — {Received  August  2.) 

(Translation.) 
Luxembourg,  2  aoUt,  1914,  Luxemburg,  Augu>8t  2,  1914, 

(Telegraphique.)  (Telegraphic.) 

MINISTRE   d'£tat  du  Luxembourg  The  Luxemburg  Minister  of  State, 

Eyschen  vient  de  recevoir  par  Pinter-  JEyshen,  has  just  received  through  the 
mediaire  du  Ministre  d'Allemagne  a  German  Minister  in  Luxemburg,  M.  de 
Luxembourg,  M.  de  Buch,  un  tele-  Buch,  a  telegram  from  the  Chancellor 
gramme    du    Chancelier    de    I'Empire     of    the  German    Empire,   Bethmann- 


68 

allemand     Bethmann-Hollweg     disant  HoUweg,  to  the  effect  that  the  military 

que  les  mesures  militaires  a  Luxem-  measures  taken  in  Luxemburg  do  not 

bourg  ne  constituent  pas  un  acte  hos-  constitute  a  hostile  act  against  Luxem- 

tilc  centre  le  Luxembourg,  mais  sont  burg,  but  are  only  intended  to  insure 

uniquement   des   mesures   destinees   a  against  a  possible  attack  of  a  French 

assurer  centre  attaque  eventuelle  d'une  army*     Full  compensation  will  be  paid 

armee    fran9aise.      L' exploitation    des  to  Luxemburg  for  any  damage  caused 

voies    ferrees    affermees    a    TEmpire  by  using  the  railways  which  are  leased 

Luxembourg  recevra  complete  indem-  to  the  Empire, 
nite  pour  dommages  eventuels. 


No.  130. 
Sir  Edward  Gre^j  to  Sir  E.  Goschen^  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreian  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

WE  are  informed  that  authorities  at  Hamburg  have  forcibly  detained 
steamers  belonging  to  the  Great  Central  Company  and  other  British  merchant- 
ships. 

I  cannot  ascertain  on  what  grounds  the  detention  of  British  ships  has  been 
ordered. 

You  should  request  German  Government  to  send  immediate  orders  that 
they  should  be  allowed  to  proceed  without  delay.  The  effect  on  public  opinion 
here  will  be  deplorable  unless  this  is  done.  His  Majesty's  Government,  on 
their  side,  are  most  anxious  to  avoid  any  incident  of  an  aggressive  nature, 
and  the  German  Government  will,  I  hope,  be  equally  careful  not  to  take  any 
step  which  would  make  the  situation  between  us  impossible. 


No.  131. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E,  Goschcn,  British  Amh'iss:tdor  at  Berlin^ 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1S14. 

I  STILL  believe  that  it  might  be  possible  to  secure  peace  if  only  a  little 
respite  in  time  can  be  gained  before  anj'  Great  Power  begins  war. 

The  Russian  Government  has  communicated  to  me  the  readiness  of  Austria 
to  discuss  with  Russia  and  the  readiness  of  Austria  to  accept  a  basis  of  media- 
tion which  is  not  open  to  the  objections  raised  in  regard  to  the  formula  which 
Russia  originally  suggested. 

Things  ought  not  to  be  hopeless  so  long  as  Austria  and  Russia  are  ready 
to  converse,  and  I  hope  that  German  Government  may  be  able  to  make  use 
of  the  Russian  communications  referred  to  above,  in  order  to  avoid  tension. 
His  Majesty's  Government  arc  carefully  abstaining  from  any  act  which  may 
precipitate  matters. 


No.  132. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Gosc/ccUy  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Fore'gn  Office,  Auguat  1,  1014. 

FOLLOWING  telegram  from  M.  Sazonof*  to  Count  Benckendorfft  of  the 
Slst  July  communicated  to  me  to-day : —  ' 
(Urgent.) 

"  Formule  amendee  conf ormemcnt  a  la  proposition  anglaise :  "*  Si  Autriche 
consent  a  arretcr  la  marclie  de  ses  troupes  sur  le  territoire  serbc  et  si,  recon- 
naissant  que  le  conflit  austro  serbe  a  assume  le  caractere  d'une  question  d'interet 
puropeen,  elle  admet  que  les  Grandes  Puissances  examinent  la  satisfaction  que 
la  Serbie  pourrait  accorder  au  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  sans  laisser  ported 

*  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
+  Russian  Ambassador  in  London. 


69 

atteinte  a  ses  droits  d'etat  souverain  et  a  son  independance,  la  Russie  s* engage 
a  conserve!'  son  attitude  expectante.'  "* 
(Above  communicated  to  all>the  Powers.) 

*  Tkaxslation.— "Formula  amended  in  accordance  with  the  English  proposal:  *  If 
Austria  consents  to  stay  the  march  of  her  troops  on  Servian  territory,  and  if,  recognising 
that  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  has  assumed  the  character  of  a  question  of  European 
interest,  she  admits  that  the  Great  Poanxvs  may  examine  the  satisfaction  which  Servia 
can  accord  to  the  Austxo-Hungarian  Government  without  injury  to  her  sovereign  rights 
as  a  State  and  to  her  independence,  Russia  undertakes  to  preserve  her  waiting  attitude.'  " 


No.  133. 
fSh"  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goscheriy  BHtish  Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

M.  DE  ETTER*  came  to-day  to  communicate  the  contents  of  a  telegram 
from  M.  Sazonof ,t  dated  the  31st  July,  which  are  as  follows :  — 

"The  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  declared  the  readiness  of  his  Govern- 
ment to  discuss  the  substance  of  the  Austrian  ultimatiim  to  Servia.  M.  Sazonof 
replied  by  expressing  his  satisfaction,  and  said  it  was  desirable  that  the  dis- 
cussions should  take  place  in  London  with  the  participation  of  the  Great 
Powers. 

"M.  Sazonof  hoped  that  the  British  Government  would  assume  the  direction 
of  these  discussions.  The  whole  of  Europe  would  be  thankful  to  them.  It 
would  be  very  important  that  Austria  should  meanwhile  put  a  stop  provisionally 
to 'her  military  action  on  Servian. territory." 

(The  above  has  been  communicated  to  the  six  Powers.) 

*  Counsellor  of  Russian  Embassy   in  London, 
t  Russian   Minister   for  Foreign  Affairs. 


No.  134. 

JSir  F,  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 
[Received  August  1.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  1,  1914. 

PRESIDENT  of  the  Republic  has  informed  me  that  German  Government 
were  trying  to  saddle  Russia  with  the  responsibility ;  that  it  was  only  after  a 
decree  of  general  mobilisation  had  been  issued  in  Austria  that  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  ordered  a  general  mobilisation;  that,  although  the  measures  which 
the  German  Government  have  already  taken  are  m  effect  a  general  mobilisa- 
tion, they  are  not  so  designated;  that  a  French  general  mobilisation  will 
become  necessary  in  self-defence,  and  that  France  is  already  forty-eight  hours 
behind  Germany  as  regards  German  military  preparations ;  that  the  French 
troops  have  orders  not  to  go  nearer  to  the  German  frontier  than  a  distance  of 
10  kilom.  so  as  to  avoid  any  grounds  for  accusations  of  provocation  to  Germany, 
whereas  the  German  troops,  on  the  other  hand,  are  actually  on  the  French 
frontier  and  have  made  incursions  on  it ;  that,  notwithstanding  mobilisations, 
tljG  Emperor  of  Russia  has  expressed  himself  ready  to  continue  his  conversa- 
tions with  the  German  Ambassador  with  a  view  to  preserving  the  peace ;  that 
French  Government,  whose  wishes  are  markedly  pacific,  sincerely  desire  the 
preservation  of  peace  and  do  not  quite  despair,  even  now,  of  its  being  possible 
to  avoid  war. 


No.  135. 
Sir  Edwa/rd  Grey  to  Sir  G,  Buchanan^  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh. 

CTelegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

INFORMATION  reaches  me  from  a  most  reliable  source  that  Austrian 
Government  have  informed  German  Government  that  though  the  situation  has 
been  changed  by  the  mobilisation  of  Russia  they  would  in  full  appreciation  of 
the  efforts  of  England  for  the  preservation  of  peace  be  ready  to  consider  favour- 
ably my  proposal  for  mediation  between  Austria  and  Servia.     The  effect  of 


70 


I 


this  acceptance  would  naturally  be  that  the  Austrian  military  action  against 
Servia  would  continue  for  the  present,  and  that  the  British  Government  would 
urge  upon  Russian  Government  to  stop  the  mobilisation  of  troops  directed 
against  Austria,  in  which  case  Austria  would  naturally  cancel  those  defensive 
military  counter-measures  in  Galicia,  which  have  been  forced  upon  Austria  by 
Russian  mobilisation. 

You  should  inform  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  say  that  if,  in  the  con- 
sideration of  the  acceptance  of  mediation  by  Austria,  Russia  can  agree  to  stop 
mobilisation,  it  appears  still  to  be  possible  to  preserve  peace,  Presumably 
the  matter  should  be  discussed  with  German  Government,  also  by  Russian 
Government. 


No.  136. 
Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edioard  Grey.— 
(Received  August  i.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  1,  1914. 

MINISTER  of  AVar  informed  military  attache  this  afternoon  that  orders 
had  been  given  at  3.40  for  a  general  mobilisation  of  the  French  Army.  This 
became  necessary  because  the  Minister  of  War  knows  that,  under  the  system 
of  "  Kriegszustand,"*  the  Germans  have  called  up  six  classes!  Three  classes 
are  sufficient  to  bring  .their  covering  troops  up  to  war  strength,  the  remaining 
three  being  the  reserve.  This,  he  says,  being  tantamount  to  mobilisation,  is 
mobilisation  under  another  name. 

The  French  forces  on  the  frontier  have  opposed  to  them  eight  army  co;rps 
on  a  war  footing,  and  an  attack  is  expected  at  any  moment.  It  is  therefore 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  guard  against  this.  A  zone  of  10  kilom.  has  been 
left  between  the  French  troops  and  German  frontier.  The  French  troops  will 
not  attack,  and  the  Minister  of  War  is  anxious  that  it  should  be  explained 
that  this  act  of  mobilisation  is  one  for  purely  defensive  purposes.- 

*  ''State  of  war." 


No.  137. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  M,  de  Bunsen,  British  Ambassador"  at  Vienna. 

(Telegraphic.)  ^  Foreign  Office,  August  1,  1914. 

I  SAW  the  Austro-Hungaxiah  Ambassador  this  morning.  He  supplied 
me  with  the  substance  of  a  telegram  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  had  sent  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Paris.  In  this  telegram 
his  Excellency  was  given  instructions  to  assure  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  that  there  was  no  intention  in  the  minds  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  to  impair  the  sovereign  rights  of  Servia  or  to  obtain  territorial 
aggrandisement.  The  Ambassador  added  that  he  was  further  instructed  to 
inform  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  there  was  no  truth  in  the 
report  which  had  been  published  in  Paris  to  the  effect  that  Austria-Hungary 
intended  to  occupy  the  sanjak. 

Count  Mensdorff*  called  again  later  at  the  Foreign  Office.  He  informed 
me  of  a  telegram  sent  yesterday  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  at 
.St.  Petersburgh  by  Count  Berchtold,t  and  gave  me  the  substance. 

It  states  that  Count  Berchtold  begged  the  Russian  Ambassador,  whom  he 
sent  for  yesterday,  to  do  his  best  to  remove  the  wholly  erroneous  impression  in 
St.  Petersburgh  that  the  "  door  had  been  banged  "  by  Austria-Hungary  on  all 
.further  convei-sations.  The  Russian  Ambassador  promised  to  do  this.  Count 
Berchtold  repeated  on  this  occasion  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  the  assurance 
which  had  already  been  given  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  the  effect  that  neither 
an  infraction  of  Servian  sovereign  rights  nor  the  acquisition  of  Servian  territory 
was  being  contemplated  by  Austria-Hungary. 

'Special  attention  was  called  by  Count  Mensdorff*  to  the  fact  that  this  tele- 
gram contains  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  conversations  at  St.  Petersburgh 
had  not  been  broken  off  by  Austria-Hungary. 

*  AustTo-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

f  Ausbro-Hungarian  Mirw'sber  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


No.  138. 
Sir  E,  GoscJieriy  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Fdvjard  Grey,-r 
(Received  August  2.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  1,  1914. 

YOUR  telegram  of  to-day.* 

I  have  communicated  the  substance  of  the  above  telegram  to  the  Secretary 
of  State^  and  spent  a  long  time  arguing  with  him  that  the  chief  dispute  was 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  that  Germany  was  only  drawn  in  as  Austria's 
ally.  If  therefore  Austria  and  Russia  were,  as  was  evident,  ready  to  discuss 
matters  and  Germany  did  not  desire  wgr  on  her  own  account,  it  seemed  to  me 
only  logical  that  Germany  should  hold  her  hand  and  continue  to  work  for  a 
peaceful  settlement.  Secretary  of  State  said  that  Austria's  readiness  to  discuss 
was  the  result  of  German  influence  at  Vienna,  and,  had  not  Russia  mobilised 
against  Germany,  all  would  have  been  well.  But  Russia  by  abstaining  from 
answering  Germany's  demand  that  she  should  demobilise,  had  caused  Germany 
to  mobilise  also.  Russia  had  said  tha,t  her  mobilisation  did  not  necessarily 
imply  war,  and  that  she  could  perfectly  well  remain  mobilised  for  months 
without  making  war.  This  was  not  the  case  with  Germany.  She  had  the  speed 
and  Russia  had  the  numbers,  and  the  safety  of  the  German  Empire  forbade  that 
Germany  should  allow  Russia  time  to  bring  up  masses  of  troops  from  all  parts 
of  her  wide  dominions.  The  situation  now  was  that,  though  the  Imperial 
Government  had  allowed  her  several  hours  beyond  the  specified  time,  Russia 
had  sent  no  answer.  Germany  had  therefore  ordered  mobilisation,  and  the 
German  representative  at  St.  Petersburgh.  had  been  instructed  within  a  certain 
time  to  inform  the  Russian  Government  that  the  Imperial  Government  must 
regard  their  refusal  to  an  answer  as  creating  a  state  of  war,. 

*  See  No.  131. 


No.  139. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan^  British  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh,  to  Sir  Edicard 
Grey. — {Received  August  2.) 
(Telegraphic.)  St.  Petersburghy  August  1,  1914. 

■  MY  telegram  of  31st  July.* 

The  Emperor  or.  Russia  read  his  telegram  to  the  German  Emperor  to  the 
German  Ambassador  at  the  audience  given  to  his  Excellency  yesterday.  No 
progress  whatever  was  made. 

In  the  evening  M.  Sazonoft  had  an  interview  with  the'Austrian  Ambassa- 
dor, who,  not  being  definitely  instructed  by  his  Government,  did  his  best  to 
deflect'  the  conversation  towards  a  general  discussion  of  the  relations  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  instead  of  keeping  to  the  question  .of  Seryia. 
In  reply  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Aifairs  expressed  his  desire  that  these 
relations  should  remain  friendly,  and  said  that,  taken  in  general,  they  were 
perfectly  satisfactory ;  but  the  real  question  which  they  liad  to  solve  at  this 
moment  was  whether  Austria  was  to  crush  Servia  and  to  reduce  her  to  the 
status  of  a  vassal,  or  whether  she  was  to  leave  Servia  a  free  and  independent 
State.  In  the.se  circumstances,  while  the  Servian  question  was  unsolved,  the 
abstract  discussion  of  the  relations  between  Austria-Hungary  arid  Russia  was 
a  waste  of  time.  The  only  place  where  a  successful  discussion  of  this  question 
could  be  expected  was  London,  and  any  such  discussion  was  being  made  impos- 
sible 'by  the  action  of  Au§tria-Hungary  in  subjecting  Belgrade,  a  virtually 
unfortified  town,  to  bombardment. 

M.  Sazonoft  informed  the  French  Ambassador  and  myself  this  morning 
of  his.  conversation  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador.  He  went  on  to  say  that 
"during  the  Balkan  crisis  he  had  made  it  clear  to  the  Austrian  Government, 
ihat  war  with  Russia  must  inevitably  follow  an  Austrian  attack  on  Servia. 
It  was  clear  that  Austrian  domination  of  Servia  was  as  intolerable  for  Russia 
as  the  dependence  of  the  Netherlands  on  Germanv  would  be  to  Great  Britain. 
It  was,  in  fact,  for  Russia  a  question  of  life  and  death.  The  policy  of  Austria 
had  throughout  been  both  tortuous  and  immoral,  and  she  thought  that  she 
could  treat  Russia  with  defiance,  secure  in  the  support  oi  her  German  ally. 

*  See  No.  120. 

t  Russian   Minister  for  Foreign  Aflfairs. 

D 


7^ 

Similarly  the  policy  of  Germany  had  been  a:a  equivocal  and  double-faced  policy, 
,and  it  mattered  little  whether  the  German  Gbvernmcnt  linew  or  did  not 
know  tlie  t<}rms  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum;  w^hat  mattered  was  that  her 
intervention  with  the  Austrian  Government  had  been  postponed  until  the 
moment  had  passed  when  its.  influence  would  have  been  felt.  Germany  was 
unfortunate  .in  her  representatives  in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburgh :  tho 
former  was  a  violent  Russophobe  who  had  urged  Austria  on,  the  latter  had 
reported  to  his  Government  that  Russia  would  never  go  to  war.  M.  Sazonof* 
was  completely  weary  of  the  ceaseless  endeavours  he  had  made  to  avoid  a  war. 
No  suggestion  held  out  to  him  had  been  refused.  He  had  accepted  the  pro- 
posal for  a  conference  of  four,  for  mediation  by  Great  Britain  and  Italy,  for 
direct  conversation  between  Austria  and  Russia;  but  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  had  either  rendered  these  attempts  for  peace  ineffective  by  evasive 
replies  or  had  refused  them  altogether.  The  action  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  and  the  German  preparations  had  forced  the  Russian  Government 
to  order  mobilisation,  and  the  mobilisation  of  Germany  had  created  a  desperate 
situation. 

M.  Sazonof*  added  that  the  formula,  of  which  the  text  is  contained  in  my 
telegram  of  31st  July,+  had  been  forwarded  by  the  Russian  Government  to 
Vienna,  and  he  would  adhere  to  it  if  you  could  obtain  its  acceptance  before  the 
frontier  was  crossed  by  German  troops.  .  In  no  case  would  Russia  begin  hos- 
tilities first. 

I  now  see  no  possibility  of  a  general  war  being  avoided  unless  the  agree- 
ment of  France  and  Germany  can  be  obtained  to  keep  their  armies  mobilised 
on  their  ov/n  sides  of  the  frontier,*  as  Russia  has  expressed  her  readiness  to 
do,  pending  a  last  attempt  to  reach  a  settlement  of  the  present  crisis. 

*  Russian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
t  See  No.  120. 

No.  140. 

Sh'  F.  Bertie,  British  Amhassaclor  at  Paris,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  Aio</ust  1.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Paris,  August  1,  1914. 

THE  Minister  of  War  again  sent  for  the  military  attache  this  evening,  as 
he  said  he  wished  to  keep  hin\  informed  of  the  .situation.  He  laid  great  stress 
on  the  fact  that  the 'zone  of  10  kilom.,  which  he  had  arranged  between  the 
French  troops  and  the  German  frontier,  and  which  was  still  occupied  by 
peasants,  was  a  proof  of  the  French  endeavours  to  commit  no  provocative  act. 

No.  141. 

Sir  M,  de  Bwisoif  British  Ambassador  at  Viennay  to  Sir  Edxoard  Grey.-^ 

(Received  Augiist  2.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Vienna,  August  1,  1914. 

I  AM  to  be  received  to-morrow  by  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs.  This  after- 
noon he  is  to  see  the  French  and  Russian  Ambassadors.  I  have  just  been 
informed  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  of  Gferman  ultimatum  requiring  that 
Russia  should  demobilise  within  twelve  hours.  On  being  asked  by  the  Russian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  whether  the  inevitable  refusal  of  Russia  to  yield 
to  this  curt  summons  meant  war,  the  German  Ambassador  replied  that  Ger- 
many would  be  forced  to  mobilise  if  Russia  refused.  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  thinks  that  war  is  almost  inevitable,  and  that  as  mobilisation  is  too 
expensive  to  be  kept  for  long,  Germany  will  attack  Russia  at  once.  He  says 
that  the  so-called  mobilisation  of  Russia  amounted  to  nothing  more  than  that 
Russia  had  taken  military  measures  corresponding  to  those  taken  by  Germany, 
There  seems  to  be  .even  greater  tension  between  Germany  and  Russia  than 
there  is  between  Austria  and  Russia.  Russia  would,  according  to  the  Russian 
Ambassador,  be  satisfied  even  now  with  assurance  respecting  Servian  integrity 
and  independence.  He  says  that  Russia  had  no  intention  to  attack  Austria. 
He  is  going  again  to-day  to  point  out  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
that  most  terrific  consequences  must  ensue  from  refusal  to  make  this  slight 
concession.  This  time  Russia  v/ould  fight  to  the  last  extremity.  I  agree  with 
his  Excellency  that  the  German  Ambassador  at^ Vienna  desired  war  from  the 


first,  and  that  his  strong  personal  bias  probably  coloured  his  action  here. 
The  Russian  Ambassador  is  convinced  that  the  German  Government  also 
desired  war  from  the  first. 

It  is  the  intention  of  the  French  Ambassador  to  speak  earnestly  to  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Aftairs  to-day  on  the  extreme  danger  of  the  situation, 
and  to  ask  whether  proposals  to  serve  as  a  basis- of  mediation  from  any  quarter 
are  being  considered.  There  is  great  anxiety  to  know  what  England  will  do. 
I  fear  that  nothing  can  alter  the  determination  of  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment to  proceed  on  their  present  course,  if  they  have  made  up  their  mind  with 
the  approval  of  Germany. 


No.  142. 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Gre^j. — 
[Received  August  2.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  1,  1914. 

ORDERS  have  just  been  issued  for  the  general  mobilisation  of  the  navy 
and  army,  the  first  day  of  mobilisation  to  be  2nd  August." 


No.  143. 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  August  2.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  August  1,'  1914. 

DETENTION  of  British  merchant  ships  at  Hamburg. 

Your  telegram  of  1st  August*  acted  on. 

Secretary  of  State,  who  expressed  the  greatest  surprise  and  annoyance,  has 
promised  to  send  orders  at  once  to  allow  steamers, to  proceed  without  delay. 

•^  See  No.  130. 


No.  144. 

Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
(Received  August  2.) 
(Telegraphic;)  Berlin,  August  2,  1914. 

SECRETARY  of  State  has  just  informed  me  that,  owing  to  certain  Russian 
troops  having  crossed  frontier,  Germany  and  Russia  are  now  in  a  state  of  war. 


No.  Ub. 
Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey.—r- 
{Received  August  2.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Berlin,  AMgust  2,  1914, 

MY  telegram  of  1st  August.* 

Secretary  of  State  inf.orms  me  that  orders  were  sent  last  night  to  allow 
British  ships  in  Hamburg  to  proceed  on  their  way.  He  says  that  this  must 
be  regarded  as  a  special  favour  to  His  Majesty's  Government,  as  no  other 
foreign  ships  hare  been  allowed  to  leave.  Reason  of  detention  was  that  mines 
were  being  laid  and  other  precautions  being  taken. 

*  Se©  No.  143. 


No.  146. 
Sir  F,  yUliers,  Bntish  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 
{Received  August  2.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  2,  1914. 

THE  news  that  a  German  force  has  entered  Grand  Duchy  of  Luxemburg 
has  been  officially  confirmed  to  the  Belgian  Government. 

d2 


74 


No.  147. 


Minister  of  State^  Luxemburg ^  to  /Sir 

Lux'cnihourg,  Ic  2  aoiit,  1914. 
(Telej;raphiqiic.) 

J'AI  riionncur  do  porter  a  la  con- 
iiaissance  dc  votrc  Excellence  Ics  faits 
siiivants 

Dimancbe,  2  aout,  dc  f^rand  matin, 
les  troupes  allcmandeSj  d'apres  Ics  in- 
formations qui  sont  parvenues  au  Gou- 
vernement  Grand  ducal  a  I'hcure  ac- 
tuelle,  ont  pcnctre  sur  le  territoire 
luxembourgeois  par  Ics  ponts  de  Was- 
scrbillig  ct  de  Rcmicli,  se  dirigeant 
spccialement  vers  le  sud  du  pays  et  vers 
la  ville  de  Luxembourg,  capitale  du 
Grand  Duche.  Un  certain  nombre  de 
trains  blindes  avec  des  troupes  et  des 
munitions  ont  ete  achemines  par  la 
voic  de  cliemin  de  fer  de  Wasserbillig  a 
Luxembourg,  ou  Ton  s'attend  de  les 
voir  arriver.  D'un  instant  a  I'autrc, 
ccs  faits  impliqucnt  des  actes  mani- 
fostement  contraire  a  la  neutralite  du 
Giand  Duclie  garantie  par  le  Traite  de 
Londrcs  de  18G7  Le  Gouvernement 
luxembourgeois  u'a  pas  manque  de 
protester  energiquement  contre  cettc 
agression  aupres  des  representants  de 
Sa  Majeste  TEmpereur  d'Allemagno  a 
Luxembourg.  Une  protestation  iden- 
tiquo  va  etre  transmise  telegraphique- 
ment  au  Secretaire  d'j^tat  pour  les 
Affaires  Etrangeres  a  Berlin. 


Edicard  Grey, — {Received  August  2.) 

(Translation.) 
Luxemburg, 
(Telegraphic.)  August  2,  1914. 

I  HAVE  the  honour  to  bring  to 
your  Excellency's  notice  the  following 
facts : — 

On  Sunday,  the  2nd  August,  very 
early,  the  German  troops,  according  to 
the  information  which  has  up  to  now 
reached  the  Grand  Ducal  Government, 
penetrated  into  Luxemburg  territory 
by  the  bridges  of  Wasserbillig  and 
llcmich,  and  proceeded  particularly 
towards  the  south  and  in  the  direction 
of  Luxemburg,  the  capital  of  the  Grand 
Duchy.  A  certain  number  of  armoured 
trains  with  troops  and  ammunition 
have  been  sent  along  the  railway  line 
from  Wasserbillig  to  Luxemburg, 
where  their  arrival  is  expected.  These 
occurrences  constitute  acts  which  are 
manifestly  contrary  to  the  neutrality 
of  the  Grand  Duchy  as  guaranteed  by 
the  Treaty  of  London  of  1867.  The 
Luxemburg  Government  have  not 
failed  to  address  an  energetic  protest 
against  this  aggression  to  the  represen- 
tatives of  His  Majesty  the  German 
Emperor  at  Luxemburg.  An  identi- 
cal protest  will  be  sent  by  telegraph  to 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  at  Berlin. 


No.  148. 

iSir  Edicard  Grey  to  Sir  F,  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Farts. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  2,  1914. 

AFTER  the  Cabinet  this  morning  I  gave  M.  Cambon*  the  following  memo- 
randum :— r 

''I  am  authorised  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the  German  fleet  comes  into 
the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations  against 
French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in  its 
power. 

"Tiiis  assurance  is  of  course  subject  to  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment receiving  the  support  of  Parliament,  and  must  not  be  taken  as  binding 
His  -Alnjesty's  Government  to  take  any  action  until  the  above  contingency  of 
action  by  the  German  fleet  takes  place." 

I  pointed  out  that  we  had  very  large  questions  and  most  difficult  issues  to 
consider,  and  that  Government  felt  that  they  could  not  bind  themselves  to 
declare  war  upon  Germany  necessarily  if  war  broke  out  between  France  and 
Germany  to-morrow,  but  it  was  essential  to  the  French  (Government,  whose 
fleet  had  long  been  concentrated  in  the  Mediterranean,  to  know  how  to  make 
tlioir  dispositions  with  their  north  coast  entirely  undefended.  We  therefore 
thought  it  necessary  to  give  them  this  assurance.  It  did  not  bind  us  to  go  to 
u'or  with  Germany  unless  the  German  fleet  took  the  action  indicated,  but  it 
did  give  a  ^xciirity  to  Frnnce  that  would  enable  her  to  settle  the  disposition  of 
her  own  Moditonnnean  fleet. 

M.  Cambon*  asked  me  about  the  violation  of  Luxemburg.  I  told  him  the 
*  French  Ambassador  in  London. 


.75 

doctrine  on  that  point  laid  down' by  Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Clarendon  in  1867. 
He  asked  me  what  we  should  say  about  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium.  I  said  that  was  a  much  more  important  matter  ;  we  were  considering 
what  statement  we  should  make  in  Parliament  to-morrow-^in  effect,  whether 
we  should  declare  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  to  be  a  casus  belli.  I  told  him 
what  had.  been  said  to  the  German  Ambassador  on  this  point. 

No.  149. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  AnrilHissador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Forcigr,  Office,  August  2.,  1914.     ' 

YOUR  telegram  of  1st  August.* 

I  regret  to  learn  that  100  tons  of  sugar  was  compulsorily  unloaded  from  the 
British  steamship  "  Sappho  "  at  Hamburg  and  detained.  Similar  action  appears 
■  to  have  been  taken  with  regard  to  other  British  vessels  loaded  with  sugar. 

You  should  inform  Secretary  ot  State  that,  for  reasons  stated  in  my  tele- 
gram of  1st  Augustjt  I  most  earnestly  trust  that  the  orders  already  sent  to 
Hamburg  to  allow  the  clearance  of  British  ships  covers  also  the  release  of 
their  cargoes,  the  detention  of  which  cannot  be  justified. 

*  See  No.  143.  t  Sec  No.  130. 


No.  150. 

Sir  E.  Goschen^  Brilisli  Amhassadiyr  at  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  Avgiist  3.) 
(Telegraphic.)  ,  Berlin,  August  3,  1914. 

YOUR  telegram  of  2nd  August*  :  Detention  of  British  ships  at  Hamburg. 


No  information  available. 


See  No.  149. 


No.  151. 

.  Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels y  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, — 
{Received  August  3.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  3,  1914. 

FRENCH  Government  have  offered  through  their  military  attache  the 
support  of  five  French  army  corps  to  the  Belgian  Government.  Following  reply 
has  been  sent  to-day :  — 

"We  are  sincerely  grateful  to  the  French  Government  for  oft'ering  eventual 
support.  In  the  actual  circumstances,  however,  we  do  not  propose  to  appeal 
to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers.  'Belgian  Government  will  decide  later  on  the 
action  which  they  may  tliink  it  necessary  to  take." 


No.  152. 
Sir  Edivard  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Bertie,  British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Sir,'  ,  Foreign  Office,  August  3,  1914. 

ON  the  1st  instant  the  French  Ambassador  made  the  following  communi- 
cation :  — 

'In  reply  to  the  German  Government's  intimation  of  the  fact  that  ulti- 
matums had  been  presented  to  France  and  Russia,  and  to  the  question  as  to 
what  were  the  intentions  of  Italy, 'the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano*  replied  :— 

"'The  war  undertaken  by  Austria,  and  the  consequences  which  might 
result,  had,  in  the  words  of  the  German  Ambassador  himself,  an  aggressive 
object.  Both  were  therefore  in  conflict  with  the  purely  defensive  character  of 
the  Triple  Alliance,  and  in  such  circumstances  Italy  would  remain  neutral.'  " 

In  making  this  communication,  M.  Cambont  was  instructed  to  lay  stress 

*  Italian  Minist^f  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
t  French    Ambassador  in  London. 


76 

upon  the  Italian  declaration  that  the  present  war  vv^as  not  a  defensive  but  aii 
aggressive  war,  and  that,  for  this  reason,  the  casus  faderis  under  the  terms  of 
the  Triple  Alliance  did  not  arise. 

I  am,  &c. 

E.  GREY. 


No.  153. 
Sir  Edicard  Grey  to  Sir  E.  GoscJwn,  British  Amlassador  at  Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914. 

TilE  King  of  the  Belgians  has  made  an  appeal  to  His  Majesty  the  King 
for  dipiomatic  intervention  on  behalf  of  Belgium  in  the  following  teiui.s  :  — 

"Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's  friendship  and  that 
of  your  predecessor,  and  the  friendly  attitude  of  England  in  1870  and  the  proof 
of  friendship  you  have  just  given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme  appeal  to  the 
diplomatic  intervention  of  your  Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard  the 
integii^y  of  Belgium." 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  also  informed  that  the  German  Government 
hiive  delivered  to  the  Belgian  Government  a  note  proposing  friendly  neutrality 
entail-ng  free  passage  through  Belgian  territory,  and  promising  to  maintain 
the  independence  and  integrity  of  tlie  kingdom  and  its  possessions  a^the  con- 
clusion ot  peace,  threatening  in  case  of  refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  enemy. 
An  answer  was  requested  within  twelve  hours. 

We  also  understand  that  Belgium  has  categorically  refused  this  as  a  flagrant 
violation  of  the  law  of  nations. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  bound  to  protest  against  this  violation  of  a 
treaty  to  which  Germany  is  a  party  in  common  with  themselves,  and  must 
request  an  assurance  that  the  demand  made  upon  Belgium  will  not  be  pro- 
ceeded with  and  that  her  neutrality  will  be  respected  by  Germany.  You  should 
ask  for  an  immediate  reply. 


No.  154. 

Sir  F.  ViUierSy  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. — 
{Received  August  4.) 
(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  4,  1914. 

GERMAN  Minister  has  this  morning  addressed  note  to  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  stating  that  as  Belgian  Government  have  declined  the  well-intentioned 
proposals  submitted  to  them  by  the  Imperial  Government,  the  latter  will,  deeply 
to  their  regret,  be  compelled  to  carry  out,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the 
measures  considered  indispensable  in  view  of  the  French  menaces. 

No.  155. 

Sir  Edicard  Grey  to  Sir  F.  Villiers,  British  Minister  at  Brussels. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914. 

YUU  should  inform  Belgian  Government  that  if  pressure  is  applied  to  them 
by  Germany  to  induce  them  to  depart  from  neutrality.  His  Majesty's  Gov^ern- 
ment  expect  that  they  will  resist  by  any  means  in  their  power,  and  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  will  support  them  in  offering  such  resistance,  and  that 
His  Majesty's  Government  in  this  event  are  prepared  to  join  Russia  and  France, 
if  desired,  in  offering  to  the  Belgian  Government  at  once  common  action  for 
the  purpose  of  resisting  use  of  force  by  Germany  against  them,  and  a  guarantee 
to  maintain  their  independence  and  integrity  in  future  years. 

No.  156. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  E.  Goschen,  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin, 
(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914. 

I  CONTINUE  to  receive  numerous  complaints  from  British  firms  as  to  the 
detention  of  their  ships  at  Hamburg,  Cuxhaven,  and  other  German  ports.    This 


77 

action  on  the  part  of  the  German  authorities  is  totally  unjustifiable.  It  is  in 
direct  contravention  of  international  law  and  of  the  assurances  given  to  your 
Excellency  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  You  should  demand  the  immediate 
release  of  all  British  ships  if  such  release  has  not  yet  been  given. 


No.  157. 

German  Foreign  Secretary  to  Prince  Lichnoiosh/,  German  Ambassndor  in 
London. — {Communicated  hj  Germayi  Emhassy,  Au^/Kst  4.) 
(Telegraphic.)  ^  Berlin,  August  4,  1914. 

PLEASE  dispel  any  mistrust  that  may  subsist  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Government  with  regard  to  our  intentions,  by  repeating  most  positively  formal 
assurance  that,  even  in  tlie  case  of  armed  conflict  with  Belgium,  Germany  will, 
under  no  pretence  whatever,  annex  Belgian  territory.  Sincerity  of  this 
declaration  is  borne  out  by  fact  that  we  solemnly  pledged  our  word  to  Holland 
strictly  to  respect  her  neutrality.  It  is  obvious  that  we  could  not  profitably 
annex  Belgian  territory  without  making  at  the  same  time  territorial 
acquisitions  at  expense  of  Holland.  Please  impress  upon  Sir  E.  Grey  that 
German  army  could  not  be  exposed  to  French  attack  across  Belgium,  which 
was  planned  according  to  absolutely  unimpeachable  information.  Germany 
had  consequently  to  disregard  Belgian  neutrality,  it  being  for  her  a  question  of 
life  or  death  to  prevent  French  advance. 


No.  158. 

Sir  F.  VillierSf  British  Minister  at  Brussels,  to  Sir  Edivard  Grey. — 
(Received  August  4.) 

(Telegraphic.)  Brussels,  August  4,  1914. 

MILITARY  attache  has  been  informed  at  War  Office  that  German  troops 
have  entered  Belgian  territory,  and  that  Liege  has  been  summoned  to 
surrender  by  small  party  of  Germans  who,  however,  were  repulsed. 


No.  159. 
Sir  Ediodrd  Grey  to  Sir  E»  Goscken,  British  Ambassador  at.Berlin. 

(Telegraphic.)  Foreign  Office,  August  4,  1914, 

WE  hear  that  Germany  has  addressed  note  to  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  stating  that  German  Government  will  be  compelled  to  carry  out,  if 
necessary,  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures  considered  indispensable. 

We  are  also  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has  been  violated  at 
Gemmenich. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  declined  to 
give  the  same  assurance  respecting  Belgium  as  France  gave  last  week  in  reply 
to  our  request  made  simultaneously  at  Berlin  and  Paris,  we  must  repeat  that 
request,  and  ask  that  a  satisfactory  reply  to  it  and  to  my  telegram  of  this 
morning*  be  received  here  by  12  o'clock  to-night.  If  not,  you  are  instructed 
to  ask  for  your  passports,  and  to  say  that  His  Majesty's  Government  feel  bound 
to  take  all  ste^s  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the 
observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  party  as  ourselves. 

»  See  No.  153. 


No.  160. 

Sir  E.  Goschcn,  British  Ambassador"  in  Berlin,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

Sir,  London,  Augusts,  1914. 

IN  accordance  with  the  instructions  contained  in  your  telegram  of  the 
4th  instant*  I  called  upon  the  Secretary  of  State  that  afternoon  and  enquired, 
m  the.  name  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  whether  the  Imperial  Government 

*  See  No.  153. 


78 

would  refrain  from  violating  Belgian  neutrality.  Herr  von  Jagow*  at  once' 
replied  that  he  was  sorry  to  say  that  his  answer  must  be  "  No,"  as,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  German  troops  having  crossed  the  frontier  that  morning,  Belgian 
neutrality  had  been  already  violated.  Herr  von  Jagow  ^gain  went  into  the 
reasons  why  the  Imperial  Government  had  been  obliged  to  take  this  step, 
namely,  that  they  had  to  advance  into  France  by  the  quickest  and  easiest 
way,  so  as  to  be  able  to  get  well  ahead  with  their  operations  and  endeavour 
to  strike  some  decisive,  blow  as  early  as  possible.  It  was  a  matter  of  life  and 
death  for  them,  as  if  they  had  gone  by  the  more  southern  route  th«y  could 
not  have  hoped,  in  view  of  the  paucity  of  roads  and  the  strength  of  the 
fortresses,  to  have  got  through  without  formidable  opposition  entailing  great 
loss  of  time.  This  loss  ot  time  would  have  meant  time  gained  by  the  Russians 
for  bringing  up  their  troops  to  the  German  frontier.  Rapidity  of  action  was 
the  great  German  asset,  while  that  of  Russia  was  an  inexhaustible  supply  of 
troops.  I  pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  this  fait  accompli  of  the  violation 
of  the  Belgian  frontier  rendered,  as  he  would  readily  understand,  the  situation 
exceedingly  grave,  and  I  asked  him  whether  there  was  n<jrt  still  time  to  draw 
back  and  avoid  possible  consequences,  which  both  he  and  I  would  deplore. 
He  replied  that,  for  the  reasons  he  had  given  me,  it  was  now  impossible  for 
them  to  draw  back. 

During  the  atternoon  I  received  your  further  telegram  of  the  same  date,t 
and,  in  compliance  with  the  instructions  therein  contained,  I  again  proceeded 
to  the  Imperial  Foreign  Office  and  informed  the  Secretary  of  State  that  unless 
the  Imperial  Government  could  give  the  assurance  by  12  o'clock  that  night 
that  they  would  proceed  no  further  with  their  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier 
and  stop  their  advance,  I  had  been  instructed  to  demand  my  passports  and 
inform  the  Imperial  Government  that  His  Majesty's  Government  would  have 
to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the 
observance  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  was  as  much  a  party  as  themselves. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  to  his  great  regret  he  could  give  no  other 
answer  than  that  which  he  had  given  me  earlier  in  the  day,  namely,  that  the 
safety  of  the  Empire  rendered  it  absolutely  necessary  that  the  Imperial  troops 
should  advance  through  Belgium.  I  gave  his  Excellency  a  written  summary  of 
your  telegram  and,  pointing  out  that  you  had  mentioned  12  o'clock  as  the  time 
when  His  Majesty's  Government  would  expect  an  answer,  asked  him  whether, 
in  view  of  the  tferrible  consequences  which  would  necessarily  ensue,  it  were  not 
possible  even  at  the  last  moment  that  their  answer  should  be  reconsidered. 
He  replied  that  if  the  time  given  were  even  twenty-four  hours  or  more,"  his 
answer  must  be  the- same.  I  said  that  in  that  case  I  should  have  to  demand  my 
passports.  This  interview  took  place  at  about  7  o'clock.  In  a  short  conversa- 
tion which  ensued  Herr  von  Jagow*  expressed  his  poignant  regret  at  the 
crumbling  of  his  entire  policy  and  that  of  the  Chancellor,  which  had  been  to 
make  friends  with  Great  Britain,  and  then,  through  Great  Britain,  to  get  closer 
to  France.  I  said  that  this  sudden  end  to  my  work  in  Berlin  was  to  me  also 
a  matter  of  deep  regret  and  disappointment,  T)ut  that  he  must  understand  that 
under  the  circumstances  and  in  view  of  our  engagements,  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment could  not  possibly  have  acted  otherwise  than  they  had  done. 

I  then  said  that  I  should  like  to  go  and  see  the  Chancellor,  as  it  might  be, 
perhaps,  the  last  time  I  should  have  an  opportunity  of  seeing  him.  He  begged 
me  to  do  so.  I  found  the  Chancellor *very  agitated.  His  Excellency  at  once 
began  a  harangue,  which  lasted  for  about  twenty  minutes.  He  said  that  the 
step  taken  by  His  Majesty's  Government  was  terrible  to  a  degree ;  just  for  a 
word — **  neutrality,"  a  word  which  in  war  time  had  so  often  been  disrcgarded-^- 
just  for  a  scrap  of  paper  Great  Britain  was  going  to  make  War  on  a  k?ndrcd 
nation  who  desired  nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with  her.  All  his  efforts 
in  that  direction  had  been  rendered  useless  by  this  last  terrible  stop,  and  the 
policy  to  which,  as  I  knew,  he  had  devoted  himself  since  his  accession  to  office 
had  tumbled  down  like  a  house  of  cards.  What  we  had  done  was  unthinkable ; 
it  was  like  striking  a  man  from  behind  while  he  was  fighting  for  his  life  against 
two  assailants.  He  held  Great  Britain  responsible  for  all  the  terrible  events 
that  might  happen.  I  protested  strongly  against  that  statement,  and  said 
that,  in  the  same  way  as  he  and  Herr  von  Jagow*  wished  me  to  understand 
that  for  strategical  reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  to  Germany  to 

*  German  Secretary  of  State, 
t  See  No.  159. 


79 

advance  through  Belgium  and  violate  the  latter's  neutrality,  so  I  would  wish 
him  to  understand  that  it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  matter  of  "  life  and  death  "  for 
the  honour  of  Great  Britain  that  she  should  keep  her  solemn  engagement  to  do 
her  utmost  to  defend  Belgium's  neutrality  if  attacked.  That  solemn  compact 
simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what  confidence  could  anyone  have  in  engagements 
given  by  Great  Britain  in  the  future?  The  Chancellor  said,  "But  at  what 
price  will  that  compact  have  been  kept.  Has  the  British  Government  thought 
of  that?  "  I  hinted  to  his  Excellency  as  plainly  as  I  could  that  fear  of  conse- 
quences could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an  excuse  for  breaking  solemn  engage- 
ments, but  his  Excellency  was  so  excited,  so  evidently  overcome  by  the  news 
of  our  action,  and  so  little  disposed  to  hear  reason  that  I  refrained  from  adding 
fuel  to  the  flame  by  further  argument.  As  1  was  leaving  he  said  that  the  blow 
of  Great  Britain  joining  Germany's  enemies  was  all  the  greater  that  almost  up 
to  the  last  moment  he  and  his  Government  had  been  working  with  us  and 
supporting  our  efforts  to  maintain  peace  between  Austria  and  Russia.  I  said 
that  this  was  part  of  the  tragedy  which  saw  the  two  nations  fall  apart  just 
at  the  moment  when  the  relations  between  them  had  been  more  friendly  and 
cordial  than  they  had  been  for  years.  Unfortunately,  notwithstanding  our  efforts 
to  maintain  peace  between  Russia  and  Austria,  the  war  had  spread  and  had 
brought  us  face  to  face  with  a  situation  which,  if  we  held  to  our  engagements, 
we  could  not  possibly  avoid,  and  which  unfortunately  entailed  our  separation 
from  our  late  fellow- workers.  He  would  readily  understand  that  no  one 
regretted  this  more  than  I. 

After  this  somewhat  painful  intervie'v?  I  returned  to  the  embassy  and  drew 
up  a  telegraphic  report  of  what  had  passed.  This  telegram  was  handed  in  at 
the  Central  Telegraph  Ofl&ce  a  little  before  9  p.m.  It  was  accepted  by  that 
office,  but  apparently  never  despatched.* 

At  about  9.30  p.m.  Herr  von  Zimmermann,  the  Under-Secretary  of  State, 
came  to  see  me.  After  expressing  his  deep  regret  that  the  very  friendly  official 
and  personal  relations  between  us  were  about  to  cease,  he  asked  me  casually 
whether  a  demand  for  passports  was  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war.  I  said 
that  such  an  authority  on  international  law  as  he  was  known  to  be  must  know 
as  well  or  better  than  I  what  was  usual  in  such  cases.  I  added  that  there  were 
many  cases  where  diplomatic  relations  had  been  broken  off,  and,  nevertheless, 
war  had  not  ensued ;  but  that  in  this  case  he  would  have  seen  from  my  instruc- 
tions, of  which  I  had  given  Herr  von  Jagowt  a  written  summary,  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  expected  an  answer  to  a  definite  question  by  1,2  o'clock 
that  night,  and  that  in  default  of  a  satisfactory  answer  they  would  be  forced 
to  take  such  steps  as  their  engagements  required.  Herr  Zimmermannt  said 
that  that  was,  in  fact,  a  declaration  of  war,  as  the  Imperial  Government  could 
not  possibly  give  the  assurance  required  either  that  night  or  any  other  night. 

In  the  meantime,  after  Herr  Zimmermannt  left  me,  a  flying  sheet,  issued 
by  the  "Berliner  Tageblatt,"  was  circulated  stating  that  Great  Britain  had 
declared  war  against  Germany.  The  immediate  result  of  this  news  was  the 
assemblage  of  an  exceedingly  excited  and  unruly  mob  before  His  Majesty's 
Embassy.  The  small  force  of  police  which  had  been  sent  to  guard  the  embassy 
was  soon  overpowered,  and  the  attitude  of  the  mob  became  more  threatening. 
We  took  no  notice  of  this  demonstration  as  long  as  it  was  confined  to  noise, 
but  when  the  crash  of  glass  and  the  landing  of  cobble  stones  into  the  drawing- 
room,  where  we  were  all  sitting,  warned  us  that  the  situation  was  getting 
unpleasant,  I  telephoned  to  the  Foreign  Office  an  account  of  what  was  happen- 
ing. Herr  von  Jagowt  at  once  informed  the  Chief  of  Police,  and  an  adequate 
force  of  mounted  police,  sent  with  great  promptness,  very  soon  cleared  the 
street.  From  that  moment  on  we  were  well  guarded,  and  no  more  direct 
unpleasantness  occurred. 

After  order  had  been  restored  Herr  von  Jagowt  came  to  see  me  and  expressed 
his  most  heartfelt  regrets  at  what  had  occurred.  He  said  that  the  behaviour 
of  his  countrymen  had  made  him  feel  more  ashamed  than  he  had  words  to 
express.  It  was  an  indelible  stain  on  the  reputation  of  Berlin.  He  said  that 
the  flying  sheet  circulated  in  the  streets  had  not  been  authorised  by  the 
Government ;  in  fact,  the  Chancellor  had  asked  him  by  telephone  whether  ho 
thought  that  such  a  statement  should  be  issued,  and  he  had  replied,  "Certainly 

*  This  telegram  never  reached  the  Foreign  Office. 

+  German  Secretary  of  State. 

1  German  Under-Secretary  of  State. 


80 

not,  until  the  morning."  It  was  in  consequence  of  his  decision  to  that  effect  that 
only  a  small  force  of  police  had  been  sent  to  the  neighbourhood  of  the  embassy, 
as  ho  had  thought  that  the  presence  of  a  large  force  would  inevitably  attract 
attention  and  perhaps  lead  to  disturbances.  It  was  the  "  pestilential  '  Tage- 
blatt,'  "  which  had  somehow  got  hold  of  the  news,  that  had  upset  his  calcula- 
tions. He  had  heard  rum.ours  that  the  mob  had  been  excited  to  violence  by 
gestures  made  and  missiles  thrown  from  the  embassy,  but  he  felt  sure  that 
that  was  not  true  (I. was  able  soon  to  assure  him  that  the  report  had  no  founda- 
tion whatever),  and  even  if  it  was,  it  was  no  excuse  for  the  disgraceful  scenes 
which  had  taken  place.  He  feared  that  I  would  take  home  with  me  a  sorry 
impression  of  Berlin  manners  in  moments  of  excitement.  In  fact,  no  apology 
could  have  been  more  full  and  complete. 

On  the  following  morning,  the  5th  August,  the  Emperor  sent  one  of  His 
Majesty's  aides-de-camp  to  me  with  the  following  message  :  — 

"The  Emperor  has  charged  me  to  express  to  your  Excellency  his  regret 
for  the  occurrences  of  last  night,  but  to  tell  you  at  the  same  time  that  you 
will  gather  from  those  occurrences  an  idea  of  the  feelings  of  his  people  respect- 
ing the  action  of  Great  Britain  in  joining  with  other  nations  against  her  old 
allies  of  Waterloo.  His  Majesty  also  begs  that  you  will  tell  the  King  that  he 
has  been  proud  of  the  titles  of  British  Field-Marshal  and  British  Admiral,  but 
that  in  cojisequence  of  what  has  occurred  ho  must  now  at  once  divest  himself 
of  those  titles." 

I  would  add  that  the  above  message  lost  none  of  its  acerbity  by  the  manner 
of  its  delivery. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  should  like  to  state  that  I  received  all  through  this 
trying  time  nothing  but  courtesy  at  the  hands  of  Herr  von  Jagow*  and  the 
officials  of  the  Imperial  Foreign  Office.  At  about  11  o'clock  on  the  same 
morning  Count  Wede!  handed  me  my  passports — which  I  had  earlier  in  the  day 
demanded  in  writing — and  told  me  that  he  had  been  instructed  to  confer  with 
rne  as  to  the  route  which  I  should  folloAV  for  my  return  to  England.  He  said 
that  he  had  understood  that  I  preferred  the  route  via  the  Hook  of  Holland  to 
that  via  Copenhagen ;  they  had  therefore  arranged  that  I  should  go  by  the 
former  route,  only  I  should  have  to  wait  till  the  following  morning.  I  agreed 
lo  this,  and  he  said  that  I  might  be  quite  assured  that  there  Ayould  be  no 
repetition  of  the  disgraceful  scenes  of  the  preceding  night  as  full  precautions 
would  be  taken.  He  added  that  they  were  doing  all  in  tlieir  power  to  have 
a  restaurant  car  attached  to  the  train,  but  it  was  rather  a  difficult  matter. 
He  also  brought  me  a  charming  letter  from  Herr  von  Jagow  couched  in  the 
most  friendly  terms.  The  day  was  passed  in  packing  up  such  articles  as  time 
allowed. 

The  night  passed  quietly  without  any  incident.  In  the  morning  a  strong 
force  of  police  was  posted  along  the  usual  route  to  the  Lchrter  Station,  while 
the  embassy  was  smuggled  away  in  taxi-cabs  to  the  station  by  side  streets. 
Wo  there  suffered  no  molestation  whatever,  and  avoided  the  treatment  meted 
out  by  the  crowd  to  my  Russian  and  French  colleagues.  Count  Wedel  met  us 
at  the  station  to  say  good-bye  on  behalf  of  Herr  von  Jagow  and  to  see  that 
all  the  arrangements  ordered  for  our  comfort  had  been  properly  carried  out. 
A  retired  colonel  of  the  Guards  accompanied  the  train  to  the  Dutch  frontier 
and  was  exceedingly  kind  in  his  efforts  to  prevent  the  great  crowds  which 
thronged  the  platforms  at  every  station  where  we  stopped  from  insulting  us; 
but  beyond  the  yelling  of  patriotic  songs  and  a  few  jeers  and  insulting  gestures 
we  had  really  nothing  to  complain  of  during  our  tedious  journey  to  the  Dutch 
frontier. 

Before  closing  this  long  account  of  our  last  days  in  Berlin  I  should  like 
to  place  on  record  and  bring  to  your  notice  the  quite  admirable  behaviour  of 
my  staff  under  the  most  trying  circumstances  possible.  One  and  all,  they 
worked  night  and  day  with  scarcely  any  rest,  and  I  cannot  praise  too  highly  the 
cheerful  zeal  with  which  counsellor,  naval  and  military  attaches,  secretaries, 
and  the  two  young  xittaches  buckled  to  their  work  and  kept  their  nerve  with 
often  a  yelling  mob  outside  and  inside  hundreds  of  British  subjects  clamouring 
for  advice  and  assistance.  I  was  proud  to  have  such  a  staff"  to  work  with,  and 
feel  most  grateful  to  them  all  for  the  invaluable  assistance  and  support,  often 
exposing  them  to  considerable  personal  risk,  which  they  so  readily  and  cheer- 
fullv  gave  to  me. 

I  should  also  like  to  mention  the  great  assistance  rendered  to  us  all  hy 

*  German   Secretary   of  State. 


81 

my  American  colleague,  Mr.  Gerard,*  aiid  his  staff.  Undeterred  by  the  hooting 
and  hisses  with  which  he  was  often  greeted  by  the  mob  on  entering  and  leaving 
the  embassy,  his  Exo'ellency  came  repeatedly  to  see  me  to  ask  how  he  could 
holp  us  and  to  make  arrangements  for  the  safety  of  stranded  British  subjects. 
He  extricated  many  of  thjese  from  extremely  difficult  situations  at  some  per- 
sonal risk  to  himself,  and  his  calmness  and  savoir-faire  and  his  firmness  in 
dealing  with  the  Imperial  authorities  gave  full  assurance  that  the  protection 
of  British  subjects  and  interests  could  not  have  been  left  in  more  efficient  and 
able  hands.  I  have,  &c. 

W.  E.  GOSCHEN. 
*  Am<>rican  Ambassador  in  Berlin. 

No.   161. 
Sir  31.  de  Bimsen,  British  Amhas^ador  in  Vienna,  to  Sir  Edioard  Grey. 
Sir,  London.  September  I,  1914. 

THE  rapidity  of  the  march  of  events  during  the  days  which  led  up  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  war  made  it  difiicult,  at  the  time,  to  do  more  than 
record  their  progress  by  telegrai>li.     I  propose  now  to  add  a  few  comments. 

The  delivery  at  Belgrade  on  the  2tird  July  of  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia 
was  preceded  by  a  period  of  absolute  silence  at  the  Ballplatz.  Except  Herr  von 
Tschirscky,*  who  must  have  been  aware  of  the  tenour,  if  not  of  the  actual  words 
of  the  note,  none  of  my  colleagues  were  allowed  to  see  through  the  veil  On 
the  22nd  and  23rd  July,  M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador,  had  long  interviews 
with  Baron  Macchio,  one  of  the  Under-Secretaries  of  State-  for  Foreign  Aflairs, 
by  whom  he  was  left  under  the  impression  that  the  words  of  warning  he  had 
been  instructed  to  speak  to  the  Austro-Hangarian  Government  had  not  been 
unavailing,  and  that  the  note  which  was  being  drawn  up  would  be  found  to 
contain  nothing  with  which  a  self-respecting  State  need  hesitate  to  comply. 
At  the  second  of  these  interviews  he  was  not  even  informed  that  the  note  was 
at  that  very  moment  being  presented  at  Belgrade,  or  that  it  would  be  pub- 
lished in  Vienna  on-  the  following  morning.  Count  Forgach,  the  other  Under- 
Secretary'  of  State,  had  indeed  been  good  enoug-h  to  confide  to  me  on  the  same 
day  the  true  character  of  the  note,  and  the  fact  of  its  presentation  about  tho 
time  we  were  speaking. 

So  little  had  the  Russian  Ambassador  been  made  aware  of  what  was  pre- 
paring that  he  actually  left  Vienna  on  a  fortnight's  leave  of  absence  about  the 
20th  July.  He  had  only  been  absent  a  few  days  when  events  compelled  him 
to  return.  It  miQ;ht  have  been  supposed  that  Duke  Avarna,  Ambassador  of  tho 
allied  Italian  Kingdom,  which  was  bound  to  be  so  closely  affected  by  fresh 
complications  in  the  Balkans,  would  have  been  taken  fully  into  the  confidence 
of  Count  BerchtoUlt  during  this  critical  time.  In  no"^t  of  fact  his  Excellency 
was  left  completely  in  the  dark.  As  for  myself,  no  indication  was  given  me  by 
Count  Berchtold  of  the  inr^ending  storm,  and  it  was  from  a  private  source 
that  i  received  on  the  15th  Julv  the  forecast  of  what  was  about  to  happen 
which  I  telegraphed  to  you  the  following  day.  It  is  true  that  during  all  this 
time  the  "  Neue  Freie  Presse  "  and  other  leading  Viennese  newspapers  were 
using  language  which  pointed  unmistakably  to  war  with  Servia  The  official 
'•  Fremdenblatt,"  however,  was  more  cautious,  and  till  the  note  was  published, 
tho  prevailing  opinion  amoiifi:  my  colleagues  was  that  Austria  would  shrink 
from  courses  calculated  to  involve  her  in  grave  European  complications: 

On  the  24th  July  the  note  was  published  in  the  newspapers.  By  common 
consent  it  was  at  once  styled  an  ul'imatum.  Its  integral  acceptance  by  Servia 
was  neither  expeotod  nor  desired,  and  when,  on  the  following:  afternoon,  it  was 
at  first  rumoured  in  Vienna  that  it  had  boon  unconditionally  accepted,  th^^ro 
was  a  mom-^nt  of  keen  disappointment.  The  mistake  was  quickly  corrocted. 
and  as  soon  as  it  was  known  la+er  in  the  evening  that  the  Servian  roply  had 
])eon  veipct'^d  .ind  thnt  "Hnron  G'<^s1t  hnd  brokon  off  rf^ntions  at  Bo^nrrndo 
Vienna  burst  into  a  frenzv  of  delight,  vast  crowds  parading  the  -streets  and 
singing  patriotic  songs  till  the  smMl  hours  of  the  morriing. 

The  demonstrations  were  perfe-^tly  ord^rlv.  conri=ting  for  the  most  part  of 
organised  processions  through  the  prin'^ipa)  streets  cndino:  \^v  at  the  Ministry 
of^'War.     One  or  two  attempts  to  make  hostile  manifostations  against  tho 

*  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna. 

t  A  LIS  tro -Hungarian  Minister  for   Foreign  AfTaire. 

:;:  Aiistro-Hungiarian  Minister  at  Belgrade. 


82 

Russian  /Embassy  were  frustrated  by  the  strong  guard  of  police  which  held  the 
approaches  to  the  principal  embassies  during  those  days.  The  demeanour  of 
the  pcoplo  at  Vienna  and^  as  I  was  infornied,  in  many  other  principal  cities 
of  ths  Monarchy,  showed  plainly  the  popularity  of  the  idea  of  war  with  Servia, 
and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  small  body  of  Austrian  and  Hungarian 
£:tatesnion  by  whom  this  momentous  step  was  adopted  gauged  rightly  the  sense, 
and  it  may  even  be  said  the  determination,  of  the  people,  except  presumably 
in  pcrlions  cf  the  provinces  inhabited  by  the  Slav  races.  There  had  been  much 
di.sappointment  in  many  quarters  at  the  avoidance  of  war  with  Servia  during 
the  annexation  crisis  in  1903  and  again  in  connection  with  the  recent  Balkan 
war.  Count  Bcrchtold's*  peace  policy  had  met  with  little  sympathy  in  the 
Delegation.  Now  the  flood-gates  were  opened,  and  the  entire  people  and  press 
clamoured  impatiently  for  immediate  and  condign  punishment  of  the  hated 
Servian  race.  The  country  certainly  believed  that  it  had  before  it  only  the 
alternative  of  subduing  Servia  or  of  submitting  sooner  or  later  to  mutilation 
at  her  hands.  But  a  peaceful  solution  should  first  have  been  attempted.  Few 
seemed  to  reflect  that  the  forcible  intervention  of  a  Great  Power  in  the  Balkans 
must  inevitably  call  other  Great  Powers  into  the  field.  So  just  was  the  cause 
of  Austria  held  to  be,  that  it  seemed  to  her  people  inconceivable  that  any 
country  should  place  itself  in  her  path,  or  that  questions  of  mere  policy  or 
prestige  should  be  regarded  anyAvhere  as  superseding  the  necessity  which  had 
arisen  to  exact  summary  vengeance  for  the  crime  of  Serajevo.  The  conviction 
had  been  expressed  to  me  by  the  German  Ambassador  on  the  24th  July  that 
Russia  would  stand  aside.  This  feeling,  which  was  also  held  at  the  Ballplatz, 
influenced  no  doubt  the  course  of  events,  and  it  is  deplorable  that  no  effort 
should  have  been  made  to  secure  by  means  of  diplomatic  negotiations  the 
acquiescence  of  Russia  and  Europe  as  a  whole  in  some  peaceful  compromise  of 
the  Servian  question  by  which  Austrian  fears  of  Servian  aggression  and 
intrigue  might  have  been  removed  for  the  future.  Instead  of  adopting  this 
course  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  resolved  upon  war.  Tlie  inevitable 
consequence  ensued.  Russia  replied  to  a  partial  Austrian  mobilisation  and 
declaration  of  war  against  Servia  by  a  partial  Russian  mobilisation  against 
Austria.  Austria  met  this  move  by  completing  her  own  mobilisation,  and 
Russia  again  responded  with  results  which  have  passed  into  history.  The 
fate  of  the  proposals  put  forwarcl  by  His  Majesty's  Government  for  the  pre- 
servation of  peace  is  recorded  in  the  "White  Paper  on  the  European  Crisis. t 
On  the  28th  July  I  saw  Count  Berchtold  and  urged  as  stronglj"  as  I  could  that 
the  scheme  of  mediation  mentioned  in  your  speech  in  the  House  of  Commonst 
on  the  previous  day  should  be  accepted  as  offering  an  honourable  and  peaceful 
settlement  of  the  question  at  issue.  His  Excellency  himself  read  to  me  a  tele-; 
graphic  report  of  the  speech,  but  added  that  matters  hj^d  gone  too  far ;  Austria 
was  that  day  declaring  war  on  Servia,  and  she  could  never  accept  the  confer- 
ence which  you  had  suggested  should  take  place  between  the  less  interested 
Powers  on  the  basis  of  the  Servian  reply.  This  was  a  matter  wJiich 
must  be  settled  directly  between  the  two  parties  immediately  concerned. 
I  said  His  Majesty's  Government  would  hear  with  regret  that 
hostilities  could  not  be  arrested,  as  you  feared  they  would  lead  to 
European  complications.  I  disclaimed  anj-  British  lack  of  sympathy  with 
Austria  in  the  matter  of  her  legitimate  grievances  against  Servia,  and  pointed 
out  that  whereas  Austria  seemed  to  be  making  these  the  starting  point  of  her 
policy.  His  Majesty's  Government  were  bound  to  look  at  the  question  primarily 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  maintenance  of  the  peace  of  Europe.  In  this  way 
the  two  countries  might  easily  drift  apart. 

His  Excellency  said  that  he  too  was  keeping  the  European  aspect  of  the 
question  in  sight.  He  thought,  however,  that  Russia  would  have  no  right  to 
intervene  after  receiving  his  assurance  that  Austria  sought  no  territorial 
aggrandisement.  His  Excellency  remarked  to  me  in  the  course  of  his  conversa- 
tion that,  thouerh  he  had  been  glad  to  co-operate  towards  bringing  about  the 
settlement  which  had  resulted  from  the  ambassadorial  conferences  in  London 
during  the  Balkan  crisis,  he  had  never  had  mucli  belief  in  the  nermanency 
of  that  settlement,  which  was  necessarily  of  a  highly  artificial  character, 
inasmuch  a.s  the  interests,  which  it  sought  to  liarmonise  were  in  themselves  pro- 
foundly divergent.      His  Excellency  maintained   a  most  friendly   demeanour 

*  Au  :tro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Fproign  Affairs. 

+  "'Miscolkjieous.  No.  6  (1914)." 

:;:  Sec  Han^Trd,  Vol. -65,  No.  107,  columns  931-933. 


83 

throughout  the  interview,  but  left  no  doubt  in  my  mind  as  to  the  determination 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  proceed  with  the  invasion  of  Servia. 

The  German  Government  claim  to  have  i^ersevered  to  the  end  in  the  endeavour 
to  support  at  Vienna  your  successive  proposals  in  the  interest  of  peace.  Herr 
von  Tschirscky*  abstained  from  inviting  ray  co-operation  or  that  of  the  French 
and  Russian  Ambassadors  in  carrying  out  his  instructions  to  that  effect,  and 
I  had  no  means  of  knowing  what  response  he  was  receiving  from  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Governm-ent.  1  was,  however,  kept  fully  informed  by  M.  Schebeko, 
the  Russian  Ambassador,  of  his  own  direct  negotiations  with  Count  Berchtold. 
M.  Schebeko  endeavoured  on  the  28th  July  to  persuade  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  to  furnish  Count  Szaparyt  with  full  powers  to  continue  at  St. 
Petersburgh  the  hopeful  conversations  which  had  there  been  taking  place 
between  the  latter  and  M.  Sazonof.it  Count  Berchtold§  refused  at  the  time, 
but  two  days  later  (30th  July),  though  in  the  meantime  Russia  had  partially 
mobilised  against  Austria,  he  received  M.  Schebekojl  again,  in  a  perfectly 
friendly  manner,  and  gave  his  consent  to  the  continuance  of  the  conversations 
at  St.  Petersburgh.  1^'rom  now  onwards  the  tension  between  Russia  and  Ger- 
many was  much  greater  than  between  Russia  and  Austria.  As  between  the 
latter  an  arrangement  seemed  almost  in  sight,  and  on  the  1st  August  I  was 
informed  by  M.  Schebekoll  that  Count  Szapary+  had  at  last  conceded  the  main 
point  at  issue  by  announcing  to  M.  Sazonoft  that  Austria  would  consent  to 
submit  to  mediation  the  points  m  the  note  to  Servia  which  seemed  incompatible 
with  the  maintenance  of  Servian  independence.  M.  Sazonof.I  M.  Schebekoll 
added,  had  accepted  this  proposal  on  condition  that  Austria  would  refrain  from 
the  actual  invasion  of  Servia.  Austria,  in  fact,  had  finally  yielded,  and  that 
she  herself  had  at  this  point  good  hopes  of  a  peaceful  issue  is  shown  by  the 
communication  made  to  you  on  the  1st  August  by  Count  Mensdorff,1^  to  the 
effect  that  Austria  had  neither  "banged  the  door"  on  ropi promise  nor  cut  off 
the  conversations.*'*  M.  Schebekoll  to  the  end  was  working  hard  for  peace. 
He  was  holding  the  most  conciliatory  language  to  Count  Berchtold, §  and  he 
informed  me  that  the  latter,  as  well  as  Count  Forgach,t+  had  responded  in  the 
same  spirit.  Certainly  it  was  too  much  for  Russia  to  expect  that  Austria  would 
hold  back  her  armies,  but  this  matter  could  probably  have  been  settled  by 
negotiation,  and  M  Schebekoll  repeatedly  told  me  he  was  prepared  to  accept 
any  reasonable  compromise. 

Unfortunately  these  conversations  at  St.  Petersburgh  and  A"^ienna  were  cut 
short  by  the  transfer  of  the  dispute  to  the  more  dangerous  ground  of  a  direct 
conflict  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Germany  intervened  on  the  31st  July 
by  means  of  her  double  ultimatums  to  St.  Petersburgh  and  Paris.  The  ulti- 
matums were  of  a  kind  to  which  only  one  answer  is  po.ssible,  and  Germany 
declared  war  on  Russia  on  the  1st  August,  and  on  France  on  the  Srd  August. 
A  few  days'  delay  miglit  in  all  probability  have  sjived  Europe  from  one  of  the 
greatest  calamities  in  history. 

Russia  still  abstained  from  attacking  Austria,  and  IVl  Schphekol!  had  been 
instructed  to  remain  at  his  post  till  war  should  actually  hp  declared  against 
her  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  This  only  happened  on  the  6tfi 
August  when  Count  Berchtold§  informed  the  foreign  ;  -is-inns  at  Vienna  that 
''  the  Austro-ITungarian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburgh  had  been  instructed 
to  notify  the  Russian  Government  that,  in  view  of  the  menacing  attitude  of 
Russia  in  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  and  the  fact  that  Russia  had  commenced 
hostilities  against  Germany,  Austro-Hungary  considered  herself  also  at  war 
with  Russia." 

M.  Schebekoll  left  quietly  in  a  sr)ocial  train  provided  by  th^  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  on  the  7th  August.  He  had  urgently  requested  to  be 
conveyed  to  the  Roumanian  frontier,  so  that  he  might  be  ab'e  to  proceed  to  his 
own  country,  bub  was  taken  instead  to  the  Swiss  frontier,  and  ten  days  later 
I  found  him  at  Borne. 

M.  Dumaine,  French  Ambassador,  stayed  on  till  the  12th  August.  On  the 
previous  day  he  had  been  instructed  to  demand  his  passport  on  the  ground  that 

*  German    Ambassador    in    Vienna. 

t  Austro-Hungarian   Ambassador  at  St.   Petersburgh. 

t  Russian   Minister  for   Foreign   Affairs. 

§  Austro-Hungarian   Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

II  Russian    Ambassador    in    Vienna. 

IT  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 

*"  See  No.  137 

+t  Austro-Hungarian  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


84 

Austrian  troops  were  being  employed  against  France.  This  point  was  not  fully 
cleared  up  when  I  left  Vienna.  On  the  9th  August,  M.  Dumaine  had  received 
from  Count  Berchtold*  the  categorical  declaration  that  no  Austrian  troops  were 
being  moved  to  Alsace.  The  next  day  this  statement  was  supplemented  by  a 
further  one,  in  writing,  giving  Count  Berchtold's  assurance  that  not  only  had 
no  Austrian  troops  been  moved  actually  to  the  French  frontier,  but  that  none 
were  moving  from  Austria  in  a  westerly  direction  into  Germany  in  such  a 
way  that  they  might  replace  German  troops  employed  at  the  front.  These  two 
statements  were  made  by  Count  Berchtold  in  reply  to  precise  questions  put  to 
him  by  M.  Dumaine,  under  instructions  from  his  Government.  The  French 
Ambassador's  departure  was  not  attended  by  any  hostile  demonstration,  but 
liis  Excellency  'before  leaving  had  been  justly  offended  by  a  harangue  made  by 
the  Chief  Burgomaster  of  Vienna  to  the  crowd  assembled  before  the  steps  of 
the  town  hall,  in  which  he  assured  the  people  that  Paris  'was  in  the  throes  of  a 
revolution,  and  that  the  President  of  the  Republic  had  been  assassinated. 

The  British  declaration  of  war  on  Germany  was  made  known  in  Vienna  by 
special  editions  of  the  newspapers  about  midday  on  the  4th  August.  An  abstract 
of  your  speeches  in  the. House  of  Commons,  and  also  of  the  German  Chancellor's 
speech  in  the  Reichstag  of  the  4th  August,  appeared  the  same  day,  as  well  as 
the  text  of  the  German  ultimatum  to  Belgium.  Otherwise  few  details  of  the 
great  events  of  these  days  transpired.  The  "Neue  Freie  Presse  "  was  violently 
insulting  towards  England.  The  "  Fremdenblatt  "  was  not  offensive,  but  little 
or  nothing  was  said  in  the  columns  of  any  Vienna  paper  to  explain  that  "the 
violation  of  Belgium  neutrality  had  left  His  Majesty's  Government  no  alterna- 
tive but  to  take  part  in  the  war. 

The  declaration  of  Italian  neutrality  was  bitterly  felt  in  Vienna,  but  scarcely 
mentioned  in  the  newspapers. 

On  the  5th  August  I  had  the  honour  to  receive  your  instruction  of  the 
previous  day  preparing  me  for  the  immediate  outbreak  of  war  with  Germany, 
but  adding  that,  Austria  being  understood  to  be  not  yet  at  that  date  at  war 
with  Russia  and  France,  you  did  not  desire  me  to  ask  for  my  passport  or  to  make 
any  particular  communication  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  You 
stated  at  the  same  time  that  His  Majesty's  Government  of  course  expected 
Austria  not  to  commit  any  act  of  war  against  us  without  the  notice  required  by 
diplomatic  usage. 

On  Thursday  morning,  the  13th  August,  I  had  the  honour  to  receive  your* 
telegram  of  the  12th,  stating  that  you  had  been  compelled  to  inform  Count 
Mensdorff  ,t  at  the  request  of  the  French  Government,  that  a  complete  rupture 
had  occurred  -between  France  and  Austria,  on  the  ground  that  Austria  had 
declared  war  on  Russia  who  was  already  fighting  on  the  side  of  France,  and  th^t 
Austria  had  sent  troops  to  the  German  frontier  under  conditions  that  were  a 
direct  menace  to  France.  The  rupture  having  been  brought  about  with  France 
in -this  way,  I  was  to  ask  for  my  passport,  and  your  telegram  stated,  in  con- 
clusion, that  you  had  informed  Count  Mensdorff  that  a  state  of  war  would  exist 
between  the  two  countries  from  midnight  of  the  12th  August. 

After  seeing  Mr.  Penfleld,  the  United  States  Am\)assador,  who  accepted 
immediately  in  the  most  friendly  spirit  my  request  that  his  Excellency  would 
take  charge  provisionally  of  British  interests  in  Austria-Hungary  during  the 
unfortunate  interruption  of  relations,  I  proceeded,  with  Mv.  Theo  Russell, 
Counsellor  of  His  Majesty's  Embassy,  to  the  Ballplatz.  Count  Berchtold* 
received  me  at  midday.  I  delivered  my  message,  for  which  his  Excellency  did 
not  seem  to  be  unprepared,  although  he  told  me  that  a  long  telegram  from  Count 
Mensdorfft  had  just  come  in  but  had  not  yet  been  brought  to  him.  His 
Excellency  received  my  communication  with  the  courtesy  which  never  leaves 
liim.  He  deplored  the  unhappy  complications  which  were  drawing  such  good 
friends  as  Austria  and  England  into  war.  In  point  of  fact,  he  added,  Austria 
did  not.  consider  herself  then  at  war  with  France,  though  diplomatic  relations 
with  that  country  had  been  broken  off.-  I  explained  in  a  few  words  how  cir- 
cumstances had  forced  this  unwelcome  conflict  upon  us.  Wo  both  avoided  use- 
less argument.  Then  I  ventured  to  recommend  to  his  Excellency's  consideration 
the  case  of  the  numerous  stranded  British  subjects  at  Carlsbad,  Vienna,  and 

*  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
i  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  in  London. 


85 

other  pljtces  throughout  the  country.  I  had -already  had  some  correspondence 
with  him  on  the  subject,  and  his  Excellency  took  a  no*e  of  what  I  said,  and 
promised  to  see  what  could  be  done  to  get  them  away  when  the  stress  of 
mobilisation  should  be  over.  Count  Berchtold  agreed  to  Mr.  Phillpotts,  till 
then  British  consul  at  Vienna  under  Consul-General  Sir  Frederick  Duncan,  being 
left  by  me  at  the  Embassy  in  the  capacity  of  Charge  des  Archives.  He  pre- 
sumed a  similar  privilege  would  not  be  refused  in  England  if  desired  on  behalf 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government.  I  took  leave  of  Count  Berchtold  with 
sincere  regret,  having  received  from  the  day  of  my  arrival  in  Vienna,  not  quite 
nine  months  before,  many  marks  of  friendship  and  consideration  from  his 
Excellency.  As  I  left  I  begged  his  Excellency  to  present  my  profound  respects 
to  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph,  together  with  an  expression  of  my  hope  that 
His  Majesty  would  pass  through  these  sad  times  with  unimpaired  health  and 
strength.     Count  Berchtold  was  pleased  to  say  he  would  deliver  my  message. 

Count  Walterskirchen,  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Office,  was  deputed 
the  following  morning  to  bring  me  my  passport  and  to  acquaint  me  with  the 
arrangements  made  for  my  departure  that  evening  (14th  August).  In  the  course 
of  the  day  Countess  Berchtold  and  other  ladies  of  Vienna  society  called  to  take 
leave  of  Lady  de  Bunsen  at  the  embassy.  We  left  the  railway  station  by  special 
train  for  the  Swiss  frontier  at  7  p.m.  No  disagreeable  incidents  occurred.  Count 
Walterskirchen  was  present  at  the  station  on  behalf  of  Count  Berchtold.  ^  The 
journey  was  necessarily  slow,  owing  to  the  encumbered  state  of  the  line.  We 
reached  Buchs,  on  the  Swiss  frontier,  early  in  the  morning  of  the  17th  August. 
At  the  first  halting  place  there  had  been  some  hooting  and  stone  throwing  on 
the  part  of  the  entraining  troops  and  station  officials,  but  no  inconvenience  was 
caused,  and  at  the  other  large  stations  on  our  route  we  found  that  ample 
measures  had  been  taken  to  preserve  us  from  molestation  as  well  as  to  provide 
us  with  food.  I  was  left  in  no  doubt  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  had 
desired  that  the  journey  should  be  performed  under  the  most  comfortable  con- 
ditions possible,  and  that  I  should  receive  on  my  departure  all  the  marks  of 
consideration  due  to  His  Majesty's  representative.  I  was  accompanied  by  my 
own  family  and  the  entire  staff  of  the  embassy,  for  whose  untiring  zeal  and 
efficient  help  in  trying  times  I  desire  to  express  my  sincere  thanks.  The  Swiss 
Government  also  showed  courtesy  in  providing  comfortable  accommodation 
during  our  journey  from  the  frontier  to  Berne,  and,  after  three  days'  stay  there, 
on  to  Geneva,  at  which  place  we  found  that  every  provision  had  been  made  by 
the  French  Government,  at  the  request  of  Sir  Francis  Bertie,  for  our  speedy 
conveyance  to  Paris.  We  reached  England  on  Saturday  morning,  the  22nd 
August. 

I  have,  &Q.; 

MAURICE  DE  BUNSEN. 


PART  II, 


SPEECHES  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  COMMONS. 


(1)  Sir  Eciwaid  Giey  (August  3,  19U) 

(2)  Sir  Edward  Grey  (August  3,  1914) 

(3)  Mr.  Asquith  (August  4,  1914)      ... 

(4)  Mr.  Asquith  (August  5,  1914)       ... 

(5)  Mr.  Asquith  (August  6,  1914)      e-.- 


Pago 

89 
97 
97 
98 
98 


0^ 


PART  II. 


SPEECHES  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  COMMONS. 


(1)  STATEMENT  BY  SIR  EDWARD  GREY  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  COMMONS, 

AUGUST  3,  1914. 

Last  week  I  staied  that  we  were  working  for  peace  not  only  for  this 
country,  but  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe.  To-day  events  move  so  rapidly 
that  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  state  with  technical  accuracy  the  actual  state 
of  affairs,  but  it  is  clear  that  the  peace  of  Europe  cannot  be  preserved.  Russia 
and  Germany,  at  any  rate,  have  declared  war  upon  each  other. 

Before  I  proceed  to  state  the  position  of  His  Majesty's  Government,  I  would 
like  to  clear  the  ground  so  that,  before  I  come  to  state  to  the  House  what  our 
attitude  is  with  regard  to  the  present  crisis,  the  House  may  know  exactly  under 
what  obligations  the  Government  is,  or  the  House  can  be  said  to  be,  in  coming 
to  a  decision  on  the  matter.  First  of  all  let  me  say,  very  shortly,  that  we  have 
consistently  worked  with  a  single  mind,  with  all  the  earnestness  in  our  power, 
to  preserve  peace.  The  House  may  be  satisfied  on  that  point.  We  have  always 
done  it.  During  these  last  years,  as  far  a^  His  Majesty's  Government  are  con- 
cerned, we  would  have  no  difficulty  in  proving  that  we  have  done  so.  Through- 
out the  Balkan  crisis,  by  general  admission,  we  worked  for  peace.  The  co- 
operation of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  was  successful  in  working  for  peace 
in  the  Balkan  crisis.  It  is  true  that  some  of  the  Powers  had  great  difficulty  in 
adjusting  their  points  of  view.  It  took  much  time  and  labour  and  discussion 
before  they  could  settle  their  differences,  but  peace  was  secured,  because  peace 
was  their  main  object,  and  they  were  willing  to  give  time  and  trouble  rather 
than  accentuat^e  differences  rapidly. 

In  the  present  crisis,  it  has  not  been  possible  to  secure  the  peace  of  Europe ; 
because  there  has  been  little  time,  and  there  has  been  a  disposition — at  any 
rate  in  some  quarters  on  which  I  will  not  dwell — to  force  things  rapidly  to 
an  issue,  at  any  rate  to  the  great  risk  of  peace,  and,  as  we  now  know,  the 
result  of  that  is  that  the  policy  of  peace  as  far  as  the  Great  Powers  generally 
are  concerned,  is  in  danger.  I  do  not  want  to  dwell  on  that,  and  to  comment 
on  it,  and  to  say  where  the  blame  seems  to  us  to  lie,  which  Powers  were.niost  in 
favour  of  peace,  which  were  most  disposed  to  risk  or  endanger  peace,  because 
I  would  like  the  House  to  approach  this  crisis  in  which  we  are  now  from  the 
point  of  view  of  British  interests,  British  honour,  and  British  obligations,  free 
•from  all  passion  as  to  why  peace  has  not  been  preserved. 

We  shall  iDublish  papers  as  soon  as  we  can  regarding  what  took  place  last 
week  when  we  were  working  for  peace;  and  when  those  papers  are  published 
I  have  no  doubt  that  to  every  human  being  they  will  make  it  clear  how 
strenuous  and  genuine  and  wHole-hearted  our  efforts  for  i)eace  Were,  and  that 
they  will  enable  people  to  form  their  own  judgment  as  to  what  forces  were  at 
work  which  operated  against  peace. 

I  come  first,  now,  to  the  question  of  British  obligations.  I  have  assured  the 
House — and  the  Prime  Minister  has  assiired  the  House  more  than  once — that 
if  any  crisis  such  as  this  arose  we  should  come  before  the  House  of  Commons 
and  be  able  to  say  to  the  House  that  it  was  free  to  decide  what  the  British 
attitude  should  be,  that  we  would  have  no  secret  engagement  which  we  should 
spring  upon  the  House,  and  tell  the  House  that  because  we  had  entered  into 
that  engagement  there  was  an  obligation  of  honour  upon  the  country.  I  will 
deal  with  that  point  to  clear  the  ground  first. 

There  have  been  in  Europe  two  diplomatic  groups,  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
what  came  to  be  called  the  Triple  Entente,  for  some  years  past.  The  Triple 
Enten'G  was  not  an  alliance— it  was  a  diplomatic  group.  The  House  will 
remember  that  in  1908  there  was  a  crisis— also  a  Balkan  crisis— originating  in 
the  annexation  -of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  Russian  Minister,  M. 
Isvolsky,  came  to  London,  or  happened  to  come  to  London,  because  his  visit 
wa?  planned  before  the  crisis  broke  out.  I  told  him  definitely  then,  this  being 
a  Balkan  crisis,  a  Balkan  affair,  I  did  not  consider  that  public  opinion  in  this 
country  would  justify  us  in  promising  to  give  anything  more  than  diplomatic 


90 

Buppoi  t.  More  was  never  asked  from  us,  more  was  never  given,  and  more  was 
never  promised. 

In  this  present  crisis,  up  till  yesterday,  we  have  also  given  no  promise  of 
anything  more  than  diplomatic  support — up  till  yesterday  no  promise  of  more 
than  diplomatic  support.  Now  I  must  make  this  question  of  obligation  clear 
to  the  House.  I  must  go  back  to  the  first  Moroccan  crisis  of  1906.  That  was 
the  time  of  the  Algeciras  Conference,  and  it  came  at  a  time  of  very  great 
difiiculty  to  His  Majesty's  Government  when  a  general  election  was  in  progress, 
and  Ministers  were  scattered  over  the  country,  and  I — spending  three  days  a 
week  in  my  constituency, and  three  days  at  the  Foreign  Office— was  asked  tho 
question  whether,  if  that  crisis  developed  into  war  between  France  and 
Oermany,  we  would  give  armed  support.  I  said  then  that  I  could  promise 
nothing  to  any  foreign  Power  unless  it  H'as  subsequently  to  receive  tho  whole- 
hearted support  of  public  opinion  here  if  the  occasion  arose.  I  said,  in  my 
opinion,  if  war  was  forced  upon  France  then  on  the  question  of  Morocco— a 
question  which  had  just  been  the  subject  of  agreement  between  this  country 
and  France,  an  agreement  exceedingly  popular  on  both  sides — that  if  out  of 
that  agreement  war  was  forced  on  France  at  that  time,  in  my  view  public 
opinion  in  this  country  would  have  rallied  to  the  material  support  of  France. 

I  gavh  no  promise,  but  I  exp-essed  that  opinion  during  the  crisis,  as  far  as 
I  remember  almost  in  the  same  words,  to  the  French  Ambassador  and  the 
German  Ambassador  at  the  time.  I  made  no  promise,  and  I  used  no  threats ; 
but  I  expressed  that  opinion.  That  position  was  accepted  by  the  French 
Government,  but  they  said  to  me  at  the  time,  and  I  think  very  reasonably, 
*' If  you  think  it  possible  that  the  public  opinion  of  Great  Britain  might, 
should  a  sudden  crisis  arise,  justify  you  in  giving  to  France  the  armed 
support  which  you  cannot  promise  in  advance,  you  will  not  be  able  to  give 
that,  support,  even  if  you  wish  it,  when  the  time  comes,  unless  some 
conversations  have  already  taken  place  between  naval  and  military  experts." 
There  was  force  in  that.  I  agreed  to  it,  and  authorised  those  conversations  to 
take  place,  but  on  the  distinct  understanding  that  nothing  which  passed 
beween  military  or  naval  experts  should  bind  either  Government  or  restrict 
in  any  way  their  freedom  to  make  a  decision  as  to  whether  or  not  they  would 
give  that  support  when  the  time  arose. 

As  I  have  told  the  House,  upon  that  occasion  a  general  election  was  in 
prospect;  I  had  to  take  the  responsibility  of  doing  that  without  the  Cabinet. 
It  could  not  be  summoned.  An  answer  had  to  be  given.  I  consulted  Sir 
Henry  Campbell-Bannerman,  the  Prime  Minister  ;  I  consulted,  I  remember, 
Lord  Haldane,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  State  for  War;  and  the  present 
Prime  Minister,  who  was  then  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  That  was  tho 
most  I  could  do,  and  they  authorised  that,  on  the  distinct  understanding  that 
it  left  the  hands  of  the  Government  free  whenever  the  crisis  arose.  The  fact 
that  conversations  between  military  and  naval  experts  took  place  was  later 
on — I  think  much  later  on,  because  that  crisis  passed,  and  the  thing  ceased  to 
be  of  importance — but  later  on  it  was  brought  to  the  knowledfre  of  the  Cabinet. 

The  Aga^Jir  crisis  came — another  Morocco  crisis — and  throughout  that  I 
took  precisely  the  same  line  that  had  been  taken  in  1906.  But  subsequently, 
in  1912,  after  discussion  and  consideration  in  the  Cabinet,  it  was  decided  that 
we  ought  to  have  a  definite  understanding  in  writing,  which  was  to  be  only  in 
the  form  of  an  unofficial  letter,  that  these  conversations  which  took  place  were 
not  binding  upon  the  freedom  of  either  Government ;  and  on  the  22nd  of 
November,  1912,  I  wrote  to  the  French  Ambassador  the  letter  which  I  will 
now  read  to  the  House,  and  I  received  from  him  a  letter  in  similar  terms 
in  reply.  The  letter  which  I  have  fo  read  to  the  House  is  this,  and  it  will 
be  known  to  the  piiblic  now  as  the  record  that,  .whatever  took  place  between 
military  and  naval  experts,  they  were  not  binding  engagements  upon  the 
Governments :  — 

"  My  dear  Ambassador, 

"From  time  to  time  in  recent  years  the  French  and  British  naval  and 
military  experts  have  consulted  togpther.  It  has  always  been 
understood  that  such  consultation  does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of 
either-  Government  to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or  not  to 
assist  the  other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that  consultation 
between  experts  is  not,  and  ought  not,  to  be  regarded  as  an  engage- 
ment that  commits  either  Government  to  action  in  a  contingency 
that  has  not  yet  arisen  and  may  never  arise.     The  disposition,  for 


m 

instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets  respectively  at  the  present 
moment  is  not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operato  in  war. 
"  You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave 
reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  it  might 
become  essential  to  know  whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon 
the  armed  assistance  of  the  other. 
"I  agree  that,   if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an 
unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  something  that  threatened 
the  general  peace,   it  should  immediately   discuss  with  the  other 
whether  both  Governments  should  act  together  to  prevent  aggres- 
sion and  to  preserve  peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would 
bo  prepared  to  take  in  common." 
Lord  Charles  Beresford.—Wlvdt  is  the  date  of  that?  , 

Sir  E.  Gre)/.— The  22nd  November,  1912.  That  is  the  starting  point  for 
the  Government  with  regard  to  the  present  crisis.  I  think  it  mak«s  it  clear 
that  what  the  Prime  Minister  and  I  said  to  the  House  of  Commons  was  perfectly 
justified,  and  that,  as  regards  our  freedom  to  decide  in  a  crisis  what  our  line 
should  be,  whether  we  should  intervene  or  whether  we  should  abstain,  the 
Government  remained  perfectly  free,  and  a  fortiori^  the  House  of  Commons 
remains  perfectly  free.  That  I  say  to  clear  the  ground  from  the  point  of  view 
of  obligation.  I  think  it  was  due  to  prove  our  good  faith  to  the  House  of 
Commons  that  I  should  give  that  full  information  to  the  House  now, 
and  say  what  I  think  is  obvious  from  the  letter  I  have  just  read,  that  we  do 
not  construe  anything  which  has  previously  taken  place  in  our  diplomatic 
relations  with  other  Powers  in  thjs  matter  as  restricting  the  freedom  of  the 
Government  to  decide  what  attitude  they  should  take  now,  or  restrict  the 
freedom  of  the  House  of  Commons  to  decide  what  their  attitude  should  be. 

Well,  Sir,  I  will  go  further,  and  I  will  say  this:  The  situation  in  the 
present  crisis  is  not  precisely  the  same  as  it  was  in  the  Morocco  question.  In 
the  Morocco  question  it  v/as  primarily  a  dispute  which  concerned  France^— 
a  dispute  which  concerned  France  and  France  primarily — a  dispute,  as  it 
seemed  to  us,  affecting  France  out  of  an  agreement  subsisting  between  us  and 
France,  and  published  to  the  whole  world,  in  which  we  engaged  to  give  France 
dii^lomatic.  support.  No  doubt  we  were  pledged  to  give  nothing  but  diplomatic 
support;  v.e  were,  at  any  rate,  pledged  by  a  definite  public  agreement,  to 
stand  with  France  diplomatically  in  that  question. 

The  present  crisis  has  originated  differently.  It  has  not  originated  with 
regard  to  Morocco.  It  has  not  originated  as  regards  anything  with  which  we 
had  a  special  agreement  with  France ;  it  has  not  originated  with  anything 
which  iDrimarily  concerned  France.  It  has  originated  in  a  dispute  between 
Austria  and  Servia.  I  can  say  this  with  the  most  absolute  confidence — no 
Government  and  no  country  has  less  desire  to  be  involved  in  war  over  a  dispute 
with  Austria  and  Servia  than  the  Government  and  the  country  of  France. 
They  are  involved  in  it  because  of  their  obligation  of  honour  under  a  definite 
alliance  with  Russia.  Well,  it  is  only  fair  to  say  to  the  House  that  that 
obligation  of  honour  cannot  apply  in  the  same  way  to  us.  We  are  not  parties 
to  the  Franco-R-ussian  Alliance,  We  do  not  even  know  the  terms  of  that 
alliance.  vSo  far  I  have,  I  think,  faithfully  and  completely  cleared  the  ground 
V/ith  regard  to  the  question  of  obligation. 

I  now  come  to  wliat  we  think  the  situation  requires  of  us.  For  many  years 
we  have  had  a  long-standing  friendship  with  France.  I  remember  well  the 
feeling  in  the  House — and  my  own  feeling — for  I  spoke  on  the  subject,  I  think, 
when  the  late  Government  made  their  agreement  with  France— the  warm  and 
cordial  feeling  resulting  from  the  fact  that  those  two  nations,  who  had  had  per- 
petual differences  in  the  past,  had  cleared  these  differences  away;  I  remember 
saying,  I  think,  that  it. seemed  to  me  that  some  benign  influence  had  been  at 
work  to  produce  the  cordial  atmosphere  that  had  made  that  possible.  But  how 
far  that  friendship  entails  obligation— it  has  been  a  friendship  between  the 
nations  and  ratified  by  the  nations— how  far  that  entails  an  obligation,  let  every 
man  look  into  his  own  heart,  and  his  own  feelings,  and  construe  the  extent  of 
the  obligation  for  himself.  I  construe  it  myself  as  I  feel  it,  but  I  do  not  wish 
to  urge  uDon  anyone  else  more  than  their  feelings  dictate  as  to  what  they 
should  feel  about  the  obligation.  The  House,  individually  and  collectively,  may 
judge  for  itself.  I  speak  my  personal  view,  and  I  have  given  the  House  my 
own  feeling  in  the  matter. 

The  French  fleet  is  now  in  tho  Mediterranean,  and  the  northern  and  western 


92 

coasts  of  France  are  absolutely  undefended.  The  French  fleet  being  concen- 
trated in  the  Mediterranean,  the  situation  is  very  different  from  what  it  used 
to  be,  because  the  friendship  which  has  grown  up  between  the  two  countries  has 
given  them  a  sense  of  security  that  there  was  nothing  to  be  feared  frdm  us. 

The  French  coasts  are  absolutely  undefended.  The  French  fleet  is  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  has  for  some  years  been  concentrated  there  because  of  the 
feeling  of  confidence  and  friendship  which  has  existed  between  the  two  countries. 
My  own  feeling  is  that  if  a  foreign  fleet,  engaged  in  a  war  which  France  had  not 
sought,  and  in  which  she  had  not  been  the  aggressor,  came  down  the  English 
Channel  and  bombarded  and  battered  the  undefended  coasts  of  France,  we 
could  not  stand  aside,  and  see  this  going -on  practically  witliin  sight  of  our  eyes, 
with  our  arms  folded,  looking  on  dispassionately,  doing  nothing.  I  believe,  that 
would  be  the  feeling  of  this  country.  There  are  times  when  one  feels  that  if 
these  circumstances  actually  did  arise,  it  would  be  a  feeling  which  would  spread 
with  irresistible  force  throughout  the  land. 

But  I  also  want  to  look  at  the  matter  without  sentiment,  and  from  the  point 
of  view  of  British  interests,  and  it  is  on  that  that  I  am  going  to  base  and  justify 
what  I  ai.  presently  going  to  say  to  the  House.  -If  we  say  nothing  at  this 
moment,  what  is  France  to  do  with  her  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean!''  If  she 
leaves  it. there,  with  no  statement  from  us  as  to  what  we  v/ill  do,  she  leaves  her 
northern  and  western  coasts  absolutely  undefended,  at  the  mercy  of  a  German 
fleet  coming  down  the  Channel  to  do  as  it  pleases  in  a  war  which  is  a  war  of  life 
and  death  between  them.  If  we  say  nothing,  it  may  be  that  the  French  fleet 
is  withdrawn  from  the  Mediterranean.  We  are  in  the  presence  of  a  European 
conflagration ;  can  anj'body  set  limits  to  the  consequences  that  may  arise  out  of 
it?  Let  us  assume  that  to-day  we  stand  g-side  in  an  attitude  of  neutrality, 
saying,  "No,  we  cannot  undertake  and  engage  to  help  either  party  in  this  con- 
flict." Let  us  suppose  the  French  fleet  is  withdrawn  from  the  Mediterranean; 
and  let  us  assume  that  the  consequences— which  are  already  tremendous  in  what 
has  happened  in  Europe  even  to  countries  which  are  at  peace— in  fact,  equally 
whether  countries  are  at  peace  or  at  war — let  us  assume  that  out  of  that  come 
consequences  unforeseen,  which  make  it  necessary  at  a  sudden  moment  that,  in 
defence  of  vital  British  interests,  we  should  go  to  war ;  and  let  us  assume — which 
is  quite  possible— that  Italy,  who  is  now  neutral — because^  as  I  understand,  sho 
considers  that  this  war  is  an  aggressive  war,  and  the  Triple  Alliance  being  a 
defensive  alliance,  her  obligation  did  not  arise — let  us  assume  that  consequences 
which  are  not  yet  foreseen  and  which,  perfectly  legitimately  consulting  her  own 
interests,  make  Italy  depart  from  her  attitude  of  neutrality  at  a  time  when  wo 
are  forced  in  defence  of  vital  British  interests  ourselves  to  fight — what  then  will 
be  the  position  in  the  Mediterranean?  It  might  be  that  at  some  critical 
moment  those  consequences  would  be  forced  upon  us  because  our  trade  routes 
in  the  Meditemanean  might  be  vital  to  this  country. 

.  Nobody  can  say  that  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  weeks  there  is  any  parti- 
cular trade  route,  the  keeping  open  of  which  may  not  be  vital  to  this  country. 
What  will  be  our  position  then?  We  have  not  kept  a  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean 
which  is  equal  to  dealing  alone  with  a  combination  of  other  fleets  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. .  It  would  be  the  very  moment  when  we  could  not  detach  more  ships 
to  the  Mediterranean,  and  we  might  have  exposed  this  country  from  our  nega- 
tive attitude  at  the  present  moment  to  the  most  appalling  risk. "  I  say  that  from 
the  point  of  view  of  British  interests,  We  feel  strongly  that  France  was  entitled 
to  know— and  to  know  at  once — whether  or  not  in  the  event  of  attack  upon  her 
unprotected  northern  and  western  coasts  she  could  depend  upon  British  sup- 
port. In  that  emergency,  and  in  these  compelling  circumstances,  yesterday 
afternoon  I  gave  to  the  French  Ambassador  the  following  statement  :— 

"  I  am  authorised  to  give  an  assurance  that  if  the  German  fleet  comes  into 
the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  opera- 
tions against  the  French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give 
all  the  protection  in  its  power.  This  assurance  is,  of  course,  subject 
to  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's  Government  recoiving  the  support  of 
Parhament,  and  must  not  be  tnken  as  binding  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  take  any  action  until  the  above  contingency  of  action  by  the 
German  fleet  takes  place." 

I  read  that  to  the  House,  not  as  a  declaration  of  war  on  our  part,  not  as 
entailing  immediate  aggressive  action  on  our  part,  but  as  binding  us  to  take 
aggressive  action  should  that  contingency  arise.  Tilings  move  very  hurriedly 
from  hour  to  hour.     Fresh  news  comes  in,  and  I  cannot  give  this  in  any  very  formal 


93 

iray;  but  I  understand  that  the  German  Government  would  be  prepared,  if  we 
would  pledge  ourselves  to  neutrality,  to  agree  that  its  fleet  would  not  attack 
the  noilbhern  coast  of  France.  I  have  only  heard  that  shortly  before  I  came 
to  tiie  House,  but  it  is  far  too  narrow  an  engagement  for  us.  And,  Sir,  there 
IS  the  more  serious  consideration— becoming  more  serious  every  hour— there  is 
the  question  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

I  shall  have  to  put  before  the  House  at  some  length  what  is  our  position  in 
regard  to  Belgium.  The  governing  factor  is  the  treaty  of  1839,  but  this  is  a 
treaty  with  a  history— a  history  accumulated  since.  In  1870,  when  there  was 
war  between  France  and  Germany,  the  question  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
arose,  and  various  things  were  said.  Amongst  other  things,  Prince  Bismarck 
gave  an  assurance  to  Belgium  that— confirming  his  verbal  assurance,  he  gave  in. 
writing  a  declaration  which  he  said  was  superfluous  in  reference  to  the  treaty' 
in  existence— that  the  German  Confederation  and  its  allies  would  respect  the 
neutraUty  of  Belgium,  it  being  always  understood  that  that  neutrality  would 
be  respected  by  the  other  belligerent  Powers.  That  i&  valuable  as  a  recognition 
in  1870  on  the  part  of  Germany  of  the  sacredness  of  these  treaty  rights. 

What  was  our  own  attitude.^  The  people  who  laid  down  the  attitude  of  the 
British  Government  were  Lord  Granville  in  the  ^ouse  of  Lords  and  Mr. 
Gladstone  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Lord  Granville  on  the  8th  August,  1870, 
used  these  words.     He  said  :  — 

'*  We  might  have  explained  to  the  country  and  to  foreign  nations,  that 
we  could  not  think  this  country  v,'as  bound  either  morally  or  inter- 
nationally, or  that  its  interests  were  concerned  in  the  maintenance 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium;  though  this  course  might  have  had 
some  conveniences,  though  it  might  have  been  easy  to  adhere  to  .it, 
though  it  might  have  saved  us  from  some  immediate  danger,  it  is  a 
course  which  Her  Majesty's  Government  thought  it  impossible  to 
adopt  in  the  name  of  the  country  with  any  due  regard  to  the 
country's  honour  or  to  the  country's  interests." 
Mr.  Gladstone  spoke  as  follows  two  days  later :  — 

"  There  is,  I  admit,  the  obligation  of  the  treaty.     It  is  not  necessary,  nor 
would  time  permit  me,  to  enter  into  the  complicated  question  of  the 
nature  of  the  obligations  of  that  treaty ;  but  I  am  not  able  to  sub- 
scribe to  the  doctrine  of  those  who  have  held  in  this  House  what 
plainly  amounts  to  an  assertion,  that  the  simple  fact  of  the  existence 
of  a  guarantee  is  binding  on  every  party  to  it,  irrespectively  altogether 
of  the  particular  position  in  which  it  may  find  itself  at  the  time  when 
the  occasion  for  acting  on  the  guarantee  arises.     The  great  autliori- 
ties  upon  foreign  policy  to  whom  I  have  been  accustomed  to  listen, 
such  as  Lord  Aberdeen  and  Lord  Palmerston,  never  to  my  knowledge 
took  that  rigid  and,  if  I  may  venture  to  say  so,  that  impracticable 
view  of  the  guarantee.     The  circumstance  that  there  is  already  an 
existing  guarantee  in  force  is,  of -necessity,  an  important  fact,  and 
a  weighty  clement  in  the. case,  to  which  wo  are  bound  to  give  full 
and  ample  consideration.      There  is  also  this  further  consideration, 
the  force  of  which  we  must  all  feel  most  deeply,  and  that  is,  the 
common  interests  against  the  unmeasured  aggrandisement  of  any 
Power  whatever." 
The  treaty  is  an  old  treaty— 1839 — and  that  was  the  view  taken  of  it  in  1870. 
It  is  one  of  those  treaties  which  are  founded,  not   only    on    consideration  for 
Belgium,  Avhich  benefits  under  the  treaty,  but  in  the  interests  of  those  who 
guarantee  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.     The  honour  and  interests  are,  at  least, 
as  strong  to-day  as  in  1870,  and  we  cannot  take  a  more  narrow  view  or  a  less 
serious  view  of  our  obligations,  and  of  the  importance  of  those  obligations,  than 
was  taken  by  ]Mr.  Gladstone's  Government  in  1870. 

I  will  read  to  the  House  what  took  place  last  week  on  this  subject.  When 
mobilisation  was  beginning,  I  knew  that  this  question  must  be  a  most  important 
element  in  our  policy — a  most  important  subject  for  the  House  of  Commons. 
I  telegraphed  at  the  same  time  in  similar  terms  to  both  Paris  and  Berlin  to 
say  that  it  was  essential  for  us  to  know  whether  the  French  and  German 
Governments  respectively  were  prepared  to  undertake  an  engagement  to  respect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  These  are  the  replies.  I  got  from  the  French 
Government  this  reply  :— 

"The   French    Government   are   resolved   to   respect    the    neutrality   of 
Belgium,  and  it  would  only  be  in  the  event  of  some  other  Power 


94 

violating  that  neutrality  that  France  might  find  herself  under  the 
necessity,  in  order  to  assure  the  defence  of  her  security,  to  act  other- 
wise. This  assurance  has  been  given  several  times.  The  President 
of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  and  the 
French  Minister  at  Brussels  has  spontaneously  renewed  the  assurance 
to  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  to-day." 
From  .the  German  Government  the  reply  was :  — 

"  The  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  could  not  possibly  give  an 
answer  before  consulting  the  Emperor  and  the  Imperial  Chancellor." 
Sir  Edward  Goschen,  to  whom  1  had  said  it  was  important  to  have  an  answer 
Joon,.  said  he  hoped  the  answer  would  not  be  too  long  delayed.  The  German 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  then  gave  Sir  Edward  Goschen  to  understand  that 
lie  rather  doubted  whether  they  could  answer  at  all,  as  any  reply  they  might 
give  could  not  fail,  in  the  event  of  war,  to  have  the  undesirable  effect  of  dis- 
closing, to  a  certain  extent,  part  of  their  plan  of  campaign.  I  telegraphed  at 
the  same  time  to  Brussels  to  the  Belgian  Government,  and  I  got  the  following 
reply  from  Sir  Francis  Villiers :  — 

"Belgium  expects  and  desires  that  other  Powers  will  observe  and. uphold  her 
neutrality,  which  she  intends  to  maintain  to  the  utmost  of  her  power.  In  so- 
informing  me,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that,  in  the  event  of  the  viola- 
tion of  the  neutrality  of  their  territory,  they  believed  that  they  were  in  a  posi- 
tion to  defend  themselves  against  intrusion.  The  relations  between  Belgium 
and  her  neighbours  were  excellent,  and  there  was  no  reason  to  suspect  their 
intentions;  but  he  thought  it  well,  nevertheless,  to  "be  prepared  against 
emergencies." 

It  now  appears  from  the  news  1  have  received  to-day — which  has  come  quite 
recently,  and  I  am  not  yet  quite  sure  how  far  it  has  reached  me  in  an  accurate 
form— that  an  ultimatum  has  been  given  to  Belgium  by  Germany,  the  object 
of  which  was  to  offer  Belgium  friendly  relations  with  Germany  on  condition 
that  she  would  facilitate  the  passage  of  German  troops  through  Belgium, 
Well,  Sir,  until  o;ie  has  these  things  absolutely  definitely,  up  to  the  last  moment, 
I  do  not  Avish  to  say  all  that  one  would  say  if  one  were  in  a  position  to  give 
the  House  full,  complete,  and  absolute  informatix)n  upon  the  points  We  were 
sounded  in  the  course  of  last  week  as  to  whether,  if  a  guarantee  were  given 
that,  after  the  war,  Belgian  integrity  would  be  preserved,  that  would  content 
lis.  We  replied  that  we  could  not  bargain  away  whatever  interests  or  obliga- 
tions we  had  in  Belgian  neutrality. 

Shortly  before  I  reached  the  House  I  was  informed  that  the  following 
telegram  had  been  received  from  the  King  of  the  Belgians  by  bur  King — King 
George : — 

"Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Majesty's  friendship  and 
that  of  your  predecessors,  and  the  friendly  attitude  of  England  in 
1870,   and  the  proof  of  friendship  she  has  just  given  us  again,  I 
make   a   supreme   appeal  to   the   diplomatic   intervention   of  your 
Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard  the  integrity  of  Belgium." 
Diplomatic   intervention   took   place   last   week   on   our   part.     What   can 
diplomatic  intervention  do  now?     We  have  groat  and  vital  interests  in  the 
independence— and   integrity   is   the   least   part, — of  Belgium.     If   Belgium   is 
compelled  to  submit  to   allov/  her  neutrality   to  be  violated,   of  course  the 
situation  is  clear.     Even  if  by  agreement  she  admitted  the  violation  of  her 
neutrality,  it  is  clear  she  could  only  do  so  under  duress.    The  smaller  States 
in  that  region  of  Europe  ask  but  one  thing.     Their  one  desire  is  that  they 
should  be  left  alone  and  independent.     The  one  thing  they  fear  is,  I  think, 
not  so  much  that  their  integrity  but  that  their  independence  should  be  inter- 
fered with.     If  in  this  war  which  is  before  Europe  the  neutrality  of  one  of 
those  countries  is  violated,  if  the  troops  of  one  of  the  combatants  violate  its 
neutrality  arid  nonaction  be  taken  to  resent  it,. at  the  end  of  the  war,  whatever 
the  integrity  may  be,  the  independence  will  be  gone. 

I  have  one  further  quotation  from  Mr.  Gladstone  as  to  Vvhathe  thought 
about  the  independence  of  Belgium.  It  will  be  found  in  "Hansard,"  vohuno 
203,  p.  1787.  I  have  not  had  time  to  read  the  whole  speech  and  verify  the 
context,  but  the  thing  seems  to  me  so  clear  that  no  context  could  inake  any 
difference  to  the  meaning  of  it.     Mr.  Gladstone  said;- 

"We  have  an  interest  in  the  independence  of  Belgium,  which  is  wider 
than  that  which  we  may  have  in  the  literal  operation  of  the. 
guarantee.     It  is  found  in  the  answer  to  the  question  whether,  under- 


95 

the  circumstances  of  tho,  case,  this  country,  endowed  as  ft  is  with 
influence  and  power,  would  quietly  stand  by  and  witness  the  perpe- 
tration of  the  direst  crime  that  ever  stained  the  pages  of  history, 
and  thus  become  participators  in  the  sin." 

No,  Sir,  if  it  be  the  case  that  there  has  been  anything  in  the  nature  of  in 
ultimatum  to  Belgium,  asking  her  to  compromise  or  violate  her  neutrality, 
whatever  may  have  been  ottered  to  her  in  return,  her  independence  is  gone 
if  that  holds.  If  her  independence  goes,  the  independence  of  Holland  v/ill 
follow.  I  ask  the  House  from  the  point  of  view  of  British  interests  to  consider 
what  may  "be  at  stake.  If  France  is  beaten  in  a  struggle  of  life  and  death, 
beaten  to  her  knees,  loses, her  position  as  a  great  Power,  becomes  subordinate  to 
the  will  and  power  of  one  greater  than  herself — consequences  which  I  do  not 
anticipate,  because  1  am  sure  that  France  has  the  power  to  defend  herself 
with  all  the  energy  and  ability  and  patriotism  which  she  has  shown  so  often — 
still,  if  that  weie  to  happen,  and  if  Belgium  fell  under  the  same  dominating 
influence,  and  then  Holland,  and  then  Denmark,  then  would  not  Mr.  Glad- 
stone s  words  come  true,  that  just  opposite, to  us  there  would  be  a  common 
interest  against  the  unmeasured  aggrandisement  of  any  Power? 

It  may  be  said,  I  suppose,  that  we  might  stand  aside,  husband  our  strength, 
and  that,  whatever  happened  in  the  course  of  this  war,  at  the  end  of  it 
intervene  with  effect  to  put  things  right,  and  to  adjust  them  to  our  own  point 
of  view.  If,  in  a  crisis  like  this,  we  run  away  from  those  obligations  of 
honour  and  interest  as  regards  the  Belgian  treaty,  I  doubt  whether,  whatever 
material  force  we  might  have  at  the  end,  it  would  be  of  very  much  value  in 
face  of  the  respect  that  we  should  have  lost.  .And  do  not  believe,  whether  a 
great  Power  stands  outside  this  war  or  not,  it  is  going  to  be.  in  a  position  at 
the  end  of  it  to  exert  its  superior  strength.  For  us,  with  a.  powerful  fleet, 
which  we  believe  able  to  protect  our  commerce,  to  protect  our  shores,  and  to 
protect  our  interests,  if  we  are  engaged  in  war,  we  shall  suffer  but  little  more 
than  we  shall  suffer  even  if  we  stand  aside. 

We  are  going  to  suffer,  I  am  afraid,  terribly  in  this  war,  whether  we  are 
in  it  or  whether  we  stand  aside.  Foreign  trade  is  going  -to  stop,  not  because 
the  trade  routes  are  closed,  but  because  there  is  no  trade  at  the  other  end. 
Continental  nations  engaged  in  war — all  their  populations,  all  their  energies, 
all  their  wealth,  engaged  in  a  desperate  struggle — they  cannot  carry  on  the 
trade  with  us  that  they  are  carrying  on  in  times  of  peace,  whether  we  are 
parties  to  the  war  or  whether  we  are  not.  I  do  not  believe  for  a  moment  that 
at  the  end  of  this  war,  even  if  we  stood  aside  and  remained  aside,  we  should  be 
in  a  position,  a  material  position,  to  use  our  force  decisively  to  undo  what 
had  happened  in  the  course  of  the  war,  to  prevent  the  whole  of  the  West  of 
Europe  opposite  to  us — if  that  had  been  the  result  of  the  war — falling  uiidor 
the  domination  of  a  single  Power,  and  I  am  quite  sure  that  our  moral  position 
^would  be  such  as  to  have  lost  us  all  respect.  I  can  only  say  that  I  have  put 
the  question  of  Belgium  somewhat  hypothetically,  because  1  am  not  yet  sure 
of  all  the  facts,  but,  if  the  facts  turn  out  to  be  as  they  have  reached  us  at 
present,  it  is  quite  clear  that  there  is  an  obligation  on  this  country  to  xlo  its 
utmost  to  prevent  the  consequences  to  which  those  facts  will  lead  4f  they  are 
undisputed. 

i  have  read  to  the  House  the  only  engagements  that  we  have  yet  talvcn: 
definitely  with  regard  to  the  use  of  force.  I  think  it  is  due  to  the  House  to 
say  that  we  have  taken  no  engagement  yet  with  regard  to  sending  an  expedi- 
tionary armed  force  out  of  the  country.  Mobilisation  of  the  fleet  has  taken 
place ;  mobilisation  of  the  army  is  taking  place ;  but  we  have  as  yet  taken  no 
engagement,  because  I  feel  that — in  the  case  of  a  European  conflagration  such 
as  this,  unprecedented,  with  our  enormous  responsibilities  in  India  and  other 
parts  of  the  Empire,  or  in  countries  in  British  occupation,  with  all  the  unknown 
factors — we  must  take  very  carefully  into  consideration  the  use  which  we  make 
of  sending  an  expeditionary  force  out  of  the  country  until  wo  know  how  we 
stand.    One  thing  I  would  say. 

The  one  bright  spot  in  the  whole  of  this  terrible  situation  is  Ireland.  Tlio 
general  feeling  throughout  Ireland — and  I  would  like  this  to  bo  clearly  under- 
stood abroad — does  not  make  the  Irish  question  a  consideration  which  wo  feel 
we  have  now  to  take  into  account.  I  have-told  the  House  hov/  far  wc-havc  at 
present  gone  in  commitments  and  the  conditions  which  influence  our  policy,  .ind 
I  have  put  to  the  House  and  dwelt  at  length  upon  how  vital  is  the  condition 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

What  other  poliov  is  there  before  the  Hourp?     There  is  but  one  way  in  which 


9G 

the  Government  could  make  certain  at  the  present  moment  of  keeping  outside 
this  war,  and  that  would  be  that  it  should  immediately  issue  a  proclamation  of 
unconditional  neutrality.  We  cannot  do  that.  We  have  made  the  commitment' 
to  France  that  I  have  read  to  the  House  which  prevents  us  doing  that.  We 
have  got  the  consideration  of  Belgium  which  prevents  us  also  from  any  uncon- 
ditional neutrality,  and,  without  these  conditions  absolutely  satisfied  and  satis- 
factory, we  are  bound  not  to  shrink  from  proceeding  to  the  i^e  of  all  the  force's 
in  our  power.  If  we  did  take  that  line  by  saying,  "  We  will  have  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  this  matter  "  under  no  conditions— the  Belgian  treaty  obliga- 
tions, the  possible  position  in  the  Mediterranean,  with  damage  to  British 
interests,  and  what  may  happen  to  France  from  our  failure  to  support  France — 
if  we  were  to  say  that  all  those  things  mattered  nothing,  were  as  notliing,  and 
to  say  we  would  stand  aside,  we  should,  I  believe,  sacrifice  our  respect  and  good 
name  and  reputation  before  the  world,  and  should  not  escape  the  most  serious 
and  grave  economic  consequences. 

My  object  has  been  to  explain  the  view  of  the  Government,  and  to  place 
before  the  House  the  issue  and  the  choice.  I  do  not  for  a  moment  conceal,  after 
what  I  have  said,  and  after  the  information,  incomplete  as  it  is,  that  I  have 
given  to  the  House  with  regard  to  Belgium,  that  wo  must  be  prepared,  and  we 
are  prepared,  for  the  consequences  of  having  to  use  all  the  strength  we  have 
at  any  moment— we  know  not  how  soon— to  defend  ourselves  and  to  take  our 
part.  We  know,  if  the  facts  all  be  as  I  have  stated  them,  though  I  have 
announced  no  intending  aggressive  action  on  our  part,  no  final  decision  to  resort 
to  force  at  a  moment's  notice,  until  we  know  the  whole  of  the  case,  that  the  use 
of  it  may  be  forced  upon  us.  As  far  as  the  forces  of  the  Crown  are  concerned,, 
we  are  ready.  I  believe  the  Prime  Minister  and  my  right  lion,  friend  the  First 
Lord  of  the  Admiralty  have  no  doubt  whatever  tliat  the  readiness  and  the 
efficiency  of  those  forces  Avere  never  at  a  higher  mark  than  they  are  to-day,  and 
never  was  there  a  time  when  confidence  was  more  justified  in  the  power  of  the 
navy  to  protect  our  commerce  and  to  protect  our  shores.  The  thought  is  with 
us  always  of  the  suffering  and  misery  entailed,  from  which  no  country  in  Europe 
will  escape  by  abstention,  and  from  which  no  neutrality  will  save  us.  The 
amount  of  harm  that  can  be  done  by  an  enemy  ship  to  our  trade  is  infinitesimal, 
compared  with  the  amount  of  harm  that  must  be  done  by  the  economic  con- 
dition that  is  caused  on  the  Continent. 

The  most  awful  responsibility  is  resting  upon  the  Government  in  deciding 
what  to  advise  the  Holise  of  Commons  to  do.  W^e  have  disclosed  our  mind  to 
the  House  of  Commons.  We  have  disclosed  the  issue,  the  information  which 
we  have,  and  made  clear  to  the  House,  I  trust,  that  we  are  prepared  to  face 
that  situation,  and  that  should  it  develop,  as  probably  it  may  develop,  we  will 
face  it.  We  worked  for  peace  up  to  the  last  moment,  and  beyond  the  last 
moment.  How  hard,  how  persistently,  and  how  earnestly  we  strove  for  peace 
last  week  the  House  will  see  from  the  papers  that  will  be  before  it. 

But  that  is  over,  as  far  as  the  peace  of  Europe  is  concerned.  Wo  are  now 
face  to  face  with  a  situation  and  all  the  consequences  Avhich  it  may  yet  have  to 
unfold.  We  believe  we  shall  have  the  support  of  the  House  at  largo  in  pro- 
ceeding to  whatever  the  consequences  maj'  be  and  whatever  measures  may  be 
forced  upon  us  by  the  development  of  facts  or  action  takeii  by  others.  I  believe 
the  country,  so  quickly  has  the  situation  been  forced  upon  it,  has  not  had  time 
to  realise  the  issue.  It  perhaps  is  still  thinking  of  the  quarrel  between  Austria 
and  Servia,  and  not  the  complications  of  this  matter  which  have  grown  out  of 
the  quarrel  between  Austria  and  Servia.  Russia  and  Germany  we  know  arc 
at  war.  We  do  not  yd  know  officially  that  Austria,  the  ally  whom  Germany, 
is  to  support,  is  yet  at  war  v.ith  Russia.  We  know  that  a  good  deal  has  been 
happening  on  the  French  frontier.  We  do  not  know  that  the  German  Ambas- 
sador has  left  Paris. 

The  situation  has  developed  so  rapidly  that  technically,  ias  regards  the  con- 
dition of  the  war,  it  is  most  difficult  to  describe  what  has  actually  happened.  I 
wanted  to  bring  out  the  underlying  issues  which  would  affect  our  own  conduct, 
and  our  own  policy,  and  to  put  them  clearly.  I  have  now  put  the  vital  facts  before 
the  House,  and  if,  as  seems  not  improbable,  we  are  forced,  and  rapidly  forced, 
to  take  our  stand  upon  those  issues,  then  I  believe,  when  the  country  realises ' 
what  is  at  stake,  what  the  real  issues  are,  the  magnitude  of  the  impending 
dangers  in  the  West  of  Europe,  which  I  have  endeavoured  to  describe  to  the 
House,  we  shall  be  supported  throughout,  not  only  by  the  House  of  Commons, 
but  by  the  determination,  the  resolution,  the  courage,  and  the  endurance  of  the 
whole  country. 


or 

(2)   FURTHER  STATEMENT  MADE   BY   SIR  EDWARD   GREY   IN  THE 
HOUSE  OF  COMMONS.  AUGUST  3,  1914. 


Germany  and  Belgium. 
I  want  to  give  the  House  some  information  which  I  have  received,  and  which 
was  not  in  my  possession  when  I  made  my  statement  this  afternoon.     It  is 
information  I  have  received  from  the  Belgian  Legation  in  London,  and  is  to 
the  following  effect   — 

"  Germany  sent  yesterday  evening  at  7  o'clock    a  note    proposing    to 
Belgium  friendly  neutrality,  covering  free  passage  on  Belgian  terri- 
tory, and  promising  maintenance  of  independence  of  the  kingdom 
and  possession  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  and  threatening,  in  case  of 
refusal,  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  enemy.     A  time  limit  of  twelve  hours 
was  fixed  for  the  reply      Tlie  Belgians  have  answered  that  an  attack 
on  their  neutrality  would  be  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  rights  of 
nations,  and  that  to  accept  the  German  proposal  would  be  to  sacri- 
fice the  honour  of  a  nation.       Conscious  of   its  duty,   Belgium  is 
firmly  resolved  to  repel  aggression  by  all  possible  means.'* 
Of  course,  I  can  only  say  that  the  Government  are  prepared  to  take  into 
grave  consideration  the  information  which  it  has  received      I  make  no  further 
comment  upon  it 


(3)  STATEMENT  BY  THE  PRIME  MINISTER  IN  THE  HOUSE  OP 
COMMONS,  AUGUST  4,  1914. 

Mr  Bonar  Law — I  wish  to  ask  the  Prime  Minister  whether  he  has  any 
statement  that  he  can  now  make  to  the  House? 

The  Prime  Minister  (Mr  Asquith). — In  conformity  with  the  statement  of 
policy  made  here  by  my  right  hon  friend  the  Foreign  Secretary  yesterday,  a, 
telegram  was  early  this  morning  sent  by  him  to  our  Ambassador  in  Berlin. 
It  was  to  this  effect   — 

"  The  King  of  the  Belgians  has  made  an  appeal  to  His  Majesty  the  King 
for  diplomatic  intervention  on  behalf  of  Belgium.  His  Majesty's 
Government  are  also  informed  that  the  German  Government  has 
delivered  to  the  Belgian  Government  a  note  proposing  friendly 
neutrality  entailing  free  passage  through  Belgian  territory,  and 
promising  to  maintain  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  king- 
dom and  its  possessions  at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  threatening  in 
case  of  refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  encmy>  An  answer  was 
requested  witlim  twelve  hours.  We  also  understand  that  Belgium 
has  categorically  refused  this  as  a  flagrant  violation  of  the  law  of 
nations  His  Majesty's  Government  are  bound  to  protest  against 
tjiis  violation  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  a  party  in  common 
with  themselves,  and  must  request  an  assurance  that  the  demand 
made  upon  Belgium  may  not  be  proceeded  with,  and  that  her 
neutrality  will  be  respected  by  Germany  Yon  should  ask  for  an 
immediate  reply." 
We  received  this  morning  from  our  Minister  at  Brussels  the  following 
telegram  — 

"German  Minister  has  this  morning  addressed  note  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that,  as  Belgian  Government- 
have  declined  the  well-intended  proposals  submitted  to  them  by  the 
Imperial  Government,  the  latter  will,  deeply  to  their  regret,  be 
compelled  to  carry  out,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures 
considered  rndispensable  in  view  of  the  French  menaces." 
Simultaneously — almost  immediately  afterwards — we  received  from  the 
Belgian  Legation  here  m  London  the  following  telegram   — 

'General  staff  announces  that  territory  has  been  violated  at  Gemmenich 
(near  Aix-la-Chapelle).'* 
Subsequent  information  tended  to  show  that  the  German  force  has  pene- 
trate J  still  further  into  Belgian  territory      We  also  received  this  morning  from 
the  Go'man  Ambassador  here  the  telegram  sent  to  him  by  the  German  Foreign 
Secretary,  and  communicated  by  the  Ambassador  to  us.    It  is  in  these  terms  — 
"  Please  dispel  any  mistrust  that  may  subsist  on  the  part  of  the  British 
Government  with  regard  to  our  intentions  by  repeating  most  posi- 


98 

tively  formal  assurance  that,  even  in  the  case  of  armed  conflict  with 
Belgium,  Germany  will,  under  no  i^retence  whatever,  annex  Belgian 
territory.     Sincerity  of  this,  declaration  is  borne  out  by  fact  that 
we  -solemnly  pledged  our  word  to  Holland  strictly  to  respect  her 
neutrality.    It  is  obvious  that  we  could  not  profitably  annex  Belgic 
territory  withou.t  mak-ing  at  the  same  time  territorial  acquisitions 
at  expense  of  Holland.       Please  impress  upon  Sir  E.   Grey  that 
German  army  could  not  be  exposed  to  French  attack  across  Belgium, 
which  was  planned  according  to  absolutely  unimpeachable  informa- 
tion.    Germany  had  consequently  to  disregard  Belgian"  neutrality, 
it  being    for    her    a    question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent  French 
advance." 
I  have  to  add  this  on  behalf  of  His  Majesty's  Government:    "VVe  cannot 
regard  this  as  in  any  sense  a  satisfactory  communication.     We  have,  in  reply, 
to  it,  repeated  the  request  we  made  last  week  to  the  German  Government,  that 
they  should  give  us  the  same  assurance  in  regard 'to  Belgian  neutrality  as  was 
given  to  us  and  to  Belgium  by  France  last  week.    Wo  have  asked  that  a  reply 
to  that  request  and  a  satisfactory  answer  to  the  telegram  of  this  porning— 
which  I  have  read  to  the  House— should  be  given  before  midnight. 


(4)  STATEMENT  BY  THE  PRIME  MINISTER  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF 
COMMONS,  AUGUST  5,  1914. 
Mr.  Jionar  Xau'.— May  I  ask  the  Prime  IMinister  if  he  has  any  information 
he  can  give  us  to-day? 

TJiC  Frimc  Minisfcr.— Our  Ambassador  at  Berlin  received  his  passports  at 
7  o'clock  last  evening,  and  shice  11  o'clock  last  night  a  state  of  war  has  existed 
between  Germany  and  ourselves. 

We  have  received  from  our  Minister  at  Brussels  the  following  telegram  :  — 
"I  have  just  received  from  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs" 
—that  is  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs— 

"  a  note  of  which  the  following  is  a  literal  translation :  — 
"'Belgian  Government  regret  to  have  to  inform  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment that  this  morning  armed  forces  of  Germany  penetrated  into 
Belgian  territory  in  violation  of  engagements  assumed  by  treaty. 
"  *  Bel<j;ian  Government  are  further  resolved  to  resist  by  all  moans  in  their 

l>ower. 
"'Belgium   appeals   to   Great   Britain   and   Franco    and   Russia   to   co- 
operate, as  guarantors,  in  defence  of  her  territory. 
" '  There  would  be  concerted    and    common    action    with  the  object  of 
resisting  the  forcible  measures  employed  by  Germany  against  Bel- 
gium, and  at  the  samo  time  of  guarding  the  maintenance  for  future 
of  the  independence  and  integrity  of  Belgium. 
" '  Belgium  is  happy  to  be  able  to  declare  that  she  will  assume  defence 
of  her  fortified  places.'  " 
We  have  also  received  to-day  from  the  French  Ambassador  hero  the  follow- 
ing telegram  received  by  the  French  Government  from  the  French  Minister  at 
Brussels : — 

"The  Chef  du  Cabinet  of  the  Belgian  Ministry  of  War  has  asked  the 

French  military  attache  to  prepare  at  once  for  the  co-operation  and 

contact  of  French  troops  with  the  Belgian  army  pending  the  results 

of  the  appeal  to  the  guaranteeing  Powers  nov/  being  made.     Order:S 

have  therefore  been  given  to  Belgian    provincial    Governors  not  to 

regard  movements  of  French  troops  as  a  violation  of  the  frontier." 

This  is  all  the  information  I  am  at  the  moment  able  to  give  to  the  House, 

but  I  take  the  opportunity  of  giving  notice  that  to-morrow,  in  Committee  of 

Supply,  I  sliall  move  a  vote  of  credit  of  100,000,OOOZ. 


(5)  STATEMENT  BY  THE  PRIME  MINISTER  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF 
COMMONS,  AUGUST  6,  1914. 
Motion    made,     and    Question    proposed,     "That    a    sum,     not     exceeding 
£100,000.000,  be  granted  to  His  Majesty,  beyond  the  ordinary  grants  of  Parlia- 
ment, towards  defraying  expenses  that  may  be  incurred  during  the  year  ending 
March  31st,  1915,  for  all  measures  which  may  be  taken  for  the  security  of  the 


99 

country,  for  the  conduct  of  Naval  and  Military  operations,  for  assisting  the  food 
supply,  for  promoting  the  continuance  of  trade,  industry,  and  business  com- 
munications, whether  by  means  of  insurance  or  indemnity  against  risk,  or  other- 
wise for  the  relief  of  distress,  and  generally  for  all  expenses  arising  out  of  the 
existence  of  a  state  of  war  " 

The  Frime  Minister  {Mr  Asquith)  —In  asking  the  House  to  agree  to  the 
resolution  which  i^Ir  Speaker  has  just  read  from  the  Chair,  I  do  not  propose, 
because  I  do  not  think  it  is  in  any  way  necessary,  to  traverse  the  ground  again 
which  was  covered  by  my  right  hon  friend  the  Foreign  Secretary  two  or  three 
nights  ago  He  stated— and  I  do  not  think  any  of  the  statements  he  made  are 
capable  of  answer  and  certainly  have  not  yet  been  answered — the  grounds  upon 
which,  with  the  utmost  reluctance  and  with  infinite  regret,  His  Majesty's 
Government  have  bccii  compelled  to  put  this  country  in  a  state  of  war  with 
what,  for  many  years  and  indeed  generations  past,  has  been  a  friendly  Power, 
But,  Sir,  the  papers  which  have  since  been  presented  to  Parliament,  and  which 
are  now  in  the  hands  ot  hon  Members,  will,  I  think,  show  how  strenuous,  how 
unremitting,  how  persistent,  even  when  the  last  glimmer  of  hope  seemed  to 
have  faded  away,  were  the  efforts  "of  my  right  hon.  friend  to  secure  for  Europe 
an  honourable  and  a  lasting  peace.  Everyone  knows,  in  the  great  crisis  which 
occurred  last  year  m  the  East  of  Europe,  it  was  largely,  if  not  mainly,  by  the 
acknowledgment  of  all  Europe,  due  to  the  steps  taken  by  my  right  hon.  friend 
that  the  area  of  the  conflict  was  limited,  and  that,  so  far  as  the  great  Powers 
are  concerned,  peace  was  maintained.  If  his  efforts  upon  this  occasion  have, 
unhappily,  been  less  successful,  I  am  certain  that  this  House  and  the  country, 
and  I  will  add  posterity  and  history,  will  accord  to 'him  what  is,  after  all,  the 
best  tribute  that  can  be  paid  to  any  statesman ;  that,  never  derogating  for 
an  instant  or  by  an  inch  from  tlie  honour  and  interests  of  his  own  country,  he 
has  striven,  as  few  men  have  striven,  to  maintain  and  preserve  the  greatest 
interest  of  all  countries — universal  peace.  These  papers  which  are  now  in  the 
hands  of  hon  Members  show  something  more  than  that.  They  show  what  were 
the  terms  which  were  offered  to  us  in  exchange  for  our  neutrality.  I  trust  that 
not  only  the  Members  of  this  House,  but  all  our  fellow-subjects  everywhere,  will 
read  the  communications,  will  read,  learn  and  mark  the  communications  which 
passed  only  a  week  ago  to-day  between  Berlin  and  London  in  this  matter.  The 
terms  by  which  it  was  sought  to  buy  our  neutrality  are  contained  in  the  com- 
munication made  by  the  German  Chancellor  to  Sir  Edward  Goschen  on  the 
29th  July.  No.  85  of  the  published  Paper.*  I  think  I  must  refer  to  them  for 
a  moment.  After  referring  to  the  state  of  things  as  between  Austria  and 
Eussia.  Sir  Edward  Gosclien  goes  on   — 

"He  then  proceeded  to  make  the  following  strong  bid  for  British  neu- 
trality He  said  that  it  was  clear,  so  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge  the 
main  principle  which  governed  British  policy,  that  Great  Britain 
would  never  stand  by  and  allow  France  to  be  ct-ushed  in  any  conflict 
there  might  be.  That,  however,  was  not  the  object  at  which  Ger- 
many aimed.  Provided  that  neutrality  of  Great  Britain  were  cer- 
tain, every  assurance  would  be  given  to  the  British  Government  that 
the  Imperial  Government  " 

Let  the  House  observe  these  words — 

"aimed  at  no  territorial  acquisition  at  the  expense  of  France  should 
they  prove  victorious  in  any  war  that  might  ensue." 

Sir  Edv/ard  Goschen  proceeded  to  put  a  very  pertinent  question  :— 

"I  questioned  His  Excellency  about  the  French  colonies" 

AVhat  are  the  French  colonies?  They  mean  every  part  of  the  dominions  and 
possessions  of  France  outside  the  geographical  area  of  Europe — 

"  and  ho  said  that  he  was  unable  to  give  a  similar  undertaking  in  that 
respect." 
Jjct  me  come  to  what,  in  my  mmd,  personally,  has  always  been  tlie  crucial,  and 
almost  the  governing  consideration,  namely,  the  position  of  the  small  States : — 
"As  regards  Holland,  however,  His  Excellency  said  that  so  long  as  Ger- 
many's  adversaries   respected   the  integrity   and  neutrality   of   the 
Netherlands,  Germany  was  ready  to  give  His  Majesty's  Government 
an  assurance  that  she  would  do  likewise." 
Then  we  come  to  Belgium; : — 

"It  dtsponded  upon  the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany  might 
be  forced  to  enter 'upon  in  Belgium,  but,  when  the  war  was  over^ 
Belgian  integrity  would  be  respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against 
Germany." 

*  See  Part  II,  No.  85.  page  64. 


100 

Lot  the  House  observe  the  distinction  between  those  two  cases.  In  regard  to 
Holhmd  it  was  not  only  independence  and  integrity  but  also  neutrality ;  but  m 
regard  to  Belgium,  there  was  no  mention  of  neutrality  at  all,  nothing  but  an 
assurance  that  after  the  war  came  to  an  end  the  integrity  of  Belgium  would 
be  respected.     Then  His  Excellency  added  :— 

"Ever  since  he  had  been  Chancellor  the  object  of  his  policy  had  been  to 

bring  about  an  understanding  with  England.     He  trusted  that  these 

assurances  " 

the  assurances  I  have  read  out  to  the  House — 

"might  form  the    basis   of    that    understanding    which  he  so  much 

desired." 

What  docs  that  amount  to?  Let  me  just  ask  the  House.  •  I  do  so,  not  with  the 
object  of  inflaming  passion,  certainly  not  with  the  object  of  exciting  feeling 
against  Germany,  but  I  do  so  to  vindicate  and  make  clear  the  position  of  the 
British  Government  in  this  matter.  What  did  that  proposal  amount  to?  In 
the  first  place,  it  meant  this:  That  behind  the  back  of  France— they  were  not 
made  a  party  to  these  communications— we  should  have  given,  if  we  had  assented 
to  that,  a  free  licence  to  Germany  to  annex,  in  the  event  of  a  successful  war, 
the  whole  of  the  extra-European  dominions  and  possessions  of  France.  What 
did  it  mean  as  regards  Belgium  ?  When  she  addressed,  as  she  has  addressed  in 
these  last  few  days,  her  moving  appeal  to  us  to  fulfil  our  solemn  guarantee  of 
her  neutrality,  what  reply  should  we  have  given  ?  What  reply  should  we  have 
given  to  that  Belgian  appeal?  We  should  have  been  obliged  to  say  that,  with- 
out her  knowledge,  we  had  bartered  away  to  the  Power  threatening  her  our 
obligation  to  keep  our  plighted  word.  The  House  has  read,  and  the  country 
has  read,  of  course,  in  the  last  few  hours,  the  most  pathetic  appeal  addressed 
by  the  King  of  Belgium,  and  I  do  not  envy  the  man  who  can  read  that  appeal 
with  an  unmoved  heart.  .  Belgians  are  fighting  and  losing  their  lives.  What 
would  have  been  the  position  of  Great  Britain  to-day  in  the  face  of  that  spec- 
tacle, if  we  had  assented  to  this  infamous  proposal?  Yes,  and  what  are  we  to 
get  in  return  for  the  betrayal  of  our  friends  and  the  dishonour  of  our  obliga- 
tions? What  are  we  to  get  in  return?  A  promise — nothing  more;  a  promise 
as  to  what  Germany  would  do  in  certain  eventualities ;  a  promise,  be  it  observed 
— I  am  sorry  to  have  to  say  it,  but  it  must  be  put  upon  record — given  by  a  Power 
which  was  at  that  very  moment  announcing  its  intention  to  violate  its  own  treaty 
and  inviting  us  to  do  the  same.  I  can  only  say,  if  we  had  dallied  or  temporised, 
we,  as  a  Government,  should  have  covered  ourselves  with  dishonour,  and  we 
should  have  betrayed  the  interests  of  this  country,  of  v/hich  we  are  trustees.  I 
am  glad,  and  I  think  the  country  will  be  glad,  to  turn  to  the  reply  which  my 
right  hon.  friend  made,  and  of  which  I  will  read  to  the  House  two  of  the  more 
salient  passages..  This  document.  No.  101  of  my  Paper,*  puts  on  record  a  week 
ago  the  attitude  of  the  British  Government,  and,  as  I  believe,  of  the  British 
people.     My  right  hon.  friend  saj's:— 

"His  ^Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain  the  Chan- 
cellor's proposal  that  they  should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on 
such  terms.  What  he  asks  us  in  eflect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while 
French  Colonies  are  taken  if  France  is  beaten,  so  long  as  Germany 
does  not  take  French  territory  as  distinct  from  the  Colonies.     From 

the  material  point  of  view  " 

My  right  hon.  friend,  as  he  always  does,  used  very  temperate  language: — 

"such  a  proposal  is  unacceptable,  for  France,  without  further  terri- 
tory in  Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crushed  as  to  lose 
her  position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  become  subordinate  to  German 
policy." 

That  is  the  material  aspect.     But  he  proceeded  :  — 

"Altogether,  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this 
bargain  with  Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from 
which  the  good  name  of  this  country  would  never  recover.  The 
Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain  away  whatever  obligation 
or  interest  we  have  as  regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could 
not  entertain  that  bargain  either." 

He  then  says:— 

"We  must  preserve  our  full  freedom  to  act,  as  circumstances  may  seem 
to  us  to  require." 

And  he  added,  I  think,  in  sentences  which  the  House  will  appreciate :  — 

"You  should  .  .  J  add  most  earnestly  that  the  one  way  of  main- 
tnining  the  good  relations  between  England  and  Germany  is  that 

*  Sec  Part  II,  No.  101,  page  77. 


101       / 

they  should  continue  to  work  together  to  preserve  the  peace  of 
Europe.  .  .  .  For  that  object  this  Government  will  work  in  that 
way  With  all  sincerity  and  good  will. 
If  the  peace  ci  Europe  can  be  preserved  and  the  present  crisis  safely 
passed,  my  own  endeavour  will  be  to  promote  some  arrangement  to 
which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured  that 
no  aggressive  or  hostile  pr-licy  would  be,  pursued  against  her  or  her 
allies  by  France,   Russia,*  and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately.     I 

have  dosired  this  and  worked  for  it" 

Th©  statement  was  never  more  true-^ 

"as  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis  and  Germany 

having   a   corresponding   object,    our   relations   sensibly    improved. 

The   idea  has   hitherto   been  too  Utopian   to   form  the  subject   of 

definite  proposals,  but  if  this  present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute 

than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely 

passed,  I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  will  follow 

may  make  possible  some  more  definite  rapprochement  between  the 

Powers  than  has  been  possible  hitherto." 

That  document,  in  my  opinion,  states  clearly,  in  temperate  and  convincing 

language  the  attitude  of  this  Government.     Can  anyone  who  reads  it  fail  to 

appreciate  the  tone  of  obvious  sincerity  and  earnestness  which  underlies  it ;  can 

anyone  honestly  doubt  that  the  Government  of  this  country  in  spite  of  great 

provocation — and  I  regard  the  proposals  made  to  us  as  proj)osals  which  we 

might  have  thrown  aside  without  consideration  and  almost  without  answer-^ 

can  anyone  doubt  that  in  spite  of  great  provocation  the  right  hon.  Gentleman, 

who  had  already  earned  the  title — and  no  one  ever  more  deserved  it — of  Peace 

Maker  of  Europe,  persisted  to  the  very  last  moment  of  the  last  hour  in  that 

beneficent  but  unhappily  frustrated  purpose  ?     I  am  entitled  to  say,  and  I  do 

so  on  behalf  of  this  country — I  speak  not  for  a  party,  I  speak  for  the  country 

as  a  whole— that  we  made  every  effort  any  Government  could  possibly  make  for 

peace.     But  this  war  has  been  forced  upon  us.     What  is  it  we  are  fighting  for? 

Every  one  knows,  and  no  one  knows  better  than  the  Government,  the  terrible 

incalculable  suffering,  economic,  social,  personal  and  political,  which  war,  and 

especially  a  war  between  the  Great  Powers  of  the  world,  must  entail.     There 

is  no  man  amongst  us  sitting  upon  this  bench  in  these  trying  days — more  trying 

perhaps  than  any  body  of  statesmen  for  a  hundred  years  have  had  to  pass 

through,  there  is  not  a  man  amongst  us  who  has  not,  during  the  whole  of  that 

time,  had  clearly  before  his  vision  the  almost  unequalled  suffering  which  war, 

even  in  a  just  cause,  must  bring  about,  not  only  to  the  peoples  who  are  for  the 

moment  living  in  this  country  and  in  the  other  countries  of  the  world,  but  to 

posterity  and  to  the  whole  prospects  of  European  civilisation.     Every  step  we 

took  we  took  with  that  vision  before  our  eyes,  and  with  a  sense  of  responsibility 

which  it  is  impossible  to  describe.     Unhappily,  if — in  spite  of  all  our  efforts  to 

keep  the  peace,   and  with  that  full  and  overpowering  consciousness  of  the 

result,  if  the  issue  be  decided  in  favour  of  war — ^we  have,  nevertheless,  thought 

it  to  be  the  duty  as  well  as  the  interest  of  this  country  to  go  to  war,  the  House 

may  be  well  assured  it  was  because  we  believe,  and  I  am  certain  the  country  will 

believe,  we  are  unsheathing  our  sword  in  a  just  cause. 

If  I  am  asked  what  we  are  fighting  for,  I  reply  in  two  sentences.  In  the 
first  place  to  fulfil  a  solemn  international  obligation,  an  obligation  which,  if  it 
had  been  entered  into  between  private  persons  in  the  ordinary  concerns  of  life, 
would  have  been  regarded  as  an  obligation  not  only  of  law  but  of  honour,  which 
no  self-respecting  man  could  possibly  have  repudiated.  I  say,  secondly,  we  are 
fighting  to  vindicate  the  principle  which,  in  these  days  when  force,  material 
force,  sometimes  seems  to  be  the  dominant  influence  and  factor  in  the  develop- 
ment of  mankind,  we  are  fighting  to  vindicate  the  principle  thai;  small  nation- 
alities are  not  to  be  crushed,  in  defiance  of  international  good  faith,,  by  the 
arbitrary  will  of  a'  strong  and  over-mastering  Power.  I  do  not  believe  any 
nation  ever  entered  into  a  great  controversy — and  this  is  one  of  the  greatest 
history  will  ever  know — with  a  clearer  conscience  and  stronger  conviction  that 
it  is  fighting  not  for  aggression,  not  for  the  maintenance  even  of  its  own  selfish 
interest,  but  that  it  i«  fighting  in  defence  of  principles,  the  maintenance  of 
which  is  vital  to  the  civilisation  of  the  world.  With  a  full  conviction,  not  only 
of  the  wisdom  and  justice,  but  of  the  obligations  which  lay  upon  us  to  challenge 
this  great  issue,  we  are  entering  into  the  struggle.  Let  us  now  make  sure  that 
all  the  resources,  not  only  of  this  United  Kingdom,  but  of  the  vast  Empire  of  • 
Which  it  is  the  centre,  shall  be  thrown  into  the  scale,  and  it  is  that  that  object 
may  be  adequately  secured  that  I  am  now  about  to  ask  this  Committee — to 
make  the  very  unusual  demand  upon  it — to  give  the  Government  a  Vote  of 
Credit  of  100,000,OOOL  I  am  not  going,  and  I  am  sure  the  Committee  do  nob 
wish  it,  into  the  technical  distinctions  between  Votes  of  Credit  and  Supple- 


102 

mentary  Estimates  and  all  the  rarities  and  refinements  which  arise  in  that 
connection.  There  is  a  much  higher  point  of  view  than  that.  If  it  were  neccsr 
sary,  I  could  justify,  upon  purely  technical  grounds,  the  course  we  propose  to 
adopt,  but  I  am  not  going  to  do  so,  because  I  think  it  would  be  foreign  to  the 
temper  and  disposition  of  the  Committee.  There  is  one  thing  to  which  I  do 
call  attention,  that  is,  the  Title  and  Heading  of  the  Bill.  As  a  rule,  in  the 
past,  Votes  of  this  kind  have  been  taken  simply  for  naval  and  military  opera- 
tions, but  we  have  thought  it  right  to  ask  the  Committee  to  give  us  its  confi- 
dence in  the  extension  of  the  traditional  area  of  Votes  of  Credit  so  that  this 
money,  which  we  are  asking  them  to  allow  us  to  expend,  may  be  applied  not 
only  for  strictly  naval  and  military  operations,  but  tp  assist  the  food  supplies, 
promote  the  continuance  of  trade^  industry,  business,  and  communications — 
whether  by  means  of  insurance  or  indemnity  against  risk  or  otherwise— for  the 
relief  of  distress,  and  generally  for  all  expenses  arising  out  of  thcj  existence  of 
a  state  of  war.  I  believe  the  Committee  will  agree  with  us  that  it  was  wise  to 
extend  the  area  of  the  Vote  of  Credit  so  as  to  include  all  these  various  matters. 
It  gives  the  Government  a  free  hand.  Of  course,  the  Treasury  will  account  for 
it,  and  any  expenditure  that  takes  place  will  be  subject  to  the  approval  of  tho 
House.  I  think  it  would  be  a  great  pity— in  fact,  a  great  disaster— if,  in  a 
crisis  of  this  magnitude,  we  were  not  enabled  to  make  provision — provision  far 
more  needed  now  than  it  was  under  the  simpler  conditions  that  prevailed  in  the 
old  days — for  all  the  various  ramifications  and  developments  of  expenditure 
whicli  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war  between  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  must 
entail  on  any  one  of  them. 

I  am  asking  also  in  my  character  of  Secretary  of  State  for  War— a  position 
which  I  held  until  this  morning— for  a  Supplementary  Estimate  for  men  for 
the  Army.  Perhaps  the.  Committee  will  allow  me  for  a  moment  just  to  say  on 
that  personal  matter  that  I  took  upon  myself  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State  for 
War  under  conditions,  upon  which  I  need  not  go  back  but  which  are  fresh  in 
the'-minds  of  everyone,  in  the  hope  and  with  the  object  that  the  condition  of 
things  in  the  Army,  which  all  of  u&  deplored,  might  speedily  be  brought  to  an 
end  and  complete  confidence  re-established.  I  believe  that  is  the  case  ;  in  fact, 
I  know  it  to  be.  There  is  no  more  loyal  and  united  body,  no  body  in  which  the 
spirit  and  habit  of  discipline  are  more  deeply  ingrained  and  cherished  than  in 
the  British  Army.  Glad  as  I  should  have  been  to  continue  the  work  of  that" 
office,  and  I  would  have  done  so  under  normal  conditions,  it  would  not  be  fair 
to  the  Army,  it  would  not  be  just  to  the  country,  that  any  Minister  should 
divide  his  attention  between  that  Department  and  another,"  still  less  that  tho 
First  Minister  of  the  Crown,  who  has  to  look  into  the  affairs  of  all  departments 
and  who  is  ultimately  responsible  for  the  whole  policy  of  the  Cabinet,  should 
give,  as  he  could  only  give,  perfunctory  attention  to  the  affairs  of  our  Army 
in  a  great  war.  I  am  very  glad  to  say  that  a  very  distinguished  soldier  ana 
administrator,  in  the  person  of  Lord  Kitchener,  with  that  great  public  spirit 
and  patriotism  that  everyone  would  expect  from  him,  at  my  request  stepped 
into  the  breach.  Lord  Kitchener,  as  everyone  knows,  is  not  a  politician.  His 
association  with  the  Government  as  a  Member  of  the  Cabinet  for  this  purpose 
must  not  be  taken  as  in  any  way  identifying  him  with  any  set  of  political 
opinions.  He  has,  at. a  great  public  emergency,  responded  to  a  great  public 
call,  and  I  am  certain  he  will  have  with  him,  in  the  discharge  of  one  of  the 
most  arduous  tasks  that  has  ever  fallen  upon  a  Minister,  the  complete  confi- 
dence of  all  parties  and  all  opinions. 

I  am  asking  on  his  behalf  for  the  Army,  power  to  increase  the  number  of 
men  of  all  ranks,  in  addition  to  the  number  already  voted,  by  no'  less  than 
500,000.  I  am  certain  the  Committee  will  not  refuse  its  sanction,  for  we  are 
encouraged  to  ask  for  it  not  only  by  our  own  sense  of  the  gravity  and  the 
necessities  of  the  case,  but  by  the  knowledge  that  India  is  prepared  to  send 
us  certainly  two  Divisions,  and  that  every  one  of  our  self-governing  Dominions," 
spontaneously  and  imasked,  has  already  tendered  to  the  utmost  limits  of  theii; 

Sossibilities,  both  in  men  and  in  monev,  every  help  they  can  afford  to  the 
mpire  in  a  moment  of  need.  Sir,  the  Mother  Country  must  set  the  example, 
while  she  responds  with  gratitude  and  affection  to  those  filial  overtures  from 
the  outlying  members  of  her  family. 

^11^' J  will  say  no  more.  This  is  not  an  occasion  for  controversial  discussion. 
In  all  that  I  have  said,  I  believe  I  have  not  gone,  either  in  the  statement  of  our 
case  or  in  my  general  descriotion  of  the  provision  we  think  it  necessary  to  make, 
beyond  the  strict  bounds  of  truth.  It  is  not  my  purpose— it  is  not  the  purpose 
of  any  patriotic  man— to  inflame  feeling,  to  indulge  in  rhetoric,  to  excite  inter- 
rational  animosities.  The  occasion  is  far  too  grave  for  that.  We  have  a  great 
duty  to  perform,  we  have  a  great  trust  to  fulfil,  and  confidently  we  believe  that 
Parliament  and  the  country  will  enable  us  to  do  it. 

BAZELL,   WATSON   AND   VINEY,   LD.,   LONDON   AND   AYLESBURY.    PRINTERS   BY   APPOINTMENT  TO 
HIS   MAJESTY  THE   KING. 


wmtM  m  mum  Mmim. 


RECUEIL 


DE  DOCUMENTS  DIPLONATIIlllES. 


lV6^oeialions  ayani  preeede  la  guerre. 


%  Juillet  -  ",  S"  1914. 


Retrograde, 

Imprimerie  de  V  Etat. 

1914. 


he  Charge  d'aflTaire^  eii  Serbia  au  AUnistre  de»  ItTaires 

Etrang^res. 

Belgrade,  le  >%s  Juillet  1914. 

(T^ldgramme). 

Le  Ministre  d'Autriche  vient  de  transmettre,  k  6  heures  du 
soir,  au  Ministre  dee  Finances  Patchou,  qd  remplace  Pachitch,  une 
note  ultimative  de  son  Gouveraement  f ixant  un  d61ai  de  48  heures  pour 
Tacceptation  des  demandes  y  contenues.  Giesl  a  ajoute  verbalement 
que  pour  le  cas  oii  la  note  ne  serait  pas  acceptee  int^gralement  dans 
un  d41ai  de  48  heures,  il  avait  Tordre  de  quitter  Belgrade  avec  le 
personnel  de  la  Legation.  Pachitch  et  les  autres  Ministres  qui  se 
trouvent  en  toum^e  61ectoraIe  ont  6t^  rappel^s  et  sont  attendus  k 
Belgrade  demain  Vendredi  k  10  heures  du  matin.  Patchou  qui  m'a 
communique  le  contenu  de  la  note,  sollicite  Taide  de  la  Russia 
et  d^lare  qu'aucun  Grouvemement  Serbe  tfe  pourra  accepter  les 
demandes  de  rAutriche 

(Sign6)  Strandtman. 


^2. 

Le  Charge  d'aflUres  en  Serble  au  Ministre   des  AflUres 

Etrangdres* 

Belgrade,  le  "/„  Juillet  1914. 

(T^ldgramme). 

Textedela  note  qui  a  4t6  transmis**  anjonrd'hui  par  le  Ministre 
d^Autriche-Hongrie  au  gouvemement  Serbe: 

Le  31  Mars  1909  le  Ministre  de  Serbie  4  Vienne  a  fait,  d'ordre 

de  son  Gouvemement,  au  Gouvemement  Let  R.la  declaration suivante: 

La  Serbie  reconnait  qu'elle  n'a  pas  ete  atteinte  dans  ses  droits 

par  le  fait  accompli  cr^e  en  Bosnie  Herz^govine  et  qu'elle  se  conformera 


par  consequent  a  telle  decision  que  les  Puissances  prendront  par 
rapi)ort  k  Tarticle  25  du  Traite  de  Berlin.  Se  rendant  aux  Conseils 
des  Grandes  Puissances,  laSerbie  s'engagodes  a  present  k  abandtmnei 
Pattitude  de  protestation  et  opposition  qu'elle  a  observee-  k  Pegard 
de  Pannexion  depuis  Pautoume  dernier,  et  elle  sVngage,  en  outre, 
a  changer  le  cours  de  sa  politique  actuelle  envers  PAutriche-Hongrie 
pour  vivTe  desormais  avec  cette  demiere  sur  le  pied  d'un  bon  voisinage*. 

Or,  Phistoire  des  demieres  ann^es,  et  not^mment  les  6venenients 
douloureux  du  28  Juin,  ont  d^montre  Pexistence  en  Serbie  d'un 
mouvement  subversif  dont  le  but  est  de  detacher  de  la  Monarchie 
Austro-Hongroise  eertaines  parties  de  ses  territoires.  Ce  mouvement 
qui  a  pris  jour  sous  les  yeux  du  Gouvemement  Serbe  est  arrive  a 
se  manifester  au  dela  du  territoire  du  Eoyaume  par  des  actes  de  terro- 
risrae,  par  une  s4rie  d'aftentats  et  par  des  meurtres. 

Le  Gouvemement  Royal  Serbe,  loin  de  satisfaire  aux  engagements 
formels  contenus  dans  la  declaration  du  31  Mars  1909,  n'h  rien  fait 
pour  supprimer  ce  mouvement:  il  a  tol^re  Pactivit6  criminelle  des 
diff^rentes  soci^tfe  et  affiliations  dirigees  contre  la  Monarchic,  le 
langage  effr^nede  la  presse,  la  glorification  des  auteursde  Pattentat, 
la  participation  d'officiers  et  de  fonctionnaires  dans  les  agissements 
subversifs,  une  propagande  malsaine  dans  Pinstruction  publique, 
tol^re  enfin  toutes  les  manifestations  qui  pouvaient  induire  la  popula- 
tion serbe  k  la  haine  de  la  Monarchie  et  au  mepris  de  ses  institutions. 

Cette  tolerance  coupable  du  Gouvemement  Eoyal  de  Serbie 
n'avait  pas  cess6  au  moment  oik  les  4venements  du  28  Juin  demier  en 
ont  dtoontr^  au  monde  entier  les  consequences  funestes: 

II  r^sulte  des  depositions  et  aveux  des  auteurs  criminels  de  Patten- 
tat du  28  Juin  que  le  meurtre  de  Sarajevo  a  ^t^  tram6  k  Belgrade, 
que  les  armes  et  explosifs  dont  les  meurtri^rs  se  trouvaient  etre  munis, 
leur  ont  et6  donn6s  par  des  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  Serbes  faisant 
])artie  de  la  oNarodna  Odbrana*  et  enfin  que  le  passage  en  Bosnic 
des  criminels  et  de  leurs  annes  a  6t4  organist  et  effectu6  par  des  chefs 
du  ser\ice-frontiere  serbe. 

Les  r^sultats  mentionnes  de  Pinstmction  ne  pemiettent  pas 
au  Gouvemement  I.  et  R.  de  poursuivre  plus  longtemps  Pattitude 
de  longanimity  expectative  qu'il  avait  observe  pendant  des  amines 
vis-^-vis  des  agissements  concentres  a  Belgrade  et  propag^s  de  \k  sur 
les  territoires  de  la  Monarchie;  ces  resultats  lui  imposent  au  contraire 

—  4  — 


le  devoir  de  inettre  fin  k  des  nieiiees  qui  foriiieiit  une  menace  perpe- 
tuelle  pour  la  tranquillite  de  la  Monarchic. 

Cost  pour  atteindre  ce  but  que  le  Gouvemement  I.  et  R.  se  voit 
oblige  de  demander  au  Gouvemement  Serbe  T^nonciation  officiclle 
qu'il  condamne  la  propagande  dirigee  contra  la  Monarchic  Austro- 
Hongroise,  c'est  a  dire,  I'ensemble  des  tendances  qui  aspirent  en 
dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchic  des  territoires  qui  en  font 
partic,  et  qu'il  s'engage  a  supprimer,  par  tous  les  moyens,  cettc  pro- 
pagande criminelle  et  terroriste. 

Afin  de  donner  un  caractdre  solennel  a  cet  engagement,  le  Gouver- 
nement  Royal  de  Serbie  fera  publier  a  la  premiere  page  du  journal 
officiel  en  date  du  26/13  Juillet  T^nonciation  suivaiite: 

«Le  Gouvemement  Royal  de  Serbie  condamne  la  propaganda 
dirigee  contre  TAutriche-Hongrie,  c'est  a  dire  Tensemble  des  ten- 
dances qui  aspirent  en  demier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchic  Austro- 
Hongroise  des  territoires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  il  deplore  sincerement 
les  consequences  funestes  de  ces  agissements  criminels. 

Le  Gouvemement  Royal  regrette  que  des  officiers  et  fonction- 

naires  serbes  aient  particip6  a  la  propagande  susmentionn^e  et  com* 

l)romis  par  la  les  relations  de  bon  voisinage  auquel  le  Gouvemement 

!  Royal  s'6tait  solennellement  engage  par  sa  declaration  du  31  Mars  1909. 

^        Le  Gouvemement  Royal,  qui  d^sapprouve  et  r^pudie  toute  id6e 

ou    tentative    dMmmixtion    dans   les   destinies   des   habitants  de 

quelque  partie  de  TAutriche-Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  considere  de  son 

devoir  d'avertir  formellement  les  officiers,  les  fonctionnaires  et  toute  la 

.population  du  Royaume  que  dor^navant  il  procedera  avec  la  der- 

niere  rigueur  contre  les  personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables  de  pareils 

agissements,  agissements  qu'il  mettra  tous  ses  efforts  a  prevenir  et 

a  r^primer^. 

Cette  ^nonciation  sera  portee  simultan^ment  k  la  connaissance 
de  TArm^e  Royale  par  im  ordre  du  jour  de  Sa  Majesty  le  Roi  et  sera 
publiee  dans  le  bulletin  officiel  de  TArmee. 

Le  Gouvemement  Royal  Serbe  s'engage  en  outre: 

1)  i  supprimer  toute  publication  qui  excite  k  la  haine  et  au  mepris 
de  la  Monarchic  et  dont  la  tendance  g^n^rale  est  dirig^^  contre  son 
integrity  territoriale, 

2)  a  dissoudre  imniediatement  la  soci§t4  ditc  «Narodna  Odbrana». 
a  confisquer  tous  ses  moyens  de  propagande  et  k  procedor  de  la  meme 


inauiere  contre  les  autres  societes  et  affiliations  en  Serbie  qui 
sadonnenta  la  propiigande  contre  la  Monarchie  Austro-Hongroise;  le 
Gouvemement  Royal  prendra  les  mesures  n6cessaires  pour  que  les 
soci§t§s  dissoutes  ne  puissent  pas  continuer  leur  activity  sous  un 
autre  nom  et  sous  une  autre  forme, 

3)  a  6liininer  sans  d61ai  de  Tinstruction  publique  en  Serbie, 
tant  en  ce  qui  conceme  le  corps  enseignant  que  les  moyens  d'instruc- 
tion,  tout  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourrait  servir  4  fomenter  la  propagande 
contre  FAutriche-Hongrie, 

4)  a  Eloigner  du  service  militaire  et  de  Tadministration  en  g6n6- 
ral  tous  les  officiors  et  fonctionnaires  coupables  de  la  propagande 
contre  la  Monarchie  Austro-Hongroise  et  dont  le  Gouvernement  I.  et 
R.  se  reserve  de  comrauniquer  les  noms  et  les  faits  au  Gouvemement 
Royal, 

5)  h  accepter  la  collaboration  en  Serbie  des  organes  du  Gou- 
vemement I.  et  R.  dans  la  suppression  du  mouvement  subversif 
dirig§  contre  Tint^grit^  territoriale  de  la  Monarchie, 

6)  k  ouvrir  line  enquete  judiciaire  contre  les  partisans  du  com^ 
plot  du  28  Juin  se  trouvant  sur  territoire  serbe; 

des  organes  del^^s  par  le  Gouvemement  I.  et  R.  prendront 
part  aux  recherches  y  relatives; 

7)  k  proceder  d'urgence  k  Tarrestation  du  commandant  Voija 
Tankosic  et  du  nomm^  Milan  Ciganovic,  employ^  de  T^tat  Serbe ^ 
compromis  par  les  r6sultats  de  Tinstmction  de  Sarajevo, 

8)  k  empecher,  par  des  mesures  efficaces  le  concours  des  autorit^s 
Serbes  dans  le  trafic  illicite  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  k  travers  la  fron- 
tiere, 

k  licencier  et  punir  s^verement  les  fonctionnaires  du  service 
frontiere  de  Schabatz  et  de  Loznica  coupables  d*avoir  aid6  les  auteurs 
du  crime  de  Sarajevo  en  leur  facilitant  le  passage  de  la  frontito, 

9)  a  donner  au  Gouvemement  I.  et  R.  des  explications  sur  les 
prupos  injustifiables  de  hauts  fonctionnaires  serbes  tant  en  Serbie 
qu'4  r^tranger  qui,  malgr6  leurs  positions  officielles,  n'ont  pas  h^site 
apres  Tattentat  du  28  Juin  de  s'exprimer  dans  des  interviews  d'une 
mani^re  hostile  envers  la  Monarchie  Austro-Hongroise,  enfin, 

10)  d'avertir  sans  retard  le  Gouvemement  I.  et  R.  de  Tex^cution 
Jes  mesures  comprises  dans  les  points  pr6c6dent8. 


Le  Gouvemement  I.  ct  R.  attend  la  r^ponse  du  Gouverncmont 
Royal  au  j)lu8  tard  jusqu'au  Samedi  25  do  ce  mois,  h  6  heures  du  soir. 

Un  m^moire  concemant  les  r6sultats  de  rinstniction  de  Sarajevo 
k  regard  des  f onctionnaires  mentionn^s  axix  points  7  et  8  est  ann6x§ 
k  c^tte  note»» 

(Sign6)  Strandtman. 


Ko  3. 

Note  Verbale  transiiiise  persoimellenieut  par  rAmbas- 
sadeur  d'Autriche-Hoiigrie  h  St,-Petersboui-g  au  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etraugeres  le  "A*  Juillet  1914  k  10  heures 

du  matin. 

Le  Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  s'est  trouve  dans  la  neces- 
sity de  remettre  le  Jeudi  *%3  du  mois  courant,  par  IVntremise  du 
Ministre  Imperial  et  Royal  k  Belgrade,  la  note  suivante  au  Gouver- 
nement  Royal  de  Serbie: 

(Suit  le  texte  de  la  note). 

Voir  document  .\2  2. 


J\o  4. 
Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  au  (liarge  cVaffairesen 

Autriclie-Hongrie. 

St.-P6tersbourg,  le  "A4  Juillet  1914- 
(Tel^anime). 

Veuillez  transmettre  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie  ce  qui  suit. 

La  communication  du  Gouvemement  anstro-hongrois  aux  Puis- 
sances le  lendemain  de  la  presentation  de  Tultimatum  a  Belgrade 
ne  laisse  aux  Puissances  qu'un  d^lai  tout-a-fait  insuffisant 
pour  entreprendre  quoi  qu'il  soit  d'utile  pour  Taplanissoment 
des  complications  surgies.  Pour  pr^venir  les  consequences   incal- 

-  7  - 


ciilables  et  ^alemcut  nefastes  pour  toutes  les  Puissances  qui 
|H»uvent  sui\Te  Ic  mode  d'action  du  Gouveraeraent  austro- 
aongrois,  il  nous  parait  indispensable  qu'avant  tout  le  delai 
donne  a  la  Serbie  pour  repondre  soit  prolonge.  L'Autriche- 
Hongrie  se  declarant  disposee  a  informer  les  Puissances  des 
donnet^s  de  Tenquete  sur  lesquelles  le  Gouvernement  Imperial 
et  Royal  base  ses  accusations,  devrait  leur  donner  ^alement 
le  temps  de  sVn  rendre  compte.  En  ce  cas,  si  les  Puissances 
se  convainquaient  du  bienfond^  de  certaines  des  exigences 
autrichiennes,  elles  se  trouveraient  en  mesure  de  faire  parvenir 
au  Gouveraeinent  Serbe  des  conseils  en  consequence.  Un  refus 
de  prulunger  le  terme  de  rnltimatum  priverait  de  toute  port^ 
la  demarche  du  Gouveraemont  austro-hongrois  aupres  des  Puis- 
sances et  se  trouverait  en  contradiction  avec  les  bases  memes 
des    relations    Internationa los. 

Conmumique  a  I>mdres,  Rome,  Paris,  Belgrade. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


JV?  5. 

Le  Miiiistre  <les  Afl'aires  Etrangeres  au\  Representants  de 

Sa  M^este   I'Eiiipereiir  en  Angleterre,  en  Allemagne,  en 

Italie  et  en  France* 

St.-Petersbourg,  le  '7,4  Juillet  1914. 

(Telegramme). 

Me  refere  a  mon  telegramme  a  Koudachew  d'aujourd'hni;  nous 
esperons  que  le  Gouvernement  auprfe  duquel  Vous  etes  accr6dit6 
partagera  notre  point  de  vue  et  prescrira  d'urgence  a  son  Repr6- 
sentant  a  Vienne  de  se  prononcer  dans  le  meme  sens. 

Tomm unique  a  Belgrade. 

(Signe)  Sazonow, 


^a- 


Tel^^ramiiie  de  Son  Altesse  Koyale  le  Prince  Regent  de 
Serbie  a  Sa  Majeste  rEmpereur 

Belgrade,  le  "A^  JuiJlet  1914. 

Le  Gouvemement  Austro-Hongrois  a  rt-mis  bier  soir  au  Gouver- 
neraent  serbe  une  note  concemant  I'attentat  de  Sarajevo.  0>nsciente 
de  ses  devoirs  intemationaux,  la  Serbie  d6s  les  premiers  jours  de  Tho- 
rible  crime  a  d6clar6qu'ellelecondamnaitetqu'elleetaitpreteaouvrir 
uneenquetesursonterritoire  si  la  complicity  de  certains  de  ses  sujets 
etait  prouv^  au  cours  du  proces  instruit  par  les  aiitoritfe  Austrc- 
boiigroises.  Cependant  les  demandes  contenues  dans  la  note  Austro- 
bongroise  sont  inutilement  bumiliantes  pour  la  Serbie  et  incom- 
patibles  avec  sa  dignity  comme  Etat  independant.  Ainsi  on  nous  de- 
mandesurun  ton  peremptoire  une  declaration  du  gouvemement  dans 
Tofficiel  et  un  ordre  du  souverain  a  Tarmee,  ou  nous  reprimerions 
Tesprit  bostile  contre  TAutriche  en  nous  faisant  a  nous  memes  des 
reprocbes  d'une  faiblesse  criminelle  envers  nos  menees  perfides.— 
On  nous  impose  ensuite  Tadmission  des  fonctionnaires  austro-bon- 
grois  en  Serbie  pour  participer  avec  les  notres  a  Tinstruction  et  pour 
surveiller  Texecution  des  autres  conditions  indique€*s  dans  la  note. 
Nous  avons  re^u  un  delai  de  48  beures  pour  accepter  le  tout,  faute  de 
quoi  la  Legation  d'Autriche  -  Hougrie  quittera  Belgrade.  Noo? 
sorames  prets  a  accepter  les  conditions  austro-bongroises  qui  sont 
compatibles  avec  la  situation  d'un  Etat  independant.  ainsi  que  celles 
dont  I'acception  nous  sera  conseillee  par  Votre  Majeste;  toutes^ 
les  personnes  dont  la  participition  a  I'attentat  sera  demontree  seront 
severement  punis  par  nous.  Certaiues  parmi  ces  demandes  ne  pour- 
raient  etre  executees  sans  des  cbangements  de  notre legislation,  ce  qui 
exige  du  temps.  On  nous  a  donne  im  delai  trop  court.  Nous  pouvons 
etreattaques  apres  Texpiration  du  delai  par  Tannce  austro-bongroise 
qui  se  concentre  sur  notre  frontiere.  II  noug  est  im|)osible  de  nous  de- 
fendre  et  nous  supplions  Votre  Majeste  de  nous  donner  Son  aide  le 
plus  tot  possible.  La  bienveillance  precieuse  de  Votre  Majeste  qui 
s'est  manifestee  tant  de  fois  a  notre  egard  nous  fait  esperer  ferme- 
nient  que  cette  fois  encore  notre  appel  sera  entendu  par  Son  gen^reux 
coeur  slave. 

-5-  2 


En  ces  moments  difficiles  J'int^rprete  les  sentiments  du  peuple 
serbc  qui  supplie  Votre  Majeste  de  vouloir  bien  s'int6resser  au  sort 
du  Boyaume  de  Serbie. 

(Sign6)  Alexandre. 


JVo  7. 
Le  Charge  d'Affalres  eii  Allemagne  au  Mlnistre  des  Affaires 

Etraugeres* 

Berlin,  le  "A*  Juillet  1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 

Tons  les  joumaux  du  matin,  meme  ceux,  rares,  qui  reconnaissent 
i*impossibilit6  pour  la  Serbie  d'accepter  les  conditions  posies, 
accueillent  avec  une  grande  sympathie  le  ton  inergique  adopts  par 
I'Autriche.  L'officieux  «Local-Anzeiger»  est  particulierement  agressif; 
il  qualifie  de  superflus  les  recours  iventuels  de  la  Serbie  h  St.  Piters- 
bourg,  h  Paris,  k  Athenes  et  a  Bucarest,  et  termine  en  disant  que  le 
peuple  allemand  respirera  librement  quand  il  aura  appris  que  la 
situation  dans  la  pininsule  Balcanique  va  enfin  s'iclaircir. 

(Sign6)  Bronewsky. 


Le  Cliarg^  (VAffalres  en  France*  au  Mlnistre  des  Affalred 

Etrangires* 

Paris,  le  "A*  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

La  copiedela  note  officiellement  renuse  ^  Belgrade  a  6ti  commu- 
niquie  par  i'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  au  Gouvemement  Franoais. 
Plus  tard  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  visiti  le  Mlnistre  et 
lui  a  lu  une  communication  reproduisant  les  arguments  autri- 
chiens  et  indiquant  qu'en  cas  de  refus  de  la  part  de  la  Serbie, 
rAutriche  serait  obligie  de  recourir    k  une  pression  et,  en  cos 

-  10  - 


de  besoin,  a  des  mesures  militaires;  la  communication  se  termi- 
nait  par  la  remarque  qu'^  Tavis  de  rAUemagne  cette  question 
devrait  etre  r6soIue  directement  entre  TAutriche  et  la  Serbie 
et  qu'il  §tait  de  Tint^ret  des  Puissances  de  circonscrire  Taffaire 
en  I'abandonnant  aux  Parties  int6ress^es.  Le  Gerant  du  Departed 
mcnt  Politique,  qui  assistait  a  Tentretien,  demanda  a  PAmbassa* 
deur  s'il  fallait  consid^rer  Paction  autrichienne  comme 
un  ultimatum— en  d'autres  termes,  si,  dans  le  cas  oik  la  Serbie 
ne  se  soumettrait  pas  entierement  aux  demandes  autrichiennes, 
les  hostilit^s  ^taient  inevitables?  L'ambassadeur  4vita  une 
r^ponse    directe    en    alleguant    Pabsence    d'instructions. 

(Signe)  Sevastopoulo. 


Le  Charge  d' Affaires  eii  Serbie  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrang^res. 

Belgrade,  le  "/«  Juillet  1914. 
(T41%raiiime). 

Pachitch  est  rentr6  a  Belgrade.  II  a  Pintention  de 
donner  dans  le  delai  fix6,  c'est  k  dire  demain  Samedi  k  6  heures 
du  soir,  une  r^ponse  k  PAutriche  indiquant  les  points  accep- 
tables  et  inacceptables.  On  adressera  aojourd'hui  meme  aux 
Puissances  la  pri^re  de  dSfendre  Pind6pendance  de  la  Serbie. 
Ensuite,    ajouta    Pachitch,    si    la    guerre    est    inevitable—nous 

ferons  la  guerre. 

(Sign^)  Strandtman. 


JVo  10. 
Communique  du  Gonyernemeut  Imp^rialc 

St.-Petersbourg,  le  "/«  Juillet  1914. 

Les   demiers   6venements   et   Penvoi    par   PAutriche- Hongrie 
d'un  ultimatum  k  la  Serbie  pr^occupent  le  Gouvemement  Imp^- 

-11  - 


rial  au  plus  haut  degr^.  Le  Gouvenieinent  suit  attentivement 
revolution  du  conflit  serbo-autrichien  qui  nc  peut  pas  lai^ser 
la    Russie   indiffdrente. 


JV.  11. 


Le  Charge  d'Affaires  eii  Autriche-Moiigrie  au  Miiiistre  des 
Affaires  Etraiigeres. 

Vienne,  le  "/„  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^ramme). 

Le  comte  Berchtold  se  trouve  h,  Ischl.  Vu  rimpossibilit^ 
d'y  arriver  a  temps,  je  lui  ai  telegraphic  notre  proposition 
de  prolonger  le  d61ai  de  Tultimatum  et  Tai  rep6t§e  verbale- 
inent  au  Baron  Macchio.  Ce  dernier  m'a  promis  de  la  coniniu- 
niquer  a  temps  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  mais  a  ajout6 
qu'il   pouvait   prMire   avec   assurance   un   refus   catCgorique. 

(Sign6)  Koudachew. 


JV?  12. 


Lc  Charge  d'Affaires  en  Autriche-Hongrie  au  Ministre  des 
Affaires  EtrangereSt 

Vienne,  le  »%5  Juillet  1914. 

(T616gramme). 

Suite  a  nion  telCgramme  d'aujourd'hui.  Viens  de  recevoir  de 
Macchio  la  rCponse  negative  du  Gouvemement  Austro-Hongrois 
i  notre  proposition  de  prolonger  le  deiai  de  la  note. 

(SignC)  Koudachew.. 


•^  12  u. 


m  13. 

Le  Charge  d'Affaires  en   Serbie  au  Miiiistre  lies  Affaires 

Etraiigeres, 

Belgrade,  le  "/^g  Juillet  1914. 
(T^legramme). 

Re^u  avec  retard  le  14—27  Juillet  1914. 

Je  transmets  la  r^ponse  que  le  President  du  Conseil  des  Mi- 
nistres  Serbe  a  remis  au  ministre  Austro-Hongrois  k  Belgrade 
aujourd'hui  avant  Texpiration  du  d^lai  de  rultimatum. 

<Le  Gouvemement  Royal  Serbe  a  re^u  la  communication  du 
Gouvernement  Imperial  et  Royal  du  '•/«  de  ce  mois  et  il  est  persuade 
que  sa  r6ponse  ^loignera  tout  malentendu  qui  menace  de  gater  les  bons 
rapports  de  voisinage  entre  la  Monarchie  austro  hongroise  et  le 
Royaume  de  Serbie. 

LeGouvemement  Royal  est  conscient  que  les  protestations  qui  ont 
apparu  tant  de  la  tribune  de  la  Skoupchtina  nationale  que  dans  les 
declarations  et  les  actes  des  repr^sentants  responsables  de  TEtat,  pro- 
testations qui  furent  couples  court  par  la  declaration  du  Gouver- 
nement Serbe  en  date  du  ^Vsi  Mars  1909,  ne  se  sont  plusrenouvel^es 
vis-^-vis  de  la  grande  Monarchie  voisine  en  aucune  occasion  et  que, 
depuis  ce  temps,  autant  de  la  part  des  Gouvemements  Royaux  qui 
se  sont  succede  que  de  la  part  de  leurs  organes,  aucune  tentative  n'a 
et6  faite  dans  le  but  de  changer  I'^tat  de  choses  politique  et  juri- 
dique  cr6e  en  Bosnie  et  Herzegovine.  Le  Gouvememeut  Royal  constate 
que  sous  ce  rapport  le  gouvemement  J.  et  R.  n'a  fait  aucune  rep- 
resentation, sauf  en  ce  qui  conceme  un  livre  scolaire,  et  au  sujet  de 
laquelle  le  gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  a  re^u  une  explicatiou 
entiJrement  satisfaisante. 

La  Serbie  a,  de  nombreuses  fois,  donne  des  preuves  de  sa 
politique  pacifique  et  moder^e  pendant  la  dur^e  de  la  crise  balca- 
nique,  et  c'est  grace  k  la  Serbie  et  au  sacrifice  qu'elle  a  fait  dans 
rinteret  exclusif  de  la  paix  europeenne,  que  cette  paix  a  M 


Le  Gouvemement  Royal  ne  peut  pas  etre  rendu  responsable  des 
manifestations  d'un  caract^re  prive  telles  que  les  articles  des  journaux 


--18-^ 


et  le  travail  paisible  des  societes,  manifestations  qui  se  prodiiisent 
dans  presqne  tons  los  pays  conune  une  chose  ordinaire  et  qui  echap- 
pent,  en  regie  generale,  au  controle  officiel,  d'autant  moins  que  le 
Gouvemement  Royal,  lors  de  la  solution  de  toute  une  s6rie  de 
questions  qui  se  sont  presentees  entre  la  Serbie  et  rAutriche-Hongrie, 
a  niontr§  une  grande  prevenance  et  a  reussi,  de  cette  fagon,  h  en  r^ler 
le  plus  grand  nombre  au  profit  du  progres  des  deux  pays  voisins. 

C'est  pourquoi  le  Gouvemement  Royal  a  6t6  p6niblement  surpris 
par  les  affirmations,  d'apres  lesquelles  des  personnes  du  royaume 
de  Serbie  auraient  participe  a  la  preparation  de  Tattentat  commis 
a  Sarajevo.  11  s'attendait  k  etre  invito  h  collaborer  ^  la  recherche 
de  tout  ce  qui  se  rapporte  ^  ce  crime  et  il  §tait  pret,  pour  prouver 
par  des  aetes  son  cntiere  correction,  k  agir  contre  toutes  les  personnes 
a  regard  desquelles  des  communications  lui  seraient  faites. 

Se  rendant  done  au  d^sir  du  Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal, 
le  Gouvemement  Royal  est  dispose  h  remettre  aux  tribunaux  tout 
sujet  serbe,  sans  egard  h  sa  situation  et  h  son  rang,  pour  la  complicity 
duquel,  dans  le  crime  de  Sarajevo,  des  preuves  lui  seraient 
foumies. 

UsVngage  specialement  a  faire  publier  k  la  premiere  page  du 
Journal  officiel  en  date  du  13—26  juillet,  I'^onciation  suivante: 

«Le  Gouvemement  Royal  de  Serbie  condamne  toute  propagande 
qui  serait  dirigee  contre  TAutriche-Hongrie,  c'est-^-dire  Tensemble 
des  tendances  qui  aspirent  en  demier  lieu  k  detacher  de  la  Monarchic 
Austro-Hongroise  des  territoires  qui  en  font  partie,  et  il  deplore  sin- 
cerement  les  consequences  funestes  de  ces  agissements  criminels* 

♦Ix*  Gouvemement  Royal  regrette  que  certains  officiers  et  fon- 
ctionnaires  serbes  aient  particip6,  d'apr^s  la  communication  du 
Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal,  k  la  propagande  susmentionnfee 
et  compromis  par  1^  les  relations  de  bon  voisinage  auxquelles  le 
Gouvemement  Royal  s'6tait  solennellement  engage  par  sa  declaration 
du  18/31  mars  1909. 

«Le  Gouvemement  Royal,  qui  desapprouve  et r^pudie  toute  id§e  ou 
tentative  d'une  immixtion  dans  les  destinies  des  habitants  de  quelque 
partie  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  considke  qu'il  est  de  son 
devoir  d'avertir  forniellement  les  officiers,  les  fonctionnaires  et  toute 
la  population  du  royaume  que  dorenavant  il  procMera  avec  la  der- 

-14- 


niere  rigiicur  contre  Ics  personnes  qui  se  rendraient  coupables  de 
paieils  agisscmcnts,  qu'il  mettra  tous  ses  efforts  k  privenir  et  k 
r6primer». 

Cette  6nonciation  sera  ported  a  la  connaissance  de  rarmee  Koyale 
par  un  ordre  du  jour,  au  nom  de  Sa  Majest6  le  Roi  par  S.  A.,  R.  le 
Prince  h^ritier  Alexandre,  et  sera  public  dans  le  prochain  Bulletin 
officiel  de  rarmee. 

Le  Gouvemement  Royal  s'engage  ejj  outre: 

1)  A  introduire  dans  la  premiere  convocation  reguliere  de  la 
Skoupchtina  une  disposition  dans  la  loi  de  la  presse  par  laquelle 
sera  punie  de  la  maniere  la  plus  severe  la  provocation  k  la  haine  et 
au  m6pris  de  la  Monarchie  Austro-Hongroise,  ainsi  que  contre  toute 
publication  dont  la  tendance,  g^n^rale  serait  dirig^e  contre  Tinte* 
grit6  territoriale  de  rAutriche-Hongrie. 

II  se  charge,  lors  de  la  revision  de  la  Constitution,  qui  est  pro- 
chaine,  de  faire  introduire  dans  Tarticle  22  de  la  Constitution  ua 
amendement  de  telle  sorte  que  les  publications  ti-dessus  puissent 
etre  coniisquees,  ce  qui,  actuellement,  aux  termes  cat^goriques  de 
I'article  22  de  la  Constitution,  est  impossible. 

2)  Le  Gouvemement  ne  possede  aucune  preuv^,  et  la  note  du: 
Gouvemement  Lnp^rial  et  Royal  ne  lui  en  foumit  non  plus  aueune^ 
que  la  Soci6t6  Narodna  Obrana  et  les  autres  societes  similaires  aient 
commis  jusqu'a  ce  jour  quelque  acte  criminel  de  ce  genre  par  le  fait 
d'un  de  leurs  membres.  Neanmoins,le  Gouvemement  Royal  acceptera 
la  demande  du  Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  et  dissdudra  la  So- 
ci^te  Narodna  Obrana  et  toute  autre  society  qui  agirait  contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

3)  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  Serbe  s'engage  a  eliminer  sans  d^lai 
de  I'instmction  publique  en  Serbie  tout  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourrait  ser- 
vir  k  fomenter  la  propagande  contre  rAutriche-Hongrie,  quand  le 
Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  lui  foumira  des  faits  et  des  preuves 
de  cette  propagande. 

4)  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  accepte  de  meme  d'^loigner  du  service 
militaire  ceux  pour  qui  Tenquete  judiciaire  aura  prouv^  qu'ils  sont 
coupables  d'actes  diriges  contre  Tintegrit^  du  territo^e  de  la  Monarchie 
Austro-Hongroise;  il  attend  que  le  Gouvemement  liiip^al  et  Royal 
lui  communique  ulterieurement  les  noms  et  les  faiUs  de  ces  officiers 
€t  fonctionnaires  aux  fins  de  la  procMiure  qui  doit  s'ensuivre. 

—  15  - 


5)  LeGouveraement  Royal  doit  avouerqu'ilnese  rend  pas  claire- 
ment  compte  du  sens  et  de  la  port^e  de  la  demande  du  Gouyeraement 
Imperial  et  Royal  tendant  k  ce  que  la  Serbie  s'engage  k  accepter  sur 
son  territoire  la  collaboration  des  organes  du  Gouvemement  inpfirial 
et  Royal. 

Mais  il  declare  qu'il  admettra  toute  collaboration  qui  r^pondrait 
aux  principes  du  droit  international  et  h  la  procedure  criminelle, 
ainsi  qu'aux  bons  rapports  de  voisinage. 

6)  Le  Gouvemement  Royal,,  cela  va  de  soi,  considere  de  son  devoir 
d'ouvrir  une  enquete  contre  tons  ceux  qui  sont  ou  qui,  6ventuellement, 
auraient  6t6  mel^s  au  complot  du  15  juin  et  qui  se  trouveraient  sur 
le  territoire  du  royaunie.  Quant  h  la  participation  k  cette  enquete 
des  agents  des  autorit^s  austro-hongroises  qui  seraient  d61^gu6s  a 
cet  effet  par  le  Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal,  le  Gouvemement 
Royal  ne  pent  pas  raecepter,carceseraitune  violation  de  la  Constitu- 
tion et  de  la  loi  sur  la  procedure  criminelle.  Cependant,  dans  des 
cas  concrets,  des  communications  sur  les  r^sultats  de  Tinstruction 
en  question  pourraient  etye  donn^es  aux  organes  austro-hongrois. 

7)  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  a  fait  proceder  des  le  soir  meme  de 
la  remise  de  la  note  a  Tanestation  du  commandant  Voija  Tankositch. 
Qu^ant  a  Milan  Ciganovitch,  qui  est  sujet  de  la  Monarchic  Austro- 
Hongroiseet  qui  jusqu'au  15  juin  ^tait  employ^  (comme  aspirant) 
k  la  direction  des  chemins  de  fer,  il  n'a  pas  pu  encore  etre  joint.  Le, 
Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  est  pri6  de  vouloir  bien,  dans  la; 
fonne  accoutumee,  faire  eonnaitre  le  plus  tot  possible  les  pr6somptionsi 
de  culpability,  ainsi  que  les  preuves  6ventuelles  de  culpability  qui 
ont  et6  recueillies  jusqu'a  ce  jour  par  Tenquete  a  Sarajevo,  aux  fins 
d'enquetes  ult^rieures. 

8)  Le  Gouvemement  Sorbe  renforcera  et  6tendra  les  mesures 
prises  pour  empecher  le  trafic  illicite  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  k  travers 
la  frontiere.  II  va  de  soi  qu'il  ordonnera  tout  de  suite  une  enquete 
et  punira  s^verement  les  fonctionnaires  des  frontieres  sur  la  ligne 
Schabatz-Loznica,  qui  ont  manqu6  k  leur  devoir  et  laiss6  passer  les 
auteurs  du  crime  de  Sarajevo. 

9)  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  donnera  volontiers  des  explications  sur 
les  propos  que  ses  fonctionnaires,  tant  en  Serbie  qu'^  T^tranger,  ont 
tenus apr^s  Fattentat  dans  des  entrevues et  qui,  d'apres  Taffirmation du 
Gouvemement  I.  et  R.,  ont  ^tfihostilesenyersla  Monarchic,  d^s  que  le 

-  16  - 


Gouvemement  I.  et  R.  lui  aura  communique  les  passages  en  ques- 
tion de  ces  propos,  et  des  qu'il  aura  demontre  que  les  propos 
employes  out  en  effet  ete  tenus  par  les  dits  fonctionnaires,  quoi- 
que  le  Gouvemement  Royal  lui  meme  aura  soin  de  recueilltr  des 
preuves  et  convictions. 

10)  Le  Gouvemement  Royal  informera  le  Gouvemement  Imperial 
et  Royal  de  Tex^cution  desmesures  comprises  dans  les  points  prece- 
dents, en  tant  que cela  n'a  pas  et.e  d^ja  fait  par  la  presente  note, aussitot 
que  chaque  mesure  aura  ete  ordonnee  et  executee.  Dans  le  cas  ou  le 
Gouvemement  Imperial  et  Royal  ne  serai t  pas  satisfait  de  cette  reponse, 
le  Gouvemement  Royal  Serbe,  considerant  qu'il  est  de  Tinteret  com- 
mun  de  ne  paa  precipiter  la  solution  de  cette  question,  est  pret,  comme 
toujours,  a  accepter  une  entente  pacifique,  en  remettant  cette  que- 
stion, soit  a  la  decision  du  tribunal  intemational  de  la  Haye,  soit 
aux  Grandes  Puissances  qui  out  pris  part  a  Telaboration  de 
la  declaration  que  le  Gouvemement  serbe  a  faite  le  18/31  Mars 
1909». 

(Signe)  Strandtman. 


J^o  14. 


Le  Charg:e  d'affaires  en  Allema^iie  au  Ministre  des  affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Berlin,  le  ^-„  Juillet  1914. 

(Telegranime). 

Ai  reiju  Votre  teiegramme  du  ^V^i  Juillet.  Ai  communique 
son  contenu  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres.  II  me  dit  que  le 
Gouvemement  Anglais  Ta  egaleraent  prie  de  conseiller  h  Vienne  la 
prolongation  du  deiai  de  Tultimatum;  il  a  communique  cette  demarche 
teiegraphiquement  a  Vienne^  il  va  en  faire  autant  pour  notre  de- 
marche, mais  il  craint  qu'4  la  suite  de  Tabsence  de  Berchtold  parti=^ 
.pour  Ischl,  et  vu  le  manque  de  temps,  ses  teiegrammes  ne  restent 
sans  resultats:  il  a,  en  outre,  des  doutes  sur  ropportimite  pour 
TAutriche  de  ceder  au  demier  moment  et  il  se  demande  si  cela  ne 
pouvait  pas  augmenter  Tassurance  de  la  Serbie.  J'ai  repondu 
qu'une  grande  Puissance  cojnrae  PAutriche  pourrait  ceder  sans  porter 

-  17  -  8 


atteinte  a  son  prestige  et  ai  fait  yaloir  tous  Jes  arguments  conformes 
cependant  je  n'ai  pu  obtenir  des  promesses  plus  precises.  Mcme  lors- 
que  je  laissais  entendre  qu'il  fallait  agir  &  Vienne  pour  4viter 
la  possibility  de  consequences  redoutables,  le  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres  r^pondait  chaque  fois  n^ativement. 

(Sign6)  Bronewsky. 


JV?  15. 

Le  Charge  d'affaires  en  France  an  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  "/as  Juillet  1914. 
(T^l^ramme). 

Ai  re^u  le  t^l^amme  du  "/«4  Juillet  concemant  la  prolonga- 
tion du  d^lai  de  rultimatum  autrichien  et  ai  fait  la  communication 
prescrite.  Le  Eepr^sentant  de  France  k  Vienne  a  6t6  muni  d'instruc^ 
tions  conformes. 

(Sign6)  Seyastopoulo. 


J^  16. 

L'Ambassadeur  en  Angleterre  au  Uinisire  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  "7,5  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^amme). 

Recu  t^I^amme  du  II  Juillet.  Grey  a  present  h  TArabas- 
sadeur  d 'Angleterre  h  Vienne  d'appuyer  notre  d-marche  concemant 
la  prolongation  du  d^lai  de  Tultimatum.  II  m'a  dit  en  m§me  temps 
que  TAmbassadeur  d'Autriche  6tait  venu  le  voir  et  avait  expliqu6 
qu'on  ne  devrait  pas  attribuer  k  la  note  autrichienne  le  caract^re 
d'un  ultimatum;il  faudrait  la  consid^rer  comme  une  dtoarche  qui,enca« 
d'absencede  r6ponseou  en  cas  de  r^ponse  insuffisante  au  terme  f  ix6,aurait 
comme  suite  la  rupture  des  relations  diplomatiques  et  le  depart  immidiat 

^  16  - 


de  Belgrade  du  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie,  sans  entraiaer  cependant 
Ic  commencement  immMiat  des  hostilites.— Grey  a  ajout^  qu'  a 
la  suite  de  cette  explication  il  a  indiqu6  h  rAmbassadeur  d'Angle- 
terre  h  Vienne  que  dans  le  cas  ou  il  serait  trop  tard  pour  soulever  la 
question  de  la  prolongation  du  d^lai  de  rultimatum,  celle  de  I'arret 
des  hostilites  pourrait  peutretre  servir  de  base  a  la  discussion. 

(Sign6)  Benckendorff. 


JS?  17. 


Le^  JSIiiIstre  des  Affaires  Etraiigeres  a  FAmbassadeur  k 

Londres. 

St.-Petersbourg,  le  «/„    Juillet  1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 

Dans  le  cas  d'une  nouvelle  aggravation  de  la  situation, 
pouvant  provoquer  de  la  part  des  Grandes  Puissances  des  actions 
conformes,  nous  comptons  que  I'Angleterre  ne  tardera  pas  de 
se  ranger  nettement  du  c6t6  de  la  Russie  et  de  la  France, 
en  vue  de  maintenir  T^quilibre  europ6en,  en  favour  duquel 
elle  est  intervenue  constamment  dans  le  pass^  et  qui  serait 
sans  aucun  doute  compromis  dans  le  cas  du  triomphe  de  rAutriche. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


JVolS. 


Kote  verbale  reinlse  par  FAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  au 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangferes  le  "As  Juillet  1914. 

II  nous  revient  de  source  aUtoritative  que  la  nouvelle 
r^pandue  par  quelques  joumaux  d'apr^s  laquelle  la  demarche 
du  Gouvemement  d'Autriche-Hongrie  k  Belgrade  aurait  ^tk 
laite  h  Tinstigation  de  TAllemagne  est  absolument  fausse.  Le 
Gouvemement  Allcmand  n*a  pas  eu  connais$ance  du  texte  de 
la  note  Autrictienne  avant  qu'elle  ait  ^t6  remise  et  n'a  exfei^c^ 

- 10  .^  ♦ 


1 


aucune  influence  sur  son  contenu.  G'est  a  tort  qu'on  attribue 
a    rAUemagne   line    attitude   comminatoire. 

L'Allemagne  appuie  naturellement  comme  alli6  de  TAutriche 
les  revendications  i,  son  avis  legitimes  du  Cabinet  de  Vienna 
centre   la   Serbie. 

Avant  tout  elle  desire  comme  elle  Ta  d^]h  d^clar^  des  le 
commenceinent  du  differend  Austro-Serbe  que  ce  conflit  reste 
localise. 


JV?  19. 

Le  Charge   d^aflaire    en  France  au  Ministre  des  aflaires 

Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le   "/„    Juillet  1914. 
(Telegramme). 

Me   refere  a  mon   telegramme   du    ^^^    Juillet. 

Aujourd'hui  un  journal  du  matin  a  public,  sous  une  forme 
pas  entierenient  exacte,  les  declarations  d'hier  de  TAmbassadeur 
d'Allemagne,  en  les  faisant  suivre  de  commentaires  qui  attri- 
buent  k  cette  demarche  le  caractere  d'une  menace.  L'Ambassa- 
deur  d'Allemagne,  tres  impressionne  par  ces  divulgations,  a  visite 
aujourd'hxii  le  G^rant  du  D^partement  Politique  pour  lui 
dire  que  ses  paroles  n'avaient  nullement  eu  le  caractere  de 
menace  qu'on  leur  attribue.  II  a  declare  que  TAutriche  avait 
presents  sa  note  h  la  Serbie  sans  entente  precise  avec  Berlin, 
mais  que  cependant  I'Allemagne  approuvait  le  point  de  yue  de 
rAutriclie  et  que  certainement  ih  fleche  unefois  parties  (ce  sont  la 
$es  propres  paroles),  TAUemagne  ne  pouvait  se  laisser  guider  que 
par  ses  devoirs  .d'alliee. 

(Sign6)  Sevastopoulo. 


-20- 


JV?  20. 

L'ainbassadeur    en   Angleterre  au  Hinistre  des  Affaires 

Etrang^res. 

Londres,  le  "/„    Juillet  1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 

Grey  m'a  dit  que  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemague  lui  a  dMard 
que  le  Gouvernement  Allemand  n'avait  pas  6t6  informe  du 
texte  de  la  note  autrichienne,  mais  qu'il  soutenait  entierement 
la  d-marche  autrichienne.  L'Ambassadeur  a  demand^  en  meme 
temps  si  TAngleterre  pouvait  consentir  k  agir  k  St.-P^tersbourg 
dans  un  esprit  de  conciliation.  Grey  a  r^pondu  que  cela  6tait 
completement  impossible.  Le  Ministre  a  ajoute  que  tant  que 
les  complications  n'existaient  qu'entre  TAutriche  et  la 
Serbie,  les  int^rets  Anglais  n'etaient  engages  qu'indirecte- 
ment,  mais  qu'il  devait  prevoir  que  la  mobilisation  autrichienne 
aurait  comme  suite  la  mobilisation  de  la  Russie  et  que  des  ce  mo- 
ment on  se  trouverait  en  presence  d'une  situation  a  laquelle  seraient 
interessees  toutes  les  Puissances.  L'Angleterre  se  reservait  pour 
ce   cas   une   complete   liberte  d'action. 

(Signe)  Benckendorff. 


JSf  21. 

Le    Charge  d'affaires  en  Serbie  au  Hinistre  des  Affaires 

Etrang^res. 

Belgrade  le  "/„  JuiUet  1914. 
(T^l^amme). 
Malgre  le  caractere  extremement  conciliant  de  la  reponse  serbe 
a  Tultimatum,  le  Ministre  d'Autriche  vient  d'infonner,  a  6V2  du 
soir,  le  Gouvernement  Serbe  par  note,  que  n'ayant  pas  recu  au  delai 
fix6  une  reponse  satisfaisante  il  quitte  Belgrade  avec  tout  le  personnel 
de  la  Legation.  La  Scoupchtina  est  convoqu^  k  Nich  pour  le  "/a?  Juil- 
let. Le  Gouvernement  Serbe  et  le  Corps  Diplomatique  partent  ce 
soir  pour  la  meme  ville. 

(Sign^)  Strandman. 

-21  — 


JVo  22. 

L'AmbassaAeur  en  Angleterre  au    Miuistre    des  ilfaires 

Etrang^res, 

Londres  le  ^-/as  Juillet  1914. 

(T^16gramme). 

Grey  a  dit  a  TAinbassadeur  d'Allemagne  qu'4  son  avis  la 
mobilisation  autrichienne  devait  entrainer  la  mobilisation  de  la 
Russie,  qii'alors  siu^irait  le  danger  aigu  d*une  guerre  g^nerale  et 
qu'il  ne  vovait  qu'un  seul  nioyen  pour  ime  solution  pacifique:  qu'en 
presence  des  mobilisations  autrichienne  et  russe,  TAllemagne,  la  France, 
ritalie  et  TAngleterre  s'abstiennent  d'une  mobilisation  immediate 
et  proposent  tout  d'abord  leurs  bons  offices.  Grey  m'adit  que  ce 
plan  necessitait  avant  tout  Tagrement  de  TAllemagne  et  Tengage- 
ment  de  cette  Puissance  de  ne  pas  mobiliser.  En  consequence  il  a 
adresse  tout  d'abord  a  Berlin  une  question  a  ce  sujet. 

(Signe)  Benckendorff . 


No  23. 
te  Miiiistre  des  A.ffaires  Etrangeres  k  TAmbassadeur  en 

Italie. 

St.  Petersbourg,  le  »V«c  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

L'ltalie  pourraitjouer  un  role  detout  premier  ordre  en  faveur  du 
maintien  de  la  paix,  en  exercant  T influence  necessaire  sur  TAutriche 
et  en  adoptant  une  attitude  nettement  defavorable  au  conflit,  car 
ce  demict  ne  saurait  etre  localise.  II  est  desirable  que  vous  expri- 
miez  la  conviction  qu*il  est  impossible  pour  la  Russie  de  ne  pas 
venir  en  aide  a  la  Serbie, 

{Sign6)  Sazonow. 

-  22  - 


JV?  24. 

Le^Gerant  du  Consulat  a  Prague  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Prague,   le    »%e  Juillet  1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 
La  mobilisation  a  et6  decretee. 

(Signe)  Kazanskv.. 


JVo  25. 

Xe   Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres   &  I'Ambassadeur  en 

Autriche  Hongrle. 

St.  P^tersbourg,  le  »Vjc  Juillet  1914. 
(Telegramme). 

J-ai  eu  aujourd'hui  un  long  entretien  sur  iin  ton  amical  avec 
TAmbassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie.  Apres  avoir  examine  avec  lui  les 
lO.demandes  adfess^esa  la  Serbie,  j'ai  fait  observer  qu'a  part  la  forme 
peu  habile  sous  laquelle  elles  sont  presentees,  quelques  uries  panni  elles 
sont  absolument  inexecutables,  meme  dans  le  cas  ou  le  gouvernement 
Serbe  d^clarerait  les  vouloir  accepter.  Ainsi,  par  exemple,  les  points  1 
et  2  ne  pourraient  etre  executes  sans  un  remaniement  des  lois  serbes 
sur  la  presse  et  sur  les  associations,  pour  lequel  le  consentemeht  de  la 
Scoupchtina  pourrait  etre  difficilement  obtenu;  quant  a  Texecution  des 
points  4  et  5,  elle  pourrait  produire  des  consequences  fort  dangereuses 
et  meme  faire  naitre  le  danger  d'actes  de  terrorisme  diriges  centre 
les  membres  de  la  Maison  Royale  et  centre  Pachitch,  ce  qui  ne  saurait 
entrer  dans  les  vues  de  TAntriclie.  En  ce  qui  regarde  les  autres  points. 
il  me  semble,qu'aveccertainschangements  dans  les  details,  il  ne  serait 
pas  difficile  de  trouver  un  terrain  d'entente  si  ies  accusations  y 
contenues  6taient  confirmees  par  des  preuves  suffisantes. 

Dans  rinteret  le  la  conservation  de  la  paix  qui.  aux  dires  de 
Szapary,  est  precieuse  a  TAutriche  au  meme  degre  qu'^  toutes  les 
Puissances,  il  serait  necessaire  de  mettre  au  plus  tot  possible  une 

-  23  - 


fin  a  la  situation  tenduo  du  moment  Dans  ce  but  il  lae  semblerait 
tres  desirable,  que  rAmbassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie  fiit  autorise 
d'entrer  avec  moi  dans  un  echangede  vues  prive  aux  fins  d'un  rema- 
niement  en  comniun  de  quelques  articles  de  la  note  autrichienne  du 
^VnJuillet.  Ce  procede  permettrait  peut  etre  de  trouver  une  formule 
qui  lut  acceptable  pour  la  Serbie,  tout  en  donnant  satisfaction 
a  r Autriche  quant  au  fond  de  ses  demandes.  Veuillez  avoir  une  expli- 
cation prudente  et  amicale  dans  le  sens  de  ce  t616grainme  avec  le 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres.  Communique  aux  Ambassadeurs 
en  Allemagne,  en  France,  en  Angleterre  et  en  Italic. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


X?  26. 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  h  rAmbassadeui*  en 

Alleniague. 

St.  Petersbourg^  le  "Aa  Juillet. 

(Telegranime). 

Veuillez  comrauniquer  le  contenu  de  mou  telegraimne  a  Vienne 
d'aujourd'hui  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  Allemand  et  lui 
exprimer  Tespoir,  que  de  son  cote  il  trouvera  possible  de  conseiller 
a  Vienno  d'aller  au  devant  de  notre  proposition. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 

J^o  27. 

Le  Charge  d'AtTaires  en  France  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  ^V-c  Juillet  1914. 

(Telegramme). 

L»?  DIrecteur  du  Departement  Politique  m'informe,  que  lors  de 
la  communication  quMl  a  faite  a  FAmbassadeur  d'Autriche  du  contenu 
de  la  reponse  serbe  a  rultimatum,  TAmbassadeur  n'a  pas  cache  son 

-  24  ~ 


etonnement  de  ce  qu'elle  n'ait  pas  donne  satisfaction  a  Giesl.  L'at- 
titude  conciliante  de  la  Serbie  doit,  selon  Tavis  du  Directeur  du 
Departement  Politique,  produire  la  meilleure  impression  en  Europe. 

(Signe)  Sevastopoulo. 


J^9  28. 

Le  Charge  d'AlTaires  en  France  au   Ministre  des    AfTaires 

Etraiig:eres. 

Paris,  le  'V,o  Juillet  1914. 

(Tel^grarame). 

Aujourd'hui  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  de  nouveau  rendu 
visite  au  Gerant  du  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  et  lui  a  fait  les 
declarations  suivantes: 

«L'Autriche  a  declare  a  la  Russie  qu'elle  ne  recherche  pas  des 
acquisitions  territoriales  et  qu'elle  ne  menace  pas  Tintegrite  de  la 
Serbie.  Sou  but  unique  est  d'assurer  sa  propre  tranquillite.  Par 
consequent  fl  depend  de  la  Russie  d'eviter  la  guerre.  L'Alle- 
magne  se  sent  solidaire  avec  la  France  dans  Je  d^sir  ardent  de 
conserver  la  paix  et  espere  ferniement  que  la  France  usera  die  son 
influence  a  Petersbourg  dans  un  sens  niodtoteur».  Le  Ministte  fit 
observer  que  rAllemagne  pdurrait  de  son  cote  entreprendre  des 
demarches  analogues  a  Vienne,  surtout  en  presence  de  Pesprit  de 
conciliation  dont  a  fait  preuve  la  Serbie.  L'Ambassadeur  repondit 
que  cela  n'etait  pas  possible,  vu  la  resolution  prise  de  nepass'immiscer 
dans  le  conflit  austro-serbe.  Alors  le  Ministre  demanda,  si  les  quatre 
Puissances— PAngleterre,  rAllemagne,  Pltalie  et  la  France— ne  poi;i- 
vaient  pas  entreprendre  des  demarches  a  St.-^P^tersbourg  et  a  Vienne, 
puisque  I'affaiire  se  reduisait  en  somrae  k  un  conflit  entre  la  Russie 
et  PAutriche.  yAi:nbassadeur  allegua  Pabsehce  d'instnictions. 
Finalement  le  Mmistre  refusa  d'adherer  a  la  proposition  allemande. 

(Signe)  Sevastopoulo. 


-25- 


J^s  29. 

Le  Charge  d*Affaires  en  France  au  Ministre  de8  AtTaires 

Etrang^res. 

Paris,   le    '%6   Juillet   1914. 

(TeUgramrae). 

Le  Directeur  du  P^partement  Politique  a  declare  qu*^  sod  avis 
persormeU  les  demarches  successives  allemandes  a  Paris  ont  pour 
but  d'intimider  la  France  et  d'amener  son  intervention  h  St-P6ter8- 
buurg. 

(Sign6)  Sevastopoulo. 


JVo  30. 

Le  Charge  d'AtTaires  en  Allemagne  an  Ministre  des  AlTai* 

res  Etrangferes. 

.  Berlin,  le   "Vze  Juillet  1914. 
(Tdfgramme). 

Apres  la  reception  a  BerliD  de  la  nouvelle  de  la  mobilisation 
de  Parmee  autrichienne  contre  la  Serbie  une  grande  foule,  cdmpos^e, 
auxdiresdes  journaux,enpartie  d  elements  autrichiens,  se  livra  h  une 
serie  de  bruyantes  manifestations  en  faveur  de  TAutriche.  A  une  heure 
avanc6e  de  la  soiree  les  manifestants  se  masserent  a  plusieurs  reprises 
devant  le  palais  de  TAmbassade  Imp^riale  en  poussant  des  cris  hostiles 
a  la  Russie;  la  police  etait  presque  absente  et  ne  prenait  aucune  mesure. 

(Sign6)  Bronewsky. 


-26- 


JV?  31. 

L*Ambassadeur  cii  Aiigleterre   au  Miuistre   des  AITaires 

£traiigeres. 

Londres,  le  ^V^,  Juillet  1914. 

(T^legramme). 

Ai  reQuvotret^legramme  du  13—26  Juillet.  Prie  me  tMegraphief 
«i,  i  Votre  avis,  Vos pourparlers  directs  avec  le  cabinet  de  Vienne  s'accor^ 
dent  avec  le  projet  de  Grey  concemant  la  mediation  des  4  (jouveme- 
ments;  Ayant  appris  del'Ambassadeurd'AngleterreiSt.-P^tersbourg 
^jue  Vous  6tiez  dispose  k  accepter  cette  corabinaison,  Grey  a  decide 
de  la  transformer  en  une  proposition  officielle  quMl  a  faite  bier  soir 
at  Berlin,  h  Paris  et  i  Jlorae. 

(Signe)  Benckendorff. 


j^  32. 

Le  JUnistre  des  Affaires  Etraiig^res  aux  Ambassadeiirs  en 
France  et  en  Augleterre. 

St.-P6tersbourg,  le  '%  JuiUet  1914. 

(T^ldgramme). 

L'Ambassadeur  d^Angleterre  est  venu  s*infonner  si  nous 
jugeons  utile  que  rAngleterre  prenne  Pinitiative  de  convoquer  k 
Londres  une  conference  des  reprSsentants  de  PAngleterre,  la  France, 
PAllemagne  et  ritaliCj  pour  4tudier  une  issue  k  la  situation  actuelle- 

J'ai  r^pondu  k  PAmbassadeur  que  f  ai  entame  des  pourpar- 
lers avec  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie,  en  conditions  que 
j^esp§re  favorables.  Pourtant  je  n'ai  pas  encore  re^u  de  reponse  k 
la  proposition  que  j'al  {aite  d'une  revision  de  la  note  entre  les 
deux  Cabinets. 

^  2t  - 


Si  des  explications  directos  avec  le  Cabinet  de  Viwme  se 
frouvaient  irr6alisables,  je  suis  pret  a  accepter  la  proposition 
auglaise  ou  toute  autre  de  nature  h  resoudre  favorablenient  le 
couflit. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


J^?  33. 

Lc  Miiiii^tre  des  AtYaires  Etraiii^eres  aiix  Aiiibassacleurs  en 
France,  en  Angleterre,  en  Alleiuagne,  en  Autriehe-llongrie 

et  en  Italie. 

St.-Petersbourg,  le  '%  Juillet  1914. 

(T^legramme). 

Ai  pris  connaissance  de  la  r^ponse  transniise  par  lc  Gouvcnicmcnt 
Serbe  au  Baron  Gicssl.  Elle  d^passe  toutes  nos  previsions  par  sa  mode- 
ration et  son  desir  de  donner  la  plus  complete  satisfaction  a  rAutriche. 
Nous  ne  voyons  pas  quelles  pourraient  etre  encore  les  deraandes  de 
J'Autriche,  amoins  que  le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  ne  cherche  un  pretexte 
pour  une  guerre  avec  la  Seibie, 

(Sign6)  Sazonow. 


JVo  34. 

Le  Charge  d'AtTaires  en  France  an  Ministre  dcs  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  "/„  Juillet  1914. 

(T^legramme). 

J/Ambassadour  d'AlIemagne  a  conf^re  aujourd'hui  de  nouveau 
longuement  sur  la  situation  avec  le  Directeur  du  D^partement  Poli- 
tique. L'Ambassadour  a  beaucoup  insists  sur  rexclusion  de  toute 
possibilite  d'unc  mediation  ou  d'une  conference. 

(Signe)  Sevastppoulo. 


—  28  — 


JV?  35. 

L'AiiibasHiMleiir  en  France  au  Jllinistre  des  AITairen 

£traugeres. 

Paris,  le  'V*7  JuiHet  1914. 
(T61egrammej. 

Ai  coni*6re  avec  le  Gerant  du  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrang^res, 
en  presence  de  Berthelot,  imm^diatement  apres  men  retour  k  Paris. 
Tons  les  deux  m'ont  confirme  les  details  concemant  les  d-marches  de 
TAmbassadeur  d'AUemagne  que  Sevastopoulo  Vous  a  comiiiunrques 
dans  ses  telegrammes.  Ce  matin  le  Baron  de  Schoen  a  confirme  par 
ecrit  sa  declaration  d'hier,  savoir:  1)  T Autriche  a  declare  h  la  Kussie 
qu'elle  ne  recherche  ])as  d'acquisitions  et  n'attente  pas  a  Tintegrit^ 
de  la  Serbie.  Son  unique  but.  est  d'assurer  sa  j)ropre  tranquil-^ 
lite.  2)  Par  consequent  il  d^jiend  de  la  Russie  d'^viter  la  guerre. 
3)  L'AIleniagne  et  la  France,  completement  solidaires  dans  I'ardent 
desir  de  ne  pas  rompre  la  paix,  doivcnt  agir  sur  la  Russie  dans  un 
sens  modtoteur.  Le  Baron  de  Schoen  a  specialenient  souligne  Tex- 
pression  de  la  solidarity  entr^  TAllemagne  et  la  France.  D'apres  la 
conviction  du  Ministre  de  la  Justice,  les  d-marches  susditesdeTAl- 
lemagne  ont  i)our  but  evident  de  desunir  la  Russie  et  la  France, 
d'entraimrleGouvemementFranQaisdans  la  voie  des  representations 
a  St.-Petersbourg  et  de  conipromettre  ainsi  notre  alli§  k  nos  yeux; 
enfin,  en  cas  de  guerre,  d'en  rejeter  la  responsabilite  non  surTAlle- 
magne,  qui  employe  soi  disant  tons  ses  efforts  pour  le  maintien  de 
la  paix,  mais  sur  la  Russie  et  la  France. 

(Sign6)  Iswolsky. 

JV?  36. 

L'Ambassadeur  en  France  au  Ninistre  des  Attaires 

Etrangei'es. 

Paris,  le  •%,  Juillet  PJ14. 
(T61pgramme). 

II  ressort  de  vos  teiegrammes  du  ^Vifi  Juillet  que  vous  ne  con- 
naissiez  pas  encore  la  rej^onse  du  Gouvernement  Serbe.  Le  t^legramme 
par  lequel  cette  nouvelle  m'a  ete  coramuniquee  de  Belgrade  a  et^ 

—  29  — 


egalement  en  route  pendant  20  heures.  Le  t6l^rainme  du  Ministre 
des  Affaires  Etrangeres  Fran^ais  expMi6  avant  hier,  au  triple  tarif, 
a  onze  heures  du  matin,  et  contenant  Tordre  d'appuyer  notre  d6- 
marche  n'est  parvenu  k  sa  destination  qu'4  6  heures.  II  n^y  a  aucun 
doute  que  ce  t^lSgramme  n'ait  6t6  retenu  intentionnelloment  par 
le  t^l^aphe  autrichien. 

(Sign6)  Iswolsky. 


J^37. 


L'Aiiibassadeur  en  France  au  Mini^re  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  "/.^  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

D'ordre  de  son  Gouvemeraent,  V  Ambassadeur  d'Autriche  a  cora- 
iuuniqu6  au  G^rant  du  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  que  la  r6- 
ponse  de  la  Serbie  a  6t4  jug6e  insuffisante  h  Vienne  et  que  demain, 
tnardi ,  rAutriche  proc^derait  k  des  tactions  6nergiques»  dont  le  but serait 
de  forcer  la  Serbie  de  lui  donner  les  garanties  n^cessaires.  Le  Ministre 
ayant  demand^  en  quoi  consisteraient  ces  actions,  V  Ambassadeur 
r6pondit  qu'il  n'avait  pas  de  renseignements  exacts  k  ce  sujet,  mais 
qu'il  pouvait  s'agir  d'un  passage  da  la  fronti^re  serbe,  d'un  ultima- 
tum et  meme  d'une  declaration  de  guerre. 

(Sign6)  Iswolsky. 


JS^?38. 

he  Charge  iFAffaTres  en  Alleniagne  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres* 

Berlin,  le  "/„  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme).! 

J'ai  prie  le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  d'a[)puyer  a  Vienne 
votrc  proposition  tendant  k  autoriser  Szapary  d*eiaborer,  parlavoie 
d'un  ^change  de  vues  priv6  avec  Vous,  une  redaction  des  demandcs 

—  30  — 


austro-hongroises  acceptable  pour  les  deux  parties.  Jagow  a  r^pondu 
qu'il  6tait  au  courant  de  cette  proposition  et  qu'il  partageait  Tavis 
de  Pourtales  que,  puisque  Szapary  avait  commence  cette 
conversation,  il  pourrait  aussi  bien  la  continuer.  II  t^l^aphiera 
dans  ce  sens  k  I'Ambaisadeur  d'Allemagne  k  Vicnne.  Je  Tai  pri6 
de  cottseiller  d'une  fa^on  plus  pressante  k  Vienne  de  s'engager  dans 
cette  voie  de  conciliation;  Jagow  a  r^pondu  qu'il  ne  pouvait  pas 
conseiller  k  TAutriche  de  c^der. 

(Sign6)  Bronewsky. 


JV?39. 
Le  Charge  d'AtTalres  eu  Alleuiagiie  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

£traiig^res. 

Berlin,  le  "/„  Juillet  1914.» 

(T^l^amme). 

Aujourd'hui,  avantma  visite  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrang^res, 
ce  dernier  avait  re^u  celle  de  TAmbassadeur  de  France  qui  avait  tent6  de 
lui  faire  accepter  la  proposition  anglaise  relative  k  une  action  en  favour 
de  la  paix,  action  qui  serait  exerc^e  simultan^ment  k  St.-P6tersbourg 
et  AVienne  par  TAngleterre,  TAllemagne,  Tltalie  et  la  France.  Cambon 
a  propose  que  ces  Puissances  donnent  k  Vienne  un  conseil  dans  les 
termes  suivants:  «S'abstenir  de  tout  acte  qui  pourrait  aggraver  la 
situation  de  Theure  actuelle^.  En  adoptant  cette  formule  voilde  on 
^viterait  de  mentionner  la  n6cessit6  de  s'abstenir  d'une  invasion  de 
la  Serbie.  Jagow  a  oppos6  k  cette  proposition  un  refus  cat^orique, 
et  oela  malgr6  les  instances  de  TAmbassadeitr  qui  a  fait  valoir,  comme  un 
bon  c6t6  de  la  proposition,  le  groupement  mixte  des  Puissances 
grace  auquel  on  6vitait  I'opposition del' Alliance i TEntente,  ce  dont 
s'6tait  si  souvent  plaint  Jagow  lui  meme. 

(Sign§)  Bronewsky., 


—  31  — 


Ko  40. 

Telegraiiiine  rte  Sa  Majeste  Impcriale  FEmpereur  h  Son 
Altesse  Royale  le  Prince  Alexandre  de  Serbie  en  date  du 

'%  Juillet  1914. 

Votre  Altesse  Royale  en  s'adressant  k  Moi  dans  un  moment 
particulierement  difficile  no  s'est  pas  tromp^e  sur  les  sentiments  qui 
M'animent  a  Sou  6gard  et  sur  Ma  sympathie  cordiale  pour  le  peuple 
serbe. 

Ma  plus  serieuse  attention  est  attir^e  par  la  situation  actuelle 
et  Mon  Gouvcrnements'applique  de  toutes  ses  forces  k  aplanir  les  pre- 
sentes  difficult^s.  Je  ne  doute  point  que  Votre  Altesse  et  le  Gouver- 
nement  Royal  ne  veuillent  faciliter  cette  tache  en  ne  negligeant  rien 
pour  arriver  a  une  solution  qui  permette  de  pr6venir  les  horreurs 
d'lme  nouvelle  guerre  tout  en  sauvegardant  la  dignite  de  la  Serbie. 

Tant  qu'il  y  a  le  moindre  espoir  d'eviter  une  effusion  de  sang, 
tons  nos  efforts  doivent  tendre  vers  ce  but.  Si,  malgr6  Notre  plus 
sincere  d^sir,  Nous  ne  reussissons  pas,  Votre  Altesse  pent  etre  assur^e 
qu'en  aucim  cas  la  Russie  ne  se  d6sinteressera  du  sort  de  la  Serbie. 

(Signe)  Nicolas. 


Xo  41. 


L'Ambassadeur   en   Aiitriclie-Hougrie    an    Ministre   des 
AtTaires  Etrani^eres. 

Vienne  le  ^%  juillet  1914. 

(Tel^gramme). 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  est  absent.  Pendant  un  entre- 
tien  prolong^,  que  j'ai  eu  aujourd'hui  avec  Macchio,  j*ai,  en 
terraes  tout  a  fait  amicaux,  attir^  son  attention  sur  rimpression  defa- 
vorable  qu'a  produite  en  Russie  la  presentation  par  I'Autriche  a  la 
Serbie  de  demandes  absolument  inacceptables  pour  chaque  6tat 
ind^pondant,  bien  que  petit.  J'ai  ajout6  que  ce  proc6d6,  qui  pour- 
rait  am^ner  des  complications  les  raoins  desirables,  a  provoqu6  en  Rus- 
sie une  profonde  surprise  et  une  reprobation  g6n6rale,  II  faut  sup- 


poser  que  TAutriche,  sous  I'influence  des  assurances  du  Represen- 
tant  Allemand  k  Vienna,  lequel  pendant  toute  cette  crise  a  jou§  un 
role  d'instigateur,  a  compt6  sur  la  probability  do  la  localisation  de 
son  conflit  avee  la  Serbie  et  sur  la  possibility  de  porter  a  cette  der- 
ni^re  impun^ment  un  coup  grave.  La  declaration  du  Gouvemement 
Imperial  concemant  Timpossibilit^  pour  la  Russie  de  rester  indif- 
f^rente  en  presence  d'un  tel  proc6d4  a  i)rovoque  ici  une  grande  impres- 
sion. 

(Sign6)  Sch§b6ko. 


Xo  42. 

PAmMssadeur  en  AiigleteiTe  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  "/n  Juillet  1914. 
(T^legramme). 

Grey  vient  de  r6pondre  a  TAmbassadeur  d'  Allemagne,  qui  efaft 
venu  le  questionner  sur  la  possibilite  d'une  action  a  St.-Petcrsbourg, 
que  cette  action  devrait  se  produire  a  Vienne  et  que  le  cabinet  de  Berlin 
serait  le  mieux  qualif  i6  pour  Texercer.  Grey  afait  observer  enmeme  temps 
que  lar^ponse  serbe  h  la  note  autrichienne  d^passait  par  sa  moderation 
et  son  esprit  de  conciliation  tout  ce  k  quoi  on  pouvait  s'attendre.  Grey  a 
ajoute  qu'il  en  concluait  que  la  Russie  avait  conseille  k  Belgrade  de 
donner  une  r^ponse  moder^e  et  qu'il  pensait  que  la  reponse  serbe  pouvait 
servir  de  base  a  une  solution  pacifique  et  acceptable  de  la  question. 

Dans  ces  conditions,  a  continue  Grey,  si  TAutriche  malgre  cette 
reponse  commen(?ait  les  hostilit^s,  elle  prouverait  son  intention 
d'an^antir  la  Serbie.  La  question  plac^e  sur  ce  terrain  produirait  une 
situation  qui  pourrait  amener  une  guerre  dans  laquelle  seraient  im- 
pliqu^es  toutes  les  Puissances. 

Grey  a  enfin  d6clar6  que  le  Gouvemement  Anglais  etait  bien 
sincerement  dispose  k  collaborer  avee  le  gouvemement  Allemand  tant 
qu'il  s'agirait  de  la  conservation  de  la,  paix;  mais  que  pour  le  cas 
contraire  I'Angleterre  se  r^servait  une  pleiue  liberty  d'action. 

(Sign6)   Benckendorff. 
—  33  —  6 


^  43. 

lie  JUiiiistre  de$  AtYaires  Etraiii^eres  h  rAiiibassadeiir  en 

Aiigleteri*e. 

St.-Pa<jrsbourg,  le  *V«8  Juillet  1914, 

(T^l^gramme). 

Mes  entretiens  avec  I'Ainbassadeur  d'Allemagne  confirment  mon 
impression  que  rAllemague  est  plutot  favorable  h  I'intransigeance 
de  rAutriche. 

Le  Cabinet  de  Berlin,  qui  aurait  pu  arreter  tout  le  d^velop- 
penient  de  la  crise,  parait  n'exercer  aucune  action  sur  son  alli^e. 

L'ambassadeur  trouve  insuffisante  la  r^ponse  de  la  Serbie. 

Cette  attitude  allemande  est  tout  particulierement  alannante. 

11  nie  semble  que  mieux  que  toute  autre  Puissance  I'Angleterre 
serait  en  mesiure  de  tenter  encore  d'agir  k  Berlin  pour  engager  le 
Gouvemement  Allemanda  Taction  neci^ssaire.  C'est  k  Berlin  qu'indu-: 
bitablement  se  trouve  la  clef  de  la  situation. 

(Sign6)  Sazonow. 


JVo  44. 

Le  Consul  genera)  a  Fiunie  an  Ministre  des  Attlnii*e$  Eti*an« 

geres. 

Fiume  lo  "Ag  juillet  1914. 

(T616gramme), 

L'^tat  dc  si§ge  a  6t6  proclani6  en  Slavonie,  en  Croatia  eth  Fiume  et 
en  meme  temps  les  reservistt-s  de  toutes  lescat^oriesont6t6mobilis6s. 


(Signe)  Salviati. 


3r- 


A?  45. 

L'AmlKiBsad^iii*  en  4iiinc1ie-l[oii^rie  an  Niiiistre  de$  AtTat* 

res  Etrangeres. 

Vieiinek'Vig  JuilH1914. 
(T616gramme). 

J'tii  entretenu  aujourd'hui  le  Comte  B^rchtold  dans  le  sens 
dos  instructions  de  Votre  Excellence.  Jo  lui  fis  observer,  en  termes 
Ics  plus  amicaux,  corabien  il  ^tait  desirable  de  trouver  une  solu- 
tion qui,  en  consolidant  les  bons  rapports  entre  rAutriche-Hongrie 
et  la  Russie,  donnerait  k  la  Monarchie  Austro-Hongroise  des  garan- 
ties  s^ricuses  pour  ses  rapports  futurs  avec  la  Serbie. 

J'attirais  Tattcntion  du  Comte  Borchtold  sur  tous  les  dangers 
pour  la  paix  de  TEurope  qu'entrainerait  un  conflit  arm6  entre 
TAutriche-Hongrie  et  la  Serbie. 

Le  Comte  Berchtold  me  r^pondit  qu*il  se  rendait  parfaitement 
compte  du  s^rieux  de  la  situation  et  des  avantages  d'une 
franche  explication  avec  le  Cabinet  de  Saint-Petersbourg.  II  me 
dit  que  d*un  autre  c6t4  le  Gouvemement  Austro-Hungrois,  qui 
ne  s'6tait  d§cid6  que  tr^s  mal  volontiers  aux  mesures  ^ner- 
giques  qu'il  avait  prises  contre  la  Serbie,  ne  pouvait  plus  ni  reculer,  ni 
entrer  en  discussion  aucune  des  termes  de  la  note  Austro-Hongroise. 

Le  Comte  Berchtold  ajouta  que  la  crise  6tait  de  venue  si  aigue, 
et  que  Texcitation  de  Topinion  publique  avait  atteint  tel  degr^, 
que  le  Gouvemement,  le  voulait  il,  ne  pouvait  plus  y  consentir, 
d'autant  moins,  me  dit-il,  que  la  r6ponse  meme  de  la  Serbie  donne 
la  preuve  du  manque  de  sinc6rit6  de  ses  promesses  pour  Tavenir. 

(Sign6)  Sch^b^ko. 

A?  4G. 

Le  Charge  d'affaires  eii  Alleiiia?iie  an  Miiiistre  des  Attiiires 

Etraiig^res. 

Berlin,  le  »/t8  Juillet  1914. 
(T^Ugramme). 

Le  Buteau  Wolff  n'a  pas  public  le  texte  de  la  note  respon- 
sive serbe  qui  lui  avait   6t6   communique.    Jusqu'a   ce  moment 

-.  36  — 


1 


iBtte  note  n'a  paru  in  extenso  dans  aucun  des  jonrnaux  locaux; 
qui  selon  toute  Evidence  ne  veulent  pas  lui  donner  place  dans 
leurs  colonnos,  se  rendant  compte  de  I'effet  calmant  que  cette 
publication    pruduirait    sur    les    lecteurs    Allemands. 

(Signe)  Bronewsky. 

JV?  47. 

L'Ambassadeur  en  Aiitriclie-Hongrie  an  Miiiislre  des  AtTai- 

res  Etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  'Vt8  Juillet,  1914. 

(T^legramme). 

Le  decret  sur   la   mobilisation  gencrale   a  ete  signe. 

(Signe)  Schebeko. 


Ko  48, 


Le  Minis! re  des  Ait'aires  Etrangeres  h  TAnibassadeur  k 

Londres. 

St.-Petersbourg,  le  »%8  Juillet,  1914. 
(Tel^gramrae). 

En  presence  des  hostilites  entre  rAutriche-Hongrie  et  'la 
Serbie  il  est  necessaire  que  TAngleterre  entreprenne  d'urgence 
uue  action  mediatrice  et  que  Taction  militaire  de  rAutrichc 
contre  la  Serbie  soit  imm^diatement  suspendue.  Autrement  la 
mediation  ne  servira  que  de  pr^texte  pour  tirer  en  longueur 
la  solution  de  la  question  et  donnera  entre  temps  a  TAutriche 
la  possibilite  d'ecraser  completement  la  Serbie  et  d'occuper 
une   situation   dominante   dans   les   Balcans. 

Communique    k   Paris,    Berlin,    Vienne    et    Rome. 

(Sign6)  Sazonow, 


—  36  — 


JVo  49. 

Le  Miuistrc  des  Affaires  Etraiigeres  au  Charge  d'Affaircs 

^n  Allema^^iie. 

St.-Petersbourg,  le  »V„  Juillet,  1914. 

(T614graiiime). 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  m'informe,  au  nora  du  Chance- 
lier,  que  rAllemagne  n'a  pas  cess^  dVxercer  a  Vienne  une  influence 
modfea trice  et  qu'elle  contintiera  cette  action  meme  apres  la 
declaration  de  guerre.  Jusqu'^  ce  matin  il  n'y  avait  aucune  nou- 
velle  que  les  armies  autrichiennes  aient  franchi  la  frontiere 
Serbe.  J'ai  pri6  TAmbassadeur  de  transmettre  au  Chancelier  mes 
remerciments  pour  la  teneur  amicale  de  cette  communication.  Je 
Tai  inform^  des  mesures  militaires  prises  par  la  Russie,  dont  au- 
Cune,  lui  dis-je,  n'etait  dirigee  contre  TAllemagne;  j'ajoutais 
qu'elles  ne  pr^jugeaient  pas  no?i  plus  des  mesures  agressives  contre 
I'Autriche-Hongrie,  ces  mesures  s'expliquant  par  la  mobilisation 
de*  la  plus  grande  partie  de  I'armee  austro-hongroise. 
L'ambassadeur  se  pronon(?ant  en  faveur  d'explications  directes  entre 
le  Cabinet  de  Vienne  et  nous,  je  r^pondis  que  j'y  6tais  tout 
dispose,  pour  peu  que  les  conseils  du  Cabinet  de  Berlin  dont  il 
parlait  trouvent  echo  h  Vienne. 

En  meme  temps  je  signalais  que  nous  etions  tout  disposes  a 
accepter  le  projet  d'une  conference  des  qua tre  Puissances,  un  projet 
auquel,  paraissait-il,  I'Allemagne  ne  sympathisait  pas  entierement. 

Je  dis  que,  dans  mon  opinion,  le  meilleur  moyen  pour  met  tre 
k  profit  tous"  les  moyens  propres  h  produire  une  solution  pacifique 
consisterait  en  une  action  parallele  des  pourparlers  d'une  conference 
h  quatre  de  TAllcmagne,  de  la  France,  de  TAngleterre  et  de  Tlta- 
lie  et  d'un  contact  direct  entre  rAutriche-Hongrie  et  la  Russie,  a 
rinstar  h  peu  pres  de  ce  qui  avait  eu  lieu  aux  moments  les  plus 
critiques  de  la  crise  de  Van  dernier. 

Je  dis  h  TAmbassadeur  qu'apres  les  concessions  faites  par  la 
Serbie,  un  terrain  de  compromis  pour  les  questions  restees  ou- 
vertes  ne  serait  pas  tres  difficile  k  trouver,  k  condition  toutefois  de 

-  37  — 


qiielque  boniie  voloiite  de  la  part  do  I'Autriche  et  a  condition  quel 
toutes  les  Puissances  usent  de  toute  leur  influence  dans  un  sens  d^ 
conciliation. 

Communique  aux  Ambassadeurs  en  Angleterre,   en  France,  enj 
Autriche-Hongrie  et  en  Italic. 

(Sign6)  Sazonow. 


JV?  50. 

Le  Miiiistre  des  Affaires  Etrangires  aux  Ambassadeurs  eu! 
Augleterre  et  eu  France. 

St.-P4tersboiirg,  le  '%^  JuUlet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

Lors  de  mon  entretien  avec  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne,  dont 
traite  mon  telegramme  pr6e6dent,  je  n'avais  pas  encore  rcQU  le 
tel^granmie  du  *V«  Juillet  de  M.  Sch^b^ko. 

Le  contenu  de  ce  t^l^anmie  constitue  un  refus  du  Cabinet 
de  Vienne  de  proc^er  h  un  ^change  d'idees  direct  avec  le  Gouver- 
nement  Imperial. 

D^  lors,  il  ne  nous  reste  plus  qu'^  nous  en  rcmettre  entiSre- 
ment  au  Gouvemement  britannique  pour  Tinitiative  des  d-marches 
qu'il  jugera  utile  de  provoquer. 

Communique  a  Vienne,  Rome  et  Berlin. 

(Sign^)  Sazonow. 


J«51. 

Le  Charge  d'AfTaires  en  Allemagne  au  Miuistre  des  AflUres 

£trang^res. 

Berlin,  le»V„  Juillet  1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 

Sur  ma  question  s'il  avait  une  r^ponse  de  Vienne  relativement 
h  Votre  proposition  de  pourparlers  privfe  ^  St.-P6tersbourg,  le  Secre- 
taire d'Etat  a  r^pondu  ndgativement. 

—  38  — 


II  declare  qu'il  lui  est  fort  difficile  d'agir  sur  Vienne,  surtout 
ouvertement.  Parlant  i  Cambon,  il  a  meme  ajout^  qu'en  cas  d'une 
pression  trop  6vidente  I'Autriche  se  haterait  de  mettre  rAllemagne 
en  presence  d'un  fait  accompli. 

Le  Secretaire  d'Etat  dit  qu'il  a  fe^u  aujourd'hui  un  t6l6grarame 
de  Pourtales  d'oik  il  constate  que  plus  que  les  premiers  jours  VousStes 
dispose  h  trouver  un  compromis  acceptable  pour  tous.  J'ai  repliqu^ 
que  probablement  Vous  avez  ete  d^s  le  commencement  en  faveur  d'un 
compromis  bien  entendu  a  la  condition  qu'il  soit  acceptable  non 
seulement  pour  TAutriche,  mais  ^galement  pour  nous.  II  m'a  dit 
ensuite  qu'il  paraissait  que  nous  avions  conmienc^  k  mobiliser  sur  la 
fronti^re  autrichienne  et  qu'il  craignait  que  ceci  rendrait  plus 
difficile  pour  TAutriche  la  possibilite  de  s'entendre  avec  nous, 
d'autant  plus  que  I'Autriche  ne  mobilisait  que  contre  la  Serbie  et 
ne  faisait  pas  de  pr^paratifs  sur  notre  frontiere.  J'ai  repondu  que,  d'apres 
les  renseignements  dont  jedisposais,  I'Autriche  mobilisait  egalement 
sur  notre  frontiere  et  que  par  consequent  nous  devions  prendre  des 
mesures  analogues.  J'ai  ajoute  que  les  mesures  que  nous  avons  peut- 
etre  prises  de  notre  cote  n'etaient  nuUement  dirigees  contre 
TAUemagne* 

(Signe)  Bronewsky. 


JVo  52. 

Le  Charge  d'afTalres  en  Serbie  au  Hinistre  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Nich,  le  >«A9   Juillet  1914. 

(T^I^gramme).  '- 

Aujourd'hui,  le  Ministre  de  Bulgarie,  au  nom  de  son  Gouvemo- 
ment,  a  declare  h  Pachitch  que  la  Bulgarie  observerait  la  ufiutralite. 

(Signe)  Strandtman. 


-39 


JVo53. 

L'Ambassadeur  en  France  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etranj^eres. 

Paris,  le  »«Air  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

A  Voccasion  de  Tarrivee  du  President  de  la  Republique  Francaise 
le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  avait  prepare  un  court  expose 
de  la  situation  politique  actuelle,  k  pen  pres  dans  les  termes  suivants: 
L'Autriche,  craignant  la  decomposition  interieiire,  s'est  empar6e  du 
pr6texte  de  Tassassinat  de  rArchiduc  pour  essayer  d'obtenir  des 
garaiities  qui  pourront  revetir  la  forme  de  Toccupation  des  communi- 
cations militaires  serbes  ou  meme  du  territoire  serbe.  L'Allemagne 
^outient  TAutriche.  Le  maintien  de  la  paix  depend  de  la  seule  Russie, 
parce  qu'il  s'agit  d'une  affaire  qui  doit  etre  «localisee»  entre  FAutriche 
et  la  Serbie,  c'est  a  dire  de  la  punition  de  la  politique  precedente  de 
la  Serbie  et  des  garanties  pour  Tavenir.  De  ceci  TAUemagne  conclue 
qu'il  faut  exercer  une  action  moderatrice  a  Petersbourg.  Ce  sophisme 
a  6te  rMute  a  Paris  comme  a  Londres.  A  Paris,  le  Baron  de  Schoen 
a  envaintached'entrainer  la  France  a  une  action  soiidaire  avec  I'Alle- 
magne  sur  la  Russie  en  faveur  du  maintien  de  la  paix.  Les  memes 
tentatives  ont  et6  faites  a  Londres.  Dans  les  deux  capitales  il  a  ete 
r6pondu  que  Paction  devrait  etre  exerc6e  a  Vienne,  car  les  demandes 
excessives  de  I'Autriche,  son  refus  de  discuter  les  rares  reserves  de 
la  Serbie,  et  la  declaration  de  guerre  menacent  de  provoquer  la  guerre 
gendrale.  La  France  et  PAngleterre  ne  peuvent  exercer  une  action 
moderatrice  sur  la  Russie  laquelle  jusqu'ici  a  fait  preuve  de  la  plus 
grande  moderation,  surtout  en  conseillant  a  la  Serbie  d'accepter 
ce  qui  etait  possible  de  la  note  autrichienne.  Aujourd'hui  I'Allemagne 
parait  renoncer  k  I'idee  d'une  action  sur  la  Russie  seule  et  incline 
vers  une  action  mediatrice  a  Petersbourg  et  k  Vienne,  mais  en  meme 
temps  PAllemagne  comme  PAutriche  tachent  de  faire  trainer  Paffaire. 
L'AUemagne  s'oppose  a  la  Conference  sans  indiquer  aucune  autre 
maniere  d'agir  pratique.  L'Autriche  mene  des  pourparlers  manifeste- 
ment  dilatoires  k  Petersbourg.  En  meme  temps  elle  prend  des  mesures 
actives,  et  si  ces  mesures  sont  toierees,  ses  pretentions  augmenteront 
proportionellcment..  11  est  tr^s  desirable  que  la  Russie  prete  tout 

—  40  — 


son  appui  au  projet  de  ra^diatioa  que  pr6sentera  Sir  E.  Grey.  Dans 
le  cas  contraire  TAutriche,  sous  pr^texte  de  «garantie»,  pourra,  en 
fait,  changer  le  statut  territorial  de  ['Europe  orientale. 

(Signe)  Iswolsky. 


^  54. 

L'Ambassadeur  en  Angleterre  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etraiigeres, 

Londres,  le  ^V^,  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

Ai  communique  le  contenu  de  Vos  tel^grammes  du  *V«8  Juillet 
h  Grey.  11  a  d6clar6  aujourd'hui  k  TArabassadeur  d'AUemagne  que 
les  pourparlers  directs  entre  la  Russie  et  rAutriche  avaient  6chou6, 
et  que  les  correspondants  des  journaux  mandaient  de  St.-Peters- 
bourg  que  la  Russie  mobilisait  contre  TAutriche  k  la  suite  de  la 
mobilisation  de  cette  derniere.  Grey  dit  qu'en  principe  le  Gouver- 
nement  AUemand  s'est  declare  en  faveur  de  la  mediation,  mais  qu'il 
rencontre  des  difficultes  quant  a  la  forme.  Grey  a  insiste  pour  que 
le  Gouvernement  AUemand  indiquat  la  forme  laquelle  a  I'avis  de 
TAllemagne  pourrait  permettre  aux  4  Puissances  d'exercer  leur  media- 
tion pour  6viter  la  guerre;  vu  le  consentement  de  la  France,  de  Tltalie 
et  de  TAngleterre  la  mMiation  pourrait  avoir  lieu  seulement  dans  le 
cas  ou  TAllemagne  cionsentirait  k  se  ranger  du  c6t6  de  la  paix. 

(Signe)  Benckendorff. 


JVo  55. 

L'Ambassadeor  en  Prance  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etra  ng^res. 

Paris,  le  'V,,  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

Vivian!  vient  de  me  confirmer  I'enti^re  resolution  du  Gouveme* 
ment  Fran^ais  d'agir  d*accord  avec  nous.   Cette  resolutioTi  est  sou- 

-  41  -  6 


tentio  par  les  cereles  les  plus  6tendus  et  par  les  partis  y  conipris  les 
radicaux-socialistes  qui  viennent  de  lui  presenter  luie  declaration 
exprimant  la  confiance  absolue  et  les  dispositions  patriotiques  dugroupe. 
Des  sou  arrivee  a  Paris,  Viviani  a  telegraphic  d'urgence  k  Londres  que 
vu  la  cessation  des  pourparlers  directs  entre  P6tersbourg  et  Vienne  il 
etait  necessaire  que  le  Cabinet  de  Londres  renouvelat  le  plus  tot 
possible  sous  telle  ou  autre  forme  sa  propesition  concemant  la  me- 
diation des  Puissances.  Avant  moi  Viviani  a  re(ju  aujourd'hui  TAmbas- 
sadeur  d'Allemagne  qui  lui  a  renouveie  Tassurance  des  tendances 
pacifiques  de  rAIlemagne.  Viviani  ayant  fait  observer  que  si  TAlle- 
niagne  desirait  la  paix  elle  devrait  se  hater  d'adherer  a  la  proposition 
de  mediation  anglaise,  le  Baron  Schoen  a  rCpondu  que  les  mots«confe- 
r€nce»  ou  «arbitr.age»  effrayaient  TAutriche.  Viviani  a  repliqu6  qu'il 
ne  s'agissait  pas  de  mots  et  qu'il  serait  facile  de  trouver  une  autre 
forme  de  mediation.  D'apres  Tavis  du  Baron  de  Schoen,  pour  le  succ^s 
des  negociations  entre  les  Puissances  il  serait  necessaire  de  savoir 
ce  que  TAutriche  compterait  demander  a  la  Serbie,  Viviani  a  repbndu 
que  le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  pourrait  bien  facilement  s'en  enqu^rir  aupr^s 
derAutriche,  mais  qu'en  attendant  la  note  responsive  serbe  pour- 
rait servir  de  base  a  la  discussion;  il  a  ajoute  que  la  France  desirait 
sincerement  la  paix,  mais  qu'elle  etait  en  meme  temps  rCsolue  d'agir  en 
pleine  harmonic  avec  ses  allies  et  amis,et  que  lui,  le  Baron  de  Schoen, 
avait  pu  se  convaincre  que  cette  resolution  rencontrait  la  plus  vive 
approbation  du  pays. 

(Signer  Iswolsky. 


JV?  56. 

Telegramme  de  son  Altesse  Royale  le  Prince  Alexandre 
de  Serbie  a  sa  Majeste  I'tmpereur. 

Profondement  touche  par  le  teiegramme  que  Votre  Majeste  a 
bien  voulu  M'adresserhier,  Je  M'empresse  de  Laremercierde  tout  mon 
coeur.  Je  prie  Votre  Majeste  d'etre  persuadeeque  la  cordialesyrapathie, 
dont  Votre  Majeste  estanimee  en  vers  Mon  pays,  nous  est  particulie- 
rement  precieuse  et  remplit  notre  ame  de  Tespoir  que  Pavenir  de  la 
Serbie  est  assure  etant  devenu  Pobjet  de  la  Haute  sollicitude  de 

-  42  - 


Votre  Majest6.~Ces  moments  penibles  ne  peiivent  queraffermir  les 
liens  de  Tattachement  profond  qui  unissent  la  Serbie  a  la  sainte  Russia 
slave,  et  les  sentiments  de  reconnaissance  etemelle  pour  Taide  et 
la  protection  de  Votre  Majesty  seront  conserves  pieusement  dans  Tame 
detous  les  serbes. 

(Sign6)  Alexandre. 


Ko  67. 

Le  Charge  d'Airaires  en  SerWe  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrang^res. 

Nich  le  »V„  Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

J'ai  communique  a  Pachitch  le  texte  du  telegrarame  responsif 
de  Sa  Majest6  TEmpereur  au  Prince  Alexandre.  Pachitch  apres 
Tavoir  lu,sesignaet  dit:  «Seigneurl  Le  Tzar  est  grand  et  clement*! 
Ensuite  il  m'embrassa,  ne  pouvant  contenir  Temotion  qui  I'avait 
gagn6.  L'heritier  est  attendu  a  Nich  dans  la.nuit. 

(Signe)  Strandtman. 


JV?58. 


Le  3Iinistre  des  Affaires   Btrang^res  k  TAmbassadeur  en 

France. 

St.  Pctersbourg  le  *%,  Juillet  1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 

Aujourd'hui  TAmbassadeur  dAllemagne  m'a  communique  la 
resolution  prise  par  son  gouvemement  de  mobiliser,  si  la  Russie  ne 
cessait  pas  ses  preparatifs  militaires.  Or,  nous  n'avons  commence 
ces  derniers  qu'^  la  suite  de  la  mobilisation  h  laquelle  avait  dej^ 
procede  TAutriche  et  vu  Tabsence  §vidente  chez  cette  deniiere  du 
desir  d'accepter  un  mode  quelconque  d'une  solution  pacifique  de 
son  conflit  avec  la  Serbie. 

-  43  -- 


Puisque  nous  ne  pouvons  pas  aec^der  au  desir  de  I'Alleniagne, 
il  ne  nous  reste  que  d'acc61erer  nos  propres  armements  etde  compter 
avec  rinevitabilite  probable  de  la  guerre.— Veuillez  en  avertir  le 
Gouveniement  Francais  et  lui  exprimer  en  nieme  temps  notre  sincere 
reconnaissance  pour  la  declaration  que  I'Ambassadeur  de  Prance  m\i 
faite  en  son  nom  en  disant  que  nous  pouvons  compter  enti^- 
rement  sur  I'appui  de  notre  alli^e  la  France.  Dans  les  circonstances 
actuelles  cette  declaration  nous  est  particulierement  pr§cieuse. 
Communique  aux  Ambassadeurs  en  Angleterre,  Autriche-Hongrie, 
Italic.  Allemagne. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


X?  59. 

Le  Charge  d'Aflaires  en   Serbie  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etraiigeres. 

Nich,  le   "A,  Juillet  1914. 

(T^legramme). 

Le  Prince-R^gcnt  a  public  hier  un  'manifeste  sign^  par  tous  les 
Ministres  a  Toccasion  de  la  declaration  de  la  guerre  par  TAutriche 
a  la  Serbie.  Le  manifeste  se  termine  par  les  paroles  suivantes:  «De- 
fendez  de  toutes  vos  forces  vos  foyers  et  la  Serbie».  Lors  de  I'ouver- 
ture  solennelle  de  la  Scouptchina,  le  Regent  lut  en  son  non 
le  discours  du  trone,  au  d^but  duquel  il  indiqua  que  le  lieu  de  la  con- 
vocation demontrait  I'importance  des  evcnements  actuels.  Suit 
Texpose  des  faits  des  demiers  jours— rultimatum  autrichien,  la 
reponse  serbe,  les  efforts  du  gouvemement  Royal  de  faire  tout  ce  qui 
etait  compatible  avec  la  dignity  le  TEtat  pour  ^viter  la  guerre  et 
enfin  I'agression  armee  du  voisin  plus  puissant  contre  la  Serbie, aux 
cotes  de  laquelle  se  tient  le  Montenegro.  En  passant  a  Texaraen  de 
I'attitude  des  Puissances  en  presence  du  conflit,  le  Prince  insista 
tout  d'abord  sur  les  sentiments  dont  est  anim6e  la  Russie  et  sur  la 
Toute  Gracieuse  Conmiunication  de  sa  Majest6  TEmpereur 
disant  que  la  Russie  en  aucun  cas  n'abandonnera  la  Serbie.  A  chaque 
mention  du  nom  de  Sa  Majeste  Imp6riale  et  de  la  Russie  un  «jivio> 

-  44  - 


foriniduble  et  febrile  secouait  la  salle  des  stances.  Les  marques  de 
sympathie  de  la  part  de  la  France  et  de  TAngletene  furent  aussi 
relev^es  s^parement  et  provoquerent  des  «jivio»  d'approbation  de 
la  part  des  d6put6s.  Le  discours  du  trone  se  tennine  par  la  declaration 
d*ouverture  de  la  Scouptchina  et  par  Texpression  du  voeu  que  toutes 
les  mesures  soient  prises  pour  faci liter  la  tache  du  Gouvemement. 

(Signe)  Strandtiuan. 


Xo  60. 


].e  Miiiistre  de5  Affaires  Etrangeres  aux  Aiiibassadeiirs  en 
Allemagiie,  «ii  Autriche-Hongrie.  en  France,  en  Angleterre. 

et  en  Italie. 

St.  Paersbourg,  le  'V30  Juillet  1914. 
(T61egramme). 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  qui  vient  de  me  quitter  m'a  de- 
niande  si  nous  ne  pouvions  pas  nous  contenter  de  la  promesse  que 
rAutriche  pourrait  donner— de  ne  pas  porter  atteinte  a  Tintegrite 
du  Royaume  de  Serbie — et  indiquer  h  quelles  conditions  nous 
pourrions  encore  consentir  a  suspendre  nos  armements;  je  lui  ai 
dict6,  pour  etre  transmise  d'urgence  a  Berlin,  la  declaration  suivante: 
«Si  rAutriche,  reconnaissant  que  la  question  austro-serbe  a  assume 
le  oaractere  d'une  question  europeenne,  se  declare  prete  a 
eiiminer  de  son  ultimatum  les  points  qui  portent  atteinte  aux  droits 
souverains  de  la  Serbie,  la  Russie  s'engage  k  cesser  ses  pr^paratifs 
niilitaires». 

Veuillez  tei^graphier  d'urgence  quelle  sera  I'attitude  du  Gouver: 
nement  Allemand  en  presence  de  cette  nouvelle  preuve  de  notre 
d^sir  de  faire  le  possible  pour  la  solution  pacitique  de  la  question, 
car  nous  no  pouvons  pas  admettre  que  de  seniblables  pourparlers  ne 
servent  qu  a  faire  gagner  du  temps  k  rAllemagne  et  a  TAutriciie 
pour  leurs  pr^paratifs  militaires. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


-  46  - 


L^Aiiibassadeur    eii    Alleiiiaj^iie  au   Miiiistre  des  Affaires 

Etraiigdres. 

Berlin,   le    'Vao   Juillet  1914. 
(T^legramme). 

J'apprends  que  le  d^cret  de  mobilisation  de  Tarra^e  et  de  la 
flotte' allemandes  vient  d'etre  promulgue. 

(Sign6)  Swerb^ew. 


JVo  62. 

L'Ambassadeur  en  AUema^ne  au  Miiiistre  des  Affaires 

Etraug^res. 

Berlin,  le   "Ao   Juillet  1914. 

fT^legramme). 

Le  Miuistre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  vient  de  me  telephoner  pour 
me  communiquer  que  la  nouvelle  lancee  tout  a  I'heure  de  la  mobili- 
sation de  Tarm^e  ct  de  la  flotte  allemandes  est  fausse;  que  les  feuillets 
des  journaux  etaient  imprimes  d'avance  en  prevision  de  toutes  6ven- 
tualites,  et  mis  en  vente  a  Theure  de  Tapres  raidi,  mais  que  main- 
tenant  ils  sont  confisqu6s. 

(Signe)   Swerb6ew. 


^0  63. 

L'Aiabassadeur  en  Alleniagiie  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Berlin,   le   "Ao   Juillet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

Ai  re^u.  Votre  t^legramme  du  1^—29  Juillet  et  ai  transmis  le 
tfixU  de  Votre  proposition  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangtos  que  je 

-  46  - 


viens  de  voir;  il  m'a  dit  qu'il  avait  re^u  un  tdl^gramme  identique 
de  rAmbassadttur  d'Allemagne  a  St.-P6tosbourg  et  m*a  d^clar^ 
ensuite  qu'il  trouvait  notre  proposition  inacceptable  pour  I'Autriche. 

(Sign6)  Swerb^ew. 


^  64-. 

L'Aiiibassadciir   en   Aii^leterrc   au   Sliuistre   des   Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  17/30  Jiiillet  1914. 
(T^l^granune). 

Ai  communique  le  contenu  de  Vos  t^legrammes  du  16  el  ITJuillet. 
a  Grey  lequel  considere  la  situation  comme  tres  serieuse,  mais  desire 
continuer  les  pourparlers.  J'ai  fait  observer  a  Grey  que  depuis  que 
Vous  lui  aviez  fait  la  proposition  d'accepter  tout  ce  qu'il  propose- 
rait  en  faveur  du  maintien  de  la  paix,  pourvu  que  TAutriche 
ne  {)ut  prof  iter  de  ces  atermoiements  pour  ^eraser  la  Serbie,  la 
^tuation  dans  laquelle  Vous  vous  trouviez  s'etait  apparenmient 
modifiee.  A  cette  epoque  nos  rapports  avec  rAllemagneu'etaient  pas 
comi)romis.  Apres  la  declaration  de  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  a 
St.-P6tersbourg  concemant  la  mobilisation  allemande,  ces  rapports 
avaient  change  et  sa  demande  avait  re^u  de  Votre  part  la  seule  reponse 
que  pouvait  donner  une  grande  Puissance.  Lorsque  TAmbassadeur 
d'Allemagne  ^tait  revenu  aupres  de  Vous  et  s'etait  enquis  de  Vos 
conditions,  Vous  les  aviez  formul6es  dans  de^  circonstances  tout-a- 
fait  speciales.  J'ai  en  meme  temps  de  nouveau  insists  aupres  de  Grey 
sur  la  necessite  de  prendre  en  consideration  la  situation  uouvelle 
cr66e  par  la  f  ante  de  rAllemagne  a  la  suite  de  Taction  dePAmbassadeur 
d'AUemagne.  Grey  a  repondu  qu'il  le  comprenait  et  qu'il  tiendrait 
compte  de  ces  arguments. 

(Sign6)  Benckendorff. 


-  47  - 


JVo  G5. 

L'Ambassadeur  en   Amt^leterre   au   Ministre   des   Affaires 

£traug^re$. 

Londres,  le  "Ao  Juillet  1914. 
'(T616gramme). 

L'Ambassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  demand^  k  Grey  pour  quelle 
raison  I'Angleterre  prenait  des  mesures  militaires  sur  terre  et  sur 
mer.  Grey  a  r^pondu  que  ces  mesures  n'avaient  pas  un  caract^re 
agressif ,  mais  que  la  situation  6tait  telle  que  chaque  Puissance  devait 
se  preparer. 

(Sign^)  Benckendorff. 


JV^  66. 

L'Ambassadeur  en  Autriclie-Hongrie  au  Ministre  des  AftUires 

Etrangeres. 

Vienue,  le  ^Vsi  Juillet  1914. 

(T416gramme). 

Malgr6  la  mobilisation  gen^rale  je  continue  k  ^changer  des  vues 
avec  le  Comte  Berchtold  et  ses  collaborateurs  Tous  insistent  but 
I'absence  chez  TAutriche  d'intentions  aggressives  quelconques  contre 
laRussieetde  vis6es  de  conqueteil'^gard  delaSerbie,  mais  tous  insistent 
6galement  sur  la  n6cessit6  pour  TAutriche  de  poursuivre  jusqu'au 
bout  Taction  commenc^e  et  de  donner  a  la  Serbie  une  le(?on  s6rleuse 
qui  pourrait  constituer  une  certaine  garantie  pour  Tavenir. 

(Sign6)  Sch6b6ko. 


48 


JVo  67. 

Le  Mlnistre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  aux  Ambassadeiirs  en 
Allemagiie,  Autriclie-Hoiigrie,  en  France,  en  Angletcrre  et 

en  Italie. 

St.  Petersbourg,  le  »%i  Juillet  1914. 
(T61egrarame). 

Me  r^f^re  k  mon  tel^gramme  du  *Vjo*  Juillet.  D'ordre  de  son 
gouvernement,  rAmbassadeur  d'Angleterre  m'a  transmis  le  desir  du 
Cabinet  de  Londres  d'introduire  quelques  modifications  dans  la  for- 
raule  que  j'ai  propos^e  hier  k  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne.  J*ai  r6- 
pondu  que  j'acceptais  la  proposition  anglaise.  Ci  dessous  je  vous 
transmets  la  formule  modifide  en  consequence. 

«Si  TAutriche  consent  a  arreter  la  niarche  de  ses  arraees  sur  le 
territoire  Serbe  et  si,  reconnaissant  que  le  conflit  austro-serbe  a 
assum6  le  caractere  d'une  question  d'interet  europeen,  elle  adinet 
que  les  Grandes  Puissances  examinent  la  satisfaction  que  la  Serbie 
pourrait  accorder  au  gouvernement  d'Autriche-Hongrie  sans  laisser 
porter  atteinte  k  ses  droits  d'Etat  souverain  et  a  son  independance,— 
la  Russie  s'engage  a  conserver  son  attitude  expectante». 

(Sign6)  Sazonow. 


J^  68. 

L'Ambassadeur   en   AUeniagne    au   Ministre   des   Affaires 

Etrangeres. 

Berlin,  le  %t  Juliet  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

Le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  vient  de  me  dire  que  nos 
pourparlers,  qui  6taient  d6ja  difficiles  k  la  suite  de  la  mobilisation 
contre  PAutriche,  le  deviennent  encore  davantage  en  presence  des  graves 
mesuresmilitaires  que  nous  prenonscontrePAllemagne;  des  nouvelles  y 
relatives  sont,  d'apres  lui^reijues  ici  de  tons  les  cotes  et  devront  prOvo- 
quer  in^vitablement  des  mesures  analogues  de  la  part  de  PAllemague. 

—  49  —  1 


A  cela  j\ii  r^pondu  que,  d'apres  des  renseigiiemcnts  surs  dont  je 
disposals  ct  qui  ctaient  confirmes  par  tous  nos  compatriptes  iurivant 
a  Berlin,  la  prise  coutre  nous  des  mcsuros susditos se  poursuivait  6gale- 
nient  en  Allemagne  avec  graude  activite.  Malgr6  cela,  le  Ministre  des 
Affaires  Etrangeres  affirme  qu'ici  on  n'a  fait  que  rappeler  les  offi- 
ciers  de  leurs  conges  et  les  troupes  des  champs  de  manoeuvres. 

(Sign^)  Swerb^w. 


Xo  69. 

Le   3Iiiii$tre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  h  rAinbassadeiir  eii 

Aiigleterre. 

S.-Petersbourg,  le  ^V^i  Juilletl914. 
(T^l^gramme). 

J'ai  prie  TAmbassadeur  d'^Vngleterre  de  transmettre  a  Grey 
Texpression  de  ma  plus  sincere  reconnaissance  pour  le  ton  amical  et 
ferme  dont  il  a  use  pendant  les  pourparlers  avecrAllemagiieetrAutri- 
che,  grace  a  quoi  Tespoir  de  trouver  une  issue  pacifique  de  la  situation 
actuelle  n'est  pas  encore  perdu. 

Je  Tai  aussi  pri6  de  dire  au  Ministre  Anglais  que  je  pensais  que 
ce  n'etait  qu'a  Londres  que  les  pourparlers  auraient  encore  quelques 
chances  d'un  succes  quelconque,  en  facilitant  ^TAutriche  la  necessite 
d'un  compromis. 

Communique  k  TAmbassadeur  en  France. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


X?  70. 

Telegrainiiic  secret  aux  Representaiits  de  Sa  Majeste 
TEmpereur  k  Tetraiiger. 

Le  19  Juillet/1  Aout  1914. 
(Telegramrae). 
A  minuit  TAmbassadeur  d'AUemagne  m'a  d6clar6,  d'ordre  de 
son  Gouvemcment,  que  si  dans  les  12  heures,  c'est  k  dire  k  midi, 
Samedi,  nous  ne  commencions  pas  la  demobilisation,  non  seulement 

—  60  — 


a  I'^gard  de  I'Allcmagnc,  mais  aussi  k  regard  de  I'AutricIie,  le  Gauverac- 
ment  Allemand  serait  force  de  donner  Tordre  de  mobilisation.  A  ma 
question  si  c'6tait  la 'guerre,  i'Ainbassadeur  a  repondu  par  la 
negative,  mais  en  ajoutant  que  nous  etions  fort  pres  d'elle. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


Xo  71. 

L'Ainbassadeur  en   Angleterrc   au   Miuistre  des  AfTaires 

Etran^eres. 

Londres  19  Juillet/1  Aout  1914. 

(T^legramme). 

Grey  m'a  dit  qu'il  a  tel^aphi6  a  Berlin  q\i*k  son  avis  la  der- 
niere  formule  acceptee  par  le  Gouvemcment  Russe  constitue  la  base 
de  n^ociations  qui  presente  le  plus  de  chimces  pour  une  solution 
pacifique  du  conflict.  11  a  exprime  en  meme  temps  Tespoir  qu'aucune 
grande  Puissance  ne  commencerait  les  hostilites  avant  Texamen  de 
cette  formule. 


(Signe)  Benckendorff. 


Xo  72. 

L'Aiubassadcur  cu   Aiigletcrre   an   Ministrc  des   AfiFaires 

Etrangeres. 

Londres,  le  19  Juillet/1  Aout  1914. 

(T^l^gramme). 

Le  Gouvernement  de  la  Grande  Bretagne  a  pos6  aux  Gouverneihents 
Franeais  et  Allemand  la  question  s'ils  respecteraient  la  neutralite 
de  la  Belgique. 

La  France  a  repondu  dans  Taffirmative,  tandis  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment Allemand  a  declare  ne  pouvoir  repbndre  a  cette  question  cat^gori- 
quemcnt. 

(Signe)  Benckendorff. 


51  -> 


Ko  73. 

L'Aiiibassadeur  en  France  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrang^res. 

Paris,  le  19  Juillet/1  Aout  1914. 

(Teli^gramme). 

L'Anibassadeur  d'Autricho  a  visits  hier  Viviani  et  lui  a  d6clar§ 
quo  TAutrichc  non  seulement  n'avait  pas  le  dessein  de  porter  atteinte 
a  rint^grit^  territoriale  de  la  Serbio,  mais  etait  prete  h  discuter 
avee  les  autres  Puissances  le  fond  de  son  eonflit  avec  la  Serbie.  Le 
GouvemementFrangaisesttrespreoeuppe  paries  preparatifs  militaires 
extraordinaires  de  rAllemagne  sur  la  frontiere  fran^aise,  car  il  est 
convaineu  que  sous  le  voile  du  «Kriegszustand»  se  produit  une  veri- 
table mobilisation. 

(Sign6)  Iswolsky. 


Ko  74. 

L'Anibassadeur  en  France  au  Ministre  des  Affaires 
Etrang:^res. 

Paris,  la  19  Juillet/1  Aout  1914. 

(T616gramme). 

A  la  reception  ici  du  t^l^gramme  de  TAmbassadeur  de  France 
a  St.-P^tcrsbourg  contonant  la  communication  que  Vous  a  faite 
TAnibassadeur  Allemand  concemant  la  resolution  de  I'Allemagne 
de  d^creter  aujourd'hui  la  mobilisation  g^n^rale,  le  President  do 
la  Republique  a  signe  le  d^cret  de  mobilisation.  Dans  les  rues  on 
procede  a  Taffichage  des  listes  d'appel  des  r^servistes.  L'Ambassadeur 
d'Allemagne  vient  de  rendre  visite  a  Viviani,  mais  ne  lui  a  fait  aucune 
nouvclle  communication,  en  all^guant  Timpossibilite  de  d^chiffrer  les 
t^l^ammes  qu'il  a  reQus.  Viviani  Pa  informe  de  la  signature  du 
decrct  de  mobilisation  en  r^ponse  a  la  mobilisation  allemande  et 
lui  a  fait  part  de  son  6t(»nnement  de  ce  que  PAllemagne  eiit  pris  une 
telle  raesure  a  un  moment  ou  se  poursuivait  encore  un  ^change  de 
Tucs  amical  entre  la  Russie,  rAutriche  et  les  Puissances;  il  a  ajoute 

-  52  - 


que  la  mobilisation  ne  pr^jugeait  pas  n^cessairement  la  guerre  et 
que  TAmbassadeur  d'AlIemagne  pourrait  rester  k  Paris  coramc 
TArnbassadeur  de  Russie  est  rest6  k  Vicnne  et  cclul  d'Autriche  k 
St.-P6tersbourg. 

(Sign6)  Iswolsky. 


JVo  75. 

L'Anibassadeur  en  France  au  Jlinistre  des  Affaires 

Etran^eres. 

Paris,  le  19  Juillet/1  Aout  1914. 

(T^ldgramme). 

Jetionsdu  President  que  pendant  les  demi^res  joum^es  TAmbaa- 
sadeur  d'Autriche  a  assure  avec  force  le  President  du  Conseil  des 
Ministres  et  Ini  meme,  que  I'Autriche  nous  aurait  d6clar6 
etre  prete  a  respecter  non  seulement  Tint^grit^  territoriale  de  la 
Serbie,  mais  aussi  ses  droits  souverains,  mais  que  nous  aurions  inten- 
tionnellement  fait  le  silence  sur  cette  declaration.*  J'ai  oppose  ua 
dementi  cat^orique  k  cela.. 

(Sign6)  Iswolsky. 


\Xo  70. 

Jiote  remise  par  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne  a  S.-Peters- 
bourg  le  19  Juillet  19U  a  7  h.  10  du  soir. 

Le  Gouvemement  Imj^^rial  s'est  efforc6  des  les  debuts  dc 
laitise  de  la  mener  a  une  solution  pacifique.  Se  rendant  a  un 
d^sir  qui  lui  en  avait  M  exprim^  par  Sa  Majesty  TEmpereur 
de  Eussiti,  Sa  Majeste  TEmpereur  d'Allemagne  d'accord  avee 
I'AngletHrre  s'6tait  appliqu6  a  accomplir  un  role  m6diateur 
aupres  des  Cabinets  de  Vienne  et  de  St.-Petersbourg,  lorsque 
la  Kussie,  sans  en  attendre  le  resultat,  proc^da  a  la  mobili- 
sation de  la  totality  de  ses  forces  de  terre  et  de  mer.  A  la 
suite  'de  cette  mesure  mena(?ante  motiv6e  par  aucun  presage 
militaire  d^  la  part  de  TAllemagne  TEmpire  Allemand  c'est 
trouv6  vis-^-vis  d'un  danger  grave  et  imiiiinent.  Si  le  Gouveme- 

-  53  - 


ment  Imperial  out  lUiinque  de  parer  k  ce  peril,  il  aurait  oompro- 
mis  la  security  et  Texistencc  meme  de  rAllomtigue.  Par  conse- 
quent le  Gouvemeraent  Allemand  se  vit  force  do  s'adresser  au 
Gouvemement  de  Sa  Majeste  TEmpereur  de  Toutes  les  Russies 
en  insistant  sur  la  cessation  des  dits  actes  miiitaires.  La  Russie 
ayant  refus6  de  faire  droit  k  (n'ayant  pas  cru  devoir  repondre 
a*)  cette  demande  et  ayant  manifesto  par  ce  refus  (cette  atti- 
tude*) que  son  action  etait  dirig§e  centre  TAUeinagne,  j'ai 
riionneur,  d'ordre  de  inon  Gouvemement,  de  faire  savoir  a 
Votre  Excellence  ce  qui  suit: 

Sa  Majeste  TEinpereur  Mon  Auguste  Souvorain  au  nom  de 
TEiupire,  relevant  le  defi  se  considere  en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la 
Russie. 

St.-Petersbourg,  le  19  Juillet/1  Aout  1914. 

(Signe)  F.  Pourtales. 


jYo  77. 

Communique  du  3Iiulstre   des  AtTaircs  Etraui^^^rcs  coucer- 
uaut  les  evenemeuts  des  deruiers  jours. 

Le  20  Juillet/2  Aout  1914. 

Un  expos6  dcfigurant  les  eveneraents  des  derniers  jours 
ayant  paru  dans  la  presse  6trangere,  le  Ministcre  des  Affaires 
Etrangeres  croit  de  son  devoir  de  publier  Taper^u  suivant  des 
pouri)arlers   di[)lomatiques   pendant   le   temps   susvise. 

Le  10/23  Juillct  a.  c.  le  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  a 
Belgrade  presenta  au  Ministre  President  Serbe  une  note  o^ 
le  Gouvemement  Serbe  etait  accuse  d 'avoir  favorise  le  mouve- 
ment  panserbe  qui  avait  abouti  h  Tassassinat  de  rentier 
du    trone    austro-hongrois.     En    consequence    TAutriche-Hongrie 


•)  Les  mots  places  cntre  parentheses  se  trouvent  dans  Toriginal.  II  faut 
suppuser  que  deux  variantes  avaient  et6  preparSes  d'avance  et  que  par  erreur 
clles  ont  ete  inser^es  tiutes  les  deux  dans  la  note. 

—  64  — 


demandait  au  Gouvemrment  Serbc  non  seulement  de  condamner 
sous  une  forme  solennelle  la  susdite  propagandc,  mais  aussi 
de  prendre,  sous  le  controle  de  rAutriche-Hongrie,  une  serie 
de  mesures  tendant  a  la  decouvcrte  du  coniplot,  a  la  punition 
des  sujets  swbes  y  ayant  particip^  et  a  la-  prevention  dans 
Tavenir  de  tout  attentat  sur  le  sol  du  Roavume.  Un  delai  de 
48  heures  fut  fix6  au  Gouvemement  Serbe  pour  la  reponse  a 
la   susdite   note. 

Le  Gouvemement  Imperial,  aiiquel  I'Ambassadeur  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie  h  St.-Petersbourg  avait  communique  le  texte  de  la 
note  17  heures  apres  sa  remise  a  Belgrade,  ayant  pris  eonnais- 
sance  des  demandes  y  contenues,  dut  s'apercevoir  que  quelques 
unes  parmi  elles  etaient  inexecutables  quant  au  fond,  tandisque 
d'autres  etaient  presentees  sous  une  forme  incompatible  avee 
la  dignite  d'un  Etat  independant.  Trouvant  inadmissibles  la 
diminution  de  la  dignite  de  la  Serbie  contenue  dans  ces  deman- 
des, ainsi  que  la  tendance  de  rAutriche-Hongrie  d'assurer  sa 
preponderance  dans  les  Balcans  demontree  par  ces  memes  exi- 
gences, le  Gouvemement  Russe  fit  observer  dans  la  forme  la 
plus  amicale  a  I'Autriche-Hongrie  qu'il  serait  desirable  de 
soumettre  k  un  nouvel  examen  les  points  contenus  dans  la 
note  austro-hongroise.  Le  Gouvemement  Austro-Hongrois  ne 
cmt  possible  de  consentir  h,  une  discussion  de  la  note.  L 'action 
moderatrice  des  autres  Puissances  a  Vienne  ue  fut  non  plus 
couronnee    de    succes. 

Malgr6  que  la  Serbie  eut  reprouve  le  crime  et  se  fut  mon- 
tr^e  prete  a  donner  satisfaction  a  rx\utriche  dans  une  mesure 
qui  depassa  les  provisions  non  seulement  de  In  Russie,  mais 
aussi  des  autres  Puissances,  le  Ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  a 
Belgrade  jugea  la  reponse  serbe  insuffisante  et  quitta  cette 
ville. 

Reconnaissant  le  caractere  exagOre  des  demandes  presentees 
par  TAutriche,  la  Russie  avait  declare  encore  auparavant  qu'il  lui 
serait  impossible  de  rester  indifferente,  sans  se  refuser  toutefois  a 
employer  tons  ses  efforts  pour  trouver  une  issue  pacifique  qui  fut 
acceptable  pour  rAutriche  et  menageatson  amour-propre  de  grande 
puissance.  En  meme  temps  la  Russie  etablit  fernieijient  qu'elle 
admettait  une  solution  pacifique  de  la  question  seulement  dans  une 

—  r>5  — 


raesure  qui  n'impliquerait  ptos  la  diminution  do  la  dignity  dc  la  Serbie 
conime  Etat  ind6])endant.  Mallii^ureuseinent  tons  Ics  efforts  d^ploy^s 
piir  lo  Gouvenioment  Imperial  dans  cctto  direction  rrsterent  sans 
effet.  LeGouvernemont  Austro-Hongfois,  apres  s'etre  derob6  ^touto 
intervention  eonciliatrice  des  Puissances  dans sonconflitavocla Serbie, 
prot-eda  a  la  mobilisation,  d6clara  officiellemont  la  guerre  c\  la  Serbie, 
et  le  jour  suivant  Belgrade  fut  bombard^e.  Le  manifesto  qiii  a  accoin- 
piigne  la  declaration  de  guerre  accuse  ouvertement  la  Serbie  d'avoir 
prepare  et  execute  le  crime  de  S^Taiewo.  Une  parnlle  accusation  d'un 
crime  de  droit  commun  lancee  contre  tout  un  peuple  et  tout  un  6tat 
attira  k  la  S.^rbie  par  son  inanite  cvidente  les  larges  sympathies  dos 
cercles  de  la  society  europeemie. 

A  la  suiti'  de  cette  maniere  d'agir  du  Gouvernement.  Austro- 
Hongrois,  malgre  la  declaration  de  la  Russic  qu'elle  ne  pourrait  rester 
indifferente  au  sort  de  la  Serbie,  le  Gouvernement  Imp6rial  jugea 
necessaire  d'ordonner  la  mobilisation  des  circonscriptions  militnires 
deKiew,d'Odessa,de  Moscou  etde  Kazan.  Une  telle  decision  s'iinpo- 
sait  parceque  depuis  la  date  de  la  remiso  de  la  note  austro-lion- 
groise  au  Gouvernement  Serbe  et  les  premieres  demarches  de  la  Russie 
cinq  juurs  s'etaient  ecoules,  et  cependant  le  Cabinet  d''  Vienne  n'avait 
fait  aucun  pas  pour  aller  au  devant  de  nos  efforts  pacifiques;  au 
contraire,  la  mobilisation  de  la  moiti6  dc  Tarinee  austro-hongroise 
Avait  ele  decretee. 

Le  Gouvernement  Allemand  fut  mis  au  courant  des  mesures 
prises  par  la  Russie;  11  lui  fut  en  meme  temps  cxpliqu6  qu'elles 
n'6taient  que  la  consequence  des  armements  autrichiens  et  nullement 
dirigees  contre  rAlli'nuigno.  En  meme  temps,  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial  dec lara  que  la  Russie  6tait  prete  a  continuer  les  pourparlers 
en  vue  d'une  solution  pacifique  du  confiit,  soit  par  la  voie  de  nego- 
ciations  directes  avec  le  Cabinet  dc  Vienne,soit,  en  suivant  la  pro- 
position de  ia  Grande  Bretagne,  par  la  voie  d'une  Conference  des 
quatre  Grandes  Puissancs  non  interosseosdircctement,  voire,,  I'Angle- 
terre,  la  France,  TAllemagne  et  I'ltalie. 

Cependant  cette  tentative  de  la  Russie  echoua  egalement.  L'Au- 
triche-Hongric  declina  un  echange  de  vucs  ulterieur  avec  nous,  et  le 
Cabinet  de  Vienne  se  deroba  a  la  participation  a  la  Conference  des 
Puissances  projetee. 

-  56  - 


Neanmoins,  la  Eussie  ne  discontinua  pas  ses  efforts  en  faveur  de 
la  paix  R^pondant  h  la  question  de  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne,  a 
quelles  conditions  nous  consentirions  encore  k  suspendre  nos  armements, 
le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres  declara  que  ces  conditions 
seraient  la  reconnaissance  par  TAutriche-Hongrie  que  la  question 
Austro-Serhe  avaitrevetu  le  caractere  d'une  question  europeenne,  et  la 
declaration  de  cette  meme  Puissance  qu'elle  consentait  a  ne  pas 
insister  sur  des  demandes  incompatibles  avec  les  droits  souverains 
de  la  Serbie. 

La  proposition  de  la  Russie  fut  jugee  par  TAllemagne  inaccep- 
table  pour  I'Autriche-Hongrie.  Simultanement  onre^uta  St.-Peters- 
bourg  la  houvelle  de  la  proclamation  de  la  mobilisation  generale 
par  TAutriche-Hongrie. 

En  meme  temps  les  hostilites  continuaient  sur  le  territoirre  Serbe 
et  Belgrade  fut  bombardee  de  rechef. 

L'insucces  de  nos  propositions  pacifiques  nous  obligea  d'elargir 
les  mesures  de  precaution  militaires. 

Le  Cabinet  de  Berlin  nous  ayant  adresse  une  question  a  cesujet, 
il  lui  fut  repondu  que  la  Russie  etait  forcee  de  commencer  ses  arme- 
nieuts  pour  se  prenmnir  contre  toutes  eventualites. 

Tout  en  prenant  cette  mesure  de  precaution,  la  Russie  n'en  ^f^ 
continjait  pas  moins  de  rechercher  de  toutes  ses  forces  une  issue  de 
cette  situation  et  declara  etre  prete  a  accepter  tout  moyen  de  solution 
du  conflit  qui  comport^ait  Tobservation  des  conditions  posees  par 
nous. 

Malgre  cette  communication  conciliante,  le  Gouvernement  Alle- 
mand,  le  ^  V31  Jwill^t,adressa  au  Gouvemement  Russelademande  d'avoir 
a  suspendre  ses  mesures  militaires  a  midi  du  19  Juil let/1  Aout, 
en  menaQant,  dans  le  cas  contraire,  de  proceder  a  une  mobilisation 
generale. 

Le  lendemain,  19  Juillet/1  Aout,  TAmbassadeur  d'Allemagne 
transmit  au  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  au  nom  de  son  Gouver- 
nement, la  declaration  de  guerre. 


-  57 


%^ 


j\o  78. 

Le  Hinistre  des  Affaires  Etraiig^res  aux  Kepreseiitaiits  de 
8.  M.  FEiupereur  a  retrauji:er. 

St.-Petersboui^,  le  20  Juillet/2  Aout  1914. 
(T^l^gramme). 

II  est  absohiment  clair  que  TAllemagne  s'efforce  des  a  present 
de  rejeter  sur  nous  la  responsabilit^  de  la  rupture.  Notre  mobilisation 
a  ete  provoquee  par  Tenorme  responsabilite  que  nous  aurions  assumee, 
si  nous  n'avions  pas  pris  toutes  les  mesures  de  precaution  a  un  moment 
ou  TAutriche,  se  bomanta  des  pourparlers  d'un  caractere  dilatoire, 
bombardait  Belgrade  et  procedait  a  une  mobilisation  generale. 

Sa  Majesty  TErapereur  s'etait  engage  vis-a-vis  de  TEmpereur 
d'Allemagne  par  sa  parole  a n'entreprendreaucun  acte  agressif  tant  que 
dureraient  les  pourparlers  avec  rAutriche,  Apres  une  telle  garantie  et 
apres  toutes  les  preuves  de  Tamour  de  la  Russie  pour  la  paix,  TAlle- 
magne  ne  pouvait  ni  avait  le  droit  de  douter  de  notre  declaration  que 
nous  accepterions  avec  joie  toute  issue  pacifique  compatible  avec 
la  dignite  et  Tindependance  de  la  Serbie.  Une. autre  issue,  tout  en 
etant  completement  incompatible  avec  notre  propre  dignite,  aurait 
certainement  ebranle  Tequilibre  Europeen,  enassurant  Th^gemonie  de 
TAllemagne.  Ce  caractere  Europeen,  voire  mondial,  du  conflit  est  infi- 
niment  plus  important  que  le  pretexte  qui  Ta  cree.  Par  sa  decision  de 
nous  declarer  la  guerre  a  un  moment  oil  se  poursuivaient  les  n4go- 
ciations  entre  les  Puissances,  TAllemagne  a  assume  une  lourde 
responsabilite. 

(Signe)  Sazonow. 


J^79. 

Note    remise    par    I'Ambassadeur    d'Autriche-Hongrie     h 

St.-Petersboui'g   au   Miiiistre    des    Aflfaires  Etrangeres   le 

24  Jiiillet  h  6  h.  du  soir. 

D'ordre  de  son  Gouvemement  le  soussigne  Ambassadeur  d'Au- 
triche-Hongrie  a  Thonneur  de  notifier  a  Son  Excellence  Monsieur 
le  Ministre  des  Affaires  Etrangercs  de  Russie  ce  qui  suit: 

■k  —  58  — ' 


<Vu  Tattitude  mena^te  prise  par  la  Russie  dans  le  conflict  entrc 
la  Monarchic  Austro-Hongroise  et  la  Serbie  et  en  presence  du  fait 
qu'en  suite  de  ce  conflict  la  Russie  d'aprds  une  communication  du 
Cabinet  de  Berlin  a  cru  devoir  ouvrir  les  hostilit^s  centre  TAUemagnc 
et  que  celle-ci  se  trouve  par  consequent  en  6tat  de  guerre  avec  la 
dite  Puissance,  TAutriche-Hongrie  se  considere  ^alement  en  ^tat 
de  guerre  avec  la  Russie  k  partir  du  present  moment. 

(Sign6)  Szapary. 


St.-Petersbourg. 
6  Aout/24  Juillet  1914. 


59- 


PAGES  D'HISTOIRE  -   1914 

2*  Serif 

Les  Pourparlers 

Diplomatiques 

16/29  JOIK  —   3/16  ROUT 


IV 

LE    LIVRE    BLEU   SERBE 


NEGOCIATIONS    AYAHT    PRECEDE    LA    GUERRE 


LlBRAIRIE    MILITAIRE    BERGER-LEVRAULT 

PARIS  I  NANCY 

5-7,     RUE    DES    8EAUX   ARTS  j  18,   ROE  DBS   CLACtS 


;5?S?  Prtjc  :  60  centimes. 


Les  Pourparlers 

Diplomatiques 


Correspondance  diplomatique  du  Gouvernement  serbe 


11  a  eie  tire  de  ce  polume  cinqnante-cinq  exem- 
plaires  numerot^s  a  lapresse,  dont: 

5  sur  papier  du  Japon  (N""^  i  a  5); 
5o  sur  papier  de  Hollande  (N""^  6  a  55). 


Les  Pourparlers 

Diplomatiques 


Correspondance  diplomatique  du  GouYernemeni  serbe 


M.  Jov.  M.  Jopanoi>itch ,  ministre  a  Viennef 
a  M.  N.  Pachitch,  pr^esident  du  Conseil  et  mU 
nistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.)  Vienne,  le  16/29  juin  1914. 

Les  journaux  de  Vienne  affirment  que  Tins- 
truction  judiciaire,  ouverte  contre  les  auteurs  de 
Fattentat,  a  e tabli  que  le  crime  avait  ete  prepare  a 
Belgrade,  que  tout  un  com  plot  sur  une  base  plus 
large  avait  ete  organise  a  Belgrade  parmi  la  jeu- 
nesse  ins]3iree  par  Tidee  panserbe,  et  que  les 
journaux  de  Belgrade  alarment  le  public  par 
ieurs  peintures  de  la  gravite  de  la  situation  en 
Bosnie.  Ceci,  d'apr^s  euX;  exerce  une  influence 


4  PAGES  D'raSTOIRE 

considerable,  vu  quecesjournaux  sont  introduits 
en  Bosnie,  en  cachette,  en  grand  nombre. 


N«  2 

M.  Jov.  M.  Joi>anoQitch,  ministre  a  Viennej^ 
a  M.  N.  Pachitchy  president  du  Conseil  et 
ministre  des  Affaires  4trangeres. 

(Telegramme.)  Vienne,  le  17/30  juin  1914. 

La  tendance  est  de  plus  en  plus  ^vidente  a 
Vienne  de  donner  a  TEurope  I'impression  que 
Tattentat  commis  contre  I'archiduc  -  heritier 
d'Autriche-Hongrie  est  le  resultat  d*un  complot 
l)repare  en  Serbie.  On  a  I'intention  de  s'en  ser- 
vir  co.mme  d'un  moyen  politique  contre  nous. 
Aussi  FsLitt-il  surveiller  avec  la  plus  grande  atten- 
tion le  langage  de  nos  journaux  sur  I'^venement 
de  Serajevo. 


N«3 

M.  le  D'  M.  Jomnontch,  charge  d'affaires  a  Ber- 
lin, a  M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et 
ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(T616gramme.)  Berlin,  le  11/30  juin  1914. 

Les  journaux  de  Berlin  publient,  d'apres  les 
informations  de  Vienne  et  de  Budapest,  les  ar- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUE S  5 

tides  on  I'attentat  de  Serajevo  est  rattache  a  la 
Serbia  :  on  induit  ainsi  en  erreur  Fopinion  pu- 
blique  allemande. 


N°4 

M.  le  D""  M.  Jo{>ano{>itch^  charge  d'affaires  a 
Berlin^  a  M.  N.  Pachitch^  president  du  Conseil 
et  ministi^e  des  Affaires  etr anger es» 

(Telegramme.)  Berlin,  le  17/30  juin  1914. 

L'hostilite  de  Fopinion  publique  en  Allemagne 
envers  nous  dure  toujours,  entretenue  par  des 
nouvelles  mensongeres,  envoy ees  de  Vienne  et  de 
Budapest,  que  j)resque  tons  les  journaux  alle- 
mands,  malgre  nos  dementis,  repandent  avec 
zele  par  Fintermediaire  de  certains  jOurnaux^et 


N«  5 

M.  JoQ.  M.  JoQanovitchy  ministre  a  Vienne^ 
a  M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  da  Conseil  et 
ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  17/30  juin  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 
Gomme  le  comte  Berchtold  n'a  i)u  me  rece- 
voir,  j'ai  eu,  sur  Fattcntatdc  Serajevo,  un  entre- 


6  PAGES  D^HISTOIRE 

tien  avec  le  premier  chef  de  section  du  minis- 
tere  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  Au  cours  de  notre 
conversation,  je  luiai  diten  resume  ceci  : 

«  Le  Gouverncment  Royal  reprouve  de.  la 
maniere  la  plus  energique  I'attentat  de  Serajevo 
et  de  son  cote  fera,  certainement  et  le  x:>lus  loya- 
lement,  tout  pour  prouver  que  sur  son  territoire 
il  ne  souffrira  aucune  agitation  ou  entreprisc 
passible  d'une  j)eine  et  pouvant  nuire  a  nos 
relations  deja  si  delicates  avec  TAutriche-Hon- 
grie.  Jepense  que  le  Gouverncment  de  Belgrade 
esti^ret  a  mettre  en  jugement  les  complices,  s'il 
est  prouve  qu'il  y  en  ait  en  Serbie,  en  depit  de 
tons  les  obstacles  qu'y  a  aj^portes  la  diplomatic 
austro-hongroise  (creation  d'une  Albanie  inde- 
pendante,  opposition  a  une  sortie  libre  du 
Royaume  serbe  sur  I'Adriatique,  demande  de 
revision  du  traite  de  Bucarest,  ultimatum  du 
mois  de  septembre,  etc.),  le  Gouvernement 
serbe  a  persiste  dans  son  desir  de  retablir 
sur  des  bases  solides  nos  relations  de  voisinage. 
Vous  savez  que  dans  cette  voie  quelque  chose  a 
ete  fait  et  obtenu.  La  Serbie  veut  poursuivre  cet 
effort,  convaincue  qu'il  peut  et  doit  etre  con- 
tinue. L'attentat  de  Serajevo  ne  doit  pas  et  ne 
peut  pas  entraver  cette  tache.  » 

Le  baron  Macchio  a  pris  note  en  se  chargeant 
de  communiquer  au  comte  Berchtold  tout  ce  que 
je  lui  ai  dit.  Le  m^me  jour,  j'ai  communique  le 
fond  de  mon  entretien  aux  ambassadeurs  de 
France  et  de  Russie. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  7 

N"  6. 

M.  M.  Georgevitch,  charge  d'affaires  a  Cons- 
tantinoplBy  a  M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du 
Conseil  et  ministre  des  Affaires  itrangeres. 

Constantinople,  le  17/30  juin  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

J'ai  eu  aujourd'hui,  a  pivjpos  de  I'attentat  de 
Serajevo,  une  assez  longue  conversation  avec 
Tambassadeur  d'Autriche-Hongrie.  J'ai  exprime 
I'espoir  que  ce  triste  evenement,  quoi  qu'on  en 
dise  dans  certains  cei^cles  diplomatiques,  ne  nui- 
rait  pas  aux  relations  entrc  la  Serbie  et  I'Au- 
trich6-Hongrie,  considerablement  ameliorees  dans 
ces  derniers  temps. 

II  m'a  repondu  qu'il  ne  faut  pas  m€me  avoir 
de  crainte  a  ce  sujet.  II  tix)uve,  lui  aussi,  que  les 
rapports  entre  la  Serbie  et  I'Autriche-Hongrie 
sont  devenus  bien  meilleurs  ces  derniers  temps. 
II  a  ajoute  qu'il  faut  continuer  dans  cette  yoie.  II 
m'a  dit  que  ses  derniers  entretiens  avec  le  comte 
Berchtold  I'avaient  convaincu  que  celui-ci  etait 
content  de  Tattitudc  du  Gouvernement  serbe  et 
que,  pour  sa  part,  il  desire  sincerement  les  rela- 
tions amicales  avec  la  Serbie. 

Veuillez,  etc. 

NO  7 

M.  M.  S.  Bochkovltch^  ministre  h  Londres,  h 
M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  stranger es. 

(Teiegramme.)  Londres,  le  18  juin/l"  juillet  1914. 

Pi*esque  tous  les  journaux  anglais  annoncent, 


8  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

d'apres  les  sources  autrichiennes,  que  Tattentat 
de  Serajevo  est  I'oeuvre  des  revolutionnaires 
serbes. 


N*^  8 

M.  N.  Pachitch^  president  du  Conseily  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangereSy  a  touies  les  Legations 
Roy  ales. 

Belgrade,  le  18  juin/1"  juillet  1914. 

La  presse  austro-hongroise  accuse  de  plus  en 
plus  la  Serbie  de  Tattentat  de  Serajevo.  Le  but 
est  evident :  ruiner  le  grand  credit  moral  dont  la 
Serbie  jouit  aujourd'hui  en  Europe  et  exploiter 
politiquement  contre  la  Serbie  la  folle  entreprise 
d'un  jeune  fan^^tique  exalte.  Gependant  I'attentat 
de  Serajevo  a  rencontre  en  Serbie  la  reprobation 
la  plus  severe  dans  toutes  les  classes  sociales; 
dans  les  cercles  officiels  et  non  officiels,  tous  ont 
immediatement  compris  que  cet  evenement 
aurait  la  repercussion  la  plus  d^favorable  sur 
nos  relations  de  bon  voisinage  et  sur  la  vie  des 
Serbes  d'Autriche-Hongrie,  ce  que  les  derniers 
evenements  ont  confirme.  Au  moment  ou  la  Ser- 
bie fait  tout  pour  que  le»  relations  avec  la  Mo- 
narchic voisine  deviennent  meilleures  et  de  plus 
en  plus  amicales,  il  serait  absurde  de  penser 
qu'elle  aurait  pu,  soit  directement  soit  indirecte- 
ment,  insj)irer  depareils  actes.  Tout  au  contraire, 
il  etait  dans  I'interet  vital  de  la  Serbie  elle-meme 
que  ce  crime  fut  evite.  Par  malheur,  cela  n'etait 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  9 

pas  en  son  pouvoir,  les  deux  auteurs  de  Tattentat 
etant  sujets  autrichiens.  La  Serbie  a  toujours 
veille,  et  depuis  les  derniers  evenements  elle  re- 
doublera  de  vigilance,  sur  les  elements  anar- 
chistes;  si  elle  en  decouvre  en  Serbie,  elle  pren- 
dra  contre  eux,  avec  energie,  les  mesures  les 
plus  severes.  De-plus,  elle  fera  tout  son  devoir, 
et  par  tous  les  moyens  en  son  pouvoir,  pour  cal- 
mer, a  I'interieur  de  ses  fronti^res,  les  esprits 
exaltes.  Seulement,  elle  ne  peut  nullement  per- 
mettre  que  la  presse  austro-hongroise  induise 
en  erreur  I'opinion  publique  en  Europe  et  que, 
dans  un  but  purement  politique,  elle  fasse  re- 
tomber  la  lourde  responsabilite  du  crime  d'un 
sujet  autricbien  sur  la  Serbie  et  tout  le  peuple 
serbe,  auxquels  de  pareils  actes  ne  peuvent  cau- 
ser que  des  dommages  sans  leur  apporter  aucun 
profit. 

Je  vous  prie  d'agir,  en  cet  esprit,  par  tous  les 
moyens  propices,  pour  mettre  fin  le  plus  tot  pos- 
sible a  la  campagne  antiserbe  de'vant  Topinion 
publique  euroioeenne. 


N°9 

M.  Joi>.  M.  JoQanovitch,  ministre  a  Vienney  a 
M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.)  Vienne,  le  18  juin/1"  juillet  1914. 

Des  demonstrations  ont  eu  lieu  bier  soir  devant 
la  Legation.  Je  peux  dire  que  la  police  s'est  mon- 


10  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

tr^e  energique.  L*ordre  et  la  tranquillity  ont  ^16 
maintenus.  Si  j'apx^renais  que  le  drapeau  national 
ait  et6  brftle,  je  ferais  une  d-marche  aupr^s  de 
qui  de  droit  et  vous  informerais  du  resultat.  Ge 
sont  surtout  les  cercles  cathoKques  inferieurs,  la 
presse  et  les  cercles  militaires  qui  pr6chent  la 
haine  centre  les  Serbes  etla  Serbie.  Je  vous  prie 
de  faire  le  necessaire  pour  que  les  demonstrations 
soient  evitees  chcz  nous  et  pour  que  le  ton  de  la 
presse  de  Belgrade  soit  mesurt^  autant  que  pos- 
sible. Les  dispositions  centre  nous  reslent  ici  les 
jnSmes.  Oncroit  que  I'attitude  k  prendre,  vis-a-vis 
de  la  Serbie  et  des  Serbes,  sera  decid^e  apres  les 
funerailles  de  FArchiduc. 


N°  10 


M.  le  D^  M.  R.  Vesnitchy  ministre  d  Paris,  A 
M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi' 
nistre  des  Affaires  e tr anger es. 

(Telegramme.)  Paris,  le  19  juin/2  juillet  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  frangais  nous  conseille  d'ob- 
server  le  plus  grand  sang-froid  et  le  recueiile- 
ment  aussi  bien  dans  nos  cercles  officiels  que 
dansropinion  publique. 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  11 

N«  11 

M.  JoQ.  M.  JoQanovitchy  ministre  a  Vienne^  a 
M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Viennc,  le  20  juin/3  juillet  1014. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

Hier,  jour  du  transfert  des  deponilles  mor- 
telles  de  rarchiduc  Francois-Ferdinand  et  de  sa 
femme,  de  Serajevo,  j'ai  fait  hisser  et  mettre  6n 
heme,  a  mon  domicile,  le  drapeau  national. 

Get  evenement  a  donne  lieu  nier  soir  aux  pro- 
testations du  concierge,  des  locataires,  du  gerant 
et  du  proprietaire  meme  de  Timmeuble,  qui  exi- 
gerent  qu'on  enlevdt  le  drapeau.  Les  explications 
n'ayant  servi  a  rien,  on  a  requis  le  concours  de 
la  police  qui  a  demande,  non  officiellement,  I'en- 
l^vement  du  drai)eau  pour  eviter  les  desordres. 
Le  drapeau  a  ete  maintenu ,  et  ce  fait  a  provoque 
hier  soir  des  demonstrations  vehementes  devant 
la  Legation.  La  police  fut  energique  et  aucune 
atteinte  ne  fut  portee  ni  au  bdtiment,  ni  au  dra- 
peau. Vers  2  heures  du  matin,  les  manifes- 
tants  furent  re^Dousses  de  mon  domicile.  Les  jour- 
naux  d'aujourd'hui,  surtout  ceux  de  la  nuance 
clerico-populaire,  ont  public  des  articles  sous  le 
litre  :  «  Los  provocations  du  ministre  de  Ser- 
bie  »  en  representant  d'une  fagon  infidele  toute 
cette  affaire. 

Le  drapeau  est  reste  hisse  sur  I'immeuble  de 
la  Legation  jusqu'a  la  fin  de  la  messe  funebre 
celebree,  dans  I'eglise  de  la  Cour,  pour  les  de- 
funts,  puis  il  a  ete  retire. 


IJ^  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

lous  les  habitants  du  quartier  que  j'habite 
sont  alles  a  la  police,  a  THotel  de  Ville,  a  la  pre- 
sidence  du  Gonseil  des  ministres,  pour  reclaimer 
renlevement  de  notre  drapeau. 

Les  manifestants  furent  harangues  ^par  le  doc- 
teur  Funder,  le  directcur  principal  du  journal 
catholique  Reichspost,  Hermengild  Wagner  et 
Leopold  Mandl,  qui  sont  connus  comme  les  prin- 
cijDaux  instigateurs  de  la  campagne  dirigee  dans 
la  presse  autrichienne  et  allemande  contre  la 
Serbie  et  les  Serbes. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


N<»  12 

M,  Jov.  M.  Jopano(fitch,  ministre  a   Vienne,  a 
.    M.  N.  Pachitchy  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres, 

Vienne,  le  20  juin/3  juillet  1914. 
Monsieur  le  President, 

Dans  la  conversation  que  j'ai  eue  a  projDos  de 
I'attentat  de  Serajevo  avec  le  premier  chef  de 
section  au  ministere  des  Afiaires  etrangeres,  le 
baron  Macchio  a  attaque  tres  vivement  la  presse 
de  Belgrade.  11  a  cite  des  exemples  afm  de  prou- 
ver  qu'elle  etait  efTrene'e  et  qu'elle  faisait  die 
Ileizercien  gegen  die  Monarchie  (des  excitations 
contre  la  Monarchie).  Je  lui  ai  dit  que  la  presse 
etait  chez  nous  completement  libre  et  que  les 
particuliers  et  le  Gouvernement  en  sou  (Trent  sou- 
vent,  mais  que  nous  n'avions  d'autres  moyens 
contre  elle  que  le  recours  aux  tribunaux.  J'ai 
ajoute  que,  dans  le  cas  present,  la  presse  autri- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  13 

cliienne  et  hongroise,  que  le  Gouvernement  com- 
mun  tenait  entre  ses  mains,  avait  commence  : 
n'est-ce  j)sis  la  presse  autrichienne  et  hongroise 
qui,  depuis  presque  deux  ans,  administre  des 
coups  aux  Serbes  et  a  la  Serbie,  en  touchant  les 
points  les  plus  sensibles?  Ges  jours-ci,  il  y  avait 
juste  un  an  depuis  la  malheureuse  guerre  avec 
les  Bulgares.  J'ai  ete  temoin  du  manque  de  res- 
pect avec  lequel  la  presse  de  Vienne  avait  traite 
la  Serbie  et  son  armee  pendant  et  apres  la  cam- 
j)agne,  i^uis  dans  beau  coup  d'autres  questions. 
La  presse  de  Belgrade  a  ete  beaucoup  plus 
moderee.  Aujourd'hui  aussi,  apres  cet  horrible 
crime,  c'est  d'ici  qu'on  envoie  dans  le  monde  des 
telegrammes  accusant  tout  le  peuple  serbe  et  la 
Serbie  comme  s'ils  avaient  ete  meles  a  I'odieux 
attentat  de  Serajevo.  Tons  les  journaux  de  la 
Monarchie  ^crivent  en  ce  sens.  Peut-on  rester 
indifferent  devant  tout  cela  ?  Si  I'auteur  de  I'at- 
tentat  est  de  race  serbe,  tout  le  peuple  serbe  et 
le  royaume  de  Serbie  n'en  sont  pas  coupables,  et 
on  ne  pent  pas  les  en  accuser  comme  on  le  fait  a 
present 

Le  baron  Macchio  m'a  r^pondu  : 

—  Personne  n'accuse  le  Royaume,  ni  le  Gou- 
vernement  serbe,  ni  tout  le  peuple  serbe.  Nous 
accusons  seulement .  ceux  qui  entretiennent  les 
projets  panserbes  et  qui  travaillent  a  leur  reali- 
sation... 

—  II  m'a  paru  des  le  premier  moment,  lui 
r^pondis-je,  qu'on  insistait  sur  la  rac^  de  I'auteur 
pour  le  rattacher  a  Belgrade  et  provoquer  Tim- 
pression  que  le  crime  avait  ete  prepare  en  Ser- 
bie. Geci  m'a  frappe  de  suite,  car  je  savais  que 
jusqu'a  present  on  appelait  les  Serbes  en  Bosnie 


14  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

die  Bosniaken  (les  Bosniaques),  et  que  Ton  disait 
bosnische  Sprache  (la  laiigue  bosniaque),  die 
Orthodoxen  aiis  Bosnien  (les  prthodoxes  de  Bos- 
nie) ;  maintcnant  on  dit  que  I'auteur  de  rattentat 
est  ein  Serbe  (un  Serbe),  mais  sans  ajouter  qu'il 
etait  de  Bosnia  et  sujet  autrichien... 

—  Je  vous  repete,  reprit  le  baron  Macchio, 
que  nous  n'accusons  ni  le  Gcuvernement  serbe, 
ni  le  ]3euple  serbe,  mais  certains  agilateurs... 

Je  I'ai  prie  d'agir  sur  la  presse  de  Yienne,  afni 
qu'en  ces  heures  difficilcs  oii  Ton  met  a  serieuse 
epreuve  les  relations  entre  la  Scrbie  et  I'Au- 
triche-IIongrie,  elle  n'aggrave  pas  cette  crise  i)ar 
de  telles  accusations. 

Vcuillez,  etc, 

N*>  13 

M.  le  D^  M.  R.  Vesnitchy  ministre  a  Paris,  a 
M.  N.  Pachitchy  president  dii  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Paris,  le  21  juin/4  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

J'ai  eu,  mercredi,  a  pix)pos  de  I'attentat  de  Sera- 
jevo,  un  assez  long  entretien  avec  le  nouveau 
ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres,  M.  Yiviani,  que 
cet  evenement  a  rendu  passablement  inquiet. 
J'ai  profite  de  cette  occasion  pour  lui  exposer  a 
grands  traits  les  causes  qui  ont  provoque  cet 
attentat,  a  savoir,  en  premier  lieu,  I'intolerable 
systeme  de  gouvernement  dans  les  provinces 
annexees,  surtout  I'attitude  des  organes  officiels 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  15 

et  toute  la  politique  du  Gouvernement  bosniaque 
vis-a-vis  de  tout  ce  qui  touche  a  la  religion  ortho- 
doxe.  II  a  compris  la  situation;  cependant  il  a 
exprimc  le  desir  et  I'espoir  que  le  sang-froid  et 
la  dignity  seront  gardes  chez  nous,  afin  de  ne 
pas  donner  des  motifs  j)Our  de  nouvelles  accusa- 
tions de  Vienne. 

Apres  la  premiere  emotion,  Topinion  publique 
frangaise  s'est  ressaisie  a  tel  point  que  le  presi- 
dent du  Conseil  lui-mdme  a  juge  convenable 
d'adoucir  au  Palais-Bourbon  les  termes  de  la 
declaration  qu'ii  propos  de  cct  evidnement,  11 
avail  faite  anterieurement  au  Senat. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


N*  14 


M.  leD"  M.  Spalaikovitch,  ministre  a  Petrogrady 
a  M^  N,  Pachitcky  president  da  Conseil^  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(T616gramme.)        Petrograd,  le  21  juin/4  juiUet  1914. 

Le  ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  m'a  dit  que 
les  cruautes  commises  sur  les  Serbes  en  Bosnie 
accroitront  les  sympathies  de  I'Europe  pour  nous. 
II  croit  que  le  monde  ne  pretera  pas  foi  aux  accu- 
sations lancdes  de  Vienne  centre  nous.  II  est 
essentiel  que  Topinion  publique  en  Serbie  reste 
calme. 


16  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

NO  15 

M.  Jov.  Jomnooitch,  ministre  a  Vienne,  a 
M,  N.  Pachitch,  president  dii  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(T61egramme.)  Vienne,  le  23  juin/6  jiiillet  lOli. 

Kemotion  dans  les  cercles  militaires  et  gouvcr- 
nementaux  contre  la  Serbie  augmente  sans  cesse, 
par  suite  des  articles  de  nos  journaux  que  la  Lega- 
tion austro-hongroise  a  Belgrade  exploite  avee 
zele. 


N^  16 

M.  JoQ.  JovanoQitch,  ministre  a  Vienne,  a 
M.  N.  Pachitchy  president  dii  Conseil ^  mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  23  juin/6  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

La  tendance  generale  des  journaux  de  Vienne 
au  sujet  de  I'attentat  est  la  suivante  : 

Des  le  diraanche  i5  juin,  dans  Tapres-midi, 
les  editions  speciales  des  journaux  annon^aient 
en  gros  caracteres  que  les  deux  auteurs  de  I'at- 
tentat etaient  des  Serbes,  de  fagon  a  faire  croire 
qu'il  s'agissait  de  Serbes  de  Serbie.  Dans  les 
comptes  rendus  publics  plus  tard,  on  remarque 
la  tendance  constante  d'etablir  un  lien  entre  cet 
evenement  et  la  Serbie,  en  insistant  particuliere- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOIVIATIQUES  17 

inent  sur  deux  circonstances  qui  semblaient  prou- 
ver  que  les  origines  de  Tattentat  devraient  etre 
recherchecs  a  Belgrade  :  i^  le  sejour  de  deux  au- 
teurs  de  rattentat  a  Belgrade  et  i"  I'origine  des 
hombes.  Goinme  troisieme  et  derniere  de  leurs 
preuves,  les  journaux  d'ici  out  commence  a  pu- 
blier  les  dires  des  auteurs  de  Tattentat  a  Tins- 
truction.  II  est  caracteristique  que  ces  cc  dires  » 
n'ont  dte  connus  que  par  le  Bureau  hongrois  de 
correspondance  et  les  journaux,  magyars,  surtout 
le  journal  Az  Est.  Ces  dires  se  resument  a  ceci  : 
V  qu'il  est  prouve  que  les  auteurs  de  I'attentat 
avaient  frequents  a  Belgrade  le  comitadji  Michel 
Giganovitcb  et  2®  que  I'organisateur  et  I'instiga- 
teur  de  I'attentat  avait  ete  le  commandant  Pri- 
bitchevitch. 

En  meme  temps,  une  nouvelle  tendance  de  faire 
retomber  la  responsabilite  sur  I'association  «  Na- 
rodna  Odbrana  »  (la  Defense  nationale)  com- 
mencait  a  se  faire  jour,  de  sorte  que  le  dernier 
communique  du  Bureau  hongrois  de  correspon- 
dance aux  journaux,  vendredi  dernier,  a  ete 
eongu  dans  ces  termes  : 

<k  L'instruction  poursuivie  jusqu'ici  a  demon- 
tre,  d'une  fagon  qui  exclut  le  moindre  doute,  que 
€et  attentat  etait  le  r^sultat  d'un  complot.  En 
dehors  de  deux  auteurs  de  I'attentat,  on  a  arr^te 
un  certain  nombre  de  personnes,  pour  la  pluj)art 
des  jeunes  gens;  d'apr^s  ce  qui  est  demontre,  ils 
avaient  ete,  comme  les  auteurs  de  I'attentat,  en- 
gages par  laK<  Narodna  Odbrana  »  de  Belgrade 
pour  commettre  le  crime  et  c'etait  a  Belgrade 
qu'on  leur  avait  remis  les  bombes  et  les  revol- 
vers. » 

Le  nieme  jour,  tard  dans  la  nuit,  le  meme  Bu- 


18  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

reau  avait  adresse  aux  journaux  la  demande  sui- 
vante  :  -«  Nous  prions  I'lioiiorable  redaction  de 
ne  pas  publier  la  nouvelle  au  sujet  de  Tattentat 
de  Serajevo,  inseree  dans  notre  edition  de  ce 
soir.  » 

En  meme  temj)s,  le  Bureau  de  corr^spondance 
de  Vienne  a  public  le  communique  suivant  : 

«  On  affirme  en  lieu  competent  que  Tinstruc- 
tion  au  sujet  de  I'attentat  se  poursuit  dans  le 
plus  grand  secret.  Tons  les  details  publics  la- 
dessus  doivent  etre  acceptes  sous  reserves.  » 

Neanmoins,  on  ne  cessait  pas  de  publier  a 
Budapest  les  pretendus  comptes  rendu?  de  Tins- 
truction.  Dans  le  dernier  compte  rendu  publie 
par  le  journal  A  Nap  et  rex>roduit  par  les  jour- 
naux viennois  d'hier,  la  tendance  a  faire  retom- 
ber  la  responsabilite  de  I'attentat  sur  la  (c  Na- 
rodna  Odbrana  »  est  encore  plus  accentu^e  :  on 
pretend  que  I'accuse  Cabrinovitch  aurait  designe 
le  general  Jankovitch  comme  le  principal  insti- 
gateur. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


P^o  ^7 


31.  Jov.  M.  JomnoQitchy  ministre  a  Vienney  a 
M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  4trangeres. 

Vienne,  le  24  juin/7  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 
Keraotion  produite  par  I'attentat  de  Serajevo 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  19 

subsiste  toujours  dans  les  cerclcs  comxoetenls. 
Bien  que  TEmpereur  ait  adresse  aux  presidents 
des  Conseils  autrichien  et  hongrois  et  au  ministre 
commun  des  Finances,  M.  Bilinski,  une  lettre 
qui  invite  au  calmc,  on  ne  iieut  tout  de  memc 
pas  preciser  quelle  attitude  le  Gouvernement 
commun  prendra  a  notre  egard.  Pour  cux,  une 
chose  est  claire  :  avec  ou  sans  preuve  que  I'at- 
tentat  ait  ete  inspire  a  Belgrade,  ils  doivent  re- 
gler  une  fois  pour  toutes  la  question  des  soi- 
disant  agitations  panserbes  dans  les  limites  de  la 
Monarchie  des  Habsbourg.  II  n'est  -psLS  encore 
decide  de  quelle  fagon  ils  procederont  et  quels 
moyens  ils  emploieront  jjour  atteindre  leur  but; 
on  en  delibere,  surtout  dans  les  hautes  spheres 
catholiqucs  et  militaires.  La  decision  ne  sera 
X)rise  certainement  qu'apres  qu'on  aura  appris 
cc  que  les  juges  d'instruction  auront  trouve  a 
Scrajevo.  G'est  d'apres  ce  qu'on  aura  trouve  que 
la  decision  sera  prise. 

A  cet  egard,  TAutrichc-Hongrie  aura  a  choisir 
entre  deux  solutions  :  ou  considerer  le  crime  de 
Serajevocomme  un  m.alhcur  national,  mais  aussi 
comme  un  acte  criminel  qui  doit  etre  juge  sui- 
vant  les  preuves  etablies,  en  demandant  a  la 
Serbie  de  lui  j)i'eter  aide  dans  cette  tacbe,  afm 
que  les  coupables  ne  puissent  pas  se  soustraire  a 
la  condamnation  la  plus  severe;  ou  faire  de  I'at- 
tentat  de  Serajevo  un  complot  panserbe,  jougo- 
slave,  panslavc,  avec  toutes  Ires  manifestations  de 
la  haine  envers  le  monde  slave,  haine  jusqu'ici 
dissimulee.  II  y  a  plusieurs  signes  qu'on  pousse 
les  cercles  competents  vers  cette  seconde  solution, 
et  c'est  pour  cela  qu'il  faut  etre  pret  pour  la  de- 
fense.   Au   cas  oil    la  premiere   solution   serait 


20  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

adoptee,  ce  qui  serait  un  signe  de  grande  sagesse^ 
il  nous  faudrait  nous  y  raUier  completement. 
Veuillez,  etc. 


NO  18 


M.  "N.  Pachitch,  president  dii  Conseil  et  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres,  a  toiites  les  Legations 
toy  ales, 

(Telegramme.)  Belgrade,  le  26  juin/9  juillet  1914. 

Presque  tous  les  jours,  le  Prince-heritier  re^oit 
d' Autriche  -  Hongrie  des  lettres  de  menace  de 
mort.  Mettez  au  courant  de  ce  fait  dans  vos  con- 
versations vos  collogues  et  les  journalistes. 


N°^19 


M.  le  D*  M.  Jovanovitchy  charge  d'affaires  a 
Berlin^  a  M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil 
et  ministre , des  Affaires  etrang^res. 

(Telegramme.)  Berlin,  le  1«V16  juillet  1914. 

Le  secretaire  d'Etat  a  declare  qu'il  ne  compre- 
nait  pas  I'attitude  provocante  de  la  presse  serbe 
et  ses  attaques  contre  rAutriche-Hpngrie,  que 
celle-ci,  comme  grand©  puissance,  ne  peut  sup* 
porter; 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  21 

M.  N.  Paehitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangereSj  a  toutes  les  Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.)  Belgrade,  le  1""-/14  juillet  1914. 

I*  Le  Gorrespondenz  Bureau  imperial  et  royal 
alarme  roj)iiiioii  europeenne  dans  im  but  spe- 
cial. II  ne  represente  pas  Fattitude  de  la  press« 
de  Belgrade  d'une  fayon  exacte  et  vraie.  II  clioi- 
sit  a  dessein  les  expressions  les  j)lus  fortes  dans 
les  articles  des  journanx  qui  publient  des  re- 
ponses  aux  injures,  aux  menaces  et  aux  men- 
songes  tendancieux,  et  les  sert  au  public  en  Au- 
triche-Hongrie ; 

a""  Le  Gorrespondenz  Bureau  cite  surtout  les 
extraits  des  journaux,  qui  ne  sont  les  organes  ni 
des  partis,  ni  des  corporations; 

3*^  L'Autricbe-Hongrie  a  interdit,  depuis  I'an- 
nexion  bosniaque,  Timporlation  sur  son  terri- 
toirc  des  organes  de  nos  partis  ainsi  que  de  tous 
les  autres  journaux  paraissant  en  Serbie,  de 
sorte  que  ceux-ci  ne  pourraient  jDas  exciter  Topx- 
nion  publiqueen  Autriche-Hongrieet  en  Europe, 
si  le  Gorrespondenz  Bureau  ne  faisait  pas  ressor- 
tir  et  repandre  les  nouvelles  dont  il  fait  choix 
dans  les  differents  journaux  en  aggravant  leur 
contenu.  II  y  a  six  jours,  VOd/ek,  organe  du 
parti  radical  independant,  a  et6  frappe  d'inter- 
diction;  maintenant  aucun  journal  serbe  nepeut 
passer  en  Autz-iclie-Hongrie ; 

4^  La  presse  est  completement  libra  chez  nous; 


22  PAGES  d'histoire 

les  journaux  ne  peuvcnt  ^tre  confisques  que  pour 
le  crime  de  lese-majeste  ou  Lieu  au  cas  d'une 
excitation  a  la  revolution.  Iln'existe  aucune  cen- 
sure preventive. 

En  cetetat  de  choses,  expliquez  a  qui  de  droit, 
rien  qu'^a  titre  de  renseignement,  que  nous  ne 
possedons  aucun  moyen  constitutionnel  ou  legal 
de  changer  la  maniere  d'ecrire  de  nos  journaux, 
Cependant  si  Ton  compare  la  maniere  d'ecrire  des 
journaux  serbes  avec  celle  des  journaux  d'Au- 
tricbe-IIongrie,  on  voit  clairement  que  ce  sont 
ces  derniers  qui  commencent  la  polemique  et  que 
nos  journaux  ne  font  que  riposter.  Insistez  de 
meme  sur  le  fait  que  I'opinion  publique  chez 
nous  est  relativement  calme  et  que,  de  notre 
cote,  personne  ne  desire  provoquer  ou  blesser 
I'Autriche-Hongrie.  De  ce  que  nos  journaux. pu- 
blient,  personne  en  Europe  n'en  saurait  rien, 
si  le  Correspondenz  Bureau  do  Vienne  ne  le  re- 
pandaitdans  le  setil  but  de  nuire  a  la  Serbie. 


N°  2X 


M.  N.  Pachitchf  president  da  Conseil  et  minis' 
tre  des  Affaires  etrangereSy  a  toutes  les  Lega- 
tions royales. 

(Telegramme.)  Belgrade,  le  1"/14  juillet  1914. 

Les  journaux  austro-hongrois  ont  repanduces 
derniers  jours  le  bruit  que  des  demonstrations 
contra  la  legation  d'Autriche-Hongrie  auraient 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  23 

lieu  a  Belgrade,  que  certains  correspondants  des 
journaux  austro-hongrois  auraientete  assassines, 
que  les  sujets  austro-hongrois  sent  maltraites  et 
qu'ils  soiit  pris  de  panique,  que  les  etudiants 
serbes  ont  manifeste  contre  le  ministre  d'Autri- 
che-Hongrie  lors  des  funerailles  de  feu  Hartwig, 
ministre  de  Russie,  etc...  Toutes  ces  nouvelles 
sont  absolument  fausses  et  inventees.  La  tran- 
quillite  absolue  regne  a  Belgrade ;  aucune  de- 
monstration n'a  eu  lieu  cette  annee;  personne 
n'a  eu  I'intention  de  provoquer  des  desordres. 
Ce  n'est  pas  seulement  le  ministre  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie  et  ses  fonctionnaires  qui  se  promenent 
librement  en  ville ;  mais  encore  aucune  injure, 
soit  par  des  actes  soit  par  des  paroles,  n'a  ete 
faite  a  aucun  sujet  austro-hongrois,  comme 
les  journdux  de  Vienne  le  pretendent,  de  meme 
qu'aucun  n'a  vu  sa  maison  attaquee  ni  ses 
fenetres  brisees;  aucun  sujet  austro  hongrois 
n'a  eu  des  motifs  pour  exprimer  la  moindre 
plainte.  Toutes  ces  fausses  nouvelles  ne  sont  re- 
pandues  que  dans  le  but  d'emouvoir  et  d'aigrir 
Topinion  publique  en  Autriche-Hongrie  contre 
la  Serbie. 

Toute  la  population  de  Belgrade  a  pris  part 
aux  obseques  de  M.  Hartwig,  tout  le  corps  diplo- 
matique y  assistait,  et  aucune  manifestation  con- 
tre qui  que  ce  soit  Ji'a  ete  signalee.  Toute  la  cere- 
monie  s'est  passee  dans  un  ordre  exemplaire,  de 
sorte  que  les  etrangers  en  furent  surpris.  Je  vous 
prie  de  porter  ces  renseignements  a  la  connais- 
sance  du  Gouvernement  et  de  la  presse. 


Si  PAGES  lyHISTOmE 

M.  Jo^.  M.  Jovanovitch,  ministre  a  Vienney  a 
M.  N.  Pachitchy  president  du  Gonseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

yienne,le  X-'/U  juillQt  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

C'est  le  Bureau  de  la  presse  du  imuistere  des 
Affaires  etrangeres  qui,  cette  fois  encore,  a  dirige 
Fopinion  publique  contre  nous.  Sauf  la  Z^i7  et 
VArbeiter  Zeitung jtous  les  journauxauslro-bon- 
grois  ont  etc  renseignes  et  diriges  par  lui  potir 
leurs  articles  sur  I'attentat  de  Serajevo.  Vous 
avez  vu  quels  furent  ces  renseignements  et  le  ton 
de  leurs  articles. 

Je  tiens  d'une  source  siire  que  les  cercles  offi^ 
ciels  allemands  d'ici  sont  les  plus  hostiles  contre 
nous.  Ces  cercles  ont  exerce  une  certaino  in- 
fluence sur  la  fagon  d'ecrire  des  journaux  de 
Vienne,  particulierement  sur  celle  de  la  Nou- 
pelle  Presse  Libre. 

Ce  journal  esttoujours  anim^  d'un  esprit  anti- 
serbe  a  outrance.  La  NouQelle  Presse  Libre  qui 
a  assez  de  lecteurs  et  d'amis  dans  les  hauts  cer- 
cles financiers  et  qui,  lorsqu'il  le  faut,.  ecrit  sui- 
vant  les  instructions  du  Bureau  de  la  presse 
de  Vienne,  resume  Taffaire  en  quelques  mots  ; 
«  Nous  devons  regler  nos  affaires  avec  la  Serbie 
par  la  force  des  armes ;  il  est  Evident  qu'il  n'est 
pas  possible  d'y  arriver  par  des  mojens  pacifi- 
ques.  Et  puisqu'on  arrivera  a  la  guerre  plus  tard, 
il  vaut  mieux  en  finir  tout  de  suite!  » 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  ^5 

La  Bourse  est  tres  mauvaise.  Une  pareille 
baisse  n'a  pas  eu  lieu  depuislongtemps.  Certains 
papiers  ont  baisse  de  4^  couronnes. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


N**  23 


M,  Jov.  M.  JopanoQitch,  ministre  a  Vienney 
a  M.  iV.  Pachitchy  president  du  Conseil  et 
ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Viennci  le  2/15  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

La  chose  qui  doit  le  plus  nous  interesser,  c'est 
le  geste  que  le  Gouvemement  austro-hongrois  a 
Tintention  de  faire  a  propos  de  I'attentat  de  Sera- 
jevo.  Jusqu'k  present,  je  n'ai  pas  pu  me  rensei- 
gner  a  ce  sujet ;  mes  collegues  non  plus.  La  devise 
est  ici  maintenant  ;  «  Ne  rien  communiquer  a 
per  Sonne.  » 

Gne  reunion  des  minis  tres  communs  a  eu  lieu 
la  semaine  derniere  a  Vienne.  On  n'a  pas  appxns 
beaucoup  de  choses  sur  les  deliberations  et  les 
resultats  de  ce  con^eiL  Le  communique  en  fut 
court  et  peu  clair.  11  semble  qu*on  y  a  discute 
longuement  sur  les  consequences  de  I'attentat  de 
Serajevo,  mais  qu'aucune  decision  n'a  ete  prise. 
On  n'est  pais  sur  que  le  chef  d'^tat-major  gene- 
ral et  le  chef  de  la  marine  aient  assiste  k  cetta 
seance,  comme  on  I'avait  dit.  Apres  cette  seance, 
le  comte  Berchtold  est  alle  a  Ischl  pour  eji 
rendre  compte  k  I'Empereur  qui  y  ^tait  reparti 


26  PAGES  d'histoire 

apres  les  funerailles  de  Francois-Ferdinand,  dans 
un  etat  de  sante  et  d'esprit  loarfait.  An  Parle- 
ment  de  Hongrie,  Tisza  a  repondu  aux  interpel- 
lations de  I'opposition  sur  I'evenement  de  Sera- 
jevo;  voiis  savez  ce  qu'il  a  dit.  Son  discours 
n'etait  pas  clair;  je  pense  qu'il  n'etait  pas  clair  a 
dessein.  D'aucuns  y  ont  vu  un  ton  rassurant 
pour  le  developpement  des  choses  et  pour  I'atti- 
tude  du  Gouvernement  austro-hong-rois,  et  d'au- 
cuns, les  intentions  dissimulees  pour — dirai-je  — 
une  action  encore  non  decidee.  On  s'est  aper^u 
qu'il  ne  fall  ait  point  s'a  venturer  avant  de  con- 
naitre  les  resultats  de  I'instruction.  Apres  cela, 
un  certain  temps  se  i)assa;  on  jDarla,  on  discuta, 
on  ecrivit,  on  inventa,  puis  survinrentla  mort  de 
Hartwig  et  I'alarme  du  baron  Giesl.  A  ce  propos, 
de  nouvelles  interpellations  furent  adressees  au 
comte  Tisza  au  Parlement  hongrois;  vous  avcz  lu 
sa  seconde  reponse  egalement.  Plusieurs  per- 
sonnes  trouvent  ici  que  ce  discours  est  beaucoup 
plus  rassurant  que  le  premier  et  qu'il  est  du  a  la 
lettre  de  I'EmjDereur.  La  Bourse  est  meilleure 
maintenant ;  les  deux  ministres  de  la  Guerre  et 
le  chef  d'etat  -  major  general  sont  partis  en 
conge.  Je  m'abstiens  de  toutc  appreciation.  Ce 
qui  frappe  dans  ce  dernier  discours,  c'est  que 
I'hypothese  d'une  guerre  n'est  pas  cxclue,  au  cas 
ou  les  reclamations  austro-liongroises  au  sujet 
des  consequences  de  I'attentat  de  Serajevo  n'ob- 
tiendraient  pas  satisfaction. 

Une  chose  est  d'ores  et  deja  siire  :  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  fera  des  demarches  diplomatiques  a 
Belgrade  aussitot  que  Tinstruction  aura  ete  close 
^Serajevo,  et  I'affaire  presentee  au  tribunal. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  27 

N1  24 

M.  Jov.  M.  Jovanontch,  ministre  a  Vlennef 
a  M.  N.  Pachilch,  president  du  Conseil  et 
ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  2/15  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

On  est  d'avis  ici  que  ni  Tinstr action,  ni  Ten- 
quete  sur  I'attentat  com  mis  a  Serajevo  n'ont 
fourni  de  preuve  suffisante  pour  qu'on  puisse 
accuser  la  Serbie  officielle ;  mais  on  croit  que  la 
Serbie  sera  accusee  d'avoir  tolere  sur  son  terri- 
toire  certains  elements  re volutionnaires.  On  cri- 
tique et  on  condamne  dans  les  cercles  diploma- 
tiques  d'ici  les  procedes  du  Gouvernement 
austro-bongrois,  surtout  Tattitude  du  Correspon- 
denz  Bureau,  du  Ballplatz  et  de  la  presse  vien- 
noise  depuis  I'attentat  jusqu'aujourd'bui.  Un 
tres  grand  nombre  de  j)ersonnes  approuvent 
notre  attitude,  la  jugeant  correcte  et  digne  d'Un 
pays  serieux.  Elles  desapprouvent  seulement  les 
articles  de  certains  de  nos  journaux,  quoiqu'elles 
reconnaissent  toutes  que  ces  articles  ont  ^te  pro- 
voques  par  la  presse  viennoise. 

Bien  qu'il  paraisse  que  le  ministere  des  Affaires 
etrangeres  allemand  n'approuve  pas  la  politique 
de  Vienne  contre  la  Serbie,  I'ambassade  d'Alle- 
magne  a  Vienne  encourage  cette  politique  preci- 
s^ment  en  ce  moment-ci.- 

VeuiUez,  etc. 


28  PAGES  d'ihstoire 


N°  25 

M.  Jov.  M.  Jo0ano9itchy  ministre  a  Vienne,  a 
M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  2/15  juillet  m4. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

Quelles  demarches  seront  faites?  Sous  quelle 
forme?  Que  va  demander  a  la  Serbie  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie?  Je  ne  crois  pas  qu'au  Ballplatz  meme, 
on  puisse  repondre  aujourd'hui  a  ces  questions 
d'une  maniere  claire  et  precise.,  Je  pense  que 
cela  s'elabore  maintenant  et  que  le  comte  For- 
gach  y  est  redevenu  le  facteur  principal. 

Dans  un  de  mes  rapports  precedents,  j*ai  men- 
tionne  que  I'Autriche-Hongrie  avait  a  choisir 
entre  deux  voies  :  consid^rer  Tattentat  de  Sera- 
jevo  comme  une  affaire  interieure  en  nous  invi- 
tant  a  lui  prSter  aide  pour  decouvrir  les  cou- 
pables  et  les  punir ;  ou  bien  faire  de  la  tragedie 
de  Serajevoun  proces  contre  les  Serbes  et  la  Ser- 
bie et  meme  contre  la  Jougo-slavie.  A  en  juger 
par  tout  ce  qui  se  prepare  et  ce  qui  se  fait,  il  me 
semble  que  I'Autriclie-Hongrie  choisira  cette 
seconde  voie.  Elle  fera  cela,  convaincue  qu'elle 
obtiendra  Tapprobation  de  I'Europe;  pourquoi 
ne  pas  en  profiter  pour  nous  humilier  et,  jusqu'a 
un  certain  point,  justifier  le  proces  Friedjung  et 
celui  d'Agram?  En  outre,  elle  justifierait  devant 
ses  peuples  et  devant  I'Europe  les  mesures 
s^v^res  et  reactionnaires  qu'elle  a  I'intention  de 
prendre  dans  le  pays,  pour  r^primer  la  propa- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUE S  29 

gande  panserbe  et  Tidee  jougo-slave.  Enfin,  ce 
Gouvernement  croira  faire  quelque  cHose  aiissi 
en  faveur  de  son  prestige,  convaincu  que  cela 
le  relevera  a  l-exterieur  ainsi  qu'a  Tinterieur  de 
la  Monarchie. 

Je  pense  que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hon- 
grois  redigera  un  memoire»  plutot  une  accusa- 
tion contre  la  Serbie.  Dans  cet  acte  d'accusation, 
on  exposera  tout  ce  qui  a  ete  recueilli  contre 
nous  depuis  avril  1909  jusqu'aujourd'hui,  et  je 
crois  que  cet  acte  sera  assez  long.  Get  acte  d'acr 
ciisation,  il  le  transmettra  aux  cabinets  des 
Puissances  eurojo^ennes,  en  ajoutant  que  les  faits 
exposes  lui  conferent  le  droit  de  faire  a  Bel- 
grade des  demarches  diplomatiques  et  de  deman^ 
der  que  la  Serbie  remplisse  a.  Tavenir  toutes  les 
obligations  d'un  voisin  loyal.  En  meme  temps, 
le  Gouvernement  de  Vienne  nous  remettra,  a 
nous  aussi,  une  note  ou  sera  consigne  tout  ce  que 
la  Monarcliie  dualiste  desire  que  nous  execu- 
tions saris  discussion. 

Veuillez,  etc... 


N«  36 


M.  le  D^  M.  JoQanoQilchf  charge  d'affaires  h 
Berlin',  a M,  N.Pachitch,  president du  Conseil 
et  ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres, 

(T6l6gramme<)  Berlin,  le  3/16-3uiIlet  1914. 

Le  secretaire  d'fitat  m-a  declare  qu'il  a  acquis 


30  PAGES  D  HISTOIRE 

la  conTiction,  d'aj)res  les  rapports  du  ministre 
d'AUemagne  a  Belgrade,  de  Texistencc  d'lme 
proiDagande  j)anserbe,  que  le  Gouvernement 
devrait  eiiergiquement  reprimer,  dans  I'interet 
de  scs  bonnes  relations  avec  TAutriche-Hongrie. 


N°  27 


M.  M.  S.  Bochkovltch,  ministre  a  Londres,  a 
M.  N.  Pachilch,  president  da  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.)  Londres,  le  4/17juillet  1914. 

L'ambassade  d'Autriche  fait  Ics  plus  grands 
ellbrts  pour  exciter  la  presse  anglaise  contre 
nous  et  la  gagn3r  a  I'idee  que  la  Monarchic  doit 
donner  une  bonne  le^on  a  la  Serbia.  L'ambas- 
sade  remet  aux  redactions  les  coupures  de  nos 
journaux  comme  preuves  de  la  fa^on  dont  notre 
presse  est  redigee.  La  situation  pcut  s'aggraver 
au  cours  des  semaines  a  venir.  11  ne  faut  pas  se 
ficr  aux  declarations  pacifiques,  bien  calculees, 
des  cercles  austro-hongrois,  car  on  prepare  une 
pression  sur  la  Serbie,  qui  pent  se  transformer 
en  une  attaque  a  main  armee.  II  est  a  croire  que 
FAutriche-Hongrie  changera  d'attitude  et  cher- 
chera  a  humilier  la  Serbie,  des  qu'elle  aura  fait 
une  demarche  a  Belgrade. 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  3f 

N«  28 

M.  Ljdub.  MickailoQitch,  ministre  a  RomCy  a 
M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Gonseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(T61egramme.)  Rome,  le  4/17  juillet  1914. 

J'ai  des  informations  sures  que  le  marquis  de 
San  Giuliano  a  declare  a  rambassadeur  d*Au- 
triche-Hongrie,  qu'une  demarche  quelconque  de 
rAutriche-Hongrie,  dirigee  contre  la  Serbie  et 
ne  lui  temoignant  pas  les  egards  dus  par'un^ 
nation  a  une  nation,  rencontrerait  la  reproba- 
tion de  ropinion  pubiique  en  italiej  et  que  le 
Gouvernement  italien  tient  a  ce  que  Tentiere 
independance  de  la  Serbie  soit  maintenue. 


N''  29 


j\L  le  D^  M.  SpalaXkovitchf  ministre  a  Petro- 
grad,  dM.  N.  Pachitchi  president  du  Gonseil 
et  ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(Telegramme.)  Petrograd,  le  5/18  juillet  1914. 

J'ai  eu  iin  entretien  avec  I'adjoint  du  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres  au  sujet  de  I'attitude 
provocante  du  Correspondenz  Bureau  de  Vienne 
et  de  la  presse  austro-hongroise.  M.  Sazonoff 
m'a  dit,  il  y  a  quelques  jours^  qu'il  et.ait  dtonne 


32  PAGES  d'HISTOIRE 

que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  n'eiit  pris 
aucune  mesure  pour  mettre  fm  a  cette  agitation 
sterile  de  la  x^i^esse  de  Vienne "  qui  aboutit  a 
n'emouvoir  personne  et  qui  ne  nuit  qu'a  I'Au- 
triclie-Hongrie. 


N**  30 


M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  dii  Conseil  et  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres  a  toutes  les  Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.)  Belgrade,  le  6/19  juillet  1914. 

Des  I'attentat  de  Serajevo,  la  x)resse  austro- 
liongroise  a  commence  a  rejetei  ?ur  la  Serbie  la 
responsabilitc  de  ce  crime  horrible  qui,  a  son 
avis,  etait  le  resultat  de  I'idec  panserbe.  Elle  a 
ensuite  affirme  que  cette  idee  avait  ete  soutcnue 
et  propagee  par  les  differentcs  associations  comme 
«  Narodna  Qdbrana  »,  «  Kolo  Srpskih  Sestara  » 
(cercle  des  Soeurs  serbes),  etc.,  que  le  Gouver- 
nement serbe  avait  toler^es. 

Gependant,  des  I'arrive'e  de  la  nouvelle  de  I'at- 
tentat, la  Gour  et  le  Gouvernement  serbes  ont 
exprime  non  seulement  leurs  condoleances,  mais 
leur  vive  reprobation  et  leur  borreur  contre  un 
tel  crime.  Toutes  les  rejouissances  qui  devaient 
avoir  lieu  ce  jour-la  a  Belgrade  furent  sus- 
pendues. 

Neanmoins  la  presse  de  la  Monarcbie  voisine 
n'a  cess^  de  rendre  la  Serbie  resix)nsable  de  I'eve- 
nement  de  Serajevo.  De  plus  elle  a  commence  a 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUE S  33 

ce.propos  a  lancer  differentes  nouvelles  tendan- 
cieuses  et  fausses  qui  ont  provoque  la  presse  de 
Belgrade  a  y  repondre,  a  se  defendre  et  quelque- 
fois  a  atlaquer  aussi,  indignee  de  la  voir  denatu- 
rer  ainsi  les  evenements.  Voyant  que  c'est  avec 
intention  que  la  presse  austro-hongroise  attirait 
la  presse  de  Belgrade  dans  cette  discussion  deli- 
cate et  desagreable,  le  Gouvernement  serbe  s'est 
empresse  de  conseiller  a  la  presse  de  Belgrade  et 
meme  de  lui  recommander  de  garder  le  sang- 
froid et  de  se  borner  a  dementir  et  a  refuter  les 
fausses  et  tendancieuses  nouvelles.  Cette  de- 
maixihe  du  Gouvernement  serbe  est  restee  sans 
resultat  aupres  de  certains  journaux  de  moindre 
importance,  surtout  parce  qu'on  ne  cessait  de 
lancer  de  nouvelles  inventions  dont  la  tendance 
etait  d'exp loiter  I'attentat  au  point  de  vue  poli- 
tique, non  seulement  contre  la  Serbie,  mais  aussi 
contre  les  Serbes  d'Autriche-Hongrie.  Le  Gou- 
vernement serbe  n'a  pas  ete  a  meme  de  mettre 
fin  a  cette  polemique  entre  les  presses  serbe  et 
austro-hongroise;  la  loi  et  meme  les  clauses  de  la 
Constitution  garantissent  en  Serbie  I'entiere 
liberie  de  la  px'esse  et  interdisent  tdute  mesure 
preventive  et  meme  la  confiscation  des  journaux. 
Cette  polemique  a  ete  cependant  aggravee  par  ce> 
fait  que  les  journaux  de  Vienne  et  de  Budapest 
avaient  pris  des  extraits  de  certains  de  nos  jour- 
naux, qui  n'exercent  aucune^  influence  sur  ToxdI- 
nion  publique,  aggrave  encore  leur  ton  et,  de- 
formes  de  cette  fa^on,  les  avaient  repandus  dans 
la  presse  etrangere  dans  le  but  Evident  d'emou- 
voir  I'opinion  publique  dans  les  autres  Etats  euro- 
peens  et  de  representer  la  Serbie  comme  coupable. 
Ceux  qui  ont  suivi  cette  polemique  savent  que 


34  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

les  journaux  de  Belgrade  n'ont  fait  que  se  dc- 
fendre  et  se  borner  a  repousser  des  attaqucs,  a 
refuter  des  mensongss  tendancieux.  Les  Gouver- 
nements  etrangers,  occupes  j)ai'  d'autres  affaires, 
n'ont  pas  eu  le  loisir  de  bien  voir  le  but  jioursuivi 
par  la  presse  austi^o-hongroise  qui  est  d'emou- 
voir  Topinion  publique  dans  la  Monarcbie  et  a 
I'etranger.  Des  le  commencement,  le  Gouverne- 
ment  serbe  s'est  declare  pret  a  traduire  devant 
les  tribunaux  tout  sujet  sei^be  dont  il  aurait  ete 
prouv^  qu'il  cut  pris  j)art  a  I'attcntat  de  Serajevo. 
En  outre,  il  a  declare  qu'il  avait  prepare  un  pro- 
jet  de  loi  pour  rendre  plus  efficaces  les  mesures 
deja  prises  contre  tout  abus  d'explosifs.  Ceprojet 
de  loi  etait  deja  soumis  au  Gonseil  d'Etat,  mais 
il  n'a  pas  pu  ^tre  prdsente  a  la  Skoux^chtina, 
celle-ci  ayant  ^t^  dissoute.  Enfin,  le  Gouverne- 
ment  serbe  a  declare  qu'il  etait  pret  k  I'avenir 
comme  pai'  le  passe  a  remplir  tous  les  devoirs  de 
voisinage,  auxquels  Toblige  sa  position  d'Etat 
europeen. 

Depuis  que  Tattentat  a  ete  commis,  le  Gouver- 
nement  austro-hongrois  ne  s'est  jamais  adresse 
au  Gouvernement  serbe  pour  un  concours  quel- 
conque  au  sujet  de  I'attcntat.  II  n'a  "reclame  pour 
aucun  des  complices. ni  Fouverture  d'unc  instruc- 
tion ni  la  mise  en  jugement.  Une  seule  fois,  il  a 
demande  des  renseignements  sur  le  domicile 
actuel  de  quelques  eleves  expulses  de  I'P^cole 
normale  primaire  de  Pakrac,  qui  avaient  ]Dasse 
en  Serble  pour  continuer  leurs  etudes.  Tous  les 
renseignements  qui  ont  pu  6tx^e  recueillis  a  ce 
sujet  lui  ont  ete  transmis. 

Gependant  la  campagne  contre  la  Serbie  conti- 
nuait  dans  la  presse  austro-hongroise,  et  on  excl- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  35 

tait  contre  la  Serbie  ropinion  publique  en  Au- 
triche-Hongrie  et  en  Europe.  On  a  pouss^  si  loin 
dans  cette  voie  que  des  chefs  eminents  de  partis 
polidques  en  Autriche-Hongrie  ont  commence  a 
interpeller  au  Parlement  au  sujet  de  Tattentat,  et 
que  le  President  du  Conseil  hongrois  leur  a  re- 
pondu.  Des  discussions  engagees  a  ce  sujet j  il 
apparalt  que  I'Autriche-Hongrie  a  I'intention  de 
faire  certaines  demarches,  mais  on  ne  voit  pas 
dans  quel  sens.  On  ne  dit  pas  si  les  mesures 
prises,  surtout .  les  mesures  militaires,  depen- 
dront  de  la  reponse  et  de  1' esprit  de  conciliation 
du  Gouvernement  serbe.  De  loin,  on  fait  entre- 
voir  la  possibilite  d'un  conflit,  au  cas  ou  le  Gou- 
Ternement  serbe  ne  pourrait  pas  donner  une 
reponse  categorique  et  satisfaisante, 

Lors  de  la  mort  subite  du  minisire  russe 
Hartwig  a  Belgrade,  au  domicile  du  ministre 
d'Autriche,  la  polemique  de  presse  a  ete  encore 
ranimee ;  mais  ce  triste  evenement  n  a  provoque 
aucun  desordre,  lors  des  funerailles.  Cependant  la 
legation  d'Aiitriche-Hongrie,  par  suite  de  fausses 
nouvelles  recues  parelle,  s'etait  emue  a  tel  point, 
que  les  sujets  austro-hongi*ois  ayaient  commence 
a  S8  cacher  dans  des  hotels  de  Semlin  et  de  Bel- 
grade,  ct  certains  a  la  Legation  meme.  Le  jour 
de  I'anniversaire  du  Roi,  qui  s'est  j)asse  dans  un 
ordre  parfait,  le  ministre  d' Autriche-Hongrie, 
par  I'intcrmediaire  du  vice-consul  Podgradski, 
m'a  informe,  ver«  5  heures  de  Tapres-midi,  que 
des  agressions  contre  la  l%ation  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie  et  contre  les  sujets  austro-hongrois  a 
Belgrade  etaient  projetees  pour  cette  nuit  m^nie. 
II  m'a  prie  de  prendre  les  mesures  n^cessaires 
pour  la  protection  des  sujets  austro-hongrois  et 


36  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

de  la  Legation,  en  ajoutant  qu'il  rendrait  la 
Serbie  responsable  de  tout  ce  qui  arriverait.  Je 
lui  ai  repondu  que  le  Gouvernement  responsable 
du  Royaume  de  Serbie  n'avait  aucun  renseigne- 
ment  sur  n'importe  quels  preparatifs  de  cette 
nature,  mais  que  j'en  informerais  tout  de  meme, 
sans  retard,  le  ministrc  de  I'lnterieur  et  lui  de- 
manderais  en  mfime  temps  de  prendre  toutes  les 
mesures  necessaires.  Le  lendemain  a  demon tre 
que  la  legation  d'Autriche-Hongrie  avait  ete 
trompee  jDarde  fauxrenseignements,  etantdonne 
qu*aucune  agression  n'a  ete  tentee,  aucun  prepa- 
ratif  d'attaque  n'ayant  ete  fait.  Neanmoins,  la 
i)resse  austro-hongroise  a  exploite  cette  affaire 
encore  dans  le  but  de  prouver  que  I'opinion  serbe 
est  excitee  et  prete  a  tout.  Eile  est  allee  meme 
plus  loin  et  a  essaye  d'affirmer  «  qu'en  effet  quel- 
que  chose  devait  se  passer,  car  M.  Pacbitch,  lui- 
meme,  avait  dit  qu'il  en  avait  entendu  parler  :». 
Tout  ccla  demontre  d'une  fagon  evidente  Tinten- 
tion  d' exciter  I'opinion  publique  contre  la  Serbie 
dans  cbaque  occasion  et  a  propos  de  tout  evene- 
ment. 

Si  Ton  ]Drend  en  consideration  tout  ce  qui  a  ete 
dit  au  Parlement  bongrois  au  sujet  de  la  tragedie 
de  Sarajevo,  on  aura  des  raisons  de  s'inquieter 
ct  de  croire  qu'on  prepare  contre  nous  une  de- 
marche qui  pourrait  avoir  des  consequences  de- 
sagreables  pour  les  relations  entre  la  Serbie  et 
TAutriche-Hongrie.  Cette  inquietude  est  d'autant 
plus  justifiee  qu'il  semble,  d'apres  tout,  quel'ins- 
truction  ouverte  ne  se  bornerait  pas  aux  seuls 
coupables  et  aux  complices  eventuels  de  I'at- 
tentat,  mais  qu'elle  engloberait  aussi  la  Serbie  et 
Tidee  nanslave. 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  Sf 

Par  son  attitude  et  ses  precedes,  le  Gouverne- 
ment  serbe  a  donne  des  preuves  irrefutables 
qu'il  travaille  a  Fapaisement  des  esxDrits,  dans 
i'interet  de  lapaix  et  du  maintien  des  bons  rap- 
ports avec  tons  ses  voisins.  II  a  donne  surtout 
des  preuves  de  son  desirderegler  et  d'ameliorer 
ses  relations  avec  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise 
qui,  dans  ces  derniers  temps,  s'etaient  refroidies , 
a  cause  de  la  guerre  balkanique  et  des  questions 
qui  en  ont  decoule.  Dans  ce  but,  le  Gouverne- 
ment  serbe  a  x^rocede  au  reglement  des  chemins 
de  fer  orientaux,  de  nouveaux  cbemins  de  fer 
et  du  transit  des  produits  austro-hongrois  pour 
Constantinople,  Sofia,  Salonique  et  Athenes. 

Le  Gouverneraent  serbe  considere  que  ses  in- 
terets  vitaux  lui  imposent  que  la  paix  et  la  tran- 
quillite  dans  les  Balkans  soient  consolidees  au 
mieux  et  pour  la  duree  la  plus. longue  possible. 
Et  c'est  parce  qu'il  desire  cela  qu'il  craint  main- 
tenant  que  la  surexcitation  de  Topinion  publique 
en  Autriche-Hongrie  ne  fournisse  au  Gouverne- 
ment  austro  hongrois  des  motifs  pour  faire  une 
demarclie  qui  tendrait  a  liumilier  la  dignite  de 
TEtat  serbe  et  pour  faire  presenter  des  reclama- 
tions qui  ne  pourraient  pas  etre  acceptees. 

C'est  pour  cela  que  j'ai  I'honneur  de  vous 
prier  de  faire,  aupres  du  Gouvernement  aupres 
duquel  vous  etes  accredite,  tout  ce  qui  est  neces- 
saire  pour  qu'il  prenne  note  de  notre  desir  sin- 
cere de  maintenir  des  relations  amicales  avec 
I'Autriche-Hongrie,  et  de'reprimer  sur  notre  ter- 
ritoire  toute  tentative  pouvant  porter  atteinte  a 
la  tranquillite  et  a  la  securite  de  la  Monarchie 
voisine.  De  meme,  nous  accueillerons  les  recla- 
mations de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  au  cas  oii  elle 


38  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

demanderait  que  certains  complices  se  trouvant 
en  Scrbie  —  sil  y  en  a,  bicn  entendu  —  soient 
traduits  dcrant  nos  tribunaux  indeiDcndants, 
j)our  etre  juges. 

Mais  nous  ne  pourrons  jamais  accepter  des 
reclamations  qui  iraient  contre  la  dignite  de  la 
Serbie  et  que  ne  saurait  accepter  aucun  Etat 
qui  respcctc  son  independancc  ct  qui  veut  la 
con server. 

Dans  le  desir  de  voir  les  bons  rapports  de  voi- 
sinage  avec  la  Monarcbie  dualiste  se  consolider 
et  se  maintenir,  nous  prions  les  Gouvernements 
amis  de  prendre  note  de  notre  declaration  et 
d*agir  dans  un  esprit  pacinque  lorsque  Toccasion 
se  prcsentera  ou  lorsque  le  besoin  I'exigera. 


K«  31 


M.  Jov.  M.  Jovano^itch,  ministre  a  Vienne^  a 
M.  N.  Pachiich,  president  du  Conseilj  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

Vienne,  le  7/20  juillet  1014. 

Monsieur  le  President, 
II  est  tres  difficile,  presque  impossible  d'ap- 
prendre  ici  queique  chose  de  jwsitif  sur  les  veri- 
tables  inlenlions  de  rAutriche-Hongrie.  Le  mot 
d'ordre  pour  tout  ce  qui  se  fait  est  d'en  gardcr  le 
secret  absolu.  A  en  juger  par  ce  que  nos  jour- 
naux  ecrivent,  on  est  oi^timiste  a  Belgrade  en  ce 
qui  concerne  nos  rapports  avec  rAulriche-Hon- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUEo  39 

grie.  Cependant,  on  ne  i)eut  pas  etre  oi^timiste. 
II  n'est  pas  douteux  que  rAutriche-Hongrie  pre- 
pare quelque  chose  de  serieux.  Ge  qu'on  devrait 
craindre  le  j)lus,  et  ce  qui  est  tres  a  croire,  c'est 
qu'elle  prepare  une  guerre  contre  la  Serbie.  La 
conviction  generale  ici  est  que  ne  rien  faire  cette 
fois-ci  encore  contre  la  Serbie  equivaudrait  pour 
TAutriche-Hongrie  a  un  vei^itable  suicide.  En 
outre,  Tidee  que- la  Serbie,  apres  deux  guerres, 
est  completement  epuisee  et  qu'une  guerre  en- 
treiDrise  contre  elle  serait  en  fait  une  simple 
expedition  terminee  par  une  prompte  occupation, 
a  pris  des  racines  encore  plus  profondes.  On 
croit  aussi  qu'une  telle  guerre  serait  terminee 
avant  que  I'Europe  ait  pu  intervenir. 

Les  i^reparatifs  militaircs  qu'on  est  en  train 
dc  faire,  surlout  sur  la  frontiere  serbe,  prouvent 
que  les  intentions  de  rAutriche  sont  serieuses. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


N"  32 


M.  le  baron  Giesl  de  Gieslingen,  ministre  d'Au- 
iriche-Hongrie  a  Belgrade,  a  M.  Laza  PatchoUy 
president  dii  Conseil  et  ministre  des  Affaires 
etrangeres  par  interim. 

Belgrade,  le  10/23  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 
J'ai  I'honneur  de  remettre  a  Votre  Excellence 
laJiote  ci-jointe  que  j'ai  re^ue  de  mon  Gouverne- 


40  PAGES  D  HISTOIRE 

ment  et  qui  est  adressee  au  Gouvernement  da 
Royaume  de  Serbie. 
Yeuillez,  etc. 

Remis  p'ersonnellement  a  6  heures  de  rapres-midi. 

«  Le  3 1  mars  1909,  le  ministre  de  Serbie  a 
Vienne  a  fait,  d'ordre  de  son  Gouvernement,  au 
Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal,  la  declaration 
suivante  : 

«  La  Serbie  recoiinait  qu'elle  n'a  pas  ete  atteinte 
dans  ses  droits  par  le  fait  accompli  cree  en  Bos- 
nie-Herzegovine  et  qu'elle  se  conformera  par 
consequent  a  telle  decision  que  les  Puissances 
prendront  par  rapport  a  rarlicle  25  du  traite  de 
Berlin.  Se  rendant  aux  conseils  des  grandes 
Puissances,  la  Serbie  s'engage  des  a  jDresent  a 
abandonner  Tattitude  de  protestation  et  d  oppo- 
sition qu'elle  a  observee  a  I'egard  de  I'anncxion 
depuis  Tautomne  dernier  et  elle  s'engage,  en 
outre,  a  changer  le  cours  de  sa  politique  actuelle 
envers  I'Autriche-Hongrie  pour  vivre  desormais 
avec  cette  derniere  sur  le  pied  dun  bon  voisi- 
nagc.  » 

Or,  I'histoire  des  dernieres  annees  et  notam- , 
ment  les  cvenemenls  douloureux  du  28  juin  ont 
demontre  I'existence  en  Serbie  d'un  mouvement 
subversif  dont  le  but  est  de  detacher  de  la  Mo- 
narchic austro-hongroise  certaines  parties  de  ses 
territoires.  Ce  mouvement,  qui  a  pris  jour  sous 
les  yeux  du  Gouvernement  serbe,  est  arrive  a  se 
mani fester  au  dela  du  territoire  du  royaume  par 
des  actes  de  terrorisme,  par  une  s^rie  d'attentats 
et  par  des  meurtres. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe,  loin  de  satis- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  41 

faire  aux  engagements  formels  contenus  dans  la 
declaration  du  3i  mars  1909,  n'a  rien  fait  pour 
supprimcr  ce  mouvemcnt  :  il  a  tolere  ractivite 
criminelle  des  difFerentes  societes  et  affiliations 
dirigees  contre  la  Monarchie,  le  langage  elTrene 
de  la  presse,  la  glorification  des  auteurs  d'atten- 
lats,  la  participation  d'officiers  et  de  fonction- 
naires  dans  des  agissements  subversifs,  une  pro- 
pagande  malsaine  dans  Tenseignement,  tolere 
enfin  toutes  les  manifestations  qui  pouvaient 
induire  la  population  serbe  a  la  haine  de  la 
Monarchie  et  au  mepris  de  ses  institutions. 

Gette  tolerance  coupable    du   Gouvernement 

royal  de  Serbie  n'avait  j)as  cesse  au  moment  ou 

Jos  evenements  du   28  juin  dernier  en   ont  de- 

iaontrc  au  monde  cntier  les   consequences  fu- 

nestcs. 

II  resulte  des  depositions  et  aveux  des  auteurs 
de  Tattentat  du  28  juin  que  le  meurtre  de  Sera- 
jevo  a  ete  trame  a  Belgrade,  que  les  armes  et  les 
explosifs  dont  les  meurtriers  se  trouvaient  etre 
munis  leur  ont  ete  donnes  par  des  officiers  et 
fonctionnaires  serbes  faisant  partie  de  la  «  Na- 
rodna  Odbrana  »  et  enfin  que  le  passage  en  Bos- 
nie  des  criminels  et  de  leurs  armes  a  ete  orga- 
nise et  effectuepar  des  chefs  du  service-frontiere 
serbe. 

Les  resultats  mentionnes  de  Tinstruction  ne 
permettent  pas  au  Gouvernement  imperial  et 
royal  de  poursuivre  plus  longtemps  I'attitude 
de  ionganimite  expectative  qu'il  avait  obser- 
vee  pendant  des  annees  vis-a-vis  des  agissements 
de  Belgrade  propage's  de  la  sur  les  territoires 
de  la  Monarchie.  Ces  resultats  lui  imposent  au 
contraire  le  devoir  de  mettre  fm  a  des  menees  qui 


42  PAGES  D^HISTOIKE 

forment  une  menace  perpetuelle  pour  la  tran- 
quillitc  de  la  Monarchie. 

G'est  pour  atteindre  ce  but  que  le  Gouverne- 
ment  imperial  et  royal  se  voit  oblige  de  deman- 
der  au.  Gouvernement  serbe  d'enoncer  officielle- 
ment  qu'il  condamne  la  propagande  dirigee 
contre  la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise,  c'est- 
a-dire  Tensemble  des  tendances  qui  aspirent  en 
dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la  Monarchie  des  ter- 
ritoires  qui  en  font  paitie,  et  qu'il  s'engage  a 
supprimer,  -par  lous  les  moyens,  cette  propa- 
gande criminelle  et  terrorisle. 

A  fin  de  donncr  un  caractere  solenncl  a  cet 
engagement,  le  Gouvernement  royal  de  Serbie 
fera  publier  a  la  ^^remiere  page  du  Journal  Ofji- 
del  en  date  du  i3/26  juillet  I'enonciation  sui- 
vante  : 

i(  Le  Gouvernement  royal  de  Serbia  condamne 
la  propagande  dirigee  contre  rAutriche-Hongrie, 
c'est-a-dire  Fensemble  des  tendances  qui  asx:)irent 
eu  dernier  lieu  a  detacher  de  la -Monarchie  aus- 
tro-hongroise des  territoires  qui  en  font  partic, 
et  il  deplore  sincerement  les  cons(3quences  fu- 
ncstes  de  ces  agissements  criminels. 

tt  Le  Gouvernement  royal  regrette  que  ses  of- 
ficiers  et  fonctionnaires  serbes  aient  particip^  a 
la  propagande  susmentionnee  et  comj)romis  par 
la  les  relations  de  bon  voisinage  auxquelles  le 
Gouvernement  royal  s'etait  solenncl Icment  en- 
gage par  ses  declarations  du  3i  mars  1909. 

(c  Le  Gouvernement  royal,  qui  desapprouve  et 
r^pudie  toute  idee  ou  tentative  d'immixtion  dans 
les  deslinees  des  habitants  de  quelque  ]3artie  de 
rAutriche-Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  considere  de  son 
devoir  d'avertir  formellement  les  officiers,  les 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  43 

fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  population  duroyaume 
que  dorenavant  il  procedera  avec  la  dernierc  ri- 
gueur  contre  les  per^sonnes  qui  se  rendraient 
coupables  de  pareils  agissements,  qu'il  mettra 
tous  ses  efforts  a  iDrevenir  et  a  reprimer.  » 

Cette  enonciation  sera  porte'e  en  mSme  temps 
a  la  connaissance  de  Tarmee  royale  par  un  ordre 
du  jour  de  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  et  sera  publi^e  dans 
le  Bulletin  Officiel  de  VArmee. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe  s'engage,  en 
outre : 

1°  A  interdirc  toute  publication  qui  excite  a  la 
haine  et  au  mepris  de  la  Monarchie  et  dont  la 
tendance  generate  est  dirigee  contre  son  integrity 
territoriale ; 

2°  A  dissoudre  immediatement  la  Societe  dite 
«  Narodna  Odbrana  »,  a  confisquer  tous  ses 
raoyens  de  propagande  et  a  proceder  de  la  m^me 
maniere  contre  les  autres  societes  et  affiliations 
en  Serbie  qui  s'adonnent  a  la  propagande  contre 
la  Monarchie  austro-hongroise.  Le  Gouvernement 
royal  prendra  les  mesures  necessaires  pour  qiie 
les  societes  dissoutes  ne  puissent  pas  continuer 
leur  activite  sous  un  autre  nom  et  sous  une 
autre  forme ; 

3""  A  eliminer  sans  delai  de  Tenseignement  pu- 
blic en  Serbie,  tant  du  corps  enseignant  que  des 
moyens  d'instruction,  tout  ce  qui  sert  pu  pour- 
rait  servir  a  fomenter  la  propagande  contre  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie ; 

4°  A  eloigner  du  service  militaire  et  de  Tadmi- 
nistration  en  general  tous  les  officiers  et  fonction- 
naires  coupables  de  propagande  contre  la  Mo- 
narchie austro-hongroise  et  dont  le  Gouverne- 
ment imperial  et  royal  se  reserve  decommuni- 


44  PAGES  d'histoire 

quer  les  noms  et  les  actes  au  Gouvernement 
royal; 

5**  A  acceijter  la  collaboration  en  Serbie  des 
organes  du  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  dans 
la  suppression  du  mouvement  subversif  dirige 
contre  Tintegrite  territoriale  de  le  Monarchie  ; 

6^  A  ouvrir  une  enquSte  judiciaire  contre  les 
partisans  du  complot  du  28  juin  se  trouvant  sur 
le  territoire  serbe ;  des  organes  delegues  par  le 
Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  prendront  j)art 
aux  recherche s; 

'j°  A  proceder  d'urgence  a  Tarrestation  du  com- 
mandant Voia  Tankositch  et  du  nomme  Milan 
Ciganovitch,  employe  de  TEtat  serbe,  compromis 
par  les  resultats  de  I'instruction  de  Serajevo; 

8^  A  empecher  par  des  mesures  efficaces  le 
concours  des  autorites  serbes  dans  le  trafic  illi- 
cite  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  a  travers  la  frontiere; 
a  licencier  et  punir  s^verement  les  fonction- 
naires  du  service  frontiere  de  Ghabatz  et  de  Loz- 
nitza  coupables  d'avoir  aide  les  auteurs  du 
crime  de  Serajevo  en  leur  facilitant  le  passage 
de  la  frontiere ; 

9"*  A  donner  au  Gouvernement  imperial  et 
royal  des  explications  sur  les  propos  injustifia- 
bles  de  hauts  fonctionnaires  serbes  tant  en  Ser- 
bie qu'a  I'etranger  qui,  malgre  leur  jDosition 
officielle,  n'ont  pas  hesite,  apres  I'attenlat  du 
28  juin,  a  s'exp rimer  dans  des  interviews  d'une 
maniere  hostile  envers  la  Monarchie  austro- 
hongroise ; 

10°  Avertir,  sans  retard,  le  Gouvernement 
imperial  et  royal  de  Fexecution  des  mesures  pre- 
c^dentes. 

Le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  attend  la 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  45 

reponse  du  Gouvernement  royal  au  plus  tard 
jiisqu'au  samedi  25  de  ce  mois  a  5  heures  du 
soir. 

Le  memoire  relatif  aux  resultats  de  I'instruc- 
tion  ouverte  a  Serajevo,  en  ce  qui  concerne  les 
fonctionnaires  mentionnes  sous  les  n**^  7  et  8,  est 
joint  a  cette  note. 


L'instruction  criminclle  ouverte  par  le  tribu- 
nal de  Serajevo  contre  Gavrilo  Princip  et 
consorts  du  chef  d'assassinat  et  de  complicite 
y  relative,  crime  commis  par  eux  le  28  juin  der- 
nier, a  jusqu'ici  abouti  aux  constatations  sui- 
vantes : 

i<*  Le  complot,  ayant  pour  but  d'assassincr, 
lors  de  son  sejour  a  Serajevo,  I'archiduc  Fran- 
Qois-Ferdinancl,  fut  forme  a  Belgrade  par  Gavrilo 
Princip,  Nedeljko  Cabrinovitch,  le  nomme  Milan 
Ciganovitch  et  Trifko  Grabez,  avec  le  concours 
du  commandant  Voi'a  Tankositch ; 

2''  Les  six  bombes  et  les  quatre  pistolets  brow- 
nings, au  moyen  desquels  les  malfaiteurs  ont  com- 
mis Tattentat,  furent  livres  a  Belgrade  a  Princip, 
Cabrinovitch  et  Grabez  par  le  nomme  Milan  Ci- 
ganovitch et  le  commandant  Voia  Tankositch ; 

3""  Les  bombes  sont  des  grenades  a  main  prove- 
nant  du  depot  d'armes  de  I'armee  serbe  a  Kragu- 
jevats ; 

4°  Pour  assurer  la  reussite  de  Fattentat,  Ciga- 
novitch enseigna  a  Princip,  Cabrinovitch  et 
Grabez  la  maniere  de  se  servir  des  grenades  et 
donna,  dans  une  foret  pres  du  champ  de  tir  a 
Topchidere,  des  lemons  de  tir  avec  pistolets  brow- 
nings a  Princip  et  a  Grabez ; 


48  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

5**  Pour  rendre  possible  a  Princip,  Cabrinovitch 
et  Grabez  de  passer  la  frontiere  de  Bosnie-Herze- 
govine  et  d'y  introduire  clandestinement  leur 
contrebande  d'armes,  un  systeme  de  transport 
secret  fut  organise  par  Ciganovitch. 

D'apres  cette  organisation,  I'introduction  en 
Bosnie-Herzegovine  des  malfaiteurs  et  de  leurs 
armes  fut  operee  par  les  capitaines-frontieres  de 
Chabatz  (Rado  PoiDOvitch)  et  ceiui  de  Loznitza^ 
ainsi  que  par  le  douanier  Radivoj  Grbitch  de 
Loznitza  avec  le  concoux's  de  divers  particuliers. 


N«  33 


M.  le  ly  L.  PatchoUj  president  dii  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  etran^eres  par  interim^  a 
toutes  les  Legations  royales. 

(Tel^gramme.)  Belgrade,  le  10/23  juillet  1914. 

A  propos  de  I'attentat  de  Serajevo,  le  ministre 
d'Autriche-Hongrie  m'a  remis  aujourd'ltui  a  six 
heures  de  I'apres-midi  une  note  contenant  les 
reclamations  du  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois 
et  a  demande  une  reponse  du  Gouvernement 
serbe  dans  un  delai  de  deux  jours,  c  est-a-dire 
avant  samedi  a  6  heures  de  I'apres-midi.  II  m'a 
inform^  verbalement  qu'il  quitterait  Belgrade 
avec  son  iDersonnel  au  cas  ou  il  n'aurait  pas  re^u 
une  rdponse  satisiaisante  dans  le  delai  fixe. 

Le  Gouvernement  serbe  n'a  encore  pris  aucune 
decision,  tous  les  ministres  n'etant  pas  x^resents 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  47 

a  Belgrade;  mais,  des  mainteaant,  je  puis  dire 
que  ces  reclamations  sont  telles  qu'aucun  Gou- 
vernement  serbe  ne  pourrait  les  accepter  eix 
entier. 


N'^S^ 


M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  ministre 
des  Affaires  elrangeres,  a  M.  N,  Spalaikovitch, 
ministre  a  Peirograd. 

(Telegramme.)  Belgrade,  le  11/24  juillet  1914. 

J'ai  informe  le  charge  d'affaires  russe  que  je 
remettrai,  la  rdponse  a  rultimatum  austro-hon- 
grois  demain  samedi  avant  6  beures  de  Fapres- 
midi.  Je  lui  ai  dit  que  le  Gouvernement  serbe 
demandera  aux  Etats  amis  de  proteger  I'indepen- 
dance  de  la  Serbie.  Au  cas  ou  la  guerre .  serait 
inevitable,  ajoutai-je,  la  Serbie  la  fera. 


N«  35 


M,  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres,  a  M.  M.  Bochkovitchj 
ministre  a  Londres. 

(Telegramme.)  Belgra(ie,  le  11/24  juUIet  A9U. 

J'ai  informe  aujourd'hui  le  cbarge  d'affaires 
anglais  que  les  reclamations  de  I'Autricbe-Hon- 


48  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

grie  etaient  telles  que  le  Gouverneinent  d'aucun 
pays  independant  ne  pourrait  les  accepter  en 
entier.  Je  lui  ai  exprime  I'espoir  que  le  Gouver- 
nement  anglais  pourrait  agir  aupres  du  Gouver- 
nement  austro-hongrois  pour  que  ce  dernier 
attenue  ses  reclamations.  Je  ne  lui  ai  pas  cachd 
que  j'etais  inquiet,  a  cause  des  evenements  qui 
j)ourraient  survenir. 


NO  36 


M.  leD"^  N,  Spalaikovitchy  ministre  a  Petrograd, 
a  M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  etrangeres. 

(Tel^gramme.)  Petrograd,  le  11/24  Juillet  1914. 

En  sortant  du  cabinet  de  M.  Sazonow,  a  qui  j'ai 
fait  connaitrc  le  texte  de  rultimatum  austro-hon- 
grois,  j'ai  rencontre  Tambassadcur  d'Alleraagne. 
II  avait  I'air  d'etre  de  tres  bonne  humeur.  Dans 
la  conversation  que  j'ai  engagee  avec  le  comte 
de  Pourtales  au  sujet  de  la  demarche  austro-hon- 
groise,  je  Fai  prie  de  m'indiquer  la  mauiere  dont 
on  jDourrait  sortir  de  la  situation  creee  par  Tulti- 
matum  austro-hongrois.  L'ambassadeur  m'a  re- 
pond  u  que  cela  ne  dependrait  que  de  la  Serbie, 
puisqu'il  s  agit  d'une  question  qui  doit  etre  reglee 
entre  rAutriche  et  la  Serbie  seules  et  dont  per- 
sonne  autre  ne  pourrait  semeler.  J'ai  r^pondu  au 
comte  de  Pourtales  qu'il  se  trompait  et  qu'il  se 
convaincrait  bientot  qu'il  s'agissait  non  pasd'une 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  49 

question  entre  la  Serble  et  I'Autriche,  mais  d'une 
question  europeenne. 


N^ST 


S.  A.  It.  le  prince  heritier  Alexandre 
a  S,  M.  VEmpereur  de  Russie. 

(Telcgrammc.)  Belgrade,  le  11/24  juillet  1911. 

Le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  a  remis 
hier  soir  au  Gouvernement  serbe  une  note  eon- 
cernant  I'attentat  de  Serajevo.  Consciente  de  ses 
devoirs  internationaux,  la  Serbie,  d6s  les  pre- 
miers jours  qui  suivirent  I'horrible  crime,  a 
declare  qu'elle  le  condamnait  et  qu'elle  etait  j)rete 
a  ouvrir  line  enquete  sur  son  territoire  si  la  com- 
plicity de  certains  de  ses  sujets  etait  j)rouvee  au 
cours  du  X3roces  instruit  par  les  autorites  austro- 
hongroises. 

Cependant,  les  demandes  contenues  dans  la 
note  austro-bongroise  sont  inutilement  humi- 
liantes  pour  la  Serbie  et  incompatibles  avec  sa 
dignite  d'Etat  independant.  Ainsi  on  nous  de- 
mande  sur  un  ton  peremptoire  une  declaration 
du  Gouvernement  dans  VOfJiciel  et  un  ordre  du 
Souverain  k  I'armee  ou  nous  reprimerions  I'esprit 
hostile  contre  TAutriche,  en  nous  faisant  k  nous- 
m^mes  des  reproches  d'une  faiblesse  criminelle 
envers  nos  menees  perfides.  On  nous  impose  en- 
suite  I'admission  de  fonctionnaires  austro-hon- 
grois  en  Serbie  pour  participer  avec  les  n6tres  a 

4 


50  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

I'instruction  et  pour  surveiller  rexecution  des 
autres  conditions  indiquees  dana  la  note.  Nous 
avons  regu  un  delai  de  quarante-huit  heures 
pour  accepter  le  tout,  faute  de  quoi  la  legation 
d'Autriche-Hong-rie  quittera  Belgrade. 

Nous  sommes  prdts  a  accepter  les  conditions 
austro-hongroises  qui  sont  compatibles  avec  la 
situation  d'un  Etat  independant,  ainsi  que  celles 
dont  I'acceptation  nous  sera  conseillee  par  Votre 
Majeste ;  toutes  les  personnes  dont  la  participa- 
tion a  I'attentat  sera  demontree  seront  severe- 
ment  punies  par  nous.  Certaines,  parmi  ces  de- 
mandes,  ne  pourraient  etre  executees  sans  des 
changements  de  notre  legislation,  ce  qui  exige 
du  temj^s.  On  nous  a  donne  un  delai  trop  court. 
Nous  pouvons  etre  attaques  apres  I'expiration  du 
delai  par  I'armee  austro-hongroise  qui  se  con- 
centre sur  notre  frontiere.  II  nous  est  impossible 
de  nous  defendre  et  nous  supplions  Votre  Ma- 
jeste de  nous  donner  son  aide  le  plus  tot  pos- 
sible. La  bienveillance  precieuse  de  Votre  Ma- 
jeste, qui  s'est  manifestee  tant  de  fois  a  notre 
egard,  nous  fait  esperer  f  ermement  que,  cette  fois 
encore,  notre  appel  sera  entendu  par  son  gene- 
reux  coeur  slave. 

Eu  ces  moments  difficiles,  j'interprete  les  sen- 
timents du  peuple  serbe  qui  supplie  Votre  Ma- 
jeste de  vouloir  bien  s'interesser  au  sort  du 
Royaume  de  Serbie. 

Alexandre. 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  51 


N°  38 

M.  N.  Pachitch,  president  dii  Conseil  et  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrangeres,  a  toutes  les  Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.)  Belgrade,  le  12/25  juillet  1914. 

J'ai  communique  aujourd'hui  aux  represen- 
tants  des  iitats  amis  les  grands  traits  do  la  re- 
ponse  du  Gouvernement  royal.  Je  leur  ai  dit  que 
la  reponse  sera  tout  a  fait  conciliante  et  que  le 
Gouvernement  serbe  acceptera  toutes  les  recla- 
ttiations  austro  hongroises  dans  la  mesure  ou  11 
sera  possible  de  le  faire.  Le  Gouvernement  serbe 
espere  que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois, 
sauf  dans  le  cas  ou  il  desirerait  a  tout  prix  la 
guerre,  ne  pourra  qu'accepter  la  satisfaction  com- 
plete que  lui  donne  la  reponse  serbe. 


N«  39 


Reponse  du  Gouvernement  royal  serbe  a   la 
note  de  VAutriche-Hongrie, 

Belgrade,  le  12/25  juillet  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe  a  requ  la  com- 
munication du  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal 
du  10/23  de  ce  mois  et  il  est  persuade  que  sa  re- 
ponse eloignera  tout  malentendu  qui  menace  de 


52  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

comproinettre  les  bons  rapports  de  voisinage 
entre  la  Mcnarchie  austro-hongroise  et  le 
Royaume  de  Scrbie. 

Le  Gouvernemcnt  royal  a  conscieuce  que  les 
protestations  qui  out  apparu  tant  a  la  tribune  de 
la  Skoupcbtina  nationale  que  dans  les  declara- 
tions et  les  actes  des  representants  responsables 
de  I'Etat,  protestations  auxquelles  coupa  court  la 
declaration  du  Gouvernement  serbe  faite  le 
i8/3i  mars  1909,  ne  se  sont  plus  renouvelees  vis- 
a-vis de  la  grande  Monarcliie  voisine  en  aucune 
occasion  et  que,  dej^uis  ce  temps,  aulant  de  la 
part  des  Gouvemements  royaux  qui  se  sont  s.;c- 
cede  que  de  la  part  de  leurs  organcs,  aucune  ten- 
tative n'a  ete  faite  dans  le  but  de  changer  I'etat 
de  choses  politique  et  juridique  cree  en  Bosnie- 
Herzegovine. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  constate  que  sous  ce 
rapport  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  n'a 
fait  aucune  representation,  sauf  en  ce  qui  con- 
cerne  un  livre  scolaire,  au  sujet  de  laquelie  repre- 
sentation le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  a 
re^u  une  explication  entierement  satisfaisante. 

La  Serbie  a,  a  de  nombreuses  reprises,  donne 
des  preuves  de  sa  politique  pacifique  et  moderee 
pendant  la  duree  de  la  crise  balkanique,  et  c'est 
grace  a  la  Serbie  et  aux  sacrifices  qu'elle  a  fails 
dans  I'inter^t  exclusif  de  la'paix  europeenne,  que 
cette  iDaix  a  ete  preservee. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  ne  pent  pas  etre  rendu 
responsable  des  manifestations  d'un  caractere 
prive  telles  que  les  articles  des  journaux  et  les 
agissements  des  societes,  manifestations  qui  se 
produisent  dans  presque  tous  les  pays  comme 
une  chose  ordinaire  et  qui  ^chappent  en  r^gle 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  53 

generale  au  controle  officiel  —  d'autant  moius 
que  le  Gouvernement  royal,  lors  dc  la  solution 
do  toutc  une  seric  de  questions  qui  so  sont  pre- 
sentees entrc  la  Serbie  el  rAutriche-Hongrie,  a 
montre  une  grande  prevenance  et  a  reus  si,  de 
cette  fa^on,  a  en  regler  le  plus  grand  nombre  au 
profit  du  progres  des  deux  x^ays  voisins. 

G'est  pourquoi  le  Gouvcrnement  royal  a  ete 
peniblement  surpris  par  ies  affirmations  d'apres 
lesquelles  des  sujets  du  Royaume  de  Serbie  au- 
raient  partici]3e  a  la  preparation  dc  I'attentat 
commis  a  Serajevo.  II  s'atlendait  a  etre  invile  a 
collaborer  a  la  reclierclie  de  tout  ce  qui  so  rai)- 
porte  a  ce  crime  et  il  etait  j)ret,  pour  prouver 
imr  des  actes  son  entiere  correction,  a  agir  contre 
toutes  Ies  personnes  a  Tegard  desquelles  des 
communications  iui  seraient  faites. 

Se  rendant  done  au  desir  du  Gouvernement 
imperial  et  royal,  le  Gouvernement  royal  est  dis- 
pose a  remettre  aux  tribunaux  sans  egard  a  sa 
situation  et  a  son  rang,  tout  sujet  serbe,  pour  la 
complicite  duquel,  dan^^le  crirae  de  Serajevo, 
des  preuves  Iui  seraient  fournics. 

II  s'engage  specialement  a  fairc  publicr  a  la 
premiere  page  du  Journal  Officiel  en  dale  du 
13/2G  juillet  I'enonciation  suivante  : 

«  Le  Gouvernement  royal  de  Serbie  condamne 
toute  2:)ropagandc  qui  scrait  dirigee  contre  I'Au- 
triche-Hongrie,  c'est-a-dire  rensemble  des  ten- 
dances qui  aspircnt  en  dernier  lieu  a  detacher 
de  la'Monarchie  austro-hongroise  des  territoires 
qui  en  font  parlic  et  il  deplore  sinccrement  Ies 
consequences  funestes  dc  ces  agissements  crimi- 
nals. 

«  Le  Gouvei'nement  royal  regrette  que  cer- 


54  PAGES  d'histoire 

tains  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  serbes  aient  par- 
ticipe,  d'apres  la  communication  du  Gouverne^ 
ment  imperial  et  royal,  a  la  propagande  sus- 
mentionnee  et  compromis  par  la  les  relations  de 
bon  voisinage  auxquelles  le  Gouvernement  royal 
s*etait  solennellement  engage  par  la  declaration 
du  1 8/3 1  mars  1909. 

«  Le  Gouvernement,  qui  desapprouve  et  repu- 
die  toute  idee  ou  tentative  d'une  immixtion  dans 
les  destinees  des  habitants  de  quelque  partie  de 
I'Autriche-Hongrie  que  ce  soit,  considere  qu^il 
est  de  son  devoir  d'avertir  formellement  les  offi- 
ciers, les  fonctionnaires  et  toute  la  population  du 
Royaume  que  dorenavant  il  procedera  avec  la 
derniere  rigueur  contre  les  personnes  qui  se 
rendraient  coupables  de  pareils  agissements, 
qu'il  mettra  tous  ses  efforts  a  pr^venir  et  a  re- 
primer.  » 

Cette  enonciation  sera  portee  a  la  connaissance 
de  Tarmee  royale  par  un  ordre  du  jour,  au  nom 
de  Sa  Majeste  le  Roi  par  S.  A.  R.  le  Prince 
heritier  Alexandre,  et  sera  publiee  dans  le  pro- 
chain  Bulletin  officiel  de  VArm^e. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  s'engage,  en  outre  r 
I**  A  introduire  dans  la  premiere  convocation 
r^guliere  de  la  Skoupchtina  une  disposition  dans 
la  loi  sur  la  presse  par  laquclle  sera  punie  de  la 
maniere  la  plus  severe  la  provocation  a  la  haine 
et  au  mepris  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise, 
ainsi  que  contre  toute  publication  dont  la  ten- 
dance generale  sera  dirigee  contre  I'integrite 
territoriale  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie. 

II  se  charge,  lors  de  la  revision  de  la  Constitu- 
tion, qui  est  prochaine,  de  faire  introduire  dans 
Farticle  22  de  la  Constitution,  un  amendement 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  55 

de  telle  soHe  que  les  publications  ci-dessus 
puissent  etre  confisquees,  ce  qui,  aetuellement, 
aux  termes  categoriques  de  I'article  22  de  la 
Constitution,  est  impossible  ; 

2*^  Le  Gouvernement  ne  possede  aucune 
preuve  et  la  note  du  Gouvernement  imperial  et 
royal  ne  lui  en  fournit  non  i>lus  aucune,  que  la 
soci^te  «  Narodna  Odbrana  »  et  les  autres  societes 
similaires  aient  commis  jusqu'a  ce  jour  quelque 
acte  criminel  de  ce  genre  jyixv  le  fait  d'un  de 
leui*s  membres.  Neanmoins,  le  Gouvernement 
royal  accejDtera  la  demande  du  Gouvernement 
imperial  et  royal  et  dissoudra  la  societe  «  Na- 
rodna Odbrana  »  et  toute  autre  societe  qui  agirait 
contre  TAutriche-Hongrie  ; 

3**  Le  Gouvernement  royal  scrbe  s'engage  a 
elimirer  sans  delai  de  I'instruction  publique  en 
Serbie  tout  ce  qui  sert  ou  pourrait  servir  a  fo- 
mcnter  la  propagande  contre  FAutriche-Hon- 
grie,  quand  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal 
lui  fournira  des  faits  et  des  preuve s  de  cette 
propagande ; 

4°  Le  Gouvernement  royal  accepte,  du  moins, 
d'eloigner  du  service  militaire  ceux  dont  I'en- 
quete  judiciaire  aura  prouve  qu'ils  sont  cou- 
pables  d'actes  diriges  contre  I'integrite  du  terri- 
toire  de  la  Monarchic  austro-hongroise ;  il  attend 
que  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  lui  com- 
munique ulterieureraent  les  noms  et  les  faits  de 
ces  officiers  et  fonctionnaires  aux  fins  de  la  pro- 
cedure qui  doit  s'ensuivre  ; 

5°  Le  Gouvernement  royal  doit  avouer  qu'il 
ne  se  rend  pas  clairement  compte  du  sens  et  de  la 
portee  de  la  demande  du  Gouvernement  impe- 
rial et  royal  tendant  a  ce  que  la  Serbie  s'engage 


56  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

a  accepter  sur  sou  tem^itoire  la  collaboration  des 
organes  du   Gouvernement  imperial   et  royal. 

Mais  11  declare  qu'il  admettra  toute  collabora- 
tion qui  repondrait  aux  principes  du  droit  inter-^ 
national  et  a  la  procedure  criminelle,  ainji 
qu'aux  bons  raipports  de  voisinage  ; 

G*'  Le  Gouvernement  royal,  cela  va  de  s^i, 
considere  de  son  devoir  d'ouvrir  une  enquete 
centre  tous  ceux  qui  sont  ou  qui,  eventuellement, 
auraient  ete  meles  au  complot  du  i5/28  jum  et 
qui  se  trouvefaient  sur  le  territoire  du  Royaime. 
Quant  a  la  participation  a  cette  enquete  des 
agents  des  autorites  austro-bongroises  qu  se- 
raient  delegues  a  cet  effet  par  le  Gouvernepaent 
imperial  et  royal,  le  Gouvernement  royal  ne 
peut  pas  Taccepter,  car  ce  serait  une  violation 
de  la  Constitution  et  de  la  loi  sur  la  procedure 
criminelle.  GejDendant,  dans  des  cas  cohere ts, 
des  communications  sur  les  resultats  de  I'ins- 
truction  en  question  pourraient  dtre  donnees  aux 
organes  austro-hongrois ; 

7*  Le  Gouvernement  royal  a  fait  proceder  des 
le  soir  me  me  de  la  remise  de  la  note  a  I'arresta- 
tion  du  commandant  Voia  Tankositch.  Quant  a 
Milan  Ciganovitcb,  qui  est  sujet  de  la  Monarcbie 
austro-bongroise  et  qui,  jusqu'au  16/28  juin, 
etait  employe  (comme  aspirant)  a  la  direction 
des  cbemins  de  fer,  il  n'a  pas  pu  encore  etre 
joint.  Le  Gouvernement  imperial  et  royal  est 
prie  de  vouloir  bien,  dans  la  forme  accoutumee, 
faire  connaitre  le  plus  t6t  possible  les  presomp- 
tions  de  culpabilite,  ainsi  que  les  preuves  even- 
tuelles  de  culpabilite  qui  ont  6i6  recueillies  jus- 
qu'a  ce  jour  par  I'enquete  de  Serajevo,  aux  fins 
d'enquStes  ulterieures; 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  57 

S*'  Le  Gouveruement  serbe  renforcera  et  eten- 
dra  les  mesures  j)rises  pour  empecher  le  tratic 
illicite  d'armes  et  d'explosifs  a  travers  la  fron- 
tiere.  II  ya  de  soi  qu'il  ordonnera  tout  de  suite 
una  enquete  et  punira  severement  les  fonction- 
naires  des  frontieres  sur  la  ligne  Chabatz-Loz- 
nitza  qui  out  manque  a  leur  devoir  et  laisse 
passer  les  auteurs  du  crime  dc  Serajevo  ; 

9°  Le  Gouvernement  royal  donnera  volontiers 
des  explications  sur  les  propos  que  ses  fonction- 
naires,  tant  en  Serbic  qu'a  I'etranger,  ont  tenu 
apres  Tattentat  dans  des  interviews  et  qui, 
d'apres  I'affirmation  du  Gouvernement  imperial 
et  royal,  ont  ete  hostiles  a  la  Monarchic,  des 
que  ]e  Gouvernement  imperial  et, royal  lui  aura 
communique  les  passages  en  question  de  ces 
propos,  et  des  qu'il  aura  demontre  que  les  pro- 
pos employes  ont  en  elTet  ete  tenus  par  lesdits 
fonctionnaires,  propos  au  sujet  desquels  le  Gou- 
vernement royal  lui-meme  aura  soin  de  re- 
cueillir  des  prcuves  et  convictions  ; 

10"  Le  Gouvernement  royal  informera  le  Gou- 
vernement imperial  et  royal  de  1' execution  des 
mesures  comprises  dans  les  points  pi'ecedents  en 
tant  que  cela  n'a  pas  ete  deja  fait  par  la  pre- 
cedente  note.  A  issitOt  que  cbaque  mesure  aura 
ete  ordonnee  et  executee,  dans  le  cas  ou  le  Gou- 
vernement imperial  et  royal  ne  serait  pas  satis- 
fait  de  cette  reponse,  le  Gouvernement  royal 
serbe,  considerant  qu'il  est  de  I'interet  commun 
de  ne  pas  precipiter  la  solution  de  cette  ques- 
tion, est  pret,  comme  toujours,  a  accepter  une 
entente  pacifique,  en  remettant  cette  question 
soit  k  la  decision  du  tribunal  international  de  La 
Haye,  soit  aux  grandes  puissances  qui  ont  pris 


58  PAGES  d'HISTOIRE 

part  a  relaboration    de  la  declaration  que  le 
Gouvernement  serbe  a  faite  le  i8/3i  mars  1909. 


N*>  40 


M.  le  baron  Giesl  de  Gieslingen,  ministre  cTAii- 
triche-Hongrie  a  Belgrade^  a  M.  N.  Pachitch, 
president  da  Conseil  et  ministre  des  Affaires 
etr  anger  es. 

Belgrade,  le  12/15  juillet  1914,  6  heures 
de  Tapres-midi. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

Etant  donne  que  le  delai  fixe  par  la  note  que 
j'ai  remise  sur  I'ordre  de  mon  Gouvernement  a 
Son  Excellence  M.  Patchou  avant-hier,  jeudi,  a 
six  heures  de  Tapres-midi,  a  expire,  et  que  je  n'ai 
pas  rcQU  une  reponric  satisfaisante,  j'ai  I'honneur 
d'informer  Votre  Excellence  que  je  quitte  Bel- 
grade ce  soir  avec  le  personnel  de  la  legation 
imperiale  et  royalc. 

La  protection  de  la  legation  imperiale  et 
royale  avec  tout  ce  qui  s'y  rattache,  avec  ses 
annexes  et  ses  archives,  ainsi  que  la  protection 
des  sujets  et  interets  autrichiens  et  hongrois  en 
Serbic  sont  confiees  a  la  legation  imperiale  d'Al- 
lemagne. 

Les  chanceliers  Ferdinand  Jovanovitch  et  Mi- 
lan Mekovitch,  qui  resteront  a  Belgrade,  sont 
rattaches  a  la  legation  imperiale  d'Allemagne. 

Enfin,  je  constate  que,  des  le  moment  ou 
Votre  Excellence  aura  re^u  cette  Icttre,  la  rup- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  59 

ture  des  relations  diplomatiques  entre  la  Serbie 
et  I'Autriche-Hongrie  revdtira  le  caractere  d'un 
fait  accompli. 
Veuillez,  etc... 


N°41 


M.  N.  Pachitchj  president  du  Conseil  ef  minis  ire 
des  Affaires  etrangereSy  a  toutes  les  Legations 
royales, 

Belgrade,  le  12/25  juillet  1914. 

C'est  aujourd'hui  a  5  h.  et  3/4  de  rapres-midi 
que  J'ai  remis  la  reponse  a  la  note  austro-hon- 
groise.  V6us  en  recevrez  ce  soir  le  texte  integral. 
Vous  y  verrez  que  nous  sommes  alles  jusqu'aux 
limites  extremes  ou  nous  pouyions  aller.  Lors- 
qu'il  a  re^u  la  note,  le  ministre  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie  a  declare  qu'il  devait  la  comparer  avec 
les  instructions  et  qu'il  donnerait  immediate- 
ment  sa  reponse.  Des  mon  retour  au  ministere, 
le  ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  ma  informe  par 
lettre  qu'il  n'etait  pas  satisfait  de  notre  reponse 
et  qu'il  quittera  Belgrade  ce  soir  m^me  avec 
tout  le  personnel  de  la  legation.  II  remet  au 
ministre  d'Allemagne  la  protection  de  la  legation 
avec  tout  le  mobilier  et  les  archives,  ainsi  que  la 
protection  des  sujets  et  des  interets  austro-hon- 
grois  en  Serbie.  Enfin,  11  declare  que,  par  le  fait 
de  la  remise  de  sa  lettre,  les  relations  diploma- 
tiques entre  la  Serbie  et  rAutriche-Hongrie  sont 
c6mpletement  rompues. 

Le  Gouvernement  royal  a  convoque  la  Skoup- 
cbtina  pour  le  14/27  juillet  a  Nicb,  ou  partent 


60  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

des  ce  soir  tous  les  minist^res  avec  leur  person 
nel.  Au  nom  du  Roi,  le  Prince  heritier  a  sign^ 
Tordre  de  mobilisation  de  I'armee;  domain  ou 
apres-demain,  paraitra  una  j)roclamation  par  la- 
quelle  les  citoyens  qui  ne  sont  pas  militaircs 
seront  invites  a  rester  tranquillement  cliez  eux, 
et  les  militaires  a  rejoindre  ieiirs  drapeaux  et  a 
defendre  la  Serbie  selon  leurs  forces,  au  cas  oii 
elle  serait  attaquee. 


N°  42 


M.  le  comte  Leopold  Berchiold,  ministre  des 
Affaires  etrangeres  d* Aiitriche-Hongrie ^  a 
M.  JoQ.  M.  Jo^anovitch,  ministre  de  Serbie  a 
Vienne, 

Vienne,  Ic  12/25  juillet  1914. 

Etant  donne  que  la  note  que  I'envoye  extraor- 
dinaire ct  ministre  plenipotcntiaire  imperial  et 
royal  a  remise  au  Gouvernement  royal  le  io/i^3 
de  ce  mois,  est  restee  sans  reponse  favorable, 
j'ai  ete  contraint  d'envoyer  Fordre  au  baron 
Giesl  de  quitter  la  capitale  serbe  ct  de  remettre 
la  protection  des  sujcts  dc  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale 
et  Royale  apostolique  au  ministre  d'Allemagne. 

Ayant  le  regret  de  voir  par  la  se  terminer  les 
rapports  que  j'ai  eu  I'honneur  d'entretenir  avec 
vous,  Monsieur  le  Ministre,  je  n'ai  pu  manquer 
de  mcttre  a  votre  disposition  les  passeports 
ci-joinls  pour  votre  retour  en  Serbie  et  pour  le 
retour  du  personnel  de  la  legation  royale. 

Veuillez,  etc. 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUE S  61 


N^*  43 

Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  VEmpereiir  de  Riissie  a 
Son  Aliesse  Royals  le  Prince  heritier  de  Ser- 
bie,  Alexandre. 

(Telegi-amme.)  Petrograd,  le  14/37  juillet  1914. 

Voire  Altesse  Royale,  en  s'adressant  a  Moi 
dans  un  moment  iDarticulierement  difficile,  ne 
s'est  pas  trompee  sur  les  sentiments  qui 
m'animent  a  Son  egard  et  sur  Ma  symjjathie 
cordiale  pour  le  peuple  serbe. 

Ma  plus  serieuse  attention  est  attiree  sur  la 
situation  actuelle  et  Mon  Gouvernement  s'ap- 
plique  de  toutes  ses  forces  a  aplanir  les  presentes 
difficultes.  Je  no  doute  point  que  Votre  Altesse 
et  le  Gouvernement  royal  ne  yeuillent  faciliter 
cette  taclie  en  ne  negligeant  rien  pour  arriver  a 
une  solution  qui  permette  de  x^revenir  les  hor- 
reurs  d'une  nouveile  guerre,  tout  en  sauvegar- 
dant  la  dignite  de  la  Serbie. 

Taiit  qu'il  y  a  le  moindre  espoir  d'eviter  une 
effusion  de  sang,  tous  mes  efforts  doivent  tendrc 
vers  ce  but.  Si,  malgre  notre  idIus  sincere  desir, 
Nous  ne  reussissons  pas,  Votre  Altesse  pent  etre 
assuree  qu'en  aucun  cas,  la  Russie  ne  se  desint^- 
ressera  du  sort  de  la  Serbie. 

Nicolas. 


62  PAGES  d'HISTOIRE 


NO  44 


Son  Altesse  Roy  ale  le  Prince  her  i  tier  de  Serbie 
Alexandre  a  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  I'Empereur 
de  Riissie, 

(T6l6gramme.)  Nich,  le  17/30  juillet  1914. 

Profondement  touche  par  le  telegramme  que 
Votre  Majeste  a  bien  voulu  M'adresser  hier,  je 
m'empresse  de  La  remercier  de  tout  Mon  coeur. 
Je  prie  Votre  Majeste  d'etre  j)ersuadee  que  la 
cordiale  sympathie  dont  Votre  Majeste  est  ani- 
mee  envers  Mon  pays  nous  est  particulierement 
precieuse  et  remplit  notre  ame  de  Tespoir  que 
TavfeDir  de  la  Serbie  est  assure^  etant  devcnu 
I'objet  de  la  haute  soUicitude  de  Votre  Majeste. 

Ces  moments  peniblcs  ne  peuvent  que  rafler- 
mir  les  liens  d'attachement  profond  qui  unissent 
la  Serbie  a  la  sainte  Russie  slave  et  les  senti 
ments  de  reconnaissance  eternell^  pour  I'aide  et 
la  protection  de  Votre  Majeste  seront  conserves 
precieusement  dans  I'^me  de  tous  les  Serbes. 

Alexandre. 


N°45 

M.  le  comte  Leopold  Berchtold,  ministre  des 
Affaires  etrangeres  dAutriche-Hongriej  a 
M.  N.  Pachitchf  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  de  Serbie. 

(T616gramme.)  Vienne,  le  15/28  juillet  1914. 

Le    Gouvernement   royal    serbe   n'ayant   pas 
(donne  une  r^ponse  favorable  a  la  note  que  le 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  63 

ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  lui  a  remise  le 
23/10  juillet  1914,  le  Gouvernement  imperial  et 
royal  se  voit  oblige  de  pourvoir  lui-merae  a  la 
protection  de  ses  droits  et  interets  et  de  rficou- 
rir,  dans  ce  but,  a  la  force  des  armes.  L*Au- 
triche-Hongrie  se  considere  done,  des  ce  mo- 
ment, en  etat  de  guerre  avec  la  Serbie. 


N«  46 


M.  TV".  Pachitch,  president  du  Conseil  et  minis tr^e 
des  Affaires  elrangeres,  a  toutes  les  Legations 
royales. 

(Telegramme.)  Nicli,  le  15/28  juillet  1914. 

Le  Gouvernement  de  FAutriche  -  Hongrie  a 
declare  la  guerre  aujourd'hui,  a  midi,  par  un 
telegramme  en  clair  adresse  au  Gouvernement 
serbe. 


N«  47 


M.  le  D""  Spala'ikontch,  ministre  a  Petrograd^ 
a  M.  S.  D,  SazonoWy  ministre  russe  des  Affaires 
etr  anger  es. 

Petrograd,  le  15/28  juillet  1914. 

Excellence, 

J'ai  I'honneur  de  porter  a  votre  connaissance 
que  je  viens  de  recevoir  de  M.  N.  Pachitch,  pre- 
sident du  Conseil,  ce  telegramme  urgent  envoye 


04  PAGES  D  HISTOIRE 

de  Nich  aujourd'hui  a  a  h.  lo  dans  rapr^s-midi. 
«  Le  Gouvcrnement  de  FAutriche-Hongric  a 
declare  la  guerre  aujourd'hui,  a  midi,  par  un 
telegramme  en  clair  adress^  au  Gouvernement 
serbe.  »  «  Pachitch.  » 

En  portant  a  votre  connaissance  I'acte  qu'une 
grande  Puissance  a  eu  le  triste  courage  de  com- 
mettre  vis-a-vis  d'un  petit  pays  slave  qui  vient 
a  I)eine  de  sortir  d'une  longue  serie  de  luttes 
aussi  heroiques  qu'epuisantes,  je  prends  la  liberie, 
en  une  circonstance  si  grave  pour  mon  pays,  d'ex- 
primer  I'espoir  que  cct  acte,  qui  brise  la  paix  de 
TEurope  et  re  volte  sa  conscience,  sera  r^jirouve 
par  tout  le  monde  civilise  et  severement  puni 
par  la  Russie,  protectrice  de  la  Serbie. 

Je  j)rie  Votre  Excellence  de  vouloir  bien  porter 
devant  le  tr6ne  deSaMajeste  cette  priere  de  tout 
le  peuple  serbe  et  de  vouloir  bien  agreer  I'assu- 
rance  de  mon  devouement  et  de  mon  respect* 

Veuillez,  etc. 


N«  48 


M.  S.  D.  SazonoWt  ministre  des  Affaires  etran- 
geres  russe^  a  M,  le  Jy  Spalaikovitch,  ministre 
de  Serbie  a  Petrograd, 

Petrograd,  le  17/30  juillet  1914. 

Monsieur  le  Ministre, 
J'ai  eu  Thonneur  de  recevoir  votre  lettre  du 
15/28  juillet,  n^  527,  par  laquelle  vous  avez  bien 
voulu  me  communiquer  le  telegramme  de  Son 


LES  POURPARLERS   DIPLOMATIQUES  65 

Excellence  M.  N.  Pachitch  au  sujet  de  la  cle'cla- 
ration  de  guerre  de  I'Autriche  -  Honiifrie  a  la 
Serbie.  En  regrettant  sincerement  ce  triste  ev^- 
nement,  je  m  empresse  de  vous  informer,  Mon- 
sieur le  Mini^rtt^,  que  je  ne  manquerai  pas  de 
soumettre  a  Sa  Majesie  TErapereur  la  demand© 
du  peuple  serbe,  dont  vous  etes  Tinterprele. 
Veuillez,  etc. 


N»  49 


M,  N.  Pachitchy  president  du  Conseil  et  minisire 
des  Affaires  elrangereSj  a  M.  le  D'  Jovanovitch» 
charge  d'affaires  a  Berlin. 

(T^legramme.)  Nich,  le  22  juilIet/4  aoul  1914. 

Je  vous  prie  d'informer  le  Gouvernement  impe- 
rial que  vous  avez  regu  Tordre  de  quitter  TAlle- 
magne  avec  le  personnel  de  la  legation  et  du 
consulat.  Je  vous  prie  de  partir  saus  retard. 


N«  50 


.  Le  Ministere  des  Affaires  etrangeres  serbe 
a  la  Legation  d'Allemagne  a  Nich, 

Nich,  le  24  juillet/6  aoui  1914. 

Le  Ministere  royal  des  Affaires  etrangeres  a 
Thonneur  d'informer  la  Legation  imperiale  d'Al- 

5 


66  PAGES  b*HISTOIRE 

lemagne  que,  vu  I'etat  de  guerre  existant  entre 
la  Serbie  et  rAutriche-Hongrie,  alliee  de  I'AUe- 
magne,  ainsi  que  I'etat  de  guerre  existant  entre 
la  Russie  et  rAllemagne,  alliee  de  rAutriche- 
Hongrie,  le  Gouvernement  royal  serbe,  se  soli- 
darisant  avec  la  Russie  et  ses  allies,  consid^re 
comme  terminee  la  mission  en  Serbie  de  Son 
Excellence  le  baron  Griesinger,  envoye  extraor- 
dinaire et  ministre  plenipotentiaire  d'Allemagne. 
II  prie  Son  Excellence  de  quitter,  avec  le  person- 
nel de  la  legation,  le  territoire  de  la  Serbie  et 
lui  remet  ci-joint  les  passeports  necessaires. 


N*  51 

M.  le  ly  JoQanoQitchf  charge  d'affaires  a  Berlin , 
d  M,  Pachltch,  president  du  Conseil  et  ministre 
des  Affaires  etrang-^res. 

Berlin,  le  24  juillet/6  aout  1914. 

Lors  de  la  visite  que  j'ai  faite  au  sous-secre- 
taire d  Etat,  M.  Zimmermann,  pour  lui  notifier  la 
rupture  des  rapports  diplomatiques,  il  m*a,  entre 
autres  choses,  declare  que  rAllemagne  avait  tou- 
jours  ete  animee  de  sentiments  amicaux  envers 
la  Serbie  et  qu'elle  regrettait  que  les  relations 
entre  la  Serbie  et  I'AUemagne,  a  cause  des  com- 
binaisons  politiques,  dussent  etre  rompues.  II 
tient  la  Russie,  qui  a  sans  cesse  excite  la  Serbie, 
pour  seule  responsable  des  evenements  qui  sont 
survenus  et  qui  auront  de  lourdes  consequences 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  67 

pour  tous  les  peuples.  Si  la  Russie  n'avait  pas, 
au  dernier  moment,  alors  qu'il  paraissait  deja 
possible  d  eviter  un  conflit  arme,  mobilise  toute 
sa  force  militaire,  on  n'en  serait  pas  arrive  a  la 
guerre,  car  TAlIemagne.  avait  use  de  toute  son 
influence  sur  I'Autriche-Hongrie  pour  qu*elle 
s'enlendit  avee  la  Russie.  Peut-etre  I'Autriche- 
Hongrie  se  serait-elle  contentee  d'occuper  Bel- 
grade, et  alors  des  negociations  se  seraient  enga- 
gees  dans  le  but  de  regler  les  rapports  austro- 
serbes. 


N^-  52 


M.  JoQ.  M:  Jos^anovitch,  ministre  a  Vienne^  a 
AI.  jV.  Paclutch,  president  du  Conseil  et  mi- 
nistre des  Affaires  e tr anger es, 

Nich,  le  3/16  aout  1914. 

Monsieur  le  President, 

Depuis  le  i7/3o  juin,  la  legation  de  Serbia  a 
Vienne  a  ete  assiegee  par  la  police  et  la  gendar- 
merie, et  son  personnel  soumis  sans  cesse  a  la  sur- 
veillance des  fonctionnaires  de  la  Surete.  Nos 
mouvements  et  nos  communications  avee  le 
monde  exterieur  furent  rendus,  com  me  vous 
pouvez  le  penser,  considerablement  plus  diffi- 
cilcs;  Tattitude  de  la  rue  avait  quelque  chose  de 
mena^ant  envei^s  la  legation  et  son  personnel. 

Des  le  commencement  du  mois  de  juillet,  m^me 
les  communications  telegraphiques  avee  vous  de- 
yinrent  plus  dil'ficiles  et  les  evenements  se  sont 


68  PAGES  d'HISTOIRE 

developpes  si  vite  que  je  n'ai  pas  pu  vous  com- 
muniquer  certains  details  relatifs  a  ce  qui  a  pre- 
cede notre  con  flit  arme  avec  rAutriche-Hongrie. 
Cast  pourquoi  je  le  fais  maintenant. 

Jusqu'a  la  fin  du  mois  de  juin,  il  parut  que 
toute  FalFaire  de  Serajevo  se  developpait  normale- 
ment.  Mais  au  commencement  du  mois  de  juillet 
un  revirement  s'opera.  II  n'y  avait  pas  de  signes 
patents  de  ce  revirement :  c'etaient  plutot  des  in- 
dices et  des  symptomes  imprecis  qui  trahissaient 
certaines  intentions  dissimulees.  Tout  d'abord,  les 
journaux  de  Vienne  et  de  Budapest,  sur  les  ins- 
tructions du  Bureau  de  la  presse  du  ministere 
des  Ailaires  etrangeres,  suspendirent  la  publica- 
tion des  informations  sur  le  cours  de  Tinstruc- 
tion  au  sujet  de  I'attentat  de  Serajevo.  Cette 
meme  presse  commen^a  a  representer  toute  Taf- 
faire  comme  une  question  qui  devait  ^tre  reglee 
cntre  la  Serbie  et  TAutriche-Hongrie,  eventuelle- 
ment  par  la  force  des  armes 

D'ailleurs,  les  grands  journaux  de  Vienne  rece- 
vaient  des  communications  .pareilles  provenant 
de  Tambassade  d'Allemagne;  exception  doit  etre 
faite  pour  le  aemi-ofriciei  Fremdenblatt  qui  etait, 
en  general,  plus  modere,  comme  aussi  pour  la 
Zeit  et  VArbeiier  Zeitang. 

A  cette  nouvelle  attitude  de  la  presse,  vint 
s'ajouter  un  etat  d'insecurite  de  la  Bourse  tel 
qu'on  n'en  avait  pas  connu  de  pareil  durant  tout  le 
cours  des  derniei^  evenements  dans  les  Balkans. 
Dans  les  conversations  privees  des  hauts  cercles 
financiers,  on  denon^ait  le  «  compte  a  regler  avec 
la  Serbie  »,  comme  la  seule  issue  de  la  crise  gene- 
rale,  financiere  et  economique,  ou  TAutriche- 
Hongrie  etait  entree  depuis  I'annexion  de  la  Bos- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPL0MATIQUE3  69 

ni(3-HerzegoVine.  Puis,  par  une  circulaire  secrete, 
on  ordonaa  le  retrait  graduel  de  la  monnaie  d'or 
et  en  meme  temps  la  hausse  graduelle  de  son 
cours.  On  ne  tarissait  pas  d' explications  sur  I'in- 
terruption  du  conge  du  ministre  de  la  Guerre 
Krobatin  rt  du  chef  d'etat-major  Hoetzendorf,  sur 
leur  retour  et  leur  sejour  a  Vienne.  Le  chef 
d'etat-major  general  etait  tantot  dans  le  Slid, 
tantot  dans  TEst,  tantot  dans  le  Nord  de  la  Mo- 
narchic, ou  il  se  rencontrait  avec  le  chef  d'etat- 
major  allemand,  comte  de  Moltke,  en  Boheme,  a 
Karlsl^ad,  je  crois. 

Tous  les  reservistes,  qui  avaient  ele  convoques 
pour  les. manoeuvres  de  juin  en  Bosnie-Herzego- 
vine,  furent  maintenus  sous  les  drapeaux.  Les 
soldats  des  cadres  en  Autriche  et  en  Hongrie 
obtenaient  ^n  nombre  beaucoup  plus  conside- 
rable que  d'ordinaire  de  courtes  permissions 
dans  le  but  de  terminer  les  travaux  des  champs 
et  autres,  et  les  reservistes  charges  des  services 
administi'atifs  dans  I'armee  elaient  convoques  de 
plus  en  plus.  Ajoutez  les  interpellations  au  Par- 
lement  hongrois  et  les  reponses  ambigues  du 
president  du  Conseil,  le  comte  Tisza,  un  homme 
d'Etat  qui,  j usque-la,  avait  ete  tres  clair  dans  ses 
declarations  politiques. 

L' attitude  du  Ballplatz  fut  la  plus  caracteris- 
tique.  Les  receptions  hebdomadaires  chez  le 
comte  Berchtold  furent  suspendues.  Tout  d'un 
coup,  les  conversations  au  sujet  de  I'evenement 
de  Serajevo  avec  les  representants  des  Etats  etran- 
gers  cesserent,  ou,  lorsqu'on  en  parlait,  c'etait 
toujours  com  me  par  ordre  et  pour  dissiper  la 
crainte  ou  le  doute  que  TAutriche-Hongrie  pre- 
parat  une  action  serieuse  contre  la  Serbie.  On  y 


70  PAGES  D*HISTOmE 

avouait  que  certaines  demarches  seraient  faites 
a  Belgrade  des  que  les  resultats  de  Tinstruction 
ouverte  au  sujet  de  Tattentat  de  Serajevo  en 
auraient  suffisamment  prouve  les  attaches  avec 
Belgrade.  Mais,  en  meme  temps,  on  disait  que 
ces  demarches  ne  seraient  pas  telles  qu  on  diit 
s'en  inquieter  beaucoup.  L'ambassadeur  de  Rus- 
sie  qui,  en  Fabsence  du  comte  Berchtold,  avait 
plusieurs  Ibis  cause  a  ce  sujet  avec  le  comte  For- 
gach,  n'a  jamais  pu  saisir  les  veritables  inten- 
tions de  FAutriche-Hongrie.  M.  Schebeko  m'a  dit 
que  le  comte  Szapary,  ambassadeur  d'Autriche- 
Hongrie  a  Petrogi^d,  qui,  pour  des  raisons  de 
famille,  se  trouvait  en  Autriche-Hongrie,  lui 
avait  dit  que  les  demarches  qui  seraient  faites  a 
Belgrade  auraient  le  caractere  conciiiant.  Le 
"Comtej  d'apres  les  dires  de  M.  Schebeko  a 
M.  Sazonow,  a  donne  I'assurance  que  la  note  que 
TAutriche-Hongrie  avait  Fintention  d'adresser  a 
la  Serbie  serait  telle  que  les  Russes  n'en  seraient 
pas  mecontents.  M.  Dumaine,  ambassadeur  de 
France,  qui,  sur  Fordre  de  son  Gouvernement, 
avait  attire  Fattention  du  Gouvernement  de 
Vienne  sur  les  complications  qui  pourraient  sur- 
gir  au  cas  ou  les  reclamations  eventuelles  qu'on 
avait  Fintention  d'adresser  a  la  Serbie  ne  seraient 
pas  moderees,  rcQut  du  baron  Macchio,  premier 
chef  de  section  au  ministere  des  Allaires  etran- 
geres,  la  reponse  que  le  Gt^^vernement  austro- 
hongrbis  appreciait  les  demarches  amicales  et 
conciliantes  de  la  France  et  que  les  conditions  de 
la  note  a  la  Serbie  seraient  de  nature  a  ^tr 
acceptees  par  celle-ci  sans  grande  hesitation.  Je 
fis  remarquer  aux  ambassadeurs  des  puissances 
de  la  Triple-Entente  que  de  telles  assurances  pou- 


LES  POURPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  71 

vaient  cacher  les  vraies  intentions  du  Gouveme- 
ment  austro-hongrois  afin  de  mettre  les  puis- 
sances devant  certains  iaits  accomplis  que  I'Eu- 
rope  serait  obligee  d'accepter  pour  eviter  une 
guerre  gene  rale. 

Cependant,  les  precedes  du  Ballplatz  eurent 
un  certain  succes,  car  tous  mes  collegues,  que 
j'eus  I'occasion  de  voir  ces  jours-la,  croyaient  a 
peine  que  T Autriche-Hongrie  vouliit  entreprendre 
une  action  serieuse  qui  put  provoquer  des  com- 
plications europeennes.  Plusieurs  membres  du 
corps  diplomatique  etaient  si  confiants  que,  ces 
jours-la,  ils  faisaient  des  preparatils  pour  leur 
depart  en  long  conge  ou  dans  les  villes  d'eaux. 

Malgre  tout,  on  savait  qu/on  preparait  au  mi- 
nistere  une  note  qui  contiendrait  les  griefs  et  les 
reclamations  de  I'Autriche-Hongrie  contre  la 
Serbie.  Ce  travail  fut  confie  au  comte  Forgach, 
ancien  ministre  d'Autriche-Hongrie  en  Serbie. 
On  croyait  generalement  que,  parrai  les  repr^- 
sentants  etrangers,  seul  I'ambassadeur  d'Alle- 
magne,  M.  Tschirsky,  avait  ete  tenu- au  courant 
de  ce  travail,  et  j'ai  eu  des  raisons  de  croire  qu'il 
a  meme  collabore  a  la  redaction  de  la  note.  Aussi 
les  representants  des  Etats  qui  nous  etaient  favo- 
rables  etaient-ils  d'accord  avec  moi  pour  penser 
que,  redigee  par  ces  deux  auteurs,  la  note  con- 
tiendrait des  conditions  tres  dures  pour  la  Ser- 
bie, mais  non  pas  telles  qu'elle  ne  put  les  accep- 
ter. Lorsque  le  texte  de  la  note  fut  public,  ils  en 
furent  tous  surpris,  j)our  ne  pas  dire  constern^s. 

Autant  on  a  fait  mystere  avec  soin  du  contenu 
de  la  note,  autant  on  a  cache  la  date  ou  elle  serait 
presentee.  Le  jour  de  la  remise  de  I'ullimatum  a 
Belgrade,    I'ambassadeur    de  France  euti  a  ce 


78  PAGES  D*HISTOmE 

^ujet»  Tine  longue  conversation  avec  le  premier- 
chef  de  section  au  ministere  des  Affaires  etran- 
g^res,  le  comte  Berchtold  s*etant  trouvedenou- 
veau  a  Ischl.  Or,  le  baron  Macchio  n'avait  pas 
dit  k  M.  Dumaine  que  ce  jour-la,  dans  I'apres- 
midi,  la  note  serait  remise  a  Belgrade  et  que  le 
Lendemain  elle  serait  publiee  par  les  journaux, 

Lorsque  le  1 1/24  j  uillet,  au  matin,  les  joumaux 
viennois  publierent  le  contenu  de  la  note  que  le 
baron  Giesl  avait  remise  au  Gouvernement  serbe, 
une  inquietude  s'empara  de  nos  amis  et  des  amis 
de  la  paix  europeeiine.  G'est  alors  seulement 
qu'on  coraprit  que  de  grands  evenements  euro- 
peens  pourraient  survenir,  bien  qu'on  ne  crut 
pas  que  le  Gouvernement  austro-hongrois  eut 
Tintention  de  les  i^rovoquer.  Ce  sentiment  fut 
fortifi«  par  les  violents  articles  de  tous  les  jour- 
naux  de  Vienne,  excepte  le  Zeit  et  VArbeiter 
Zeitiing,  ainsi  que  par  les  demonstrations  de  la 
rue  qui  prouvaient  d'une  fa^on  evidente  que  la 
guerre  bien  entendu  une  guerre  contre  la  Ser- 
bie,  —  serait  la  solution  la  plus  desirable. 

Apres  deux,  trois  conversations  que  j'ai  cues 
ce  jour-la,  je  me  suis  rendu  compte  qu'un  conllit 
arme  entre  la  Serbie  et  la  Monaivhie  etuit  inevi- 
table, m^me  au  cas  ou  la  Serbie  accepterait  tou- 
tes  les  conditions  austro-hongroises,  de  la  pre- 
miere a  la  derniere.  L'attitude  de  la  rue  erivers 
notre  legation  etait  deja  telle  que  je  m'attendais 
m^me  a  des  voies  de  fait  contre  le  personnel  de 
la  legation. 

L'ambassadeur  de  France  aussi  bien  que  celui 
d*Angloterre,  et  le  charge  d*all*aires  de  Russia 
considererent  que  la  demarche  du  Gouverne- 
ffienl  austro-hongrois  etait,  non  x>as  une  simple 


UES  POUnPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  73 

note,  mais  un  ultimatum.  lis  furent  indignes  de 
la  forme  aussi  bien  que  du  fond  et  du  delai 
fixe  par  la  note,  et  ils  la  jugerent,  eux  aussi, 
inacceptable.   Dans  les   convei^sations    que   j*a:i 
eues  avec  eux  au  sujet  de  cette  note,^  je  leur 
exj)liquai  qu'en  particulier  les  passages  relatifs 
a  I'ordre  du  jour  du  Roi  a  I'armee,  a  la  destitu- 
tion des  fonctionnaires  et  officiers,  et  surtout  k 
la  participation  des  fonctionnaires  austro-hon- 
grois  a  la  «  repression  du  mouvement  existant 
en  Serbie  contre  Tintegrite  de  la  Monarchic  »,ne 
pourraient  absolument  pas  ^tre  acceptes,  etant 
contraires  a  la  dignite  et  a  la  souverainete  natio- 
nales.  Ce  n'est  qu'une  guerre  victorieuse,  dis-je, 
qui  x>ourrait  amener  Taeceptation  de  conditions 
aussi  humiliantes  poiir  un  pays  independant.  A 
leur  question  :  s 'il  ne  valait  pas  mieux  les  accep- 
ter pour  le   moment  et  eviter  la  guerre,  j'ai 
repondu  que  la  note  austro-hongroise,  qui  en  fait 
^tait  une  declaration  de  guerre  a  la  Serbie,  etait 
redigee  de  fa^on  que,  m^me  au  cas  ou  la  Serbie 
I'aurait  acceptee  sans  aucune  reserve,  I'Autricha- 
Hongrie  y  aurait  trouve  a  tout  instant  des  motifs 
pour  faire   entrer  ses  troupes   en  Serbie.  G'est 
dans  la  conviction  que  le  conflit  resterait  iimite 
a   nous  deux    qu'elle  .  avait    redige    une  telle 
note. 

M.  Dumaine,  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen  et  le  prince 
KoudacheflV  charge  d'allaires  russe,  furent  sur- 
pris  de  cette  note  inattendue,  autant  qu  inquiets 
des  complications  qu'elle  mena^ait  d'amener. 
Avant  la  remise  de  la  note  austro-hongroise, 
M.  Schebeko,  ambassadeur  de  Russie,  avait  dit 
a  plusieurs  reprises  a  ses  collegues  que  la  Russie 
ne  pourrait  pas  rester  indiiferente  a  une  demarche 


74  PAGES  D*HIST0IRE 

de  TAutriche-Hongrie  qui  tendrait  k  humilier  la 
Serbie.  Cette  opinion,  ii  Tjivait  ouvertement  ex- 
primee  au  Ballplatz.  D'ou,  Finqui^tude  chez  les 
ambassadeurs  qui  envisageaient  la  possibilite 
d'une  ftueri^  entre  la  Russie  et  TAutriche-Hon- 
grie. 

Le  lendemain  du  jour  ou  la  note  fut  remise  a 
Belgrade,  le  prince  Koudacheff  alia  en  parler  au 
comte  Berchtold.  A  sa  declaration  que  la  note, 
telle  quelle,  etait  inaccep table  et  que  la  Russie  ne 
pouvait  pas  regarder  avec  indifference  une  humi-, 
liation  de  la  Serbie,  le  comte  Berchtold  repondit 
que  TAutriche-Hongrie  s'etait  trouvee  forcee  de 
faire  une  telle  d-marche  en  SerbiCj  son  existence 
mdme  etant  mise  en  question,  que  rAutriclie- 
Hongriene  pourrait  jms  renoncer  a  ses  demarches 
ni  changer  les  conditions  de  la  note,  et  qu^elle  esti- 
mait  que  ce  differend  ne  regardait  que  la  Serbie 
et  r Autriche-Hongrie,  c'est-a-dire  qu'aucune  autre 
puissance  n*avait  de  raisons  de  s'en  meler. 

Cette  r^ponse  du  comte  Bei^chtold  ne  laissait 
pas  de  doutes  sur  I'intention  de  I'Autriche-Hon- 
grie  d'infliger  une  correction  ^  niain  armee  k  la 
Serbie,  sans  jugement  de  FEurope  Fy  autorisant. 
Des  conversations  que  j'ai  cues  alors  avec  les 
ambassadeurs  des  puissances  de  la  Triple-En- 
tente, —  qui,  durant  ces  jours  penibles,  furent  k 
tous  egards  accoeillants  et  bienveillants  envers 
moi  et  envers  le  personnel  de  la  legation,  —  il 
ressortait  clairement  que,  du  moment  ou  ell« 
s'etait  decidee  k  adresser  cette  note  qui  signifiait 
sans  aucun  doute  la  guerre,  FAutiiche-Hongrie 
avait  re^u  des  assurances  et  m^me  acquis  la  con- 
viction que  le  conflit  serbo-austro-hongrois  serait 
localise.  De  m^me,  11  6tait  clair  que  FAutriche- 


LES  POUiiPARLERS  DIPLOMATIQUES  75 

Hongrie  avail  ete  confirmee  dans  cette  convic- 
tion particulierement  et  peut-etre  uniquement 
par  M.  Tscliirsky,  ambassadeur  d*Aliemagne  a 
Vienne.  M.  Tschirsky  etait  seul  a  penser  eta  dire 
ouvertement  que  la  Russie  se  tiendrait  tranquille 
pendant  que  rAutriche-Hongrie  infligerait  la  pu- 
nition  {Straf expedition)  a  la  Serbie.  II  assurait 
que  le  ministre  des  Affaires  etrangeres  de  Rus- 
sie viendrait  facilementa  bout  des  panslavistes, 
comme'  I'annee  prec^dente,  et  que  la  Russie 
n'avait  aujourd'hui  aucun  interet  a  soulever  tant 
de  questions  epineuses  qui  latouchent  de  plus 
pres  en  Europe  et  en  Asie.  Selon  lui,  il  etait 
necessaire  qu'une  legon  fut  donnee  a  la  Serbie. 
La  Russie  n'avait  aucun  droit  d'intervenir.  Quant 
a  TAllemagne,  il  declarait  qu'elle  avait  pleine 
conscience  de  ce  qu'elle  faisait,  enappuyantTAu- 
triche-Hongrie  dans  sa  demarche* 

Ge  langage  de  M.  Tschirsky  a  fait  penser  a 
beaucoup  de  personnes  que  c'est  TAUemagne  qui 
a  voulu  provoquer  la  guerre  europeenne,  car, 
bien  auparavant,  on  a  dit  et  mdme  ecrit  a  Vienne 
qu'il  fallait  faire  la  guerre  a  la  Russie  avant 
qu'elle  Cut  prete  au  point  de  vue  militaire, 
c'est-a-dire  avant  le  printemps  de  191 7  ;  «  Plus 
on  remet  TaHaire,  moindres  seront  les  chances 
des  puissances  de  la  Triple- Alliance.  »  Cepen- 
dant,  de  Berlin,  de  sources  diplomatiques,  les 
plus  authentiques  nouvelles  me  parvenaient  que 
la  Wilhelmstrasse  n'approuvait  pas  Taction  de 
TAutriche-Hongrie  dans  cette  question  et  que 
M.  Tschirsky  avait  outrepasse  ses  instructions. 

A  son  re  tour  de  Petrograd,  M.  Schebeko,  am- 
bassadeur de  Russie,  multiplia  ses  efforts  aupres 
du  Ballpjatz,  afin  d'obtenir  prolongation  du  ccurt 


76  PAGES  D*HISTOIRE 

delai  fix^  au  Gouvernement  serbe  pour  sa  re- 
ponse  a-Ja  note  austro-hongroise,  et  de  trouver  le 
moyen  d'arriver  a  un  echange  d'idees  sur  Ten- 
semble  du  diil'erend  entre  Vienne  et  Petro- 
grad;  mais  ces  eftbrts  resterent  sans  s\icc6s  jus- 
qu'au  13/26  juillet,  jour  de  notre  entrevue.  Par 
la  conversation  que  j'eus  alors  avec  lui,  je  com- 
pris  qua  Petrograd  ia  note  austro-hongroise  ^tait 
consideree,  dans  le  fond  et  dans  la  forme,  comme 
une  provocation  adressee  k  la  Russie,  non  pas  k 
la  Serbie,  et  que  la  Russie  ne  soull'rirait  pas 
rhumiliation  de  la  Serbie,  dilt-elle  s'exposer  a 
une  guerre. 

Le  jour  de  mon  depart  de  Vienne,  M.  Sch^- 
beko  me  dit  que,  en  depit  de  toutes  les  grandes 
difficultes,  il  y  avait  des  chances  pour  qu'on 
trouvat  a  Petrograd,  entre  le^  Gouvernement 
russe  et  le  comte  Szapary,  une  solution  quel- 
sonque  qui  empdcherait  I'ouverture  du  conflit. 
D'autre  part,  des  que  Ton  apprit  a  Vienne  que 
le  conflit  austro-serbe  pouvait  provoqUer  une 
guerre  entre  la  Russie  et  rAutriche-Hongric,  on 
commenga  a  s'en  inquieter. 


ANNEXE 


Declarations 
de  M.  Giolitti  a  la  Chambre  italienne  \i) 

5  decern  bre  1914- 

«  ...  Comrae  je  tiens  pour  necessaire  que  la 
loyaut^  de  1  Italie  dans  robservation  des  pactes 
internationaux  soit  au-dessus  de  toute  discus- 
sion|  je  me  sens  oblige  de  rappeler  un  precedent 
qui  demontre  que  T interpretation  donnee  par 
notre  Gouverneraent  a  nos  traites,  au  debut  du 
conflit,  etait  exacte  et  qu'elleaele  admise  comme 
TPaie  par  les  Puissances  alliees  elles-memes. 

«  Au  cours  dela  guerre  balkanique,  precis^- 
ment  le  9  aout  igiS,  etant  absent  de  Rome,  j'ai 
re?u  de  mon  coUegue,  I'bon.  Di  San  Giuliano,  le 
telegramme  suivant  : 

«  L'Autricbe  nous  a  communique,  ainsi  qu'a 
«  FAllemagne,    son  intention  d'agir   contre  la 


(1}  II  semble  qu'il  yait  egalement  eu  une  demarche  syme- 
trique  de  I'Autiiche  aupres  de  la  Roumanie  f»n  mai  1913. 
M.  Take  lon^^s^.o  a  lormellement  declare  qu'il  en  avail  trace 
dans  un  ttlegramme  adresse  par  le  comte  Beichtuld  au 
prince  de  Kiiifeienherg  et  communique  par  lui  au  chef  da 
Gouvernement  roumaiu.  Les  dementis  officieux  anxquiels 
cette  r6vehit  on  a  donne  lieu  de  la  pan  de  i'Autriche  ne  nous 
permetteni  pas  de  lui  donner  place  dans  ce  recueil  sour 
fonne  d'un  lextc  olficiel. 


78  PAGES  D'HISTOIRE 

*  SerLie  et  elle  defmit  cette  action  une  action 
«  defensive,  esperant  appliquer  a  la  Triple-Al- 

*  liance  le  casus  foederis,  que  je  crois  inappli- 
«  cable.  Je  cherche  a  concerter  avec  TAUemagne 
<f  des  ellbrts  en  vue  d'empecher  cette  action 
«  autrichienne ;  mais  il  pourrait  etre  necessaire 
«  de  dire  clairement  que  nous  ne  considerons 
«  pas  cette  action  eventuelle'  comme  defensive  et 
«  que,  par  consequent,  nous  ne  croyons  pas  que 
«  le  casus  foederis  existe.  Je  te  prie  de  me  tele- 
«  graph ier  a  Rome  si  tu  approuves.   » 

«  —  J  ai  repondu  ainsi  : 

«  Si  TAutriche  agit  contre  la  Serbie,  il  est 
«  evident  que  le  casus  Joederis  n'existe  pas. 
«  Cest  une  action  qu'elle  entreprend  pour  son 
cc  proi>re  compte;  car  il  n'est  pas  question  de  de- 
«  fense,  puisque  personne  ne  songe  a  Tattaquer. 
«  II  est  necessaire  que  cela  soit  declare  a  TAu- 
«  triche  de  la  fa<;on  la  plus  formelle  et  il  est  a 
«  souhaiter  que  Taction  de  TAllemagne  dissuade 
«  I'Autriche  de  cette  perilleuse  aventure.  » 

t  Cest  ce  qui  fut  fait;  et  I'interpretation  don- 
«  n^e  par  nous  eut  le  consentement  de  nos  allies 
«  avec  lesquels  nos  rapports  d'amitie  ne  furent 
«  pas  le  moins  du  monde  troubles.  La  declara- 
«  tion  de  neutralite  faite  au  debut  du  present 
«  conflit  est  done  conforme  a  I'esprit  et  a  la 
«  lettre  des  traites.  J'ai  voulu  rappeler  ce  fait 
«  parce  que  je  juge  utile  qu'il  apparaisse  aux 
«  yeux  de  toute  TEurope  que  lltalie  a  ete  com- 
«  pletement  loyale.  » 


NANCY-PARIS.   —  IMPRIMERIS  BERCyER-LEVRAULT 


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